K Answers

AT Framework

Definitions

Resolved means to be determined

Collins English Dictionary no date (http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/resolved)

resolved (rɪˈzɒlvd Pronunciation for resolved) Definitions adjective fixed in purpose or intention; determined

We are resolved to affirm biometric consciousness – resolved doesn't have to be a legal action

Merriam Webster no date (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve)

resolve verb re·solve \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ : to find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something) : to make a definite and serious decision to do something

The USFG is a representational government where the citizens shape the policy being created

Encyclopedia Britannica no date (http://www.britannica.com/topic/representation-government)

Representational government: representation, in government, a method or process of enabling the citizenry, or some of them, to participate in the shaping of legislation and governmental policy through deputies chosen by them. The rationale of representative government is that in large modern countries the people cannot all assemble, as they did in the marketplace of democratic Athens or Rome; and if, therefore, the people are to participate in government, they must select and elect a small number from among themselves to represent and to act for them. In modern polities with large populations, representation in some form is necessary if government is to be based on the consent of the governed. Elected representatives are also less likely to reflect the transitory political passions of the moment than are the people, and thus they provide greater stability and continuity of policy to a government. Through the course of long historical evolution, various methods and devices have been developed in attempts to solve the many problems that have arisen in connection with representation. These problems include the qualifications of electors (see suffrage); the apportionment of constituencies (see constituency); apportionment (electoral); the basis of election (see plurality system; proportional representation); methods of nominating candidates (see primary election); and means of ascertaining the wishes of electors (see referendum and initiative). Because of the need to formulate systematically the demands of citizens, political parties have come to act as intermediaries between the citizens and their representatives. Political debate along party lines has thus become a characteristic feature of most representative systems of government. How answerable a representative should be to his electors is an issue that has long been debated. The basic alternatives are that the representatives of the people act as delegates carrying out instructions or that they are free agents, acting in accordance with their best ability and understanding. The representative principle is not limited to government: it is applied in electing executive officers of large social organizations such as trade unions and professional associations.

Roleplaying Bad

Cycles of oppression—standards like switch side debate and roleplaying promote a disinterested approach to argumentation where we sever ourselves from our in round representations and make it possible to advocate for ideas that are bad or ideas that we don't legitimately have an interest in solving. Interrogations of structures of power from a standpoint of the oppressed are key to challenge US exceptionalism. Professor William V. Spanos sat in on a policy debate round and stated that….(begin reading card)

Spanos 6 [Spanos, William V. Prof of Comparative Literature at SUNY Binghamton. (quoted by Joe Miller in Cross-x, and posted on edebate and cross-x.com, http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?t=945110)

Dear Joe Miller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then --and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about "objectivity" has crept into the "philosophy of debate" -- that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn't matter which position you take on an issue -- say, the United States' unilateral wars of preemption -- as long as you "score points". The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an "exceptionalist" America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its "errand in the wilderness." That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it. And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, to assume, as the protocols of debate do, that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not "disinterested." It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the "democratic" institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language if "truth," far from being "disinterested" or "objective" as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of "others." This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him [We] should call into question the traditional "objective" debate protocols and the instrumentalist language they privilege in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death matter[s]. I am very much aware that the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush administration -- judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. learned their "disinterested" argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed. This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. A revolution in the debate world must occur. It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena where positions make a difference. To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of "deterring democracy" (in Noam Chomsky's ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the blind arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

Under a detached worldview, the world must be represented according to an image of thought. This reduces life to objects on the game board of life, like Nazi doctors.

Makau 96 (Josina M., Western Michigan University, Hampton Press, Inc. Responsible Communication, Argumentation Instruction in the Face of Global Perils) 1996

Weisel's critique of German education prior to world war II points to another danger of traditional argumentation instruction **. Like the Nazi doctors, students in traditional argumentation courses are taught "how to reduce life and the mystery of life to abstraction."** Weisel urges educators to teach students what the Nazi doctors never learned – that people are not abstractions. Weisel urges educators to **learn from the Nazi experience the importance of humanizing their charges, of teaching students to view life as special, 'with its own secrets, its own treasures, its own sources of anguish and with some measure of triumph.' Trained as technocrats with powerful sensory skills but little *understanding,* students** participating in traditional argumentation courses would have difficulty either grasping or appreciating the importance of Weisel's critique. Similarly, they would **have difficulty grasping or appreciating** Christian's framework for **an ethic** of technology an approach **that requires** above all, **openness, trust and care**. The notion of conviviality would be particularly alien to these trained technocrats.

Traditionally trained debaters are also likely to fail to grasp the complexity of issues. **Trained to view problems in black and white terms and conditioned to turn to "expertise" for solutions, students, and traditional courses become subject to ethical blindness.** As Benhabib noted, 'Moral blindness implies not necessarily an evil or unprincipled person, but one who can not see the moral texture of the situation confronting him or her.' These traditional **debaters**, deprived of true dialogic encounter, **fail to develop** 'the capacity to represent' to themselves **the 'multiplicity of viewpoints, the variety of perspectives, the layers of meaning, etc. which constitute a situation'. They are thus inclined to lack 'the kind of sensitivity to particulars, which most agree is essential for good and perspicacious judgment.' Encouraging student to embrace the will to control and to gain mastery, to accept uncritically a sovereign view of power, and to maintain distance from their own and others 'situated ness**; the traditional argumentation course provides an unlikely site for nurturing guardians of our world's precious resources. It would appear, in fact, that **the argumentation course foster precisely the 'aggressive and manipulative intellect bred by modern science and discharged into the administration of things' associated with most of the world's human made perils**. And is therefore understandable that feminist and others critics would write so harshly of traditional argumentation of debate.

Their form of detached roleplaying displaces individual identity to that of authority. When we imagine that we're the government, we turn people into statistics, and it becomes a legitimate practice to engage in apocalyptic or dehumanizing rhetoric—Stanford Prison Experiment proves this

Reed 5 [Reed et al, Director of Command and Leadership Studies, U.S. Army War College, 2005 [Professor George E., Guy B. Adams, Professor, Public Affairs, University of Missouri-Columbia, Danny L. Balfour, Professor, Public and Nonprofit Administration, Grand Valley State University, "Putting Cruelty First: Abu Ghraib, Administrative Evil and Moral Inversion," Paper prepared for presentation to "Ethics and Integrity of Governance: A Transatlantic Dialogue," Leuven, Belgium, June 2-5, 2005 http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/ethics/paper/Paper%20WS5_pdf/Guy%20Adams.pdf, 24-28]

Total guard aggression increased daily, even after prisoners had ceased any resistance and deterioration was visible. Prisoner rights were redefined as privileges, to be earned by obedient behavior. The experiment was planned for two weeks, but was terminated after six days. Five prisoners were released because of extreme emotional depression, crying, rage and/or acute anxiety. Guards forced the prisoners to chant filthy songs, to defecate in buckets that were not emptied, and to clean toilets with their bare hands. They acted as if the prisoners were less than human and so did the prisoners (Haney, Banks and Zimbardo, 1973, p.94): At the end of only six days we had to close down our mock prison because what we saw was frightening. It was no longer apparent to us or most of the subjects where they ended and their roles began. The majority had indeed become "prisoners" or "guards," no longer able to clearly differentiate between role-playing and self. There were dramatic changes in virtually every aspect of their behavior, thinking and feeling. In less that a week, the experience of imprisonment undid (temporarily) a lifetime of learning; human values were suspended, self-concepts were challenged, and the ugliest, most base, pathological side of human nature surfaced. We were horrified because we saw some boys ("guards") treat other boys as if they were despicable animals, taking pleasure in cruelty, while other boys ("prisoners") became servile, dehumanized robots who thought only of escape, of their own individual survival, and of their mounting hatred of the guards. This experiment suggests that group and organizational roles and social structures play a far more powerful part in everyday human behavior than most of us would consider. And we can see clearly how individual morality and ethics can be swallowed and effectively erased by social roles and structures. One is rarely confronted with a clear, up-or-down decision on an ethical issue; rather, a series of small, usually ambiguous choices are made, and the weight of commitments and of habit drives out morality. One does not have to be morally degenerate to become caught in a web of wrongdoing that may even cross the line into evil. The skids are further greased if the situation is defined or presented as technical, or calling for expert judgment, or is legitimated, either tacitly or explicitly, by organizational authority, as we shall see below. It becomes an even easier choice if the immoral behavior has itself been masked, redefined through a moral inversion as the "good" or "right" thing to do. Administrative Evil and Dehumanization The Stanford prison experiment provides a fairly powerful explanation for at least some of what happened at Abu Ghraib. But it also does not fully fit the specifics of the situation. Unlike the Stanford experiments, the guards did not act in an isolated and controlled environment, but were part of a larger organizational structure and political environment. They interacted regularly with all sorts of personnel, both directly and indirectly involved with the prisoners. They were in a remarkably chaotic environment, were by and large poorly prepared and trained for their roles, and were faced with both enormous danger and ambiguity. However, like the Stanford Prison Experiment, tacit permission was available to those who chose to accept it. In his ground-breaking book, The Destruction of the European Jews, Raul Hilberg observed that a consensus for and the practice of mass murder coalesced among German bureaucrats in a manner that (Hilberg, 1985, p.55), "…was not so much a product of laws and commands as it was a matter of spirit, of shared comprehension, of consonance and synchronization." In another study of mid-level bureaucrats and the Holocaust, Christopher Browning describes this process in some detail as he also found that direct orders were not needed for key functionaries to understand the direction that policy was to take (Browning, 1992, pp. 141-142): Instead, new signals and directions were given at the center, and with a ripple effect, these new signals set in motions waves that radiated outward… with the situations they found themselves in and the contacts they made, these three bureaucrats could not help but feel the ripples and be affected by the changing atmosphere and course of events. These were not stupid or inept people; they could read the signals, perceive what was expected of them, and adjust their behavior accordingly… It was their receptivity to such signals, and the speed with which they aligned themselves to the new policy, that allowed the Final Solution to emerge with so little internal friction and so little formal coordination If something as horrific and systematic as the Holocaust could be perpetrated

based more on a common understanding than upon direct orders, it should not be difficult to imagine how abuse of detainees in Iraq and elsewhere occurred, with otherwise unacceptable behaviors substituting for ambiguous, standard operating procedures. While the Nazi Holocaust was far, far worse than anything that has happened during the American occupation of Iraq, it has been amply demonstrated that Americans are not immune to the types of social and organizational conditions that make it possible and seemingly permissible to violate the boundaries of morality and human decency, in at least some cases, without believing that they were doing anything wrong. It would be naïve to assume that the "few bad apples" acted alone, and that others in the system did not share and support the abuses as they went about their routines and did their jobs. Before and surrounding overt acts of evil, there are many more and much less obviously evil administrative activities that lead to and support the worst forms of human behavior. Moreover, without these instances of masked evil, the more overt and unmasked acts are less likely to occur (Staub, 1992, pp. 20-21). The apparent willingness and comfort level with taking photos and to be photographed while abusing prisoners seems to reflect the "normalcy" of the acts within the context of at least the night shift on Tiers 1A and 1B at Abu Ghraib (and is hauntingly similar to photos of atrocities sent home by SS personnel in World War II). In the camps and prisons run by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, orders and professional standards forbidding the abuse of prisoners and defining the boundaries of acceptable behavior for prison guards could be found in at least some locations posted on some walls, but were widely ignored by the perpetrators. Instead, we find a high stress situation, in which the expectation was to It would be naïve to assume that the "few bad apples" acted alone, and that others in the system did not share and support the abuses as they went about their routines and did their jobs. Before and surrounding overt acts of evil, there are many more and much less obviously evil administrative activities that lead to and support the worst forms of human behavior. Moreover, without these instances of masked evil, the more overt and unmasked acts are less likely to occur (Staub, 1992, pp. 20-21). The apparent willingness and comfort level with taking photos and to be photographed while abusing prisoners seems to reflect the "normalcy" of the acts within the context of at least the night shift on Tiers 1A and 1B at Abu Ghraib (and is hauntingly similar to photos of atrocities sent home by SS personnel in World War II). In the camps and prisons run by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, orders and professional standards forbidding the abuse of prisoners and defining the boundaries of acceptable behavior for prison guards could be found in at least some locations posted on some walls, but were widely ignored by the perpetrators. Instead, we find a high stress situation, in which the expectation was to extract usable intelligence from detainees in order to help their comrades suppress a growing insurgency, find weapons of mass destruction, and prevent acts of terrorism. In this context, the power of group dynamics, social structures, and organizational ambiguities is readily seen. The normal inhibitions that might have prevented those who perpetrated the abuses from doing these evil deeds may have been further weakened by the shared belief that the prisoners were somehow less than human, and that getting information out of them was more important than protecting their rights and dignity as human beings. For example, in an interview with the BBC on June 15, 2004, Brig. General Janis Karpinski stated that she was told by General Geoffrey Miller – later placed in charge of Iraqi prisons and former commander at Guantanamo Bay – that the Iraqi prisoners, "...are like dogs and if you allow them to believe at any point that they are more than a dog then you've lost control of them." Just as anti-Semitism was central to the attitudes of those who implemented the policy of mass murder in the Holocaust, the abuses at Abu Ghraib may have been facilitated by an atmosphere that dehumanized the detainees. In effect, these detainees, with their ambiguous legal status, could be seen as a "surplus population," living outside the protections of civilized society (Rubenstein, 1983). And when organizational dynamics combine with a tendency to dehumanize and/or demonize a vulnerable group, the stage is set for the mask of administrative evil.

No reason to prefer role playing over pure discussion- functionally the same for education

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We have several sets of findings. One is that, as expected, either treatment improves performance over lecture alone, holding everything else constant; role play improves total quiz scores by about 2.4 points and discussion by 1.9 (both p < 0.05).23 The effects of each treatment, however, are different. Role play boosts performance in the multiple-choice section of the assessment, and discussion in the short-answer portion. This counters theoretical predictions, which expect that performance on analytical tasks like open-ended response items would improve from the more engaging treatment (simulation). Comparing the two active learning techniques head to head, though, reveals that role-play does not produce significantly larger gains than discussion. The coefficient on the simulation variable is statistically insignificant, though we do note that the sign is contrary to our theoretical expectations. This finding holds even when controlling for major alternative explanations like class year, days since the lecture, intensity of participation in the simulation, and the instructor's teaching experience. We can conclude, then, that both techniques are similarly effective; neither is superior to the other for the types of tasks assessed here. That discussion sections add value to a course is probably not surprising; that is, after all, their primary purpose — not just providing employment for graduate students. Many instructors and scholars are more interested, though, in other types of active-learning methods, such as the role-play activities and simulations. One common concern with integrating role-playing activities into classrooms is that these methods are less efficient, preventing instructors from covering as much material in a given time. Our results suggest that this concern may be unwarranted. Although the groups that participated in the role-play activity did not perform statistically better than the groups that were engaged in a traditional discussion section, the role-play groups also did not perform significantly worse in two out of three evaluations (total quiz score and multiple choice score). The lack of significance may be due to the small size and particular nature of the control group as much as it is to the effect of the activity itself. Activities such as the bureaucratic politics role-playing game may serve to engage students whose learning styles benefit from more active approaches to learning. Unfortunately, we were not able to evaluate the hypothesis that students with different learning styles benefit differently from the two treatments in this experiment. Another hypothesis we were unable to evaluate here is whether active learning approaches, such as simulations, produce a more substantial benefit in the long-term than in short-term. As Meizlish and Bernstein (2003) find, the benefits of active learning methods may be more pronounced in long-term knowledge retention than is demonstrated in a short-term recall instrument as we used. These unanswered questions provide interesting directions for future research.

Radical Thought Good

Radical thought and movement necessary for any form of social reform, empirics prove.
Kutner 15

(Robert Kutner, Co-Founder/Editor of "The American Prospect", professor at Brandeis University, The Dance of Liberals and Radicals, http://prospect.org/article/dance-liberals-and-radicals, March 17 2015)

History shows that liberals need radicals. We need radicals because drastic change against entrenched evil and concentrated power requires personal bravery to the point of obsession. It requires a radical sensibility to look beyond today's limits and imagine what seems sheer impossibility within the current social order. And sometimes it's necessary to break the law to redeem the Constitution. No great social change in America has occurred without radicals, beginning with the struggle to end slavery. Causes that now seem mainstream began with radical, impolite and sometimes civil disobedient protest. Martin Luther King, Jr. was the best sort of radical. His tactics broke what was then the law—flawed, biased, oppressive law. But he was above all affirmative and idealistic. He kept in his mind the kind of society America needed to be, and could be. He appealed to the best in America, bore personal witness and shamed his racist oppressors. MLK braved violence and eventually his own assassination, yet his radicalism was always constructive. Birth control began as a radical movement for which some women went to jail and, astonishingly, contraception is still considered radical in some circles today. The demonstrations against the Vietnam War were at first the work of radical protesters. Only later did they become more mannered and mainstream. Some women today may take for granted rights that never would have been achieved without the radicalism of early feminism and then second-wave feminism. Same with LGBT rights, same with disability rights. Sometimes, outrageous tactics are needed to barge into the chamber of civil debate. Even supposedly mainstream principles such as pure food and drugs, or safe working conditions, began with radical protest. The fact that these principles are being relentlessly undermined by corporate elites suggests the need for continued vigilance and radical protest once again. The labor movement has a long history of necessarily confrontational organizing. And radicals, famously, make the best organizers. Unions were largely illegal until the 1930s, so you could not organize one without breaking the law. (Today, it is corporations that break the law to resist unions).

Radical thought in debate space solves for actual social reform
Universal No Date

(Universal Online Classes, https://www.universalclass.com/articles/psychology/understanding-social-movements.htm Understanding Social Movements)

A. Social Movements: Distinguishing Characteristics

Essentially, social movements are a form of concentrated, preplanned group action. Collectively focused on a specific political or social issue, social movements, also known as social reformation movements, strive to implement, oppose, or reverse social change. Furthermore, social movements are characterized as having a purposeful direction and a good deal of internal order. A social movement is a more or less persistent, organized effort on the part of a relatively large number of people to bring about or resist social change. Take, for instance, the women's movement, referred to in a variety of ways, such as women's liberation, suffrage movement, or women's right advocates. The core group of constituents was made up of women intent upon achieving equal liberties with regard to work, pay, respect, and opportunity. Hence, they were, in fact, working toward reversing some of the previously held stereotypes and beliefs about women while putting forth a new view of how women should and ought to be treated. B. Social Movements: Components. To mount and drive an effective social movement

campaign, combinations of different components are required, including creation of special purpose groups and coalitions to explore possibilities, derive a sense as to the opinion held by the general public, and develop strategies. These groups must determine the steps needed to alter the commonly held perspective, such as public or town hall type meetings, processions, rallies, speeches and demonstrations, petition drives to invoke change, lobbying efforts, educational programs and literature, and an unwavering commitment.

By adopting a form of radical thought, the aff solves for for real change. Fitzgerald 14

(Andy Fitzgerald ,Blogger at the New Public Sphere, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/20/we-need-radicals-for-social-change, January 2014)

America has a propensity for dismissing people and ideas with labels. Terms like "socialist" and "communist" are frequently hurled at those who dare to promote substantial programs that address poverty, or suggest that government provide what many other "developed nations" deem fundamental services – like universal healthcare. Anyone who openly identifies with such positions is assumed to have nothing legitimate to contribute to public debate, irrespective of the plausibility, merit, and true ideology informing their arguments. It's a similar scenario with "radical" – a word often used to evoke associations with extremism, instability and an absolutist approach to politics. But the popular usage belies the important role many radicals have played in promoting democracy and justice throughout history, not to mention the continued role radical ideas and activism have to play in unfinished projects.

A recent op-ed in the Chicago Tribune illustrates the common abuse of the term in the media. The columnist, Dennis Byrne, rightly criticizes a tendency in America to privilege individual liberty over community solidarity, but he then attempts a "balanced" perspective by presenting examples of "radicalism" on both sides of the aisle. On abortion, Byrne writes: "Radical individuals on the right and the left demand the supremacy of a woman's body. … For [those who are pro-choice], a woman's rights are nearly absolute." Squaring the false equivalence circle he adds: "Similar absolutist views are held on the right by those who interpret the Constitution's Second Amendment to mean that government regulation of firearms should be extraordinarily limited, if not nonexistent." But the mischaracterization of radicals extends beyond mainstream media and politics. While discussing feminist activism with several friends, one retorted, "there are radicals in every group". I challenged the presumption that radicals were inherently a liability to social movements, given the positive history of radicalism in America. Indeed, it was "radicals" who were responsible for sowing the seeds of two of America's most important social movements: worker rights and racial justice. The labor movement, in its nascent days, was a radical movement. A confrontational approach to management was necessary to win many of the concessions now sorely taken for granted: the minimum wage, the eight-hour day, even the very possibility of forming a union. Prior to the American civil war, "radical abolitionists" occupied the fringe with the seemingly absurd and absolutist demand that people should not be property. Perhaps its most infamous member, John Brown, attempted to lead an armed slave uprising in the south. His failed raid on an armory in Harpers Ferry, Virginia and subsequent execution for treason are portrayed historically as the act of a madman – an idealistic extremist with delusions of grandeur, despite the fact that it inspired greater opposition to slavery – a portrait sociologist James Loewen properly skewers in his book, Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong.

We must radically change the educational sphere, our performance is an act of liberation, visibility, and empowerment, creating a public space for dissent and challenges

Mohanty 03 [Chandra Talpade, Ph.D. and Master's degree from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, as well as a Master's degree and a bachelor's degree from the University of Delhi in India. Originally a professor of women's studies at Hamilton College in Clinton, New York, she is currently the women's studies department chair at Syracuse University, Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity, Duke University Press p. 205-207]

In the intellectual, political and historical context I have sketched thus far, decolonization as a method of teaching and learning is crucial in envisioning democratic education. My own political project involves trying to connect educational discourse to questions of social justice and the creation of citizens who are able to conceive of a democracy which is not the same as "the free market." **Pedagogy in this context needs to be revolutionary to combat business as usual in educational institutions**. After all, the politics of commodification allows the cooptation of most dissenting voices in this age of multiculturalism. Cultures of dissent are hard to create. **Revolutionary pedagogy needs to lead to a consciousness of injustice, self-reflection on the routines and habits of education in the creation of an "educated citizen," and action to transform one's social space in a collective setting.** In other words, the practice of decolonization as defined above. I turn now to a narrative in the tradition of Toni Cade Bambara, a story that "keeps me alive - a story which saves our lives." The story is about a performance by a student at Hamilton College. Yance Ford, an African American studio art major and feminist activist, based her performance, called "This Invisible World," on her three-plus years as a student at the college." She built an iron cage that enclosed her snugly, suspended it ten feet off the ground in the lobby of the social sciences building, She shaved her head and - barefoot and without a watch, wearing a sheet that she had cut up-spent five hours in the cage in total silence. The performance required unimaginable physical and psychic endurance, and it dramatically transformed a physical space that is usually a corridor between offices and classrooms. It had an enormous impact on everyone walking through - no mundane response was possible. Nor was business as usual possible. It disrupted educational routines - many fac*ulty* (including me) sent their classes to the performance and later attempted discussions that proved profoundly unsettling. For the first time in *my* experience at Hamilton, students, faculty, and staff were faced with a performance that could not be "consumed~ or assimilated as part of the "normal" educational process. We were faced with the knowledge that it was impossible to "know" what led to such a performance, and that the knowledge we had, of black women's history of objectification, of slavery, invisibility, and soon, was a radically inadequate measure of the intent or courage and risk it took for Vance to perform "This Invisible World." ~ In talking at length with Vance, other students, and colleagues, and thinking through the effects of this performance on the campus, I have realized that this is potentially a very effective story. Here is how Vance, writing in October 1993, described her project: What is it? I guess or rather I know that it is about survival. About trauma, about loss, about suffering and pain, and about being lost within all of those things. About trying to find the way back to yourself The way back to your sanity, a way to get away from those things which have driven you beyond a point of recognition. Past the point where you no longer recognize or even want to recognize yourself or your past or the possibility that your present may also be your future. That is what my project is about. I call it refuge but I really think I mean rescue or even better, survival, escape, saved. My work to me is about all the things that push you to the edge. Its about not belonging, not liking yourself, not loving yourself, not feeling loved or safe or accepted or tolerated or respected or valued or useful or important or comfortable or safe or part of a larger community. It's about how all these things cause us TO hate ourselves into corners and boxes and addictions and traps and hurtful relationships and cages. It's about how people can see you and look right through you. Most of the time nor knowing you are there. It is about fighting the battle of your life, for your life. And this place that I call refuge is the only place where I am sacred. It is the source of *my* strength, *my* fortitude, my resilience, *my* ability to be for myself what no one else will ever be for me. This is most directly Vance's response and meditation on her three years at a liberal arts college-on her education. In extensive conversations with her, two aspects of this project became clearer to me: her consciousness of being colonized at the college, expressed through the act of being caged like "animals in a science experiment, ~ and **the performance as an act of liberation, of active decolonization of the self, of visibility and empowerment. Vance found a way to tell another story, to speak through a silence that screamed for engagement**. However, in doing so, **she also created a public space for the collective narratives of marginalized peoples**, especially other women of color. **Educational practices became the object of public critique as the hegemonic narrative of a liberal arts education, and its markers of success came under collective scrutiny. This was then a profoundly unsettling and radically decolonizing educational act. This story illustrates the difference between thinking about social justice and radical transformation in our frames of analysis and understanding in relation to race, gender, class, and sexuality versus a multiculturalist consumption and assimilation into a supposedly "democratic" frame of education as usual. It suggests the need to organize to create collective spaces for dissent and challenges** to consolidation of white heterosexual masculinity in academy.

Opening up public space for epistemological standpoints is fundamental to the exposure of power relations – we must make the politics of everyday experience important

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If my argument in this essay is convincing, it suggests why we need to take on questions of race and gender as they are being managed and commodified in the liberal U.S. academy. **One mode of doing this is actively creating public cultures of dissent where these issues can be debated in terms of our pedagogics and institutional practices.**[20] **Creating such cultures in the liberal academy is a challenge in itself, because liberalism allows and even welcomes** "plural"~ or even "alternative" perspectives. **However, a public culture of dissent entails creating spaces for epistemological standpoints that are grounded in the interests of people and that recognize the materiality of conflict, of privilege, and of domination. Thus creating such cultures is fundamentally about making the axes of power transparent in the context of academic, disciplinary, and institutional structures as well as in the interpersonal relationships** (rather than individual relations) **in the academy. It is about taking the politics of everyday life seriously as teachers, students, administrators, and members of hegemonic academic cultures.** Culture itself is thus redefined to incorporate individual and collective memories, dreams, and history that are contested and transformed through the political

Oppression is not a binary force – only by examining our relationship to others can we participate in liberatory political projects

Henze 00 [Brent, Professor of English, "Who Says Who Says?" Reclaiming Identity: Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism, Ed. Paula Moya & Michael Hames-Garcia]

One outcome of these approaches to participating in the politics of the oppressed is that **our way of thinking about oppression must be modified. Rather than treat oppression as a binary force either oppressive or unoppressive to ourselves** (and, if unoppressive, also unrelated to ourselves), **we must see it as complex and relational, linking us to others and at the same time making us responsible for how we participate in the matrices of power that sustain oppression. The result of seeing oppression in this way is to enable more effective participation in these systems; by broadening our ways of knowing about the systems within which we operate, we** at least potentially **increase our ability to shape these systems in the long term. It enables us to participate in liberatory political projects more effectively, working in concert with rather than against or in place of those whose experiences of oppression both necessitate and ground this work.**

Micropolitics Good

Micropolitics are a necessary form of resistance and political action
Willner, University of Hamburg, 11

Roland, "Micro-politics: An Underestimated Field of Qualitative Research in Political Science", German Policy Studies, pp. 155-185, https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/politik/methoden/Roland/GPS_3-2011_Willner.pdf

2 Micro-analysis and micro-politics¶ Political science and especially policy studies focus on political¶ processes, among other things, in order to understand specific¶ policies or institutional pathways of decision-making (Blum and¶ Schubert 2011). The majority of empirical studies concentrate on ¶ macro- as well as meso-phenomena. A micro-analytical perspective¶ does not challenge this focus but tries to answer macro- and¶ meso-questions using discoveries on the micro-level. The prefix¶ "micro" implies a focus on the smallest unit of action between¶ specific actors. Hence, the objects of research are primarily actors¶ and their behavior, but not from a psychological perspective¶ which tries to explain behavior with individual skills or personality¶ traits. **Micro-analyses instead examine daily routines, selfevident¶ behavior patterns, and informal processes** (Schöne 2010:¶ 15). As Patzelt emphasizes, micro-analysis explores the construction,¶ reproduction, modification, and transformation of political¶ policies, processes and structures in concrete situations (Patzelt¶ 2000). Micro-analyses facilitate understanding the inner workings¶ of politics and the decision-making process which leads to¶ specific policies (Nullmeier et al. 2003).¶ In relation to this perspective arises the idea of micro-politics¶ as a specific research concept2¶ For the discussion of micro-political studies in political¶ science, it is necessary to direct the focus onto political organizations.¶ Political, in this case, means the alignment to generally¶ binding decisions. In fact, the vast majority of political decisions¶ are made in political organizations such as parties, parliaments,¶ or ministerial bureaucracies. As a consequence, it is impossible¶ . The research interest is on organizations¶ which are confronted with different actors and their interests,¶ strategies, and power struggles. The underlying definition¶ of organization is based upon March and Simon (1958, 1976).¶ They see organizations as systems of coordinated acts between¶ individuals and groups which have different preferences, information,¶ interests, and knowledge. Organizations from this perspective¶ transform conflict into cooperation. This perspective¶ stresses the role of actors and analyzes structure through the interactions¶ within an organization (Miebach 2007: 11f). Micropolitical¶ concepts share the basic premise of this actor- and¶ process-centered perspective. Organizing is an interactive social¶ process in which actors shape organizations. Hence, organizations¶ are "socially constructed artifacts" (Letiche 2007: 188). to understand politics without examining the organizational context¶ in which decisions are made (Bogumil and Schmid 2001:¶ 21f; Miebach 2007: 11). With this in mind, it is remarkable that¶ political science has neglected the concrete focus on organizations¶ for so long. As early as 1950 Merriam had written that it is¶ confusing to draw a "sharp and exclusive line between political¶ and other forms of organizations" (Merriam 1950: 9). With micro-politics¶ as a heuristic framework it is possible to highlight the¶ similarities in the way of thinking about micro-processes and the¶ fruitful transfer of analytical instruments. Because micro-politics did not evolve out of a systematic research¶ tradition, the development of a common understanding¶ has so far been difficult (Nullmeier et al. 2003: 14). The origins¶ of micro-politics can be found in economic organization theory.¶ The term micro-politics was first mentioned by Burns in his 1961¶ article on "Mechanism of Institutional Change," which emphasizes¶ the role of actors and their interactions. For Burns **the main¶ feature of micro-politics is the use of individual power resources¶ to create and change formal structure**. Other early papers, such as¶ those by Mechanic (1962) and Strauss (1963), also deal with individual¶ political behaviour. In German-language research Bosetzky¶ (1972; 1992) observed in his own working environment¶ that formal hierarchy cannot completely determine actions. He¶ follows Burns in using the term **micro-politics for individual actions¶ which undermine formal rules**. In contrast to other authors,¶ especially in economics, Bosetzky stresses that micro-politics¶ can be seen as an elementary process which assures adjustment¶ to the environment, the achievement of aims, and the integration¶ of actors (Bosetzky 1992: 37).

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Bottom up v. Top down

El Kilombo Intergalactico 2007 [Collective in durham NC that interviewed Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, *Beyond Resistance: Everything* p. 9-10]

But how might this alternative take shape? In order to begin to address this question, <u>the Zapatistas implore us to relieve ourselves of the positions of "observers" who insist on their own neutrality and distance</u>; this position may be adequate for the *microscope*-wielding academic of the "precision-guided" T.V. audience of the latest bombings over Baghdad, but <u>they</u> are completely insufficient for those who are seeking change. The Zapatistas <u>insist we throw away our microscopes and our televisions, and instead</u> they demand that we <u>equip our "ships" with an "inverted periscope</u>."According to what the Zapatistas have stated, one can never ascertain a belief in or vision of the future by looking at a situation from <u>the position of "neutrality" provided for you by the existing relations of power</u>. These methods <u>will only allow you to see what already is, what the balance of the relations of forces are in your field of inquiry</u>. In other words, such methods allow you to see that field only <u>from the perspective of those who rule</u> at any given moment. In contrast, <u>if one learns to harness the power of the periscope not by honing in on what is happening "above" in the halls of the self-important, but by placing it</u> deep below the earth, <u>below</u> even <u>the very bottom of society, one finds that there are struggles and memories of struggles that allow us to identify not "what is" but</u>

more importantly "what will be." By harnessing the transformative capacity of social movement, as well as the memories of past struggles that drive it, the Zapatistas are able to identify the future and act on it today. It is a paradoxical temporal insight that was perhaps best summarized by "El Clandestino" himself, Manu Chao, when he proclaimed that, "the future happened a long time ago!"

Given this insight afforded by adopting the methodology of the inverted periscope, we are able to shatter the mirror of power, to show that power does not belong to those who rule. Instead, we see that there are two completely different and opposed forms of power in any society: that which emerges from above and is exercised *over* people (Power with a capital "P"), and that which is born below and is able to act with and *through* people (power with a lower case "p"). One is set on maintaining that which *is* (Power), while the other is premised on transformation (power). These are not only not the same thing; they are (literally) worlds apart. According to the Zapatistas, once we have broken the mirror of Power by identifying an alternative source of social organization, we can then see it for what it is—a purely negative capacity to isolate us and make us believe that we are powerless. But once we have broken that mirror spell, we can also see that power does not come from above, from those "in Power," and therefore that it is possible to *exercise* power without *taking* it—that is, without simply changing places with those who rule. In this regard, it is important to quote in its entirety of the famous Zapatista motto that has been circulated in abbreviated form among movements throughout the world: "What we seek, what we need and want is for all those people without a party or an organization to make agreements about what they don't want and what they do want and organize themselves in order to achieve it (preferably through civil and peaceful means), not to take power, but to exercise it." Only now can we understand the full significance of this statement's challenge.

Bottom up approaches are good

A performative concept of participation as resistance explodes the distinction between public and private, between the political and the apolitical. As Foucault explains, what was formerly considered apolitical, or social rather than political, is revealed as the foundation of technologies of state control. Contests over identity and everyday social life are not merely additions to the realm of the political, but actually create the very character of those things traditionally considered political. The state itself is "superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth. Thus it is contestations at the micro-level, over the intricacies of everyday life, that provide the raw material for global domination, and the key to disrupting global strategies of domination. Therefore, the location of political participation extends way beyond the formal apparatus of government, or the formal organization of the workplace, to the intimacy of daily actions and iterations.

Simulation Bad

Simulation Bad

MITCHELL, Assistant Professor of Communications at University of Pittsburgh, **IN 1998** [Gordon, "Pedagogical Possibilities for Argumentative Agency in Academic Debate," *Argumentation and Advocacy*, Fall, ProQuest]

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead of focusing on the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a disadvantage" or bolster the "inherence of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most politically debilitating failures of contemporary education: "Educational institutions have failed even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"The sense of argumentative agency produced through action research is different in kind from those skills that are honed through academic simulation exercises such as policy debate tournaments. Encounters with broader public spheres beyond the realm of the academy can deliver unique pedagogical possibilities and opportunities. By anchoring their work in public spaces, students and teachers can use their talents to change the trajectory of events, while events are still unfolding. These experiences have the potential to trigger significant shifts in political awareness on the part of participants. Academic debaters nourished on an exclusive diet of competitive contest round experience often come to see politics like a picturesque landscape whirring by through the window of a speeding train. They study this political landscape in great detail, rarely (if ever) entertaining the idea of stopping the train and exiting to alter the course of unfolding events. The resulting spectator mentality deflects attention away from the roads that could carry their arguments to wider spheres of public argumentation. However, on the occasions when students and teachers set aside this spectator mentality by directly engaging in broader public audiences, key aspects of the political landscape change, because the point of reference for experiencing the landscape shifts fundamentally.

Simulation is bad

STANNARD 2000 [Matt, director of forensics and associate lecturer in the University of Wyoming Department of Communication and Journalism, "Portraying the Ruling Class: Argument Fields and the Material Antecedents of Policy Debate," http://www.uvm.edu/~debate/stannard300a.html]

Moreover, reliance on mass media sources, the journals of elitist think tanks, and public relations-manufactured press services all serve to construct a particular possibility of argument in policy debates. The advent of electronic research databases has exacerbated this conservatizing tendency since most of these databases are mainstream in content.

To summarize, I am suggesting that discursive inequalities and marginalized identities are not the only objects of criticism in policy debate. These problems are symptoms of the reproduction of <u>the policy field</u>, a field which, <u>in its institutionalized materiality, produces and contains both inequality and marginalization. The field of policy debate is a ritualized and enhanced reproduction of this larger material institution. Debaters are taught, through pedagogy and reward, drawing from policy literature and traditional</u> (uncritical) <u>notions of governing, to imitate the ruling class. Inequality and marginalization are part of the structure governing such imitation</u>.

SSD Bad

Switch Side Bad

GREEN Dpt of Comm Studies, Univ of Minn **& HICKS** Assoc. Prof of Human Comm Studies, Univ of Denver   **2k5**

Day also demonstrated his commitment to free speech more radically than Schlesinger by abandoning Schlesinger's deployment of 'clear and present danger' as an external value to regulate the reasonableness of speech. Yet, Day's defence of debating both sides elides the national particularity of how free speech was being put to work in the global struggle between liberal democracy and totalitarianism. One way that Cold War liberalism helped to transform the national particularity of the United States into a universal form of liberalism was through the constitution of free speech as a democratic norm. **As a cultural technology debating both sides contributed to American exceptionalism by transforming students into the concrete embodied performers of the universal norms of free speech**. In other words, by instantiating a desire for full and free expression, **the** pedagogical **technique of debating both sides became a mechanism by which the student-debater-citizen becomes an exceptional 'American' the bearer of universal norms of liberal democracy.**

SSD is bad

GREEN Dpt of Comm Studies, Univ of Minn **& HICKS** Assoc. Prof of Human Comm Studies, Univ of Denver   **2k5**

The ethical problematization of debating both sides suggests that the globalization of liberalism is not so much registered by universal norms of interaction as the circulation of techniques required for internalizing a series of ethical attributes conducive to democratic citizenship. Surely debate is not alone in the circulation of liberal attributes, one might suggest that teaching professional journalistic norms of objectivity and balance _ norms operationalized by the attempt to offer 'two-sides' to every political issue _ offers a functional equivalent to debating both sides. Increasingly, journalistic norms find uptake as a spectacle of partisan spin and the rhetoric of commitment, far away from the ethical pedagogy of debating both sides. A unique value of debating both sides is that it works as a technique of embodied speech performance. To produce a liberal citizen requires more than the presentation of different points of view to a third party, it requires the empathetic advocacy of views that are not one's own. In a world increasingly dominated by fundamentalism (religious and otherwise) the development of a respect for pluralism, tolerance and free speech remains politically valuable. However, the technical history of cultivating these norms must be evaluated if we might hope to govern ourselves differently. What this paper demonstrates is that debating both sides helps liberalism to produce a governing field between a person's first order convictions and his/her commitment to the process norms of debate, discussion and persuasion. This field is then managed in and through the alteration of different communicative practices. The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as **it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.**

Tolerance Good

Tolerance is good

Brown 2006 [Wendy, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire*, Princeton University Press, pages 22-24]

But liberalism *is* cultural. This is not simply to say that liberalism promotes a certain culture—say, of individualism or of entrepreneurship—though certainly these are truisms. Nor is it simply to say that liberalism is always imbricated with what we call national cultures, although it is and too little contemporary liberal theory has considered what this imbrication implies, even as our histories of political thought have routinely compared the liberalisms emerging from different parts of Europe and the Americas. Nor is it simply to say that there is no pure liberalism but only varieties of it—republican, libertarian, communitarian, social democratic. Nor is it only to say that all liberal orders harbor, affirm, and instantiate in law nonliberal values and practices, although this is also so. Rather, the theoretical claim here is that both the constructive and repressive powers we call those of culture—the powers that produce and reproduce subjects' relations and practices, beliefs and rationalities, and that do so without their express choice or consent—are neither conquered by liberalism nor absent from liberalism. Liberalism is not only itself a cultural form, it also is striated with nonliberal culture wherever it is institutionalized and practiced. Even in the texts of its most abstract analytic theorists, it is impure, hybridized, and fused to values, assumptions, and practices unaccounted by it and unaccountable within it. Liberalism involves a contingent, malleable, and protean set of beliefs and practices about being human and being together; about relating to self, others, and world; about doing and not doing; about valuing and not valuing select things. And liberalism is also always institutionalized, constitutionalized, and governmentalized in articulation with other cultural norms—those of kinship, race, gender, sexuality, work, politics, leisure, and more. This is one reason why liberalism, a protean cultural form, is not analytically synonymous with democracy, a protean political practice of sharing power and governance. The double ruse on which liberalism relies to distinguish itself from culture—on the one hand, casting liberal principles as universal; on the other, juridically privatizing culture—ideologically figures liberalism as untouched by culture and thus as incapable of cultural imperialism. In its self-representation as the sole political doctrine that can harbor culture and religion without being conquered by them, liberalism casts itself as uniquely tolerant of culture from its position above culture. But liberalism is no more above or outside culture than is any other political form, and culture is not always elsewhere from liberalism. Both the autonomy and the universality of liberal principles are myths, crucial to liberalism's reduction of questions about its imperial ambitions or practices to questions about whether forcing others to be free is consonant with liberal principles. In sum, the contemporary "culturalization of politics" reduces nonliberal political life (including radical identity claims within liberal regimes) to something called culture at the same time that it divests liberal democratic institutions of any association with culture. Within this logic, tolerance is invoked *as* a liberal democratic principle but *for* what is named the cultural domain, a domain that comprises all essentialized identities, from sexuality to ethnicity, that produce the problem of difference within contemporary liberalism. Thus, tolerance is invoked as a tool for managing what are construed as (non-liberal because "different" and nonpolitical because "essential") culturalized identity claims or identity clashes. As such, tolerance reiterates the depoliticization of those claims and clashes, at the same time depicting itself as a norm-free tool of liberal governance, a mere means for securing freedom of conscience or (perhaps more apt today) freedom of identity.

Tolerance good

Brown 2006 [Wendy, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire*, Princeton University Press, pages 202-4]

That tolerance is preferable to violent civil conflict is inarguable. What this truism elides, however, is the discursive function of tolerance in legitimating the often violent imperialism of international liberal governmentality conjoined with neoliberal global political economy. The practice of tolerance does not simply anoint the superior or advanced status of the tolerant. Withholding tolerance for designated practices, cultures and regimes does not simply mark them as beyond the pale of civilization. The economy of this offering and this refusal also masks the cultural norms of liberal democratic regimes and of the West by denying their status *as* cultural norms. What becomes clear when we consider together the above-named thinkers is that the discourse of tolerance substantively brokers cultural value—valorizing the West, othering the rest—while feigning to do no more than distinguish civilization from barbarism, protect the former from the latter, and extend the benefits of liberal thought and practices. Insofar as tolerance in its

civilizational mode draws on a political-juridical discourse of cultural neutrality, in which what is at stake is said to be rationality, individual autonomy, and the rule of law rather than the (despotic) rule of culture or religion, tolerance is crucial to liberalism's denial of its imbrication with culture and the colonial projection of culture onto the native. It is crucial to liberalism's conceit of independence from culture, of neutrality with regard to culture . . . a conceit that in turn shields liberal polities from charges of cultural supremacy and cultural imperialism. This was precisely the conceit that allowed George W. Bush to declare, without recourse to the infelicitous language of "crusade," that "we have no intention of imposing our culture" on others while insisting on a set of liberal principles that others cannot brook without risking being bombed (see chapter 6).

Tolerance *conferred* as well as tolerance *withheld* serves this function; both are essential in the circuitry that tolerance travels as a civilizational discourse. *Tolerance conferred* on "foreign" practices shores up the normative standing of the tolerant and the liminal standing of the tolerated—a standing somewhere between civilization and barbarism. It reconfirms, without reference to the orders of power that enable it, the higher civilizational standing of those who tolerate what they do not condone or share—their cosmopolitanism, forbearance, expansiveness, catholicity, remoteness from fundamentalism. It is only against this backdrop that *tolerance withheld* succeeds in marking the other as barbaric without implicating the cultural norms of the tolerant by this marking. When a tolerant civilization meets its limits, it says not that it is encountering political or cultural difference but that it is encountering the limits of civilization itself. At that point, the tolerant civilization is justified not only in refusing to extend tolerance to its Other but in treating it as hostile, both internally oppressive *and* externally dangerous, and, as chapter 6 made clear, externally dangerous *because* internally oppressive. This hostile status in turn legitimates the tolerant entity's suspension of its own civilizational principles in dealing with this Other, principles that range from political self-determination and nation-state sovereignty to rational deliberation, legal and international accountability, and reasoned justification. Such legitimate abrogation of civilizational principles can be carried quite far, up to the point of making preemptive war on the Other.

The circuitry of tolerance in civilizational discourse also abets the slide from terrorism to fundamentalism to anti-Americanism that legitimates the rhetorical Manicheanism often wielded by the Bush regime: "You're either with the civilized world, or you're with the terrorists." It facilitates the slide from Osama bin Laden to Saddam Hussein as the enemy to civilization, and from a war *on* terrorism to wars *for* regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. And likewise it indulges a slide from a war justified by Iraq's *danger* to the "civilized world" to one justified by the Iraqi people's *need* for liberation (by the West). Tolerance in a liberal idiom, both conferred and withheld, does not merely serve as the *sign* of the civilized and the free: it configures the *right* of the civilized against a barbaric opposite that is both internally oppressive and externally dangerous, neither tolerant nor tolerable.

AT Deliberative Democracy

AT Agonism/Negotiation/Deliberative Democracy

Olson 2009 [Joel, Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Affairs at Northern Arizona University, "Friends and Enemies, Slaves and Masters: Fanaticism, Wendell Phillips, and the Limits of Democratic Theory," *Journal of Politics* Vol. 71, No. 1]

Abolitionist talk sought an insurrection of thought and ended up inspiring an insurrection. While pacifists such as Garrison had moral qualms with Brown's actions at first (Mayer 1998), Phillips did not because he saw Harpers Ferry as embodying the function of talk, which is not just deliberation or agonistic engagement but also agitation. Agitation is the use of contentious talk to mold public opinion and thereby shape the laws and customs of society (Phillips 1891, 396). "The work of the agitator," Richard Hofstadter explains, "consists chiefly in talk; his function is . . . to influence the public mind in the interest of some large social transformation" (1948, 136). In other words, talk is a form of action for Phillips. "Our aim is to alter public opinion" (Phillips 1863, 110). Phillips seeks to agitate public opinion to construct a new, more radically democratic ethico-political framework, from which the reorganization of democratic institutions will follow (Phillips 1865, 13–21). As agitation, then, talk is not an end in itself, which is what Schmitt criticizes liberal discussion for being. Rather, it is a means to achieve hegemony.

Agitation does not presume a common ethicopolitical playing field. Rather, it constructs opposing frameworks and encourages conflict between them. Phillips's goal is not to achieve consensus through deliberation or to turn enemies into adversaries but to foster two hostile camps. In a May 1863 speech he provocatively constructs a principle he calls "the North," which represents equality, free speech, freedom of religion, and democracy. The principle of "the South," meanwhile, represents censorship, religious oppression, a sham democracy, and an "aristocracy of the skin" (Phillips 1863, 534). "That South," Phillips thunders, "is to be annihilated . . . This country will never know peace nor union until the South (using the words in the sense I have described) is annihilated, and the North is spread over it" (534– 35). There is little evidence of a desire for a "conflictual consensus" here, even as civil war rages. In another speech, Phillips blasts the Lincoln administration for its early conduct of the war. As of August 1862, Phillips notes, Lincoln was still publicly denying that the Civil War was a war to end slavery.10 Until Lincoln acknowledges this, the war's outcome is in doubt.11 "The war can only be ended by annihilating that oligarchy which formed and rules the South and makes the war,—by annihilating a state of society," Phillips insists. Yet "our present policy neither aims to annihilate that state of things we call 'the South,' made up of pride, idleness, ignorance, barbarism, theft, and murder, nor to replace it with a substitute. Such an aimless war I call wasteful and murderous" (451). Lincoln must not sit on the fence any longer. He must recognize that this war is a struggle for hegemony between the framework of liberty and the framework of slavery, identify his friends and his enemies, and act accordingly to defeat "the South" and install "the North" as the new national common sense.12

Phillips's speeches illuminate two important points regarding fanaticism. First, zealotry is essentially a means rather than an end. It is an approach to politics rather than an ethico-political framework itself. The fanatical approach stands in contrast to political moderation. Fanaticism seeks to exacerbate conflict by dividing the public sphere into friends and enemies, while the moderate approach seeks to avoid extreme positions or solutions in the interest of containing conflict. Both approaches play to the political middle but in very different ways: moderation seeks to preserve the middle as the dominant political voice, while fanaticism seeks to liquidate it by pushing moderates into the friends or enemies camp. Compared to moderation fanaticism is an extraordinary approach to politics, but it is not necessarily an undemocratic, intolerant, irrational, or violent one, and it need not lead to undemocratic, intolerant, irrational, or violent outcomes. As such, it should not automatically be equated with religious fundamentalisms or other authoritarian political systems. Phillips, for example, was a zealot in his means and a radical democrat in his ends. He embraced reason and pluralism and largely eschewed violence, yet the aim of

antislavery politics for him was not to moderate the North-South conflict but to sharpen it. ''Now, wherever there is the war of ideas, every tongue takes a side. There is no neutrality. Even silence is not neutrality; but he who speaks a word of sympathy to his brother-man is on the side of humanity and progress'' (1891, 44). Abolitionist agitation crystallizes politics into freedom and slavery, right and wrong, salvation and sin, democracy and tyranny—and forces people to decide between them.

Second, a comparison with Phillips reveals that deliberative and agonal theories take a moderate approach to expanding democracy. Rather than triangulating the public sphere into friends, enemies, and the moderate middle, these models seek to soften political divisions by restricting them to a common ethico-political framework. Phillips draws sharp lines between friends and enemies in order to mobilize friends and moderates. Gutmann and Thompson and Mouffe want to preclude the likelihood of such lines being drawn. Deliberation for Gutmann and Thompson, for example, is intended to diminish dualistic rhetoric such as ''Either you're for killing babies or you're against killing babies'' (1997, 80). Their goal is to bring opponents together in a way that neutralizes extreme positions and ''sustains a moral community'' (80). Mouffe, meanwhile, seeks to ''tame'' and ''defuse'' antagonism by turning enemies into adversaries (Mouffe 2005a, 19). Both models trim between opposing positions, while Phillips seeks to defeat his enemy. They limit conflict to a common ethicopolitical framework, while Phillips seeks hegemony. They exclude extremists from ''legitimate'' politics, while Phillips uses fanatical abolitionism to defeat fanatical masters. ''No man can fight Stonewall Jackson, a sincere fanatic on the side of slavery, but John Brown, an equally honest fanatic on the other'' (Phillips 1863, 540).

Sort

One type of crisis occurs when the owners go beyond that which they have trained their slaves to think of as 'fair' in terms of wages, hours and conditions. Another type occurs when the owners go beyond that which they have trained their slaves to think of as 'fair' in terms of housing, education and welfare. Sometimes, as with the flooding of New Orleans, the totality of oppression is unveiled. Masters, having successfully confined their slaves' ambition for bread and roses within the horizon of the juridical sometimes, in capitalist desperation, get out ahead of their slaves. In such moments the system of white-over-black experiences a crisis because the slaves see the owners for what the owners are and they also see themselves and what it is they have been doing to themselves. The

slave is _{then} welcomed into the master's house for negotiations. Negotiation requires the slave to pretend that it has something in common with its master. Slaves and masters have nothing in common and there is therefore nothing to negotiate. Negotiation is always already at its beginning the almost-escaped slave's surrender to its almost-former master. There are many mansions in the master's house, each filled with the beauty of yesteryear's dreams of legal emancipation. These legal dreams of equality are the endless prayers offered up by the slaves during the endless crises of capital. These surrenders are the secret of capital time.

Insert tag here
Young 1

Let us suppose that by some combination of activist agitation and deliberative persuasion, **some deliberative settings emerge that approximately represent all those affected by the outcome of certain policy decisions**. Given the world of structural inequality as we know it, the activist believes such a circumstance will be rare at best but is willing to entertain the possibility for the sake of this argument. **The activist remains suspicious of the deliberative democrat's exhortation to engage in reasoned and critical discussion** with people he disagrees with, even on the supposition that the public where he engages in such discussion really includes the diversity of interests and perspectives potentially affected by policies. That is **because he perceives that existing social and economic structures have set unacceptable constraints on the terms of deliberation and its agenda**.

Problems and disagreements in the real world of democratic politics appear and are addressed against the background of a given history and sedimentation of unjust structural inequality, says the activist, which helps set agenda priorities and constrains the alternatives that political actors may consider in their deliberations. **When this is so, both the deliberative agenda and the institutional constraints it mirrors should themselves be subject to criticism, protest, and resistance**.7 **Going to the table to meet with representatives of those interests typically served by existing institutional relations, to discuss how to deal most justly with issues that presuppose those institutional relations, gives both those institutions and deliberative process too much legitimacy.** It co-opts the energy of citizens committed to justice, leaving little time for mobilizing people to bash the institutional constraints and decisionmaking process from the outside. Thus, the responsible citizen ought to withdraw from implicit acceptance of structural and institutional constraints by refusing to deliberate about policies within them. Let me give some examples.

A local anti-poverty advocacy group engaged in many forms of agitation and protest in the years leading up to passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act by the U.S. Congress in the spring of 1996. This legislation fundamentally changed the terms of welfare policy in the United States. It abolished entitlements to public assistance for the first time in sixty years, allowing states to deny benefits when funds have run out. It requires recipients of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families to work at jobs after a certain period and allows states to vary significantly in their programs. Since passage of the legislation, the anti-poverty advocacy group has organized recipients and others who care about welfare justice to protest and lobby the state house to increase welfare funding and to count serving as a welfare rights advocate in local welfare offices as a "work activity."

In its desire to do its best by welfare clients, the county welfare department proposes to establish an advisory council with significant influence over the implementation and administration of welfare programs in the county. They have been persuaded by advocates of

deliberative democracy that proceedings of this council should be publicly accountable and organized so as to facilitate serious discussion and criticism of alternative proposals. They believe that democratic justice calls for making this council broadly inclusive of county citizens, and they think legitimate deliberations will be served particularly if they include recipients and their advocates on the council. So they invite the anti-poverty advocacy group to send representatives to the council and ask them to name recipient representatives from among the welfare rights organization with which they work.

After deliberating among themselves for some weeks, the welfare activists decline to join the council. The constraints that federal and state law have put on welfare policy, they assert, make it impossible to administer a humane welfare policy. Such a council will deliberate about whether it would be more just to place local welfare offices here or there but will have no power to expand the number of offices. They will decide how best to administer child care assistance, but they will have no power to decide who is eligible for that assistance or the total funds to support the program. The deliberations of a county welfare implementation council face numerous other constraints that will make its outcomes inevitably unjust, according to the activist group. All citizens of the county who agree that the policy framework is unjust have a responsibility to stay outside such deliberations and instead pressure the state legislature to expand welfare options, by, for example, staging sit-ins at the state department of social services.

The deliberative democrat finds such refusal and protest action uncooperative and counterproductive. Surely it is better to work out the most just form of implementation of legislation than to distract lawmakers and obstruct the routines of overworked case workers. The activist replies that it is wrong to cooperate with policies and processes that presume unjust institutional constraints. **The problem is not that policy makers and citizen deliberations fail to make arguments but that their starting premises are unacceptable**.

It seems to me that **advocates of deliberative democracy who believe that deliberative processes are the best way to conduct policies even under the conditions of structural inequality that characterize democracies today have no satisfactory response to this criticism**. Many advocates of deliberative procedures seem to find no problem with structures and institutional constraints that limit policy alternatives in actual democracies, advocating reflective political reasoning within them to counter irrational tendencies to reduce issues to sound bites and decisions to aggregate preferences. In their detailed discussion of the terms of welfare reform in Democracy and Disagreement, for example, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson appear to accept as given that policy action to respond to the needs of poor people must come in the form of poor support rather than changes in tax policy, the relation of private and public investment, public works employment, and other more structural ways of undermining deprivation and income inequality.8 James Fishkin's innovative citizens' forum deliberating national issues in connection with the 1996 political campaign, to take another example, seemed to presume as given all the fiscal, power, and institutional constraints on policy alternatives that the U.S. Congress and mainstream press assumed. To the extent that such constraints assume existing patterns of class inequality, residential segregation, and gender division of labor as given, **the activist's claim is plausible that there is little difference among the alternatives debated, and** he suggests **that the responsible citizen should not consent to these assumptions but instead agitate for deeper criticism and change**.

The ongoing business of legislation and policy implementation will assume existing institutions and their priorities as given unless massive concerted action works to shift priorities and goals. Most of the time, then, politics will operate under the constrained alternatives that are produced by and support structural inequalities. **If the deliberative democrat tries to insert practices of deliberation into existing public policy discussions, she is forced to accept the range of alternatives that existing structural constraints allow**. While two decades ago in the United States, there were few opportunities for theorists of deliberative democracy to try to influence the design and process of public discussion, today things have changed. Some public officials and private foundations have become persuaded that inclusive, reasoned extensive deliberation is good for democracy and wish to implement these ideals in the policy formation process. To the extent that such implementation must presuppose constrained alternatives that cannot question existing institutional priorities and social structures, **deliberation is as likely to reinforce injustice as to undermine it.**

I think that the deliberative democrat has no adequate response to this challenge other than to accept the activist's suspicion of implementing deliberative processes within institutions that seriously constrain policy alternatives in ways that, for example, make it nearly impossible for the structurally disadvantaged to propose solutions to social problems that might alter the structural positions in which they stand. **Only if the theory and practice of deliberative democracy are willing to withdraw from the immediacy of the already given policy trajectory can they respond to this** activist **challenge**. The **deliberative democracy should help create inclusive deliberative settings in which basic social and economic structures can be examined; such settings for the most part must be outside of and opposed to ongoing settings of official policy discussion**.

AT Fairness

no

We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct **into the very term fair**. Thus, the stronger party is able to have ~~his~~ [their] way and see ~~himself~~ [themselves] as principled at the same time.

Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead -- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?"

What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse.

Notice what the objective standard renders irrelevant: a downcast look; ambivalence; the question, "Do you really think we should?"; slowness in following the man's lead; a reputation for sexual selectivity; virginity; youth; and innocence. Indeed, only a loud firm "no" counts, and probably only if it is repeated several times, overheard by others, and accompanied by forceful body language such as pushing the man and walking away briskly.

Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts. A nice trick if you can get away with it.

[This card was gender paraphrased]

Reps First

Reps must be evaluated prior to questions of policy

Doty 96 [Roxanne Lynn Doty, assistant professor of political science at arizona state university, imperial encounters, p. 5-6, 1996]

This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal of analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine *how* certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and, identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is *a re-presence,* or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. So, for example, **when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real,"** though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. **It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion,"** a "show of force," a "training exercise," a "rescue," and so on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies—thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, **subjective/objective—that a critical genealogy calls into question**. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and'performative character of discourse.'In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a "reality" whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the "first world". Focusing on discursive practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

Representations are the most important questions—the representations used are pivotal in determining the persuasiveness of the policy and the likelihood of implementation.

Gorham 99 (Bradley, University of Wisconsin, Howard Journal of Communications, Spring, ebsco)

Racial stereotypes in the media : So what ? Why are stereotypes in the media important, and why should we care ? At first glance, it seems absurd that such questions need to be answered. It is almost a truism that racial stereotypes in the media are important; so much research has been done about stereotypes in the media that they *must* be important. Similarly, there is the intuitively appealing notion that stereotypes in the media are harmful. Stereotypes are often viewed as false overgeneralizations made by socially dominant groups about socially oppressed groups, and since they have been prevalent in the media to varying degrees for many years (Stroman, Merritt, & Matabane, 1989–1990) , they *must* be bad. But why ? If so many people consciously disavow any belief in or endorsement of the stereotypes that circulate through society (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991) , why are they important, and why do they exercise their ''badness'' ? These are important questions to answer for several reasons. Critical scholars and others who are concerned about the ideological and social effects of stereotypical media representations need to be able to point to more concrete mechanisms than simply ''learning'' or ''modeling'' if they expect their arguments to carry any weight outside of the academic world. That is, those concerned with the ideological effects of persistent stereotypical portrayals need to be able to lay out the mechanisms by which these representations lead to these effects. By doing so, researchers can not only make their arguments against these representations more convincing, but they can also make it easier to identify areas that are most susceptible to real-world intervention and change. This could also have the added benefit of making it easier for message producers, consumers, and policymakers to see how scholars' theory and research might have practical implications. Conversely, researchers in the empirical tradition must acknowledge the very real ideological effects that may arise from these repeated stereotypical representations. Although the term may make some empirical researchers uncomfortable, ''ideology'' clearly seems to be an important concept in understanding the effects of stereotypical representations. After all, if ideology is ''a kind of collective symbolic self-expression'' that works to promote and legitimate the interests of social groups through ''action-oriented discourse'' (adapted from Eagleton, 1991, p. 29) , then stereotypical images in the media can certainly convey messages about what are not

only appropriate thoughts for members of particular social groups, but also what are appropriate actions and roles. These thus become important effects to understand.

Framework questions should be resolved prior to policymaking because they determine the effectiveness and outcome of policy

The Frameworks Institute 03 ("The FrameWorks Perspective: Strategic Frame Analysis", http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/strategicanalysis/perspective.shtml)

This interdisciplinary work is made possible by the fact that the concept of framing is found in the literatures of numerous academic disciplines across the social, behavioral and cognitive sciences. Put simply, framing refers to the construct of a communication — its language, visuals and messengers — and the way it signals to the listener or observer how to interpret and classify new information. By framing, we mean how messages are encoded with meaning so that they can be efficiently interpreted in relationship to existing beliefs or ideas. Frames trigger meaning. The questions we ask, in applying the concept of frames to the arena of social policy, are as follows: How does the public think about a particular social or political issue? What is the public discourse on the issue? And how is this discourse influenced by the way media frames that issue? How do these public and private frames affect public choices? How can an issue be reframed to evoke a different way of thinking, one that illuminates a broader range of alternative policy choices? This approach is strategic in that it not only deconstructs the dominant frames of reference that drive reasoning on public issues, but it also identifies those alternative frames most likely to stimulate public reconsideration and enumerates their elements (reframing). We use the term reframe to mean changing "the context of the message exchange" so that different interpretations and probable outcomes become visible to the public (Dearing & Rogers, 1994: 98). Strategic frame analysis offers policy advocates a way to work systematically through the challenges that are likely to confront the introduction of new legislation or social policies, to anticipate attitudinal barriers to support, and to develop research-based strategies to overcome public misunderstanding. What Is Communications and Why Does It Matter? The domain of communications has not changed markedly since 1948 when Harold Lasswell formulated his famous equation: *who says what to whom through what channel with what effect?* But what many social policy practitioners have overlooked in their quests to formulate effective strategies for social change is that communications merits their attention because it is an inextricable part of the agenda-setting function in this country. Communications plays a vital role in determining which issues the public prioritizes for policy resolution, which issues will move from the private realm to the public, which issues will become pressure points for policymakers, and which issues will win or lose in the competition for scarce resources. No organization can approach such tasks as issue advocacy, constituency-building, or promoting best practices without taking into account the critical role that mass media has to play in shaping the way Americans think about social issues. As William Gamson and his colleagues at the Media Research and Action Project like to say, media is "an arena of contest in its own right, and part of a larger strategy of social change." One source of our confusion over communications comes in not recognizing that each new push for public understanding and acceptance happens against a backdrop of long-term media coverage, of perceptions formed over time, of scripts we have learned since childhood to help us make sense of our world, and folk beliefs we use to interpret new information. As we go about making sense of our world, mass media serves an important function as the mediator of meaning — telling us what to think about (*agenda-setting*) and how to think about it (*media effects*) by organizing the information in such a way (*framing*) that it comes to us fully conflated with directives (*cues*) about who is responsible for the social problem in the first place and who gets to fix it (*responsibility*). It is often the case that nonprofit organizations want communications to be easy. Ironically, they want soundbite answers to the same social problems whose complexity they understand all too well. While policy research and formulation are given their due as tough, demanding areas of an organization's workplan, communications is seen as "soft." While program development and practice are seen as requiring expertise and the thoughtful consideration of best practices, communications is an "anyone can do it if you have to" task. It is time to retire this thinking. Doing communications strategically requires the same investment of intellect and study that these other areas of nonprofit practice have been accorded. A Simple Explanation of Frame Analysis In his seminal book Public Opinion (1921:16), Walter Lippmann was perhaps the first to connect mass communications to public attitudes and policy preferences by recognizing that the "the way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do." The modern extension of Lippmann's observation is based on the concept of "frames." People use mental shortcuts to make sense of the world. Since most people are looking to process incoming information quickly and efficiently, they rely upon cues within that new information to signal to them how to connect it with their stored images of the world. The "pictures in our heads," as Lippmann called them, might better be thought of as vividly labeled storage boxes - filled with pictures, images, and stories from our past encounters with the world and labeled youth, marriage, poverty, fairness, etc. The incoming information provides cues about which is the right container for that idea or experience. And the efficient thinker makes the connection, a process called "indexing," and moves on. Put another way, how an issue is framed is a trigger to these shared and durable cultural models that help us make sense of our world. When a frame ignites a cultural model, or calls it into play in the interpretation, the whole model is operative. This allows people to reason about an issue, to make inferences, to fill in the blanks for missing information by referring to the robustness of the model, not the sketchy frame.

Questions of policy can't even be attempted to be answered without first examining representations—it proves our framework is critical to more effective policymaking.

Doty 96 (Roxanne, assistant professor of political science at ASU, Imperial Encounters, p. 170-171)

North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modern man, the united States, the West, real states), has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace-the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid.). Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely (Derrida 1978: z8o). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social, political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of struc-tures of meaning. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to "get beyond"

the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered-indeed. before we can even proceed to attempt an answer—attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

Their framework depoliticizes debate and ensures the cooptation of all politics

Holloway 02 (Johnny Holloway, Professor of political science at The American University, 2002, The Military Reflex of the Body Politic: Thinking Critically About the United States' "War on Drugs," March, http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/holloway.html)

What separates critical theory most significantly from other modes of analysis is the value placed on cognition. While critical theory does encompass the positivist elements of reality like observable events and physical matter, its larger focus is on the non-observable elements of reality – thoughts, beliefs, values, language– that govern human interaction (Alway 1995, 105; Campbell 1992, 4-5; Guess 1981, 56). As is elegantly stated in the passage from Michel Foucault above, to be critical is not simply a matter of proffering criticism. Mere disparagement and other expressions of disapproval towards existing conditions are inadequate; true critical theory must address the dominant ideology – the basic thoughts and beliefs that form the bedrock of specific behaviors, policies, actions, etc that in turn formulate, reinforce, and perpetuate existing conditions. The basis of this address is reflection, the intellectual act of holding up a mirror to truly examine – and question – the world-view embraced by both the individual and the larger society of which he or she is a member (Leonard 1990, 4). By weighing the beliefs and assumptions held about (for example) society against the knowledge of the origins of those beliefs and assumptions combined with observable facts (e.g. consistently disproportionate allocation of resources, pervasive injustice, etc), real and rigorous reflection undermines and eventually shatters this world-view. By turning things on its head, the individual becomes enlightened; aware of those coercive elements (both self-imposed and produced and reproduced by the institutions of society) that have formed the ideology that had heretofore permitted the justification of a hypocrisy of incommensurate words and deeds. Moreover, this realization will not permit a simple acknowledgment; it compels action and understandably so – the world (or some aspect of it) as one knew it to be is no 2more. "Although reflection alone can't do away with real social oppression, it can free ... agents from unconscious complicity in thwarting their own legitimate desires" (Guess 1981, 75). At a minimum, reflection can bring about an intellectual freedom that compels advocacy for change through a basic rationality (i.e., one plus one is supposed to equal two; not six). After outlining these elements of critical theory – cognition, reflection, enlightenment – it becomes increasing evident as to the utility of this approach in regards to the question of the War on Drugs. Measurements of such things as total tons of cocaine seized or annual budgets for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in and of themselves can only offer a description of events – not an explanation for them or the policies that promulgate them. Consider the following assessment: Many Americans approach questions of drug ... policy with standard-issue drug war eyeglasses ... crafted from particular beliefs and values rooted in American political culture. When they hear the word narcotics, they hear danger and crime ... When they consider how the government should respond, they think "get tough"; and when the problem does not improve, they conclude that more force and more threats are needed (Bertram, et al: 57). In order to get to the why's at the heart of the matter (e.g. Why view through this lens and not another? Why use the military metaphor?, etc), any meaningful analysis is going to have address the thoughts, beliefs, assumptions, and language that privileges certain responses over others. Confronted with a policy focused on eradication and interdiction that has been pursued for roughly twenty years, at a cost of billions of dollars, with advocates who claim that "victory" is imminent on one hand and wide scale evidence of an ever increasing supply of drugs at stable (and sometimes decreasing) prices essentially unaffected by that policy on the other, a "what is wrong with the is picture?" frame of analysis is imperative. Recognition of the wrongness of that picture and the reasons why is inherently emancipating – a freedom that may be limited to a personal refusal to accept the platitudes that shroud hypocrisy or may result in adding another voice to the call for greater introspection and larger understanding

Their demand to work only within the policy community forecloses options and prevents real change.

Smith 97 (Steve Smith, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wales, Power and truth; a reply to William Wallace, Review of International Studies, Issue 04, Volume 23, October 1997, Cambridge Journals)

In summary, I think that Wallace fundamentally misrepresents the relationship between theory and practice. His article works very effectively, but only because of its internal logical and political structure. By his setting up of two alternatives (cooption or scholasticism) the logical structure of the article performs a disciplining function by placing anyone outside of his logic of the policy–theory relationship in a predefined position of being self-righteous, self-indulgent, opposed to empirical work, too detached from the world of practice and too fond of theory. Note also the very revealing way in which those defined as having to 'struggle with the dilemmas of power' are policy-makers; there are massive normative and ethical assumptions at work here, ones that undermine his very notion of theory as explanatory and reveal his political project. The trouble is that Wallace's logical structure is a textual construction and is therefore never subjected to any self-critical analysis in the article. My worry is that his prescriptions would make academic International Relations a servant of the state, responding to today's headlines.

Agreeing with Wallace means that academics will run the risk of having to work within the agenda of the policy community, of being unable to stand back and examine the moral, ethical and political implications of that choice. Giving policy advice is not the problem; the problem is if those who give it are unaware of the extent to which they are standing on the policy conveyor-belt of the state. It means problem-solving, it means taking the 'givens' of policy-makers as the starting points of analysis. It means walking the thin line between influence and fitting the values of policymakers. Clearly the discipline wants and needs to give advice on policy, but to whom? Is doing so for policy-makers a requirement for academics in discharging their responsibility to the state? My worry is that policy advice all too often means talking to governments; unfortunately, they may not be the right people to talk to if one's concern is really with 'those who have to struggle with the dilemmas of power'. And, crucially, are policy-makers listening to ideas or are they searching for an intellectual justification for their existing values? Ultimately, Wallace's picture worries me because he has a very restricted view of politics and its relationship to academia. Politics for Wallace is a far more limited activity than I think it is, and that is why I find no academic activity more political or ethical than showing the epistemological assumptions of International Relations theory. For me it is not so much a question of speaking truth to power as of showing how various versions of the power/truth relationship operate between civil society and the state. In that relationship it may well be that those who espouse a restrictive view of theory are the ones who are hiding behind walls, preaching sermons of self-righteousness, and ultimately acting as the discipliners of the discipline. For all of us interested in international relations, Wallace has raised important questions concerning our responsibilities and our self-awareness. I hope that this reply has shown why the picture is not quite as simple as his beguiling argument suggests and why, ultimately, it may be impossible for 'truth to speak to power' in the liberal way that he suggests. After all, if 'truth' itself only gets meaning from the regimes of truth within which it operates, then how can it speak to power when it is itself a construction of those same power relationships? How do we know that it is truth rather than power that we speak when we are speaking to policy-makers? Surely the task of academics is to show how these very relationships between truth and power, and between the empirical and the theoretical, operate. That, rather than the search for influence within the policy-making community, is the ultimate ethical and political engagement with the civil society in which we work and to which we are responsible.

Roleplaying releases sadistic desires and promotes violence—Stanford prison experiment proves

Sherrer 00 (Hans Sherrer, author living in Auburn, Washington, The Inhumanity of Government Bureaucracies, The Independent Review, v.V, n.2, Fall 2000, http://www.21learn.org/arch/articles/sherrer_one.htm)

Bureaucratic structures increase sadistic behavior by permitting and even encouraging it.[2] This effect is produced by the systematic lessening of the moral restraints inherent in personal agency (Kelman 1973, 52). Stanford psychology professor Philip Zim- bardo's "Stanford County Prison" experiment in the early 1970s confirmed this rela- tionship in dramatic fashion (Zimbardo, Haney, and Banks 1973). The experiment revealed that the sadism of people unhealthily obedient to authority can be tapped into and given an expressive outlet by their association with a bureaucratic organization, demonstrating that placing people in an environment in which they can freely exercise their sadistic impulses can have a liberating effect on their doing so. Zimbardo conducted the experiment by setting up a mock jail in the basement of a building and using participants from the general public who had been selected for their normality. Those chosen to participate were randomly assigned the role of a guard or an inmate. To Zimbardo and his fellow researchers' surprise, a majority of the guards began to behave sadistically toward the inmates within hours of initiation of the experiment (1973, 87-97). Just as surprising, the inmates meekly accepted their subservient role and mistreatment. In writing about this experiment, sociologist Zygmunt Bauman noted a "**sudden transmogrification of likable and decent American boys into near monsters** of the kind allegedly to be **found only in places like Auschwitz** or Treblinka" (Bauman 1989, 167). **What began as a make-believe experiment soon degenrated into an all too real microcosm of the interpersonal dynamics of real jails and prisons.** The universality of Zimbardo's finding is confirmed by the fact that the over- whelming majority of the heinous acts committed in Europe during the Nazi era were not perpetrated by fanatics or deranged people. To the contrary, those acts were per- formed by ordinary Germans, French, Poles, Czechs, and others who considered themselves to be legally authorized to act in ways that we retrospectively view as inhumane (Browning 1993, 159-89; Kren and Rappoport 1994, 70, 81-83).

Roleplaying is bad – it overlooks our own role in creating violence

Jayan Nayar, Professor of Law at the University of Warwick, 1999 (Symposium: Re-Framing International Law For The 21st Century: Orders of Inhumanity, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599)

The description of the continuities of violence in Section II in many ways is familiar to those who adopt a critical perspective of the world. "We" are accustomed to narrating human wrongs in this way. The failures and betrayals, the victims and perpetrators, are familiar to our critical understanding. From this position of judgment, commonly held within the "mainstream" of the "non-mainstream," there is also a familiarity of solutions commonly advocated for transformation; the "marketplace" for critique is a thriving one as evidenced by the abundance of literature in this respect. Despite this proliferation of enlightenment and the profession of so many good ideas, however, "**things**" appear to remain as they are, or, worse still, [*620] deteriorate. And so, the cycle of critique, proposals for transformation and disappointment continues. Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that prevail. But there are necessary prerequisites to answering the "what do we do?" question. We must first ask the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "toward what end?" These questions, obviously, impinge on our vision and judgment. When we attempt to imagine transformations toward preferred human futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the present. This is difficult not because we are oblivious to violence or that we are numb to the resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health, environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization)--the encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And without doubt, the perspectives of the observer, commentator, and actor become crucial determinants. It is necessary, I believe, to question this, "our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers and critics, but is also one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds where we stand very much as participants. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering.

Even Rawls agrees that the framework must be debatable

Ed Wingeenbach, Professor at the University of South Carolina, 1999 (Unjust Context: The Priority of Stability in Rawls's Contextualized Theory of Justice, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 1 January)

The recognition that we share no common doctrine except the fundamental intuition that no common doctrine can ever gain widespread acceptance involves a recognition of the underlying indeterminacy of modern democratic politics. Any conception of the political realm appropriate to such conditions **must be one that accepts and institutionalizes this indeterminacy. Democracy should be seen as the political practice which meets these demands**, if by democracy we understand a form of politics which recognizes that the context of politics itself must also be an object of contestation. This means that the framework within which political activity takes place, in Rawls's case the political conception of justice, must be open to debate and reform. Any attempt to take certain subjects or practices "off the table" violates Rawls's fundamental insight into modern democratic societies, namely, that no common doctrine licensing such a removal can achieve legitimate acceptance.

Methodology 1st

Methodology is key to effective policy making – vital to true education

Bartlett '90 (Katharine T., Professor of Law @ Duke University, (*Feminist Legal Methods*, Harvard Law Review, February)

Feminists have developed extensive critiques of law n2 and proposals for legal reform. n3 Feminists have had much less to say, however, about what the "doing" of law should entail and what truth status to give to the legal claims that follow. These methodological issues matter because methods shape one's view of the possibilities for legal practice and reform. Method "organizes the apprehension of truth; it determines what counts as evidence and defines what is taken as verification." n4 Feminists cannot ignore method, because if they seek to challenge existing structures of power with the same methods that [*831] have defined what counts within those structures, they may instead "recreate the illegitimate power structures [that they are] trying to identify and undermine." n5

Method matters also because without an understanding of feminist methods, feminist claims in the law will not be perceived as legitimate or "correct." I suspect that many who dismiss feminism as trivial or inconsequential misunderstand it. Feminists have tended to focus on defending their various substantive positions or political agendas, even among themselves. Greater attention to issues of method may help to anchor these defenses, to explain why feminist agendas often appear so radical (or not radical enough), and even to establish some common ground among feminists.

As feminists articulate their methods, they can become more aware of the nature of what they do, and thus do it better. Thinking about method is empowering. When I require myself to explain what I do, I am likely to discover how to improve what I earlier may have taken for granted. In the process, I am likely to become more committed to what it is that I have improved. This likelihood, at least, is a central premise of this Article and its primary motivation.

Circumvention

Under the state's current understanding of what a population is, there will always be biometric surveillance – to have any semblance of solvency we must work outside legislative action

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http://www.salon.com/2013/05/10/hidden_in_immigration_reform_vast_biometrics_plan/

The very concept of population is one of a certain type of control — namely the mechanisms through which certain groups get to be counted as among, or outside the population. Indeed, to be part of a population — further, a citizenry — is to be countable, databased. It should come as no surprise then, that tucked into the proposed immigration reform bill currently under debate in the Senate is a mandate for ensuring every American is identified, counted and countable constantly. As Wired noted Friday, "Buried in the more than 800 pages of the bipartisan legislation (.pdf) is language mandating the creation of the innocuously-named "photo tool," a massive federal database administered by the Department of Homeland Security and containing names, ages, Social Security numbers and photographs of everyone in the country with a driver's license or other state-issued photo ID."

The aim of the database would be to ensure that employers did not employ illegal immigrants — the would have to check new hires in the database to verify that they match their photo. Privacy advocates have, however, expressed concern for the creeping use of biometrics and enforced identification in every aspect of American life. Wired reports:

Privacy advocates fear the inevitable mission creep, ending with the proof of self being required at polling places, to rent a house, buy a gun, open a bank account, acquire credit, board a plane or even attend a sporting event or log on the internet. Think of it as a government version of Foursquare, with Big Brother cataloging every check-in.

"It starts to change the relationship between the citizen and state, you do have to get permission to do things," said Chris Calabrese, a congressional lobbyist with the American Civil Liberties Union. "More fundamentally, it could be the start of keeping a record of all things."

The privacy advocate's concerns are apt, but fail to point out that such a vast biometrics database is just the latest technology — following from passports, Social Security numbers and the like — to illustrate that inherent to the very concept of population are mechanisms of counting and checking. Which sorts of checks we find unacceptable and violating is then the question we have to ask. That we — as citizens, as a population — are checkable and countable should be well understood.

Reform Bad

Reform is bad

Rodriguez 08 (Dylan Rodriguez, assistant professor at University of California Riverside, "Abolition Now!", p. 93-100)

We are collectively witnessing, surviving, and working in a time of unprecedented state-organized human capture and state-produced physical/social/ psychic alienation, from the 2.5 million imprisoned by the domestic and global US prison industrial complex to the profound forms of informal apartheid and proto- apartheid that are being instantiated in cities, suburbs, and rural areas all over the country. This condition presents a profound crisis – and political possibility – for people struggling against the white supremacist state, which continues to institutionalize the social liquidation and physical evisceration of Black, brown, and aboriginal peoples nearby and far away. If we are to approach racism, neoliberalism, militarism/militarization, and US state hegemony and domination in a legitimately "global" way, it is nothing short of unconscionable to expend significant political energy protesting American wars elsewhere (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan etc.) when there are overlapping, and no less profoundly oppressive, declarations of and mobilizations for war in our very own, most intimate and nearby geographies of "home." This time of crisis and emergency necessitates a critical examination of the political and institutional logics that structure so much of the US progressive left, and particularly the "establishment" left that is tethered (for better and worse) to the non-profit industrial complex (NPIC). I have defined the NPIC elsewhere as the set of symbiotic relationships that link political and financial technologies of state and owning class social control with surveillance over public political discourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements. This definition is most focused on the industrialized incorporation, accelerated since the 1970s, of pro-state liberal and progressive campaigns and movements into a spectrum of government-proctored non-profit organizations.   It is in the context of the formation of the NPIC as a political power structure that I wish to address, with a less-than-subtle sense of alarm, a peculiar and disturbing politics of assumption that often structures, disciplines, and actively shapes the work of even the most progressive movements and organizations within the US establishment left (of which I too am a part, for better and worse): that is, the left's willingness to fundamentally tolerate – and accompanying unwillingness to abolish – the institutionalized dehumanization of the contemporary policing and imprisonment apparatus in its most localized, unremarkable, and hence "normal" manifestations within the domestic "homeland" of the Homeland Security state. Behind the din of progressive and liberal reformist struggles over public policy, civil liberties, and law, and beneath the infrequent mobilizations of activity to defend against the next onslaught of racist, classist, ageist, and misogynist crirninalization, there is an unspoken politics of assumption that takes for granted the mystified permanence of domestic warfare as a constant production of targeted and massive suffering, guided by the logic of Black, brown, and indigenous subjection to the expediencies and essential violence of the American (global) nation-building project. To put it differently: despite the unprecedented forms of imprisonment, social and political repression, and violent policing that compose the mosaic of our historical time, the establishment left (within and perhaps beyond the US) **does not care to envision, much less politically prioritize, the abolition of US domestic warfare** and its structuring white supremacist social logic as its most urgent task of the present and future. Our non-profit left, in particular, seems content to engage in desperate (and usually well-intentioned) attempts to **manage** the casualties of domestic warfare, foregoing the urgency of an abolitionist praxis that openly, critically, and radically addresses the moral, cultural, and political **premises of these wars.** Not long from now, generations will emerge from the organic accumulation of rage, suffering, social alienation, and (we hope) **politically principled rebellion against this living apocalypse** and pose to us some rudimentary questions of radical accountability: How were we able to accommodate, and even culturally and politically normalize the strategic, explicit, and openly racist technologies of state violence that effectively socially neutralized and frequently liquidated entire nearby populations of our people, given that ours are the very same populations that have historically struggled to survive and overthrow such "classical" structures of dominance as colonialism, frontier conquest, racial slavery, and other genocides? In a somewhat more intimate sense, how could we live with ourselves in this domestic state of emergency, and why did we seem to generally forfeit the creative possibilities of radically challenging, dislodging, and transforming the ideological and institutional premises of this condition of domestic warfare in favor of **short-term, "winnable" policy reforms?** (For example, why did we choose to formulate and tolerate a "progressive" political language that reinforced dominant racist notions of "criminality" in the process of trying to discredit the legal basis of "Three Strikes" laws?) What were the fundamental concerns of our progressive organizations and movements during this time, and were they willing to comprehend and galvanize an effective, or even viable opposition to the white supremacist state's terms of engagement (that is, warfare)? 'this radical accountability reflects a variation on anti- colonial liberation theorist Frantz Fanon's memorable statement to his own peers, comrades,

and nemeses: Each generation must discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opacity. In the underdeveloped countries preceding generations have simultaneously resisted the insidious agenda of colonialism and paved the way for the emergence of the current struggles. Now that we are in the heat of combat, we must shed the habit of decrying the efforts of our forefathers or feigning incomprehension at their silence or passiveness. Our historical moment suggests the need for a principled political rupturing of existing techniques and strategies that fetishize and fixate on the negotiation, massaging, and management of the worst outcomes of domestic warfare. One political move long overdue is toward grassroots pedagogies of radical dis-identification with the state, in the trajectory of an anti-nationalism or anti-patriotism, that reorients a progressive identification with the creative possibilities of insurgency (this is to consider "insurgency" as a politics that pushes beyond the defensive maneuvering of "resistance"). Reading a few lines down from our first invoking of Fanon's call to collective, liberatory action is clarifying here: "For us who are determined to break the back of colonialism, our historic mission is to authorize every revolt, every desperate act, and every attack aborted or drowned in blood."

AT CTP

The focus on politics proper ignores the ability of the alternative to have effects across the political spectrum and misunderstands the need for new types of political organization

Misoczky and Flores 2012 [Ceci Misoczky Professora Adjunta no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul and Rafael Kruter Flores, Doutorando em Administração no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Contributions of Latin American revolutionary intellectuals for the study of the organization of liberating struggles REBELA, v. 2, n. 1, jun. 2012)

In a different direction, we are convinced that <u>the focus on the organization of social anti-capitalist struggles is a relevant academic praxis, because it opposes the hegemonic definition of organization</u> (as a synonym of enterprise) in a context of worldwide dominance of the managerial discourse. <u>The aim is to produce counter-hegemonic knowledge in the very space where the hegemonic managerial discourse is produced and reproduced</u>, and to contribute for the emancipation of OS (or at least ofe the parts of OS which intend to be critical) from the hegemony of management. We believe, with Neuhaus and Calello (2006, p. 2), that <u>researches may "be critical interventions, both in the spaces where they are done - where potential forces of resistance to the hegemonic power are concentrated; and in the researchers themselve</u>s". <u>The first step to widen the ways in which we study requires the abandonment of restrictive understandings of organization as a unit of analysis</u> (Cooke, 2004 and 2010; Dar, 2008). Cooper and Burell (1988, p. 106) and Böhm (2005) had already indicated the direction of an expanded conception of organization as an ongoing process "that occurs within the wider 'body' of society". In our research group, we have been exploring alternative ways of defining organization in order to deal with our focus of interest - the organization of social struggles. <u>Organizations have been conceived as the collective inter-subjective act which is, simultaneously, a means for the praxis of liberation and a learning space for the experimentation of organizational practices compatible with liberating struggles</u> (MISOCZKY, 2010). As part of this research project we felt the need to engage with the thought of Latin American intellectuals. The fact that the development of OS in Latina America can be understood as a distorted version of the functionalist or the critical thought of the Centre has already been recognized. Despite such dominance scholars often express the uncomfortable sense that such approaches do not really explain what happens in their countries, while acknowledging that these frameworks give them recognition in the international arena, which is another way to say that to be allowed in you must deny your own identity (IBARRA- COLADO, 2006). We can say, using the expression of Schwarz (1992), that the hegemonic version of Latin American and Brazilian OS is made of texts which do not express marks of location, which do not offer reflections about the peculiarities of our space of enunciation or about how social and institutional contexts limit and condition the production of ideas. But this is not truth concerning the wider critical (often revolutionary) intellectual Latin American production, marked by a vast and rich cultural tradition. <u>When we mention the Latin American cultural tradition or social thought we are opposing the construction of Latin America as an object of representation</u>. This last expression means, for Moraña (1998), an image that defines its existence through the watching eyes, as the place of the other – an exotic pre-theoretical marginal place when confronted with metropolitan discourses. Instead, <u>we are stating the existence of a creative, original and autonomous tradition, resulting from processes of transculturation.</u>

Current political spheres marginalize the voices of those who don't fit into the image of normativity—our analysis is a good starting point

Dawson 14 (Michael J. Dawson, John D. MacArthur Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, "Civic Engagement and America's Racialized, Anti-Democratic Public Sphere, The Democracy Papers, May 2014, http://thedemocracypapers.ssrc.org/civic-engagement-and-americas-racialized-anti-democratic-public-sphere/)

<u>==Racial cleavages in public opinion remain massive==</u> particularly <u>==between black and white citizens==</u>. <u>Gaps of twenty to sixty percent between mean black and white opinion are consistently found</u> on questions such as support for military intervention in the Middle East, economic redistribution, prospects for blacks achieving racial equality in the U.S., whether felons who have served their time should be allowed to vote, whether the government should apologize to blacks for slavery and Jim Crow, and the whether the poor government response to the Katrina disaster was due in part to racial inequality. <u>Group differences of this magnitude are disturbing for a number of reasons.</u> <u>==These differences are indicative of large degrees of==</u>

polarization between black and white citizens, and that political discourse within the U.S. is to a substantial degree structured along racial lines. Even more worrisome, these vast cleavages are also indicative of the anti-democratic nature of public discourse in the U.S. and more generally the public sphere. An important form of civic engagement and political participation is the ability of citizens and groups of citizens to participate in the public sphere, and thereby influence public opinion, shape policy formation and demand accountability from public officials. In the U.S., however, as we saw vividly during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, mainstream black political opinion is marginalized, excluded and demonized. Not only are mainstream black political voices rarely heard (as even in this conservative era they anchor the left of the American political spectrum), not only is mainstream black opinion not represented in the institutions of government, these positions and the speakers that utter them are demonized—condemned as being hopelessly out of step with "real American" politics, or worse anti-American. Jean Cohen (1999) points out that multiple publics do not in and of themselves signify an exclusionary set of publics. Multiple publics are a mark, according to Cohen, of any pluralistic society—one can have both multiple publics and multiple different types of publics. The key, however, is that these multiple publics comprised of "readers, listeners, viewers, and now cyber-communicators scattered around the national and international society" must also be part of a larger "public of publics," which allows them to contribute to what Cohen calls "public opinion in general" and what Habermas calls the will-formation process. Much public sphere theory conceptualizes political influence as flowing from public sphere to the policy formation process—from the public to the state. But for subordinate counterpublics, publics that must fight to have their voices heard and considered, the causal arrow is at least partially reversed. In a pluralistic democratic society, for the counterpublic's views to be heard and be influential in the larger "public of publics" and have an impact on the state, the subordinate population must wield sufficient political power for their views would be heard and considered. That political power could come from three sources: (1) local mass mobilization from within black civil society; (2) local political power exercised through the electoral system; and (3) substantial political pressure from outside of any given local area—most likely, as is usually the case for subordinate populations, from their compatriots nationally. In this era of the triumph of neoliberal sensibilities even within black politics, local or national black political mobilization is rare, and the limited leverage provided by black electoral power has had to serve as the main, if not ideal, protector of local black interests. In a racially fragmented civil society the black counterpublic formed in response to the dominant publics has its roots in the relative political, economic, and social powerlessness that African Americans have had historically and continue to have in this era. The relative powerlessness of the black counterpublic has made it difficult for the consensuses that developed within it to be interjected within mainstream publics. The extreme racial polarization found within public opinion surveys is indeed an indication of lack of success that the black counterpublic has had in influencing white mainstream publics. The reverse is also true of course; black publics remain relatively resistant to white opinion, but it is white opinion that molds public policy, and it is white opinion that gets coded as "normal," "rational," and "reasonable." Indeed, as Nancy Fraser (1989) and Michael Warner (2002) both argue, counterpublics are by their nature subordinate to their dominant counterparts (in this case, subordinate to white-dominated civil society, public spheres, and counterpublics) and, as Fraser argues, have subaltern status. Warner makes this point when he states, "Dominant publics are by definition those that can take their discourse pragmatics and their lifeworlds for granted, misrecognizing the indefinite scope of their expansive address as universality or normalcy." But the effect of this misrecognition is that alternative discourses become marginalized and, in this case, with real consequences for the shape of political power and the distribution of life chances. Both the exclusion from civil society as well as exclusion from the "public of publics" has led to a near total lack of access to the policy-making arena. This deadly combination has left black communities especially vulnerable to economic, political and other disasters—a vulnerability that was highlighted in recent years by the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina and the human-constructed disaster of the aftermath to the storm, and more recently by the financial crisis that has gripped the world. Real threats exist to the ability of blacks and other marginalized populations, particularly Latinos, to participate in traditionally conceived political participation and civic engagement. Minority voting rights are under attack throughout the country. In addition to fighting these attacks, we must also address how to reconstruct political discourse within the U.S. so that the public sphere serves the democratic functions it ought to and no longer be a site of racial exclusion and marginalization. If this does not occur, black (and other) citizens will not fully have the ability to participate in all aspects of democratic life.

The focus on politics proper ignores the ability of the alternative to have effects across the political spectrum and misunderstands the need for new types of political organization

Misoczky and Flores 2012 [Ceci Misoczky Professora Adjunta no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul and Rafael Kruter Flores, Doutorando em Administração no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Contributions of Latin American revolutionary intellectuals for the study of the organization of liberating struggles REBELA, v. 2, n. 1, jun. 2012)

In a different direction, we are convinced that <u>the focus on the organization of social anti-capitalist struggles is a relevant academic praxis, because it opposes the hegemonic definition of organization</u> (as a synonym of enterprise) in a context of worldwide dominance of the managerial discourse. <u>The aim is to produce counter-hegemonic knowledge in the very space where the hegemonic managerial discourse is produced and reproduced</u>, and to contribute for the emancipation of OS (or at least ofe the parts of OS which intend to be critical) from the hegemony of management. We believe, with Neuhaus and Calello (2006, p. 2), that <u>researches may "be critical interventions, both in the spaces where they are done - where potential forces of resistance to the hegemonic power are concentrated; and in the researchers themselve</u>s". <u>The first step to widen the ways in which we study requires the abandonment of restrictive understandings of organization as a unit of analysis</u> (Cooke, 2004 and 2010; Dar, 2008). Cooper and Burell (1988, p. 106) and Böhm (2005) had already indicated the direction of an expanded conception of organization as an ongoing process "that occurs within the wider 'body' of society". In our research group, we have been exploring alternative ways of defining organization in order to deal with our focus of interest - the organization of social struggles. <u>Organizations have been conceived as the collective inter-subjective act which is, simultaneously, a means for the praxis of liberation and a learning space for the experimentation of organizational practices compatible with liberating struggles</u> (MISOCZKY, 2010). As part of this research project we felt the need to engage with the thought of Latin American intellectuals. The fact that the development of OS in Latina America can be understood as a distorted version of the functionalist or the critical thought of the Centre has already been recognized. Despite such dominance scholars often express the uncomfortable sense that such approaches do not really explain what happens in their countries, while acknowledging that these frameworks give them recognition in the international arena, which is another way to say that to be allowed in you must deny your own identity (IBARRA- COLADO, 2006). We can say, using the expression of Schwarz (1992), that the hegemonic version of Latin American and Brazilian OS is made of texts which do not express marks of location, which do not offer reflections about the peculiarities of our space of enunciation or about how social and institutional contexts limit and condition the production of ideas. But this is not truth concerning the wider critical (often revolutionary) intellectual Latin American production, marked by a vast and rich cultural tradition. <u>When we mention the Latin American cultural tradition or social thought we are opposing the construction of Latin America as an object of representation</u>. This last expression means, for Moraña (1998), an image that defines its existence through the watching eyes, as the place of the other – an exotic pre-theoretical marginal place when confronted with metropolitan discourses. Instead, <u>we are stating the existence of a creative, original and autonomous tradition, resulting from processes of transculturation.</u>

Civic engagement is a vague concept—their authors are likely referring to different actions as indicators of civic engagement

Ekman and Amna 12 (Joakim Ekman and Erik Amna, "Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology", Human Affairs, Volume 22, Issue 3, p. 283-300, July 2012, http://link.springer.com/article/10.2478%2Fs13374-012-0024-1)

Somewhat provocatively, <u>it has argued that "civic engagement" as a concept is ready for the dustbin.</u> In recent, <u>it has been used as a buzzword</u>, to cover everything from voting in elections to giving money to charity, or from bowling in leagues to participate in political rallies and marches (Berger 2009, 335). <u>Putnam has been identified as the one that popularised the concept, and for him, it was a matter of pointing out the importance of "social capital" for a vital democratic society. In a manner of speaking, his focus was more on "engagement" than on the "civic" or the "political".</u> When analysing citizens' levels of engagement, Putnam covered just about everything from <u>reading newspapers, political participation, social networks and interpersonal trust to associational</u>

involvement. All of this was labelled civic engagement and the point was very simplified that such civic engagement tended to correlate with a functioning democracy and market economy (Putnam 1993). In a few articles and a larger study, Putnam expanded his thesis, and argued that civic engagement was on the decline in the US. American democracy was supposedly eroding from the inside (Putnam 1995; 1997; 2000). This sparked a global debate about the future of the established democracies. But again, Putnam was somewhat unclear about what it was that was actually declining, since "civic engagement" was a bit of everything (Berger 2009). What we have here is a typical example of conceptual stretching (Berger 2009, 336; Sartori 1970). If civic engagement is used by scholars to mean completely different things, it is basically a useless concept—it confuses more than it illuminates. If the crucial issue for the established democracies has to do with declining levels of "civic engagement", as Putnam and others have argued (Pharr, Putnam 2000), then we certainly need to be more clear about what it is that is actually declining or what exactly it is that we so desperately need as much of as we can possibly get. Other scholars too have noted the lack of consensus on what constitute civic engagement. Reviewing existing definitions of the term, Adler and Goggin (2005) conclude that there is no single agreed-upon meaning of civic engagement. That does not mean that all definitions are broad and all-encompassing. As Adler and Goggin point out, there are a number of more confined definitions that restrict civic engagement to apply to very specific action, such as community service, collective action and even political involvement (Adler, Goggin 2005, 238-240).

A lot of things could be civic engagement

Ekman and Amna 12 (Joakim Ekman and Erik Amna, "Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology", Human Affairs, Volume 22, Issue 3, p. 283-300, July 2012, http://link.springer.com/article/10.2478%2Fs13374-012-0024-1)

The two writers ask us to think about the term as a continuum, spanning from the private sphere to the formal or public sphere. The former covers individual action like helping one's neighbours or simply discussing politics with one's friends. The latter encompasses collective action, like activity within a party, an organisation or interest group. Adler and Goggin also propose their own definition of civic engagement; it has basically to do with "how an active citizen participates in the life of a community in order to improve conditions for others or to help shape the community's future" (Adler, Goggin 2005, 241). We certainly like to applaud Adler and Goggin's attempt to conceptualise civic engagement and bring order in the rich flora of definitions of the term. However, we also feel that Berger (2009) has a point when criticising such broad definitions. It is hard not to agree that a term covering everything from helping a neighbour to voting in elections or running for public office in fact entails conceptual stretching. Let us proceed by contrasting the image depicted by Berger (2009) and Adler and Goggin (2005) with another description of a field of research, focusing more narrowly on "political participation". Political science research on citizens' engagement in politics has conventionally focused on electoral participation (cf. Brady 1999; van Deth 2001). For a long time, voting was perceived as the primary way for a citizen to make his or her voice heard in the political system, and voting turnout has been described as the most commonly used measure of citizen participation in the US. When post-war American political scientists thought about political participation, they quite simply thought about acts intentionally aimed at influencing governmental decisions (Verba, Nie 1972; Easton 1953, 134). A frequently cited definition by Verba and his associates, from the 1970s, testifies to the focus on the election of political leaders and the approval of their policies: By political participation we refer to those legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions that they take (Verba, Nie, Kim 1978, 1). Other often-cited definitions from the same era are quite similar: political participation was understood as "actions of private citizens by which they seek to influence or support government and politics" or as "all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system" (Milbrath, Goel 1977, 2; Kaase, Marsch 1979, 42). At the same time, Verba and others admitted that all allocations of values in society are not determined by political elites alone—also, private and civil society actors could fill this function. Still, most political scientists at the time were not really interested in civic engagement in wider sense or in how citizens acted in relation to social elites outside of the political domain; rather, it was a matter of pointing out that citizens could also, in addition to voting, participate in politics in-between elections (Verba, Nie, Kim 1978, 47). This way of thinking about political participation at least implicitly opened up for analyses of activities that included not only voting behaviour, but also e.g. demonstrations, strikes, boycotts and other forms of protest behaviour. This line of thought was also quite early on followed by Barnes and Kaase in their seminal work on Political Action (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979; Kaase, Marsh 1979; cf. Verba, Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Montero, Westholm, van Deth 2007, 434). Consequently, actions

directed against all political, societal, media or economic actors (or elites) could be analysed as "political participation" (Teorell et al. 2007, 335-336; Norris 2002, 193).

Political participation takes on many different forms

Ekman and Amna 12 (Joakim Ekman and Erik Amna, "Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology", Human Affairs, Volume 22, Issue 3, p. 283-300, July 2012, http://link.springer.com/article/10.2478%2Fs13374-012-0024-1)

The strength of the typology suggested by Teorell et al. is the explicit focus on manifest political participation in a more narrow sense—i.e. activities intended to influence actual political outcomes by targeting relevant political or societal elites (cf. Brady 1999). At the same time, the typology is wide enough to cover a lot more than just participation in elections. Moreover, the typology is based on previous studies that have demonstrated empirically that different forms of participation seem to be related: citizens involved in one mode or dimension of political behaviour tend to be involved in other forms of political behaviour within the same dimension, but not necessarily involved in political activities in other dimensions. For example, citizens involved in illegal demonstrations also tend to get involved in legal demonstrations, but not necessarily in conventional party activity. However, we would nevertheless like to argue that the typology suggested by Teorell et al. is not optimal. For one thing, it is not obvious that all "protest behaviour" could be tapped with measures like participation in demonstrations, strikes and illegal political action. Certain forms of voting—e.g. blank voting—could be described as a protest as well. Or, for that matter, non-voting, the signing of petitions and political consumption. In the typology suggested by Teorell et al., the two latter forms of participation are called "consumer participation", a label that may in fact obscure the protest character of the specific action. More importantly, the typology does not take into account latent forms of political participation, the kind of engagement that may be regarded "pre-political" or on "standby". This notion of latency is based on the simple observation that citizens actually do a lot of things that may not be directly or unequivocally classified as "political participation", but at the same time could be of great significance for future political activities of a more conventional type. If we are interested in declining levels of political participation, we must not overlook such potentially political forms of engagement. People of all ages and from all walks of life engage socially in a number of ways, formally outside of the political domain, but nevertheless in ways that may have political consequences. Even the relatively extensive typology developed by Teorell et al. ultimately fails to take such "pre-political" actions or activities into account. What do we miss, employing such a theoretical framework? A bit pointedly, only the rest of the iceberg. A lot of citizen engagement in the contemporary democracies seems to be formally non-political or semipolitical on the surface, that is, activities not directly aimed at influencing the people in power, but nevertheless activities that entail involvement in society and current affairs. People in general discuss politics, consume political news in papers and on TV or on the Internet, or talk about societal issues. People are aware of global problems, like environmental issues and the poverty or HIV situation in different parts of the world. People have political knowledge and skills, and hold informed opinions about politics. Some people write to editors in local papers, debating local community affairs. Others express their opinions on-line. Moreover, people with such attention to societal affairs take more active part in society as well, in different ways. People donate money, to support the building of schools or clean water delivery systems in developing countries, or to support research on cancer and heart diseases. People of all ages recycle. People organise car pools to get to work in an environmental friendly way. All of this is excluded from the typology suggested by Teorell et al. Although this is perfectly reasonable, we still feel that it is a shortcoming, since all these things may be important for us to accurately analyse and understand the conditions for political participation in different countries. What is more, if we are interested in explaining different forms of engagement in political affairs among different groups in society, e.g. youth, women, or immigrants, we certainly cannot afford to overlook these aspects of "pre-political" orientations and activities. The closest thing to the notion of "latent participation" we find in the works of Schudson (1996; 1999) and his notion of "monitorial citizens". Schudson's optimistic claim is that citizens today are not uninterested or uninformed

about politics, or lack political efficacy; they just take a deliberate anticipative stand in which they seek out information about politics and stay interested. And (only) when they feel that it is really imperative, they will intervene or act politically. They thus avoid conventional channels of political participation; but it is not correct to say that they are not politically involved; they are, as "monitorial citizens". This notion is close to various ideas about "post-modern" orientations among citizens today (cf. Hooghe, Dejaeghere 2007, 250-251; Inglehart 1990; 1997). As we have demonstrated so far, "civic engagement" has arguably become something of a catch-all concept in recent years, less than ideal for precise empirical analyses of the conditions for citizens' involvement in society. Furthermore, the literature on "political participation" stands out as too narrow in scope, in some respects. Important aspects of citizens' political (or pre-political) engagement are systematically overlooked, using the standard definitions of political participation. Here, the idea is thus to enhance our understanding of the much-debated declining levels of political engagement, low electoral turnout, and eroding public confidence in the institutions of representative democracy, by constructing a new typology of citizens' political and "pre-political" behaviour (here conceptualised as "civic engagement" and "social involvement").

Political participation doesn't necessarily have to relate to or be the government

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Turning next to manifest political behaviour, the idea is to emphasise that what we refer to as actual "political participation" is quite simply all actions directed towards influencing governmental decisions and political outcomes. It is goal oriented or rational, if you will. It is observable and can be measured straightforwardly. It has to do with the wishes of ordinary citizens to influence politics and political outcomes in society, or the decisions that affect public affairs. Within the framework of a representative democracy, this is what we in our typology refer to as formal political participation. Citizens vote in the general elections, in order to support some parties or candidates, or to make sure others will not gain too much influence. People take part in referenda for similar reasons. To some, it may be a deliberate political act to abstain from voting in an election or a referendum, as a protest against the political order or the incumbents. Or, they may cast a blank vote in an election to demonstrate political dissatisfaction. Other types of formal political participation, on the individual level, cover what other scholars have referred to as "contact activities". Citizens may write to politicians or civil servants, in order to try to influence the political agenda or political outcomes. Also, individuals may run for office themselves, in local or national government. As for "formal" collective forms of political behaviour, the typical example would be membership: in a political party, a trade union, or any organisation with a distinct political agenda, e.g. human rights advocacy groups, peace organisation, or environmental groups. However, political participation need not relate directly to the formal political institutional framework of a country (the parliamentary sphere) or to the conventional actors within that framework (political parties, political actors, trade unions and organisations). In order to influence the political agenda or the political outcomes, citizens may engage in extra-parliamentary activities and manifestations, sometimes referred to as protest behaviour or "unconventional" political participation. Here however, we have deliberately avoided the notion of "unconventional" participation, since such forms of what was once considered protest behaviour—like signing petitions or taking part in demonstrations and strikes—are not really unconventional any more. Instead, we simply talk about extra-parliamentary forms of political participation, and make a special point out of distinguishing between legal and illegal forms of extra-parliamentary activism. Legal forms of extra-parliamentary activities include participation in demonstrations, strikes and other manifest forms of protest actions. Also, under this heading we place membership in (or activity within) groups or parties that deliberately stand outside of the parliamentary sphere, like network-based social movements or political actions groups of various kinds. Such forms of political participation include involvement in e.g. women's rights groups, animal protection organisations, or the global justice movement. Such expressions of political interest and channels for political participation seem to fit young people particularly well; it is not organised in a conventional (or hierarchical) way, like a political party, nor is it just about supporting a good cause. Extra-parliamentary activity within network-based groups provides its members or supporters with a sense of "doing something", an opportunity to personally take a stand and make a difference. For many people, the manifest political activities becomes concentrated to particular and not seldom spectacular events, like the European Social Forum (ESF) meetings or counter-demonstrations at G8 meetings or EU top meetings. Also, on the individual level, extra-parliamentary activism could come in the form of signing or collecting petitions, handing out political leaflets, or boycotting/"boycotting". Certain brands and products are bought—or refuted—for ideological, ethical or environmental reasons. This is also a way for ordinary citizens to directly influence the people in power (not necessarily politicians), and thus a rational form of manifest political action. In an emerging political science literature, such behaviour is referred to as "political consumption" (Stolle, Hooghe, Micheletti 2005). Some forms of extra-parliamentary political activities are unlawful, like participating in illegal demonstrations or violent protests bordering on riots. For example, in Europe, the autonomous radical left has since the 1970s been something of a standing feature in some major cities, like Berlin, Paris and Copenhagen. Other forms of illegal political action encompass animal liberation groups that set animals free or attack stores selling furs or laboratories where animal testing is conducted. Anti-sexist attacks on porn shops by militant feminist groups would also fit this category, alongside all sorts of civil disobedience activities.

Civic engagement can be community-based approaches too

Ekman and Amna 12 (Joakim Ekman and Erik Amna, "Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology", Human Affairs, Volume 22, Issue 3, p. 283-300, July 2012, http://link.springer.com/article/10.2478%2Fs13374-012-0024-1)

Civic engagement conventionally refers to activities by ordinary citizens that are intended to influence circumstances in society that is of relevance to others, outside the own family and circle of close friends (Adler, Goggin 2005, 241). In our typology (Table 1 and 2), the concept refers specifically to such individual or collective actions noted above (cf. Zukin et al. 2006). People engage in society in a number of different ways: they discuss politics, follow political issues, write to editors, donate money, and recycle for environmental reasons. People do voluntary work to help others. People get organised

to solve local problems or to improve conditions for certain groups in society. In Table 1, we place all such activities under the heading civil participation, which we also think of here as latent political participation. To be very clear, the civil actions we refer to are of course manifest (observable) behaviour as well, but "latent" in relation to specific political parliamentary and extra-parliamentary actions. Again, this reflects our wish to cover not only activities intended to influence actual political outcomes by targeting relevant political or societal elites, but activities and forms of engagement that could very well be of great relevance for e.g. future manifest political action, even if "pre-political" or "potentially political" rather than directly political as such. Of course, to cover such actions also gives us a more nuanced picture of the total engagement/participation situation in a given country at a given point in time, and consequently, we become better equipped to analyse supposed crises of democracy and participation. Also, the distinction is made to point out that there are limits to what we would refer to as political participation. Not everything fits this category. Recycling, for example, even if done for environmental reasons, is not "political participation" in our typology, since the action is not directly aimed at any specific actor (like a boycott, for example). Rather, recycling for environmental reasons could be seen as an act of civic engagement in our typology

Debate Space Key

The Debate space is key to analyze questions of oppression

Reid-Brinkley, '08 (Dr. Shanara R. Reid-Brinkley, professor at the University of Georgia focusing on racial studies, argument and performance, and black feminist theory, she is also the director of debate, "The Harsh Realities of" acting Black": How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance and Style", https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf

The attempts at educational reform are not limited to institutional actors such as the local, state, and federal governments. Non-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating the black/white achievement gap have also proliferated. One such organization, the Urban Debate League, claims that "Urban Debate Leagues have proven to increase literacy scores by 25%, to improve grade-point averages by 8 to 10%, to achieve high school graduation rates of nearly 100%, and to produce college matriculation rates of 71 to 91%." The UDL program is housed in over fourteen American cities and targets inner city youths of color to increase their access to debate training. Such training of students defined as "at risk" is designed to offset the negative statistics associated with black educational achievement. The program has been fairly successful and has received wide scale media attention. The success of the program has also generated renewed interest amongst college debate programs in increasing direct efforts at recruitment of racial and ethnic minorities. The UDL program creates a substantial pool of racial minorities with debate training coming out of high school, that college debate directors may tap to diversify their own teams. The debate community serves as a microcosm of the broader educational space within which racial ideologies are operating. It is a space in which academic achievement is performed according to the intelligibility of one's race, gender, class, and sexuality. As policy debate is intellectually rigorous and has historically been closed to those marked by social difference, it offers a unique opportunity to engage the impact of desegregation and diversification of American education. How are black students integrated into a competitive educational community from which they have traditionally been excluded? How are they represented in public and media discourse about their participation, and how do they rhetorically respond to such representations? If racial ideology is perpetuated within discourse through the stereotype, then mapping the intelligibility of the stereotype within public discourse and the attempts to resist such intelligibility is a critical tool in the battle to end racial domination.

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State Debate

State Inevitable and Key

State is inevitable and necessary part to get rid of current mechanisms that exist and cause violence

Welsh et al 10 (John F. Welsh, Independent Scholar (Louisville, KY, USA), E. Wayne Ross University of British Columbia Kevin D. Vinson University of the West Indies, "To Discipline and Enforce: Surveillance and Spectacle in State Reform of Higher Education," Vol.3, No. 2 (February 2010) Pp. 25-39)//ghs-VA

At the base of the society of the spectacle is the division of labour produced by the specialization of political power. "The specialized role played by the spectacle is that of spokesperson for all other activities … and the source of the only discourse which society allows itself to hear" (Debord 1994:28). Politically, the spectacle is an endless discourse "upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise. The spectacle is the self-portrait of power in the age of power's totalitarian rule over the conditions of existence" (29). The spectacle's division of society into those who wield power and those who passively observe or contemplate the spectacle "is inseparable from the modern State, which, as the product of the social division of labor and the organ of class rule, is the general form of all social division" (30). For Debord, the spectacle maintains its own regime of control and discipline, differentiated from surveillance and the Panopticon. The spectacle exists for its own reproduction and, through the economic and political realms, subordinates all human life to its needs. It controls by isolating and fragmenting, distorting communication, alienating human action, and restructuring communication to ensure oneway, instantaneous messaging. It operates to mitigate community and dialogue and, thus, to control image, conflict, and change. Those who control images have the ability to mystify being and hierarchical power relations within the spectacle. Both Foucault and Debord articulated libertarian and antistatist visions of power, authority, and control in contemporary society. Both are **centrally concerned with the role of the state** and the mechanisms it uses to ensure direct and ideological social control in a society characterized by a loss of community and the structures of civil society that mediate relationships among people. Foucault's studies envisioned a Panopticon of surveillance. Debord's studies envisioned society as a collection of spectacles where appearance is more important than being. What is unique today is the merging of surveillance and spectacle where it is technologically possible and culturally desirable to see and be seen simultaneously and continuously. The potential of a totally administered society becomes more real as culture and technology become media through which everyone can watch everyone across all time and space. At the extreme, society becomes nothing more than a totality of isolated individuals incessantly under surveillance whose relationships are mediated by images. Postsecondary reform provides one case in which the merger of surveillance and spectacle can be understood, and which can itself be understood as surveillance and spectacle. One example of the operation of surveillance is the hierarchical observation of the attitudes, behaviours, and performances of institutions, programs, faculty/staff, and students within higher education. An example of spectacle occurs in the presentation and reporting of institutional and system performance to higher education's many constituencies. Both surveillance and spectacle elevate image above authenticity and operate as vehicles of social control, political domination, and cultural conformity.

State K2 Solve Surveillance

Individual acts of resistance reinforce the surveillance state apparatus – legislative change is key
Monahan 10 (Torin, Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "Surveillance in the time of Insecurity," 2010, Chapter 9 pg. 128-130)//ghs-VA

Resistance to surveillance, especially to dominating forms of surveillance, is a vital dimension of power negotiations. As Michel Foucault observes, "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power."1 Put differently, resistance is not reactive or in dialectical relationship to power; rather, it is co-constitutive of it. There are clearly many forms that resistance to surveillance can take; they range from civil society organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union challenging government spying programs in courts, on one end of the spectrum, to individuals not complying with marketers' requests for personal information like zip codes and e-mail addresses, on the other. People are not simply passive subjects compliantly succumbing to demands for their behaviors, preferences, and beliefs to become more transparent to and controllable by others. Nevertheless, when the field for social action and identity construction is radically constricted, opportunities for effective resistance—at least effective resistance without great personal risk—are diminished. One dominant argument of this book, for instance, is that neoliberal policies and practices have transformed public spaces and rights into private ones and have individualized what might be thought of as collective problems. Demands for people to become insecurity subjects fit neatly within this neoliberal framework because these demands push responsibility onto individuals to meet security needs through consumption, regardless of the veracity of security threats or their probability of actualizing. Resistance to surveillance can also function within and therefore unintentionally reinforce these security cultures **if it does not also challenge the rules** that govern possibilities for resistance. To make this case, this chapter analyzes practices of countersurveillance by activists and media artists—particularly against video and closed circuit television (CCTV) systems in urban areas—and theorizes their political implications. Countersurveillance activism can include disabling or destroying surveillance cameras, mapping paths of least surveillance and disseminating that information over the Internet, employing video cameras to monitor sanctioned surveillance systems and their personnel, or staging public plays to draw attention to the prevalence of surveillance in society. In some cases, marginal groups selectively appropriate technologies that they might otherwise oppose when used by those with institutional power.2 These examples illustrate the underdetermination of technologies and suggest further avenues for political intervention through countersurveillance. However, because surveillance systems evolve through social conflict, countersurveillance practices may implicate opposition groups in the further development of global systems of control. Countersurveillance operates within and in reaction to ongoing global transformations of public spaces and resources. According to social theorists, a crisis in capital accumulation in the 1970s precipitated a shift from mass production to flexible production regimes, catalyzing organizational decentralization, labor outsourcing, computerized automation, just-in-time production, and, increasingly, the privatization of that which has historically been considered "public."3 These structural transformations aggravated conditions of social inequality, leading to the development of new mechanisms of social control to regulate bodies in this unstable terrain. Some of the most effective forms of social control are those that naturalize the exclusion of economically or culturally marginalized groups through architecture or infrastructure. Mass incarceration of over 2.3 million individuals in the United States alone is one extreme measure of such postindustrial exclusion.4 Less dramatically, but perhaps more pervasively, fortified enclaves such as gated communities, shopping malls, and business centers have multiplied exponentially over the past decade and seem to be as prevalent in "developing" as in "developed" countries.5 Additionally, privatized streets, parks, and security services effectively sacrifice civic accountability and civil rights while increasing affordances for the monitoring of public life.6 Finally, telecommunications and other infrastructures unevenly distribute access to the goods and services necessary for modern life while facilitating data collection on and control of the public.7 Against this backdrop, the embedding of technological surveillance into spaces and infrastructures serves to augment not only existing social control functions but also capital accumulation imperatives, which are readily seen with the sharing of surveillance operations and data between public and private sectors.8 Through a range of interventions into the logic and institutions of global capitalism, countersurveillance tacticians seek to disrupt these trends in the privatization, sanitation, and elimination of public spaces, resources, and rights. While the ideologies and intentions of those engaging in countersurveillance are manifold and disparate, they are unified in the mission of safeguarding— or creating—the necessary spaces for meaningful participation in

determining the social, environmental, and economic conditions of life. Because of this orientation, the term countersurveillance will be used here to indicate intentional, tactical uses or disruptions of surveillance technologies to challenge power asymmetries. In this chapter I review several countersurveillance practices and analyze the power relations simultaneously revealed and reproduced by resistance to institutionalized surveillance. The emphasis here is upon the framing of surveillance problems and responses by activists, or on points of symbolic conflict rather than physical confrontation. Thus, it is assumed that while countersurveillance practitioners may have immediate practical goals, such as circumventing or destroying video cameras, that they are foremost engaged in acts of symbolic resistance with the intention of raising public awareness about modern surveillance regimes. I analyze two categories of countersurveillance efforts—interventions into the technical and social faces of public surveillance—and then theorize the efficacy and implications of countersurveillance more generally. The data are drawn primarily from Web sites, video productions, and publications, but I conducted several interviews with activists in the United States to corroborate the critical readings offered here. The main argument is that activists tend to individualize both surveillance problems and methods of resistance, **leaving the institutions, policies, and cultural assumptions that support public surveillance relatively insulated from attack**. Furthermore, while the oppositional framing presented by activists (that is, countersurveillance versus surveillance) may challenge the status quo and raise public awareness, it also introduces the danger of unintentionally reinforcing the systems of social control that activists seek to undermine.

Individual Reflection Bad

Institutional change is key – abstract post-modernism ignores the reality of everyday people

Monahan 10 (Torin, Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "Surveillance in the time of Insecurity," 2010, Chapter 9)//ghs-VA

This <u>countersurveillance intervention is explicitly conceived of as an art project</u> that appropriates surveillance technologies to challenge their dominant meanings and uses. <u>Mann mobilizes a tactic he calls "reflectionism," or reflecting experiences of being surveilled back on the surveillers, with the goal of destabilizing</u> store <u>employees to make them realize that they are merely "totalitarianist officials" involved in acts of blind obedience</u> and conformity. 21 Mann writes: "It is my hope that the department store attendant/ representative sees himself/herself in the bureaucratic "mirror" that I have created . . . [and that this helps them] to realize or admit for a brief instant that they are puppets and to confront the reality of what their blind obedience leads to."22 Beyond this somewhat dubious educational goal, the Shooting Back project further aspires to explode the rhetoric behind systematic public surveillance in places of commerce. For example, the project raises the question: if surveillance is intended for public safety, then would not more cameras increase the potential for such safety? The answer is an obvious no, because the primary intended function of cameras in stores is theft prevention, and they are as often trained on employees as on customers.23 Shooting Back is a provocative project because it calls attention to the embodied experiences of watching and being watched, of recording and being recorded. Usual uses of video surveillance, in contradistinction, tend to erase all sense of embodied action and interaction through their ambiguity (you do not know who is watching or when), through their integration into infrastructure (they become the taken-for-granted backdrop to social life), and through their mediation of experience (camera operators may feel a disconnect from those they are watching, and vice versa). Shooting Back disrupts the illusion of detached, objective, impersonal, disembodied monitoring—a camera in one's face personalizes the experience of being recorded in a very direct and uncomfortable way. One can speculate that the project is especially destabilizing and annoying for employees, because for them store surveillance systems and monitoring practices are institutional projections that they are relatively powerless to alter. <u>Mann's</u> rather unforgiving <u>denouncement of individuals working in stores</u>, however, <u>reveals certain assumptions about the problems of modern surveillance</u>. First, by criticizing employees as being "puppets" who blindly accept their companies' explanations for surveillance and comply with company policies, Mann implies that all individuals are rational actors with equal social and economic footing. Thus, if low-income employees elect not to fight the system as he does, then they must be either ignorant or weakwilled, or both. Second, <u>by calling store clerks and security guards representatives of totalitarian surveillance regimes, Mann conflates individuals with the institutions they are a part of,</u> effectively **sidestepping the important but more difficult problem** of <u>changing institutional relations, structures, or logics</u>. Both these assumptions lead to the conclusion that one can contend with the problem of rampant surveillance by intervening on the level of the individual and by educating people about their complicity with the systems. Unfortunately, <u>the fact that people have very real dependencies upon their jobs or that vast power differentials separate workers from the systems they work within</u> (and perhaps from activists and academics as well) <u>become unimportant issues once the critique of surveillance is abstracted and individualized in this way</u>. Surveillance Camera Players The Surveillance Camera Players (SCP) is a New York–based ad hoc acting troupe that stages performances in front of surveillance cameras in public places.24 Founded in 1996 with a performance of Alfred Jarry's Ubu Roi in front of a subway station, it has since performed numerous play adaptations of famous (and not-so-famous) works of cautionary fiction or troubling nonfiction, ranging from George Orwell's 1984 to Wilhelm Reich's The Mass Psychology of Fascism.25 Because most surveillance cameras are not soundequipped, the troupe members narrate their performances with large white placard signs, which they hold up for remotely located camera operators to read. A performance of 1984, for instance, uses placards describing scene locations (for example, "ROOM 101") or key lines from the book (for example, "WE ARE THE DEAD").26 When possible, fellow troupe members document the plays with video cameras and distribute information brochures to curious spectators. The players are routinely confronted by security guards or New York City police and asked to disperse, often before the conclusion of their performances. Up close, it appears as if SCP is directing its messages at camera operators, police, or security guards. The troupe's determination to notice and respond to video surveillance, rather than let it fade uninterrogated into the urban landscape, places it in confrontation with institutional representatives. By speaking to cameras (and their representatives), the actors become perceived as threats to the political and economic systems that support and indeed demand public surveillance, so institutional agents move in to contend with the perceived threat. <u>As with Steve Mann's concentration on individuals, SCP performances force interactions with others, and, because of this, they draw attention to the always present embodiment of surveillance</u>

technologies and the social relations they engender. If one takes a step back, however, the Surveillance Camera Players are **really performing for the public**: they enroll the unwitting police and security personnel into their play so that the public can witness the spectacle and perhaps the absurdity of modern surveillant relations. The troupe acknowledges this staging explicitly: "The SCP no longer consider their primary audience to be the police officers and security guards who monitor the surveillance cameras installed in public places. Today, the SCP concentrate on the people who happen to walk by and see one of their performances."27 In a mode true to its "situationist" theoretical orientation, SCP affirms that the revolutionary potential of art thoroughly infuses everyday life because everyday life is a complex artistic performance. In this vein, SCP seeks to repoliticize the everyday by inviting the public to participate in its performances, by inviting all of us to recognize that we are already enmeshed in political performances and that we are required to act—and act well. The primary adversary for SCP is the state. SCP is concerned about the erosion of public space and personal privacy brought about by the state's support of police surveillance and its permissive non-regulation of private surveillance. Its members write: The SCP is firmly convinced that the use of video surveillance in public places for the purposes of law enforcement is unconstitutional, and that each image captured by police surveillance cameras is an unreasonable search. We also believe that it is irresponsible of the government to allow unlicensed private companies to install as many surveillance cameras as they please, and to install them wherever they please.28 The implication is that the state is not living up to its responsibility to safeguard civil liberties through improved regulation of public surveillance. Thus, SCP performances confront individual agents of public and private sector security, but the troupe's primary audience is the general public, whom it hopes to cast as transformative actors who can collectively agitate for social change, **especially on the level of public policy**. Both Steve Mann's Shooting Back project and the Surveillance Camera Players' performances intervene on an overtly social level by challenging institutional agents of surveillance. Mann draws upon relatively sophisticated technical apparatuses to place store representatives in uncomfortable positions. By doing so, he aims to reflect back to them the hypocritical logics and empty rhetoric that they impose upon others and to raise their awareness about their complicity with the surveillance society. SCP, on the other hand, employs decidedly low-tech countersurveillance props such as signs and costumes to address police and security guards with the aim of creating a public spectacle—and to raise public awareness about the everyday surveillance spectacle of which we are all already a part. These two interventions share in common their focus on individual representatives of institutionalized surveillance. By engaging with store employees or speaking to those behind the cameras, Mann and SCP seek to reveal and challenge the larger structures and rationalities that those individuals represent. A key difference is that SCP overtly enrolls members of the public in activist performances, whereas Mann's project invites public involvement only through the technical mediation of Web sites. Because of this difference, SCP seems more successful at moving beyond its initial site of intervention (the individual) to critique institutions for their dominance over the public, which is a relationship betrayed by the ironic juxtaposition of police removing SCP performers from public streets while private companies remain free to monitor the public at will. While each of the four countersurveillance interventions discussed in this chapter so far seeks to raise public awareness and to mobilize for social change, none is completely successful at moving its critique from the individual to the institutional plane. SCP comes closest to doing this, but so far its plays remain too isolated and discrete to effect long-term change. This deficiency may be in part because activists construct surveillance problems in **individualized and abstracted terms in order to make them somewhat tractable and receptive to intervention**. The challenge lies in ratcheting up the unit of analysis to the **institutional level so that lasting change can be achieved**. The desired outcomes might take the form of better regulation and oversight of surveillance and/or meaningful democratic participation in the process of setting surveillance policies, for instance. In the long run, as I will argue in the next section, the oppositional framing of surveillance versus countersurveillance may be counterproductive for meeting these goals.

AT: Rejection Solves

Individual approaches reify neoliberalism and can't solve

Monahan 10 (Torin, Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "Surveillance in the time of Insecurity," 2010, Chapter 9)//ghs-VA

Countersurveillance and Global Systems of Control When viewed from a distance, <u>surveillance and countersurveillance appear to be engaged in a complicated dance</u>, with the larger, cumbersome partner pushing and pulling while the smaller, defter dancer negotiates her- or himself—and others—out of harm's way. <u>The oafish leader is</u>, of course, <u>the state</u> and corporate apparatus surveilling the public, <u>and the partner is the collective of activist adversaries circumventing or destabilizing surveillance systems</u>. Drawing upon Michel Foucault's insights about the disciplinary potential of modern bureaucratic regimes, one could read surveillance societies as bringing about disciplinary or panoptic relationships.29 But <u>Foucault was</u> also <u>insistent upon the productive capacity of power to generate and sustain social relations apart from any property of control that might be possessed by individuals</u>. As Gilles Deleuze expresses it: "Power has no essence; it is simply operational. It is not an attribute but a relation: the power-relation is the set of possible relations between forces, which passes through the dominated forces no less than through the dominating."30 Therefore, <u>the metaphor of the panopticon is not a static or transcendent statement of disciplinary power but is instead a **contingent and situated articulation of modernity** in a fluid field of production regimes</u>.31 In specific response to Foucault's work, Michel de Certeau's book The Practice of Everyday Life provides a point of departure for thinking about the agency of individuals and groups within disciplinary power structures.32 For de Certeau, <u>the practices of the dominant dancer clearly would be strategic ones of building control structures to regulate the activities of those in the field of power, whereas the practices of the defter dancer would be much more tactical, **poaching off the existing structures** to create new meanings and possibilities</u>. <u>The two dancers may be in opposition, but that does not change the fact that they are engaged in a reciprocal relationship and collective activity</u>—although without comparable degrees of influence or control. It is this tense connection that is worth probing, even if there is never an embrace or a union, because after all the exchanges of strategic structuring and tactical appropriation, the dance has moved somewhere across the floor and created a pattern, or a logic, or a world that was not there before.33 Examples of this problematic, if not dialectical, relationship between surveillance and countersurveillance practitioners abound. The capture on videotape of the beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991 did not necessarily catalyze correctives to actions of police brutality, nor did it motivate greater police engagement with urban communities. Instead, police have seemingly used this event to further distance themselves from and maintain antagonistic relationships with communities,34 while learning from the blowup that they must exert greater control over the conditions where brutality occurs. This enhanced and learned control can be seen in the torture case of Haitian immigrant Abner Louima by the New York City police in 1997. Louima was beaten in a vehicle on the way to the 70th Precinct stationhouse and was then sodomized with the stick from a toilet plunger in the police restrooms. 35 Regardless of the fact that the story did finally emerge, the police officers obviously exercised extreme caution in regulating the places of abuse (a police vehicle and a police restroom), and one can speculate that this level of control was a response to their fear of being surveilled and thus held accountable for their actions. Another example of the dance of surveillance and countersurveillance can be witnessed in the confrontations occurring at antiglobalization protests throughout the world. <u>Activists have been quite savvy in videotaping and photographing police and security forces as a technique not only for deterring abuse but also for documenting and disseminating any instances of excessive force</u>. According to accounts by protesters of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the police, in turn, now zero in on individuals with video recorders and arrest them or confiscate their equipment as a first line of defense in what has become a war over the control of media representations.36 Similarly, vibrant Independent Media Centers (IMCs) are now routinely set up at protest locations, allowing activists to produce and edit video, audio, photographic, and textual news stories and then disseminate them over the Internet, which serves as an outlet for alternative interpretations of the issues under protest.37 As was witnessed in the beating of independent media personnel and destruction of an Indymedia center by police during the 2001 G8 protests in Genoa, Italy,38 those with institutional interests and power are learning to infiltrate "subversive" countersurveillance collectives and vitiate their potential for destabilizing the dominant system. A final telling example of the learning potential of institutions was the subsequent 2002 G8 meeting held in Kananaskis, which is a remote and difficult-to-access mountain resort in Alberta, Canada. Rather than contend with widespread public protests and a potential repeat of the police violence in Genoa (marked by the close-range shooting and death of a protester), the organizers of the mountain meeting exerted the most extreme control over the limited avenues available for public participation: both reporters and members of the public were excluded, and a no-fly-zone was enforced around the resort. It could be that <u>grassroots publicizing of protests</u> (through Indymedia, for example) <u>is</u>

ultimately more effective than individualized countersurveillance because such protests are collective activities geared toward **institutional change**. While the removal of the 2002 G8 meetings to a publicly inaccessible location was a response to previous experiences with protesters and their publicity machines, this choice of location served a symbolic function of revealing the exclusionary elitism of these organizations, thereby calling into question their legitimacy. So, whereas mainstream news outlets seldom lend any sympathetic ink or air time to antiglobalization movements, many of them did comment on the overt mechanisms of public exclusion displayed by the 2002 G8 meeting.39 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri would describe these ongoing exchanges between dominant and subordinate groups as a mutual and perhaps unwitting advancement of Empire—the larger system of global capitalism and its colonization of lifeworlds.40 They note, for instance, how humanitarian efforts by Western countries first establish discursive universal orders—such as "human rights"—as justification for intervention, and how these universals are then capitalized upon by military and economic institutions as rationales for imperialistic invasions. Similarly, activist struggles appear to teach the system of global capitalism, or those manning its operations, how to increase strategic efficiency by controlling spaces available for political opposition. From this perspective, the flexible ideologies of the 1960s counterculture movements may have disturbed the capitalist system, but in doing so they also described a new territory (the self) and a new mode of operation for the growth of capitalism: Capital did not need to invent a new paradigm (even if it were capable of doing so) because the truly creative moment had already taken place. Capital's problem was rather to dominate a new composition that had already been produced autonomously and defined within a new relationship to nature and labor, a relationship of autonomous production.41 The postindustrial colonizations of public spaces and resources today are outgrowths of an earlier colonization of "flexibility" as a viable and successful challenge to the rigidities of technocratic bureaucracies. I would build upon these observations to say that the conflicts between surveillance and countersurveillance practices today represent a larger struggle over the control of spaces and bodies. It is doubtful that most police or security forces are manipulating spaces and bodies with surveillance and other strategies because they intentionally wish to neutralize democratic opportunities; in fact, they probably believe that their actions of social control are preserving democracy by protecting the public and safeguarding the status quo. Be that as it may, such activities advance neoliberal agendas by eliminating spaces for political action and debate, spaces where effective alternatives to economic globalization could emerge and gain legitimacy if they were not disciplined by police and corporate actions. Therefore, it should not be seen as a coincidence that the demise of public spaces is occurring at the same time that spatial and temporal boundaries are being erased to facilitate the expansion of global capital. The two go hand in hand. Whereas one can readily critique Hardt and Negri for their attribution of agency to capitalism or to the amorphous force of Empire, their **systemic** viewpoint is worth preserving in what has become a contemporary landscape of social fragmentation, polarization, and privatization. Dominant and subordinate groups serve as asymmetrical refractions of each other in emerging global regimes. Surveillance and countersurveillance are two sets of overlapping practices selectively mobilized by many parties in this conflict, but the overall effect is unknown. Perhaps non-governmental organizations are the best place to look for effective countersurveillance movements on the institutional level. There are a host of remarkable groups tackling surveillance abuses in societies and lobbying for accountability and policy reform. Some of the best-known organizations are the American Civil Liberties Union, Privacy International, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Statewatch, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Other organizations represent niche issues of concern to specific audiences, such as Katherine Albrecht's fundamentalist Christian organization Caspian, which opposes RFID technologies on the grounds that they are the "mark of the beast" (see chapter 5). According to surveillance studies scholar Colin Bennett,42 who has done extensive research on civil society groups, their narrow focus on particular issues, especially on privacy, hinders coalition building for widespread policy changes or lasting social movements. In fact, focusing on privacy alone may hamstring such organizations at the outset because privacy is a highly individualized rather than collective concept, and it cannot meaningfully account for issues of power or domination.43 This does not mean that such groups or similar ones do not attempt to challenge surveillance from a collective standpoint, but in an individualistic political, legal, and cultural climate, such an approach meets with serious difficulties in generating support, especially financial support, for their efforts.

AT: Aff = State Good

A curtailment especially in context of surveillance calls into question the legitimacy of the state and doesn't affirm it

Newman 10 (Saul Newman, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2)//ghs-VA

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state – say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing – is one of the **basic strategies of social movements** and radical groups. Making such demands does not necessarily mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy. On the contrary, demands are made from a position outside the political order, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure. **They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state** by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.

AT: Identity

Reform has to be methodologically based around structural reform -- not a purely identity based response

Wills 12 (David Barnard, Research Fellow in the Department of Informatics and Sensors at Cranfield University, "Surveillance and Identity: Discourse, Subjectivity, and the State," 2012, pg. 24-28)//ghs-VA

<u>Resistance to Surveillance</u> There is a rich emerging literature on resistance to surveillance, which Lyon positions as an important corrective to the dystopian trends in surveillance research (2007:160). Much of this research necessarily involves paying attention to subjects of surveillance, their experience and activities. Lyon identifies a number of caveats when considering resistance to surveillance: firstly that <u>surveillance is ambiguous, it is not a purely negative phenomenon</u>, secondly that <u>surveillance is complex, with different institutions or perspectives playing a large part in the specific politics of surveillance</u>. Thirdly, that surveillance technology is not infallible (Lyon 2007:162). In analyzing surveillance, we should be wary of taking the claims of those designing or promoting surveillance technologies and practices as social fact, although intentions of technologists are important. Marx suggests that the existence of a potential for surveillance does not mean that this surveillance occurs, and that much of the reason for this is resistance of various types (Marx 2003:294). These three factors affect the way that surveillance is complied with, negotiated, and resisted. As the converse of resistance, surveillance is frequently complied with for reasons of: the widespread presence of surveillance practices, that many practices are taken for granted, that we are unaware of many surveillance practices, and that many systems are accepted as legitimate and necessary (Lyon 2007:164). Resistance can range from ad hoc and individual, (avoiding CCTV cameras by walking a different route) to organized and collective (joining a group to campaign against the introduction of identity cards), instrumental or non-instrumental, direct or strategic. Marx presents a typology of eleven forms of resistance to surveillance These include discovery, avoidance, piggy-backing, switching, distorting, blocking, masking (identification), breaking, refusal, cooperative and counter-surveillance moves (Marx 2003). These moves can be contrasted with explicitly political strategies to remove surveillance systems and practices through democratic political process or direct action. Work in political theory on resistance to surveillance often tends to take the form of analyses of privacy and practices of the regulation of personal data, emphasizing the individual, owned nature of privacy rather than collective or social resistance. Sociology has also contributed research into the experiences of the subject under surveillance. Insights have been drawn from the work of Goffman on the presentation of self (Goffman 1990). including the social work done by individuals to present an appropriate public face to other members of their social group. Additionally there are accounts drawing upon phenomenological and psychological approaches focusing on differing degrees of scopophobia and scopophillia (the fear and love of being watched) (Jay 1994). Many analyses of resistance to surveillance emerge from this level of analysis, focusing on the experience of the individual under surveillance (Ball & Wilson 2000; Koskela 2006; Matheson 2009). as do many of the artistic contributions to a cultural understanding of surveillance practices (Levin et al. 2002; MeGrath 2004). Lyon argues an important part of understanding resistance to surveillance is the subjectivities of those resisting surveillance, especially the alternate identities which can be mobilized against imposed and attributed surveillant representations (Lyon 2007:67). There is a politics of resistance associated with (he subject's own understanding of their identity or identities and interaction with the data double. <u>Another important question involves the connection between</u> **<u>individual and collective responses</u>** - understanding the ways in which individual resistance acts become taken up in collective and organized ways (Marx 2003:304). Monahan is concerned that <mark>current</mark> modes of <mark>activism</mark> tend to **leave institutions, policies and cultural assumptions** <mark>supportive of surveillance in place</mark> because of their focus upon <u>individualistic resistance to specific instances of surveillance</u> (Monahan 2006a: 1). Sieve Mann (Mann 2002) has popularised the practice and concept of sous-veillance, watching 'from below" in which surveillance technologies are turned upon those in power. Mann has built and advocated wearable cameras to facilitate this. This approach suffers from simple binary models of power, in which 'the powerful" do surveillance, and the less powerful are surveilled. Surveillance is not automatically effective in supporting the ends to which it is put. <u>Sousveillance is</u> therefore best understood as <u>surveillance that is being used to draw attention to power relations</u> (of surveillance) <u>and as a type of consciousness raising activity</u>. There is nothing wrong with this, but to assume the automatic success (or subversiveness) of sousveillance is to perpetuate some of the myths about the automatic functioning of surveillance and visual power. Photojournalists have long realised that <u>simply documenting or creating an image of some immoral or harmful practice is</u> **not sufficient** <u>to bring about its end</u>. Mann argues that photographing low level clerks in department stores1 is an effective way of getting to speak with the manager. This misses that the clerk is already likely under surveillance by in-store CCTV system. Surveillance, as we have seen is not simply an up/down binary Mann's form of resistance is also not available to all, being based upon technological literacy, but also on social capital. <mark>Rose identifies a problem with identity based responses to surveillance</mark>. He argues <u>experience of the actuarial processes of contemporary surveillance practices</u> **does not produce collective identities** <u>in the same way as the collective experience of</u> workplace <u>exploitation or</u>

racism (Rose 1999:236). Anticipating the same impediments, Ogura provides a potential solution to this problem. He suggests that "identity politics" should be drastically transformed. Rather than attempting to 'establish the collective identity of social minority groups against cultural, ideological or political integration or affiliation by social groups' he points in the direction of a "de-convergent politics' able to resist methodological individualism and biological determinism he sees as present in information technology identity systems. Whilst he acknowledges that we have not yet seen such a social movement or politics based on identity, he identifies "criminal* identity activity, such as fake ID cards and identity theft as manifestations of a surveillance orientated society's focus on methodological individualism and biological determinants of identity (such as biometrics). He predicts the possibility of a politics based around self-determination of identity, potentially associated with the (non-criminal) use of multiple identities, collaborative identities or anonymity (Ogura 2006). If the exploitation of identity expands and deepens, resistance against it to achieve self determination rights of who 'is' will also follow. In the very near future, we may grab hold of an alternative identity politics based on an identity of identities that is against identity exploitation. (Ogura 2006:292) Brian Martin suggests that a sense of unfairness is not inherent in the act of surveillance, but rather people's sense of unfairness is subject to a continual struggle between interests. He places privacy campaigners on one side, trying to increase a sense of concern about surveillance, with surveillance purveyors on the other side. This suggests that motivations for resistance come from understanding and evaluation of the practice of surveillance, as well as the meaning of fairness, the possibility of resistance, subject positions and political alternatives, all of which are contested discursively. One of the key elements of interpretative struggles is language (Martin 2010) Aaron Martin, Rosamunde Van Brakel and Daniel Bernhard conducted an insightful review of the literature on resistance in international relations, social psychology, information systems and education, to counter a tendency in surveillance studies accounts to focus exclusively on the resistance relationship between the surveyor and the surveilled. They address an assumption that the resisting actor, is an autonomous agent capable of interaction with technology and observers, resistance emerging because surveillance is recognised and rejected. They also find this binary in the sousveillance literature. They find instead that resistance is multiple and rhizomatic, and that many actors beyond the surveillance subject are capable of resistance. This includes powerful actors seeking to prevent other resistance, and. drawing upon information systems perspectives, technologies themselves. They find that resistance is not an unavoidable consequence of surveillance, but the result of interpreting surveillance as overbearing, and that this representation is dependent upon specific relational histories of the actors involved, including the content of previous interactions. The ability of an actor to resist, the ways they resist and the actors at whom their resistance is directed are determined in large part by the power relations of the resisting actor to others as well as by the context. (Martin et al. 2009:226) From education contexts they draw the insight that not all authority is resisted, and that authority can be allowed if it is perceived as legitimate and just. On the other hand, resistance is problematic if there is no clearly identifiable figure of dominance. They also identify the way that structural roles affect resistance, showing how different actors are likely to resist at different stages of a technology development and introduction lifecycle. For Martin et al, understanding resistance to surveillance requires understanding the context, roles and relationships of various actors. We can expand this account by suggesting these shared histories and contexts also depend upon conventional representations of the world, and of the structures of legitimate and illegitimate power. Roles are not just structural but are subjective.

Role Playing/Simulation Good

Rice – USFG Key

Public resistance to surveillance starting at the USFG is critical – creates the most effective advocates and change

Rice 15 (Rebecca, University of Montana, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy," pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd)//ghs-VA

Public Sphere Resistance Based on these critiques, Greenwald identifies several actors who can change US surveillance policies: the public, the government, and journalists. As discussed above, the first group Greenwald calls on is the public, which he encourages to **deliberate to resist surveillance**. Greenwald reminds his audience that "it is human beings **collectively**, not a small number of elites working in secret, who can decide what kind of world we want to live in" (2014, p. 253). However, aside from average citizens, who can come together to discuss surveillance, Greenwald also names special actors within the public sphere. In the epilogue of NPTH, Greenwald says that Snowden's leaks triggered the first global debate about the value of individual privacy in the digital age and prompted challenges to America's hegemonic control over the Internet. It changed the way people around the world viewed the reliability of any statements made by US officials and transformed relations between countries. It radically altered views about the proper role of journalism in relation to government power. And within the United States, it gave rise to an ideologically diverse, trans-partisan coalition pushing for meaningful reform of the surveillance state (p. 248). These changes stem from the public sphere, and occurred through public discussion. Greenwald's "trans-partisan coalition" can be conceived of as a public, which he calls into being as he addresses this group in NPTH. Greenwald's created public. Warner (2002) encourages scholars to frame publics discursively, saying they exist "by virtue of being addressed" (p. 413). Greenwald calls a concerned public into being throughout NPTH, often by discussing his readers as a collective "we." Greenwald's created audience is concerned about surveillance, and **willing to take public action to advocate for reform**. Greenwald emphasizes the choice readers can make with Snowden's leaked NSA documents. He says that Snowden's leaks can create a new discussion about surveillance, or they can fade due to public apathy. In the introduction to NPTH, he writes That's what makes Snowden's revelations so stunning and so vitally important. By daring to expose the NSA's astonishing surveillance capabilities and its even more astounding ambitions, he has made it clear, with these disclosures, that we stand at a historic crossroads. Will the digital age usher in the individual liberation and political freedoms that the Internet is uniquely capable of unleashing? Or will it bring about a system of omnipresent monitoring and control, beyond the dreams of even the greatest tyrants of the past? Right now, either path is possible. Our actions will determine where we end up. (2014, p. 6). Greenwald gives the audience two choices and links their actions to the two potential paths. In this way, he begins the process of public deliberation, which Goodnight (2012a) describes as a momentary pause in which we examine political paths, both taken and untaken. "As deliberation raises expectations that are feared or hoped for, public argument is a way to share in the construction of the future," he says (Goodnight, 2012a, p. 198). Greenwald shares his interpretation of the choice the public must make with this information. He projects two alternative futures based on the public's deliberation about privacy. This shared future is emphasized through his use of the words "our," "everyone," and "we," which link readers together as the American public. Greenwald's projected paths put the decision into the readers' hand, emphasizing the public's ability to act and intervene in technical surveillance. Through invitations to deliberate, Greenwald addresses his readers as part of a public sphere. Greenwald also argues that deliberation is an effective way to resist surveillance and curb surveillance abuses. Greenwald offers an example from his own life. He says he first learned of the power of deliberation when he heard from Laura Poitras, another journalist who accompanied him on the trip to Hong Kong. She said that she had been detained in airports dozens of times as a result of her writing and filmmaking. Greenwald covered the interrogations of Poitras in a Salon article, which received substantial attention. In the months afterward, Poitras was not detained again. In NPTH, Greenwald writes "The lesson for me was clear: **national security officials do not like the light**. They act abusively and thuggishly only when they believe they are safe, in the dark. Secrecy is the linchpin of abuse of power, we discovered, its enabling force. Transparency is the only real antidote" (2014, p. 12). Greenwald generalizes this example to other abuses of power. He says that power **without deliberation** is "the ultimate imbalance, permitting the most dangerous of all human conditions: the exercise of limitless power with no transparency or accountability" (2014, p. 169). Greenwald presents public

deliberation as the solution and antithesis to surveillance, which he calls for the public to undertake. After addressing readers as members of this public, Greenwald names special actors within the public sphere who can also help to effect change. Government reform. First, Greenwald says the government must make changes in order to curb abuses from the NSA, and that readers should pressure the government to do so. Greenwald says that public branches of the government do not have enough control over the NSA. Giving examples of reform that occurred after his reporting, Greenwald says that he and Snowden were pleased by a bipartisan bill introduced to US Congress. This bill proposed defunding the NSA, which was "by far the most aggressive challenge to the national security state to emerge from Congress since the 9/11 attacks" (2014, p. 249). The bill did not pass, but only by a small margin, which Greenwald portrays as a hopeful sign of reform. Additionally, Greenwald suggests "converting the FISA court into a real judicial system, rather than the onesided current setup in which only the government gets to state its case, would be a positive reform" (2014, p. 251). Greenwald's suggestions for change go beyond individual acts to put pressure on government policy reform. By reforming the FISA court, the secrets of the NSA would be public knowledge. Though Greenwald writes about power from a Foucauldian perspective, he proposes large acts of resistance to the public problems created by surveillance in addition to small acts to resist the discipline of individual bodies. These ideas are compatible with Foucault's (1997) idea of critique, however, which he defines as "the art of not being governed quite so much" (p. 45). Greenwald asks the audience to resist through public sphere discussion in order to negotiate the way they are governed. He argues that discussion through the public sphere can alter power relations between citizens and the US surveillance state. Though the government is considered completely separate from the public sphere by many scholars (Habermas, 1974), others push back on this idea (e.g. Asen & Brouwer, 2001). In the case of the NSA, other government branches are considered members of the public by Greenwald. Greenwald notes that many congressional members were unaware of the tactics used by the NSA, including spying on Congress itself (2014). For these reasons, Greenwald specifically calls on Congress to be part of the solution. This should occur through legislative reform spurred by public pressure. Greenwald's summoned public addresses politicians as well as average citizens.

Mimoso – NSA

Debates over meta-data and the NSA and <u>uniquely key now</u> – outweighs your education claims.

Mimoso 14 (Michael, award-winning journalist and former Editor of Information Security magazine, a two-time finalist for national magazine of the year. He has been writing for business-to-business IT websites and magazines for over 10 years, with a primary focus on information security, "NSA Reforms Demonstrate Value of Public Debate," March 26, 2014, https://threatpost.com/nsa-reforms-demonstrate-value-of-public-debate/105052)//ghs-VA

<u>The president's proposal would end the NSA's collection</u> and storage <u>of phone data</u>; those <u>records would remain with the providers and the NSA would require judicial permission</u> <u>under a new court order</u> to access those records. The House bill, however, requires no prior judicial approval; a judge would rule on the request after the FBI submits it to the telecommunications company. "**It's absolutely crucial to understand the details of how these things will work**," the ACLU's Kaufman said <u>in reference to the "new court order</u>" mentioned in the New York Times report. "<u>There is no substitute for robust</u> Democratic **debate** in the court of public opinion and in the courts. **The system** of oversight **is broke and issues like these need to be debated in public**." <u>Phone metadata</u> and dragnet collection of digital data from Internet providers and other technology companies <u>is supposed to be used to map connections between foreigners suspected of terrorism and threatening the national security of the U.S. The NSA's dragnet</u>, however, <u>also swept up communication involving Americans</u> that is supposed to be collected and accessed only with a court order. The NSA stood by claims that the program was effective in stopping hundreds of terror plots against U.S. interests domestic and foreign. Those numbers, however, quickly were lowered as they were challenged by Congressional committees and public scrutiny. "<u>The president said the effectiveness of this program was one of the reasons it was in place</u>," Kaufman said. "<u>But</u> <u>as soon as these claims were made</u> public, journalists, **advocates** and the courts **pushed back** <u>and it could not withstand</u> <u>the scrutiny</u>. It's remarkable how quickly [the number of] plots turned into small numbers. The NSA was telling FISC the program was absolutely necessary to national security, but <u>the government would not go nearly that far in defending the program</u>. <u>That shows **the value of public debate and an adversarial process**</u> in courts."

State Education – Giroux

Political engagement is necessary – your ethical education absent concrete political reform is the exact reason the lefts progressivism fails.

Giroux 15 (Henry, currently holds the McMaster University Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest in the English and Cultural Studies Department and the Paulo Freire Chair in Critical Pedagogy at The McMaster Institute for Innovation & Excellence, "Orwell, Huxley and the Scourge of the Surveillance State," 30 June 2015, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/31639-orwell-huxley-and-the-scourge-of-the-surveillance-state)//ghs-VA

In this instance, the surveillance state is one that not only listens, watches and gathers massive amounts of information through data mining, allegedly for the purpose of identifying "security threats." It also acculturates the public into accepting the intrusion of commercial surveillance technologies - and, perhaps more vitally, the acceptance of privatized, commodified values - into all aspects of their lives. In other words, the most dangerous repercussions of a near total loss of privacy involve more than the unwarranted collecting of information by the government: We must also be attentive to the ways in which being spied on has become not only normalized, but even enticing, as corporations up the pleasure quotient for consumers who use new digital technologies and social networks - not least of all by and for simulating experiences of community. Many individuals, especially young people now run from privacy and increasingly demand services in which they can share every personal facet of their lives. While Orwell's vision touches upon this type of control, there is a notable difference that he did not foresee. According to Pete Cashmore, while Orwell's "Thought Police tracked you without permission, some consumers are now comfortable with sharing their every move online." (17) The state and corporate cultural apparatuses now collude to socialize everyone - especially young people - into a regime of security and commodification in which their identities, values and desires are inextricably tied to a culture of commodified addictions, self-help, therapy and social indifference. Intelligence networks now inhabit the world of major corporations such as Disney and Bank of America as well as the secret domains of the NSA, FBI and 15 other intelligence agencies. As Edward Snowden's revelations about the PRISM program revealed, the NSA has also collected personal data from many of the world's largest internet companies, including Apple, Google, Yahoo and Facebook. According to a senior lawyer for the NSA, the internet companies "were fully aware of the surveillance agency's widespread collection of data." (18) The fact is that Orwell's and Huxley's ironic representations of the modern totalitarian state - along with their implied defense of a democratic ideal rooted in the right to privacy and the right to be educated in the capacity to be autonomous and critical thinkers - have been transformed and mutilated almost beyond recognition by the material and ideological registers of a worldwide neoliberal order. Just as we can envision Orwell's and Huxley's dystopian fables morphing over time from "realistic novels" into a "real life documentary," and now into a form of "reality TV," privacy and freedom have been radically altered in an age of permanent, nonstop global exchange and circulation. That is, in the current moment, the right to privacy and freedom has been usurped by the seductions of a narcissistic culture and casino capitalism's unending desire to turn every relationship into an act of commerce and to make all aspects of daily life subject to market forces under watchful eyes of both government and corporate regimes of surveillance In a world devoid of care, compassion and protection, personal privacy and freedom are no longer connected and resuscitated through their connection to public life, the common good or a vulnerability born of the recognition of the frailty of human life. Culture loses its power as the bearer of public memory, civic literacy and the lessons of history in a social order in which the worst excesses of capitalism are left unchecked and a consumerist ethic "makes impossible any shared recognition of common interests or goals." (19) With the rise of the punishing state along with a kind of willful amnesia taking hold of the larger culture, we see little more than a paralyzing fear and apathy in response to the increasing exposure of formerly private spheres to data mining and manipulation, while the concept of privacy itself has all but expired under a "broad set of panoptic practices." (20) With individuals more or less succumbing to this insidious cultural shift in their daily lives, there is nothing to prevent widespread collective indifference to the growth of a surveillance culture, let alone an authoritarian state. The worst fears of Huxley and Orwell merge into a dead zone of historical amnesia as more and more people embrace any and every new electronic device regardless of the risks it might pose in terms of granting corporations and governments increased access to and power over their choices and movements. Detailed personal information flows from the sphere of entertainment to the deadly serious and integrated spheres of capital accumulation and policing as they are collected and sold to business and government agencies that track the populace for either commercial purposes or for fear of a possible threat to the social order and its established institutions of power. Power now imprisons not only bodies under a regime of surveillance and a mass incarceration state but also subjectivity itself, as the threat of state control is now coupled with the seductions of the new forms of passivity-inducing soma: electronic technologies, a pervasive commodified landscape and a mind-numbing celebrity culture. The Growing Role of Private Security Companies Underlying these everyday conveniences of modern life, as Boghosian documents in great detail, is the growing Orwellian partnership between the militarized state and private security companies in the United States. Each day, new evidence surfaces pointing to the emergence of a police state that has produced ever more sophisticated methods for surveillance in order to enforce a mass suppression of the most essential tools for democratic dissent: "the press, political activists, civil rights advocates and conscientious insiders who blow the whistle on corporate malfeasance and government abuse." (21) As Boghosian points out, "By claiming that anyone who questions authority or engages in undesired political speech is a potential terrorist threat, this government-corporate partnership makes a mockery of civil liberties." (22) Nowhere is this more evident than in US public schools where young people are being taught that they are a generation of suspects, subject to the presence of armed police and security guards, drug-sniffing dogs and an array of surveillance apparatuses that chart their every move, not to mention in some cases how they respond emotionally to certain pedagogical practices. Whistleblowers are not only punished by the government; their lives are also turned upside down in the process by private surveillance agencies and major corporations that now work in tandem. For instance, Bank of America assembled 15 to 20 bank officials and retained the law firm of Hunton & Williams in order to devise "various schemes to attack WikiLeaks and [journalist Glenn] Greenwald whom they thought were about to release damaging information about the bank." (23) It is worth repeating that Orwell's vision of surveillance and the totalitarian state look mild next to the emergence of a corporate-state surveillance system that wants to tap into every conceivable mode of communication, collect endless amounts of metadata to be stored in vast intelligence storage sites around the country and potentially use that data to repress any vestige of dissent. (24) As Huxley anticipated, any critical analysis must move beyond documenting abuses of power to how addressing contemporary neoliberal modernity has created a social order in which individuals become complicit with authoritarianism. That is, how is unfreedom internalized? What and how do state- and corporate-controlled institutions, cultural apparatuses, social relations and policies contribute to making a society's plunge into dark times self-generating as Huxley predicted? Put differently, what is the educative nature of a repressive politics and how does it function to secure the consent of the US public? And, most importantly, how can it be challenged and under what circumstances? The nature of repression has become more porous, employing not only brute force, but also dominant modes of education, persuasion and authority. Aided by a public pedagogy, produced and circulated through a machinery of consumption and public relations tactics, a growing regime of repression works through the homogenizing forces of the market to support the widespread embrace of an authoritarian culture and police state. Relentlessly entertained by spectacles, people become not only numb to violence and cruelty but begin to identify with an authoritarian worldview. As David Graeber suggests, the police "become the almost obsessive objects of imaginative identification in popular culture ... watching movies, or viewing TV shows that invite them to look at the world from a police point of view." (25) But it is not just the spectacle of violence that ushers individuals into a world in which brutality becomes a primary force for mediating relations as well as the ultimate source of pleasure; there is also the production of an unchecked notion of individualism that both dissolves social bonds and removes any viable notion of agency from the landscape of social responsibility and ethical consideration. Absorbed in privatized orbits of consumption, commodification and display, Americans vicariously participate in the toxic pleasures of the authoritarian state. Violence has become the organizing force of a society driven by a noxious notion of privatization in which it becomes difficult for ideas to be lifted into the public realm. Under such circumstances, politics is eviscerated because it now supports a market-driven view of society that has turned its back on the idea that social values, public trust and communal relations are fundamental to a democratic society. This violence against the bonds of sociality undermines and dissolves the nature of social obligations as freedom becomes an exercise in self-development rather than social responsibility. This upending of the social and critical modes of agency mimics not just the death of the radical imagination, but also a notion of banality made famous by Hannah Arendt who argued that at the root of totalitarianism was a kind of thoughtlessness, an inability to think, and a type of outrageous indifference in which, "There's simply the reluctance ever to imagine what the other person is experiencing." (26) Confronting the Threat of Authoritarianism By integrating insights drawn from both Huxley and Orwell, it becomes necessary for any viable critical analysis to take a long view, contextualizing the contemporary moment as a new historical conjuncture in which political rule has been replaced by corporate sovereignty, consumerism becomes the only obligation of citizenship, and the only value that matters is exchange value. Precarity has replaced social protections provided by the state, just as the state cares more about building prisons and infantilizing the US public than

it does about providing all of its citizens with quality educational institutions and health care. The United States is not just dancing into oblivion as Huxley suggested; it is also being pushed into the dark recesses of an authoritarian state. Orwell wrote dystopian novels but he believed that the sheer goodness of human nature would in the end be enough for individuals to develop modes of collective resistance that he could only imagine in the midst of the haunting specter of totalitarianism. Huxley was more indebted to Kafka's notion of destabilization, despair and hopelessness. For Huxley, the subject had lost his or her sense of agency and had become the product of a scientifically manufactured form of idiocy and conformity. Progress had been transformed into its opposite, and science needed to be liberated from itself. As Theodor Adorno has pointed out, where Huxley fails is that he has no sense of resistance. According to Adorno, "The weakness of Huxley's entire conception is that it makes all its concepts relentlessly dynamic but nevertheless arms them against the tendency to turn into their own opposites." (27) Hence, the forces of resistance are not simply underestimated but rendered impotent. The authoritarian nature of the corporate-state surveillance apparatus and security system with its "urge to surveil, eavesdrop on, spy on, monitor, record, and save every communication of any sort on the planet" (28) can only be fully understood when its ubiquitous tentacles are connected to wider cultures of control and punishment, including security-patrolled corridors of public schools, the rise in supermax prisons, the hypermilitarization of local police forces, the justification of secret prisons and state-sanctioned torture abroad, and the increasing labeling of dissent as an act of terrorism in the United States. (29) This is part of Orwell's narrative, but it does not go far enough. The new authoritarian, corporate-driven state deploys more subtle tactics to depoliticize public memory and promote the militarization of everyday life. Alongside efforts to defund public and higher education and to attack the welfare state, a wide-ranging assault is being waged across the culture on all spheres that encourage the public to hold power accountable. If these public institutions are destroyed, there will be few sites left in which to nurture the critical formative cultures capable of educating people to challenge the range of injustices plaguing the United States and the forces that reproduce them. One particular challenge comes from the success of neoliberal tyranny to dissolve those social bonds that entail a sense of responsibility toward others and form the basis for political consciousness. Under the new authoritarian state, perhaps the gravest threat one faces is not simply being subject to the dictates of what Quentin Skinner calls "arbitrary power," but failing to respond with outrage when "my liberty is also being violated, and not merely by the fact that someone is reading my emails but also by the fact that someone has the power to do so should they choose." (30) The situation is dire when people no longer seem interested in contesting such power. It is precisely the poisonous spread of a broad culture of political indifference that puts at risk the fundamental principles of justice and freedom, which lie at the heart of a robust democracy. The democratic imagination has been transformed into a data machine that marshals its inhabitants into the neoliberal dream world of babbling consumers and armies of exploitative labor whose ultimate goal is to accumulate capital and initiate individuals into the brave new surveillance-punishing state that merges Orwell's Big Brother with Huxley's mind-altering soma. Nothing will change unless people begin to take seriously the subjective underpinnings of oppression in the United States and what it might require to make such issues meaningful in order to make them critical and transformative. As Charles Derber has explained, knowing "how to express possibilities and convey them authentically and persuasively seems crucially important". (31) if any viable notion of resistance is to take place. The current regime of authoritarianism is reinforced through a new and pervasive sensibility in which people surrender themselves to both the capitalist system and a general belief in its call for security. It does not simply repress independent thought, but constitutes new modes of thinking through a diverse set of cultural apparatuses ranging from the schools and media to the internet. The fundamental question in resisting the transformation of the United States into a 21st century authoritarian society must concern the educative nature of politics - that is, what people believe and how their individual and collective dispositions and capacities to be either willing or resistant agents are shaped. I want to conclude by recommending five initiatives, though incomplete, that might help young people and others challenge the current oppressive historical conjuncture in which they along with other oppressed groups now find themselves. My focus is on higher education because that is the one institution that is under intense assault at the moment because it has not completely surrendered to the Orwellian state.

(32) A Resource for Resistance: Reviving the Radical Imagination First, there is a need for what can be called a revival of the radical imagination. This call would be part of a larger project "to reinvent democracy in the wake of the evidence that, at the national level, there is no democracy - if by 'democracy' we mean effective popular participation in the crucial decisions affecting the community." (33) Democracy entails a challenge to the power of those individuals, financial elites, ruling groups and large-scale enterprises that have hijacked democracy. At the very least, this means refusing to accept minimalist notions of democracy in which elections become the measure of democratic participation. Far more crucial is the struggle for the development of public spaces and spheres that produce a formative culture in which the US public can imagine forms of democratic self-management of what can be called "key economic, political, and social institutions." (34) One step in this direction would be for young people, intellectuals, scholars and others to go on the offensive in defending higher education as a public good, resisting as much as possible the ongoing attempt by financial elites to view its mission in instrumental terms as a workstation for capital. This means fighting back against a conservative-led campaign to end tenure, define students as consumers, defund higher education and destroy any possibility of faculty governance by transforming most faculty into adjuncts. Higher education should be harnessed neither to the demands of the warfare state nor to the instrumental needs of corporations. In fact, it should be viewed as a right rather than as an entitlement. Nowhere is this assault on higher education more evident than in the efforts of billionaires such as Charles and David Koch to finance academic fields and departments, and to shape academic policy in the interest of indoctrinating the young into the alleged neoliberal, free market mentality. It is also evident in the repressive policies being enacted at the state level by right-wing politicians. For instance, in Florida, Gov. Rick Scott's task force on education has introduced legislation that would lower tuition for degrees friendly to corporate interests in order to "steer students toward majors that are in demand in the job market." (35) In Wisconsin, Gov. Scott Walker drew up a proposal to remove the public service philosophy focus from the university's mission statement, which says that the university's purpose is to solve problems and improve people's lives. He also scratched out the phrase "the search for truth" and substituted both ideas with a vocabulary stating that the university's goal is to meet "the state's work force needs." (36) But Walker's disdain for higher education as a public good can be more readily understood given his hatred of unions, particularly those organized for educators. How else to explain his egregious comparison of union protesters to the brutal terrorists and thugs that make up ISIS and his ongoing attempts to eliminate tenure at Wisconsin's public universities as well as to eviscerate any vestige of shared governance. (37) Another egregious example of neoliberalism's Orwellian assault on higher education can be found in the policies promoted by the Republican Party members who control the North Carolina Board of Governors. Just recently it has decimated higher education in that state by voting to cut 46 academic degree programs. One member defended such cuts with the comment: "We're capitalists, and we have to look at what the demand is, and we have to respond to the demand." (38) The ideology that drives this kind of market-driven assault on higher education was made clear by the state's Republican governor, Pat McCrory, who said in a radio interview, "If you want to take gender studies, that's fine, go to a private school and take it. But I don't want to subsidize that if that's not going to get someone a job." (39) This is more than an example of crude economic instrumentalism; it is also a recipe for instituting an academic culture of thoughtlessness and a kind of stupidity receptive to what Hannah Arendt once called totalitarianism. Crafting Educational Counternarratives Second, young people and progressives need to create the institutions and public spaces in which education becomes central as a counternarrative that serves to both reveal, interrogate and overcome the common sense assumptions that provide the ideological and affective webs that tie many people to forms of oppression. Domination is not just structural and its subjective roots and pedagogical mechanisms need to be viewed as central to any politics that aims to educate, change individual and collective consciousness, and contribute to broad-based social formations. Relatedly, a coalition of diverse social movements, from unions to associations of artists, educators and youth groups, needs to develop a range of alternative public spheres in which young people and others can become cultural producers capable of writing themselves back into the discourse of democracy while bearing witness to a range of ongoing injustices from police violence to the violence of the financial elite. Rejecting Criminalization Third, the United States has become a society in which the power at the state and national levels has become punitive for most Americans and beneficial for the financial and corporate elite. Punishment creep now reaches into almost every commanding institution that holds sway over the US public and its effects are especially felt by poor people, Black people, young people and the elderly. Millions of young men are held in prisons and jails across the United States, and most of them for nonviolent crimes. Working people are punished after a lifetime of work by having their pensions either reduced or taken away. Poor people are denied Medicaid because right-wing politicians believe the poor should be financially responsible for their health care. And so it goes. The United States is one of the few countries that allows teenagers to be tried as adults, even though there are endless stories of such youth being abused, beaten and in some cases committing suicide as a result of such savage treatment. Everywhere we look in US society, routine behavior is being criminalized. If you owe a parking ticket, you may end up in jail. If you violate a dress code as a student, you may be handcuffed by the police and charged with a criminal offense. A kind of mad infatuation with violence is matched by an increase in state lawlessness. In particular, young people have been left out of the discourse of democracy. They are the new disposables who lack jobs, a decent education, hope and any semblance of a future better than the one their parents inherited. In addition, an increasing number of youth suffer mental anguish and overt distress, even, perhaps especially, among the college-bound, debt-ridden and unemployed whose numbers are growing exponentially. Many reports claim that "young Americans are suffering from rising levels of anxiety, stress, depression and even suicide." For example, "One out of every five young people and one out of every four college students ... suffers from some form of diagnosable mental illness." (40) According to one survey, "44 percent of young aged 18 to 24 say they are excessively stressed." (41) One factor may be that there are so few jobs for young people. In fact the jobless rate for Americans aged 15 to 24 stands at 15.8 percent, more than double the unemployment rate of 6.9 percent for all ages, according to the World Bank. (42) Facing what Richard Sennett calls the "specter of uselessness," the war on youth serves as a reminder of how finance capital has abandoned any viable vision of democracy, including one that would support future generations. The war on youth has to be seen as a central element of state terrorism and crucial to critically engaging the current regime of neoliberalism. Reclaiming Emancipatory Morality Fourth, as the claims and

promises of a neoliberal utopia have been transformed into an Orwellian and Dickensian nightmare, the United States continues to succumb to the pathologies of political corruption, the redistribution of wealth upward into the hands of the 1%, the rise of the surveillance state and the use of the criminal legal system as a way of dealing with social problems. At the same time, Orwell's dark fantasy of an authoritarian future continues without enough massive opposition as students and low-income and poor youth of color are exposed to a low-intensity war in which they are held hostage to a neoliberal discourse that translates systemic issues into problems of individual responsibility. **This individualization of the social is one of the most powerful ideological weapons used by the current authoritarian regime and must be challenged**. Under the star of Orwell, morality loses its emancipatory possibilities and degenerates into a pathology in which misery is denounced as a moral failing. Under the neo-Darwinian ethos of survival of the fittest, the ultimate form of entertainment becomes the pain and humiliation of others, especially those considered disposable and powerless, who are no longer an object of compassion, but of ridicule and amusement. This becomes clear in the endless stories we are now hearing from US politicians disdaining the poor as moochers who don't need welfare but stronger morals. This narrative can also be heard from conservative pundits, such as New York Times columnist David Brooks, who epitomize this view. According to Brooks, poverty is a matter of the poor lacking virtue, middle-class norms and decent moral codes. (43) For Brooks, the problems of the poor and disadvantaged can be solved "through moral education and self-reliance … high-quality relationships and strong familial ties." (44) In this discourse, soaring inequality in wealth and income, high levels of unemployment, stagnant economic growth and low wages for millions of working Americans are ignored. What Brooks and other conservatives conveniently disregard are the racist nature of the drug wars, the strangle hold of the criminal legal system on poor Black communities, police violence, mass unemployment for Black youth, poor quality education in low-income neighborhoods, and the egregious effect of mass incarceration on communities of color. Paul Krugman gets it right in rebutting the argument that all the poor need are the virtues of middle-class morality and a good dose of resilience. (45) He writes: So it is … disheartening still to see commentators suggesting that the poor are causing their own poverty, and could easily escape if only they acted like members of the upper middle class…. Shrugging your shoulders as you attribute it all to values is an act of malign neglect. The poor don't need lectures on morality, they need more resources - which we can afford to provide - and better economic opportunities, which we can also afford to provide through everything from training and subsidies to higher minimum wages. (46) Developing a Language of Critique and Possibility Lastly, any attempt to make clear the massive misery, exploitation, corruption and suffering produced under casino capitalism must develop both a language of critique and possibility. It is not enough to simply register what is wrong with US society; it is also crucial to do so in a way that enables people to recognize themselves in such discourses in a way that both inspires them to be more critical and energizes them to do something about it. In part, this suggests a politics that is capable of developing a comprehensive vision of analysis and struggle that "does not rely on single issues." (47) It is only through an understanding of the wider relations and connections of power that the US public can overcome uninformed practice, isolated struggles and modes of singular politics that become insular and self-sabotaging. This means developing modes of analyses capable of connecting isolated and individualized issues to more generalized notions of freedom, and developing theoretical frameworks in which it becomes possible to translate private troubles into broader more systemic conditions. In short, this suggests developing modes of analyses that connect the dots historically and relationally. It also means developing a more comprehensive vision of politics and change. The key here is the notion of translation, that is, the need to translate private troubles into broader public issues and understand how systemic modes of analyses can be helpful in connecting a range of issues so as to be able to build a united front in the call for a radical democracy. This is a particularly important goal given that the fragmentation of the left has been partly responsible for its inability to develop a wide political and ideological umbrella to address a range of problems extending from extreme poverty, the assault on the environment, the emergence of the permanent warfare state, the rollback of voting rights, the assault on public servants, women's rights and social provisions, and a range of other issues that erode the possibilities for a radical democracy. The dominating mechanisms of casino capitalism in both their symbolic and material registers reach deep into every aspect of US society. Any successful movement for a radical democracy will have to wage a struggle against the totality of this new mode of authoritarianism rather than isolating and attacking specific elements of its anti-democratic ethos.

Policy Capacity

Policy capacity is key to effective surveillance change

Kraft and Furlong 15 (Michael E, Department of Public & Environmental Affairs - University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, Scott R, Political Science - University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, "Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives," 2015, pg. 477-479)//ghs-VA

Improving Policy Capacity Policy analysis also can help improve the performance of government and its responsiveness to citizen concerns. Policy capacity refers to the ability of government to identify and act on public problems within a reasonable period of time. One element of such a capacity is public trust and confidence in government because such trust affects the ability of policymakers to work together on policy solutions. Yet public trust in governmental institutions fell almost steadily from the 1960s to the late 1990s, with a small upward trend only in the fall of 2001, following the terrorist attacks on the United States and the U.S. response to them (Mackenzie and Labiner 2002). After the financial crisis of 200S and 2009, and growing public frustration over government's seeming ineptitude in figuring out what to do, it would be remarkable if trust and confidence in government returned to its former levels anytime soon. On the campaign trail in 2008, then-candidate Obama pledged to "make government cool again." In support of such a goal, some policymakers and on/i'ii activists supported a new civilian service academy, analogous to the military academics but devoted to training a new generation of public servants. The United States Public Service Academy would have offered a free four-year college education if individuals who attend arc prepared to commit to five years of government service. In early 2009, the idea was attracting support, and legislation was pending in Congress to create such a program, but it was not approved." By 2014, many public opinion polls pointed to a continuing decline in public confidence in government and particularly in the U.S. Congress. Indeed, public assessments of Congress reached historic lows, and the public clearly disapproved of the performance of both major political parties. The congressionally forced government shutdown in the fall of 2013 further reduced the public's confidence in government and its capacity to act. Much the same was true in many state governments that faced similar partisan divisions, a rising level of political incivility, and policy stalemate." Despite the many criticisms of government performance, the evidence on how well government programs have done is clearly mixed. Some programs have indeed fallen short of expectations, but others, as we have shown in previous chapters, have produced significant benefits to the public, from public education and environmental protection to health care services delivered through Medicare, Medicaid, and the veterans' health care system. A 2007 article in the National journal on ten notable successes in public policy put it this way: "Not every problem is intractable. Progress is possible."" In a similar vein, in 2000, the Brookings Institution released a study of government's greatest achievements of the past half-century. Among the most notable were rebuilding Europe after World War II; expanding the right to vote; promoting equal access to public accommodations, such as hotels and restaurants; reducing disease; ensuring safe food and drinking water; increasing older Americans' access to health care; enhancing workplace safety; increasing access to higher education; and reducing hunger and improving nutrition. The study's point was simple; it is easy to ignore some of the most important public policy actions because they are not very visible as they become routine parts of American life; yet examining such a list confirms the important role that government and public policy can play in improving everyday life.1" Still, there is little doubt from public commentary and political rhetoric over the past decade that many people believe to the contrary, that government is not working well (Bok 2001). In response to this skeptical public mood, policymakers at all levels of government have struggled with how to improve public policies and programs and better meet citizens* needs. Various efforts to "reinvent" government and to improve its efficiency were tried during the 1990s, and they continue today. As indicated earlier. President Obama began his administration determined not only to operate with openness and transparency but also to ensure that all programs would be as effective and efficient as possible. Yet, as noted, the public remains distrustful of government, and partisan divisions in the nation continue over what role government should play in our lives, from health care and food safety to environmental protection and energy policy. To some extent, the rise of the Tea Party movement reflects this broad discontent, which is fueled by increasingly partisan news shows and talk radio.' It is clear that any meaningful change in the public's view of government and public policy will require more than a determined White I louse. It will mean **developing a broader policy capacity** to define and respond effectively to public problems, both present and future, and ensuring that government agencies, from the military to Social Security, arc as well managed as they can be. How can policy analysis contribute to improving the policy capacity of government? One way is through the analysis of proposed institutional reforms, such as changes in the electoral process, campaign finance reform, and opportunities for citizens to participate in decision making. This is a task at which political scientists excel (Levi ct al. 2008). Yet too often their analyses fail to reach the public or even policymakers, who then must act without benefit of what the analysis has uncovered. The box "Steps to Analysis: Money in Politics" illustrates these needs. Other chapters have suggested that policy capacity can also be improved through better evaluation of the agencies charged with implementing policies and programs. Thanks to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the federal government is likely to conduct more evaluations of this kind than in the past, though probably of varying quality (Radin 2006). For many reasons, think tanks and

other independent bodies carrying out external evaluations may be better able to identify institutional strengths and weaknesses and to suggest meaningful paths to reform. For example, chapter 11 noted that a series of studies by the National Academy of Public Administration (1995, 2000) identified many elements of the U.S. environmental protection system that could be changed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other agencies. Studies by Resources for the Future have reached similar conclusions (Davics and Mazurck 1998). Chapter 12 highlighted a number of studies by the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service on foreign economic assistance, domestic electronic surveillance, the risks of terrorism, and military weapons acquisition and spending.

Policy Education Key

Circumvention contributes to the cycle of civic ignorance- that causes authoritarianism in the name of national security

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That root cause is difficult to discuss in a democracy, for it lies in the electorate's own deficiencies. This is the second great obstacle the reform proposals confront; on this point Bagehot's and Madison's theories converge. Bagehot argued that when the public becomes too sophisticated to be misled any longer about who holds governmental power but not informed enough to play a genuine role in governance, the whole structure will "fall to the earth," in his phrase. Madison, contrary to popular belief, did not suggest that the system that he and his colleagues designed was self-correcting. The Framers did not believe that merely setting "ambition against ambition" within the government would by itself save the people from autocracy. They believed that this competition for power would not occur absent an **informed** and **engaged** public— what Robert Dahl has called the "adequate citizen," the citizen able and willing to undertake the responsibilities required to make democracy work. Thomas Jefferson spoke for many of the Framers. He said: "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be." Competition between institutions was thus written into the constitutional architecture not as a substitute for civic virtue— there is none— but as a backstop, as an additional safeguard to forestall the rise of autocracy. But that backstop was not freestanding: it, too, depended upon an electorate possessed of civic virtue. If anything, the essentiality of civic virtue has grown over the years. In the early days of the Republic, public-policy issues were less intricate, and the franchise was de jure or de facto more restricted. A smaller electorate was more capable of mastering the more straightforward issues it faced. As Louis Henkin pointed out, however, the United States has since changed gradually from a republic to a democracy—an "ultra-democracy," Bagehot believed. The problems government has faced over the years have become more complex, and a greater base of civic knowledge has thus become **indispensable** for responsible participation in the process of governance. Yet a cursory glance at consistent survey results confirms what former Supreme Court justice David Souter has described today as the public's "**pervasive** civic **ignorance**." The numbers are sobering. A 2011 Newsweek survey showed that 80 percent of Americans did not know who was president during World War I; 40 percent did not know whom the United States fought in World War II; and 29 percent could not identify the current vice president of the United States. Far more Americans can name the Three Stooges than any member of the Supreme Court. One poll has found that 71 percent of Americans believe that Iran already has nuclear weapons. In 2006, at the height of U.S. military involvement in the region, 88 percent of Americans aged eighteen to twenty-four could not find Afghanistan on a map of Asia, and 63 percent could not find Iraq or Saudi Arabia on a map of the Middle East. Ilya Somin's fine book Democracy and Political Ignorance analyzes the problem in depth. The great conundrum is that the public's ignorance does not derive from "stupidity"—average raw iq scores

actually have increased in recent decades—so much as it derives from simple rationality: Why spend time and energy learning about national-security policies that cannot be changed? That is the **nub** of the negative feedback loop in which the United States is now locked. Resuscitating the Madisonian institutions requires an informed, engaged electorate, but voters have little incentive to be informed or engaged if they believe that their efforts would be for naught— and as they become more uninformed and unengaged, they have all the more reason to continue on that path. The Madisonian institutions thus continue to atrophy, the power of the Trumanite network continues to grow and the public **continues** to **disengage**. Should this trend continue, and there is scant reason to believe it will not, it takes no great prescience to see what lies ahead: outward symbols and rituals of national security governance that appear largely the same, concealing a Trumanite network that takes on the role of a silent directorate, and Madisonian institutions that, like the British monarchy and House of Lords, quietly and gradually are transformed into museum pieces.

Plans Key

Role playing is key – developing these skills in less high risk scenarios like debate is net better than throwing people into the policy making process absent training
Steve 7 (Anonymous member of Black Bloc and Active Transformation, "Anarchist! Get Organized! A discussion of A16, the blackblock, and beyond!," 2007, https://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/global/a16dcdiscussion.htm)//ghs-VA

What follows is not an attempt to discredit our efforts. It was a powerful and inspiring couple of days. I feel <u>it is important to always analyze our actions and be self-critical</u>, and try to move forward, advancing our movement. The State has used Seattle as an excuse to beef up police forces all over the country. In many ways Seattle caught us off-guard, and we will pay the price for it if we don't become better organized. <u>The main weakness</u> of the Black Block <u>in DC was that clear goals were not elaborated in a strategic way and tactical leadership was not developed to coordinate</u> our <u>actions. By leadership I don't mean</u> any sort of <u>authority, but</u> some <u>coordination</u> beside the call of the mob. We were being led around DC by any and everybody. All someone would do is make a call loud enough, and the Black Block would be in motion. We were often lead around by Direct Action Network (DAN - organizers of the civil disobedience) tactical people, for lack of our own. We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was doomed from the get go, because we had none of our own. The DAN strategy was the same as it was in Seattle, which the DC police learned how to police. Our only chance at disrupting the IMF/WB meetings was with drawing the police out of their security perimeter, therefore weakening it and allowing civil disobedience people to break through the barriers. This needs to be kept in mind as we approach the party conventions this summer. Philadelphia is especially ripe for this new strategy, since the convention is not happening in the business center. Demonstrations should be planned all over the city to draw police all over the place. On Monday the event culminated in the ultimate anti-climax, an arranged civil disobedience. The civil disobedience folks arranged with police to allow a few people to protest for a couple minutes closer to where the meetings were happening, where they would then be arrested. The CD strategy needed arrests. Our movement should try to avoid this kind of stuff as often as possible. While this is pretty critical of the DAN/CD strategy, it is so in hindsight. This is the same strategy that succeeded in shutting down the WTO ministerial in Seattle. And, while we didn't shut down the IMF/WB meetings, we did shut down 90 blocks of the American government on tax day - so we should be empowered by their fear of us! <u>The root of the lack of strategy problem is a general problem within the North American anarchist movement</u>. <u>We get caught up in tactical thinking **without establishing clear goals**</u>. <u>We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy</u>. <u>Moving away from strictly tactical thinking **toward political goals** and long term strategy needs to be a priority</u> for the anarchist movement. <u>No longer can we justify a **moralistic** approach</u> to the latest outrage - <u>running around like chickens with their heads cut off</u>. We need to prioritize developing the political unity of our affinity groups and collectives, as well as developing regional federations and starting the process of developing the political principles that they will be based around (which will be easier if we have made some headway in our local groups). The NorthEastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (NEFAC) is a good example of doing this. They have prioritized developing the political principles they are federated around. <u>The strategies that we develop in our collectives</u> and networks will never be blueprints set in stone. They <u>will be documents in motion, constantly being **challenged and adapted**</u>. But <u>without a specific elaboration of what we are working toward and how we plan to get there, we will always end up making bad decisions</u>. If we just assume everyone is on the same page, we will find out otherwise really quick when shit gets critical. Developing regional anarchist federations and networks is a great step for our movement. We should start getting these things going all over the continent. We should also prioritize developing these across national borders, which NEFAC has also done with northeastern Canada. Some of the errors of Love and Rage were that it tried to cover too much space too soon, and that it was based too much on individual membership, instead of collective membership. We need to keep these in mind as we start to develop these projects. One of the benefits of Love and Rage was that it provided a forum among a lot of people to have a lot of political discussion and try to develop strategy in a collective way. This, along with mutual aid and security, could be the priorities of the regional anarchist federations. These regional federations could also form the basis for tactical leadership at demonstrations. Let me first give one example why we need tactical teams at large demos. In DC the Black Block amorphously made the decision to try to drive a dumpster through one of the police lines. The people in front with the dumpster ended up getting abandoned by the other half of the Black Block who were persuaded by the voice of the moment to move elsewhere. The people up front were in a critical confrontation with police when they were abandoned. This could be avoided if the Black Block had a decision making system that slowed down decision making long enough for the block to stay together. With this in mind we must remember that the chaotic, decentralized nature of our organization is what makes us hard to police. We must maximize the benefits of decentralized leadership, without establishing permanent leaders and targets. Here is a proposal to

consider for developing tactical teams for demos. Delegates from each collective in the regional federation where the action is happening would form the tactical team. Delegates from other regional federations could also be a part of the tactical team. Communications between the tactical team and collectives, affinity groups, runners, etc. could be established via radio. The delegates would be recallable by their collectives if problems arose, and as long as clear goals are elaborated ahead of time with broader participation, the tactical team should be able to make informed decisions. An effort should be made to rotate delegates so that everyone develops the ability. People with less experience should be given the chance to represent their collectives in less critical situations, where they can become more comfortable with it. The reality is that liberal politics will not lead to an end to economic exploitation, racism, and sexism. Anarchism offers a truly radical alternative. Only a radical critique that links the oppressive nature of global capitalism to the police state at home has a chance of diversifying the movement against global capitalism. In order for the most oppressed people here to get involved the movement must offer the possibility of changing their lives for the better. A vision of what "winning" would look like must be elaborated if people are going to take the risk with tremendous social upheaval, which is what we are calling for. We cannot afford to give the old anarchist excuse that "the people will decide after the revolution" how this or that will work. We must have **plans** and ideas for things as diverse as transportation, schooling, crime prevention, and criminal justice. People don't want to hear simple solutions to complex questions, that only enforces people's opinions of us as naive. We need practical examples of what we are fighting for. People can respond to examples better than unusual theory. While we understand that we will not determine the shape of things to come, when the system critically fails someone needs to be there with anti-authoritarian suggestions for how to run all sorts of things. If we are not prepared for that we can assume others will be prepared to build up the state or a new state.

Galles

Policy details are key – abstract rhetoric devices ensure failure

Galles 9 (Gary M, Professor of economics @ Pepperdine University, "The Orange Grove: Obama health plan; we need details," March 3, 2009, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/details-25757-proposals-obama.html)//ghs-VA

The problem with such vagueness is that any informed public policy decision **has to be based on specific proposals**. Absent concrete details, which is where the devil lurks, no one--including those proposing a "reform"--can judge how it would fare or falter in the real world. So when the President wants approval for a proposal which offers too few details for evaluation, we must ask why. Like private sector salesmen, politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Unlike them, however, a politician's product line consists of claimed consequences of proposals not yet enacted. Further, politicians are unconstrained by truth in advertising laws, which would require that claims be more than misleading half-truths; they have fewer competitors keeping them honest; and they face "customers"--voters-- far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than those spending their own money. These differences from the private sector explain why politicians' "sales pitches" for their proposals are so vague. However, if vague proposals are the best politicians can offer, they are inadequate. **If rhetoric is unmatched by specifics**, there is no reason to believe a policy change will be an improvement, because no reliable way exists to determine whether it will actually accomplish what is promised. Only the **details** will determine the actual incentives facing the decision-makers involved, which is the only way to forecast the results, including the myriad of unintended consequences from unnoticed aspects. We must remember that, however laudable, goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. It may be that President Obama knows too little of his "solution" to provide specific plans. If so, he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then necessarily depends on blind faith that Obama and a panoply of bureaucrats, legislators, overseers and commissions will somehow adequately grasp the entire situation, know precisely what to do about it, and do it right (and that the result will not be too painful, however serious the problem)--a prospect that, due to the painful lessons of history, attracts few real believers. Alternatively, President Obama may know the details of what he intends, but is not providing them to the public. But if it is necessary to conceal a plan's details to put the best possible public face on it, those details must be adverse. If they made a more persuasive sales pitch, a politician would not hide actual details. They would be trumpeted at every opportunity, proving to a skeptical public he really had the answers, since concealing rather than revealing pays only when better informed citizens would be more inclined to reject a plan. Claiming adherence to elevated principles, but keeping detailed proposals from sight, also has a strategic advantage. It defuses critics. Absent details, any criticism can be parried by saying "that was not in our proposal" or "we have no plans to do that" or other rhetorical devices. It also allows a candidate to incorporate alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform, as if it was his idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display. However, adequate analysis cannot rest upon such flimsy foundations. That requires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. In the private sector, people don't spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. It is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics, because political incentives guarantee that people would object to what is kept hidden. So while vagueness may be good political strategy, **it virtually ensures bad policy**, if Americans' welfare is the criterion.

Concrete Plans Good

Simulation is key to good decision making -- abstractions promote bad outcomes

Lantis et al 8 (Jeffrey S. Lantis , Professor in the Department of Political Science and Chair of the International Relations Program at The College of Wooster, Kent J. Kille, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The College of Wooster, Matthew Krain is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at The College of Wooster, "The State of the Active Teaching and Learning Literature," 2008, http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/thestateoftheactiveteachingandlearningliterature_sample.pdf)//ghs-VA

Simulations, games, and role-play represent a third important set of active teaching and learning approaches. Educational objectives include deepening conceptual understandings of a particular phenomenon, sets of interactions, or socio-political processes by using student interaction to bring abstract concepts to life. They provide students with a real or imaginary environment within which to act out a given situation (Crookall 1995; Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; Kaufman 1998; Jefferson 1999; Flynn 2000; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Thomas 2002; Shellman and Turan 2003; Hobbs and Moreno 2004; Wheeler 2006; Kanner 2007; Raymond and Sorensen 2008). The aim is to enable students to actively experience, rather than read or hear about, the "constraints and motivations for action (or inaction) experienced by real players" (Smith and Boyer 1996:691), or to think about what they might do in a particular situation that the instructor has dramatized for them. As Sutcliffe (2002:3) emphasizes, "Remote theoretical concepts can be given life by placing them in a situation with which students are familiar." Such exercises capitalize on the strengths of active learning techniques: creating memorable experiential learning events that tap into multiple senses and emotions by utilizing visual and verbal stimuli. Early examples of simulations scholarship include works by Harold Guetzkow and colleagues, who created the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) in the 1950s. This work sparked wider interest in political simulations as teaching and research tools. By the 1980s, scholars had accumulated a number of sophisticated simulations of international politics, with names like "Crisis," "Grand Strategy," "ICONS," and "SALT III." More recent literature on simulations stresses opportunities to reflect dynamics faced in the real world by individual decision makers, by small groups like the US National Security Council, or even global summits organized around international issues, and provides for a focus on contemporary global problems (Lantis et al. 2000; Boyer 2000). Some of the most popular simulations involve modeling international organizations, in particular United Nations and European Union simulations (Van Dyke et al. 2000; McIntosh 2001; Dunn 2002; Zeff 2003; Switky 2004; Chasek 2005). Simulations may be employed in one class meeting, through one week, or even over an entire semester. Alternatively, they may be designed to take place outside of the classroom in local, national, or international competitions. The scholarship on the use of games in international studies sets these approaches apart slightly from simulations. For example, Van Ments (1989:14) argues that games are structured systems of competitive play with specific defined endpoints or solutions that incorporate the material to be learnt. They are similar to simulations, but contain specific structures or rules that dictate what it means to "win" the simulated interactions. Games place the participants in positions to make choices that affect outcomes, but do not require that they take on the persona of a real world actor. Examples range from interactive prisoner dilemma exercises to the use of board games in international studies classes (Hart and Simon 1988; Marks 1998; Brauer and Delemeester 2001; Ender 2004; Asal 2005; Ehrhardt 2008). A final subset of this type of approach is the role-play. Like simulations, roleplay places students within a structured environment and asks them to take on a specific role. Role-plays differ from simulations in that rather than having their actions prescribed by a set of well-defined preferences or objectives, role-plays provide more leeway for students to think about how they might act when placed in the position of their slightly less well-defined persona (Sutcliffe 2002). Role-play allows students to create their own interpretation of the roles because of role-play's less "goal oriented" focus. The primary aim of the role-play is to dramatize for the students the relative positions of the actors involved and/or the challenges facing them (Andrianoff and Levine 2002). This dramatization can be very simple (such as roleplaying a two-person conversation) or complex (such as role-playing numerous actors interconnected within a network). The reality of the scenario and its proximity to a student's personal experience is also flexible. While few examples of effective roleplay that are clearly distinguished from simulations or games have been published, some recent work has laid out some very useful role-play exercises with clear procedures for use in the international studies classroom (Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Johnston 2003; Krain and Shadle 2006; Williams 2006; Belloni 2008). Taken as a whole, the applications and procedures for simulations, games,

and role-play are well detailed in the active teaching and learning literature. Experts recommend a set of core considerations that should be taken into account when designing effective simulations (Winham 1991; Smith and Boyer 1996; Lantis 1998; Shaw 2004; 2006; Asal and Blake 2006; Ellington et al. 2006). These include building the simulation design around specific educational objectives, carefully selecting the situation or topic to be addressed, establishing the needed roles to be played by both students and instructor, providing clear rules, specific instructions and background material, and having debriefing and assessment plans in place in advance. There are also an increasing number of simulation designs published and disseminated in the discipline, whose procedures can be adopted (or adapted for use) depending upon an instructor's educational objectives (Beriker and Druckman 1996; Lantis 1996; 1998; Lowry 1999; Boyer 2000; Kille 2002; Shaw 2004; Switky and Aviles 2007; Tessman 2007; Kelle 2008). Finally, there is growing attention in this literature to assessment. Scholars have found that these methods are particularly effective in bridging the gap between academic knowledge and everyday life. Such exercises also lead to enhanced student interest in the topic, the development of empathy, and acquisition and retention of knowledge.

Student Role Playing

Debating within institutions in role playing bridges the gap between knowledge and real life – simple consciousness isn't sufficient

O'Reilly 13 (Patricia, Department of Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson University, "Implementing and Assessing Student Performance Skills and Learning: A Policy Role-Playing Exercise," February 27, 2013, http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ije/article/viewFile/3137/2875)//ghs-VA

1. Introduction Instructors constantly strive to accurately assess students' learning, that is, the knowledge students have gained in a subject. At the post-secondary level, their memory and ability to reason are tested and examined repeatedly. However, the performance component of knowledge is often not emphasized and only weakly assessed. Performance is here referred to as the ability to orally present and/or argue or debate your ideas to or in a group. Performance skills are important in all public institutions such as the university or workplace, and they play an important role in social engagement. Acquiring the skills for public speaking and presentations is a useful and practical part of learning, but the lack of attention in the teaching and learning literature to the development and assessment of performance skills in post-secondary social science education means we are undervaluing an important element of learning – one that post-secondary students themselves value (Cavanagh, 2011). A scan of the teaching and learning literature shows very little reference to performance skills of students - as performance rather than as knowledge acquisition (Lai, 2011). Learning through performance ought to be encouraged, assisted and rewarded. It is a reality for both the student and the graduate. In the classroom or tutorial there is always both informal and formal evaluation of students' performances. In the public sphere, students and instructors share in the fact that all adults need to "perform" in regular public engagement. There are performance skills sets that are useful to this social and political interaction. Educational institutions need to teach these skills to prepare their graduates for the workplace - especially when many full-time jobs begin as short-term contract jobs and those who "perform" best are more likely to be offered the full-time jobs. The ability to perform effectively and intelligently requires individual skills such as personal presentation and professional comportment, clear articulation, systematic revelation of one's ideas, and ease of intellectual exchange. These are the kinds of skills that tend to improve with practice and guidance, as well as help develop influence and leadership (Rackaway & Goertzen, 2008, p. 330). As instructors we sometimes forget that despite all their education, even graduate students may not have developed basic professional skills. We at the post-secondary level could learn from the training of earlier-level education teachers where classroom performance is proven to be enhanced by such non-academic factors as recognition of the role of emotions in learning (Timostsuk & Ugaste, 2012) and face-to-face performance feedback from instructors (Thurlings, Vermeulen, Kreijns, Bastianens & Stijnen, 2012). Another level at which performance is important to the education of the student is that of improved understanding of the nature of our social and political environment. That is, while learning through performance is important; learning about performance is also important. In order to better understand social and political interaction, students would do well to understand the use of performance in the institutions and discourse of the public sphere. Although the latter is being studied more and more in the social sciences - in for example, discourse analysis - the former is relatively understudied; and the importance of performance per se is not often considered in the social sciences. In Political Science/Studies in North American, for example, there are many textbooks that document and discuss the institutions, actors and processes of politics, but there are few studies that show the underlying informal human relations and emotions that drive interactions in the formal systems of governance, despite their importance to politics (Johns, O'Reilly & Inwood, 2007). Politicians, like any public actors, relate to each other and to their public. That is, they perform. When students themselves experience the limits of process and subjectivity through performance, they understand it better. In one of my policy courses, an undergraduate student reporting on our classroom performance exercises, had this to say I always knew that the political system and policy-making were complex, but my understanding of these processes was largely academic...In essence, I have a good understanding of how the system works and who the major and minor players in it are, but I really had no concept of how it feels to be a part of it. The policy exercises (we did in class) really helped open my eyes as to why a policy often ends up radically different from when it was first envisioned. Through the use of more structured forums for performance learning, students can both enhance their own professional performance skills and gain a better understanding of the complex messy nature of public social engagement - as it is practiced. With this in mind, this paper looks at some of the means by which we might organize, monitor and evaluate our students' performances in political exercises in order to encourage knowledge and development of performance skills and performance learning. First, it looks at the importance of encouraging performance skills in students and provides simple assessment techniques for evaluating student presentations and classroom or tutorial debates. Second, it provides a three-part policy exercise which could be used either individually or in a progressive developmental process to enable students to enhance their interactive performance skills and to better understand the limitations encountered by policy makers. Third, it discusses some means for instructor assessment of students' performance throughout the policy exercise, as well as students' understanding of the role of performance in politics. And fourth, this paper presents some early finding and conclusions from the author's use of the policy exercises in various political studies courses over several years. 2. Encouraging Student Performance Skills and Performance Learning Whether or not we make much note of it, performance is an important aspect of any post-secondary educational classroom and tutorial experience. Social studies and humanities courses have a considerable amount of informal discussion and debate. Classroom lectures often include Socratic exchange between the instructor and those students who choose to engage with questions or ideas in the classroom; and informal debates among the students are also encouraged by some instructors. However, the lecture format tends to ensure that these classroom exchanges are ad hoc and limited in nature. Tutorials attached to lectures are set up as a means to allow for more elaborate and continuous discussion and debate among the students, but, this format is generally not very structured and it is left up to the (often inexperienced) tutorial leader to run a fairly informal session that may vary considerably from tutor to tutor. Students are asked to speak, discuss, debate and present; but although it is often encouraged, it is not so often systematically organized, monitored and evaluated with feedback to encourage student improvement and development in this skill. Where participation is graded it is often done so more for content than performance per se. Even when performance skills are directly assessed and graded such as in mandatory slide presentations, they are rarely taught or weighted heavily in the final grade. This signal from the instructor means the students themselves are not always encouraged to perform well - many participate reluctantly. In a large classroom setting students are often nervous about how they are perceived by their peers as well as the instructor, and need encouragement to learn performance skills such as how to speak and present in front of groups. Adding an element of performance assessment provides the instructor with both the excuse to decrease the volume of input from the overly enthusiastic student and increase the input of the more reserved student. There are two things to keep in mind here: one, both individual and collective student performance already affects the quality of student learning whether or not we focus on it; and two, when students come together and undergo the pressures of the institutional learning environment, they are under both hierarchical student-to-instructor pressure and student-to-student peer pressure. At the most obvious level, the classroom or tutorial environment is altered by student engagement, either positively or negatively. As any instructor or student knows, the discussion and debate can be elevated by the performance skills of a few good students, or it can be lowered by weaker but highly vocal students. In either case the environment may discourage the more timid students from speaking.

If the instructor maintains a degree of control over student participation, this can improve both quality and fairness. At a more hidden level, there are subtle pressures related to performance in the classroom or tutorial. Instructors are making conscious and unconscious judgements about a student's intellectual and social abilities when listening to student responses and engagements during the most simple classroom exchanges. Students are right to be concerned that classroom performance is noticed by the person who will be evaluating their course learning. There is a hierarchy here. There is also considerable peer pressure among students in any classroom or discussion group, just as there is among academics themselves. It is better, I would argue, to recognize this rather than ignore it. In this way teaching exercises and techniques can be used to counter these pressures while downplaying the disadvantages and enhancing the advantages of the oral exchange and debate in student-to-instructor and student-to-student exchange. It would also enhance fairness since students who are uncomfortable with performance skills are those who suffer most from the open, ungraded discussion. There are various simple means by which an instructor can allow for active performance in the classroom and these can be monitored with instructor feedback and grading. For example, simple classroom presentations and debates can be set up with performance in mind. But in order to teach students more fully about the nature of their own and broader institutional performance skills an instructor needs to set up a more formal means of playing out and monitoring these skills as well as and providing feedback for improvement - not unlike those advocated by professionals-in-training through some sort of service learning (Gleason & Violette, 2012, p. 280) or those used for training teachers by utilizing keywords to prevent learner overload during instructor feedback (Coninx, Kreijns & Jochems, 2012, p. 11). A useful method of active performance in the classroom which is used throughout the social sciences is that of role playing – which has the added advantage of including and coaching the more reserved students, such as those who are reluctant participators for cultural reasons (Chunlei & Han, 2010, p. 81; Micari & Drane, 2011). The education literature on role playing and simulations, although weighted toward the positive, is somewhat ambiguous on its benefits (Chad, 2012, p. 23). Analysis suggests they increase student interest, enthusiasm, sense of control over learning, and **development of empathy** (Dougherty, 2003). Some say they increase political knowledge (Baranowski, 2006; Kahn & Perez, 2007), develop critical thinking and logical reasoning (Hayati, 2006; Smith & Boyer, 1996), increase retention of knowledge (Cherney, 2008; Smith & Boyer, 1996), and decrease levels of cynicism (Lay & Smarick, 2006). Others note that they improve students' public speaking abilities and negotiation skills, as well as their capacity to critically analyze their own positions on issues (Fliter, 2009) or ethical dilemmas (Rackaway & Goertzen, 2008). Conversely, some analysts have shown little difference of increased learning or knowledge of the subject taught through the use of simulations and experiential learning (Krain & Lantis, 2006; Powner & Allendoerfer, 2008). (Although this is countered by methodologists such as Chad who suggests that these results may be more attributable to poor technique on the part of the simulation designers than to student efforts (Chad, 2012).) It is also, I would argue, important to note that this literature tends to focus on the measurement or evaluation of student learning with the use of these exercises. It is then compared to learning in standard teaching forums, generally through comparative test results of total acquired knowledge. While this may be a useful exercise to prove a point, it is to some degree missing the point. An alternative approach to teaching that only supplements a strongly traditional education for students need not be "better than" standard academic teaching methods currently used in the field to merit use. Even if it were "less than" in terms of rote knowledge taken away from a social science course that will in all likelihood be outdated before long-certainly in political knowledge-the fact that it might alter the traditional routine of exams and essay writing for students and generate such benefits as enthusiasm, empathy, a focus on ethics and decreased cynicism would make it worthy of pursuit. Essays are a good tool for the development of critical thinking skills, but as others have also noted, there are other means and other tools to develop "higher order thinking skills" in students (Cherney, 2008; Rackaway & Goertze, 2008), especially where understanding of multi-dimensional and complex relations is required (Grove, 2005). It is notable that the most extensive use of role playing and simulations in political science is in International Relations where negotiations and diplomacy play such a key role in political outcomes (Chasek, 2004). It is easier to teach this sort of dynamic to young adults through role playing. I would argue there is value-added by experiential learning even if it is only as good as the standard teaching formats measured by standard learning measurements. These **debates** over the measured outcomes **are missing a significant point about** the importance of **performance learning** by students. While standard learning outcomes are clearly important to teaching, verbal engagement or the performance aspects of educational exercises are also important, and as I argue here, the two are linked in the real world of social and political engagement. Policy and legislative output, for example, is **not the product of knowledge alone**; it is developed through one-on-one interpersonal interaction during set processes within institutions and among actors engaged in ongoing rhetorical and power relations. The educated student would do well to better understand these dynamics. 3. Three-Stage Policy Exercise For anyone interested in teaching about public performance and the role it plays in our social and political processes and outcomes through experiential learning, a series of graduated participation forums that highlight both process and content is useful. Here the students learn more than in a standard lecture or tutorial about the structuring of group discourse and what this does to political or policy content. Over the course of three weeks a series of expanding forums may be used: starting out as one-on-one and then getting larger and more complex in both process and content. This exercise may be used to illustrate different social or political interactions such as structural, administrative or policy dynamics (redesigning institutional processes, enhancing institutional/group accountability and ethics, or producing policy and/or policy analysis). Here the example of a public policy debate and some of its common forums will be used. Preparation for the policy exercise includes an assigned or student-chosen jurisdiction and policy issue, e.g., a nation-state dealing with climate change, plus an assigned political role for each student, e.g., the national leader, various party members, members of a policy network, etc. (Hereafter, the example of political parties will be used.) Research guidance is given, and preferably illustrated, in class. Media presentations of legislative debates, journalist scrums or political or policy issue debates that feature cross-party discussions of political or policy issues are good tools for this type of classroom learning. This allows for a better understanding by the students of the actors and institutions involved, as well as the policy debates common to the chosen policy field. It also allows for illustration of the use of rhetoric and argument, as well as the use of content avoidance as a political tool. These are strategies the students may wish to employ in their own discussions and debates. The first week of the Three-Stage exercise is called the Triage Stage. Here each student comes to class with a personal triage list that moves from the most to least important issues in the selected policy area. Students are told explicitly to use their own personal policy preferences here, but to also research their political role so that they understand how the person they will later represent would think about the policy. When the exercise begins the students are put into groups of two, then four, then eight, and so on, respectively, depending on class size. Each student must begin by explaining and defending her or his original triage list to the discussion group (of two) and then come to an agreement on a new list to take to the next level (of four), and so on until the full group has one triage list. This entails considerable discussion, debate and retreat. Power dynamics, persuasion and knowledge differentials among the students begin to show up here, since they are forced to agree on one list in the end. The second part of the Triage stage, then, asks the students to repeat the first exercise, this time acting out their assigned political role within their own political party, and again producing one triage list – to be used in the next stage of the exercise. By representing a political actor, they are forced to move beyond their personal perspective to look at the likely output of the political actors involved. It provides the opportunity to see how process and hierarchy affects output since the party members range in power. It also provides an illustration of how ideas, relations and emotions can shape or even subvert a seemingly straightforward process. In these exercises both the interpersonal and institutional world is brought in to demonstrate the effects they can have on politics and policy making. Once a final single triage list is produced by each party in the class, they are ready to enter the Negotiation Stage held the following week, preferably in an informal setting. The time lapse allows the students to assimilate the triage experience, record their impressions (more below in Assessment section), and engage in further research with the members of their own party. At the negotiations, each party has a central table where the party leader coordinates activities, sending out sets of students to negotiate with the other parties. Blank tables with headings are provided for students to keep track of the negotiations. In the role playing, the governing party group is looking for backers for the triage they will be pushing during the final policy debate stage. Other groups are deciding whether or not to back those in power as well as which groups or individuals they might be able to bring on board in order to oppose the governing party during the policy meeting. The students then report back, and at the end of the session each party leader meets individually with each of the other party leaders to debate and negotiate positions. The results of these negotiations are known only within each party and will be used to build its strategy for the more formal debate the following week. The negotiation exercise helps reveal the dynamics of political communication, debate and negotiation. It also illustrates to the students the "back room" strategies and deal making of the real pre-meeting political dynamics that occur prior to major policy meetings/debates in, for example, the legislature, committee system, executive caucuses, or institutions of federalism. The final stage of the learning exercise, the Debate Stage, is where a full class debate is held and a vote taken on a final policy "to do" list. If using political parties, this can be a legislative debate and vote of the full legislature or house. The students' task here is further develop performance skills, and to

demonstrate political and policy knowledge. Each student brings his or her research summary notes, party triage list and negotiation tables, and another blank table with headings is provided to make quick notations during the debate. Prior to the debate, each party also prepares a brief opening statement of their policy position. After the opening statements, the floor is open to debate and it is up to the individual students and their group to put forth their best arguments and counter-arguments to the policy choices proposed. The competitive environment means it moves along at a good pace, since the students are eager to demonstrate all the policy research they have in front of them. As one student put it, "When the debate occurred, I learned that you really had to stay on your toes and think quickly in order to rebut." At the end of the session either consensus is reached on a number of issues or a vote is held and the majority wins. The results of the vote are recorded in the session and can then be used in the student's final journal entry. The debate exercise advances the students' understanding of communication, debate, and negotiation, only this time it is in a formal institutional setting where there are rules of procedure, time limits, and hierarchies of authority. Performance skills play a role here as well. This is enhanced if the simulated institutional process is one which is open to the public, such as a House Question Period, where the dynamics of political language and rhetoric aimed at the public through the media can be demonstrated. Of course, the debate also offers students the opportunity to demonstrate their policy and political knowledge – or content knowledge rather than process or performance knowledge. Any of these three stages could be used independently, but there is an advantage to using all three and to using them in succession. Education experiments have shown that although some students start out with trepidation about new modes of learning, this is often overcome as the exercise progresses (Frederking, 2005, p. 391). The staged approach allows the student to build up gradually toward the more pressured performance forum of the full debate. They begin in the less formal communications and debate sessions without too much pressure, since the instructor is not focused solely on them, and the group dynamics are still small. But as the role playing exercises progress, they are under increasing hierarchical pressure and peer pressure to perform. The staged approach also takes the students from their original personal policy preferences through a simulated institutional process: from the internal informal process of the triage, to the external informal process of the negotiations, to the external formal process of the policy making debate. Students learn: how this process alters their personal policy list; what the informal sphere does to policy content; and what the formal rules of an institution allow in the development of public policy. These things rarely discussed or not fully understood out of textbooks.

Simulation Model Good

Simulation models like debate are key to effective policy – simply reading isn't sufficient, an adversarial process is key

Levy et al 1 (David Levy, Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, FRANK CHALOUPKA, University of Illinois, Chicago, IL, USA, JOSEPH GITCHELL Pinney Associates DAVID MENDEZ and KENNETH E. WARNER University of Michigan, MI, USA, "The Use of Simulation Models for the Surveillance, Justification and Understanding of Tobacco Control Policies," 2002)//ghs-VA

Simulation models can be useful tools in informing policy makers who are trying to develop an appropriate mix of policies to reduce tobacco use and its consequences, **and**, more generally, in helping to understand the effects of tobacco policies. They can serve to predict future tobacco use and the effect of policies on that use, justify the implementation of particular policies, and help to **better understand the impact** of these policies. Simulation models generally start with a status-quo scenario, which projects smoking rates and health outcomes from some date forward in the absence of any specific policy addressing tobacco use. This type of information enables policy makers to understand and plan for likely future trends. Status quo scenarios generally reflect current policies, which is generally the base most relevant to policy makers. The models predict the effect of new policies on current levels and trends in smoking rates. The level of socio-demographic detail may vary from model to model, but, at a minimum, variation in smoking levels across different age cohorts is needed. Simulation models can allow policy makers to conduct experiments to determine the effects of well-defined programs and/or policies on smoking rates and specific tobacco-related problems in their communities before the actual expenditure of funds. Policies may be considered individually and then compared. For example, policy makers can use models as a tool to estimate the long-term impact of a tax increase on smoking rates or deaths, and to compare these effects to those of youth access policies. The effects of policies may be gauged in terms of the level and timing of their effect on smoking-related harms as well on smoking rates. Different policies may be also considered together or implemented in some sequence. The effect of newly implemented policies in a state or community is likely to depend on the policies already in effect, as well as on the intensity of their implementation and enforcement, and on policies being considered. For example, mass media-related policies may be more effective if they are accompanied by attempts to pass clean air laws or raise taxes. The effects of policies on different socio-demographic groups may also be considered. Many policies are likely to affect those of different ages, genders, racial/ethnic groups, or income/ education levels in different ways. Consequently, **knowledge of the effects of policies on these different groups will be helpful in targeting policies to particular populations where the need is greatest**, and in coordinating the effects of different policies. For example, treatment-oriented policies aimed at adult smokers may be an important adjunct to youth oriented policies, not only because they affect a different population but also because adults serve as a role model for youth and as a potential source of cigarettes. The results of simulation models may be used to justify specific tobacco policies or tobacco policies in general. The effect of one tobacco control policy may be considered relative to another policy in order to determine which is more effective. Alternatively, tobacco control policies may be compared to other public health policies, such as treatment for alcohol abuse. The effects of other policies may be considered in the model or may be derived from other models or literature. In comparing different policies, **cost-effectiveness analyses** are often useful. When combined with information on the costs of the policies, their effect may be gauged relative to the expenditure of scarce resources. The choice between tobacco policies may also be justified. Part of justifying tobacco control policies is a **"heuristic" role of explaining the effects of policies** to those less familiar with the public health literature. Simulation models demonstrate what is known from the scientific literature concerning the relative effectiveness of various policy approaches on the prevention of smoking and its consequences. They provide a useful method for helping to understand the basic effects of policies. Besides being used as a teaching device, simulation models may help to provide guidance on research needs in the field of public health and help define priorities and new directions for this research. In developing equations in simulation models, decisions must be made to explain how policies affect smoking outcomes. Policies may be transmitted through the population in various ways. They may affect the physical or financial availability of tobacco products, norms regarding use, or the ability to get successful treatment. They may affect initiation, quit or relapse rates, may have effects of

different magnitude and duration, and may affect different socio-demographic groups in different ways. Policies may have interactive effects. In other words, simulation models force the developers to think in a system wide fashion that provides a basis for a more complete understanding of the policies. In developing the linkages, the limitations of our knowledge on the effects of different policies are also made more explicit. In addition to examining how policies affect the population, simulation models may be used to examine the form that policies may take. For example, youth access policies generally involve some combination of compliance checks, penalties on those who violate the law, and attempts to educate and mobilize the community. The model may consider how different uses of these components may affect outcomes of the policy. Thereby, models can help policy makers to more effectively implement policy. In addition, simulation models may provide a structure for those studying public health to better understand and explore the effects of a policy

Real Life Application

Traditional pedagogical techniques fail – simulation is key to breaking out of current models of passive learning – adversarial model is key

Silvia 10 (Chris, Assistant Professor in the Romney Institute of Public Management at Brigham Young University, PhD in Public Affairs from the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, "The Impact of Simulations on Higher-Level Learning," 2010, http://www.naspaa.org/jpaemessenger/article/vol18-2/10_silva.pdf)//ghs-VA

Often, political science, <u>public policy</u>, and public administration <u>course objectives include statements regarding increasing responsible citizenship</u>, developing a continued interest in public affairs and policy, building the capacity to integrate the course material to develop policy arguments, <u>and fostering the ability to apply the theoretical concepts to "real life" situations</u>. These objectives are beyond simple recall and comprehension and are often referred to as higher-level learning. However, the **traditional pedagogical techniques** of assigned readings, lectures, tests, and papers often <u>fail to replicate the "real world."</u> As a result, some have turned to **role-playing simulations** to <u>help achieve</u> their <u>course objectives</u>. While the benefits of role-playing simulations are often touted, there is a dearth of empirical evidence to support this assertion. A survey of nearly 200 students in four sections of an entry-level course in urban policy is used to examine this gap in the teaching and learning literature and attempts to uncover the impact of multisession classroom role-playing simulations on higher-level student learning. The results of this study suggest that <u>role-playing simulations are an effective means to give students the opportunity to engage in higher-level learning</u>. "One must learn by doing the thing, for though you think you know it—you have no certainty until you try." — Sophocles (495–406 BCE) Over the past few years, many college campuses around the country have moved toward the use of innovative teaching techniques to improve student learning. One of the most commonly used techniques has been active learning, which has been defined as "anything that involves students in doing things and thinking about the things they are doing" (Bonwell & Eison, 1991, p. 2). This movement has been spurred on by the thought that <u>"genuine learning" is the result of the student's active engagement in the learning process and not merely their passive absorption of what is being taught</u> (Alder, 1982). Proponents argue that the incorporation of active learning activities (e.g. hands-on activities, <u>role plays</u>, group projects, peer-led learning, <u>and simulations</u>) <u>better</u> help an instructor "create a lesson plan that <u>maximizes student learning, encourages critical thinking</u>, aids information retention, <u>and allows students to apply key concepts and knowledge gained through readings and lecture to real</u> (or realistic) <u>problems</u>" (Raines, 2003, p. 432). Further, it has been argued that active learning techniques help bridge the lecturer-listener divide. In a traditional lecture, the students passively listen while the professor actively lectures (Bonwell, 1996). This approach places more focus on the teacher's teaching than on the students' learning (O'Leary, 2002). Since individual students "process information, learn concepts, and solve problems in different ways" (Brock & Cameron, 1999, p. 251), all of the students in the classroom may not be able to grasp the material through merely hearing a lecture. The standard lecture format may in fact only help those students to learn the intended material who "learn auditorially, have a high working memory capacity, have all the required prior knowledge, have good note-taking skills, and are not susceptible to information-processing overload" (Johnson, Johnson, & Smith, 1991, p. 89). Further, some contend that lectures are "not suited for teaching higher orders of thinking such as application, analysis, synthesis or evaluation" (Bonwell, 1996, p. 32). Thus, using active learning activities in the classroom has become a popular teaching technique because such activities are designed to engage students actively in their own learning (Campbell & McCabe, 2002) and are more effective alternatives to the traditional lecture/ discussion approach whereby students take a passive role in their own learning process (Poling & Hupp, 2009). While much of the literature on the scholarship of teaching and learning suggests that students will comprehend better, retain longer, and become more interested in the material when active learning techniques are used (Bonwell, 1996; Fink, 2003; Poling & Hupp, 2009), a healthy debate continues over whether active learning techniques are of value. Some are skeptical that the juice is worth the squeeze, for they see too many barriers to usage to justify its incorporation. Such barriers include concerns that the preparation time required to conduct these activities is too onerous (Crawford & Machemer, 2008; Faria & Wellington, 2004; Killian &Brandon, 2009), that active learning activities make it harder to cover the required course material (Killian &Brandon, 2009; Michaelsen, Knight, & Fink, 2004), that the amount of class time taken up by active learning activities is too great (Faria & Wellington, 2004), and, finally, that these activities simply do not work as they were intended to work (Powner & Allendoerfer, 2008). However, perhaps the largest point of contention raised by those who question the utility of active learning activities is the lack of empirical evidence that these techniques really work (Gosen & Washbush, 2004; Krain & Lantis, 2006; Rochester, 2003). The answer to this question is difficult to assess because of the difficulty in determining what works means. As Rochester counsels, "Rather than offering ringing endorsements of the latest innovations and sweeping indictments of old-fashioned techniques, we should engage in research that specifies what learning outcomes are maximized under what circumstances for what clienteles" (2003, p. 434). In other words,

instead of flocking blindly toward an approach that is an unproven panacea, professors need to apply the research skills that we hone in our individual disciplines to our teaching to see if what many think works really does work. ROLE-PLAYING SIMULATIONS AS AN ACTIVE LEARNING TECHNIQUE Experiential learning activities have been a commonly employed pedagogical tool for centuries. The physical sciences have had laboratory sessions, language classes have included role-playing exercises, and the health sciences have held mock-ups, all of which were designed to allow the student to use and apply what was read or presented in class. With the lectures and/or readings as a foundation, many of these experiences were intended to crystallize the students' understanding of the material. For example, since the relationship between force, mass, and acceleration is often not intuitive, many physics courses include a lab session where students manipulate these three parameters and prove to themselves that force is equal to mass times acceleration. Whereas classes in the physical sciences reinforce and build upon the concepts and theories taught in lecture with opportunities to experiment in a laboratory setting, courses in the social sciences often do not include similar, hands-on learning opportunities. This lack of an active learning experience may be particularly problematic in the political science, public policy, and public administration classrooms, for students in these disciplines must often grapple with the conflicting facts and values that are common in public policy debates and throughout the policy process in the real world. Since pure laboratory experiments in many disciplines are not possible or ethical, instructors in these fields have turned to simulations as ways to allow students a laboratory-like experience. Simulations vary widely in their length—some last only 5 to 10 minutes (Davis, 2009), and others are held over multiple class sessions (Woodworth, Gump, & Forrester, 2005). Additionally, the format of simulations ranges from computerized games to elaborate, role-playing scenarios (Moore, 2009). While not all simulations involve role playing, for the purposes of this paper, the terms role playing, role-playing simulation, and simulations are used synonymously to refer to active learning techniques in which students try to "become another individual and, by assuming the role, to gain a better understanding of the person, as well as the actions and motivations that prompt certain behaviors… [and] explore their [own] feelings" (Moore, 2009, p. 209). "Simulations give students the chance to apply theory, develop critical skills, and provide a welcome relief from the everyday tasks of reading and preparing for classes" (Kanner, 2007). An additional benefit of many of these simulations is the introduction of an aspect of realism into the students' experience. Such simulations are historically seen in the medical fields, where mock-up patients take on the signs and symptoms of a certain disease or injury and the student is asked to assess, diagnose, and/or treat the "patient." Here the students must apply what they have learned to a reasonably realistic scenario. Further, there is evidence that the experiential learning that occurs in role-playing simulations promotes long-term retention of course material (Bernstein & Meizlish, 2003; Brookfield, 1990). Increasingly, public administration, public policy, and political science courses are turning toward simulations and role playing to help their students both better understand and apply the material. Simulations have been used in courses such as international relations (e.g., Shellman & Turan, 2006), negotiations (e.g., Kanner, 2007), constitutional law (e.g., Fliter, 2009), comparative politics (e.g., Shellman, 2001), professional development (e.g., Wechsler & Baker, 2004), economics (e.g., Campbell & McCabe, 2002), human resource management (e.g., Dede, 2002; Yaghi, 2008), leadership (e.g., Crosby & Bryson, 2007), and American government (e.g., Caruson, 2005). Frequently, the learning objectives in these courses include statements regarding increasing responsible citizenship, developing a continued interest in public affairs and policy, building the capacity to integrate the course material to develop policy arguments, and fostering the ability to apply theoretical concepts to real-life situations. Many professors want their students to be able to apply the "book knowledge" to the real world, to see how the abstract concepts and theories play out in the real world, to be able to experience real-world processes, and to become motivated to become involved in the real-world processes that are discussed in class. Scholars have claimed that simulations achieve all four objectives (see Brock & Cameron, 1999; Campbell & McCabe, 2002; Shellman, 2001; Smith & Boyer, 1996, respectively) because they place the students in roles where they are asked to apply what they have learned previously in order to "exercise judgment,…enlarge their analytical capacity"(Moreno, 2007, p. 85), "make decisions, solve problems, and react to the results of their decision" (McKeachie & Marilla, 2006, p. 226). The aforementioned objectives are beyond simple recall and comprehension and are what Bloom (1956) referred to as higher levels of student learning. However, the traditional pedagogical techniques of assigned readings, lectures, tests, and papers often fail to replicate the real world in that these traditional learning experiences frequently do not require the students to integrate, synthesize, and apply the course material in realistic situations. Simulations, on the other hand, put students in realistic situations that allow them to participate affectively, behaviorally, and cognitively (Blanchard & Donahue, 2007) and, in so doing, may assist students in engaging in higher-level learning.

Util

Extinction First

High risk of extinction - doomsday argument

Nick **Bostrom, 2012** ("A Primer on the Doomsday Argument" http://www.anthropic-principle.com/?q=anthropic_principle/doomsday_argument)

Here is the doomsday argument. I will explain it in three steps:¶ Step I¶ Imagine a universe that consists of one hundred cubicles. In each cubicle, there is one person. Ninety of the cubicles are painted blue on the outside and the other ten are painted red. Each person is asked to guess whether she is in a blue or a red cubicle. (And everybody knows all this.)¶ Now, suppose you find yourself in one of these cubicles. What color should you think it has? Since 90% of all people are in blue cubicles, and since you don't have any other relevant information, it seems you should think that with 90% probability you are in a blue cubicle. Let's call this idea, that you should reason as if you were a random sample from the set of all observers, the self-sampling assumption.¶ Suppose everyone accepts the self-sampling assumption and everyone has to bet on whether they are in a blue or red cubicle. Then 90% of all persons will win their bets and 10% will lose. Suppose, on the other hand, that the self-sampling assumption is rejected and people think that one is no more likely to be in a blue cubicle; so they bet by flipping a coin. Then, on average, 50% of the people will win and 50% will lose. – The rational thing to do seems to be to accept the self-sampling assumption, at least in this case.¶ Step II¶ Now we modify the thought experiment a bit. We still have the hundred cubicles but this time they are not painted blue or red. Instead they are numbered from 1 to 100. The numbers are painted on the outside. Then a fair coin is tossed (by God perhaps). If the coin falls heads, one person is created in each cubicle. If the coin falls tails, then persons are only created in cubicles 1 through 10.¶ You find yourself in one of the cubicles and are asked to guess whether there are ten or one hundred people? Since the number was determined by the flip of a fair coin, and since you haven't seen how the coin fell and you don't have any other relevant information, it seems you should believe with 50% probability that it fell heads (and thus that there are a hundred people).¶ Moreover, you can use the self-sampling assumption to assess the conditional probability of a number between 1 and 10 being painted on your cubicle given how the coin fell. For example, conditional on heads, the probability that the number on your cubicle is between 1 and 10 is 1/10, since one out of ten people will then find themselves there. Conditional on tails, the probability that you are in number 1 through 10 is one; for you then know that everybody is in one of those cubicles.¶ Suppose that you open the door and discover that you are in cubicle number 7. Again you are asked, how did the coin fall? But now the probability is greater than 50% that it fell tails. For what you are observing is given a higher probability on that hypothesis than on the hypothesis that it fell heads. The precise new probability of tails can be calculated using Bayes' theorem. It is approximately 91%. So after finding that you are in cubicle number 7, you should think that with 91% probability there are only ten people.¶ Step III¶ The last step is to transpose these results to our actual situation here on Earth. Let's <u>formulate the following</u> two rival <u>hypotheses. Doom Early</u>: humankind goes extinct in the next century and <u>the total number of humans that will have existed is,</u> say<u>, 200 billion</u>. <u>Doom Late: humankind survives</u> the next century and goes on to colonize the galaxy; the <u>total number of humans is</u>, say, <u>200 trillion</u>. To simplify the exposition we will consider only these hypotheses. (Using <u>a more fine-grained partition</u> of the hypothesis space <u>doesn't change the principle</u> although it would give more exact numerical values.)¶ Doom Early corresponds to there only being ten people in the thought experiment of Step II. Doom Late corresponds to there being one hundred people. Corresponding the numbers on the cubicles, we now have the "birth ranks" of human beings – their positions in the human race. Corresponding to the prior probability (50%) of the coin falling heads or tails, we now have some prior probability of Doom Soon or Doom Late. This will be based on our ordinary empirical estimates of potential threats to human survival, such as nuclear or biological warfare, a meteorite destroying the plant, runaway greenhouse effect, self-replicating nanomachines running amok, a breakdown of a metastable vacuum state due to high-energy particle experiments and so on (presumably there are dangers that we haven't yet thought of). <u>Let's say</u> that based on such considerations, <u>you think that there is a 5% probability of Doom Soon</u>. The <u>exact number doesn't matter</u> for the structure of the argument.¶ Finally, corresponding to finding you are in cubicle number 7 we have the fact that you find that <u>your birth rank is</u> about <u>60 billion</u> (that's approximately how many humans have lived before you). Just as finding you are in cubicle 7 increased the probability of the coin having fallen tails, so <u>finding you are human number 60 billion gives you reason to think that Doom Soon is more probable</u> than you previously thought. Exactly how much more probable will depend on the precise numbers you use. In the present example, the <u>posterior probability of Doom Soon will be very close to one</u>. You can with near certainty rule out Doom Late.¶ *¶ That is the Doomsday argument in a nutshell. After hearing about it, many people think they know what is wrong with it. But these objections tend to be mutually incompatible, and often they hinge on some simple misunderstanding. Be sure to read the literature before feeling too confident that you have a refutation.¶ If the Doomsday argument is correct, what precisely does it show? It doesn't show that there is no point trying to reduce threats to human survival "because we're doomed anyway". On the contrary, the <u>Doomsday argument could make such efforts seem even more urgent. Working to reduce the risk that nanotechnology will be abused to destroy intelligent life, for example, would decrease the prior probability of Doom Soon</u>, and this would reduce its posterior probability after taking the Doomsday argument into account; humankind's life expectancy would go up.

Existential risk education good

http://pcast.ideascale.com/a/dtd/Catalyze-Education-and-Industry-in-Existential-Risk-and-Global-Catastrophic-Risk-Reduction/72299-8319

There is no agenda for innovation more important for humanity to undertake than the identification and reduction of "existential risks" (human extinction risks). Following that are global catastrophic risks our civilization could survive.¶ The effort to reduce existential and global catastrophic risks involves information technology (rogue artificial intelligence, infrastructure threats), biotechnology (bioweapons, virulent contagious diseases), and nanotechnology (nanoweapons, nanorobots). These "golden triangle" technologies also are of great interest economically, and young people can become inspired to work in them based on the need to reduce existential risk and global catastrophic risk. Like the anti-terrorism agenda, a focus on risk reduction also has the potential to unite the U.S. with other nations in applying science, technology, and innovation to cooperative efforts¶ Expansion of industry to meet demands of such risk reduction - in the near term as well as the longer term through education - could generate many white and blue collar jobs, and provide a boost to the economy that will not disappear over time, since the demand will be self-perpetuating (new risks will be determined and risk reduction can always be improved) as well as in everyone's rational self-interest. Improving analysis of potential interactions between risks and proactively developing solutions and contingency plans (including how risks may impact the economy) would seem to be an especially promising area for commercial development. In turn, commercial development would spur more innovative solutions for risk reduction.¶ There may be tens of thousands of people working on specific risks including arms control, severe climate scenarios, mega-scale natural disasters, asteroids, technological weaponization and many other particular risks. However, instead of viewing these risks as fundamentally dissimilar, they can all be classified as "existential risks" or "global catastrophic risks." Popularizing these classifications, with objective weightings for things such as the significance of impact, the likelihood of occurrence, and the time horizon to avert, would facilitate wiser allocations of (inter)governmental resources and contribute to synergies between various risk reduction institutes and companies (e.g. via shared conferences, publications, web tools, business solutions, etc.). This could be especially beneficial to those working on reduction of existential risks, which receive much less attention than some global catastrophic risks, e.g. some forms of large-scale terrorism.¶ Ideally, a government panel would be formed as soon as possible to explore how to highlight and reward the study of existential and global catastrophic risks in education and catalyze industry quickly around the reduction of such risks, both to serve that primary aim and secondarily to create valuable jobs that help boost the economy, many of which will relate to information technology, biotechnology, and nanotechnology.

Future generations

Bostrom and Andersen 2012 (The Atlantic, "We're underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction" http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)

Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the

probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

High risk - new technologies and observer selection effect

Bostrom and Andersen 2012 (The Atlantic, "We're underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction" http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)Bostrom: Well, there's another line of thinking that's very similar to what you're describing that speaks to how much weight we should give to our track record of survival. Human beings have been around for roughly a hundred thousand years on this planet, so how much should that count in determining whether we're going to be around another hundred thousand years? Now there are a number of different factors that come into that discussion, the most important of which is whether there are going to be new kinds of risks that haven't existed to this point in human history---in particular risks of our own making, new technologies that we might develop this century, those that might give us the means to create new kinds of weapons or new kinds of accidents. The fact that we've been around for a hundred thousand years wouldn't give us much confidence with respect to those risks. ¶ But, to the extent that one were focusing on risks from nature, from asteroid attacks or risks from say vacuum decay in space itself, or something like that, one might ask what we can infer from this long track record of survival. And one might think that any species anywhere will think of themselves as having survived up to the current time because of this observation selection effect. You don't observe yourself after you've gone extinct, and so that complicates the analysis for certain kinds of risks.¶ A few years ago I wrote a paper together with a physicist at MIT named Max Tegmark, where we looked at particular risks like vacuum decay, which is this hypothetical phenomena where space decays into a lower energy state, which would then cause this bubble propagating at the speed of light that would destroy all structures in its path, and would cause a catastrophe that no observer could ever see because it would come at you at the speed of light, without warning. We were noting that it's somewhat problematic to apply our observations to develop a probability for something like that, given this observation selection effect. But we found an indirect way of looking at evidence having to do with the formation date of our planet, and comparing it to the formation date of other earthlike planets and then using that as a kind of indirect way of putting a bound on that kind of risk. So that's another way in which observation selection effects become important when you're trying to estimate the odds of humanity having a long future.

Predictions are inevitable and good - the idea that we can either have perfect information or none is absurd and makes action impossible

Nick **Bostrom 2007** ("The Future of Humanity", http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.html)

We need realistic pictures of what the future might bring in order to make sound decisions. Increasingly, we need realistic pictures not only of our personal or local near-term futures, but also of remoter global futures. Because of our expanded technological powers, some human activities now have significant global impacts. The scale of human social organization has also grown, creating new opportunities for coordination and action, and there are many institutions and individuals who either do consider, or claim to consider, or ought to consider, possible long-term global impacts of their actions. Climate change, national and international security, economic development, nuclear waste disposal, biodiversity, natural resource conservation, population policy, and scientific and technological research funding are examples of policy areas that involve long time-horizons.

Arguments in these areas often rely on implicit assumptions about the future of humanity. By making these assumptions explicit, and subjecting them to critical analysis, it might be possible to address some of the big challenges for humanity in a more well-considered and thoughtful manner.¶ The fact that we "need" realistic pictures of the future does not entail that we can have them. Predictions about future technical and social developments are notoriously unreliable – to an extent that have lead some to propose that we do away with prediction altogether in our planning and preparation for the future. Yet while the methodological problems of such forecasting are certainly very significant, the extreme view that we can or should do away with prediction altogether is misguided. That view is expressed, to take one example, in a recent paper on the societal implications of nanotechnology by Michael Crow and Daniel Sarewitz, in which they argue that the issue of predictability is "irrelevant":¶ ¶ preparation for the future obviously does not require accurate prediction; rather, it requires a foundation of knowledge upon which to base action, a capacity to learn from experience, close attention to what is going on in the present, and healthy and resilient institutions that can effectively respond or adapt to change in a timely manner.2¶ ¶ Note that each of the elements Crow and Sarewitz mention as required for the preparation for the future relies in some way on accurate prediction. A capacity to learn from experience is not useful for preparing for the future unless we can correctly assume (predict) that the lessons we derive from the past will be applicable to future situations. Close attention to what is going on in the present is likewise futile unless we can assume that what is going on in the present will reveal stable trends or otherwise shed light on what is likely to happen next. It also requires non-trivial prediction to figure out what kind of institution will prove healthy, resilient, and effective in responding or adapting to future changes.¶ The reality is that predictability is a matter of degree, and different aspects of the future are predictable with varying degrees of reliability and precision.3 It may often be a good idea to develop plans that are flexible and to pursue policies that are robust under a wide range of contingencies. In some cases, it also makes sense to adopt a reactive approach that relies on adapting quickly to changing circumstances rather than pursuing any detailed long-term plan or explicit agenda. Yet these coping strategies are only one part of the solution. Another part is to work to improve the accuracy of our beliefs about the future (including the accuracy of conditional predictions of the form "if x is done, y will result"). There might be traps that we are walking towards that we could only avoid falling into by means of foresight. There are also opportunities that we could reach much sooner if we could see them farther in advance. And in a strict sense, prediction is always necessary for meaningful decision-making.4¶ Predictability does not necessarily fall off with temporal distance. It may be highly unpredictable where a traveler will be one hour after the start of her journey, yet predictable that after five hours she will be at her destination. The very long-term future of humanity may be relatively easy to predict, being a matter amenable to study by the natural sciences, particularly cosmology (physical eschatology). And for there to be a degree of predictability, it is not necessary that it be possible to identify one specific scenario as what will definitely happen. If there is at least some scenario that can be ruled out, that is also a degree of predictability. Even short of this, if there is some basis for assigning different probabilities (in the sense of credences, degrees of belief) to different propositions about logically possible future events, or some basis for criticizing some such probability distributions as less rationally defensible or reasonable than others, then again there is a degree of predictability. And this is surely the case with regard to many aspects of the future of humanity. While our knowledge is insufficient to narrow down the space of possibilities to one broadly outlined future for humanity, we do know of many relevant arguments and considerations which in combination impose significant constraints on what a plausible view of the future could look like. The future of humanity need not be a topic on which all assumptions are entirely arbitrary and anything goes. There is a vast gulf between knowing exactly what will happen and having absolutely no clue about what will happen. Our actual epistemic location is some offshore place in that gulf.5¶

Magnitude first - we can recover from anything short of extinction and there's consensus that it's a real risk

Nick **Bostrom 2007** ("The Future of Humanity", http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.html)

Human extinction risks have received less scholarly attention than they deserve. In recent years, there have been approximately three serious books and one major paper on this topic. John Leslie, a Canadian philosopher, puts the probability of humanity failing to survive the next five centuries to 30% in his book End of the World.19 His estimate is partly based on the controversial "Doomsday argument" and on his own views about the limitations of this argument.20 Sir Martin Rees, Britain's Astronomer Royal, is even more pessimistic, putting the odds that humanity will survive the 21st century to no better than 50% in Our Final Hour.21 Richard Posner, an eminent American legal scholar, offers no numerical estimate but rates the risk of extinction "significant" in Catastrophe.22 And I published a paper in 2002 in which I suggested that assigning a probability of less than 25% to existentialdisaster (no time limit) would be misguided. 23 The concept of existential risk is distinct from that of extinction risk. As I introduced the term, an existential disaster is one that causes either the annihilation of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic curtailment of its potential for future desirable development.24¶ It is possible that a publication bias is responsible for the alarming picture presented by these opinions. Scholars who believe that the threats to human survival are severe might be more likely to write books on the topic, making the threat of extinction seem greater than it really is. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that there seems to be a consensus among those researchers who have seriously looked into the matter that there is a serious risk that humanity's journey will come to a premature end.25¶ The greatest extinction risks (and existential risks more generally) arise from human activity. Our species has survived volcanic eruptions, meteoric impacts, and other natural hazards for tens of thousands of years. It seems unlikely that any of these old risks should exterminate us in the near future. By contrast, human civilization is introducing many novel phenomena into the world, ranging from nuclear weapons to designer pathogens to high-energy particle colliders. The most severe existential risks of this century derive from expected technological developments. Advances in biotechnology might make it possible to design new viruses that combine the easy contagion and mutability of the influenza virus with the lethality of HIV. Molecular nanotechnology might make it possible to create weapons systems with a destructive power dwarfing that of both thermonuclear bombs and biowarfare agents.26 Superintelligent machines might be built and their actions could determine the future of humanity – and whether there will be one.27 Considering that many of the existential risks that now seem to be among the most significant were conceptualized only in recent decades, it seems likely that further ones still remain to be discovered.¶ The same technologies that will pose these risks will also help us to mitigate some risks. Biotechnology can help us develop better diagnostics, vaccines, and anti-viral drugs. Molecular nanotechnology could offer even stronger prophylactics.28 Superintelligent machines may be the last invention that human beings ever need to make, since a superintelligence, by definition, would be far more effective than a human brain in practically all intellectual endeavors, including strategic thinking, scientific analysis, and technological creativity.29 In addition to creating and mitigating risks, these powerful technological capabilities would also affect the human condition in many other ways.¶ Extinction risks constitute an especially severe subset of what could go badly wrong for humanity. There are many possible global catastrophes that would cause immense worldwide damage, maybe even the collapse of modern civilization, yet fall short of terminating the human species. An all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States might be an example of a global catastrophe that would be unlikely to result in extinction. A terrible pandemic with high virulence and 100% mortality rate among infected individuals might be another example: if some groups of humans could successfully quarantine themselves before being exposed, human extinction could be avoided even if, say, 95% or more of the world's population succumbed. What distinguishes extinction and other existential catastrophes is that a comeback is impossible. A non-existential disaster causing the breakdown of global civilization is, from the perspective of humanity as a whole, a potentially recoverable setback: a giant massacre for man, a small misstep for mankind.¶ An existential catastrophe is therefore qualitatively distinct from a "mere" collapse of global civilization, although in terms of our moral and prudential attitudes perhaps we should simply view both as unimaginably bad outcomes.30 One way that civilization collapse could be a significant feature in the larger picture for humanity, however, is if it formed part of a repeating pattern. This takes us to the second family of scenarios: recurrent collapse.

AT: ethics

Constant surveillance is morally fantastic

James Stacy **Taylor, 2005** (In Praise of Big Brother: Why We Should Learn to Stop Worrying and Love Government Surveillance; Public Affairs Quarterly 19(3))

If the above pro-surveillance argument is sound, then it is morally permissible¶ for a State to subject its citizens to constant surveillance. Given the horror with¶ which the current proliferation of surveillance devices is usually greeted this¶ conclusion is not likely to be a popular one. However, before turning to rebut the¶ objections that it will be faced with, some of its advantages should be outlined.¶ The most obvious advantages to the State's installing such a surveillance system¶ would result from the fact that witnesses would no longer be needed in either¶ criminal or civil cases, for their testimony would be supplanted by information¶ supplied by surveillance devices. Unlike witness testimony, this information would¶ be accurate. It would, for example, be unaffected by any biases (whether conscious¶ or unconscious) that human witnesses might be subject to and which could taint¶ their testimony. It would also be free from distortions, whether deliberate (e.g.,¶ the witness is lying, or omitting parts of the truth), or accidental (e.g., the witness¶ has a faulty memory). Moreover, the juries and judges to whom the information¶ taken from surveillance devices would be presented in a court could take it at its¶ face value, rather than having subjectively to assess its accuracy in the light of¶ the perceived reliability of the witness from whom it was taken. Furthermore, that¶ witnesses would no longer be needed under a system of constant and universal¶ State surveillance would also benefithose who would otherwise have served in¶ this capacity. Most obviously, they would no longer be burdened with the task of¶ testifying, which might have required them to travel, or to take time off work. They¶ would also be relieved from any threats that they might have faced from persons¶ who would be adversely affected either by their testimony (e.g., the defendants¶ or their associates), or by its lack (e.g., the prosecutors).¶ A system of constant State surveillance would have other advantages, too.¶ Under the current criminal justice system a wealthy defendant who is innocent¶ of the charges that she is faced with can use her wealth to hire private investigators¶ to demonstrate her innocence, either by finding persons who witnessed the¶ crime of which she is accused, or by finding persons who can provide her with a¶ legitimate alibi. This option is not open to poorer defendants who are similarly¶ innocent, but who cannot afford to hire private investigators. Since this is so,¶ innocent, poor defendants are more likely than innocent, wealthy defendants to¶ accept plea bargains, or to be convicted of crimes that they did not commit. If,¶ however, a poor person were to be accused of a crime in a State that subjected its¶ citizens to constant surveillance, the judge in her case would be morally justified¶ (indeed, would be morally required) in enabling the defense to secure information¶ that would prove her innocence, and that would have been gathered by the State's¶ surveillance devices. A State's use of constant surveillance could thus reduce the¶ number of persons who are wrongfully convicted. This would not only be good in¶ itself, but it would also lead to a more equitable justice system, for the disparity¶ in wrongful conviction rates between the wealthy (who could use their wealth to¶ prove their innocence) and the poor could be eliminated.¶ In addition to these advantages constant State surveillance would also benefit¶ the State's citizenry at large, by serving as a deterrent to crime. This would not be¶ because the citizens who lived under State surveillance would never know when¶ they were being watched, and so would refrain from committing crimes for fear¶ of being caught in the act, as would persons in both 1984 and Jeremy Bentham's¶ Panopticon.11 As is clear from the second clarification of this pro-surveillance¶ argument, above, this argument does not justify the State watching its citizens,¶ for in doing so it would acquire more information about them than it is morally¶ permitted to acquire. However, if the State were to subject its citizens to the degree¶ of surveillance that would be justified on the above argument, its citizens would¶ know that whenever acrime was committed its performance would be recorded,¶ and so its perpetrator would be likely to be apprehended. This knowledge would¶ deter many potential criminals from committing crimes.18 (It would also deter¶ law enforcement officers from extending the limits of their authority.19) To be¶ sure, the knowledge that one's criminal act would be recorded would not deter¶ all potential criminals from committing crimes. Some persons would still commit¶ crimes of passion, and of anger; others would succumb to the temptation to¶ commit an opportunistic theft, act under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or act¶ on the belief that they would not be caught. But most persons would simply judge¶ the commission of crime not to be worthwhile, once they realized that they were¶ subject to constant State surveillance, and so such surveillance would serve as¶ an effective deterrent to most criminal activity.

Deontology implies that you can't evaluate the potential for abuse

James Stacy **Taylor, 2005** (In Praise of Big Brother: Why We Should Learn to Stop Worrying and Love Government Surveillance; Public Affairs Quarterly 19(3))

It must be admitted that, in practice, a system of constant State surveillance¶ is likely to be abused to some extent.[20] However, <u>if one adopts a rights-based¶ understanding of claim (ii)</u> above (i.e., if one holds that such a system of State¶ <u>surveillance is permissible as long as it does not in itself violate persons' moral¶ rights</u>), this objection can be readily rebutted. On such an understanding of claim¶ (ii) <u>one could first note that this abuse-based objection gets its force from the¶ view that such abuse would violate persons' moral rights</u>. The proponent of a¶ rights-based understanding of claim (ii) would certainly agree with this underlying¶ view, and would join with its advocates in condemning such abuse. However, the¶ rights theorist who was in favor of such a system of State surveillance would also¶ note that <u>the condemnation of the abuse of State surveillance is not to condemn¶ State surveillance itself</u>. To condemn the use of x for the purposes of v, where y¶ violates persons' rights (e.g., to privacy or autonomy) is not also to condemn the¶ use of x for the purposes of z, where z does not violate persons' rights. <u>Thus</u>, a¶ rights theorist who was a proponent of State surveillance could argue, <u>to offer the¶ possibility of abuse as an objection to constant State surveillance is to confuse the¶ moral status of different possible uses of such surveillance</u>. For such proponents¶ of State surveillance, then, this first objection can be readily dismissed¶

And, either the benefits outweigh or state corruption is inevitable

James Stacy **Taylor, 2005** (In Praise of Big Brother: Why We Should Learn to Stop Worrying and Love Government Surveillance; Public Affairs Quarterly 19(3))

To show why there is good reason to believe that little harm would accrue

from such a system of State surveillance its consequentialist <u>proponents should¶</u> first <u>distinguish between major abuses of such a system and minor abuses of it</u>.¶ A major abuse of such a system would be one in which the State used its power¶ together with its improved surveillance capabilities to persecute or oppress its¶ citizens, either individually or as a whole. A minor abuse of the system would be¶ one in which some of the agents of the State secured access to the information¶ gathered by its surveillance devices for their own nefarious purposes, such as¶ voyeurism or the mockery of the persons whose recorded actions they are viewing.¶ <u>The consequentialist proponent of constant and universal State surveillance need not be unduly concerned about the possibility of major abuses of the State surveillance system</u>. If the State were prone to abuse its citizens in this way <u>prior</u>¶ <u>to the installation of such a system</u>, this would provide good consequentialist¶ grounds for resisting its introduction. <u>The consequentialist proponent of constant</u>¶ State <u>surveillance is thus only concerned with defending the introduction of such a surveillance system in those cases where the State was not prone to abusing its citizens in this way</u>. This is not to say, however, that a State (or the agents of a¶ State) that was not prone to persecuting or oppressing its citizens might not occasionally¶ persecute individual citizens. In response to this the consequentialist¶ proponent of constant State surveillance should note that given its power <u>were¶ the State (or its agents) to decide to persecute some of its citizens in this way it¶ would not need a system of surveillance to do this effectively</u>. Thus, although such¶ a surveillance system might make it easier for the State (or its agents) to engage¶ in the persecution that it had decided upon, this would not make things any worse¶ for the person or persons thus persecuted. <u>As such</u>, then, <u>the possibility of the¶ major abuse of a system of</u> constant and universal <u>State surveillance</u> by a State¶ that was not prone to persecuting its citizens <u>would not</u>, for a conseqentialist, <u>be¶ a significant objection to the introduction of such a system</u>.¶ What, then, of the concern that such a system of constant State surveillance¶ would be subject to minor abuses? The most obvious response to this concern is to¶ argue that if such a system of surveillance is introduced then it must be accompanied¶ by a series of safeguards that would reduce the possibility that the information that¶ it gathers would be abused in this way. It might, for example, be that such a system¶ should be accompanied by the requirement that only a very few persons have access¶ to the information that it gathers, that such persons be screened carefully and¶

supervised closely, and that they are subject to draconian penalties for any abuses¶ that they might perpetrate. If they were severe enough such safeguards would be¶ likely to reduce the possibility of the minor abuse of such a system of surveillance¶ to a level whereby the harm that its abusers might cause would be outweighed by¶ the advantages that it would provide to the State's citizens as a whole.¶ However, the consequentialist proponent of State surveillance also has a¶ second - and more philosophically interesting - response to the concern that¶ such surveillance would be subject to minor abuse: that such abuse would not¶ be harmful, and so would not detract from the advantages outlined above. This¶ response is based on observing that given the penalties for abuse by which such¶ a system would be accompanied (as outlined above) any such abuse would be¶ perpetrated covertly. As such, its victims (e.g., persons subjected to the voyeuristic gaze of some of the agents of the State) would not know that they were victims.¶ Yet even though this is so, the proponents of this second response to the above¶ abuse-based objection do not use this observation to argue that, since such persons¶ did not know that they were being watched, this watching did not harm them.21¶ This is because, as Joel Feinberg has persuasively argued, the mere fact that a¶ person is ignorant of the frustration of her interests (e.g., her interest not to be¶ the unwilling subject of voyeurism) does not mean that she has not thereby been¶ harmed.22 Rather, this second consequentialist response to the above abuse-based¶ objection conjoins this observation with the claim that for a person to be harmed¶ her life must have been adversely affected in some way, whether she knew of¶ this or not. To support this latter claim it will be useful to examine more closely¶ Feinberg's argument against the view that a person can be harmed only if she¶ knows that she has been harmed. This examination will serve two purposes. First,¶ it will show why the consequentialist proponent of constant State surveillance¶ should not claim that the unwitting victim of (e.g.) State voyeurism failed to be¶ harmed by it owing to her ignorance of it. Second, it will support the claim that¶ a person's life must be adversely affected for her to be considered harmed - the¶ claim on which this second response rests.¶ To show that a person can be harmed even though she is ignorant of it,¶ Feinberg¶ provides an example of a woman who devotes thirty years of her life "to the¶ furtherance of certain ideals and ambitions in the form of one vast undertaking."¶ Unfortunately, one month before this woman dies "the empire of her hopes" collapses¶ and she is disgraced. However, this woman's friends conceal this from her¶ and she dies contented. Feinberg writes "it would not be very controversial to say¶ that the woman . . . has suffered grievous harm to her interests although she never¶ learned the bad news."23 Feinberg is correct here; this woman has been harmed¶ even though she does not know this. As such, that the victim of (e.g.) voyeurism¶ does not know that she is being watched, and so does not experience harm as a¶ result, does not show that such voyeurism does not harm her. Thus, one should¶ not claim that owing to their ignorance of their being watched such voyeurism¶ would not harm the potential victims of such minor abuse of State surveillance.¶ Close examination of Feinberg's example, however, also shows that we consider¶ this woman to have been harmed even though she did not experience harm¶ because her life was adversely affected as a result of the collapse of the empire of the empire¶ of her hopes.24 Feinberg is right to claim that the woman in this case is harmed¶ because her interests are thwarted, whether she realizes this or not. However, the¶ success of this woman's enterprise and her enjoyment of a good reputation are¶ not the only interests that she has. She also has an interest in not being deceived¶ and an interest in the effective exercise of her autonomy - and these interests are¶ thwarted when her friends deceive her. Through controlling the information that¶ she has this woman's friends usurp her autonomy, acting so as to ensure that it¶ is they, and not she, who controls what type of actions she performs. That is, it is they who control whether she performs actions that she considers appropriate¶ to perform if her enterprise is flourishing and her reputation is intact, or whether¶ she performs actions that she considers appropriate for a situation where her¶ enterprise has collapsed and her reputation is ruined. This woman is thus harmed¶ by the collapse of the empire of her hopes because this leads to her deception by¶ her friends and the consequent compromise of her autonomy. And this compromise¶ of her autonomy has an adverse effect on her life, insofar as it results in the¶ thwarting of her interest to exercise her autonomy.25 Given this, then, although the¶ consequentialist proponent of constant State surveillance should not argue that if¶ a person did not know that she was the object of voyeurism then she would not¶ be harmed by this, he should argue that if such abuse of the State surveillance¶ system did not affect this person's life then she would not be harmed by it. And¶ it is plausible that such minor abuse would indeed fail to affect the lives of those subject to it. Given the draconian penalties that would be imposed upon those who¶ engaged in such minor abuse of the system it is unlikely that its victims would¶ come to learn of their victimization, and so it is unlikely that they would come to¶ be upset by it as a result of gaining such knowledge. Moreover, the perpetrators¶ of such abuse would not be deceiving their victims as the friends of the woman¶ in Feinberg's example deceived her. The system of State surveillance that would¶ be justified by the above pro-surveillance argument would not be one in which¶ the State's citizens were constantly watched, but just one in which their actions¶ were recorded. As such, the perpetrators of such minor abuses as voyeurism would¶ have no direct contact with their victims. They would thus be unable to influence¶ the type of actions that they performed, as the woman's friends were able¶ to influence the type of actions that she performed. This is because they would¶ be unable to control the

information that their victims had about their situations¶ in the same way as the woman's friends were able to control her informational¶ environment. Since the victims of such minor abuse would thus be immune to¶ being deceived by its perpetrators they would not suffer, as did the woman in¶ Feinberg's example, from the usurpation of their autonomy. Thus, since such¶ minor abuses of the State surveillance system as voyeurism would neither upset¶ their unwitting victims, nor compromise their autonomy through subjecting them¶ to deception, they would not harm them in any way.26¶ Through instituting safeguards, then, one could ensure that the minor abuse of¶ the type of State surveillance system that was argued for above could be reduced¶ to a minimum - or, perhaps, even eliminated altogether. Yet even if such abuse¶ did occur it would not necessarily harm its victims, for it would not necessarily¶ adversely affectheir lives. As such, then, even though the consequentialist proponents¶ of such a system of constant State surveillance must take into account¶ the possibility of the harm that its abuse might cause, they still have good reason¶ to believe that, all things considered, the State should be morally permitted to¶ subject its citizens to it.

No autonomy impact

James Stacy **Taylor, 2005** (In Praise of Big Brother: Why We Should Learn to Stop Worrying and Love Government Surveillance; Public Affairs Quarterly 19(3))

Fortunately, however, the citizens of a State that utilized the type of constant¶ surveillance that would be justified on the above pro-surveillance argument¶ would not similarly suffer from compromised autonomy. As noted earlier such a¶ surveillance system would not utilize the type of in-person surveillance that was¶ used by Big Brother's Party in 1984. Instead, it would merely record the actions¶ of the citizens and the events that they participated in. Since this is so, most of¶ the citizens subject to this form of State surveillance would not believe that they¶ needed to alter their behavior to conform to the State's view of how they should¶ act (were the State even to hold such a view) for they would recognize that the¶ State would not actually be watching them. Moreover, if they were law-abiding,¶ then they would also recognize that the chances of the State having just cause to access information about their actions would be very slim indeed. Free from the¶ pressure to conform of the sort that was imposed upon the citizens of Oceania,¶ then, most citizens whose State subjected them to constant and universal surveillance¶ of the type outlined above would not cede control over their acts to the¶ State. The citizens of such a State would thus not become heteronomous with¶ respect to their behavior, as did the citizens of Oceania. Instead, they would retain¶ their autonomy with respect to it. Moreover, the claim that most citizens placed¶ under constant State surveillance would not suffer from any diminution in their¶ autonomy is not merely a speculative one. Persons subjected to surveillance are¶ unlikely to alter their behavior once they become used to being "on tape" (unless¶ they previously performed acts that they believed they should not have been performing)¶ when they realize that there is little chance that the information that the¶ surveillance devices record would ever be required, and so there is little chance¶ of their actions ever being observed.35¶ Of course, not all the citizens of a State that utilized the type of surveillance¶ advocated above would retain full autonomy with respect to all of their actions.¶ The exceptions would be those who are criminally inclined, and who, as a result¶ of being placed under State surveillance, would alter their behavior by refraining¶ from committing crimes. Such persons would suffer from compromised autonomy¶ with respect to their deliberate omission of criminal activity, insofar as they alter¶ their behavior solely to avoid incurring criminal penalties. Yet, given that the actions¶ that these persons refrain from performing are criminal ones, the diminution¶ in autonomy that these persons would experience as a result of being placed under¶ State surveillance is one that it is morally legitimate to inflict upon them.36

AT: CDA

The subjectivity inherent to CDA makes politics arbitrary

Ruth **Breeze, 2011** (Articles in pragmatics, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics")

As we have seen, those working within the field of CDA have rarely been slow to defend their own political standpoint, their own belief that research must be "critical" in all the senses outlined above. It is also evident that the heterogeneous nature of CDA's intellectual inheritance sets a complex task for the researcher trying to trace exactly what the justification for a particular stance or interpretation might be. This has led some critics to accuse CDA of operating somewhat randomly, moved by personal whim rather than well-grounded scholarly principle, while others have made attempts to uncover and explicate the precise philosophical and sociological basis, concluding that its foundations are by no means as sound as its practitioners appear to believe.¶ Hammersley (1997: 237-248) attacks the founding assumptions of CDA, accusing Fairclough and others of asserting the need for a critical approach as though this were quite obvious and unproblematic. First of all, Hammersley argues, orthodox Marxist theory is now discredited: It has been discarded by philosophers, historians and economists, who have rejected most of Marx's ideas as mechanistic, unfounded and irrelevant to an understanding of society today. He then takes the arguments back to an analysis of the Frankfurt school, which, as we have seen, is generally claimed to provide immediate antecedents for CDA. He insists that the Frankfurt school in no sense constitutes a solid basis for CDA's critical enterprise, because the changes wrought on Marxist theory by Adorno and Hochheimer were extremely radical, reaching far beyond economic factors to issues related to alienation, rationality and human nature. They believed alienation to be "a product of the distortion of Western rationality, in particular the latter's pursuit of control over nature, including human nature" (Hammersley 1997: 242), which begs a large number of unresolved questions about the essentially rational nature of scientific enquiry. Moreover, the type of critique proposed by Adorno, for example, would seem to undercut the ground for privileging one agent over another, and casts doubt on the possibilities of attaining emancipation. The Frankfurt school may have been interested in explaining social change, and may have offered a thorough critique of orthodox Marxism, Hammersley argues, but it certainly does not provide an effective philosophical basis for "critical" research of the type carried out by critical discourse analysts. None the less, although Hammersley's main contention that CDA's philosophical foundations are "simply taken for granted, as if they were unproblematic" (1997: 244) is borne out in many studies associated with CDA, this does not necessarily mean that a more throughly grounded approach can be ruled out; nor does the intrinsic difficulty of an approach built on a critique of Western rationality mean that such analysis is not possible. In the last analysis, perhaps Hammersley's most telling criticism is that levelled at the ambitious claims made by CDA practitioners to offer a comprehensive understanding of society as a whole and how it functions, which is "superior" to other positions precisely because it is conducted in a spirit of self-reflexive critique (1997: 244-5). Since a large part of its claim to legitimacy rests on this¶ assertion, CDA specialists need to pay special attention to this aspect of the epistemological underpinning of their work, and to its methodological implications.¶ At this point, it is interesting to note that the term "critical" itself has a special role in the history of the Frankfurt school. The word itself is thought to have been adopted when members of the Frankfurt school were exiled in the USA, where the original descriptor "Marxist" was deemed unacceptable (Scholem 1982: 210). As we saw above, in this first sense, "critical" means the capacity to evaluate society from a specific standpoint, in this case, Marxism. There is actually a long history of use of the term "critical" that extends back to Kant, who used it to signify that his analysis was based on rational a priori principles "without the aid of experience" rather than the uncritical dogmatism of his predecessors (Kant 1781: 3; Bilig 2002: 37). In its post- Frankfurt after-life, the word "critical" has been adopted by a range of approaches in the social sciences, most notably by critical psychology, which also claims intellectual descent from the Frankfurt school (even though many of its approaches appear to have little in common with the work of these theorists), and which also operates on the premise that academic research should criticise the existing conditions of social life with the aim of improving those conditions (Gergen 1994: 11-20). In the field of education, the word "critical" is associated with Paulo Freire's "critical pedagogy", which again states the aim of challenging domination and empowering the oppressed by encouraging the development of critical consciousness. The term "critical" is thus employed across a range of disciplines, used loosely to mean "critical of the status quo" or "critical of liberal humanist perspectives", usually with a view to highlighting commitment to social change.¶ To complicate matters, however, there are at least another two potential meanings of the word "critical". On the one hand, the Frankfurt school theorists themselves recognised that their work was

"critical" in another sense, that is, it provided a critique on what they perceived as the authoritarian positivism of orthodox Marxism (Shaw 1985: 165). In other words, they felt that they should be critical of received ideas, and hoped to develop new, deeper and broader understandings of developments in capitalism that would extend far beyond straightforward Marxism. In doing this, they should also be self-critical, and should aim to subject their own work to rigorous intellectual standards. This aspect of the "critical" heritage from the Frankfurt school does not figure largely in most approaches associated with CDA, which tend rather to assume their own left-wing political standpoint uncritically. One notable exception to this general trend is found in the discourse historical approach (Wodak 2001; Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 32-35, 2009: 86-89), which distinguishes three dimensions of critique, namely textual, socio-diagnostic, and prospective/retrospective, and advocates critical self-reflection at multiple stages along the analytical route. Another is that advocated by Gloy (1998) and the so-called Oldenburg school (Bredehöft 1994: 4; Bluhme 2000: 10-13), who acknowledge that analysts participate in the discourses which form their object of study, and insist that scholars must therefore always reveal their own perspectives and show how they are grounded, in order to give their views validity on an intersubjective level.¶ On the other hand, to the multiple connotations of the term "critical" in this context, we also have to add a further sense: In the classic liberal education in most English-speaking countries, students are encouraged to "be critical", that is, to think for themselves rather than to take what they read at face value – an intellectual skill that does not presuppose any particular ideological affiliation. One senses intuitively that the¶ Critical discourse analysis and its critics 499¶ 500 Ruth Breeze¶ polysemy of the term "critical" may have led to certain confusions regarding what the role of the discourse analyst is, and what if any political stance she ought to take. Many scholars feel that they are generally "critical" because that is what their education has encouraged them to be; others define "critical" as meaning critical of society from a neo-Marxist standpoint; while still others see themselves as "critical" because they adopt a critical stance to some neo-Marxist positions. The outcome is a merging of meanings, with the consequent loss of clarity and intellectual precision. It is scarcely surprising, given the problems of definition that lie at the very basis of CDA, that the enterprise may sometimes seem to lack coherence.¶ At the same time, there is a major contradiction, alluded to above, between the Marxist and post-structuralist strands in CDA's intellectual antecedents. While Marxists rely on a normative theory of history and society, authors within the post-structuralist or post-modern movement see all such totalising meta-narratives as invalid and potentially manipulative. Moreover, on the level of individual political decisions, in the post- modern philosophical landscape it is hard to justify adopting a particular meta-narrative to interpret the phenomena one has observed. Foucault, for example, at one time notoriously refused to commit himself to value judgements about the discourses that he studied (Foucault 1969). Instead, in a post-modern framework, it has been suggested that one simply "chooses" particular values or stances, in a process of existential self- definition which is sometimes referred to as decisionism (Habermas 1976; Macintyre 1981). In this perspective, although we may try to form our commitments by following "rational" procedures, the fragmentation of the moral and intellectual order is such that it is hard to find consistent grounds for a rational politics, or for reasoned political discourse, and there is little real hope of furthering human emancipation.¶ Faced with these seemingly contradictory scenarios, Hammersley asks whether it would perhaps be more appropriate to situate CDA researchers on the post- structuralist side of the fence, as people who have chosen a particular standpoint by an act of will, rather than as a result of extended deliberation based on examination of the facts and issues. If this is the case, he argues (1997: 242-245), then there is no particular reason why readers should accept CDA's political stance rather than any other, and CDA's claim to "interpretive power" and "emancipatory force" can be regarded as mere assertions that one can accept if one chooses to share their point of view, or not, as the case may be.¶ The consequences that this would have for CDA's status as an approach are far-reaching. As Hammersley points out, if the political stance on which CDA is founded turns out not to be well founded, but merely a product of decisionism, this fits ill with the strong claims made by CDA for itself and its own activities. If a central tenet of critical research is that research should be explicitly designed to fulfil political functions (exposure of inequality, dominance, injustice), rather than what would be the more conventional purpose of research (to observe and interpret phenomena), then there has to be a sound justification for this. If, in the end, the justification is only a matter of individual choice, then there is little incentive for the reader to take this type of research seriously.¶ CDA researchers are usually careful to make their own political commitments quite explicit before they embark on the interpretation and explanation of social phenomena. Fairclough, for example, tends to stress his old-Left leanings, even though in principle he agrees that critical research need not be left-wing, and that right-wing forms of CDA are perfectly conceivable (Fairclough 1996: 52). Two points should be¶ made here. One is that, if this is so, then Fairclough's and others' interpretations must be quite open to argument, because any left-wing interpretation might equally be challenged from the right, or from any other political dimension that might exist. Thus the whole scholarly project of CDA can be seen as heavily

conditioned by political choice, rather than scientific criteria, which might be thought to take on a secondary role. Secondly, the fact that CDA's adherents regularly bow in the direction of transparency and truthfulness by stating their political affiliations does not somehow mean that they are absolved from the need for objectivity in their research. Bourdieu has alluded to the perfunctory nature of many declarations of this kind, and to the role that self-definitions play in academic power struggles (1984b: 308). Indeed, in various types of post-modern framework, it is common for writers to try to circumvent serious epistemological difficulties by taking an explicit stance from the outset. This is particularly common in areas such as post-modern approaches to feminism (Harding 11-12), where the usual justification given is that a feminist perspective is needed redress the balance in a system that has been dominated by patriarchy. However, whether or not the epistemological problems of post-modernism are resolved by this, such gambits do not free the author to misrepresent the data, or to interpret the data in any way he or she chooses for some particular political purpose.¶ Given the striking heterogeneity of CDA's intellectual sources, it is at least surprising that there is little debate within CDA circles about their relevance or, indeed, their compatibility. As Slembrouck points out (2001: 40-41), "CDA continues to be unclear about its exact preferences for a particular social theory." Indeed, trends over the years seem to have broadened rather than narrowed its intellectual base. So while Fairclough (1989) is largely informed by neo-Marxism with a Gramscian view of hegemony, in which naturalised "common sense" is the vehicle of ideology and text is a site of struggle, ten years later, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) construct a research agenda that is engaged in ongoing dialogue between late modernity, feminism and post- modernism. CDA is thus able to draw on a vast and somewhat contradictory panorama of ideas about society, encompassing thinkers from Marx, through Gramsci and Horkheimer to Giddens, and an enormous diversity of approaches to language and communication, which take in Bakhtin, Foucault, Habermas and Halliday, seemingly without ever perceiving the need to justify this eclecticism, or to systematise its intellectual base, other than by linking these notions vaguely to the phenomena associated with late modernity (consumer capitalism, marketisation, achievement and consolidation of hegemony through ideological manipulation). Indeed, Weiss and Wodak (2002) go one step further, to declare that the theories or constructs gleaned from different philosophical or sociological thinkers are simply tools, just as linguistic approaches are also seen to be instruments, to be used by the analyst as appropriate in any given situation: "one can speak of a theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools (...). Tools of this kind are, for example, Foucault's discursive formations, Bourdieu's habitus, or register and code as defined by Halliday and Bernstein" (2002: 7). On the strength of statements such as this, critics have noted that CDA habitually operates in the interface between an array of ideas and the world of discourse, using the one to explain the other, without addressing either of these on its own terms (Slembrouck 2001). In effect, this could lead to a situation in which the arguments from philosophy, politics and sociology are not fully worked out in terms that would be satisfactory to specialists in these disciplines, nor are the bases for language analysis firmly established in a way that is recognised by linguists.

You fail basic rigor
Ruth **Breeze, 2011** (Articles in pragmatics, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics")

The main problem here appears not to be a lack of awareness of the need for rigour. In a review of 20 articles published in Discourse and Society, Fairclough (1992)¶ argues that their analyses would have been more convincing had closer attention been paid to textual and intertextual properties. However, his review is symptomatic in that rather than decrying this lack of rigour, he merely regrets that an opportunity to support specific conclusions was lost, to the extent that "the entire exercise (...) looks like a community-building effort rather than a search for enhanced understanding" (Verschueren 2001: 67). A similar lack of scholarly rigour in applying linguistic methodology has been detected in many publications that purport to apply critical discourse analysis. For example, in a review of 40 articles using CDA in the field of education published up to 2003, Rogers et al. (2005: 385) noted that one quarter of the articles included no discussion of language theory, while the others made reference to CDA, SFL and discourse theory, many in rather general terms, and few included detailed discussion of the linguistic evidence. Other scholars have pointed out that critical analysts often

state that they are using methodology proper to the ethnography of communication, but fail to present the description of situations or the ways in which such information was obtained in a manner that would be acceptable to ethnographers (Blommaert 2001: 14-17).¶ These methodological shortcomings are generally recognised as existing on the level of how the data are actually obtained, and how they are subsequently interpreted. I shall focus here on the way CDA researchers obtain their data. In the section which follows this, I shall turn my attention to the issue of interpretation and the related question of reader response.¶ One of the most outspoken critics of CDA in this area has been Widdowson (1998, 2005). In a review of three representative studies published in the 1990s, Widdowson homes in on what he feels to be the unsystematic nature of some CDA research. He quotes Fowler (1996: 8) as stating that "critical linguists get a very high mileage out of a small selection of linguistic concepts such as transitivity and nominalisation", which he interprets as meaning that "analysis is not the systematic application of a theoretical model, but a rather less rigorous operation, in effect a kind of ad hoc bricolage which takes from theory whatever concept comes usefully to hand" (Widdowson 1998: 136). Widdowson goes on to cite Fowler as stating that other analytical approaches (CA, schema theory, etc.) could equally well be put to use, provided they were brought into the "critical" model. Any method will do, he implies, as long as the results are the right ones.¶ Widdowson revisits CDA's analyses of various key texts at length in order to illustrate what he feels to be the lack of impartiality in the way that method is applied. By focusing on particular lexical items, or by focusing on certain grammatical features (passives, nominalisations), it is possible to reach certain conclusions about ideology in the text. But, he asks, is this legitimate? Given that these features have been chosen, he feels, more or less randomly, because the researcher feels intuitively that they will provide results that have ideological meaning, it is possible that the rest of the text, which may contain contradictory data, is ignored. Widdowson does not reject the possibility that there might really be certain grammatical features (such as passives, for example) that genuinely have a "greater ideological valency" (1998: 148). But in his view, critical discourse analysts have so far not succeeded in proving that this is the case, or even addressed the issue as to how this could be proven. He proposes that corpus methodology might go some way towards resolving the problem, since its samples are larger and its methods more systematic. The results of such studies would be less likely to suffer from the "randomness" and openness to bias that Widdowson¶ Critical discourse analysis and its critics 503¶ 504 Ruth Breeze¶ perceives in studies by Fowler (1996), Fairclough (1996) and van Dijk (1996). It should be noted at this point that Widdowson himself is unable to show scientifically that such "randomness" exists in the selection of data, which somewhat undermines his point. However, the basic idea that discourse analysts should strive to implement objective standards and apply thoroughly scientific methods (for example, by engaging with larger samples of text or using corpus tools) is one which has informed much of the more recent work by CDA scholars (see below). Widdowson's critique is much more pertinent when applied to the early days of CDA, and particularly to British authors such as Fowler and Fairclough.¶ This problem of potential analytical bias is addressed by other authors, such as Toolan (1997) and Stubbs (1997), who centre their arguments on the idea that CDA, at least in its early stages, often failed to approach texts systematically. Stubbs argues for a comparative approach based on large, representative samples. In this, he addresses the issue of method by tackling what many discourse analysts call the level of "description". In Fairclough's classic definition (1989), description means ascertaining what experiential, relational or expressive values the words or grammatical structures in the text have, and what textual structures or interactional conventions can be observed. In practice, many discourse analysts choose to focus on just one of these features, or one aspect of one of the features, such as the use of passives or nominalisation (Fowler et al. 1979; Fowler 1991; Fairclough 1992a, 1992b). In Stubbs's view, the claims being made by discourse analysts on the basis of such analyses are not tenable, because the method is often simply impressionistic, or because the sample of texts is small and obtained unsystematically. Stubbs cites a study by Fairclough (1995), who claims that public language (academic writing, political debate) is becoming less formal. The essence of Stubbs's criticism is that Fairclough provides no quantitative evidence for this, and particularly, no quantitative diachronic evidence that the degree of informality is increasing. In fact, although Fairclough's claims would seem plausible, the methods he uses to obtain his evidence are not explained, and his findings are not set out in such a way that anyone else could challenge them. In fact, when some CDA studies are examined closely, it turns out that much of the argument hinges on just a few words (such as the example of the word "enterprise" in Fairclough 1995). Yet, as Stubbs reminds us, "registers are very rarely defined by individual features, but consist of clusters of associated features which have a greater than chance tendency to co-occur" (1997: 3).¶ Although it is impossible to generalise about the methods used in CDA, the main force of Stubbs's argument holds, because some critical analysts, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, paid scant regard to

issues of methodological consistency, and provided little if any justification of their own methods. Although their work may contain genuine intuitions, it lacks the kind of rigour expected in academic research. Stubbs points out that "there is very little discussion of whether it is adequate to restrict analysis to short fragments of data, how data should be sampled, and whether the sample is representative" (1997: 7). What is more, there is a danger that fragments can be presented as representative, without any explanation as to how this representativeness has been established.¶ Stubbs is not intrisically hostile to CDA, but the main brunt of his argument is that the methods used are not sound enough to justify the results that are supposedly obtained, with the consequence that the interpretations and explanations must be regarded as suspect. His manifesto for a methodologically-sound version of discourse¶ Critical discourse analysis and its critics 505 analysis is doubtless coloured by his background in corpus linguistics, but is none the¶ less useful:¶ "the text analyses must quite simply be much more detailed. Analyses must be comparative: individual texts must be compared with each other and with data from corpora. Analyses must not be restricted to isolated data fragments: a much wider range of data must be sampled before generalisations are made about typical language use. And a much wider range of linguistic features must be studied, since varieties of language use are defined, not by individual features, but by clusters of co-occurring features: this entails the use of quantitative and probabilistic methods of text and corpus analysis" (Stubbs 1997: 10)¶ In fact, by the time that Stubbs was writing, many discourse analysts had already become sensitive to the need for a more systematic approach applied across larger, more representative samples of discourse (cf. Wodak et al. 1990; van Dijk 1993; Hoey 1996: 154; Wodak 1996). In fact, there has been a growing trend to draw on corpus methodology to provide a more solid methodological framework for use in CDA (Mautner 2001: 122; Partington 2003: 12; Partington 2006: 267; Baker et al. 2008: 277- 283). Fairclough himself, who formed the butt of much of the original criticism regarding methods in CDA, subsequently published a study of the language of "new Labour" based on large quantities of empirical data and incorporating the use of corpus linguistic tools in order to obtain a more representative picture (Fairclough 2000: 17).¶ In fairness to Fairclough and CDA in general, it must be said that Stubbs's background in corpus linguistics would tend to bias him in favour of studies based on large samples of text, particularly contrastive studies that are designed to bring out the distinctive features of different genres or registers, using statistical methods to establish significance. However, this is far from being the only way to study language data. It would certainly be wrong to rule out qualitative approaches to textual analysis, since it is clear that these offer a viable alternative to quantitative methodology, which also has many flaws and inconsistencies. Similarly, it would be wrong to discard the findings of CDA simply because they have not been obtained in this way. Close, qualitative analysis of a small sample of text might be the only way of analysing certain types of discourse, for example, the discourse of a particular politician or party.¶ A slightly different angle is adopted by Verschueren (2001: 60), who points to the lack of detailed analysis of language and interaction in some CDA analysis (for example, Verschueren provides a critique of textual analysis from Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). Verschueren homes in specifically on the tendency to leave out important aspects of the text that do not fit with the interpretive framework. A review of various instances of this selective tendency leads Verschueren to conclude that many of the supposed findings are "the product of conviction rather than the result of a careful step-by-step analysis that reflexively questions its own observations and conclusions" (2001: 65).¶ Verschueren accepts the validity of Fairclough's three-stage approach to analysis (description, interpretation and explanation, see above), but takes issue with the way in which the analyst moves from the first level (description) to the second (interpretation, that is, situating the text as discourse). To make this transition, Fairclough relies on what he terms "members' resources" (1989: 167):¶ At this stage of the procedure, it is only really self-consciousness that distinguishes¶ 506 Ruth Breeze¶ the analyst from the participants she is analysing. The analyst is doing the same as the participant interpreter, but unlike the participant interpreter the analyst is concerned to explicate what she is doing.¶ Verschueren suggests that by introducing the notion of "members' resources", Fairclough is essentially giving up on the issue of empirical evidence. The analyst's interpretation is only as valid as any other interpretation (that of the participants themselves, for example, or an onlooker), since it is grounded in the same kind of working knowledge of how language is used and what society is like. Moreover, as Slembrouck has pointed out, members' resources are also conceptually affected and distorted by social power relations, and so there is no guarantee that they are free from reproduction or ideological manipulation (2001: 39).¶ According to Fairclough, from the point of interpretation, the analyst can quickly go on to the final stage of explanation. But since interpretation relies on members' resources, then even at the level of explanation, the only difference between a participant, say, and the analyst is that the

analyst can draw on social theory to interpret what he or she has observed. It is at this point that Verschueren believes that CDA's claims to interpretive insights fall down. In his words "the only real requirement for explanation is a good social theory. Nothing is said about the empirical dimension that is required to link data and theory" (Verschueren 2001: 69). In the view of some critics (Slembrouck 2001), the heart of the matter is that it is not legitimate to maintain a difference between researcher and researched solely on the grounds of access to social theory.¶

Verschueren provides a detailed analysis of how, in his estimation, Fairclough (1989) fails to cope satisfactorily with the empirical dimension – that is, fails to provide sufficiently rigorous systematic analysis of the text. The essence of his critique is that Fairclough isolates single texts for analysis, without placing them in the kind of social and intertextual context within which they would usually be read. For example, Fairclough takes a linguistic feature such as nominalisation in news reports, and interprets it as as being used to obfuscate issues of agency and avoid attribution of responsibility. However, in the context of the particular story or situation, and the ongoing reporting about a particular topic across many issues of the same newspaper, it may well be very clear to readers where responsibility lies. Verschueren's main point is that Fairclough fails to anchor the text in a communicative situation, taking it out of context and ignoring aspects of the text that do not conform to expectations, which leads to distorted results.¶ Verschueren (2001: 60-79) also analyses a similar phenomenon that occurs when Fairclough attempts to analyse conversational interaction. Taking the case study by Fairclough (1992: 50-52) contrasting two doctor-patient interactions, one "traditional" and the other "alternative", Verschueren applies systematic techniques of conversation analysis and pragmatic interpretation to show that Fairclough's conclusions are ungrounded (Verschueren 2001: 70-71). He argues that Fairclough imposes a contrastive framework from the outset, which leads to a distortion of the data and disregard for features that do not fit the predetermined scheme. In the methodology, Verschueren identifies two major flaws: First, general aspects of context are simply ignored (such as whether the patient has a specific problem or not, whether or not the doctor and patient know each other); and second, form-function relations are treated as stable, which is not acceptable in pragmatic terms (for example, Fairclough assumes¶ that the first doctor exerts control over the interaction by asking questions, but does not address the possibility that the second doctor may be exercising control more subtly by giving minimal responses and waiting for the patient to continue – or that the second doctor might simply be uninterested in the patient, or wish to seem non-committal).¶ Verschueren argues cogently for a more systematic, objective, disciplined approach to qualitative analysis of ideology in texts, based on a set of specific principles concerning the nature of the samples used, the need for horizontal and vertical exploration of the text, sensitivity to pragmatic issues in the relationship between form and function, and concern that the meanings should emerge coherently from the data rather than be imposed by the researcher (see Verschueren 2011). In fact, the past history of CDA reveals that practitioners have sometimes made few concessions to methodological exigencies, and do not always present their own research procedures with transparency (Rogers et al. 2005). The major failing of approaches such as that used by Fairclough (1989) is that it accords a pivotal role to the researcher and his/her interpretive and explanatory skills, and, as Verschueren (2001: 60-77) indicates, provides no account of exactly how or why particular aspects of the text are deemed to have one meaning or another – the researcher's judgement is enough, a questionable assumption that is sometimes justified, rather weakly, by using the rather nebulous concept of "members' resources" (Fairclough 1989: 167; Verschueren 2001: 68). In particular, Fairclough's assumption (1989: 167) that "it is only really self-consciousness that distinguished the analyst from the participants she is analysing" is singled out for criticism, because many readings are possible, and the purpose of analysis is to provide something more solid than a subjective impression, by applying a rigorous method that is theoretically grounded. As Verschueren points out (2001: 68-69), the problem of method and interpretation is a serious one which is not satisfactorily resolved in Fairclough's later studies. For example, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 67) state that CDA does not "advocate a particular understanding of a text, though it may advocate a particular explanation". In Verschueren's view, by saying this they shrug off any claims that the analyst has a privileged understanding, and thereby eliminate the need for methodological rigour at the stage of reading and "understanding" the text (Verschueren 2001: 69). Their lack of interest in the epistemological and hermeneutic dimensions of textual analysis is matched by a corresponding over-emphasis on the theoretical dimension of explanation.

After quoting Fairclough's distinction (1989: 167) between the analyst as reader (with the same "member's resources" as any other reader) and the analyst as explainer (the analyst is superior to other readers because he/she can draw on social theory), Verschueren concludes that:¶ In other words, the only real requirement for explanation is a good social theory. Nothing is said about the empirical dimension that is required to link data and theory. The theory being preconceived, it is not surprising, therefore, that 'findings' tend to be predictable and that a gap emerges between textual analysis and conclusions – even for many of those who, like myself, share large portions of the theory – as soon as the question of evidence is asked. Texts are simply made into carriers, as it were, of what one already assumes to be the case. Rather than proceeding from description via explanation to positioning, with interpretation at the core of all stages of the investigation, positioning comes first and interpretation is marginalized. (Verschueren 2001: 69).¶ This issue inevitably leads into the question of interpretation, which is again linked intimately to the issue of reader response. For the question as to how discourse analysts¶ Critical discourse analysis and its critics 507¶ 508 Ruth Breeze¶ can or should interpret text overlaps with the question as to how readers understand text. Although these questions also arise when quantitative language data are being interpreted, the problem tends to be more acute when the analysis is exclusively qualitative. These issues will be tackled together in the next section.

Circular logic
Ruth **Breeze, 2011** (Articles in pragmatics, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics")

It is perhaps on the level of textual interpretation that the CDA enterprise has come in for the greatest amount of criticism. At the most extreme end of the spectrum, critical discourse analysts have been accused of what might be called a kind of naive linguistic determinism. Widdowson (1998: 136) draws attention to an explanation offered by Kress (1996: 25):¶ "this set of semiotic features, of representational resources, suggests and implies, and I would wish to say, over the longer period produces a particular disposition, a particular habitus, and in so doing, plays its part in the production of a certain kind of subjectivity"¶ Widdowson likens the analysts' approach to "the interpretive ingenuity one associates with literary criticism" (1998: 136). In his view, discourse analysts have unwittingly fallen back into "a transmission view of meaning, whereby significance is always and only the reflex of linguistic signification" (1998: 142).¶ On this basis, several critics have targeted CDA's understanding of the relationship between texts and readers. Some authors have identified what they call "the familiar Whorfian notion of linguistic determinism" (Widdowson 1998: 139), not in its original form whereby the possibilities of a particular language code determine the habitual thought processes of the language users, but in an extended form in which discourses similarly produce, condition and restrict the thought processes of the recipient/user. It is uncontroversial to assume the existence of a significant relationship between discourse and people's view of reality. However, it is equally obvious that in a globalised world people are exposed to many different discourses, and that they learn to navigate them, ignoring many, accepting some, rejecting others. Despite the evident truth of this, much CDA research proceeds on the basis that there is a simple, one-to- one relationship between the text and its reader, or the discourse and its recipient. It would be at once more subtle and more realistic to acknowledge from the outset that some discourses are more powerful or influential than others, and to focus attention on those that are particularly likely to have an impact on a large audience, or to attempt to determine what factors make such an impact probable.¶ One of the major problems with this approach is the circularity of the argumentation. It is possible to maintain that language use determines cognition, but this claim is weakened if the only evidence we have of cognition is language use. It would be truer to say that language both represents and influences cognitive processes, and so we must be very careful when trying to draw conclusions about thought from language and vice versa. In Stubbs's view (1997), if researchers want to make claims about what people think

on the basis of what they read or hear, they really ought to obtain non-linguistic evidence about their beliefs, or examine their behaviour. As he says (1997: 6), "if we have no independent evidence, but infer beliefs from language use, then the theory is circular". Stubbs's proposal presents many difficulties, because it¶ is not clear how exactly one would infer people's thoughts and beliefs without using language, and it is by no means straightforward to relate discourses to non-linguistic evidence such as observable behaviour. None the less, his criticism stands, because it is unreasonable to assume a one-way influence from discourse to thought, and methodologically unsound to operate as though the existence of such an influence were unproblematic.¶ Taking a rather different line of attack, some CDA researchers have devoted considerable space to discussing the means by which they think texts influence people, in order to validate their own hermeneutic practices. Kress (1992: 91-117) develops a theory of representation and transformation which he proposes as the means by which discourses function to modify or change people's views of reality. His theory is initially based on Halliday's notion of representation, the process by which reality is ideationally encoded. The notion of transformation is not borrowed from Halliday, and appears to be distantly conceptually related to the Chomskian notion of transformation. The main point is an insistence on the way in which representations are changed, possibly as a result of ideological manipulation.¶ As Widdowson points out (1998: 138), there is a certain circularity in this, too, because representations are by definition an encoded version of reality, and so it is hard to know exactly how we are to know which representations are purely representations, and which are transformations. It appears that this is a theory of language change, or discourse change, but it is not entirely clear how it is possible to ascertain what has changed from what. There is a curious parallel here with the problem of classifying poetic language as a deviation ("Abweichung") from normal language, discussed by Coseriu (1980: 51). Deviation is a relational concept, one must deviate from something, but who is to say what is deviating from what? Moreover, it may be possible to "deviate" in a wealth of different ways. Similarly, the concept of transformation is set up as a dichotomy, but there is no real way of knowing which side is which or whether, indeed, there is a dichotomy at all, or a range of different possibilities. In a further explanation of transformation offered in Hodge and Kress (1993), the authors propose that some types of grammatical construction are neutral or "non-transformed", and that these, though representational, lack any particular representational significance – they are innocent reflections of reality. Others, however, are transformed, and transformed sentences "always involve suppression and/or distortion" (Hodge and Kress 1993: 35). In practice, especially in much research carried out in the 1990s, transformation appears to be involved when grammatically "less simple" structures, such as the passive, are used to convey information. However, the question as to whether use of the passive is always ideological, or indeed, whether the passive is actually "less simple" than the equivalent active form, is not fully addressed by these researchers.¶ Widdowson takes issue with Kress's notion of transformation in various ways. First, he reminds us that in a Chomskian model, all strings of words are transformed and potentially transformable, so there are no neutral, innocent, non-transformed sentences. This model offers no method for telling transformed and non-transformed sentences apart. Secondly, Widdowson relates Kress's notion that transformed sentences are more complex to the derivational theory of complexity, a theory prominent in the 1960s, based on the idea that structural complexity was mirrored by psychological complexity and the consequent difficulty in processing. Thus passive sentences, it was proposed, required more effort to process, because a passive sentence is intrinsically more complex than an active sentence. This theory, again, presupposes that some structures¶ Critical discourse analysis and its critics 509¶ 510 Ruth Breeze¶ are actually more complex than others, and that this has a knock-on effect on the reader/receptor. However, this assumption goes against the evidence that is available from the area of language processing. When experiments were actually carried out to determine the processing speed or ease of different linguistic structures, it proved impossible for the subjects to separate their understanding of the language itself from contextual factors. For example, Olson and Filby (1972) compared comprehension time in processing active and passive propositions, and found that when events or questions were coded in terms of the actor, active statements were more swiftly processed, whereas when they were coded in terms of the receiver of the action, passives were processed more quickly. In their view, "the comprehension of a passive sentence does not necessarily involve the recovery of the base structure equivalent of the passive to the active sentence, or the base S-V-O structure usually assumed to underlie (...) sentence meaning" (1972: 379). In other experiments (Wales and Grieve 1969: 327-332), subjects found it surprisingly easy to understand complex structures within a particular context, in other words, they tended

to come up with pragmatic interpretations, rather than engage in linguistic analysis.¶ In more recent CDA publications, the notion of transformation is less prominent. None the less, the underlying concept is often used (Schroder 2002; Kuo and Nakamura 2005; Stenvall 2007; and see also Billig (2008: 35-46) for a detailed discussion of possible ways in which passives and nominalisation have been thought to be "mystificatory") so that passives are often suspect of depriving certain groups of agency, or of concealing agency, for example, without full discussion as to the pragmatic functions of the passive in language in general, or the impact, or lack of it, on the reader. Finally, as Widdowson (pp. 138-141) astutely points out, the whole notion of representation versus transformation, innocent language versus ideologised manipulation, appears to contradict another of the tenets of CDA, which is that all language is ideological, and nothing can be neutral. This further undermines the dichotomy between representation and transformation, and leaves little firm ground for the analyst to stand on.¶ How, then, can the analyst interpret texts, and how can the analyst establish what effect the text has on the reader? Critical discourse analysts are not unaware of the problems that arise here, and are quick to assert that ideological meanings cannot be read off from textual features, and that textual analysis should be combined with analysis of production and consumption practices (Fairclough 1995). Yet they provide little evidence of such practices, and tend to fall back on a transmission model of hermeneutics whereby linguistic forms "convey" or "construct" meaning, which is presumably imbibed by the reader in undiluted form.¶ This model itself contains an underlying contradiction, because even CDA specialists admit that the ideological meanings are often opaque and have to be prised out with difficulty by the discourse analyst, and yet they appear to be communicated with ease to the reader and be capable of subtly exerting an ideological influence on him or her. Thus meaning is contained in text in a deeply embedded form, subtly imbricated in the syntactic structures and lexical choices, but that same meaning, opaque to the analyst, is conveyed to readers, exerting an ideological influence on them. Moreover, the problem of understanding reader response is further compounded by issues of access to context, discussed elsewhere in this paper, because poor consideration of context tends to render opaque the way that the actual participants in any situation understand and interpret it themselves. Thus if, as we have seen, the researcher privileges his own¶ position because his/her "members' resources" include access to social theory, then he or she "runs the risk of losing sight of whatever spontaneously productive 'hermeneutics' there already are in the lifeworlds" (Slembrouck 2001: 42), that is, what the participants actually think is happening.¶ The issue of reader response, analytical stance and hermeneutic possibilities has been addressed in considerable length in literary studies. When critics such as Widdowson accuse CDA of subordinating analysis to interpretation, of finding in the text what they set out to find (Widdowson 1998: 149), they frequently refer back to literary criticism for a parallel problem: CDA is "a kind of political poetics, and over and over again the same issues arise about the textual warrant for interpretation". It is therefore useful to make a brief examination of the way this issue has been tackled in literary studies, in order to draw fruitful comparisons with CDA.¶ Both Stubbs and Widdowson recognise that the problem of hermeneutics in CDA somehow mirrors the problem of literary criticism and reader response that was the object of heated debate in the 1960s and 1970s. However, their claim that the problem is similar enough to be solved in the same way is open to criticism. To summarise briefly, the arguments in the field of literature about reader response arose in implicit contradiction to previous theories of literature that had foregrounded the writer or the content and form of the literary work, and in explicit opposition to the New Criticism and to formalist theories, which consigned the reader to oblivion. The proponents of reader-response approaches centred on the idea of the reader as an active agent who completes the meaning of a literary work through interpretation – a notion which some detractors felt would lead to relativism or even chaos. Stubbs cites Fish (1980: 341, 347) who endeavours to solve the problem of the heterogenous nature of readers' responses by taking the line that a text does not have meaning outside a set of cultural assumptions about what it means and how it should be interpreted. These assumptions are embodied in the "interpretive community", which establishes the criteria for reading a particular text in a particular way, and sets norms as to what is possible and what is not.¶ Although the main question addressed by reader response theory is similar to the issue of interpretation in CDA, it is important to highlight some major differences. First, the responses to a literary work are essentially different, more complex or more multi- layered than responses to everyday texts of an informative or instrumental nature. Rather than reader response theory, which is more usually applied to works of art, the approaches to audience reception that form the staple of media studies would

provide a useful tool for gauging what people understand from a particular text, or detecting the deviant readings that are generated within particular social settings. Second, if we are to accept CDA's claims that obscure patterns and hidden meanings in discourse ultimately exert an ideological influence, then the notion that an "interpretive community" would provide useful in determining the meaning of discourse is obviously suspect: the community itself might be positioned in support of the hegemony, or various different interpretive communities might exist, offering a variety of interpretations. Moreover, when we are dealing with the type of text often studied by CDA, we are not simply thinking of the way a text is "interpreted", which is the case in literary studies, but of the way in which it is accepted, used, acted upon, changed, parodied or perhaps ignored. In this, the notion more familiar to applied linguists of the "discourse community", or the educationalists' notion of the "community of practice", offer more useful tools for gaining an understanding of how discourse works in specific social settings (Kent 1991:¶ Critical discourse analysis and its critics 511¶ 512 Ruth Breeze¶ 425-445; Lave and Wenger 1991: 22-23). As Bhatia has remarked (2002: 6), thick descriptions of the communicative practices within a particular group "may unravel many of the mysteries of the way members of various discourse communities function to achieve their institutional and disciplinary goals and to justify their discursive practices". Recent studies (Sarangi and Roberts 1999; Candlin and Hyland 1999; Arminen 2005) have brought out the complexity of the workings of power and language in academic and professional settings. There is also a substantial body of research in media studies that suggests that the influence of texts and broadcast material on subjects is much less one-way and much more complex than might be supposed (Abercrombie 1996; Nightingale 1996; Reese et al. 2003), because people bring a wide range of previous knowledge and interpretive techniques that enable them to generate a broad spectrum of divergent readings. Ideally, studies of this kind should be borne in mind or carried out in combination with discourse analytical research, in order to establish how media, institutional and other texts "work" in their natural settings.¶ Despite the foregoing, the problem of obtaining evidence about the effects of the text on the reader or listener is one that is rarely even raised in CDA research. The bodies of research that exist in media studies or ethnography of communication are rarely even alluded to by CDA practitioners, and in general it can be stated that CDA lacks a cogent theory of audience effects and audience response that would provide support for its assertions about the influence of discourses on human subjects.

CDA fails - infinite contexts and arbitrary selection

Ruth **Breeze, 2011** (Articles in pragmatics, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics")

One of the fundamental tenets of CDA is that discourse is socially embedded: It is at once socially constructed, and also plays a role in constructing and perpetuating ("reproducing") social structures and relations. CDA also declares itself to be socially committed (Fairclough and Wodak 1997), with an explicit purpose of raising its readers' consciousness "of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others, because consciousness is the first step to emancipation" (Fairclough 1989: 1). Language viewed in a social framework is a highly complex phenomenon, since it both constitutes and challenges social relations, and different linguistic media are intermeshed with each other and with non-language media, generating an intricate web of intertextuality and multimodality. It is therefore striking that one criticism levelled at CDA is that the most specifically social aspects of discourse, namely the social contexts in which discourse is embedded, have often been ignored.¶ The critiques that question CDA's claims to offering an interpretation of the social world have originated in the areas of conversation analysis, on the one hand, and the ethnography of communication and pragmatics, on the other. In essence, these approaches tend to differ from CDA in their emphasis on the need to follow a bottom- up approach (Peace 2003: 164). Both conversation analysis and ethnography require meticulous data-gathering techniques involving the use of recordings and detailed transcripts, and both disciplines are committed to the notion that interpretations should emerge from the data. Pragmatics is concerned with the functions fulfilled by language in real contexts, and with the complex relationships between form and social function, and also focuses on the detailed study of specific instances of language

use. Although CDA practitioners frequently call for "triangulation" in the sense of obtaining multiple perspectives on the phenomenon under observation (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 33ff;¶ Rogers et al. 2005: 382; van Dijk 2006: 359ff; Wodak 2007: 203), or at least for "constant movement back and forth between theory and data" (Meyer 2001: 27), there is an observable trend for work carried out in CDA to operate in a top-down manner, in that it presupposes a particular theory of social relations, and looks at language data from that perspective, or singles out interesting aspects of language that tie in with a particular theoretical view, rather than embarking on an all-round, in-depth study covering the multiple dimensions of a text to determine how language works in a particular setting.¶ Conversation analysis and CDA share an interest in naturally-occurring talk, interaction and text, and agree that discourse has a two-way relationship with context and social structures. However, the discipline of conversation analysis emerged from a different intellectual background, partly as a reaction to mainstream sociological trends. Although generalisations entail some risk of over-simplification, in broad terms it is usually accepted that conversation analysts mainly focus their analysis on close study of the interaction itself, and are unwilling to include what might have come before or after the interaction within their field of focus. It has sometimes been called the study of "micro interactions" (Rogers 2005: 378). By contrast, CDA's field of focus tends to widen out to encompass the macro context, the role that interaction plays in social relations, institutional power structures, and so on.¶ From the area of pragmatics, some critics have argued that CDA does not always look closely at the linguistic features of interactions, but that there is a tendency to jump too quickly to the macro context, making assertions as to how macro relations might be mapped onto micro interactions (Widdowson 1998). The immediate context, which determines the type of interaction in social settings, is often ignored completely (cf. Verschueren 2011). In the words of Verschueren (2001: 60), the lack of methodological rigour and, particularly, the way that context may be left out of the equation, means that CDA, particularly in its early days, was responsible for "subjecting the media, as well as other institutions, to a circus trial, playing fast and loose with the observable facts in order to support preconceived claims."¶ Contact with CDA researchers who were using some of the techniques of conversation analysis sparked a heated debate in the late 1990s. To summarise the main arguments, in Schegloff's view, context should only be taken into account insofar as it features in the interaction as a concern for the participants. Since there may be an almost infinite number of contextual factors that might possibly influence a given interaction, how is it possible to select just one that is analytically relevant? For example, an interaction between a man and a woman might be influenced by gender issues, but then again, this might not be the case, and it is conceivable that gender issues are unimportant for the participants on this particular occasion. In such a case, would it be legitimate for a researcher interested in gender to impose an analytical framework on this interaction?¶ In Schegloff's opinion, conversation analysis should be driven by a desire to understand how everyday interaction works, how identities are negotiated, how people do things through language in different settings. To this end, the appropriate analytical approach is to discover the orientations provided by the participants themselves, and the role these play in the interaction. Moreover, even when it has been established that certain aspects of the context are important, the analyst has to take care to discern exactly what these might mean in the particular situation at hand, rather than jumping to conclusions in terms of meta-categories such as "gender" or "power". In Potter's words¶ Critical discourse analysis and its critics 513¶ 514 Ruth Breeze¶ (1998: 31), "context is treated as something that is constructed, dealt with, and oriented to by participants. Features of participants such as their ethnicity, features of the setting, and other 'ethnographic' particulars are not treated as separable factors". As Potter points out, this tends to dissolve the classic distinction between micro- and macroanalysis, because researchers in this tradition do not view social structures as something in which interaction happens, but rather look at social interactions as evidence of the way social phenomena are shaped or constituted.¶ Although it is obvious that in the real world, the researcher cannot approach the data without preconceived notions, Schegloff's recommendation is that scholars should try to ground their analysis in the interaction itself, focusing on what is relevant to the participants. In his words (1997: 165), "this is a useful constraint on analysis in disciplining work to the indigenous preoccupations of the everyday world being grasped, and serving as a buffer against the potential for academic and theoretical imperialism which imposes intellectuals' preoccupations on a world without respect to their indigenous resonance."

CDA can't produce positive solutions

Ruth **Breeze, 2011** (Articles in pragmatics, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics")

CDA practititioners repeatedly emphasise that their enterprise is essentially aimed at creating a better world, effecting transformation and empowering the oppressed: "CDA is essentially political in intent with its practitioners acting upon the world in order to transform it and thereby help create a world where people are not discriminated against because of sex, colour, creed, age or social class" (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 1996: ix). However, they also admit that this objective is rarely met:¶ Critical language projects have remained just that: critiques of texts and of the social practices implied by or realised in those texts, uncovering, revealing, inequitable, dehumanising and deleterious states of affairs [...] if critical language projects were to develop apt, plausible theories of this domain, they would be able to move from critical reading, from analysis, from deconstructive activity, to productive activity [...] CL or CDA have not offered (productive) accounts of alternative forms of social organisation, nor of social subjects, other than by implication. (Kress 1996: 15-16)¶ Given the assumptions made in CDA about the nature of society, and the overwhelming interest in exposing ideological manipulation that shapes and perpetuates power imbalances through discourse, it is hardly surprising that language scholars of this school find it easier to deconstruct than to construct. In an article calling for more positive work in discourse analysis, Martin draws particular attention to the negative facets of CDA, locating CDA among "a pathological disjunction in 20th century social sciences and humanities research which systematically elides the study of social processes which make the world a better place in favour of critique of processes which disempower and oppress" (2004: 186) and calls for a serious attempt to be made to re- configure CDA in a more positive sense. He identifies this type of negative deconstruction as the dominant face of CDA, which he terms "CDA realis", which is¶ largely concerned with "exposing language and attendant semiosis in the service of power" (2004: 179). However, he also notes that CDA has a secondary aspect oriented to constructive social action, which he names "CDA irrealis", which has rarely been put into practice. In Martin's view, "we need a complementary focus on community, taking into account how people get together and make room for themselves in the world – in ways that redistribute power without necessarily struggling against it" (2004: 186). This "Positive Discourse Analysis" would focus on how change happens for the better, looking at how indigenous peoples overcome their colonial heritage, for example, or how sexism is eroded and new gender relationships are established. By studying such phenomena, we will learn more about how positive developments take place, and we will thus be in a better position to support change in the future.¶ By way of example, Martin documents the Australian government enquiry on the forced adoption of indigenous children, which is truly innovative within the genre of the bureaucratic report in that it foregrounds the voice of the victims. He similarly charts the roles of narrative and of biographical literature in raising people's awareness of injustice and changing public opinion. Martin's own frustration with the orthodoxies of CDA is plain when he states that he supposes "it would be going too far to propose a 10 year moratorium on deconstructive CDA, in order to get some constructive PDA off the ground" (2004: 199).¶ In a similar vein, Luke (2002: 98) argues that if CDA is to develop its full potential, it needs to move beyond ideological critique, and to explore what he calls "the productive use of power" and, in Freirean terms, "emancipatory discourse". Like Martin, he asserts that "if CDA is a normative form of social science and political action, it must be able to demonstrate what 'should be' as well as what is problematic" (2002: 105). If not, he argues, CDA will remain entrenched in a deterministic negative paradigm in which all media are forms of central ideological control, and CDA practitioners have the "enlightening" role of the Gramscian intellectual, to raise awareness and mobilise the people against the hegemony. Since this would be reductive (and, we might add, assumes certain premises about the nature of the audience and the workings of the media that are highly questionable), Luke proposes that a new, positively-oriented CDA should focus on minority discourses and diasporic voices, emergent counter-discourses, reinterpretations of mainstream discourses by different groups of subjects, and strategies of resistance. In the face of globalisation, for CDA to remain locked in dialectical analyses of economic disparity and political oppression would be to miss an opportunity, and ultimately to fail to come to terms with new cultural configurations, new ways of negotiating identity, new counter-discourses and voices of resistance. To meet this challenge, from a theoretical point of view, it will be necessary to stop thinking in terms of outdated dichotomies, while in methodological terms, it will be important to seek out

evidence and develop appropriate methods for investigating the new discourses and new media that characterise life in the 21st century.

You get coopted

Ruth **Breeze, 2011** (Articles in pragmatics, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics")

However, as is inevitable in the case of successful new movements of any kind, in the twenty years or so in which CDA has gathered momentum there has been a gradual move towards establishment and respectability. Some authors even claim that CDA scholars are actively engaged in an attempt to establish CDA as an approach or school in itself (Verschueren 2001: 67). Billig (2002) documents this change and sketches out what this may mean for a "revolutionary" discipline, calling for greater self-awareness and self-criticism on the part of CDA practitioners.¶ In his account, Billig (2002) draws attention to the use of the acronym "CDA", which he feels has gained the status of an academic "brand". In his view, one rhetorical strategy available to academics is to package their products as part of a range which is accredited or in some way guaranteed by a particular theoretical perspective. The "branding" of this theory is often accomplished by the use of abbreviations (Billig cites the example of SIT, Social Identity Theory, in sociology, but one might equally think of SFL, in linguistics). In Billig's view, this type of labelling makes it possible for academics to "market" their ideas "as branded and identifiable intellectual products in today's academic world" (2002: 42), and this phenomenon is becoming common in a fiercely competitive academic world that is increasingly dominated by the rules of the market place. Now that CDA has a firm foothold in universities, with its own journals and large numbers of academics who assent to its main tenets, it is part of the academic power structure, and aspiring scholars can choose to join its ranks by accepting its principles and methodological assumptions. In terms of academic power (to publish books or articles, to make appointments, to achieve promotion), CDA is now at least equal to other fields of language study. It is even possible to maintain that, in intellectual terms, a critical paradigm has been established – a critical orthodoxy which may, in its way, be as inflexible, dogmatic and exclusive as other orthodoxies of the past.¶ Moreover, Billig draws special attention to the role played by the term "critical" in the self-understanding and self-marketing of CDA. He points to the history of the way the word "critical" has been used from Kant through to Piaget and Popper, not to mention the Frankfurt school (see above), and suggests that the main force of the term has usually been to insist on the objectivity or intellectual credibility of one's own enterprise and undermine the "uncritical", "non-critical" or "acritical" approaches adopted by other scholars. In particular, CDA's insistence that academic work should be addressed to the critique of power in society, added to the difference it establishes between itself and disciplines or paradigms whose theoretical and methodological assumptions exclude direct political analysis, tends to set up a dichotomy in which CDA is constructed as positive, while non-critical approaches are positioned as potentially defective or worse. Non-critical approaches are not simply another option: By not taking a critical stance, they are taking side with the existing hegemonies, guilty of precluding the necessary social critique, and thereby of collusion or of furthering the reproduction of an unjust social order. If we appraise CDA critically, we should therefore be aware that the use of the term "critical" is itself significant as what has been termed "a rhetoric of self-praise" (Billig 2002: 37). This aspect of CDA could indeed be¶ seen as a form of ideological manipulation, a way of disqualifying the competition. As Potter (1996) indicates, CDA treats criticism as if it were intrinsic to the enterprise. Although this does not necessarily follow, the implication often seems to be that discourse analysis which is not critical is in some sense lacking. As Potter says (1996), there is scope for types of discourse analysis which might or might not lead to social criticism, depending on what emerges from the data. There is no particular need for discourse analysis to be critical in order to be valid, useful or interesting. Moreover, other discourse analysts have argued forcefully that discourse analysis ought set its own particular rules as a discipline of language study, particularly relating to rigorous and impartial standards of analysis and interpretation, and that external

concerns such as ideological issues are not necessarily germane to the enterprise (Antaki et al. 2003). However, to those working within CDA, critique is not something that may or may not emerge from the analysis of text: Critique is the raison d'être for analysis in the first place.¶ In Billig's evaluation of this situation, several points stand out as being relevant to our present discussion. First, there is the issue of the critical canon. As we have seen, the intellectual basis for CDA is a subject of discussion even within the area itself. Beginning from a fairly straightforward neo-Marxist critique of society in the 1980s, CDA has expanded its intellectual horizons to take in a range of sociological thinking of a very diverse nature. What is special about this, if CDA is considered as a "school" or "approach" within language study, is the heavy emphasis on sociology, and on figures with a particular "critical" position towards late modernity, blended with the use of notions more generally associated with post-modern paradigms. Whatever the merits of this eclectic background, the result is that CDA seems to have established its own "critical canon" consisting of "radical works of social analysis that were never considered by conventional linguists to be part of linguistics" (Billig 2002: 44), which have now been fixed as set texts for the upcoming generation. There is some danger that this "canon" will be accepted uncritically, which is a matter for concern, particularly if it contains an imbalance between social theory and works concerned with language and linguistic methodology.¶ A second, related theme is the lack of reflexivity and internal dialogue, which tends to consolidate CDA from the outside, as an intellectual paradigm with its own hierarchy and systems of control, but which may detract from the seriousness of its intellectual enterprise. Billig (2002) feels that what self-critique there is tends to omit key factors, and is concerned that the growth in respectability will entail a loss of intellectual creativity. He recommends that academics should draw back from treating CDA as if it were a reified product, or a brand name for labelling one's work so that it will be published. He asks scholars to "unpick the rhetoric that has led from 'critical approaches' to the abbreviated and capitalised 'CDA'" (Billig 2002: 44), and calls for a return to the critical analysis of discourse (without capital letters) in such a way that new approaches can arise. In his words:¶ "Above all, there is a need to encourage young academics, especially those without established positions, to criticise the language and rhetoric of the established critical writers – even to expose the self-interest and political economy of the sign 'critical'. The results would not be comfortable for the critical experts; nor should they be if the activity of social critique is to continue into the future" (Billig 2002: 45).

AT: epistemology

Focus on epistemology relies on anthropocentric and modernist notions that prevent engagement with the object itself - makes political engagement impossible (this might be two cards)
Levi R **Bryant 2011** (The Democracy of Objects)

Yet in all of the heated debates surrounding epistemology that have cast nearly every discipline in turmoil, we nonetheless seem to miss the point that the question of the object is not an epistemological question, not a question of how we know the object, but a question of what objects are. The being of objects is an issue distinct from the question of our knowledge of objects. Here, of course, it seems obvious that in order to discuss the being of objects we must first know objects. And if this is the case, it follows as a matter of course that epistemology or questions of knowledge must precede ontology. However, I hope to show in what follows that questions of ontology are both irreducible to questions of epistemology and that questions of ontology must precede questions of epistemology or questions of our access to objects.What an object is cannot be reduced to our access to objects. And as we will see in what follows, that access is highly limited. Nonetheless, while our access to objects is highly limited, we can still say a great deal about the being of objects.¶ However, despite the limitations of access, we must avoid, at all costs, the thesis that objects are what our access to objects gives us. As Graham Harman has argued, objects are not the given. Not at all. As such, this¶ book defends a robust realism.Yet, and this is crucial to everything that follows, the realism defended here is not an epistemological realism, but an ontological realism. Epistemological realism argues that our representations and language are accurate mirrors of the world as it actually is, regardless of whether or not we exist. It seeks to distinguish between true representations and phantasms. Ontological realism, by contrast, is not a thesis about our knowledge of objects, but about the being of objects themselves, whether or not we exist to represent them. It is the thesis that the world is composed¶ of objects, that these objects are varied and include entities as diverse as mind, language, cultural and social entities, and objects independent of humans such as galaxies, stones, quarks, tardigrades and so on. Above all, ontological realisms refuse to treat objects as constructions of humans. While it is true, I will argue, that all objects translate one another, the objects that are translated are irreducible to their translations. As we will see, ontological realism thoroughly refutes epistemological realism or¶ Introduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object 19¶ what ordinarily goes by the pejorative title of "naïve realism". Initially it might sound as if the distinction between ontological and epistemological realism is a difference that makes no difference but, as I hope to show, this distinction has far ranging consequences for how we pose a number of questions and theorize a variety of phenomena.¶ One of the problematic consequences that follows from the hegemony that epistemology currently enjoys in philosophy is that it condemns philosophy to a thoroughly anthropocentric reference. Because the ontological question of substance is elided into the epistemological question of our knowledge of substance, all discussions of substance necessarily contain a human reference.The subtext or fine print surrounding our discussions of substance always contain reference to an implicit "for- us".This is true even of the anti-humanist structuralists and post- structuralists who purport to dispense with the subject in favor of various impersonal and anonymous social forces like language and structure that exceed the intentions of individuals. Here we still remain in the orbit of¶ an anthropocentric universe insofar as society and culture are human phenomena, and all of being is subordinated to these forces. Being is thereby reduced to what being is for us.¶ By contrast, this book strives to think a subjectless object, or an object that is for-itself rather than an object that is an opposing pole before or in front of a subject. Put differently, this essay attempts to think an object for-itself that isn't an object for the gaze of a subject, representation, or a cultural discourse.This, in short, is what the democracy of objects means. The democracy of objects is not a political thesis to the effect that all objects ought to be treated equally or that all objects ought to participate in human affairs. The democracy of objects is the

ontological thesis that all objects, as Ian Bogost has so nicely put it, equally exist while they do not exist equally. The claim that all objects equally exist is the claim that no object can be treated as constructed by another object. The claim that objects do not exist equally is the claim that objects contribute to collectives or assemblages to a greater and lesser degree. In short, no object such as the subject or culture is the ground of all others. As such, The Democracy of Objects attempts to think the being of objects unshackled from the gaze of humans in their being for-themselves.¶ 20 Levi R. Bryant¶ Such a democracy, however, does not entail the exclusion of the human. Rather, what we get is a redrawing of distinctions and a decentering of the human. The point is not that we should think objects rather than humans. Such a formulation is based on the premise that humans constitute some special category that is other than objects, that objects are a pole opposed to humans, and therefore the formulation is based on the premise that objects are correlates or poles opposing or standing-before humans. No, within the framework of onticology—my name for the ontology that follows—there¶ is only one type of being: objects. As a consequence, humans are not excluded, but are rather objects among the various types of objects that exist or populate the world, each with their own specific powers and capacities.¶ It is here that we encounter the redrawing of distinctions proposed by object-oriented philosophy and onticology. In his Laws of Form, George Spencer-Brown argued that in order to indicate anything we must first¶ draw a distinction. Distinction, as it were, precedes indication. To indicate something is to interact with, represent, or point at something in the world (indication takes a variety of forms). Thus, for example, when I say the sun is shining, I have indicated a state-of-affairs, yet this indication is based on a prior distinction between, perhaps, darkness and light, gray days and sunny days, and so on. According to Spencer-Brown, every distinction contains a marked and an unmarked space.¶ marked unmarked¶ The right-angle is what Spencer-Brown refers to as the mark of distinction. The marked space opens what can be indicated, whereas the unmarked space is everything else that is excluded. Thus, for example, I can draw a circle on a piece of paper (distinction), and can now indicate what is in that circle. Two key points follow from Spencer-Brown's calculus of distinctions. First, the unmarked space of a distinction is invisible to the person employing the distinction. While it is true that, in many instances, the boundary of a distinction can be crossed and the unmarked space¶ can be indicated, in the use of a distinction the unmarked space of the¶ ⌗¶ Introduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object 21¶ distinction becomes a blind-spot for the system deploying the distinction. That which exists in the unmarked space of the distinction might as well not exist for the system using the distinction.¶ However, the unmarked space of the distinction is not the only blind- spot generated by the distinction. In addition to the unmarked space of a distinction, the distinction itself is a blind-spot. In the use of a distinction, the distinction itself becomes invisible insofar as one passes "through" the distinction to make indications. The situation here is analogous to watching a bright red cardinal on a tree through one's window. Here the window becomes invisible and all our attention is drawn to the cardinal. One can either use their distinctions or observe their distinctions, but never use their distinctions and observe their distinctions. By virtue of the withdrawal of distinctions from view in the course of using them, distinctions thus create a reality effect where properties of the indicated seem to belong¶ to the indicated itself rather than being effects of the distinction. As a consequence, we do not realize that other distinctions are possible. The result is thus that we end up surreptitiously unifying the world under a particular set of distinctions, failing to recognize that very different sorts of indications are possible.¶ Within the marked space of its distinctions, much contemporary philosophy and theory places the subject or culture. As a consequence, objects fall into the unmarked space and come to be treated as what is other than the subject.¶ ⌗content: signs/signifiers/representations¶ subject/culture Here one need only think of Fichte for a formalization of this logic. Within any distinction there can also be sub-distinctions that render their own indications possible. In the case of the culturalist schema, the subject/ culture distinction contains a sub-distinction marking content. The catch is that in treating the object as what is opposed to the subject or what is other than the subject, this frame of thought treats the object in terms of¶ 22 Levi R. Bryant¶ the subject. The object is here not an object, not an autonomous substance that exists in its own right, but rather a representation. As a consequence¶ of this, all other entities in the world are treated only as vehicles for human contents, meanings, signs, or projections. By analogy, we can compare the culturalist structure of distinction with cinema. Here the object would be the smooth cinema screen, the projector would be the subject or culture, and the images would be contents or representations. Within this schema, the screen is treated as contributing little or nothing and all inquiry is focused

on representations or contents. To be sure, the screen exists, but it is merely a vehicle for human and cultural representations.¶ Onticology and object-oriented philosophy, by contrast, propose to place objects in the marked space of distinction.¶ subject/culture/nonhumans object¶ It will be noted that when objects are placed in the marked space of distinction, the sub-distinction does not contract what can be indicated, but rather expands what can be indicated. Here subjects and culture are not excluded, but rather are treated as particular types of objects. Additionally, it now becomes possible to indicate nonhuman objects without treating them as vehicles for human contents. As a consequence, this operation is not a simple inversion of the culturalist schema. It is not a call to pay attention¶ to objects rather than subjects or to treat subjects as what are opposed to objects, rather than treating objects as being opposed to subjects. Rather, just as objects were reduced to representations when the subject or culture occupied the marked space of distinction, just as objects were effectively transformed into the subject and content, the placement of objects in the marked space of distinction within the framework of ontology transforms the subject into one object among many others, undermining its privileged, central, or foundational place within philosophy and ontology. Subjects are objects among objects, rather than constant points of reference related to all other objects. As a consequence, we get the beginnings of what anti-¶ 🕮¶ Introduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object 23¶ humanism and post-humanism ought to be, insofar as these theoretical orientations are no longer the thesis that the world is constructed through anonymous and impersonal social forces as opposed to an individual subject. Rather, we get a variety of nonhuman actors unleashed in the world as autonomous actors in their own right, irreducible to representations and freed from any constant reference to the human where they are reduced to our representations.¶ Thus, rather than thinking being in terms of two incommensurable worlds, nature and culture, we instead get various collectives of objects.¶ As Latour has compellingly argued, within the Modernist schema that drives both epistemological realism and epistemological anti-realism,¶ the world is bifurcated into two distinct domains: culture and nature.3¶ The domain of the subject and culture is treated as the world of freedom, meaning, signs, representations, language, power, and so on. The domain¶ of nature is treated as being composed of matter governed by mechanistic causality. Implicit within forms of theory and philosophy that work with this bifurcated model is the axiom that the two worlds are to be kept entirely separate, such that there is to be no inmixing of their distinct properties. Thus, for example, a good deal of cultural theory only refers to objects¶ as vehicles for signs or representations, ignoring any non-semiotic or non-representational differences nonhuman objects might contribute to collectives. Society is only to have social properties, and never any sorts of qualities that pertain to the nonhuman world.¶ It is my view that the culturalist and modernist form of distinction is disastrous for social and political analysis and sound epistemology. Insofar as the form of distinction implicit in the culturalist mode of distinction indicates content and relegates nonhuman objects to the unmarked space of the distinction, all sorts of factors become invisible that are pertinent¶ to why collectives involving humans take the form they do. Signifiers, meanings, signs, discourses, norms, and narratives are made to do all the heavy lifting to explain why social organization takes the form it does. While there can be no doubt that all of these agencies play a significant role in¶ the formation of collectives involving humans, this mode of distinction leads us to ignore the role of the nonhuman and asignifying in the form¶ of technologies, weather patterns, resources, diseases, animals, natural¶ 24 Levi R. Bryant¶ disasters, the presence or absence of roads, the availability of water, animals, microbes, the presence or absence of electricity and high speed internet connections, modes of transportation, and so on. All of these things and many more besides play a crucial role in bringing humans together in particular ways and do so through contributing differences that while coming to be imbricated with signifying agencies, nonetheless are asignifying. An activist political theory that places all its apples in the basket of content is doomed to frustration insofar as it will continuously wonder why its critiques of ideology fail to produce their desired or intended social change. Moreover, in an age where we are faced with the looming threat of monumental climate change, it is irresponsible to draw our distinctions in such a way as to exclude nonhuman actors.¶ On the epistemological front, the subject/object distinction has the curious effect of leading the epistemologist to focus on propositions¶ and representations alone, largely ignoring

the role that practices and nonhuman actors play in knowledge-production. As a consequence, the central question becomes that of how and whether propositions correspond to reality. In the meantime, we ignore the laboratory setting, engagement with matters and instruments, and so on. It is as if experiment and the entities that populate the laboratory are treated as mere means to the end of knowledge such that they can be safely ignored as contributing nothing to propositional content, thereby playing no crucial role in the production of knowledge.Yet by ignoring the site, practices, and procedures by which knowledge is produced, the question of how propositions represent reality becomes thoroughly obscure because we are left without the means of discerning the birth of propositions and the common place where the world of the human and nonhuman meets.

AT: grassroots

Grassroots activism statistically useless

NBS 2012 http://nbs.net/knowledge/when-shareholders-are-scarier-than-green-peace/

Shareholders unhappy with your environmental track record hurt your company's financial performance far more than a Greenpeace boycott.¶ This according to researchers Ion Bogdan Vasi of Columbia University and Brayden King of Northwestern University. Vasi and King found that a single resolution from a concerned shareholder makes analysts believe your firm is environmentally risky. And that belief translates to lower stock price valuation. The same cannot be said, however, of environmental activists outside your company.¶ "It's surprising activist groups don't influence analysts' risk assessments," said John Peloza, a management professor at Florida State University and NBS Editor on Valuing Sustainability. "Intuitively, you might assume lawsuits or boycotts attacking companies' poor environmental record would down-grade a company's stock price. But that's apparently not the case."¶ "Extracting fossil fuels is becoming increasingly risky and that is a financial risk."¶ The researchers came to the conclusion after studying the 700 highest-revenue companies in the United States from 2004 to 2008. They tracked financial analysts' perceptions of "environmental risk," studied who influenced those perceptions and compared the assessments to companies' financial performance.¶ As one analyst observed: "Extracting fossil fuels is becoming increasingly risky and that is a financial risk. The latest spate of environmental crises is pushing investors to become more interested in how environmental risk translates into financial risk."¶ Primary Versus Secondary Activists¶ Armed with risk assessments for the 700 companies, the researchers studied the influence of primary versus secondary activists on analyst assessments. Primary activists are people whose financial situation correlates directly with firm performance: shareholders, employees, suppliers and creditors.¶ Secondary activists include community groups, religious groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Greenpeace, WWF or the David Suzuki Foundation in Canada – organizations outside the firm. These external activists may use boycotts, protests, lawsuits, demonstrations, petitions or sit-ins to raise awareness about a company's poor environmental practices. Their actions are sometimes effective at prompting companies to adopt sustainable practices – or at least the appearance of improved environmental performance. From an analyst's perspective, though, environmental groups are often dismissed as radical or marginal.¶ One Unhappy Shareholder Rocks the Boat¶ Shareholders share companies' goals of making money and remaining financially viable over the long term. So their concerns about environmental policies raise red flags for potential investors. And unlike people outside the firm, shareholder activists are in a unique position to "observe corporate activities and to report what they perceive as environmental misdeeds," according to the researchers.¶ Shareholders take action against corporate environmental performance through resolutions: "Although shareholder resolutions rarely receive enough support to force a change in corporate policies," the researchers write, "they present evidence that investors [should] be concerned with firms' environmental practices."¶ Shareholder activism has its roots in the corporate raiders of the 1980s. Corporate raiders would buy an equity stake in a company and force the firm to make changes internally – or buy them out at a premium. Famous corporate raiders include Carl Icahn, T. Boone Pickens and, most recently, Bill Ackman.¶ Examples of Shareholder Resolutions¶ 2004: Brothers of Holy Cross, Dominican Sisters of Hope, Sisters of Mercy of the Americas and other religious groups ask GE to disclose the cost of PCB clean-up. Received support from 12.7 per cent of shareholders.¶ 2007: Trillium Asset Management asks Dow Chemical Company to publish a report on the extent to which its products cause or exacerbate asthma. Received support from 6.7 per cent of shareholders.¶ Comparing Risk Perception to Stock Price¶ Once they knew which companies were targeted by primary and secondary activists, the researchers examined financial performance. They studied the difference between each company's book value – the value of its assets on paper – and market value – how much analysts thought it was worth.¶ The researchers found the firms with high levels of environmental risk performed worse financially than those with low levels of risk. And the firms with the highest levels of perceived risk were the ones with shareholder resolutions – not the ones targeted by environmental groups or activists outside the company.¶ The Takeaway for CEOs¶ While you shouldn't dismiss third-party organizations' concerns about your environmental record, recognize that their public campaigns won't necessarily affect your market performance. Beware, however, the disgruntled shareholder.¶

Deliberation Good

Decolonization Impact

Deliberation key to solve colonization and social inequality

Leung 10 (Cheuk-Hang, Institute of Education, London, "Decolonization through Deliberation Teaching Democratic Citizenship in a Quasi-LiberalDemocratic Society," November 2010, https://www.ioe.ac.uk/about/documents/About_Overview/Cheuk-Hang_L.pdf)//ghs-VA

Introduction: Civic Education, Decolonization, and Quasi-Liberal-Democracy Issues on decolonization and democratization always provoke heated debates across different classes, races, religions, political camps, and cultural groups in postcolonial societies. Social struggle for democratic citizenship could be a tough and long process for the post-colonial society, as those domestic elites and conservative groups with vested interests who succeed the colonial authority do not easily concede power. Furthermore, It is not uncommon to see a re-legitimization of authoritarian rule in some post-colonial states (Grugel, 2002). This paper aims to present a philosophical analysis of democracy teaching in a post-colonial society. My focus will be on approaches to teaching civic and political education in such a contested socio-political environment, given that the transition to full-scale democracy normally takes a fairly long period of time. In the meantime, transitional politics always creates some forms of injustice, and post-colonial governments may seem resistant to promote the kind of citizenship education that favors democratic reform. Thus, civic education may be confined to, for example national identity building, instead of teaching democratic values. This paper addresses the key question of how to and who should teach citizens about the project of democratization and decolonization, given the apparent retreat of the state from the teaching of democratic citizenship in some postcolonial situations. The main theme of this paper is to argue that the concept of deliberative democracy represents a **cooperative learning process** for the public sphere; and that this could be essential for the development of democratic culture. Deliberative democracy should therefore, serve as an educational ideal for democratic citizenship education, whereas deliberation per se should be embraced as a means of civic education for the transformation to a democratic and **decolonized** citizenship. My focus on deliberation will highlight the moral salience of teaching „controversial" history through public deliberation. Therefore, as an illustration of the educative function of deliberation, in the later part of this paper, I will consider the moral implications of informal democratic education through the commemoration of a traumatic historic event in a postcolonial society, especially during the period of transitional politics towards the ultimate goal of decolonization. The progress of the decolonization project in part lies in the maturity and intensity of the democratic civic discourse within a given society, though constitutional reform still ought to be recognized as the necessary indicator. A full-scale democracy not only rests with democratic transformation of political institutions, but also requires the citizenry to take up a set of (liberal) values that can facilitate democratic operation and consolidate an open minded democratic life. The classical Marxist critique of colonialism, such as writers like Lenin and Hilfreding, that focuses on the imperialism of international trade and the coercive ruling of the colonizers seem to neglect the colonial impacts on the cultural dimensions of the colonized (Law, 2009). One of the key features of postcolonial studies is to reveal the underlying fabrics of colonial impacts on various epistemological, psychological, behavioral, and imaginary perspectives that still linger in the absence of colonial forces under the post-colonial period of time (Law, 2009). The project of decolonization thus should be conceived as both the reflection of and the rehabilitation from the colonial past. In this sense, the teaching of democratic citizenship is a top priority of the project with a view to developing a robust political culture for democratic public life. After all, democratic institutions cannot work without a robust democratic culture that efficiently conducts a specific liberal version of political morality for the interaction among people in a democratic public sphere. It is, therefore, conceivable to imagine that the teaching of democratic civic values in a postcolonial state, especially given the resistance of the government, is a necessarily contested task. It is not only because of its educational salience and controversy of teaching-learning approaches (one of which, as I will suggest below, is through public deliberation), but also due to the nature that it somehow touches on a sensitive political issue --- a highly reflective citizenry in the postcolonial condition may not always be welcome by domestic elitists, big businessmen, conservative groups, and even the government. In this context, one might note that the research of postcolonial education needs to be context-sensitive so as to grasp the accurate colonial experience for reflection. The pedagogy of civic values education, by the same token, is constrained by the social and cultural circumstances of individual postcolonial society. In this paper I propose the term quasi-liberal-democracy, which is used exclusively to depict merely some post-colonial societies that well suit the approach of teaching democracy through public deliberation. It portrays a society with semi- or fragile democratic institutions that, for example, were inherited from the colonial master in the later period of governance. The quasi-nature infers to the unfinished constitutional reforms of governmental settings. It also lies in the relative lack of a thriving political culture in favor of the consolidation of institutional democracy. On the other hand, the term „quasi-liberal" implies a critical point of view on the potentially rich liberal resources for these

postcolonial societies to further cultivate a desirable political culture and to nurture a robust democratic society. I would suggest that these quasi-liberal-democracies are mainly situated in Southeast Asian societies such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Of course, this classification is subject to empirical challenge, but the basic observation here draws on the relatively „civilized" colonial history and the rapid economic development in recent decades of these post-colonial societies, both of which contribute to their acceptance of liberal values and material foundation for democratization. Nevertheless, the term quasi-liberal-democracy is only a conceptual tool to represent the readiness for becoming democratic and to differentiate some post-colonial societies from many others. It does not aim at constructing any epistemological distinction on different postcolonial conditions. Indeed, those post-colonial societies out of the focus of this paper – African and Latin American – can largely fall into the category of quasiliberal-democracy at some level, despite the national variations in democratic constitutional settings and political culture. The term quasi-liberal-democracy, as a conceptual tool, depicts a particular societal configuration in order to illustrate a case for teaching democratic civic values through public deliberation. This is because the main purpose of this paper is to articulate and defend deliberative democracy as an ideal for civic teaching and to illustrate the normative endowment of public deliberation in the setting of informal education. In respect of this chosen context, the case for illustration is selective, though the educational implication of deliberative democracy it carries is thought to be universally applicable to all democratic societies. Therefore, in the following discussion on postcolonial society I will mainly focus on the case of Hong Kong as an example for illustrating a complex and contested political environment in teaching civic values via informal settings. Before that a working conception of deliberative democracy is needed in order to grasp its philosophical essence. <u>Deliberative Democracy</u> as Ideal for Civic Education Citizenship education in a liberal pluralist society concerns the relevant knowledge of a democratic community and aims at fostering civic virtues of commitment to a democratic polity. In other words, it <u>emphasizes the civic participation of citizens and their required education</u>. The deliberative turn in democratic theory that emerged mostly in the 1990s can be seen as a response to the increasing demand for the political participation of citizens. <u>Deliberative democracy addresses the legitimacy issue of lawmaking through the **public deliberation of citizens**</u>. It also presents an ideal of political autonomy based on practical reasoning of participatory citizens seen as a way to attain rational legislation, participatory politics, self-governance, and even accommodation of moral differences (Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). Deliberation here means a social process that is distinguished from other forms of communication. During the process of deliberation, people can propose ideas and listen to each other"s opinions. It is also an interaction that allows for changes in judgments and preferences throughout the whole process. In this sense, deliberative democracy is a model, which objects to seeing democracy as consisting merely in voting or the aggregation of citizens" preferences; it also rejects the definition that confines democracy to simply constitutionalism. Instead, <u>deliberative democracy encourages the political participation of citizens and proclaims „the authenticity of democracy" --- a substantive democratic control by „competent citizens</u>" (Dryzek, 2000). Nowadays, in real politics, some political institutions have been developed in the name of deliberative democracy, such as deliberative polls, citizens" juries, consensus conferences, and national issues forums (Goodin, 2008). Deliberative democracy is not only an ideal proposal by political philosophers; it has been gradually implemented in some of our ordinary political practices. As citizenship education aims at promoting active civic participation, deliberative democracy should become its ideal form of democratic citizenship that educational theorists apply. It carries robust moral salience for educating democratic citizen. Deliberative democracy in its ideal form can foster democratic life in at least three ways. First, the reason-giving character of deliberative democracy can enhance citizens" understanding of public debates through information sharing and public deliberation. <u>Reasoning and arguments are appreciated during the process of deliberation</u> (Cohen, 2009). In an ideal speech situation, public deliberation is free from coercion, distortion, deception, and manipulation; that is, to use another Habermasian term, a „lifeworld" would be formed where free and equal citizens can take part in public affairs with a sense of communicative rationality. <u>An ideal formulation of deliberative democracy resembles the lifeworld, in which democracy would be enriched with communicative actions through the public deliberation of reasonable citizens</u> (Habermas, 1996). In this sense, <u>democracy cannot be simply reduced to voting</u>; and voting itself is not merely a means for aggregating private interests, as we can, ideally, see the reasons behind each preference. The reason giving character and the communicative features embedded in deliberative democracy promote an educative environment for citizens to respect reasons and practices acting as politically autonomous participants. Secondly, <u>deliberative democracy can help to promote **social justice**</u>. Public deliberation can efficiently expose how certain preferences are potentially linked to <u>sectional interests</u>, as <u>public deliberation is **more capable of comprehending complex problems** than individual contemplation</u>. Citizens can figure out those partial interests underlying specific preferences and seek those that represent the interests of many (Held, 2006: 237-8). As <u>deliberation</u> enhances better understanding of arguments and reasoning (see above), it <u>could</u> help to <u>build up a more open, fair and dynamic platform for collective reasoning</u>. Public reasons prevailing through public deliberation are those could pass the scrutiny of common goods and public interests. In this regard, the requirement of transparency generates a sense of impartiality among deliberative participants. Public deliberation thus helps transcend the language of interest to the language of reason (Elster, 1998: 101-5). In deliberative context, the outcome can sometimes be shaped independently of the motives of participants, since there are powerful norms to oppose the appeal to interest or prejudice (Elster, 1998: 104). <u>Citizens and politicians are required to justify their proposals by public interest</u>. Deliberation is not only a form of information exchange, but also a process of justification and presentation of reasoning on various public proposals and opinions in order to maintain a just

society. Third, deliberative democracy requires a communal setting for a realization of fair public interaction among free and equal citizens. In this particular public setting for deliberation, given under fair conditions, citizens are encouraged to develop a sense of justice, by which they can take part in deliberation in accordance with public reasons that all are expected to follow. The effect of this communal setting of public deliberation is also, it is argued, to cultivate citizens with a sense of belonging and caring about other fellow citizens. The more they practise discussion, debate, negotiation, and interaction in public deliberation, the more citizens will come to acknowledge the virtues of accommodation of differences. Deliberative democracy, as both the ideal of democratic citizenship and the method of collective decision-making, requires individuals to always be responsive to other"s interests and needs. Talking cannot always settle disputes, but it helps us to clarify things and to put ourselves into others shoes. By knowing more about each other"s positions, we can develop codes of mutual respect in public forum. The essentiality of reciprocity is a top priority of democratic civility in deliberative political settings; and the sense of justice and of belonging and caring all help consolidate the reciprocal mindset of citizens. Deliberative democracy, apart from legitimizing collective decision and promoting social justice, cultivates reciprocal citizens who acquire liberal civility and duty that enhance their willingness to accommodate moral differences (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In a nutshell, deliberative democracy aims at strengthening the legitimacy of democratic decision-making procedures by the input of deliberative elements in the life of public participation. Citizens thus cannot simply state their preferences in public dialogues; they have to be prepared to provide reasons and arguments in supporting their points of view. Political deliberation is an ideal, that is, it is a circumstance where citizens are free from distortion, manipulation, coercion, strategizing or bargaining in motivating rationality and arguments (Cohen, 1989: 22-26). Deliberative democracy therefore offers free and equal citizens a way of dealing with moral disagreement about public affairs. It prescribes a set of principles on fair terms of cooperation that could enhance the accountability and legitimacy of decision-making for public affairs (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). A new paradigm of citizenship education should, I argue, follow this shift of democratic theory to fit in with the account and the requirement of implementing deliberative democracy.

Surveillance Deliberation

Deliberation is critical to resolving pressing issues of the status quo

Rask and Worthington 15 (Mikko Rask, Senior Researcher, National Consumer Reserch Centre in Finland, Richard Worthington, Professor of Politics at Pomona College, "Governing Biodiversity through Democratic Deliberation," 2015)//ghs-VA

'Deliberation' is a term used extensively in democratic theory and environmental governance, referring to the style and nature of problem-solving through communication and collective consideration of relevant issues.6 Deliberation welcomes different types of argumentation and communication such as exchanging observations, weighing and balancing arguments, providing reflections and associations and setting facts into a contextual perspective (Renn 2008: 285). Due to its emphasis on **argumentation** and public dialogue, deliberation is often characterized as a 'talk-centric' rather than 'vote-centric' approach to decision making (Chambers. 2003). Increased public deliberation on political matters is also seen as a way to complement and deepen practices of representative and direct democracy, which are minimalist in the sense that they tend to offer a role for the average citizens merely as a voter, who influences public policy issues rarely, perhaps once in two or four years, when parliamentary or congressional elections take place. As for 'deliberative democracy', it can be understood as a political orientation that aims at deepening democracy by enhancing the discursive quality and effectiveness of collective decision making. Supporters of deliberative democracy perceive severe problems in the established institutions of representative and direct democracy, such as the superficiality of political discussion, non-transparency of decision making and selfishness in the definition of political interests (Held, 2006). Celebrity politics, disclosure of mass surveillance and government secrecy by whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden or Julien Assange, and widespread political corruption are examples of these problems. To remedy them, the supporters of **deliberative democracy call for more informed dialogue, public reasoning, and objective weighing of political matters** (Held, 2006).

Civic Education Impact

Deliberation is key to revitalizing democracy

Kavanaugh et al 6 (Andrea L. Kavanaugh, Philip L. Isenhour Matthew Cooper, John M. Carroll, Mary Beth Rosson, Joseph Schmitz, Virginia Tech, USA, Pennsylvania State University, USA, Western Illinois University, "Information Technology in Support of Public Deliberation," 2006, http://www.sozioinformatik.org/fileadmin/IISI/upload/C_T/2005/Paper1C_T2005.pdf)//ghs-VA

Civic Participation and Social Ties Civic participation encompasses a broad range of basic rights, duties and responsibilities (e.g., Davis and Fernlund, 1991). Duties of citizens are not voluntary and include attending school, obeying laws and paying taxes. In contrast, basic rights and responsibilities are voluntary and include voting, holding elected office, influencing government, practicing one's own religion, expressing what one thinks in speech and in writing, attending public meetings, serving the community, and contributing to the common good (e.g., helping neighbors and fellow citizens). It is crucial that citizens read, write, and **evaluate political arguments** if they are to participate in democratic decision-making processes. The aspiration for an informed, engaged populace is one of the most constant elements of democracy in America (Dahl, 1989, and others). The requirements and consequences of public education with an attendant freeing of minds underlie the protections of free speech (Meikeljohn, 1948). Democratic theory typically envisions a system of government designed to foster deliberation just as much as it is to enhance participation (Schudson, 1992). **Deliberation differs from participation** in that it involves more public discussion, negotiation, prioritizing, consensus building, and agenda setting (Barber, 1984; Coleman and Gotze, 2002; Coleman, 2003). It is a multifaceted group process, one that typically occurs in public spaces, such as voluntary associations and public meetings that transpire in what Oldenburg (1991) characterizes as "Great Good Places." For most people, citizenship is not this multifaceted and active (Pateman, 1970; Verba and Nie, 1972; Milbraith and Goel, 1982; White, 2001). Few citizens participate actively in political processes, as indicated by low voter turn out and other civic engagement indicators such as those itemized by Putnam (2000), and others. Classical political theory posits that our democratic system of government works despite ill-informed and inactive citizens. According to elite theories of democracy, this successful functioning derives from the active, well informed, participation of a minority of citizens - often referred to as political 'elites' (Lasswell, 1948; Fishkin, 1991; Bottomore; 1965; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). People who belong to multiple groups act as bridging ties across groups (Simmel [1908]; Wolf, 1950; Wellman, 1988) and contribute towards 'bridging' types of social capital (Putnam, 2000) - or what Granovetter (1973) calls weak social ties. Bridging (or weak) ties increase the pace and flow of information and ideas throughout a community. Citizen engagement tends to be higher in communities that have dense social networks, high levels of trust and both 'bridging' (across groups) and 'bonding' (within groups) types of social capital (or what Fischer (2001) and others refer to as 'in-bound social networks'. When people with bridging ties use communication media, such as the Internet, they enhance their capability to educate community members and organize for collective action. Communities with a rich organizational life (i.e., numerous voluntary associations) provide many opportunities for bridging social capital to develop and grow. Nie, Powell, and Prewitt (1969) found that along with social class (high SES), rich organizational life represents the economic development component that most strongly affects mass political participation. Groups educate members, both cognitively and experientially, and generate satisfaction (or spur opposition) to political action, especially in local politics (Newton, 1997). Presently, the capability of Internet technology to facilitate deliberation is much less clear than its capability to facilitate participation - more private, passive, and individual activities. Keeping informed and participating take time, a scarce resource for the better educated, political elites and for the general populace. Much evidence suggests that the Internet can alleviate constraints of time by providing anytime/anywhere information and discussion. For these and other reasons, the Internet may serve as a medium with great potential to revive civic participation (Milbraith and Goel, 1977; Barber et al., 1997; Davis and Owen, 1998; Wilhelm, 2000; Norris, 2001; Horrigan, Garrett and Resnick, 2004).

Neolib Good

Enviornment

Neoliberalism is inevitable

Smith 12 "Candace, writer for the sociology lens"A Brief explanation of neoliberalism and its consequences", http://thesocietypages.org/sociologylens/2012/10/02/a-brief-examination-of-neoliberalism-and-its-consequences/".CC

Starting in the second half of the 20th century, neoliberalism became increasingly prominent as a form of governance in countries around the world (Peters 2001). Originally, the roots of neoliberalism were planted by a classical political economy theory which advocated for markets (and thus people) to be completely liberated from any type of governmental interference (Smith 2009). "**Free" competition and "free" enterprise were promoted as manners in which economies should be allowed to grow**. Martinez and García (2000) contend that this "liberal" type of economic theory began to be adopted in the West throughout the 1800s and into the early part of the 1900s. The Great Depression of the 1930s and the development of Keynesian economics, though, temporarily slowed down the advancement of liberal economics. In recent decades, however, there has been a revival of economic liberalism (or, neoliberalism) on a truly global level as countries around the world now either choose or are forced to engage in neoliberal governance. As a result of the growing hegemonic prominence of neoliberalism, there have been vast changes at the national-level, the international-level, and the individual-level. At the national-level, neoliberal ideas have drastically changed how states operate. By heavily promoting market-based economies that highly value competition and efficiency, neoliberalism has moved countries closer to adopting social Darwinism. Under Thatcher and Reagan, for instance, Peters (2001) argues that neoliberalism directly led to the economic liberalization/rationalization of the state, the restructuring of state sectors, and the dismantling of the welfare state. As a consequence of these changes, the U.S. and the U.K. have seen things like the abolishment of subsidies and tariffs, the corporatization and privatization of state trading departments, a sustained attack on unions, and the individualization of health, welfare, and education. Although the idea that markets should fully dictate governments would have seemed ludicrous in prior decades (George 1999), Bourdieu (1999b) contends that neoliberalism as a form of national governance has become a doxa, or an unquestioned and simply accepted worldview. Harvey (2005) is thus not surprised that the ideas of capitalism have been infused into political, social, and cultural institutions at the state-level. By placing a mathematical quality on social life (Bourdieu 1999a), neoliberalism has encouraged formerly autonomous states to regress into penal states that value production, competition, and profit above all else, including social issues. At the international-level, George (1999) argues that neoliberals have focused on three primary points: free trade in goods and services, free circulation of capital, and freedom of investments. Thus, neoliberal globalization means that there has been an emphasis placed on exchanges across national borders, financialization, and the development of international organizations as well as a transnational civil society (Bandelj, Shorette, and Sowers 2011). With the help of the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, George contends that advocates of neoliberalism have essentially forced many countries to accept this framework. Such acceptance means that more states are now tacitly agreeing to promote the rule of the market, severely cut public expenditures, reduce governmental regulation, and embrace the concept of individuality even if this means casting millions (if not billions) of people aside and regarding them as "losers" in a zero-sum game (Martinez and García 2000). By adopting such an economic worldview, George warns that it is likely that the North-South gap and global inequality are likely to become more exaggerated in the years to come. Because neoliberalism leads to the globalization of financial markets (Bourdieu 1999a), it can further be expected that economic crises—built on the backs of short-sided neoliberal policies—will become more common and catastrophic. At the individual-level, neoliberalism insists that rationality, individuality, and self-interest guide all actions (Peters 2001). In fact, neoliberalism often views itself as a global social science capable of explaining all human behavior since all behavior is thought to be directed by logical, individualistic, and selfish goals. Neoliberalism's focus on the individual means that ideas related to things such as "the public good" and "the community" are now being discarded as unnecessary components of a welfare state (Martinez and García 2000). Unsurprisingly, then, unemployment, inequality, and poverty have become increasingly blamed on individuals rather than on structural constraints (Passas 2000). Because we are turning away from the role of the community and instead focusing solely on individuals, Bourdieu (1999a) contends that social problems like suicide, alcoholism, depression, and domestic violence will consequently become increasingly prominent. Still, the outward attractiveness of individual freedom, prosperity, and growth makes it challenging for the public to realize that neoliberalism is designed to benefit only a very small class of people (Harvey 2005). Such a worldview also makes it easier to justify the thought that some people are deserving of much more than others because, after all, it is a common refrain that we are all responsible for our own destinies. Source: Stefan Kühn As can be seen from this brief description of neoliberalism and its repercussions, this ideology has led to many changes at the state-level, the international-level, and the individual-level. Such changes include the dismantling of the welfare state, the growing reality of global inequality, and the individualization of all actions. In spite of such negative outcomes, George (1999) argues that **the hegemonic nature of neoliberalism makes it seem like the only possible economic and social order available. As a true doxa, neoliberalism has become an unquestioned reality as it now seems almost logical that the markets should be the allocators of resources, that competition should be the primary driver of innovation, and that societies should be composed of individuals primarily motivated by economic conditions (Coburn 2000). Against the onslaught of neoliberal ideals, some scholars such as Bourdieu and Harvey have argued that the**

populace must rise up and resist this ideology. With the effectiveness with which neoliberals have pushed forward their ideas, though, such an uprising seems unlikely at least in the near future.

Neoliberalism solves for poverty and income inequality, neoliberalism manifests itself in different forms Europe proves

Summer 10' " Scott, Scott Sumner is a professor of economics at Bentley University in Waltham, Massachusetts. He earned his Ph.D. in economics at the University of Chicago in 1985, "The unacknowledged success of neoliberalism, http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2010/Sumnerneoliberalism.html".CC

The neoliberal policy revolution that began in the late 1970s might be the most important recent event in world history. But it remains a curiously elusive and underreported phenomenon. Many on the left question the motives behind the reforms, as well as their efficacy, while some on the right talk as if the neoliberal revolution never happened. Yet, **the neoliberal revolution has been widespread and highly successful. And the motives of neoliberal reforms are much purer than one would imagine** after reading left-wing criticisms of free-market reforms. First, to understand what neoliberalism it, we need to start with the term "liberal." The best way to make sense of liberalism, in all its permutations, is to assume that liberals are people with constantly evolving policy views but relatively stable utilitarian values. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, idealistic utilitarian reformers, aka "classical liberals," believed that free-market capitalism was the best way to improve human welfare. Views shifted over the course of the 19th century, as capitalism was increasingly associated, whether accurately or not, with overly-powerful corporations and increasing inequality. After the Great Depression, many liberals saw laissez-faire not just as unfair, but also as dysfunctional. In the United States, self-described "liberals" moved toward somewhat more socialist policy views. Modern liberalism (or social democracy outside the United States) reached its peak between the 1930s and 1970s. The policy mix included a great deal of statism (barriers to trade, price controls, high marginal tax rates (MTRs) and government ownership of industry), as well as greatly increased government spending, especially in government transfer programs. Then, beginning in the late 1970s, there was a sudden and dramatic shift away from one aspect of socialism—statist policies were discarded and free markets came back into vogue. However, there was no significant reduction in government spending: In most countries, the government's share of GDP has been fairly stable in recent decades. The neoliberal revolution combines the free markets of classical liberalism with the income transfers of modern liberalism. Although this somewhat oversimplifies a complex reality, it broadly describes the policy changes that have transformed the world economy since 1975. **Markets in almost every country are much freer than in 1980; the government owns a smaller share of industry**; and the top MTRs on personal and corporate income are sharply lower. The United States, starting from a less-socialist position, has been affected less than some other countries. But even in the United States there have been neoliberal reforms in four major areas: deregulation of prices and market access, sharply lower MTRs on high-income people, freer trade, and welfare reform. Many other countries saw even greater neoliberal policy reforms, as once-numerous state-owned enterprises were mostly privatized. **There is an unfortunate tendency to associate the term "neoliberal" with right-wing political views. In fact, the quite liberal social democracies of northern Europe have been among the most aggressive neoliberal reformers**. Indeed, according to the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom**, Denmark** is the freest economy in the world in the average of the eight categories unrelated to size of government.1 **The Nordic countries2** have begun to privatize many activities that government still performs in the United States. These include passenger rail, airports, air-traffic control, highways, postal services, fire departments, water systems, and public schools, among many others. These countries do have much larger and more comprehensive income-transfer programs than the United States has, but are not otherwise particularly socialist. So why is the left so skeptical of the neoliberal revolution? And why does the right tend to overlook it, except for the obvious cases, such as the collapse of communism? Many on the left are skeptical about how much freer markets have actually achieved. Part of this skepticism reflects the slowdown in worldwide growth since 1973. Because almost all countries instituted at least some reforms, and yet growth slowed in most countries, there is a tendency to assume that the reforms failed. Others point to well-publicized fiascos in electricity and banking deregulation and assume that these represent the broader reality. On the right, many American economists focus on the failure of Reaganomics to reduce the size of government, as well as on increased regulation in areas such as health, safety, and the environment, while the so-called "economic regulations" were trimmed back. Paul Krugman, one of the most forceful advocates of the view that neoliberal reforms in the United States caused economic growth to slow, wrote: Basically, US postwar economic history falls into two parts: an era of high taxes on the rich and extensive regulation, during which living standards experienced extraordinary growth; and an era of low taxes on the rich and deregulation, during which living standards for most Americans rose fitfully at best.3 Because economic growth slowed almost everywhere after 1973, however, we need to look at relative economic performance in order to identify the effect of neoliberal policy reforms. The following data show per capita income in terms of purchasing power parity [PPP].4 All data are from the World Bank and are expressed as a ratio to U.S. per capita income: Note that four countries gained significantly on the United States, two were roughly stable (Australia and Japan) and the rest regressed. The four that gained were Chile, Britain, Hong Kong and Singapore. Of course, many poor countries also gained on the United States, but that's to be expected. As we will see, the relative performance of each of these economies is consistent with the view that neoliberal policies promote economic growth. Britain: At the time Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979, decades of statist policies had turned Britain into the sick man of Europe. The government owned the big manufacturing firms in industries such as autos and steel. The top individual MTRs on income were 83 percent on "earned income" and an eye-popping 98 percent on income from capital. Frequent labor strikes paralyzed transportation and led to garbage piling up in the streets of London. Much of the housing stock was government-owned. Britain had

lagged other European economies for decades, growing far more slowly than most economies on the continent. Thatcher's reforms were among the most comprehensive in the world, and by the mid-1980s, Britain was growing faster than the other major European economies. By 2008, it had a higher per capita income than Germany, France, and Italy. United States: The United States was doing better than Britain in 1980, but not particularly well. We had also been growing much more slowly than Europe and Japan. Unlike Britain, we were still richer than most other developed countries, and so many people viewed this convergence as partly inevitable (the catch-up from World War II) and partly reflective of the superior economic model of the Germans and Japanese. It was widely expected that Japan and Germany would eventually surpass the United States in per capita GDP. Paul Samuelson claimed in 1973 that Soviet GDP might surpass U.S. GDP as soon as 1990.5 Obviously none of this happened, and **by the 1990s, the United States was growing faster than most major European economies**. Australia: A traditionally rich country whose commodity export model started to sputter in the 1970s, Australia began free-market reforms in the 1980s (under a left-wing government) and accelerated the reforms after the conservatives took power in 1996. After 1994, Australia's relative decline reversed. Japan: Japan is just the opposite of Australia. Its free-market export model did very well in the post-war years and didn't hit a wall until about 1990. After that, domestic growth sputtered as Japan's dysfunctional government refused to reform its statist domestic economy. Hong Kong and Singapore: These two countries top most surveys of "economic freedom" (which include size of government.) Both are in the process of becoming much richer than the United States. Some of that is due to their status as city-states. But even in larger developed economies, the population is mainly urban, and so Hong Kong's and Singapore's success is due to more than just demographics. Canada: Canada is similar to Australia, except that it was not as statist as Australia in the earlier period, and its reforms occurred in the 1990s, when Canada began shrinking the size of government as a share of GDP, after having, in 1988, adopted free trade with the United States. These reforms were successful, as its decline relative to the United States was reversed, and Canada started catching up after 1994. France and Germany: Both passed some reforms, but much less than Britain. They suffered a decline relative to both Britain and the United States. Note that the German data for the whole time period include the East, so their relative decline cannot be explained by the 1990 absorption of that less-productive region. Italy: Italy instituted a few reforms, but has a significantly more statist model than most of Western Europe. Italy fell far behind Britain. Sweden: Sweden had a bad recession in the early 1990s after having suffered decades of relative decline. It made major cuts in MTRs, privatized, and deregulated during the 1990s, and its relative performance improved after those reforms. Switzerland: Switzerland has always been regarded as one of the most capitalist countries in Western Europe, but has also been among the least aggressive countries in terms of neoliberal reforms. That pattern would predict high levels of GDP/person, but relative decline vis-à-vis the United States And that is exactly what has occurred. What about in the developing world? Even most progressives concede that India has benefited by moving away from the "License Raj," the term used to describe the morass of controls and regulations facing anyone who wanted to start or run a business. There's even less controversy about China's abandonment of Maoism after 1979. But there is controversy about the impact of neoliberalism in middle-income regions such as Latin America. Once again, here's Paul Krugman: Latin Americans are the most disillusioned. Through much of the 1990's, they bought into the "Washington consensus"—which we should note came from Clinton administration officials as well as from Wall Street economists and conservative think tanks—which said that privatization, deregulation and free trade would lead to economic takeoff. Instead, growth remained sluggish, inequality increased, and the region was struck by a series of economic crises.6 It's certainly true that neoliberal reforms have not worked miracles in Latin America. But a major part of the reason is that despite reforms such as trade liberalization, most economies in that region remain strikingly statist. Among Latin American nations, Chile has by far the best record of neoliberal reforms. It ranks tenth on the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom and is the only Latin American country, other than St. Lucia, to make the top 30. In contrast, Argentina ranks 135th. Chilean incomes were barely half those of Argentineans in 1980, but by 2008, Chile had actually become slightly richer. Argentina did some neoliberal reforms in the early 1990s and grew rapidly between 1991 and 1998. But Argentina slipped into a highly deflationary monetary policy in the late 1990s. The resulting depression led to a backlash against neoliberalism, and a more left-wing government moved Argentina back toward statism after 2002. One lesson of both Argentina after 1998 and the United States after 1929 is that even a fairly efficient free-market economy cannot easily adapt to deflationary monetary policies. Other critics of neoliberalism point to the discouraging economic situation in the former Soviet bloc. While the performance has been disappointing, the critics often overlook two important considerations. First, the entire Soviet bloc experienced a severe depression in the late 1980s and early 1990s**, even before economic reforms had begun in most areas. (The reforms began in 1992 in Russia.) Second, economic growth tended to be higher in areas that reformed most rapidly and lowest in areas that remained unreformed.** Estonia did better than Russia, which did better than the Ukraine. The one communist country that adopted no reforms (North Korea) saw an almost-complete collapse of its economy during the 1990s. The preceding examples suggest one aspect of the neoliberal revolution that is often overlooked. By the 1970s, growth was slowing sharply almost everywhere, which led Margaret Thatcher to proclaim: "There is no alternative." Britain did not grow significantly faster after the Thatcher reforms, but did overtake Western European countries that reformed their economies less aggressively. Interestingly, academics were often the last to understand what was going on. In 1981, 364 British economists signed a petition7 warning that Thatcher's polices would fail. But, by the 1990s, there was a sort of tacit understanding8 among policy-oriented economists that **when countries get into trouble, market reforms are the only real option.** Indeed, the term "economic reform" became almost synonymous with "market reforms." **Although the dispute over neoliberalism is often characterized in left/right terms, that characterization is misleading. Neoliberal reforms occurred in nearly every country during the 1980s and 1990s, regardless** of whether a left- or right-wing **government** was in office. A few years ago, I researched9 the relationship between cultural attitudes and neoliberal reforms among the developed countries. It turns out that, between 1980 and 2005, those countries with more idealistic or civic-minded cultures (as indicated by surveys on attitudes toward the common good and by indices of corruption10) tended to reform their economies much more rapidly than

countries with less civic-minded attitudes.11 Interestingly, Denmark has by far the most civic-minded culture in the group of 32 developed countries, and, as noted above, ended up with the least statist economic system in the Heritage's 2008 rankings (excluding the two size-of-government categories). Greece has the least civic-minded attitudes and ended up with the most statist economy in 2008. Far from being a right-wing plot to enrich corporations, the neoliberal revolution was liberal in the truest sense of the term: a rational response by idealistic policymakers to the increasingly obvious failure of statist economic models in the 1970s and 1980s. So far, I have focused on the move away from statism and haven't addressed the long-term viability of the welfare state. Here, the evidence is mixed. It is true that governments in rich countries tend to spend a higher share of GDP than governments of poorer countries. On the one hand, fans of the welfare state point to the relatively high living standards **in places like Sweden and Denmark,** which **have extensive income transfers and low income inequality. On the other hand, both of those countries have been aggressive neoliberal reformers, and so part of their success is despite their high tax burdens.** Figure 1. Economic Freedom Figure 1. Economic FreedomZOOM There is some evidence that the high-tax European model may eventually lose out to the low-tax/high-saving economy, the kind one observes in Singapore. The graph in Figure 1 shows the relationship between per capita GDP and the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom, including size of government. I included all sizable countries with GDPs exceeding $23,000/person (PPP), except for a few small Middle Eastern oil producers and Luxembourg (which was literally off the charts). There are two obvious outliers. Norway, the highest-income country, is much richer than other countries with similar levels of economic freedom, and New Zealand, at 80 on the economic freedom scale and only $27,260 in per capita income (US PPP dollars), is somewhat poorer than expected. Norway's position is almost certainly attributable to its vast oil wealth. Perhaps New Zealand's disappointing performance is due to its remote location and its comparative advantage in agriculture holding it back in an increasingly globalized economy in which many governments subsidize farming. But other than those two exceptions, there is a close relationship between economic freedom and income per capita. Although developed countries tend to have large governments, the very richest have smaller governments than the next tier. The lowest tier consists of relatively statist economies such as Greece. And the wealth gaps are set to widen over time. Countries with relatively small government sectors, such as the United States, Australia and Canada, are expected12 to modestly outgrow Western Europe and Japan over the next few years, even in per-capita terms. And extremely low-tax Singapore and Hong Kong are likely to dramatically outperform Western Europe and Japan. For a podcast with Scott Sumner on neoliberalism, see Sumner on Growth and Economic Policy. EconTalk, June 21, 2010. Singapore is able to combine universal health care with extremely low taxes and large budget surpluses. The government does this by requiring workers to self-insure for retirement, unemployment and non-catastrophic medical expenses. **This economic model provides much greater incentives for wealth creation a**nd may explain why Singapore leads the world in millionaires per capita (roughly 11 percent of the population and rising fast13). As Europe struggles with its enormous public-debt challenges, this sort of small government/high-saving model will look increasingly attractive.

The Free market is the best way to solve for climate change EU exchange proves

Pandit et al 13' "Gbenga Ibikunle, Andros Gregoriou, Naresh R. Pandit.University of Edinburgh. "Free market is best way to combat climate change, study suggests." ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 15 July 2013. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/07/130715105429.htm.CC

Researchers who monitored the effectiveness of the European Climate Exchange (ECX) -- the world's biggest carbon trading platform -- found it to be as efficient as Europe's two biggest exchanges, the London Stock Exchange and the Euronext Paris. Using free market platforms like the ECX to combat climate change could provide the basis for the introduction of a mandatory emissions cap and trade scheme worldwide. The report found that the value of the trades on the ECX were higher after the market closed, a sign of growing sophistication within platforms. It means that trades were made with greater confidence based upon increasingly detailed information. Researchers said there are also signs of maturity based on increased liquidity -- the immediate availability of a party to trade with -- and price efficiency, which means all available information is incorporated into prices so they are traded in a relatively transparent manner. The ECX was created by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) in 2005 to help the European Union (EU) achieve its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce carbon emissions. **The EU set limits and issued permits for how much carbon firms could emit into the atmosphere. If companies exceed their limit, they incur regulatory penalties. To avoid this, the EU-ETS allows firms with high emissions to buy the permits of other companies on platforms such as the ECX. By creating a market, it gave firms a financial incentive to reduce their carbon emissions. Researchers said that changes are needed to ensure the EU-ETS survives Europe's economic downturn. Since the study appears to confirm the ECX's effectiveness, researchers say the EU-ETS should be allowed to self-adjust emission caps in reaction to changes in the Eurozone's fortunes and industrial production.** Gbenga Ibikunle, from the University of Edinburgh Business School, said: "While individual responsibility for combating climate change is important, much needs to be done to incentivise companies -- especially those who emit most of the world's carbon -- to cut back too. **This study shows that free market mechanisms such as the EU-ETS can be effective in doing that. Several other schemes around the world are already learning from this and adopting it as a model."**

Market based incentives solve for the environment by commodifying nature it allows for better cost benefit analysis

Plastow 10 "Robert, Neoliberalism in environmental governance: a paradoxical double Movement, Working for the Centre for Ecology and Conservation at the University of Exeter, file:///C:/Users/Conner/Downloads/Neoliberalism_in_environmental_goverance_-_Plastow_2010.pdf".CC

For proponents of neoliberalism**, the market is seen not only as the governing mechanism for allocating all goods and services but also as a way of understanding the organisation and evaluation of institutional performance, necessitating the commodification of everything,** (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). However, Benton sees a clash between economic and ecological rationalities in that it makes good commercial sense for firms to externalise production costs, which is ecologically irrational, (Benton, 1991; Castree, 2008). The externalities created by production, pass the environmental costs onto society and the biophysical world, creating an ecological contradiction that sees neoliberal capitalism gnawing away at the resource base that supports it, (O'Connor, 1998; Pepper, 1993). Hence, it is argued, that without sufficient self-regulation by firms or states, capitalist societies will continue to create ecological crises, (Castree, 2008; O'Connor, 1998**). However, by making firms internalise externalities, in other words making the polluter pay, marketbased instruments provide an incentive for innovation of new technologies and are therefore more cost-effective than traditional regulation**, (Jordan et al, 2003). It is hoped that "through efficiency gains and better management, private companies will be able to lower prices, improve performance, and increase cost recovery, enabling systems to be upgraded and expanded", (Bakker, 2007: 437). **By encoding the natural world as a form of the economic world, cost-benefit analysis and market criteria can be applied to decision-making processes**, (Lemke, 2001), within the dominant, hegemonic discourse of neoliberal capitalism. This commodification of nature, or its neoliberalisation (Castree, 2008), requires the creation of new marketable property rights, "employing markets as allocation mechanisms, and incorporating environmental externalities through pricing", **then, as a result of the economic-rationality of neoliberalism: "environmental goods will be more efficiently allocated if treated as economic goods—thereby simultaneously addressing concerns over environmental degradation and inefficient use of resources**", (Bakker, 2007: 434).

Neolib will on become more entrenched in the immediate future the perm solves because we must engage in neoliberal logic in order to further the goals of the alternative

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Through its commodification, nature under neoliberalism is also subject to a restructuring of social relations, much in the same way as classical liberalism led to the enclosing of the commons to "facilitate the development of increasingly capitalist, export oriented farming operations", (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004: 277). Lockeian perspectives on the (neo)liberalisation of nature therefore look at the way it imagines and legitimates particular social orders, (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004: 277). Just as the enclosures created struggle in which a new class structure was formed largely by access to land, so too may the commodification of nature and the private property rights that ensue, have similar effects. **This change in social relations with nature is a result of the ideological power of neoliberal capitalism which "drives the politics, economics and culture of the world system**, providing the context and direction for how humans affect and interact with non-human nature and with one another.", (Heynen and Robbins, 2005: 5). This ideology has pervaded throughout modern Western living and its power is evident, paradoxically, in its seeming elusiveness as neoliberal capitalist projects have "successfully masqueraded as a set of objective, natural, and technocratic truisms", (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004: 276). Despite the objection of many in the environmental movement over the last thirty years to the effects of the change in social relations to nature – criticism being mainly born out of a more eco-centric perspective - the neoliberalisation of nature as a means to conserve it can be seen as a turn in thinking towards a more anthropocentric environmentalism

perhaps because of the force which Noel Castree describes as **"what economic sociologists are wont to call `path dependency', in simple terms, the sheer inertia of existing arrangements, [which] means that, in many situations, specific modalities of neoliberalism will not only cling on but, possibly, become further entrenched in the immediate future",** (Castree, 2009: 1788-1789). **Ultimately, neoliberalism is the most powerful ideological and political project in global governance today**, (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). **It is therefore important to engage with it as it permeates different scales and dimensions, often setting the conditions for discussion itself as "contemporary politics revolve around axes the very essences of which have been neoliberalized...[neoliberal rule systems] have the capacity to constrain, condition, and constitute political change and institutional reform in far-reaching and multifaceted ways**" (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 400-401).

Neoliberalism is the best system for solving for the pollution and carbon levels in the developing world it creates the most innovative and sustainable technologies

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Government is also seen to benefit and make political gains by using such new environmental policy instruments, as they cut public expenditure for environmental management and open up trade and investment, (Jordan et al, 2003), which encourages the eternal quest for the political holy grail of economic growth. This is also politically attractive to Third Way governments of the rollout period as the state does not have to interfere in all aspects of society unless justifiable and less politically contentious, such as in cases of taxing environmental 'bads' to provide social 'goods', (Jordan et al, 2003: 14**). In addition, voluntary agreements encourage industry to adopt a more proactive attitude to environmental protection, spurred on by cost efficiency and the potentially quicker achievement of policy goals**, (Jordan et al, 2003: 13**). Such agreements are used to reduce the expense and political difficulty of domestic emission reductions, (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). As a result offsetting purportedly leads to an expansion of the market that provides cheaper alternatives in the developing world where faster and larger reductions in carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere are possible as well as the potential sustainable development implications and technology transfer of projects to poor communities** (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008: 148). However, the political economy of offsetting produces inequality across geographies and raises ethical issues of responsibility around the producer company or country and their behaviour in the first place, (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008: 147-148). Not just in offsetting but in criticism of neoliberalism as a whole, environmentalists note the importance social justice has to impede the neoliberal conquest of nature, which is based on rising tides lifting all boats and the indefinite growth of the economy, (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). This is because neoliberalisation necessitates an act of dispossession with negative distributive consequences, (Bakker, 2007: 437), often favouring ruling elites, (Wolford, 2005). This happens locally and internationally, as neoliberal reform has shown in, for example, Latin America, where there has been an internationalisation as part of the process of engaging in global economics. This is rooted in the formation of trans-national class alliances among elites whose shared interest is the maximization of international investment, regardless of where they come from, (Glassman, 1999).

Deregulation of the market and the decentralization of government increases democracy and opens authoritarian regimes to more governance and creates different forms of how and where regulation comes

Plastow 10 "Robert, Neoliberalism in environmental governance: a paradoxical double Movement, Working for the Centre for Ecology and Conservation at the University of Exeter, file:///C:/Users/Conner/Downloads/Neoliberalism_in_environmental_goverance_-_Plastow_2010.pdf".CC

Extending from this perspective, **neoliberalism offers up the market as an alternative to the state's regulatory function. This view denies** Karl **Polanyi's contention that markets are not self-regulating,** (1944), and is of serious concern in light of the recent banking crisis, which has seen massive state intervention supportive of the Keynesian welfarism that neoliberalism has spent the last thirty years dismantling. Castree argues that the main threat to neoliberalism is the potential inadequate management of the economic-environmental relationship when left to firms and civil society groups, (Castree, 2008: 149). Furthermore, **although the deregulation proposed in the neoliberal model strips away state regulation to provide a freer market, market-oriented approaches are still subject to regulation albeit in different terms as the state does not withdraw but changes its interaction with citizens and corporations,** (Bakker, 2003: Mansfield, 2007). The state then takes on a role within which it steps in now and then to help facilitate the market and provide an international, legalistic administrative role by negotiating free-trade agreements and so forth. Therefore, fr**om a legal point of view markets cannot exist without the external intervention of the state, (**Brenner and Theodore, 2002a; Peck and Tickell, 2002). This arrangement is aptly termed reregulation as opposed to the purported deregulation, as markets still operate subject to rules (Mansfield, 2007). In practice, however, **the ideal state behaviour is not as clear cut as the neoliberal philosophy would suggest; the state still retains responsibility to mediate the relationship between the economy, civil society and the natural environment**, (Castree, 2008**). Neoliberalism instead emphasises decentralisation of government, which in many cases can improve governance and promote democratisation in countries where such notions have been weak; at the same time it also opens up "economically competitive subnational spaces ripe for transnational investment"**, (Perrault, 2005). In terms of development it is understandable why such an approach is appealing for encouraging economic growth, especially in developing countries, and the resulting favour the model carries in capitalist democracies. However, as has been shown in the Bolivian example it is vulnerable to the double movement of greater localisation and resulting potential for organising resistance mentioned above. This decentralisation has been referred to as the 'hollowing out' of the nation-state, (Jessop, 1994), and has led to the development of notions of 'governance' rather than 'government', (Jordan, 2003). This helps to fuel the shift we see today in policy making, wherein market-based instruments and other neoliberal policy tools are arguably new forms of biopower and expressions of Foucault's 'governmentality', showing the reconfiguration of power in the neoliberal era, wherein hegemony is secured by regulating ecological relations in a way that reinforces the stability of capitalist relations of power and accumulation, (Foucault, XXXX; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004; Robertson, 2004). **Such control has worked well in governing people so as an extension, governing the environment and human relations towards it is arguably just as powerful,** limited only by the potential friction of conserving and profiting at the same time as well as the contradiction of creating and destroying nature in order to perpetuate the current conditions of production sustainably**. Where nature is a commodity under capitalism that can be banked and offset, ecological restoration can be a euphemism for 'constructed nature', (Robertson, 2004; 2006) and fundamentally change human-nature relations forever, as biodiversity cannot be offset – once a species is gone it is gone forever.**

Neoliberalism is resilient the commodification of nature is a great example neolib will necessitate a cost effect solution and not a rush to find the most immediate and radical solutions
Plastow 10 "Robert, Neoliberalism in environmental governance: a paradoxical double Movement, Working for the Centre for Ecology and Conservation at the University of Exeter, file:///C:/Users/Conner/Downloads/Neoliberalism_in_environmental_goverance_-_Plastow_2010.pdf".CC

At the heart of the debate around neoliberalism in environmental governance is the balance between the state and the market and the rise of the market in the last few decades shows just how powerful it has become through the processes of deregulation and globalisation. This has happened not without its inequalities as well as wealth generation. **Neoliberal capitalism is a system of booms and busts and despite its creation of crises, it has an astounding capacity to turn around and profit from them, (Klein, XXXX). With regards to the environmental crisis and climate change, this is still to be seen but is argued, as above, that the commodification of nature will again be an example of neoliberalism's dynamic capacity to manage crisis.** It is not necessarily a case of market or state, but a nuanced balance between the two – societies are more than their political leaders and their markets and the environment plays an integral role in everyone's lives, as well as making all life possible at

all. It therefore must be valued above its destruction and attributing monetary value can stop it from being taken for granted. However, there are limits to scientific rationality and measurement, (Robertson, 2004; 2006), and nature has value beyond its potential use but intrinsic value is hard to measure, if not impossible outside of the close approximations to beauty within the arts. Due to the overwhelming threat of potential loss of nature posed by business-as-usual development, eco-centric views have paradoxically disappeared, subsumed by the vast ideological power tied to control, identity and culture of the Western capitalist system that has dominated global politics and whose discourse is anthropocentric and calculable in monetary terms. **This anthropocentric translation of nature is purportedly more efficient, encouraging of innovation and more costeffective than traditional regulation, (Jordan et al, 2003). As decision-making within all other areas of governance are also heavily weighted by economics,** commodifying nature allows for levelpegging within that deliberation and has already proved valuable in the Stern Review with regards to the climate change debate. Pricing also opens up opportunities for new trade and investment. **Therefore, going green will succeed - as with all things in the market** (unless given vast bail-outs from the public) **- if it is profitable.** Yet one must ask if turning crisis into profit is enough, as perhaps there are crises that are best averted, such as tipping points that cannot be undone regardless of any monetary value potential produced by them.

The perm solves the harms of neoliberalism, neolib is the only system in which the entire world can cooperate, while it is nice to imagine an ideal world and solution it is not the most reasonable nor is it feasible on its own

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"Whether from an anthropocentric or a biocentric perspective, **more adequate environmental values need to be formulated and linked to areas of public policy** (Tucker and Grim, 2009)." Consulting the literature surrounding environment and development, a clear pattern of environmental destruction and climate change vis-à-vis neoliberal capitalism arises (Daly, 1998; Durham, 1995; Hansen, 2013; Hopwood, 2005; McAfee, 2012). Modern civilization has not found a way to decouple development from pollution, deforestation, and carbon emissions (Ramesh, 2014). Concurrent to these development challenges, **we have not found a 21st Century development model that is not, at a fundamental level, neoliberal. Correlation can be drawn from neoliberalism to environmental damage and climate change. The first choice to reverse this trend would be to completely transform**, as Hopwood explains (2006, p. 49), "Given the need for fundamental change, a deep connection between human life and the environment and a common linkage of power structures that exploit both people and planet, we would argue that transformation is essential**." Indeed, to address climate change with the haste and industriousness necessary to avoid global ecosystem collapse, rapid transformation is ideal.** Rapid redistribution of responsibilities internationally as well as within sovereign states can align industry and science to output with maximum efficiency the knowledge and hardware required to rapidly decarbonize the world economy by 2050 (Kammen, 2013). An all hands on deck approach that throws away neoclassical economics in favor of global environmental necessities on the basis of realistic industrial potential as well as global and intergenerational equity is ideal**. Realistically, however, the structures that perpetuate neoliberal principles are not going to be radically transformed within the time frame needed to address climate change with sufficient ambition. Neoliberalism is baked in, so to speak, to the global institutions responsible for creating the standards of sustainable development. The global governance structures now developing modes of incentivizing action and creating accountability are neoliberal at heart**. Castree explains, "The first United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (informally, the Earth Summit), held in 1992, was a key event… because the now famous Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity both embodied neoliberal principles— and they did so at a global level. (2010, p. 15**)." In order to act on the timescales necessary to adequately respond to climate change, we as a global society would best benefit from leveraging the socio-economic inertia of neoliberalism rather than trying to slow it down. Already, international carbon markets are staged to play a critical role in the conservation side of the climate change equation**. Despite their shortcomings as poverty alleviation mechanisms, efforts to 'sell nature to save it' are succeeding in preventing deforestation (McAfee,

2012). Sustainable development in the 21st Century will be defined by humanity's response to climate change. There is much change guaranteed within the climate system, and much more if actions do not change soon. All human and natural systems will come under increasing threat as the manifestations of climate change create a new definition of normal on planet Earth. Humanity is entering uncharted territory with the amount of climate change already guaranteed by the current alterations to the composition of the atmosphere. Ceasing further jeopardy to modern society by drastically cutting down greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels is of the utmost importance to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. **However, the neoliberal principles that created this dilemma will not be going anywhere anytime soon. Yet even considering these misgivings, the benefits of globalized neoliberalism can be leveraged to remedy environmental destruction and climate change. The modern advancements in communication, representation, and elevation of our global consciousness created within the neoliberal capitalist system have fostered a 21st Century form of cooperation.** Never before has the human species been so interdependent**. Never before has their existed so much potential for solidarity to combat the environmental challenges we face as a global civilization**. We live in a transnational age with transnational problems. The globalization of neoliberalism may be the disease but it must also be the remedy. **To address our environmental problems and our challenges in international development with appropriate technology and a level headed progressiveness, we need to work within existing systems**, the mixed bag that they are, to forge a path of cohesive global cooperation into this daunting new century.

War

Neoliberalism has prevented war it creates alliances and balances power through economic incentives

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How can humans stop war? Obviously there's no simple answer, but a new network model analysis of international alliances suggests that trade may be at least part of the answer. The model, developed by Stanford economist Matthew O. Jackson and economics Ph.D. candidate Stephen Nei, suggests that **military alliances alone aren't enough to stop nations from attacking one other, and also that the addition of multilateral economic trade creates a more stable, peaceful world.** While there is considerable existing research on the effects of trade and war, much of it has looked at bilateral relationships. **This model focuses on multilateral interactions and considers various incentives for countries to attack, form alliances with, and trade with one another**. In an attempt to understand what's necessary to achieve a stable network with no incentive for war, Jackson and Nei first explored an alliance scenario based solely on military defense considerations, excluding trade. "The fundamental difficulty we find is that alliances are costly to maintain if there's no economic incentive," says Jackson. So networks remain relatively sparse, a condition in which even a few shifting allegiances leaves some countries vulnerable to attack. "**Stability is not just a little bit elusive; it's very elusive." Economic trade, however, makes a significant difference. "Once you bring in trade, you see network structures densify,"** he says. **Nations form a web of trading alliances, which creates financial incentive not only to keep peace with trading partners, but also to protect them from being attacked so as not to disrupt trade.** "In the context of the alliances we have analyzed, trade motives are essential to avoiding wars and sustaining stable networks," the authors wrote in their paper, Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade. Euro statue **The Eurozone has promoted peace and trade** | Associated Press Photo by Bernd Kammerer Their findings coincide with two major global trends since World War II: From 1950 to 2000, the incidence of interstate war has decreased nearly tenfold compared with the period from 1850 to 1949. At the same time, since 1950 international trade networks have increased nearly fourfold, becoming significantly more dense. **"In the period before World War II, it was hard to find a stable set of alliances," says Jackson. The probability of a lasting alliance was about 60%.** "You have almost a coin-flip chance that the alliance won't still be there in five years," he says. In Europe in the 1870s, for example, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck sought peace with "balance of power" diplomacy, which crumbled leading up to World War I. "**Then in the past 50 years or so, there's been a surprising global stability." The impact of economic interdependence is especially apparent in Europe,** Jackson says, where the Eurozone has promoted not only peace and increased trade among nations, but also labor mobility. Very costly wars still occur, of course, but Jackson notes that the most war-torn places in recent history have tended to be those with fewer global trade alliances. For example, the Second Congo War from 1998 to 2003 and beyond, which killed more than four million people and is the deadliest war since World War II, involved eight African nations with relatively few trade ties. "Then look at the Kuwait situation," says Jackson, referring to U.S. intervention in the first Gulf War to protect oil supplies. "Economic interest drives a lot of what goes on in terms of where nations are willing to exercise military strength." There are other real-world factors that have no doubt influenced war and trade trends since World War II, among them the proliferation of nuclear weapons — "Changing military technology can help maintain stable arrangements," says Jackson — the Cold War, an increase in worldwide wealth levels, and the introduction of container shipping in the 1960s, which has helped facilitate low-cost, long-range trade. Still, Jackson and Nei's theoretical model suggests that trade alliances play a critical role. **And in fact economic allies may be the most worth striving for in developing areas. "Maybe wars like the Second Congo War won't be occurring in the future if there's more trade with African nations,"** says Jackson. **"Economic interests can really help us have a more peaceful world than we already have."**

Free market capitalism and trade can prevent war better than every other system comparatively and with a lesser cost in lives and material

Nyquist 13' "JR, "The free market's path to peace", J.R. Nyquist, a WorldNetDaily contributing editor and a renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nyquist/free-market-path-peace".CC

It is the season of "Peace on earth, good will to men," though wars continue to occur and peace is far from established. While mankind should prefer peace we have nonetheless chosen war again and again. Excepting the Pax Romana from 27 BC to 180 AD, ancient history presents us with one war after another. If we read the Roman historian Tacitus, even the Pax Romana appears to have been a series of military operations. All the tribes of the earth make war, or prepare for war. It is therefore of special interest when a scholar shows that the free market may have already reduced the number of wars that otherwise would have been fought. Professor Patrick J. McDonald has offered exactly such a thesis in a book titled The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and International Relations Theory. **Under the rule of law, with private property and "competitive market structures," modernity has arguably found a greater incentive to peace than to war**. As McDonald explains in his book, "states that possess liberal political and economic institutions do not go to war with each other…." What does liberalism signify in this context? According to Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, "**The essential teaching of liberalism is that social cooperation and the division of labor can be achieved only in a system of private ownership of the means of production, i.e., within a market society, or capitalism**." Mises and McDonald would both argue that economic freedom, **and the institutions which make this freedom possible, tend to promote peace.** McDonald offers a caveat, however. He warns that democracy is not the guarantor of peace some have asserted it to be. The free market and free trade are much stronger guarantors of peace. In the case of China today, McDonald argues that an autocratic Chinese regime has adopted a policy of peace for the sake of economic development. "Because conflict or even the threat of it tends to disrupt normal trading patterns, potentially large economic costs will deter dependent states from using military force to solve their political conflicts." McDonald also noted: **"As commerce grows, the incentives for plunder or conquest decrease simply because it is a more costly means of generating economic growth." Not only does free market cooperation bring wealth to all the parties involved, it displaces national loyalties and state rivalries.** Of course, McDonald is well aware that free trade and free markets can be overridden by democratic ideological imperatives. Simply put, if economic liberalism signifies the disutility of war, democratic liberalism does no such thing. According to McDonald, "Even democratic leaders can exploit domestic institutional instability and public fears of insecurity to construct broad swaths of public support for war." **It is not the ballot box that assures peace**, says McDonald. **It is private property and free trade which binds nations and peoples to the cause of peace, despite cultural and political differences.** The controversial German revisionist, Udo Walendy, summed up democracy's readiness to start a global war when he wrote, "On September 3, 1939, England and France declared war on Germany. In so doing they transformed a limited territorial dispute between Poland and Germany into a world war over the city of Danzig, a matter that could easily have been resolved through negotiation." Patrick Buchanan offered a similar judgment in his book Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War: How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World. Arguably, in both world wars the democracies fought when they didn't have to. About this idea George Kennan wrote: "When you total up the score of two [world] wars, in terms of their ostensible objective, you find that if there has been any gain at all, it is pretty hard to discern**." Imagine if the politicians of 1914 and 1939 had consulted market priorities instead of ideology? What argument, in the end, is more likely to transform tyranny into freedom? Starting a world war to advance the cause of democracy is not practical** as the Allies learned when Josef Stalin got hold of Eastern Europe in 1945 (hardly a democratic outcome). Hitler was gone, it is true, but he was replaced with somebody equally bad – or worse. Imagine if the win-win formula of the free market had displaced the "everyone loses" syndrome of world war. Sixty million lives might have been saved and material progress might have advanced at a faster pace. Who on earth would've been worse off in this case? **Since the bloodiest dictatorship in history, located in Communist China, has come to grasp the advantages of respecting private property, is not the victory of the free market inevitable** in the teeth of the most recalcitrant despot? McDonald seems to suggest something of the kind. The truth of the proposition is not proven, of course. Men are not the "rational actors" of political economy. They do not live "by bread alone." And yet, having an economic incentive for embracing peace on earth must count for something.

Neoliberalism is the most important thing in nation building it represses conflict by taking away the benefits of conflict and can create cooperation across different forms of government in a way that democracy cannot

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The next time the United States is compelled to try to rescue and rehabilitate a broken nation, **Washington needs to pay as much attention to building free markets as to holding free elections**. If Americans have learned anything from their well-intentioned, costly efforts in the unforgiving lands of Iraq and Afghanistan**, it's that democratic elections do not ensure freedom. Nor do democratic elections necessarily promote stability,** as the post-Arab Spring chaos reminds us. But a new Fraser Institute study helps quantify how building up free-market institutions and promoting economic freedom can strengthen societies by increasing social trust and reducing the risk of war. Starting from the premise that "**adequate finance is a key ingredient for organizing violence against a state,"** Indra de Soysa and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati argue that **"economic repression and market distortions create conditions that make armed conflict feasible.**" These factors "supply the means, motive and opportunity for groups to challenge states because economic distortions spawn underground economies that form the organizational bases of insurgency." **The expansion of free markets and free economic exchange, on the other hand, "marginalizes violence because it binds people meaningfully in a way suited to addressing the collective dilemmas stemming from violence." "With economic freedom, people gain when they produce goods and services others desire in mutually beneficial exchange**," the report concludes. "**People from other groups become customers, employees, employers, suppliers." Together, they lay the building blocks for social trust and become essential ingredients in economic expansion — rather than enemies in a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources**. In other words, economic freedom raises the costs of violence — and helps remove the incentives and benefits of civil disorder. Economic freedom raises the costs of violence — and helps remove the incentives and benefits of civil disorder. Of course, others have pointed out the limitations of democracy in promoting stability and prosperity — and even the dangers of prematurely opening up a society to democratic governance. For instance, Robert Kaplan observed in his 2000 book The Coming Anarchy that "Democracies do not always make societies more civil — but they do always mercilessly expose the health of the societies in which they operate … If a society is not in reasonable health, democracy can be not only risky but disastrous." He wrote those words two years before America began its nation-building project in Afghanistan, four years before Iraq's postwar war, and more than a decade before Egypt descended into its spiral of re-revolution. "Democracy," Kaplan noted, "emerges only as a capstone to other social and economic achievements." These include the rule of law, stable institutions, economic freedom, and a civil society that protects minority rights as much as it respects majority rule. There is also an application here for international relations. Just as the spread of economic freedom creates incentives for cooperation within nation-states and disincentives for conflict between sub-state groups, it lessens the likelihood of war between nation-states by raising the costs of war. As political scientist Erik Gartzke noted in 2005, **"For six decades, developed nations have not fought each other." This "capitalist peace" is historically unusual given that "powerful nations are the most war prone."** However, nations that embrace economic freedom — **even those with different approaches to governance, politics, and religion — are learning to "capitalize on the capitalist peace … through expanding markets, development, and a common sense of international purpose." Thus, the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China would seem to be lower than it was between the United States and the Soviet Union.** After all, China needs the U.S. market, and the United States needs China's cash — and wants China's goods. Beijing owns $1.3 trillion in U.S. government debt. Annual U.S.-China trade is $562 billion. There was no such connective tissue between the United States and the USSR. Of course, there is no is failsafe inoculation against conflict. Nation-states, like individuals, are unpredictable and sometimes irrational. Miscalculations and misunderstandings can touch off unexpected, unintended conflict. Even strong commercial ties cannot always overcome this — something we should keep in mind 100 years after the cascade of calamities that triggered World War I. It pays to recall that European nations enjoyed deep commercial connections before the war. Britain accounted for more than 14 percent of Germany's exports in 1913 — then came the summer of 1914. "The United States and China," the Brookings Institution's Robert Kagan cautions, "are no more dependent on each other's economies today than were Great Britain and Germany before World War I." Beijing owns $1.3 trillion in U.S. government debt. Even so, the vast economic and commercial ties between China and the United States do help to mitigate the possibility of war. **If such economic linkages are something less than an inoculation against conflict, perhaps we can think of them — along with transparent (rather than**

secret) treaty commitments and credible expressions of deterrence — as preventive medicine. The solution to the problems posed by the rise of strong states like China and the instability of failing states like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is not to shrink U.S. foreign policy back to some 19th-century version of itself, or to have "less soldiers stationed overseas" (from Germany, Japan, and Jordan to Korea, Kuwait, and Kosovo, the presence of U.S. troops solves far more problems than it creates) or "to focus on nation-building here at home" (a phrase devoid of much meaning, aside from trying to repackage isolationism). Americans may like the sound of those applause lines, but they don't like the consequences. Perhaps that's because we feel compelled to do more than simply defend narrow self-interest. This is not a new phenomenon. As Kagan observes in Dangerous Nation, by the end of the 19th century, "The fact that many [Americans] believed they could do something to aid the Cubans helped convince them they should do something, that intervention was the only honorable course." **At least part of the solution to these new/old problems is to spend more time and energy nurturing free-market institutions that encourage commerce between nations** and planting free-market institutions that address the root cause of conflict within nations. So, the next time the United States is compelled to try to rescue and rehabilitate a broken nation — and it seems likely there will be a next time — Washington needs to pay as much attention to building free markets as to holding free elections.

It is proven that free trade decreases war and protectionism, it demystifies and humanizes potential adversaries the last 40 years is indicative

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Frédéric Bastiat famously claimed that **"if goods don't cross borders, soldiers will."** Bastiat argued that **free trade between countries could reduce international conflict because trade forges connections between nations and gives each country an incentive to avoid war with its trading partners**. If every nation were an economic island, the lack of positive interaction created by trade could leave more room for conflict. Two hundred years after Bastiat, libertarians take this idea as gospel. Unfortunately, not everyone does. But as recent research shows, the historical evidence confirms Bastiat's famous claim. To Trade or to Raid In "Peace through Trade or Free Trade?" professor Patrick J. McDonald, from the University of Texas at Austin, **empirically tested whether greater levels of protectionism in a country** (tariffs, quotas, etc.) would increase the probability of international conflict in that nation. He used a tool called dyads to analyze every country's international relations from 1960 until 2000. A dyad is the interaction between one country and another country: German and French relations would be one dyad, German and Russian relations would be a second, French and Australian relations would be a third. He further broke this down into dyad-years; the relations between Germany and France in 1965 would be one dyad-year, the relations between France and Australia in 1973 would be a second, and so on. Using these dyad-years, McDonald **analyzed the behavior of every country in the world for the past 40 years.** His **analysis showed a negative correlation between free trade and conflict: The more freely a country trades, the fewer wars it engages in. Countries that engage in free trade are less likely to invade and less likely to be invaded.** The Causal Arrow Of course, this finding might be a matter of confusing correlation for causation. Maybe countries engaging in free trade fight less often for some other reason, like the fact that they tend also to be more democratic. Democratic countries make war less often than empires do. But McDonald controls for these variables. **Controlling for a state's political structure is important, because democracies and republics tend to fight less than authoritarian regimes.** McDonald also controlled for a country's economic growth, because countries in a recession are more likely to go to war than those in a boom, often in order to distract their people from their economic woes. McDonald even controlled for factors like geographic proximity: It's easier for Germany and France to fight each other than it is for the United States and China, because troops in the former group only have to cross a shared border. The takeaway from McDonald's analysis is that **protectionism can actually lead to conflict.** McDonald found that **a country in the bottom 10 percent for protectionism** (meaning it is less protectionist than 90 percent of other countries) **is 70 percent less likely to engage in a new conflict** (either as invader or as target) than one in the top 10 percent for protectionism. Protectionism and War Why does protectionism lead to conflict, and why does free trade help to prevent it? The answers, though well-known to classical liberals, are worth mentioning. **First, trade creates international goodwill.** If Chinese and American businessmen trade on a regular basis, both sides benefit. And mutual benefit disposes people to look for the good in each other. **Exchange of goods also promotes an exchange of cultures**. **For decades, Americans saw China as a mysterious country with strange, even hostile values. But in the 21st century**, **trade between our nations has increased markedly, and both countries know each other a little better now**. iPod-wielding

Chinese teenagers are like American teenagers, for example. They're not terribly mysterious. Likewise, the Chinese understand democracy and American consumerism more than they once did. The countries may not find overlap in all of each other's values, but trade has helped us to at least understand each other. **Trade helps to humanize the people that you trade with. And it's tougher to want to go to war with your human trading partners than with a country you see only as lines on a map.** Second, trade gives nations an economic incentive to avoid war. If Nation X sells its best steel to Nation Y, and its businessmen reap plenty of profits in exchange, then businessmen on both sides are going to oppose war. This was actually the case with Germany and France right before World War I. Germany sold steel to France, and German businessmen were firmly opposed to war. They only grudgingly came to support it when German ministers told them that the war would only last a few short months. German steel had a strong incentive to oppose war, and if the situation had progressed a little differently—or if the German government had been a little more realistic about the timeline of the war— that incentive might have kept Germany out of World War I**. Third, protectionism promotes hostility. This is why free trade, not just aggregate trade** (which could be accompanied by high tariffs and quotas), **leads to peace**. **If the United States imposes a tariff on Japanese automobile**s, that tariff hurts Japanese businesses. **It creates hostility in Japan toward the United States. Japan might even retaliate with a tariff** on U.S. steel, hurting U.S. steel makers and angering our government, which would retaliate with another tariff. **Both countries now have an excuse to leverage nationalist feelings to gain support at home; that makes outright war with the other country an easier sell, should it come to that**. In socioeconomic academic circles, this is called the Richardson process of reciprocal and increasing hostilities; the United States harms Japan, which retaliates, causing the United States to retaliate again. History shows that the Richardson process can easily be applied to protectionism. For instance, in the 1930s, industrialized nations raised tariffs and trade barriers; countries eschewed multilateralism and turned inward. These decisions led to rising hostilities, which helped set World War II in motion. These factors help explain why free trade leads to peace, and protectionism leads to more conflict. Free Trade and Peace One final note: McDonald's analysis shows that taking a country from the top 10 percent for protectionism to the bottom 10 percent will reduce the probability of future conflict by 70 percent. He performed the same analysis for the democracy of a country and showed that taking a country from the top 10 percent (very democratic) to the bottom 10 percent (not democratic) would only reduce conflict by 30 percent. Democracy is a well-documented deterrent: The more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to resort to international conflict. **But reducing protectionism**, according to McDonald**, is more than twice as effective at reducing conflict than becoming more democratic**. Here in the United States, we talk a lot about spreading democracy. We invaded Iraq partly to "spread democracy." A New York Times op-ed by Professor Dov Ronen of Harvard University claimed that "the United States has been waging an ideological campaign to spread democracy around the world" since 1989. One of the justifications for our international crusade is to make the world a safer place. **Perhaps we should spend a little more time spreading free trade instead. That might really lead to a more peaceful world.**

Neoliberalism necessitates peace it lessens the cost of empire and it solves for international agreements one country cannot stifle emerging powers inevitably but can incorporate them into a larger system ensuring peace

Gady 10' "Franz Stefan, " Should the United States continue as a champion of free trade", Franz-Stefan Gady is a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute, where he was a program associate and founding member of the Worldwide Cybersecurity Initiative, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0912/comm/gady_freetrade.html".CC

Ever since the end of the Second World War and the introduction of the Bretton Woods system, the United States has been seen as a champion of free trade. In part due to its industrial supremacy and the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. government was one of the most consistent proponents of reduced tariff barriers and free trade in the last sixty years and helped to establish the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later, the World Trade Organization. Today, with its economic power in relative decline and neo-mercantilist powers such as China on the rise, the question arises whether the US will remain a champion of free trade. This paper will argue that **the United States should continue to be a champion of free trade for two reasons. First, free trade promotes peace and hence, makes it easier for the single hegemonic power to manage the international system. It lessens the cost of the "empire," so to speak. Second, the argument that the United States will deviate from free trade due its relative decline in relation to neo-mercantilist powers such as China is unsubstantiated. The truth is that a hegemon1, despite the arguments of the hegemonic stability theory, can do very little to influence states' behavior in the international system. Hegemony is based**

on tacit consensus among the members of the international system. Hence, the professed inability of the hegemon to deal with a new emerging power should not be seen as a decline but merely as a natural exposition of the limitations of any state trying to influence the domestic policy of another state in the international arena. The first part of the paper will attempt to show that free trade indeed promotes peace. The second part will take the historical case study of the British Empire and how it tried unsuccessfully to influence continental economic policy with little consequence for the overall promotion of free trade in the later part of the 19th century. CREATOR: gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v62), quality = 100 Peace through Free Trade The old liberal idea that trade promotes peace is based on four assumptions or models. The first has been labeled the "opportunity cost" or "deterrence model**". Armed conflict or even the threat of confrontation tends to disrupt normal trade pattern and out of that the resulting large economic costs will deter dependent states** from using military force to solve political conflict. A case in point would be the large Chinese trade surplus that the Chinese government uses to invest in U.S. treasury notes. Economists have referred to the growing Chinese dollar reserve as a "balance of terror" since both economies would substantially be hurt if China decided to sell U.S. treasury notes as a retaliatory measure, for such instances as U.S. intervention in the Strait of Taiwan on behalf of the island, resulting in a devaluation of the U.S. currency. **The second assumption is an "efficiency argument" in that it compares the relative costs of acquiring productive resources. As trade increases it will become progressively less productive to acquire resources through plunder or conquest in order to promote economic growth**. A good illustration for this is that the Soviet Union delivered more raw materials and wheat to Germany in one year prior to 1941 than Germany was able to extrapolate during four years of its occupation of the western parts of the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944. The third assumption is a sociological hypothesis and focuses on how trade helps to increase contact and communication across societies. **Through those contacts national loyalties and competitive behavior are displaced and hence lead to a more stable international environment.** Italy during the Renaissance provides a good example for this hypothesis. Wars were not uncommon during this period of time, but they were relatively bloodless and short mostly due to the economic interests of the parties involved such as the Medici family of Florence. Fourth and lastly, international commerce, international trade and the resulting human interaction can provide important signaling mechanism that can help a state to achieve a negotiated compromise short of war. Yet, is trade alone sufficient to explain state behavior? The simple answer is no. A mercantilist trading system, such as that of 18th century Europe, did actually promote conflict. Most of the mercantilist policies were the outgrowth of the relationship between the governments of the nation-states and their mercantile classes. In exchange for paying levies and taxes to support the armies of the nation-states, the mercantile classes induced governments to enact policies that would protect their business interests against foreign competition, which often meant through either the force of arms or trade barriers, i.e. tariffs. Both conflict and tariffs have the effect of reducing foreign competition. CREATOR: gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v62), quality = 100 Also, trade based on David Ricardo's idea of comparative advantage leads to a redistribution of income within a domestic society as shown by the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Hence, by definition it can create opposition to further transnational economic integration. It follows as a corollary that groups that see their income decline form international trade namely import-competing sectors (the mercantile class) are unlikely to lobby the state for a pacific foreign policy that promotes expanding transnational ties. Indeed, **conflict may create income gains for these sectors by enlarging a protected domestic market through conquest and the integration of another economy** as was the case for the French manufacturing industry during the Napoleonic wars. **This is precisely the reason why free trade rather than any other form of trade promotes stability and peace in the international system. Free trade removes an important foundation of domestic privilege- protective barriers to trade- that enhances the domestic power of societal groups** likely to support war and thus, is the reason why the United States will continue to support trade liberalization. The First World War is often cited as the main example to counter the free trade peace hypothesis. Scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer have characterized the global economy prior as an open trading system fostering the independence among states. In fact, starting in 1879, the great European powers became increasingly more protective. Next to wide-ranging tariffs, both France and Germany possessed capital controls that allowed them to funnel domestic savings toward their political allies and away from potential enemies. CREATOR: gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v62), quality = 100 Industries that rely on protection to remain profitable are in many senses "captured" by the state and more likely to support its entire range of domestic and foreign policies. For example, the French government used its influence on the private sector to build coalitions in support of a more aggressive foreign policy before World War I. In France, the need for the approval from the foreign and finance ministries before floating the loans of foreign governments in the Paris money market allowed the government to use the economy's financial reserves to shape balance-of-power diplomacy in Europe. It pressured the Russian government into building strategic railways in 1913 in Poland for it was hoped that a quicker Russian mobilization would slow a German offensive into France. The imposition of agricultural tariffs in Germany created an opportunity for the state to wed agricultural and industrial interests behind Weltpolitik. Those tariffs, however, produced a strong anti-German within Russia pressuring the government for a more aggressive foreign policy against German interests. Thus, the pre- World War I global economy can hardly be described as an archetypical liberal economic order and one can easily see the possibilities of conflicts arising out of the various protective measures.

While hegemony alone has its limitations the neoliberal order makes great power tacit in the international system that is spurred by free trade

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For the United States in the 21st century, **a return to a system such as the pre-World War I global economy would be detrimental to economic growth and the stability of the international system. Free trade rather than any other form of trade is the key ingredient to promoting peace. This fact can be easily proven by the relative absence of conflict between countries engaging in free trade in the last sixty years. Free trade also makes the management of the international system less costly since it promotes economic efficiency and reduces the cost of policing the international system due the decrease of international tensions. Consequently, the United States has no alternative but to promote free trade.** CREATOR: gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v62), quality = 100 The Limitation of Hegemony Scholars from the realist tradition such as Robert Gilpin have identified the distribution of power among states as a central factor in explaining the openness and stability of the international economy. The "Hegemonic Stability Theory" first coined by Charles Kindleberger in the 1970s focuses on the role of leading states- for example, Great Britain in the 19th century- and how changes in the distribution of power affect the world economy. The theory argued that the preponderance of power of one state was the precondition for an open and stable world economy. Such a hegemon served to coordinate and discipline other countries so that each feels secure enough to open its markets and to avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies. In the 19th century, Britain enjoyed this role as a global economic hegemon over most of the world. After the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the British Empire was by far the wealthiest and strongest power in the world. The British Royal Navy ruled the waves, guaranteed the free flow of capital, the globalization of markets and enforced the openness of international trade. In the 20th century the United States of America took on the role of economic hegemon and it was the U.S. Navy that guaranteed international commerce and the integration of world markets. Just like the British Empire at the end of the French Revolutionary Wars, the U.S., after the end of the Second World War, assumed the leadership role and moved forward to create an open international trade system based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and a stable monetary system founded on the Bretton Woods system. The United States also actively promoted the completion of various multilateral trade negotiations, such as the Tokyo, Uruguay and Doha rounds, aimed at reducing barriers to trade and reducing tariffs. In the 21st century, the U.S. is by far still the most economically powerful country in the world and continues to be the main proponent of free trade. Free trade, despite the U.S.'s long history of opposition, is intrinsically connected to the spirit of enlightenment of which the country's political institutions are a direct product. Various scholars and commentators, however, have assessed that this is changing and that the U.S. is rapidly declining in relative terms to neo-mercantilist powers such as China with its gigantic trade surplus and its market entry barriers. CREATOR: gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v62), quality = 100 **According to the hegemonic stability theory, the hegemonic state is able to offer both bribes and threats in exerting its influence. The unprecedented U.S. current account deficit and U.S. consumption behavior financed by abroad** (mostly China), however, **has substantially limited the United States' policy options in that regard**. It just cannot threaten to, for example, cut off China's access to the U.S. domestic market. It is increasingly argued that the United States cannot manage the rise of a new economic superpower and that according to the hegemonic stability theory this decline will result in reduced economic activity and reduced trade flows among states. In short, the emergence of a new power that only on paper abides to the rules of free trade will result in an abandonment of free trade and loss of U.S. influence on the international economic system. A case in point for some observers is the impossibility to force the Chinese to revalue their currency although the U.S. Congress drafted legislation in 2007 to "boost pressure on China to let its currency rise in value." Beijing's currency manipulation imposes severe economic costs on the United States, Europe and many developing countries that compete with China. The U.S. threatened various retaliatory measures such as trade sanction, yet so far to no avail. In reality, there is very little a hegemon can do when it comes to promoting free trade in the international system or influencing other powers to comply when they are not willing. A state that opposes an open system of trade, such as Japan in the 1980s, faced very little consequences from the hegemonic power, i.e. the Unites States. The reason is that the capabilities of a hegemon required to maintain an open system are much bigger (often too big for the hegemon to cope with) if members are opposed to the open system, i.e. free trade, rather than when they are willing to tacitly comply with the existing order. **Thus, hegemony is only possible with the tacit cooperation of most of the states in the international system. It follows that if one or two countries oppose policies of the hegemon, it does not necessarily mean a decline of hegemonic power, but the overall limitations of hegemony in the international system.** This can be illustrated with the following case study of the British Empire in the 19th century. The pax Britannica was at its height in the period 1849 to 1880; thereafter, other states began to challenge British naval superiority, colonization became widespread and British economic superiority began to fall as well. Thus, one can hypothesize that during the period from 1849 to 1880, British hegemony translated into firm British control of the international economic and financial system. The truth was far from that. For example, the series of treaties that began with the Anglo-French treaty of commerce in 1860 are generally recognized as supplying the building blocks of a low-tariff regime that persisted until the late

1870s and hence, should be seen a sign of British hegemonic influence on the European continent. Nevertheless, three points should be noted. First, the British government did not initiate the negotiations. They were essentially triggered by the transnational collusion of Richard Cobden and Michel Chevalier two businessmen. Second, British Prime minister Palmerston, had rebuffed an earlier French overture on commercial negotiations because he was unwilling to tolerate the possible loss of customs revenue from the wine duty, which the French wanted to get rid off in order to have access to the British domestic market. Third, in 1860 a primary British motivation for seeking a treaty was not to gain lower tariffs and a greater market for exports, but rather to head off a serious deterioration in Anglo-French relations. The British were simply worried about the possibility of a French invasion. At the end, Britain did not succeed in gaining substantial concessions from the French despite its hegemonic position in the world. The British experience with most of the other states of Europe during the period 1848-1880 roughly corresponds to their experience with the French—scattered British successes, but no clear evidence that Britain was making a major impact on the tariff policies of the European states. Another case in point would be Prussia. After 1848, it was not Britain but Austria that dominated Prussian calculations on tariffs. The Prussians were ready to use a low tariff policy to block Austrian entry into the Zollverein. The Prussians desired low Zollverein tariffs in order to maximize the economic and domestic political costs to the Austrian government of joining the organization. Although the Austrians mounted two serious challenges to Prussian dominance in the Zollverein in 1852-3 and 1862-4, the British played no active role in either case. Thus, although Britain was assessed to be most powerful country in the world at that time it still could not influence the behavior of a second rate power such as Prussia. Yet, when Queen Victoria opened the Great World Exhibition in 1851, her country was the world's leading industrial power producing more than half its iron, coal and cotton cloth. Britain was called the "workshop of the world". The Royal Navy was the biggest fleet of its time and soon the British Empire would rule a quarter of the world. London became the leading financial center. This pax Britannica would last until 1914 and the beginning of the First World War. Throughout that time Britain continued to advocate free trade**. As with China in the 21st century, the fear that the rise of a new economic power and the decline of U.S. preponderance may inhibit free trade due to the impossibility of the hegemon to influence the economic policy of other countries is unsubstantiated. As illustrated with the example of Great Britain, the hegemon can rarely influence economic policies when a state's government or electorate is opposed to the policy since hegemony is built on some form of tacit consensus and economic interdependence between nations**. Conclusion T**he United States was and will continue to remain the champions of free trade.** First, this paper tried to illustrate that it is in the United States' interest to promote free trade because it leads to a more stable international system by promoting peace. Second, the argument that the United States will not alter from its free trade policy despite the emergence of neo-mercantilists power challenging U.S. hegemony has been put forward. Although observers might detect a decline in U.S. hegemony due to the U.S.'s impossibility to enforce its will on China in reality, this is just an exposition of the natural limitation of hegemony that is always dependent on some form of consensus among states. It will not, as the hegemonic stability theory suggests, lead to a decline in trade openness of states. Consequently, as illustrated with the British example of the 19th century, the lack of influence on other states behavior will not alter the U.S.'s policy on free trade.bluestar

Poverty

Globalization and free trade decrease poverty it decreases export and import taxes which allows for access for new tech and it increases the poor's buying power and real income

Bannister et al 01' "Geoffrey, "International trade and poverty alleviation", a Senior Economist in the Trade Policy Division of the IMF's Policy Development and Review Department, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/banniste.htm#author".CC

Liberalization's effects Trade liberalization can affect the welfare of the poor by changing the prices of tradable goods and improving access to new products; changing the relative wages of skilled and unskilled labor and the cost of capital, thereby affecting the employment of the poor; affecting government revenue from trade taxes and thus the government's ability to finance programs for the poor; changing incentives for investment and innovation and affecting economic growth; and affecting the vulnerability of an economy to negative external shocks. Prices and availability of products. T**rade liberalization helps the poor in the same way it helps most others, by lowering prices of imports and keeping prices of substitutes for imported goods low, thus increasing people's real incomes.** Imported products that might be especially important for the poor include basic foods, pharmaceuticals and other medical or basic health products, and used clothing**. The poor may also benefit significantly from removal of export taxes or prohibitions, to the extent that the poor are net producers of exports** (as is often true in agriculture). **An open trade regime also permits imports of technologies and processes that can help the poor—for example, packaging for perishable foods** that is light and does not require refrigeration, chemicals for sterilizing water, and improved seeds and fertilizers. **An example of trade liberalization resulting in tangible and immediate benefits for the poor is the African Summit to Roll Back Malaria, held in April 2000, at which the continent's heads of state pledged to reduce or waive taxes and tariffs for mosquito nets, insecticides, antimalarial drugs, and other goods and services needed for malaria control.** There is also some evidence that liberalizing imports of used clothing can improve the welfare of the poor. Wages and employment. Trade theory predicts how trade liberalization will affect wages and employment under very specific conditions. In practice, these conditions do not often hold, and for a more general analysis, we have to rely on empirical studies. **These suggest at least two factors that will directly affect the way trade liberalization can change the wages and employment of the poor. First, how flexible labor markets are will determine whether the effects of trade reform translate into changes in employment or wages. If firms are constrained by labor regulations from reducing their workforces, most of the adjustment to changes in relative prices of outputs will be reflected in changes in real wages.** If minimum wage legislation prohibits downward adjustments in wages but labor mobility is high, however, adjustment will take place through changes in employment. In the rural and informal urban sectors (the informal sector is the part of an economy where businesses are not incorporated or otherwise registered with governments) of developing countries where the poor live, labor markets usually are highly flexible (being generally unregulated) and are characterized by a high elasticity of supply for labor. Wages will generally be determined by the requirements of urban and rural subsistence or the next-best employment opportunities that are available. Thus, we can expect that adjustment to trade shocks will take place predominantly through changes in employment. In this case, the costs of trade reform for the poor may be large, and government assistance may be required to mitigate their impact.

Neoliberalism increases trade flows and government revenue and it decreases tariffs which take away incentives for corruption and loopholes and after the intial stages the increased government revenue creates benefits for the poor

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Second, the initial pattern of protection will have an important bearing on who wins and who loses when that protection is removed. **If the pattern favors unskilled workers in agriculture and light manufacturing, as was true for Mexico in the**

early 1980s, then the removal of protection could be expected to lower the relative wages of these segments of the labor force. Government revenues and programs for the poor. There is a general concern that trade reform may lead to lower government revenues as trade taxes are reduced and that, in an effort to maintain macroeconomic stability, **governments may cut social expenditures or implement new taxes that could disproportionately affect the poor. At the initial stages of trade liberalization, however, replacing nontariff barriers with tariffs and eliminating tariff exemptions will generally increase government revenues. Similarly, if initial tariffs are prohibitively high, reducing them can result in higher trade flows, which will increase revenues. Lowering high tariffs also reduces incentives for smuggling and corruption, which, in turn, can increase the volume of goods recorded at customs and boost revenues**. Finally, simplifying the tariff regime to create a more uniform structure, with just a few tariff rates, could increase fiscal revenue by increasing transparency and simplifying tax administration. In the latter stages of reform, however, lowering tariffs may lead to lower government revenues. In this instance, domestic tax reform (particularly the introduction of broader-based and less distortionary taxes) or expenditure restraint that may be required to maintain macroeconomic stability should be designed to minimize their adverse effects on the poor. Investment, innovation, and growth. An important consideration in sustained poverty reduction is whether the country is experiencing robust economic growth in which the poor can participate. One of the main channels through which trade reform affects growth is by reducing the anti-export bias of trade policy and leading to a more efficient allocation of resources. However, this is a onetime gain in allocative efficiency and need not affect the economy's long-term growth rate. In the long term, trade liberalization can affect the economy's rate of growth by creating incentives for investment**. In addition, trade reform usually encourages foreign direct investment, with attendant spillovers of advanced technologies and new business practices that increase overall productivity and growth in domestic firms**. Recent empirical research (for example, Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999) suggests that the relationship between trade liberalization and growth is not straightforward. In particular, the effects of trade reform on growth depend upon the existence of other, complementary macroeconomic and structural policies and the creation of appropriate institutions. For example, in cross-country research, one variable that is consistently related to the rate of growth is the parallel-market premium on the exchange rate, indicating that exchange rate overvaluation may be an important inhibitor of growth. The implication is that undertaking trade reform without implementing appropriate macroeconomic and exchange rate policies (to improve competitiveness) will be less effective in promoting growth. Thus, a consistent overall economic package is essential if trade reform and other structural measures are to succeed in fostering adjustment and growth. Even when liberalization leads to growth, one concern often raised is that open trade policies may lead to a pattern of growth that disproportionately benefits the rich, thus worsening the country's distribution of income. Recent evidence (see, for example, Dollar and Kraay, 2001), however, casts doubt on this assessment. Vulnerability to negative external shocks. Trade liberalization will make an economy more open and deepen its economic integration with the rest of the world. In many cases, this will help an economy to diversify its exports in line with its comparative advantages and to become less dependent on single export markets or products. In addition, integration with foreign markets helps an economy become less dependent on the domestic market, so that domestic economic downturns are offset by growth in the international economy. Openness may, however, also make an economy more vulnerable to external shocks, such as abrupt changes in the terms of trade, that can significantly reduce growth. If the shocks directly affect certain sectors, such as agriculture or informal production, they can have significant effects on the poor.

Neoliberalism decreases poverty it changes economies from being sole buyers to economies which are competitive and produce manufactured products, and studies to the contrary ignore these benefits and complementary polices along with this growth that help the poor, Zimbabwe proves

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Findings of empirical **studies Because of the complexity of the linkages between trade reform and poverty, the empirical evidence on trade liberalization and poverty is limited largely to case studies**. Some studies use computable-general-equilibrium (CGE) models to trace the effects of trade reform on the poor. Winters (2000) reports on a joint Oxfam-Institute of Development Studies study of liberalization of the cotton market **in Zimbabwe** during the late 1980s and 1990s that illustrates the potential effects of liberalization on the poor. **Before liberalization, the government was a monopsony buyer** (a sole buyer facing many sellers**) of cotton from farmers and used low producer prices to subsidize inputs into the textile industry, thereby reducing the incomes of small, poor farmers. Liberalization included elimination of price controls and privatization of the marketing board. The results were higher prices**

and greater competition among three principal buyers, not only on price but also in providing extension and input services to small landholders. In Zambia, liberalization of the maize market had the opposite result. Before liberalization, maize producers enjoyed cross-subsidies, financed by the mining sector, that considerably lowered the cost of inputs. In addition, small producers in remote areas were implicitly subsidized by prices, set by a parastatal firm (one funded by the government without formally being a part of it) serving as monopsony buyer, that were uniform for all seasons and throughout the country. When the subsidies were removed and the parastatal was privatized, larger farmers close to national markets saw no effective change in market conditions while small farmers, and especially those in remote areas, were severely affected by price fluctuations. In addition, owing to a sharp deterioration in transportation infrastructure, remote rural markets for corn completely disappeared, leaving poor farmers without formal incomes. These episodes provide examples of the effects of different types of liberalization. In Zimbabwe, initial restrictions were analogous to a tax on exports that kept producer prices low and inhibited competition. The removal of these "taxes" resulted in benefits to net suppliers of exports. In Zambia, however, the restrictions were analogous to a tariff on imports that results in a subsidy being provided to domestic producers (and a tax on consumers) of import-competing products. The removal of the tariff/subsidy resulted in a decline in revenue for producers of the import-competing products and, at the extreme, the disappearance of uncompetitive domestic production. A more important distinction between these two cases, as Winters points out, is that in Zimbabwe liberalization resulted in the creation of markets in which the poor could participate and an improvement in market performance, while in Zambia it resulted in the disappearance of functioning markets for the poor's produce**.** **In general, this study and others have found that, in most cases, trade reform increases the income of the poor as a group and that the transition costs are generally small relative to the overall benefits**. Nevertheless, there are cases where the short-run effects of liberalization on the poor and others are negative and significant. Although these negative results cannot be discounted, it is important to realize that in many cases they have been affected by the initial patterns of protection. It is also important to note that most studies assume a short-term perspective in which no changes in investment or the growth path of the economy can occur. But **the more important gains from liberalization come from dynamic gains, such as more efficient patterns of investment and technological diffusion. Further, they do not include the effects of complementary policies that facilitate adjustment to the new free-trade equilibrium. For all these reasons, the studies are likely to significantly overstate liberalization's costs and understate its benefits, even for the poor**. Over the medium term, changes in investment and economic growth can significantly exceed the negative distributional effects of changes in prices that result from trade liberalization.

Broad based liberalization and neoliberal reforms create benefits for the poor like better infrastructure and labor mobility training in order to facilitate their participation in the market and the broad based liberalization of the country incentives government to help the poor in the transition

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Lessons for design of trade reform A natural question to ask is whether there are ways of liberalizing trade restrictions that might be more friendly to the poor. One first and obvious suggestion is to pay attention to the way liberalization might affect the most vulnerable members of society. In practical terms, this means developing diagnostic tools that can help policymakers identify who the losers from trade liberalization might be. Based on this analysis, compensatory policies can be designed to help the poor to deal with the transition costs of adjustment and to benefit from the new, open trade regime. In addition, trade reform and complementary economic policies can be implemented so as to ease the plight of the poor. **Broad-based liberalization. The importance of broad-based liberalization** (that is, of lowering trade barriers across the board) **follows from the economy-wide adjustment to trade liberalization. The wider the domain of trade that is being liberalized, the more individual sectors or groups (including the poor) will be able to perceive the benefits of liberalization (not only from cheaper inputs or consumption goods but also from economy-wide effects such as lower transportation costs). In addition, if liberalization is broad-based, the costs of adjustment will be spread more widely among different sectors. Exchange rate flexibility. Exchange rate flexibility will not only reduce the output costs of terms of trade shocks but also help a country adjust to trade liberalization.** The classic policy prescription for substantial trade liberalization under a fixed exchange rate regime is for a onetime devaluation just before, or in conjunction with, reform. If there is nominal wage rigidity (that is, if wages tend not to decrease when the demand for labor decreases), having some exchange rate flexibility, which will dissipate the shock of trade reform throughout the economy, will be better than requiring adjustment to

take place entirely through increased unemployment in the most affected industries. This is especially important if the poor depend on these industries. Complementary reforms. **Trade reform cannot succeed in promoting growth in isolation from other reforms. Complementary reforms enhance the flexibility of markets (which reduces the costs of adjustment) and facilitate the creation of markets that will benefit the poor**. Some of the more important complementary reforms are discussed below (see Winters, 2000). **Infrastructure development**. Better **roads and cheaper transportation will give the poor better access to the principal markets for their products and let them benefit from opportunities that might develop as a result of trade liberalization.** Development of markets. Encouraging the development of markets involves their deregulation and the removal of monopolies (such as state trading monopolies) that could adversely affect the poor or prevent them from receiving the benefits of trade liberalization. But perhaps more important for the poor are the technical assistance, extension services in agriculture, and training in up-to-date business practices. that they may need to receive if they are to take advantage of new market opportunities. Developing credit markets is also an important way of facilitating the provision of important inputs to encourage market activities. **Labor mobility and training. Rigidities in the labor market can also make it difficult for the poor to move into other occupations and take advantage of new market opportunities and to minimize the costs of trade liberalization. Worker training and other forms of assistance can also help the poor who lose jobs in sectors that suffer from trade liberalization to find jobs in sectors that benefit from it**. Sequencing and credibility. Although the broad-based liberalization advocated above can bring considerable benefits, it may be necessary to sequence liberalization at different speeds across sectors to ameliorate the costs of adjustment. This may be true for sectors or markets where liberalization has a very large effect on prices or where adjustment is likely to be very difficult and to take a long time. In addition, trade reform may be phased in gradually if people need more time to adjust to the new policy environment. For example, under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the maize sector was liberalized over a much longer period than other sectors because of the importance of maize farming for Mexico's rural poor. An important condition for implementing long adjustment periods for liberalizing sensitive sectors, however, is the credible commitment of the government to trade reform, often enhanced by its entering into international agreements (either regional or multilateral). Social safety nets. Even the best-designed trade reform will create winners and losers. In order to mitigate the possible adverse effects of transitory, short-term adjustment costs on the poor, developing countries need to have well-functioning social safety nets to ease the tension between implementing trade reforms and alleviating poverty. They also need to quantify the budgetary costs of offsetting some of these adverse effects—this can be done in the context of the participatory process of the poverty reduction strategy papers for countries that have IMF- and World Bank-supported programs. Given the substantial long-term benefits of trade reforms, the absence of appropriate safety-net policies should not unduly delay trade liberalization, because the sequencing and phasing of reforms can be designed to mitigate the transitional costs for the poor.

Neoliberalism does not necessitate poverty and it is inevitable only a neoliberal development effort combined with poverty reducing government policies can be effective, an outright rejection cannot reduce poverty

Rahim et al 14' "Hardy Loh, "Globalization and its effect of world poverty and inequality", Lecturer of Entrepreneurship, University Teknologi Mara, file:///C:/Users/Conner/Downloads/globalization%20and%20its%20effect%20on%20world%20poverty%20and%20inequality.pdf".CC

Different claims have been heard within the development community about how just much progress has been made against poverty (Ravallion, 2003). Research has presented conflicting arguments and estimations, with few claiming that overall poverty is on the decline, while others claim the opposite. While Aminat (2002) and Harrison and McMillan (2007) concluded in their studies that **globalization has boosted incomes and helped raised living standards and that the poor are more likely to share in the gains from globalization**, there are pro-poor growth advocates who find the idea that globalization produces losers more that what can be called 'winners.' For Stiglitz (2002), globalization fails in promoting development and hence continue to create poverty and instability. This finding is shared by Klasen (2005) in his study in which he concluded that globalization does not necessarily result in poverty reduction. Fortunately, the debate over the impact of globalization and growth on poverty and income inequality has not been entirely contradictory. For instance, between the extreme views insisting that

growth through globalization, have increased world's wealth and reduced poverty, and the opposing extreme view fault globalization for escalating poverty and perpetuating economic reliance of poor countries. **Globalization is not in itself a folly** (Sen, 2001**); it can be a force for good and has the potential to benefit all, including the poor** (Stiglitz, 2002). **Globalization seems to be irreversible. It produces both winners and losers among the poor. Thus, the question that needs to be addressed is how we can better govern this process to make it more inclusive and fairer than the current conditions. That is, it is not globalization ought to be abandoned, but rather it is poor governance of globalization is what needs to be challenged. If managed correctly and fairly for the benefit of all, globalization could be a positive force.** International community should act together in an effort to make available the resources necessary to wage a war against poverty and inequality (Akoum, 2008). Naturally, this requires fundamental adjustment of the global status quo, starting with a true political pledge of the developing and developed countries to conceive an enhanced global financial and economic landscape. **Generally, it has been found that the poor are more likely to share in the gains from globalization when there are complementary policies in place, such as access to credit, technical know-how, and other complementary inputs.** This can range from countries implementing minimum wage policies to protect unskilled workers who are most likely to be poor to encouraging export and incoming foreign investment, which has been linked to reduction in poverty levels in many countries (Harrison and McMillan, 2007). There is also a need for a Global Collective Action to sustain a steady global economic expansion and reduce the likelihood of and contain the effects of global volatility as it is the poor countries that are known for its volatility. This international policy coordination should mobilize adequate and more effective aid for poverty reduction in order to eliminate debt of poor countries. It should provide for information and knowledge sharing, removes barriers to trade, provide preferential access to the poorest countries, provide increased international support in protecting global commons and combating global diseases. **Whatever the methods and measurements used, it is important that poverty reduction via economic growth becomes the ultimate aim of development endeavors towards a more peaceful, prosperous, and accountable economic world. It cannot be said that poverty can only be reduced if globalization effort is halted or vice-versa.**

Globalization has reduced poverty in developed and developing nations it reduces poverty ensuring that growth is sustainable it requires low inequalities

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Conversely, proponents of pro-poor, while recognizing the mandatory role played by openness and growth, contends that it does not represent sufficient conditions for poverty reduction. **The United Nations (2005) stated that though some parts of the world have experienced unprecedented growth and improvement in living standards in recent years,** poverty remains unshakable and much of the world is trapped in an inequality situation. This report also focuses on the chasm between the widening gap between skilled and unskilled workers, the formal and informal economies, the growing disparities in education, health and opportunities for economic, social as well as political participation. Many view the empirical evidence in favor of globalization skeptically because they see globalization as a process through which power is concentrated upward and away from the poor. In particular, they see transnational firms as gaining a lopsided amount of both political and market power. Critics of globalization are also steadfastly of the opinion that firms will use their increased power in ways that profit themselves and harm the poor. To determine the impact of globalization on poverty over the period 1980 to 2005, Salvatore and Campano (2012) adopted the macroeconomic perspective to examine the income distributions of the people living in developing countries, as one group, and the people living in the developed countries as another group. **They also further subdivided the developing countries into two groups: those that globalized and those that did not globalize, as**

not all developing countries have globalized during this period of study. Their study found that real personal incomes grew and flourished in both developed and developing countries, but more rapidly in the developing countries, such as in China and India. However, when looking at the estimates of real personal income in terms of the three major measures of central tendency, **they found that the ratios between developed and developing have been substantially reduced in the period, especially at the mode where the most severe poverty lies.** Akoum (2008) attempted to present empirical evidence on whether countries registering high growth rates do necessarily succeed in reducing the incidence of poverty. In his study, he recognized that there are various data and methodological problems in examining the relationship between growth, globalization, and poverty. Using simple statistical methods, he concluded that higher economic growth rates are not necessarily translated into lower poverty rates. Bergh and Nilsson (2011) used panel data from more than 100 countries around the world starting from 1988 through 2007, to examine the relationship between economic and social globalization and absolute income poverty (Table I). **They found that there is no evidence that globalization is associated with higher poverty levels in developing countries. They concurred that less trade restrictions and larger information flows are robustly associated with lower poverty levels thus indicating that globalization decreases poverty more when the informal and the rural sectors are relatively bigger.** They also found clear evidence that the main part of the poverty-decreasing effect is not mediated via the growth channel. Finally, they stated that although the fact that many low-income countries embarked on programs of external economic liberalization in recent decades has been intensely debated, their analysis suggests that the underlying premises of current and previous poverty reduction strategies are correct: poverty reduction can be achieved by means of closer economic integration and higher levels of globalization. The evidence from reading criticisms of globalization is that people are more interested in the optimal policy mix to maximize the benefits to the poor while minimizing the negative impacts on any subgroup of the poor that is made worse off by such policies. **They are also interested in ensuring that growth is socially, economically, and environmentally sustainable. Social sustainability, it is assumed, requires that inequality be kept under a certain limit.**

Globalization reduces poverty it incentives creating a manufacturing base in undeveloped countries and reduces the effects of only trading commodities an example of this is the rapid growth and reduction of poverty in China

Rodrik 12' "Dani, "Global poverty amid global plenty getting globalization right", an economist and Ford Foundation Professor of International Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, http://www.americasquarterly.org/rodrik".CC

Marching to its Own Beat: China and Globalization **China's experience offers compelling evidence that globalization can be a great boon for poor nations.** Yet it also presents the strongest argument against the reigning orthodoxy in globalization, which emphasizes financial globalization and deep integration through the World Trade Organization (WTO). China's ability to shield itself from the global economy proved critical to its efforts to build a modern industrial base, which would in turn be leveraged through world markets. Since 1978, income per capita in China has grown at an average rate of 8.3 percent per annum—a rate that implies a doubling of incomes every nine years. **Thanks to this rapid economic growth, between 1981 and 2008 the poverty rate in China (the percent of the population below the $1.25-a-day poverty line) fell from 84 percent to 13 percent, much of it from reducing rural poverty.5 This meant a whopping 662 million fewer Chinese in extreme poverty, a number that accounts for virtually the entire drop in global poverty over the same period. During the same period, China transformed itself from near autarky to the most feared competitor on world markets.** That this happened in a country with a complete lack of private property rights (until recently) and run by the Communist Party only deepens the mystery. China's big break came when Deng Xiaoping and other post-Mao leaders decided to trust markets instead of central planning. But their real genius lay in their recognition that the market-supporting institutions they built, most of which were sorely lacking at the time, would have to possess distinctly Chinese characteristics. China's economy was predominantly rural in 1978. A Western-trained economist would have recommended abolishing central planning and removing all price controls. Yet without a central plan urban workers would have been deprived of their cheap rations and the government of an important source of revenue, resulting in masses of disgruntled workers in the cities and the risk of hyperinflation. The Chinese solution to this conundrum was to graft a market system on top of the plan. Communes were abolished and family farming restored, but land remained state property. Obligatory grain deliveries at controlled prices were kept in place, but once farmers had fulfilled their state quota they were now free to sell their surplus at market-determined prices. **This dual-track regime gave farmers market-based incentives and yet did not deprive the state of revenue nor deprive urban workers of cheap food.**6 Agricultural productivity rose sharply, setting off the first phase of China's post-1978 growth. Another challenge was how to provide a semblance of property rights when the

state remained the ultimate owner of all property. Privatization would have been the conventional route, but it was ruled out by the Chinese Communist Party's ideology. Once again, an innovation came to the rescue. Township and village enterprises (TVEs) proved remarkably adept at stimulating domestic private investment. They were owned not by private entities or the central government, but by local governments (townships or villages). TVEs produced virtually the full gamut of products, everything from consumer goods to capital goods, and spearheaded Chinese economic growth from the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s. The key to the success of TVEs was the self-interest of local governments, which would reap substantial income from their equity stake in the enterprises. China's strategy to open its economy to the world also diverged from received theory. The Chinese leadership resisted the conventional advice to remove trade barriers. Such an action would have forced many state enterprises to close without doing much to stimulate new investments in industrial activities. Employment and economic growth would have suffered, threatening social stability. The Chinese decided to experiment with alternative mechanisms that would not create too much pressure on existing industrial structures. While state trading monopolies were dismantled relatively early (starting in the late 1970s), what took their place was a complex and highly restrictive set of tariffs, nontariff barriers and licenses restricting imports. These were not substantially relaxed until the early 1990s. In particular, China relied on Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to generate exports and attract foreign investment. Enterprises in these zones operated under different rules than those that applied in the rest of the country; they had access to better infrastructure and could import inputs duty free. The SEZs generated incentives for export-oriented investments without pulling the rug out from under state enterprises. What fueled China's growth, along with these institutional innovations, was a dramatic productive transformation. The Chinese economy latched on to advanced, high-productivity products that no one would expect a poor, labor-abundant country to produce, let alone export. By the end of the 1990s, China's export portfolio resembled that of a country with an income-per-capita level at least three times higher than China's.7 Foreign investors played a key role in the evolution of China's industries. They created the most productive firms, introduced new technology to the economy, and became the drivers of the export boom. The SEZs, where foreign producers could operate with good infrastructure and with a minimum of hassles, deserve considerable credit. But if China welcomed foreign companies, it always did so with the objective of fostering domestic capabilities. It used a number of policies to ensure that technology transfer would take place and that strong domestic players would emerge. Early on, they relied predominantly on state-owned national champions. Later, the government used a variety of incentives and disincentives to foster joint ventures with domestic firms (as in mobile phones and computers) and expand local content (as in autos). Cities and provinces were given substantial freedoms to fashion their own policies of stimulation and support, which led to the creation of industrial clusters in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, and elsewhere.8 Many of these early policies would have run afoul of WTO rules that ban export subsidies and prohibit discrimination in favor of domestic firms—if China had been a member of the organization. Chinese policy makers were not constrained by any external rules in their conduct of trade and industrial policies and could act freely to promote industrialization. By the time China did join the WTO, in 2001, it had created a strong industrial base, much of which did not need protection or nurturing. China substantially reduced its tariffs in preparation for WTO membership, bringing them down from the high levels of the early 1990s (averaging around 40 percent) to single digits in 2001. Many other industrial policies were also phased out. However, China was not yet ready to let the push and pull of global markets determine the fate of its industries. It began to rely increasingly on a competitive exchange rate to effectively subsidize these industries. By intervening in currency markets and keeping short-term capital flows out, the government prevented its currency (renminbi) from appreciating, which would have been the natural consequence of China's rapid economic growth. Explicit industrial policies gave way to an implicit industrial policy conducted by way of currency policy. Asia's economic experience violates stereotypes and yet offers something for everyone. In effect, it acts as a reflecting pool for the biases of the observer. If you think unleashing markets is the best way to foster economic development, you will find plenty of evidence for that. If you think markets need the firm, commanding hand of the government, well, there is much evidence for that too. Globalization as an engine for growth? East Asian countries are a case in point. Globalization needs to be tamed? Ditto. **However, if you leave aside these stale arguments and listen to the real message that emanates from the success of the region, you find that what works is a combination of states and markets. Globalization is a tremendously positive force, but only if you are able to domesticate it to work for you rather than against you.** The Diversification Imperative You become what you produce. That is the inevitable fate of nations. Specialize in commodities and raw materials, and you will get stuck in the periphery of the world economy. You will remain hostage to fluctuations in world prices and suffer under the rule of a small group of domestic elites. **If you can push your way into manufactured and other modern tradable products, you may pave a path toward convergence with the world's rich countries. You will have greater ability to withstand swings in world markets, and you will acquire the broad based, representative institutions that a growing middle class demands, instead of the repressive ones that elites need to hide behind**. Globalization accentuates the dilemma because it makes it easier for countries to fall into the commodities trap. The international division of labor makes it possible for you to produce little else besides commodities, if that is what you choose to do. At the same time, globalization greatly increases the rewards of the alternative strategy, as the experiences of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China amply show**. Sustained poverty reduction requires economic growth. A government committed to economic diversification and capable of energizing its private sector can spur growth rates that would have been unthinkable in a world untouched by globalization. The trick is to leverage globalization through a domestic process of productive transformation and capacity-building.**

Rapid industrialization and the access to global markets through neoliberalism ends a reliance a commodities based economy and helps solve unending poverty

Rodrik 12' "Dani, "Global poverty amid global plenty getting globalization right", an economist and Ford Foundation Professor of International Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, http://www.americasquarterly.org/rodrik".CC

The proximate cause of poverty is low productivity. Poor people are poor because their labor produces too little to adequately feed and house them, let alone provide adequately for other needs such as health care and education. Low productivity, in turn, has diverse and multiple causes. It may be the result of lack of credit, lack of access to new and better technologies, or lack of skills, knowledge or job opportunities. It may be the consequence of small market size—or exploitative elites, in cahoots with the government, who block any improvement in economic conditions that would threaten their power. **Globalization promises to give everyone access to markets, capital and technology, and to foster good governance. In other words, globalization has the potential to remove all of the deficiencies that create and sustain poverty. As such, globalization ought to be a powerful engine for economic catch-up in the lagging regions of the world**. **And yet, the past two centuries of globalization have witnessed massive economic divergence on a global scale. How is that possible?** This question has preoccupied economists and policy makers for a long time. The answers they have produced coalesce around two opposing narratives. **One says the problem is "too little globalization," while the other blames "too much globalization."** The debate on globalization and development ultimately always comes back to the conundrum framed by these competing narratives: if we want to increase our economic growth in order to lift people out of poverty, should we throw ourselves open to the world economy or protect ourselves from it? Unfortunately, **neither narrative offers much help in explaining why some countries have done better than others, and therefore neither is a very good guide for policy.** The truth lies in an uncomfortable place: the middle. It's a point best illustrated by the country that has contributed the most—given its overall size—to the reduction of poverty globally: China. China, in turn, learned from Japan's example, as did other successful Asian countries. The Japanese Exception In the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, globalization enabled new technologies to disseminate in areas with the right preconditions, but also entrenched and accentuated a long-term division between the core and the periphery. Once the lines were drawn between industrializing and commodity-producing countries, strong economic dynamics reinforced the division. **Commodity-based economies faced little incentive or opportunity to diversify.** This was very good for the small number of people who reaped the windfall from the mines and plantations that produced commodities, but not very good for manufacturing industries that were squeezed as a result.1 The countries of the periphery not only failed to industrialize; they actually lost whatever industry they had. They deindustrialized. Geography and natural endowments largely determined nations' economic fates under the first era of globalization, until 1914. One major exception to this rule would ultimately become an inspiration to all commodity-dependent countries intent on breaking the "curse." T**he exception was Japan, the only non-Western society to industrialize prior to 1914. Japan** had many of the features of the economies of the periphery. It exported primarily raw materials—raw silk, yarn, tea, fish—in exchange for manufactures, and this trade had boomed in the aftermath of the opening to free trade imposed by Commodore Matthew Perry in 1854. Left to its own devices, the economy would have likely followed the same path as so many others in the periphery. But Japan had a local group of well-educated, patriotic businessmen and merchants, and even more important, a government—following the Meiji Restoration of 1868—that was single-mindedly focused on economic (and political) modernization. That government was little moved by the laissez-faire ideas prevailing among Western policy elites at the time. Japanese officials made clear that the state had a significant role to play in developing the economy, even though its actions "might interfere with individual freedom and with the gains of speculators."2 Many of the reforms introduced by the Meiji bureaucrats were aimed at creating the infrastructure of a modern national economy: a unified currency, railroads, public education, banking laws, and other legislation. **Considerable effort also went into what today would be called industrial policy—state initiatives targeted at promoting new industries. The Japanese government built and ran state-owned plants in a wide range of industries, including cotton textiles and shipbuilding**. Even though many of these enterprises failed, they produced important demonstration effects. They also trained many skilled artisans and managers who would subsequently ply their trade in private establishments. Eventually privatized, these enterprises enabled the private sector to build on the foundations established by the state. The government also paid to employ foreign technicians and technology in manufacturing industries and financed training abroad for Japanese students. In addition, as Japan regained tariff autonomy from international treaties, the government raised import tariffs on many industrial products to encourage domestic production. These efforts paid off most remarkably in cotton textiles. By 1914, Japan had established a world-class textile industry that was able to displace British exports not just from the Japanese markets, but from neighboring Asian markets as well.3 While Japan's militarist and expansionist policies in the run up to the Second World War tarred these accomplishments, its achievements on the economic front demonstrated it was possible to steer an economy away from its natural specialization in raw materials. Economic growth was achievable, even if a country started at the wrong end of the international division of labor, if you combined the efforts of a determined government with the energies of a vibrant private sector. The Global Rise of East Asia The experience of Asian tigers after the Second World War—**South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia—reinforced the lesson. All of these countries benefited enormously from exports, and hence from globalization.** But none, with the exception of British colony Hong Kong, came even close to being free-market economies. The state played an important guiding and coordinating role in all of them. Consider two of the most successful countries of the region: South Korea and Taiwan. In the late 1950s, neither of these economies was much richer than the

countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. South Korea was mired in political instability and had virtually no industry, having lost whatever it had to the more developed North Korea. Taiwan, too, was a predominantly agricultural economy, with sugar and rice as its main exports. The transformation that the two economies began to experience in the early 1960s placed them on a path that would turn them into major industrial powers. In many ways, their strategies mirrored Japan's. They required, first, a government that was single-mindedly focused on economic growth. Prior land reform in both countries had established some space for governments to act independently from landed elites. Both countries also possessed an overarching geo-political motive. South Korea needed to grow so it could counter any possible threats from North Korea. Taiwan, having given up on the idea of reconquest of mainland China, wanted to forestall any possible challenge from the Communists. The governments in South Korea and Taiwan understood that achieving their political and military goals required rapid economic growth. Developing industrial capabilities and a strong manufactured exports base became their predominant objective. This objective was accomplished by unleashing the energies of private business. Even though both governments invested heavily in public enterprises during the 1960s, the investment was designed to facilitate private enterprise—by providing cheap intermediate inputs, for example—and not to supplant it. One plank of the strategy called for removing the obstacles to private investment that stifled other low-income countries: excessive taxation, red tape and bureaucratic corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and high inflation. These were improvements in what today would be called the "investment climate." **Equally important were interventionist policies—government incentives designed to stimulate investments in modern manufactures.** Both governments designated such industries as "priority sectors" and provided businesses with generous subsidies. In South Korea, these largely took the form of subsidized loans administered through the banking sector. In Taiwan, they came in the form of tax incentives for investments in designated sectors. In both countries, bureaucrats often played the role of midwife to new industries: they coordinated private firms' investments, supplied the inputs, twisted arms when needed, and provided sweeteners when necessary. Even though they removed some of the most egregious import restrictions, neither country exposed its nascent industries to much import competition until well into the 1980s. While they enjoyed protection from international competition, these infant industries were goaded to export almost from day one. This was achieved by a combination of explicit export subsidies and intense pressure from bureaucrats to ensure that export targets were met. **In effect, private businesses were offered a quid pro quo: they would be the beneficiaries of state largesse, but only as long as they exported, and did so in increasing amounts**. If gaining a beachhead in international markets required loss-making prices early on, these could be recouped by the subsidies and profits on the home market. **But importantly, these policies gave private firms a strong incentive to improve their productivity so they could hold their own against established competitors abroad**.4

Globalization helps the poor although it creates winners and losers it must be compared with the countries pre-globalization which shows no trend that neoliberalism made poverty worse than it was before

Pavcnik 09' " Nina, "How has globalization benefited the poor", Professor of Economics Niehaus Family Professorship in International Studies at Dartmouth University, http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/how-has-globalization-benefited-poor".CC

The lives of people in distant countries are increasingly being linked, through commerce, communications technology, or culture. Researchers are trying to parse out how the gains from globalization are touching the lives of the poorest citizens in developing countries. Q: Is there a way to describe, in a broad sense, what impact globalization has had on the poorest people in underdeveloped countries? I first want to clarify what I mean by "globalization." It's an all-encompassing concept, and the aspect of globalization that I focus on in my work is international trade**. If you look back over the past 30 years, developing countries had very high levels of trade protection** — so they had high barriers on imports in terms of taxes, and they restricted imports quantitatively, by quotas or licenses. During the 1980s and 1990s, many countries decided to abandon these protectionist policies and implemented large-scale trade reforms. For example, India implemented trade reforms in 1991, and its average tax on imports dropped from over 80% to an average of 30% in the late 1990s. Colombia went from 50% to around 13%. We observed big increases in trade flows as a result. **Economic growth is the main channel through which globalization can affect poverty. What researchers have found is that, in general, when countries open up to trade, they tend to grow faster and living standards tend to increase.** The usual argument goes that the benefits of this higher growth trickle down to the poor. It has been a bit trickier, especially with aggregate data, to pinpoint how exactly the poor have been benefited. One challenge is that when trade or globalization happens, many other factors are changing, such as technology and macroeconomic conditions. Another challenge is that high-quality data on the well-being of the poor is often not available. It is thus really hard to tease out the effects of globalization on poverty in a broad sense. But, that said, **it is virtually**

impossible to find cases of poor countries that were able to grow over long periods of time without opening up to trade. And we have no evidence that trade leads to increases in poverty and declines in growth. Q: When you look at particular countries, how much variation are you finding in the effect of increased trade? It's very country-specific, and it depends on where countries started off and on the nature of trade reform. Oftentimes, when we try to look at what globalization has done for the poor, we focus on workers in developing countries: what types of factories they work in, and what wages they earn. We often find that wages are lower than similar workers would be making in a country like the United States and working conditions are worse. But another way of looking at the consequences of globalization for poor countries is to actually look at how workers in these countries were doing prior to globalization and compare that to how they are doing now. Recent research has focused on how trade can affect inequality and poverty by affecting relative prices of goods and wages of individuals. And what that literature has found in India and in many Latin American countries is that inequality between the more educated and less educated has increased. The extent of the increase varies somewhat from country to country, but the evidence suggests that the more educated are benefiting more from the trade reforms than the less educated. But **greater inequality doesn't necessar-ily mean greater poverty.** The effect that trade has on less educated laborers in these developing countries depends in part on where they are employed and how mobile they are across sectors. **Workers, both educated and less educated, in export-oriented sectors tend to benefit.** However, workers who were employed in sectors that were initially shielded by higher tariffs experienced a drop in relative wages as tariffs were eliminated. Many countries, such as Mexico and Colombia, had shielded industries that employed a high share of less educated workers. When the tariffs were eliminated, these unskilled workers were disproportionately affected by declines in industry wages. These are short-term costs of globalization, and over time you would hope that these workers would be able to move toward the exporting sectors and share in the benefits of globalization. But that is not occurring as fast as we would like because worker mobility in many of these countries is quite constrained. Q: What factors keep people from moving? Moving is costly. Oftentimes, it goes beyond the financial cost of moving. For example, the poor in these countries often don't have access to formal insurance and a social safety net, so they rely on family networks for these services. This might impede mobility across regions. Q: Could you describe who the poorest people are in these countries? Many studies focus on the consequences of globalization for less educated workers in manufacturing. But there are other parts of the population in developing countries who are even poorer: individuals who live on less than a dollar a day — often small-scale rural farmers. These households spend a large share of their budget on food and other essential items. They are less likely to send their children to school. They are more prone to health risks. Q: How do they end up being reached by globalization? For the rural areas, it really depends on how much globalization involves agriculture and that varies country to country. One example where the poor who were in agriculture benefited substantially was Vietnam. In the mid-1990s, Vietnam liberalized its trade. Prior to that, Vietnam limited the amount of rice that farmers were able to export abroad. When the government eliminated that quota, demand for Vietnamese rice increased and prices of rice in Vietnam increased. This led to higher standards of living for Vietnamese rice farmers. Globalization helped lift many of them out of poverty. Conversely, if you are a country that imports a majority of the food stock, farmers might be made worse off by trade liberalization because prices of agricultural products will fall. You can see how the result depends on the underlying structure of the economy prior to trade liberalization. Q: Why have some regions, such as parts of Africa, not benefited as much from globalization? In some countries in Africa, there are so many factors that work against trade. One of the reasons why many companies don't go into some of those countries is lack of political and economic stability. The risks of doing business are much higher. That precludes them from benefiting from globalization. Trade, alone, won't lift those countries. Many other changes need to occur. Q: Another issue associated with glob-alization is child labor. Does buying a sweatshirt in the United States encourage child labor in the country where that was manufactured? The usual concern that we have about glob-alization leading to child labor focuses on the fact that globalization might generate employment opportunities in poor countries. In particular, consumers in developed coun-tries tend to import a lot of products, such as t-shirts, sweatshirts, and toys, that are made with low-skilled labor. By increasing the demand for these products, we are increasing employment opportunities for children in poor countries and this discourages them from going to school. But to understand the link between child labor and international trade, we really need to think about why children work. And one reason why children might work is the story I just told. But another reason children work is because their families can't survive without the help of child work. Studies suggest that the main reason why children are working is the poverty of their household and the main channels through which trade is affecting whether children work is the effect of trade on household poverty. In circumstances where trade increases living standards of poor households, as was the case in Vietnam, households pulled their children away from work and children started going to school. The liberalization in Vietnam also created greater earning opportunities for children, but because of improved economic conditions these families no longer had to rely on children to work. Q: This suggests that the knee-jerk response of banning children from working in any factory may not be the most effective way to improve their welfare. When you look at the images of children working in not-very-safe factories, that is the knee-jerk reaction. What we need to be asking is, if we banned child labor, if we shut down these factories, what would these children be doing? We would like to see them attend school, but that might not be the alternative for these children. They might take a job that is even more hazardous, like prostitution or stone quarrying, or work in parts of the economy that are even more informal than sweatshops. Q: Are there gender differences in which kids are sent to work or school? Yes. Boys are more likely to work in market work, that is, work for wages, work for a family farm, or work for a household business. Girls are more likely to participate in domestic work, such as fetching firewood, taking care of younger siblings, cooking, sewing. Trade affects boys and girls differentially because it affects these types of work differently. That's one difference. The other thing that we found, in India, is that families on the losing end of globalization were more likely to take girls out of school than boys in response to this economic hardship. Q: How do you think about the long-term implications of whether children forgo school for work? Better-educated individuals tend to do better in life on many dimensions. We also know that countries that have higher human capital accumulation tend to do better. Another factor is that children who are working can be vulnerable to injury and occupational hazards for a longer period of time. Child labor has longer-term implications for these countries in its effects on health and human capital accumulation. But we also have to keep asking ourselves, if children

are not doing this particular job, what is their alternative? Q: For a consumer in the developed world, what actions are actually effective in trying to bring the benefits of globalization to some of the people who are getting left out? Many of us, as we benefit from cheaper goods made in China or Vietnam, or goods that have been made by child labor, worry about what we are doing. But perhaps the best way to help the poor in poor countries is for them to have the employment opportunities that arise when there is demand in rich countries for products that they produce. However, globalization generates winners and losers. For those people who are made worse off, those are real costs, and we have to help them deal with those costs. Even in a country like the United States, it's pretty tricky to compensate the losers from this process, and it's even trickier in the developing countries, where government assistance is not as readily available. **There are a lot of benefits for all of us that can be had by promoting globalization, but government policy needs to make sure that those left behind share in these gains.** Q: Are poverty and inequality threats to globalization? If you look at polls that ask people for their opinions of globalization, there is less opposition in poorer countries than there has recently been in the United States. But I think the threat can grow if more people feel as if they are left out of this process or hurt by this process.

Security Good

Realism

Defensive realism is good wars empirically have only happened in an international system when the balance of power is reached because power and politics are inevitable

Kiseleva 08' "Yulia, "The relevance of realims in international reslations toady", a phd canadidate from kings college London, https://www.academia.edu/1632931/The_Relevance_of_Realism_in_International_Relations_Theory".CC **Firstly, the balance of power derived from the concept of power as the central element of realism seems valid and workable to the present day**. It is not hard to retrace this chain of events taking Europe as a starting point. The Treaty of Westphalia after the Thirty Years' War, the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars, the world order established after the Franco-Prussian War leading to a strong, unified Germany, the Versailles-Washington world order after World War Iand the Yalta-Potsdam world order after World War II are those milestones that enable one to discern a certain logic in the historical process (Carr) and some continuity in world politics (Buzan) . **There have always been great powers, coalitions, the struggle for power, balancing, equilibrium, and wars served as punctuation marks dividing different epochs and bringing into existence new ones. The actors** (states, great powers on the international scene) **changed but the script and decorations did not. This is what Morgenthau called an "astounding continuity" in foreign policy** (Morgenthau) . Besides, war has contributed to shaping the nature of the modern state, "the state makes war and war makes the state" (Rotberg & Rubb) . 2Now that the Cold War is long over, many of today's theorists and policy-makers are welcoming the advent of a new era which will never witness war again. This may prove true but on one condition – that the balance of power is maintained. After the end of the Cold War no new balanced world order was established or, to be precise, there was one world order – with the United States at the helm, with the tacit approval of all others. That, however, does not mean that such an order is capable of generating a truly peaceful environment for all nations. There is still much tension worldwide, not least because of discontent with US foreign policy. According to Waltz, there is now a grave imbalance of power in the world (Waltz) . It seems reasonable to argue that 9/11 has contributed to or even become a pretext for extending American power and military capabilities all across the globe, which in turn continues to contribute to instability indifferent parts of the world as a whole. In this context intensified terrorist activity can be viewed as a consequence of rather than a reason for America's current foreign policy (Waltz) . Even looking at the composition of the United Nations' Security Council, one can say that the world is not represented proportionately. New centers of power have emerged and it is not indicated in the UNSC in any way. **Some may object that the balance of power implicitly means resorting to war, conflict, calamity because power politics is only about violence, the use of force and bringing misery** (Dougherty& Pfaltzgraff) . **But the question is not about banishing power politics from reality and denying its existence but rather bringing about a genuine balance of power that would maintain the easily-broken peace, stability and satisfy many who would in turn help the rest cope with their problems** (e.g. Third World countries). **This line of argument is in agreement with so-called defensive realism, which postulates that it is in a state's interest to preserve the existing balance of power rather than trying to shift it in its favor thus creating instability and conflict (**Waltz) **.That is what guarantees security**

Realism is a good starting point to any specific theory on international relations it tempers wishful think and can be combined with a more open IR framework

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Thus, **realism seems to be still alive in present-day international relations** since such everyday aspects of political life as the national state, sovereignty, legitimacy, power, national interests, security, conflict, war have not sunk into oblivion. **While it is obvious that realism can be easily challenged by other, more optimistic and humane, theories, it has the right to existence, at least because it can complement other perspectives** and produce interesting results in combination with them. As Donnelly contends, there is nothing wrong with theory being too abstract. **The questions that need to be asked are how often, in what instances and for what purposes does realism help understand the**

world (Donnelly) . In this respect, Aron argues **that realism serves as a "good starting point" for understanding the world since at least it can prove a good hindrance to "wishful thinking**" (*Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff*) . Moreover, Buzan believes that**, although realism is instrumental in revealing the fundamentals of political and international life, the narrowness and primitiveness of the realist paradigm can be overcome (**Buzan) . Kegley speaks 5about a possibility of **cooperation between realism and liberalism, particularly a likely merger of the concept of the national interest with the necessity of cooperation among state**s (*Kegley*) .**There is another side to realism – its "normative attraction" (Buzan) . Realism can be viewed as favoring different values such as ideological, cultural, political diversity, political independence, self-reliance. It is, therefore, evident that realism has something to offer to the world it attempts to describe and there are some things that one can either accept or disagree with.** At present, the world seems to be entering a profoundly new stage in its development. The current economic crisis, which affects almost everyone across the globe, is certain to have a tremendous impact on all aspects of human life, from very inconsequential to genuinely important. States are trying to protect the interests of their people in the face of the impending disaster, which may lead to serious consequences on a larger scale. Now nationalism is on the rise. It can stir up a lot of negative feeling across many nations and roll over national boundaries causing conflict and strife. In such circumstances, it may be useful to turn to realism to find some answers and learn its lessons. Realism may be making a huge comeback. Nevertheless, it is its basic tenets that we need in order to never let this comeback happen

Reps Defense

Reps not first

Need to start with policy action

Rigakos and Law 9 (George, Assistant Professor of Law at Carleton University, and Alexandra, Carleton University, "Risk, Realism and the Politics of Resistance", Critical Sociology 35(1) 79-103)

McCann and March (1996: 244) next set out the 'justification for treating everyday practices as significant' suggested by the above literature. First, the works studied are concerned with proving people are not 'duped' by their surroundings. At the level of consciousness, subjects 'are ironic, critical, realistic, even sophisticated' (1996: 225). But McCann and March remind us that earlier radical or Left theorists have made similar arguments without resorting to stories of everyday resistance in order to do so. Second, everyday resistance on a discursive level is said to reaffirm the subject's dignity. But this too causes a problem for the authors because they: query why subversive 'assertions of self' should bring dignity and psychological empowerment when they produce no greater material benefits or changes in relational power ... By standards of 'realism', ... subjects given to avoidance and 'lumping it' may be the most sophisticated of all. (1996: 227) Thus, their criticism boils down to two main points. First, everyday resistance fails to tell us any more about so-called false consciousness than was already known among earlier Left theorists; and second, that a focus on discursive resistance ignores the role of material conditions in helping to shape identity. Indeed, absent a broader political struggle or chance at effective resistance it would seem to the authors that 'powerlessness is learned out of the accumulated experiences of futility and entrapment' (1996: 228). A lamentable prospect, but nonetheless a source of closure for the governmentality theorist. In his own meta-analysis of studies on resistance, Rubin (1996: 242) finds that 'discursive practices that neither alter material conditions nor directly challenge broad structures are nevertheless' considered by the authors he examined 'the stuff out of which power is made and remade'. If this sounds familiar, it is because the authors studied by McCann, March and Rubin found their claims about everyday resistance on the same understanding of power and government employed by postmodern theorists of risk. Arguing against celebrating forms of resistance that fail to alter broader power relations or material conditions is, in part, recognizing the continued 'real' existence of identifiable, powerful groups (classes). In downplaying the worth of everyday forms of resistance (arguing that these acts are not as worthy of the label as those acts which bring about lasting social change), Rubin appears to be taking issue with a locally focused vision of power and identity that denies the possibility of opposing domination at the level of 'constructs' such as class. Rubin (1996: 242) makes another argument about celebratory accounts of everyday resistance that bears consideration: [T]hese authors generally do not differentiate between practices that reproduce power and those that alter power. [The former] might involve pressing that power to become more adept at domination or to dominate differently, or it might mean precluding alternative acts that would more successfully challenge power. ... [I]t is necessary to do more than show that such discursive acts speak to, or engage with, power. It must also be demonstrated that such acts add up to or engender broader changes. In other words, some of the acts of everyday resistance may in the real world, through their absorption into mechanisms of power, reinforce the localized domination that they supposedly oppose. The implications of this argument can be further clarified when we study the way 'resistance' is dealt with in a risk society.

Reps focus kills ptx

Bryant 2014 (Levi R. Bryant, "Thoughts on the Social and Political Implications of Correlationism" https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2014/01/20/thoughts-on-the-social-and-political-implications-of-correlationism/)

...the political problem of contemporary philosophy identified by the 'new realists' is, in fact, the product of a more fundamental epistemic problem. In his book After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux calls this problem 'correlationism' and identifies it as an essentially post-Kantian legacy, which continues to dominate and limit philosophy. As a matter of fact, correlationism lies at the heart of postmodern theory and consists in the premise that thought can only 'think itself,' that the real is inaccessible to

knowledge and human subjectivity, and that there is nothing but discursive constructs that fully determine thinking and that are meth0dologically accounted for all the way down. (1 – 2)¶Thought thinking only itself. Thought only encountering itself. In the jargon of postmodern and poststructuralist lingo, this would be the thesis of infinite semiosis, where signs ("thoughts") only ever relate to other signs. Within ths framework, discursivity comes to be the hegemonic framework defining all of being. At the level of politics and social theory more generally, if the correlationist thesis is true the consequences are clear: all social phenomena are discursive and all solutions to social and political problems will be discursive. The sole sphere of the political will be the discursive and all questions of politics will be questions of speech-acts and interpretation.¶The problem here is not that many theorists recognize that the discursive and semiotic plays an important role in the social and the political. It does and I've repeated this tirelessly. The problem is with what happens when thought or the semiotic becomes a hegemon, an "all", foreclosing our ability to recognize other forms of power. What I've wanted to say is that not all power functions discursively. In my last post and elsewhere I spoke of some other forms of politics:¶Thermopolitics: The politics surrounding energy in the form of calories and fuels such as gasoline and coal, and how our life and our very bodies are structured by energy dependencies and by being trapped in particular distributive networks that render these forms of energy available. I'm being quite literal when I speak of energy, talking about the effects, for example, of the absence of food in certain educational environments on cognition, for example; and am generally hostile to metaphorical extensions of the concept of energy which I see as erasing the dimension of real materiality.¶Geopolitics: The role that features of natural and built geography such as mountain ranges, rivers, oceans, soil conditions, roads, housing design, etc., play in the form that social relations take and how they impact individual bodies.¶Chronopolitics: The way in which the structuration of time organize what is possible for us. For example, the structuration of the working day, how much we can say and comprehend at any given time, the impact of things like the invention of the clock, etc.¶Oikopolitics: This would be the domain of political economy described so well by Marxists.¶So five different types of politics: Semiopolitics (or what currently dominates critical theory), thermopolitics, geopolitics, chronopolitics, and oikopolitics. No doubt there are other sites of the political or political struggle that we could speak of, but this is a good start. Also, it should be obvious that these aren't exclusive domains, but are entangled in all sorts of important ways. For example, something might take place at the level of semiopolitics (speech, law, rhetoric, norms, communication) that has all sorts of impact at the level of thermopolitics. Congress might decide to cut programs that fund school meal programs. This, in turn, will have a thermodynamic impact on those students that go without the calories they need developmentally and cognitively to function in a particular way. There is an entanglement here of semiopolitical and thermopolitical domains. The young student here has been constrained both at the level of semiotic phenomena and thermodynamic structures.¶The point is that if true, semiotic intervention (speech-acts, protests, interpretations, deconstructions, etc) will not be an appropriate response to all political problems because social formations are not entirely structured by the semiotic. The child in that school does not suffer from a lack of the right signs, but from a lack of calories needed to run the engine of his thought and body. Certainly semiotic interventions might be needed to render that energy available, but it is the energy itself that is at issue and the absence of that energy that forms the spider web entangling him in his position. A correlationist perspective tends to erase this as even being a site of the political.

Anthropocene means reps focus uniquely fails now

Clive **Hamilton** 01-24-**2013** ("Climate Change Signals the End of the Social Sciences" http://theconversation.com/climate-change-signals-the-end-of-the-social-sciences-11722)

In response to the heatwave that set a new Australia-wide record on 7 January, when the national average maximum reached 40.33°C, the Bureau of Meteorology issued a statement that, on reflection, sounds the death knell for all of the social sciences taught in our universities.¶ "Everything that happens in the climate system now", the manager of climate monitoring at the Bureau said, "is taking place on a planet which is a degree hotter than it used to be."¶ Eminent US climate scientist, Kevin Trenberth, made the same point more fully last year:¶ The answer to the oft-asked question of whether an event is caused by climate change is that it is the wrong question. <u>All weather events are affected by climate change because the environment in which they occur is warmer and moister than it used to be</u>.¶ Trenberth's commentary calls on us to reframe how we think about human-induced climate change. <u>We can no longer place some events into the box marked "Nature" and some into the box marked "Human</u>".¶ The invention of these <u>two boxes was the defining feature of modernity, an idea founded on Cartesian and Kantian philosophies of the subject</u>. Its emergence has also been tracked by science studies in the contradiction between purified science and the messy process of knowledge creation, leading to Bruno Latour's troubling claim that <u>the separation of Human and Nature was an illusion</u>, and that "we have never been modern".¶ Climate science is now telling us that such a separation can no longer be sustained, that the natural and the human are mixed up, and their influences cannot be neatly distinguished.¶ This <u>human-nature hybrid is true</u> not just of the climate system, but <u>of the planet as a whole</u>, although it would be enough for it to be true of the climate system. We know from the new discipline of Earth system science that changes in the atmosphere affect not just the weather but the Earth's hydrosphere (the watery parts), the biosphere (living creatures) and even the lithosphere (the Earth's crust). They are all linked by the great natural cycles and processes that make the planet so dynamic. In short, everything is in play.¶ Apart from climatic change, <u>it is apparent that human activity has transformed the Earth in profound ways</u>. Every cubic metre of air and water, every hectare of land now has a human imprint, from hormones in the seas, to fluorocarbons in the atmosphere and radioactivity from nuclear weapons tests in the soil.¶ Each year <u>humans shift ten times more rock and soil around the Earth than the great natural processes of erosion and weathering</u>. Half of the land surface has been modified by humans. Dam-building since the 1930s has held back enough water to keep the oceans three centimetres lower than otherwise. Extinctions are now occurring at a rate 100 times faster than the natural one.¶ So profound has been the influence of humans that Earth scientists such as Will Steffen have recently declared that <u>the Earth has entered a new geological epoch</u>, an epoch defined by the fact that the "human imprint on the global environment has now become so large and active that it rivals some of the great forces of Nature in its impact on the functioning of the Earth system". <u>Known as the Anthropocene</u>, the Age of Humans, it marks the end of the Holocene, the 10,000-year period of remarkable climatic stability and clemency that allowed civilisation to flourish.¶ The <u>modern social sciences</u> — sociology, psychology, political science, economics, history and, we may add, philosophy — <u>rest on the assumption that the grand and the humdrum events of human life take place against a backdrop of an inert nature</u>. Only humans have agency. Everything worthy of analysis occurs in the sealed world of "the social", and where nature does make itself felt – in environmental history, sociology or politics – "the environment" is the Umwelt, the natural world "over there" that surrounds us and sometimes intrudes on our plans, but always remains separate.¶ What was distinctive of the "social sciences" that emerged in 18th-century Europe was not so much their aspiration to science but their "social-only" domain of concern.¶ <u>So the advent of the Anthropocene shatters the self-contained world of social analysis</u> that is the terrain of modern social science, <u>and explains why those intellectuals who remain within it find it impossible to "analyze" the politics, sociology or philosophy of climate change in a way that is true to the science</u>. They end up floundering in the old categories, unable to see that something epochal has occurred, a rupture on the scale of the Industrial Revolution or the emergence of civilization itself.¶ A few are trying to peer through the fog of modernism. In an epoch-marking intervention, Chicago historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that <u>the distinction we have drawn between natural history and human history has now collapsed</u>. With the arrival of the Anthropocene, <u>humans have become a geological force</u> so that the two kinds of history have converged and <u>it is no longer true that "all history properly so called is the history of human affairs</u>".¶ E.H. Carr's famous definition of history must now be discarded:¶ History begins when men begin to think of the passage of time in terms not of natural processes — the cycle of the seasons, the human life-span — but of a series of specific events in which men are consciously involved and which they can consciously influence.¶ From hereon our history will increasingly be dominated by "natural processes", influenced by us but largely beyond our control. Our future has become entangled with that of the Earth's geological evolution. As I argue in a forthcoming book, contrary to the modernist faith, it can no longer be maintained that humans make their own history, for the stage on which we make it has now entered into the play as a dynamic and

capricious force.¶ And the actors too must be scrutinised afresh. If on the Anthropocene's hybrid Earth it is no longer tenable to characterise humans as the rational animal, God's chosen creatures or just another species, what kind of being are we?¶ The social sciences taught in our universities must now be classed as "pre-Anthropocene". The process of reinventing them — so that what is taught in our arts faculties is true to what has emerged in our science faculties — will be a sustained and arduous intellectual enterprise. After all, it was not just the landscape that was scorched by 40.33°C, but modernism itself.

China method defense

Discourse of co-operation shapes better sino – U.S policies

Mawdsley 07 (Emma Department of Geography, prof @ 04/2007 Cambridge University China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of Power http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Emma_Mawdsley/publication/229577767_China_and_Africa_Emerging_Challenges_to_the_Geographies_of_Power/links/54f6e0770cf27d8ed71f6287.pdf)(AC)

Deepening Sino–African relations are one indicator of a changing world order. The West's diplomatic, political and economic hegemony, while far from seriously threatened, is subject to an increasingly visible challenge. China is seeking increasing trade, investment, diplomatic missions and geopolitical alliances across the world. The outcomes will be socially, politically, economically and environmentally profound. As important as the actual material shape and impacts of China's rise (such as decreasing prices for consumer goods, competition for oil, the environmental impacts of its growing economy, or its programme of military development) will be the way in which Western governments, and most obviously the USA, perceive, construct and respond to the fact of China's growth (Arrighi 2005a, b; Johnston 2003; C. Pan 2006). There is a strong tendency to simplify and even demonise China, demonstrated in the growing number of popular alarmist accounts (e.g. Gertz 2002; Menges 2005; Mosher 2000;Timperlake and Triplett 2002), but also present within some foreign policy circles (see Johnston 2003). Africa is one arena in which economic and diplomatic competition is being played out. There are, of course, very real concerns, whether from a progressive standpoint (e.g. in terms of human rights and dignity, environmental futures, or participation and democracy), or, at the opposite end of what is a complex spectrum, from a realist international relations position (e.g. China as an aggressive competitor for resources, and potentially a future military threat, eventually seeking hegemonic power). But as this very brief review of Sino–African relations shows, any understanding of these emerging geographies are aided by a fuller 416 . China and Africa: emerging challenges to the geographies of power © 2007 The Author Geography Compass 1/3 (2007): 405–421, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2007.00019.x Journal Compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd appreciation of historical underpinnings; of multi-dimensional relations (not just oil or authoritarian regimes); of complex actors (noting the divisions and tensions within the Chinese and African states, people and companies); of the agency of African actors; and, not least, through considerably more humility regarding the West's past and present relations with Africa. For different Africans and African countries, China brings a range of benefits as well as problems, and China will undoubtedly become an ever more important factor in the continent's future. For the rest of the world, Sino–African relations, and how the West responds to them, may act as a very important marker of the changing geographies of power – and how these will be resisted or embraced.

Distribution of power controls challenges to American primacy – the aff is a unique form of solvency

Chan 06 (STEVE CHAN a a Chair and professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado , Boulder Published online: 07 Aug 2006. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636410490914077)(AC)

Contrary to a general inclination by colleagues engaging in this discourse to focus on how fast China is growing (whether economically or militarily), the arguments presented here suggest that one should be more concerned about whether this growth will slow down. A rising power, as long as it expects further rapid growth, is more inclined to accept minor concessions in the hope of making further gains in future rounds of bargaining. When its growth tapers off or even stops, it will demand larger concessions because it is no longer restrained by the incentive of deferred gratification. A declining hegemon will be called upon to make a large, lump-sum concession for the distribution of benefits to be adjusted fully in accordance with the actual distribution of power. Previous discussions of preventive war have focused on the motivation of the preventer,69 particularly its concern that waiting may mean a less favorable outcome for it later on. This emphasis naturally draws one's attention to the speed of the ascending state's growth. How fast is this prospective challenger closing the gap between it and the leading state? It is supposed that the more rapid the power shift to its relative disadvantage, the more urgency there is for the preventer to act. Conversely,

the slower this change and/or the more limited the challenger's growth potential is perceived to be, the weaker should be the declining hegemon's preventive motivation.Powell's research suggests that one needs to recognize a crosscutting current from the challenger's perspective.70 From this state's viewpoint, waiting is preferable to waging war as long as it can expect further improvements in its bargaining position. When it realizes that its growth is waning and that it is in danger of falling behind other, faster-growing states, it has less incentive to accept deferred gratification. **It is more inclined to demand full adjustment in benefits when its bargaining position is as strong as it will ever be. In short, the implications of power shifts tend to be quite different for declining and rising states. We need to be cognizant of both their motivations because, after all, the outbreak of war reflects a joint decision (that is, both must believe that they will be better off by fighting than by living in peace**). The analytic logic and historical evidence presented in this article lead to a very different interpretation than the current predominant characterization of Sino-American relations—and not just compared to that presented by those emphasizing the "China threat." My proposition accords instead with Copeland's argument that "since rising states wish to avoid conflict, [his] theory would expect China to continue to be relatively peaceful (especially since economic engagement is helping to fuel its growth). If destabilizing policies are to be initiated, the perpetrator will likely be a declining United States."71 At the same time, Copeland emphasized the caveat that unless a dominant but declining power believes its downward mobility will be deep and inevitable, it will not launch a preventive war, as there are other, more acceptable means to maintain its status.72 Clearly, the United States is predominant today and will remain so in the foreseeable future in tangible military and economic power, intangible soft power, and potential to realize both kinds of power with respect to not only China, but also every other country in the world. As will be seen shortly, suggestions that there is or will soon be a power transition in Sino-American relations are very misleading. There is debate in the United States about the relative merits of a policy to engage or contain China.73 Advocates of engagement argue in favor of integrating China in the existing international institutions and global conventions. They see widening and deepening economic interdependence as another way to restrain Beijing's bellicosity in its foreign relations and to encourage its domestic political and economic liberalization. Either implicitly or explicitly, they hope to "reform" China by influencing its values and practices through regular interactions and positive exchanges designed to influence the formation of its policy agenda and the political standing and perceived self-interests of its various stakeholders in pursuing this agenda. Proponents of a containment policy are pessimistic about these hoped-for changes and prefer instead to take actions that would block or at least curtail Beijing's power ascent. They would rather accept the risks of provoking and even exacerbating strains in current bilateral relations than the risks of a stronger China in the future. Whether the hard-line policies being advocated would have an effect in abetting or reinforcing Beijing's suspicions and even hostility is less consequential for the proponents of containment than the likely future distribution of power if nothing is done now to hamper Beijing's rising capability trajectory. What about China's likely policies toward the United States? Notwithstanding occasional belligerent verbal posturing,74 one would not expect China as a rising power to seek or provoke a confrontation with the United States. If anything, one would expect it to signal its limited goals and good intentions. It will have much to lose and little to gain by doing or saying anything that would strengthen the arguments of those in the United States favoring a hard-line policy. Beijing would make its security position worse rather than better if its actions or words were to induce Washington to enhance its armament and therefore to put China at a serious disadvantage (due to its economic and potential power in Copeland's terms) in an arms race with the United States. Indeed, despite all its bluster, Beijing's policy has sought to avoid a confrontation with Washington. Its preferred ways to influence Washington, especially in light of the George W. Bush administration's declared intention to wage preventive war (against Iraq), have been to emphasize the role of international organizations (for example, the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three), interlocking interests in international commerce and investment, and various lobby groups (for example, business firms, trade associations) within the United States that have a stake in continuing and expanding Sino-American ties.75 Readers familiar with the arguments of those who favor engaging China and, more broadly, those who believe in the proposition of liberal peace, whether that advanced originally by Immanuel Kant (1795) or more recently articulated by scholars such as Bruce Russett and John Oneal, will surely notice the irony. Beijing is applying the very tools advocated by U.S. liberals to transform China in its effort to restrain assertive and even bellicose unilateralism by the United States. An exclusive concern with the distribution of power misses half the picture. Some take the view that states pursue power as an end in itself. This article adopts the opposite perspective: that power is a means to achieve other ends. States do not go to war unless they believe that they can improve upon their current benefits. This reasoning draws attention to the arguments advanced by the theory of status inconsistency. Do the benefits being received by a state

correspond to its relative power? A rising state will not go to war if it can attain gains in benefits peacefully. Nor will a declining state go to war if it can continue to claim a surplus of benefits (that is, more benefits than it is objectively entitled to by its relative power). As Powell put it succinctly, "if the distribution of benefits mirrors the distribution of power, no state can credibly threaten to use force to change the status quo and the risk of war is smallest. If, however, there is a sufficiently large disparity between the distribution of power and benefits, the status quo may be threatened regardless of what the underlying distribution of power is."[77] This formulation calls attention to not just changes in relative power as a possible determinant of international instability, but also the role played by any possible institutional, political, and psychological rigidity that resists altering the existing distribution of benefits to reflect more accurately recent and ongoing changes in relative power.

Rising power

Friedberg 11 (Aaron L. Friedberg served from 2003 to 2005 in the office of the Vice President of the United States as deputy assistant for national-security affairs and director of policy planningpeer reviewed The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Friedberg%20US%20China%20Relations.pdf)(AC)

For realist pessimists, the single most important feature of the PRC today is its rising power. Everything else, including the likely character of the U.S.-China relationship, follows from this fact. Taking aggregate economic capacity as a rough surrogate for overall national power, it is apparent that China's growth has been extraordinarily rapid. Since the start of economic reforms in 1978, the PRC's gross national product (GNP) is thought to have increased by a factor of four and, according to some estimates, it could double again by the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century.[26] What is especially impressive about the Chinese economy is not only the speed with which it appears to be expanding but its growing mass and enormous potential. Given the sheer size of its population and the rising productivity of its workers, China may one day regain its historic position as the world's largest economy. Although such projections are fraught with difficulties and uncertainties, some experts have calculated that China's economy could overtake that of the United States as early as 2015.[27] The combination of the speed and the magnitude of China's growth in recent decades appears to be unprecedented. The closest analogy is proba- bly the emergence of the United States as the world's preponderant economy over the course of the nineteenth century. As was true of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so too is China's rapidly growing economy bringing expanding military capabilities in its train. A fast-growing GNP has made it comparatively easy for the PRC to sustain a large and expanding military effort and, in recent years, China's spending on arms and military equipment has grown at an impressive pace.[28] The rising levels of productivity, per capita incomes, and technological competence that accompany economic growth should also translate into an increasing ability both to absorb sophisticated weapons imported from foreign suppliers and eventually to develop such systems indigenously.[29] Although the picture is mixed, and the PRC continues to lag in many areas, these expectations too are borne out by the general pattern of Chinese military development over the last several decades. There are good reasons to expect that China will be able to build and deploy more increasingly capable military systems in the years ahead.[31]

Expansion – SOI

Friedberg 11 (Aaron L. Friedberg served from 2003 to 2005 in the office of the Vice President of the United States as deputy assistant for national-security affairs and director of policy planningpeer reviewed The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Friedberg%20US%20China%20Relations.pdf)(AC)

Realist pessimists note that, throughout history, rising powers have tended to be troublemakers, at least insofar as their more established counterparts in the international system are concerned. This is the case, in the realists' view, regardless of regime type; it was as true of a rising, democratic United States as it was of a rising, autocratic Germany. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, "The external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development."[31] There appear to be a

number of reasons for this pattern. As a state's capabilities grow, its leaders tend to define their interests more expansively and to seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. Rising powers seek not only to secure their frontiers but to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials, and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home, defend their foreign friends and allies, and promulgate their values; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their legitimate say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. This correlation between growing power and expanding interests has been succinctly summarized by Robert Gilpin: "A more wealthy and more powerful state ... will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state."32 As they seek to assert themselves, rising powers are often drawn to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutional arrangements, and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were relatively weak. Their leaders and people often feel that they were unfairly left out when the pie was divided up, and may even believe that, because of their prior weakness, they were robbed of what was rightfully theirs. Like Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, rising powers tend to want their "place in the sun," and this often brings them into conflict with more established great powers, which are typically the architects and principal beneficiaries of the existing international system.33 The collision between the expanding interests of a rising power and those of its more established counterparts can be dealt with in a number of ways, but the resulting disputes are seldom resolved peacefully. Recognizing the growing threat to its position, a dominant power (or coalition of status quo powers) may attempt to use force preventively to destroy a rising state before it can achieve its full potential. Less bellicose, established powers have also at times sought to appease emerging states, looking for ways to satisfy their demands and ambitions without conflict and to engage them and incorporate them peacefully into an existing international order. However sincere and well intentioned these efforts may be, they have usually failed. Sometimes the reason is clearly the character of the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitler's Germany, for example, a rising power may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively committing suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less extensive, the status quo powers may be too reluctant to make reasonable concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and leading to escalating demands. Successful policies of engagement/appeasement are certainly possible in theory, but in practice they have proven to be difficult to implement.34 Looking at the raw facts of its expanding economy and growing military capabilities, most realist pessimists would be content to conclude that China is a rising power and that, as such, it is unlikely to behave differently than have others of its type throughout history. Thus Huntington, after describing the correlation in past cases between rapid internal growth and external expansion, predicts that China too will "undoubtedly be moving into such a phase in the coming decades."" Similarly, according to John Mearsheimer, so long as China's power continues to grow, "China, like all previous potential hegemons, [will] be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon."36 Some analysts go a step further, arguing that China is especially likely to behave assertively, even at the risk of coming into conflict with others. Recent Chinese history, the "century of humiliation" that began with the Opium Wars of the 1840s and ended only with the final expulsion of foreign powers from the mainland after World War II, appears to have left China's leaders and its people acutely sensitive to perceived slights to national honor and prestige and especially alert to threats around their periphery.37 As a result of the painful experiences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, contemporary Chinese strategists may be even more eager than they might otherwise be to establish a sphere of influence or zone of control that would prevent such threats from reemerging in the future.38 Reaching even further back into the past, other observers point to the fact that, before its decline and domination by outside powers, China was for many centuries the preponderant force in Asia and the hub of a Sinocentric Asian international system. As they adapt to the reality of their growing power and look for models to guide their behavior under increasingly favorable conditions, the leadership in Beijing could hearken back to this earlier era of glory and seek to reestablish China as East Asia's preponderant power.39 Some U.S. government agencies have concluded that China's current leaders aim to "maximize [China's] influence within East Asia relative to the U.S." or, more bluntly, to become "the preeminent power in Asia."4"' If this is true, and assuming that the United States continues to adhere to its century-old policy of opposing the dominance of either half of Eurasia by a hostile power or coalition, the stage will be set for an intense and possibly protracted strategic competition between the two Pacific giants.41

Heg defense

Power transition is

Chan 06 (STEVE CHAN a a Chair and professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado Boulder Published online: 07 Aug 2006.
http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781134069835_sample_523874.pdf)(AC)

Historical analogies can provide a useful basis for understanding. Some have suggested that those in charge of contemporary Sino-American relations can benefit from studying the dynamics of Anglo-German rivalry a century ago.5 Others have tried to synthesize a larger number of historical episodes in order to formulate a more generalizable statement. Among such formulations, the theory of power transition has offered a leading analytic perspective and a robust research program.6 The respect and popularity accorded to this theory follow from a substantial number of studies seeking to validate its empirical derivations.7 Thus, it seems natural that Sinologists as well as others with different field specializations are drawn to this theory. This attraction extends not just to Americans but also to their Chinese colleagues, therefore suggesting a common framework of reference for their dialogue.8 This book focuses on this discourse pertaining to power transition, and seeks to develop and clarify further the relevant analytic logic and conceptual basis in the hope of understanding better the policy and theoretical implications of China's recent ascendance in the international system. What is the central claim of the power-transition theory? It contends that when a revisionist latecomer overtakes an erstwhile leader of the international system, war looms. War is likely to be precipitated by the faster-growing upstart in its attempt to displace the declining hegemon. The Anglo-German rivalry is supposed to exemplify this dynamic that eventually ended in the outbreak of World Wars I and II. Similarly, France's decline relative to Prussia is taken to have set the stage for their war of 1870.9 Contrary to the view that a balance of power between the major states provides a basis for peace and stability, the theory of power transition argues that the approach to a more symmetric relationship and especially the occurrence of a positional reversal between the two top states augur increased bilateral tension which in turn has the potential of engulfing other countries in a system-wide conflict. The logic of the power-transition theory naturally raises the concern that China's recent rapid growth portends more turmoil for the international system and the danger of heightened discord, even military collision, between Beijing and Washington.10 The brief stylized account given above presumes a shared understanding about what makes a state powerful. It would of course be difficult to assess relative changes in national power absent an agreement about the nature of this power. Therefore, when people speak about an ongoing or impending power transition, it is pertinent to inquire about the empirical indicators they are using. That is, what is the nature of their evidence? Although territorial or demographic size may be a factor, it would surely not be a decisive one because, according to these measures, Russia and China would remain the most powerful countries throughout the contemporary era. If one chooses to emphasize military power, for example by focusing on the number of a country's military personnel or the size of its defense budget, the U.K. has never been the world's premier power according to these criteria. Moreover, the entire notion of any ongoing or pending power transition involving the U.S. becomes far-fetched, as this country has been spending more on the military than the rest of the world combined. One could perhaps turn to economic size or productivity as another way to track changing national status. It is worth noting, however, that the U.S. had overtaken the U.K. as the world's largest economy before World War I. According to this criterion, prior to 1914 a power transition had occurred between the U.S. and the U.K. and not between the U.K. and Germany, if one is to focus on the displacement of a previously dominant state by a latecomer. Moreover, the Anglo-American transition was peaceful, even though it was not entirely without acrimony. Measured by their respective economic size, Germany prior to World War II and the USSR since that conflict never came close to challenging the U.S. lead. It also does not appear that the U.S. economy is in any imminent danger of being overtaken by the Chinese economy (certainly not in terms of per capita income which may be used as an approximation of a citizenry's productivity), even though the latter's size has recently grown rapidly from a relatively low base. Finally, if one emphasizes a state's pioneering and dominant status in developing leading economic sectors, one would again be hard

pressed to argue that China is capable currently or in the foreseeable future of competing with the U.S. in fostering scientific discovery and technological innovation.11 These issues naturally require those concerned about power transitions to be more specific about the capability attribute(s) they have in mind when speaking about power shifts among the world's leading states. Without a clear specification of these attributes, one can hardly begin to assess when power transitions have occurred historically and whether any is currently taking place in Sino-American relations. Vague and/or shifting empirical referents cause confusing and even arbitrary arguments about when power transitions occur and what consequences they entail. Although people can have reasonable disagreements about which indicators give the most valid or reliable information about national power, it is necessary for them to be clear and consistent about the ones they do use to reach their judgments. In Chapter 2, I explore different measures of national power for any evidence of an ongoing or impending power transition involving China. This analysis shows that the U.S. has a vast lead in those capabilities that are critical in determining future economic growth and productivity. It is also militarily much stronger than China or, for that matter, any other country or conceivable combination of countries.

Social science proves hegemony

Wohlforth 09 ("http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "back"William C. Wohlforth, Professor of government @ Dartmouth College, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, Pg. 33-35)(AC)

The literature on bargaining failure in the context of power shifts remains inconclusive, and it is premature to take any empirical pattern as necessarily probative. Indeed, Robert Powell has recently proposed that indivisibility is not a rationalistic explanation for war after all: fully rational leaders with perfect information should prefer to settle a dispute over an indivisible issue by resorting to a lottery rather than a war certain to destroy some of the goods in dispute. What might prevent such bargaining solutions is not indivisibility itself, he argues, but rather the parties' inability to commit to abide by any agreement in the future if they expect their relative capabilities to continue to shift. HYPERLINK " The larger point is that positional concerns for status may help account for the puzzle of bargaining failure. In the rational choice bargaining literature, war is puzzling because it destroys some of the benefits or flows of benefits in dispute between the bargainers, who would be better off dividing the spoils without war. Yet what happens to these models if what matters for states is less the flows of material benefits themselves than their implications for relative status? The salience of this question depends on the relative importance of positional concern for status among states. Do Great Powers Care about Status? Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state's satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state's status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity. Much of this research concerns individuals, but international politics takes place between groups. Is there reason to expect individuals who act in the name of states to be motivated by status concerns? Compelling findings in social psychology suggest a positive answer. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY (SIT) has entered international relations research as a psychological explanation for competitive interstate behavior.26 According to the theory's originator, Henri Tajfel, social identity is "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership."27 Tajfel and his followers argue that deep-seated human motivations of self-definition and self-esteem induce people to define their identity in relation to their in-group, to compare and contrast that in-group with out-groups, and to **want that comparison to reflect favorably** on themselves. In a [End Page 35] remarkable set of experiments that has since been replicated dozens of times, Tajfel and his collaborators found that simply assigning subjects to trivially defined "minimal" in-groups led them to discriminate in favor of their in-group at the expense of an out-group, even when nothing else about the setting implied a competitive relationship. Although SIT appears to provide a plausible candidate explanation for interstate conflict, moving beyond its robust but general implication about the ubiquitous potential for status seeking to specific hypotheses about state behavior has proved challenging. In particular, experimental findings concerning which groups individuals will select as relevant comparisons and which of many possible identity-maintenance strategies they will choose have proved highly sensitive to the assumptions made about the social context. The results of experimental research seeking to predict responses to status anxiety—whether people will choose social mobility (identifying with a higher status group), social creativity (seeking to redefine the relevant status-conferring dimensions to favor those in which one's group excels), social conflict (contesting the status-superior group's claim to higher rank), or some other strategy—are similarly highly context dependent.28 For international relations the key unanswered question remains: under what circumstances might the constant underlying motivation for a positive self-image and high status translate into violent conflict? While sit research is suggestive, standard concerns about the validity of experimental findings are exacerbated by the fact that the extensive empirical sit literature is generally not framed in a way that captures salient features of international relations. The social system in which states operate is dramatically simpler than the domestic social settings much of the research seeks to capture. Decision makers' identification with the state is generally a given, group boundaries are practically impermeable, and there are very few great powers and very limited mobility. For states, comparison choice and the selection of status- maintenance strategies are constrained by exogenous endowments and geographical location. Natural and historical endowments—size and power potential—vary much more among states than among individuals [End Page 36] and so play a much larger role in determining hierarchies and influencing the selection of identity maintenance strategies. Assumptions built into most sit research to date generally do not capture these realities of interstate life. In particular, standard sit research designs beg the question of the expected costs of competing for status. Experiments do not generally posit situations in which some groups are endowed with demonstrably superior means with which to discriminate in favor of their own group at the expense of out-groups. Indeed, built in to most experimental setups is an implied assumption of material equality among groups. Yet international politics is notable as a social realm with especially large disparities in material capabilities, and decision makers are unlikely to follow identity-maintenance strategies that are demonstrably beyond their means. Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt the relevance for states of sit's core finding that individual preferences for higher status will affect intergroup interactions. Individuals who identify with a group transfer the individual's status preference to the group's relations with other groups. If those who act on behalf of a state

(or those who select them) identify with that state, then they can be expected to derive utility from its status in international society. In addition, there are no evident reasons to reject the theory's applicability to interstate settings that mimic the standard sit experimental setup—namely, in an ambiguous hierarchy of states that are comparable in material terms. As Jacques Hymans notes: "In the design of most sit experiments there is an implicit assumption of rough status and power parity. Moreover, the logic of sit theory suggests that its findings of in group bias may in fact be dependent on this assumption."29Status conflict is thus more likely in flat, ambiguous hierarchies than in clearly stratified ones. And there are no obvious grounds for rejecting the basic finding that comparison choice will tend to be "similar but upward" (that is, people will compare and contrast their group with similar but higher status groups).30 In most settings outside the laboratory this leaves a lot of room for consequential choices, but in the context of great power relations, the set of feasible comparison choices is constrained in highly consequential ways. [End Page 37]How Polarity Affects Status Competition SIT is often seen in a scholarly context that contrasts power-based and identity-based explanations.31 It is thus put forward as a psychological explanation for competitive behavior that is completely divorced from distributions of material resources. But there is no theoretical justification for this separation. On the contrary, a long-standing research tradition in sociology, economics, and political science finds that actors seek to translate material resources into status. Sociologists from Weber and Veblen onward have postulated a link between material conditions and the stability of status hierarchies. When social actors acquire resources, they try to convert them into something that can have more value to them than the mere possession of material things: social status. As Weber put it: "Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity." 32 This link continues to find support in the contemporary economics literature on income distribution and status competition.33 Status is a social, psychological, and cultural phenomenon. Its expression appears endlessly varied; it is thus little wonder that the few international relations scholars who have focused on it are more struck by its variability and diversity than by its susceptibility to generalization. 34 Yet if SIT captures important dynamics of human behavior, and if people seek to translate resources into status, then the distribution of capabilities will affect the likelihood of status competition in **predictable ways**. Recall that theory, research, and experimental results suggest that relative status concerns will come to the fore when status hierarchy is ambiguous and that people will tend to compare the states with which they identify to similar but higher-ranked states.35 Dissatisfaction arises not from dominance itself but from a dominance that [End Page 38] appears to rest on ambiguous foundations.

Distribution of resources and dissatisfied contenders prove the need for hegemony

Bussman and Oneal 07 (Margit Department of Politics and Management University of Konstanz, Germany and John Political Science Department University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa "Do Hegemons distribute private goods" https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/handle/123456789/4147/Do_hegemons_distribute_privat_goods_Bussmann_Oneal_JCR_2007_51_88.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)(AC)

Power-transition theory is constructed on three fundamental claims (Kugler and Lemke 2000): the internal growth of nations influences international politics, world politics is characterized by hierarchy rather than anarchy, and relative power and evaluations of the international status quo are important determinants of interstate wars. From its earliest formulation, Organski (1968) emphasized the implications of national economic and political development for interstate relations in the modern era. Industrialization and the growing effectiveness of the state increase a nation's power and change its behavior internationally. The countries that industrialized first came to dominate the international system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but later modernizers periodically challenged the status quo. This emphasis on the international implications of domestic development sets power-transition theory apart from most realist writings, which typically take a more static view of nations' power. An even more striking difference with conventional realism is the emphasis power-transition theory places on the hierarchical—rather than anarchic—character of world politics. Organski (1968) likened the international system to a pyramid with the most powerful state at the apex and major, middle, and minor powers arrayed below. Relations among these states are anarchic in the literal sense that there is no world government, but the international system is not chaotic. The international system is hierarchical because the dominant state established and maintains it, creating patterns in states' political, military, and economic relations and in "the distribution of value" (Kugler and Lemke 2000, 131). The leading state "orders, adjusts, and allocates" (Siverson and Miller 1996, 59), and it "always benefits disproportionately from any enterprises involving less powerful states, be they friends or foes" (Organski 1968, 358). Thus, power-transition theorists adopt the traditional view of the powerful: they use their power to promote their interests. The dominant state maintains a stable international order because it is the principal beneficiary of peace. 90 Journal of Conflict Resolution © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Downloaded from http://jcr.sagepub.com at Universitat Konstanz on March 16, 2007 Bussmann, Oneal / Do Hegemons Distribute Private Goods? 91 To serve its interests, the hegemon enlists the support of other powerful states.1 Despite its

great capabilities, it cannot control potential rivals by itself or cannot control them as efficiently, so the leading state constructs a defensive security system— a status quo alliance system (Tammen et al. 2000, 33) designed to maintain the advantageous global order it created after the last great war (Organski 1968; Gilpin 1981). To be successful, a number of great and middle powers must be attracted to the hegemon's side. Powerful states are courted because they can provide valuable support. The dominant state maintains the status quo by "managing the international system under rules that benefit its allies and satisfy their national aspirations" (Tammen et al. 2000, 6). A few states at the top, more in the middle, and most at the bottom of the hierarchy are excluded from the hegemon's alliance system and are consequently dissatisfied with the existing distribution of value.2 Power-transition theory argues that alliances tend to be fixed while traditional realism sees shifting commitments as a crucial mechanism for maintaining the balance of power. The danger of a major war does not come from small states—whether dissatisfied or not—or from powerful, satisfied ones. Small states cannot effectively challenge the status quo, and the dominant state's powerful allies have limited incentive to do so. "These nations are satisfied with the present international order and its working rules, for they feel that the present order offers them the best chance of obtaining the goals they have in mind"; they have "their rightful share of benefits" (Organski 1968, 366). It is a powerful, dissatisfied state that threatens the peace, for it has both the opportunity and the willingness to initiate conflict (Starr 1978). Usually such states have come to power after the current order was established and the distribution of benefits determined. They seek to restructure the system to receive benefits commensurate with their newly acquired power. Consequently, the prospect of a great war grows as a powerful dissatisfied challenger overtakes the hegemon. The dominant nation can anticipate such a challenge and will use its power over the international distribution of value in an attempt to preserve its privileged position. It can, for example, delay the rival's growth by imposing trade barriers and embargoes, refusing to provide aid, and supporting discriminatory action in international organizations (Lemke 2002, 22-27; Lemke 2004). The leading state directs sanctions toward and benefits away from threatening states. Control over the distribution of private goods is, according to power-transition theory, important in supplementing deterrence in the hegemon's efforts to maintain the status quo.

Econ cards

Our form of predictions are good

Mincer 69 (Jacob Economic forecast and lead analyst at the National Bureau of Economic Research "ECONOMIC FORECASTS AND EXPECTATIONS" http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1214.pdf)(AC)

An economic forecast may be called "scientific" if it is formulated as a verifiable prediction by means of an explicitly stated method which can be reproduced and checked.1 Comparisons of such predictions and the realizations to which they pertain provide tests of the validity and predictive power of the economic model which produced the forecasts. Such empirical tests are an indispensable basis for further scientific progress. Conversely, as knowledge accumulates and the models improve, the reliability of forecasts, viewed as information about the future, is likely to improve. Forecasts of future economic magnitudes, unaccompanied by an explicit specification of a forecasting method, are not scientific in the above sense. The analysis of such forecasts, which we shall call "business forecasts," is nevertheless of interest.2 There are a number of reasons for this interest in business forecasts: 1. To the extent that the predictions are accurate, they provide information about the future. 2. Business forecasts are relatively informative if their accuracy is not inferior to the accuracy of forecasts arrived at scientifically, particularly if the latter are more costly to obtain. 3. Conversely, the margin of inferiority (or superiority) of business forecasts relative to scientific forecasts serves as a yardstick of progress in the scientific area. 4. Regardless of the predictive performance ascertainable in the future, business forecasts represent a sample of the currently prevailing climate of opinion. They are, therefore, a datum of some importance in understanding current economic behavior. 5. Even though the methods which produce the forecasts are not specified by the forecasters, it is possible to gain some understanding of the genesis of forecasts by relating the predictions to other available data. In this paper we are concerned with the analysis of business forecasts for some of these purposes. Specifically, we are interested in methods of assessing the degree of accuracy of business forecasts both in an absolute and in a relative sense. In the Absolute Accuracy Analysis (Section I) we measure the closeness with which predictions approximate their realizations. In the Relative Accuracy Analysis (Section II) we assess the net contributions, if any, of business forecasts to the information about the future available from alternative, relatively quick and cheap methods. The particular alternative or benchmark method singled out here for analysis is extrapolation of the past history of the series which is being predicted. The motivation for this choice of benchmark is spelled out in Section II. It will be apparent, however, that our relative accuracy analysis is suitable for compariSons of any two forecast methods. The treatment of extrapolations as benchmarks against which the predictive power of business forecasts is measured does not imply that business forecasts and extrapolations constitute mutually exclusive methods of prediction. It is rather plausible to assume that most forecasts rely to some degree on extrapolation. If so, forecast errors are partly due to extrapolation errors. Hence, an analysis of the predictive performance of extrapolations can contribute to the understanding and assessment of the quality of business forecasts. Accordingly, we proceed in Section III to inquire into the relative importance of extrapolations in generating business forecasts, and to study the effects of extrapolation error on forecasting error.3

Queer Terror K-- Aff Answers

Perm

Perm solves best—allows for best policymaking through critique of discourse and its understanding its historical effects

Puar and Rai 2 [Jasbir Puar, Associate Professor of Women's & Gender Studies at Rutgers University; Amit Rai, Senior Lecturer in New Media and Communication @ Queen Mary University of London; "Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots", pg 121-122; Social Text; Vol 20 No 3; Fall 2002; accessed 7/20/2015; MUSE.] We do not endorse gendered language

Today, we find the two figures of the monster and the person to be corrected in some ways converging in the discourse of the terrorist-monster. Which is to say that the terrorist has become both a monster to be quarantined and an individual to be corrected. It is in the strategic analyses of terrorism that these two figures come together. For the past thirty years, since 1968, the Western academy has been involved in the production and implementation of a body of knowledge that took the psyche of the terrorist as its object and target: "terrorism studies." The strategic analysis of what in the intelligence community is known as "violent substate activism" is at the moment a highly sought-after form of knowledge production. And it has direct policy relevance; hence its uneven integration into the broader field of what Edward Said once named as the disciplinary home of Orientalism: "policy studies."9 Our own analysis has been usefully informed by the pioneering work of scholars and activists such as Said, Cynthia Enloe, Ann Tickner, Noam Chomsky, Shirin M. Rai, Edward Herman, Helen Caldicott, Philip Agee, Talal Asad, and others.10 These writers have opened a space of critique that brings the **epistemological and ethical claims** of terrorism studies to crisis; their rigorous and impassioned interrogation of U.S. foreign policy has not only enabled subsequent writers to make connections to ongoing domestic wars against people of color and the working poor but crucially, their critiques have enabled the countermemory of other genealogies, histories, and modes of power: for example, sexuality, colonialism, and normalization. So, for instance, in the discourse of counterterrorism the shared modernity of the monster and the delinquent comes together in the knowledge of cultures, nations, and races. As one editorial in the magazine Foreign Policy put it, "The Global Positioning System, unmanned drones, unrivaled databases, and handheld computers—much has been made of the technological resources available to the U.S. military and diplomatic establishments. But what do you do if you're trying to wage war in or against a country where you don't know the locals, can't speak the language, and can't find any reliable maps? Welcome to the front lines of the war against terrorism, likely to be waged primarily in 'swamp states' about which the United States knows little."11 The writer ends the piece by drawing a particular lesson from Sun Tzu's The Art of War: "'If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.' If any war on terrorism is to succeed, the United States has some serious learning to do."

Terrorism studies is at the forefront of this knowledge production. In an article in the Rand Corporation–funded journal, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Richard Falkenrath notes:

The literature on terrorism is vast. Most of this work focuses on the practi- tioners of terrorism, that is, on the terrorists themselves. Different strands within terrorism studies consider, for example, the motivations or belief sys- tems of individual terrorists; the external strategies or . . . internal dynamics of particular terrorist organizations; or the interaction of terrorist move- ments with other entities, such as governments, the media, or social sub- groups. . . . Terrorism studies aspires not just to scholastic respectability but to policy relevance. . . . It has helped organize and inform governmental counter-terrorism practices.12

Perm is the only way to solve the alt—avoids cooption of squo

Richard **Jackson**, Marie Breen **Smyth**, **and** Jeroen **Gunning 09**, Jackson is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV), Smyth is Director of the CSRV, and Gunning is a Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 2009, "Critical Terrorism Studies: A new research agenda," pg 226, https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=NZEMLpmDK6IC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=critical+terror+studies+terrorism+studies&ots=BM1YDK-ij4&sig=Z182J5jqiDUgTsk2WkXvr9_R7_k#v=onepage&q&f=false

Another important methodological commitment that flows from our position is a permanent adherence to a set of responsible research ethics which take account of the various end-users of **terrorism research**, including informants, the "suspect communities* from which terrorists often emerge, and the populations who bear the brunt of terrorist campaigns and counterterrorism policies - as well as the wider public, other academics, and policymakers. More concretely, this means 'recognising the human behind the [terrorist] label' (Booth, 2008: 73), identifying marginalised and silenced voices, the adoption of a 'do no harm' approach to research, operating transparently as a researcher, recognising the vulnerability of those we research, honouring undertakings of confidentiality and protecting our interviewees, utilising principles of informed consent, and taking responsibility for the anticipated impact of our research and the ways in which it may be utilised. Adopting research paradigms, such as participative action research which aims to establish partnerships with researched populations, particularly when working with 'suspect communities', is a method of attempting to give away or share one's power as a researcher and an academic. As critical researchers, these are all principles, paradigms, and strategies that we ought to explore.

If a critically-informed research praxis is distinguished by its explicit commitment to human emancipation, an important component of CTS research is to try to **influence policy.** As we have argued both in this volume and elsewhere, **not being concerned with policy relevance is not an option** for scholars **committed to human emancipation** (Gunning, 2007b; Toros and Gunning, this volume). However, this does not mean that one should limit oneself to being relevant to state elites. Critical scholars should engage both policymakers and policy-takers, if their primary commitment is to humanity, rather than the state. Engaging policy-takers, furthermore, serves to lessen the risk of co-option by the status quo, particularly if those thus engaged include members of communities labelled "suspect' by the state, those designated 'terrorists', and so on. However, to be effective, and to work towards realising the potential for immanent change within the status quo, critical scholars must simultaneously strive to engage those who are embedded in the state, members of the 'counterterrorist' forces, the political elite, and so on.

Perm works within their framework—a responsible educator will attempt to change the system, not just criticize it

Lee **Jarvis 09**, Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Swansea University, February 2009, "The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies," Security Dialogue 40-1, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/40/1/5.full.pdf+html

It is, perhaps, too early to know whether the critical terrorism studies enterprise will replicate the achievements of the earlier critical security studies project(s). As one contribution to that enterprise, this article set out to expose the normative and meta-theoretical assumptions underpinning more orthodox works in this area. This exploration opened space for a sustained investigation into two competing analytical strategies for countering these problematic assumptions. By reflecting on the very different practices of resistance or critique embodied by these faces, the article sought to unpack the implications that accompany either broadening or reversing the gaze in the context of terrorism. As argued above, such an exercise not only adds specificity and detail to a burgeoning, and vital, research agenda; it also creates opportunities for discussion between critically oriented scholars engaging with political violence and other issues beyond.

If the two faces of critical terrorism studies discussed above depart from each other largely through their different conceptions and practices of critique, greater reflection on this issue is likely to be crucial in furthering this enterprise. At the risk of homogenizing several bodies of literature, the first, broadening, face offers a form of juxtapositional critique in substituting one conception of terrorism for an alternative – more accurate – account. Although an appealing normative call to detachment and distance in scholarship, this approach ultimately **reinforces the analytical questions and paradigms structuring the mainstream debates**. Trading truths about terrorism, I argued, is critical only up to a point.

The second, interpretivist, face of critical terrorism studies, by contrast, offers an alternative approach to critique as a practice of destabilization or discursive intervention (see, for example, Campbell, 1998: 4–8). Although variants of this style of enquiry may be found in strategies of immanent critique and deconstruction (Roffe, 2004: 44; Wyn Jones, 2005: 228), Foucault's (1988: 154–155) famous synopsis remains useful here:

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest. . . . Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and **trying to change it**: to show that things are not as selfevident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.

As Foucault's remarks suggest, by encouraging us to expose and contest constructions of (counter)terrorism, along with their political functions and outcomes, this second face offers the responsible scholar of terror a far more active and analytically sound strategy for **practising criticism** than its alternatives.

Perm solves—policy must be influenced by critical theory to truly reject the orthodoxy
Richard **Jackson**, Marie Breen **Smyth**, **and** Jeroen **Gunning 09**, Jackson is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV), Smyth is Director of the CSRV, and Gunning is a Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 2009, "Critical Terrorism Studies: A new research agenda," pg 213, https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=NZEMLpmDK6IC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=critical+terror+st udies+terrorism+studies&ots=BM1YDK-ij4&sig=Z182J5jqiDUgTsk2WkXvr9_R7_k#v=onepage&q&f=false

Although critical scholars may wish to distance themselves from certain aspects of government policy, it is crucial that they remain engaged with policymakers, **so that policy is informed by** a diverse range of views, not merely the orthodoxy. Critical scholars cannot complain about government policy on terrorism if they have not attempted to inform thai policy. Even though critical voices may be disregarded or not taken seriously, critical scholars should not let this prevent them from talking to policymakers and government, and speaking "truth to power', even though 'power' may not listen.

Some worry about accepting government funding, and the case study presented here illustrates how the design of research programmes and the involvement of certain agencies may preclude scholars' participation. However, this does not mean that all government funding is problematic or that it is not

possible to accept funding from government and retain one's integrity - and one's safety. Such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis: after all, both governments and research fields change over time.

Critical theorizing can't solve—utopian

David Martin **Jones** and M. L. R. **Smith 09**, Jones is an Associate Professor of Political Theory at the University of Queensland and Smith is a Professor of Strategic Theory at King's College in London, March 28, 2009, "We're All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies "on" Terrorism?," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32-4,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100902744128#.VbuPGipViko

In the end, un-coerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but how it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that permeate critical theory, it advances an ultimately utopian agenda under the guise of soi-disant cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely recognizes the "human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature, the cosmos and each other" (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya.

In analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security as emancipation in a way that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere.

Consequently, in this Manichean struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy, Booth further maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as university international relations departments are not now, it would seem, in business to pursue dispassionate analysis but instead are to serve as cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision

Perm solves—we must appreciate critical perspectives

Nathan **Roger 10**, Professor of International Relations and Critical Security Studies, 2010, Book Review on "Security and the war on terror," International Affairs 86

In the conclusion, Sara E. Davies and Richard Devetak draw together the diverse arguments presented in this volume, reiterating that the return to realism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks was misguided, and that to engage fully with contemporary security issues there should be 'a greater appreciation of critical approaches that questioned why insecurity existed, who was most insecure, how those insecurities might be ameliorated and how best to understand and explain security and insecurity' (p. 190). My only criticism is that this volume does not deal with the important relationship between media studies, visual culture and security in the war on terror. After all, we live in an information age where new media and images progressively dominate our lives. We are also increasingly made aware of contemporary security issues through these media and images— rather than through speech alone— hence Bleiker's announcement of an aesthetic turn in the study of IR (Millennium 30: 3, 2001, pp. 509–33). Unfortunately, in this volume the editors have themselves sidelined this important area of critical security studies.

Alt

Acknowledgement fails without connecting queer spaces to other forms of oppression

Natalie **Oswin 08**, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography, "Critical geographies and the uses of sexuality: deconstructing queer space," Progress in Human Geography 32(1)

The experiences of non-heterosexuals are no longer excluded within critical geographical work. This important change is undoubtedly the result of various disciplinary engagements with queer theory. And for as long as non-heterosexuals are discriminated against, queer spaces will remain something that, to borrow Spivak's phrase, queers cannot not want. So there is certainly a need for the recent geographical readings of queer spaces that help us understand queer cultural politics as contested sites in which racializations, genderings and classed processes take place. There are also other geographical uses for queer theory. Much of the work that I have highlighted adopts a queer approach to such issues as transnational labour flows, diaspora, immigration, public health, globalization, domesticity, geopolitics and poverty. It demonstrates the use of queer theory to these central concerns of critical geography far beyond analysis of their relationship to gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgendered lives. Once we dismiss the presumption that queer theory offers only a focus on 'queer' lives and an abstract critique of the heterosexualization of space, we can utilize it to deconstruct the hetero/homo binary and examine sexuality's deployments in concert with racialized, classed and gendered processes. Queering our analysis thus helps us to position sexuality within multifaceted constellations of power. As critical geographers seek to understand these constellations, the advancement of a queer approach alongside postcolonial, feminist, critical race and materialist approaches will most certainly help to ask new questions and illuminate a broader range of critical possibilities.

"Terrorist"

Turn—definition destroys advocacy skills, leads to worse representations, and fuels political opportunism

Christopher J. **Finlay 1/8**, reader in political theory at the University of Birmingham, January 8, 2015, "How to do things with the word 'terrorist'," Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 2009)

First of all, I agree that the application of the term 'terrorist' mainly to non-state entities is arbitrary from a purely moral point of view. There is therefore a good philosophical reason for arguing that the word should be available to direct against actions of a certain kind by states too. Moreover, there is a rhetorical argument for challenging the exclusion of states. Theorists and activists rightly voice concern that restricting 'terrorist' to the discussion of non-state actions unfairly biases public-critical discourse and policy in favour of states whose actions may be no different morally from those who try to resist them (they are often much worse, as Held rightly emphasises).81 There is therefore both a rhetorical and a philosophical rationale for rebalancing debate by broadening the scope of 'terrorist' to include some actions by states, thus permitting a more direct commensuration of state and non-state violence.

A rhetorical approach, however, suggests some further considerations that theorists ought to bear in mind around the question of redescriptive strategies. None of these are strong enough to eliminate absolutely the possibility of revisionary redescription, but I think they do suggest that theorists should approach the question with caution. First of all, while ordinary usages might be changed through redescriptive rhetorics, it would be difficult, to say the least, for theorists to achieve this comprehensively, that is, to bring about a wider shift in public discourse. Moreover, where change does occur, it is likely to be just as hard to control the direction it takes and its consequences. Changes in definition are therefore likely to have two detrimental effects: first, where proposals for redefinition aren't accepted widely or quickly enough in public discourse, they are likely to cause confusion amongst interlocutors who have to negotiate meanings using a variety of conflicting older and newer linguistic norms. This will diminish the ability of conscientious participants in public debate to argue effectively and hence diminish persuasiveness. In the short term, therefore, redefinition could decrease rather than increase the clarity of moral-political debate and make it harder for speakers to make distinctions of the kind we want to achieve. These considerations suggest that one should be hesitant about semantic innovation. Having said that, if the philosophical or rhetorical rationale for change were sufficiently compelling, theorists should then do their best to publicise their arguments and penetrate public consciousness. But for reasons to which I'll return below, I'm not sure the case for change is as compelling in this case as is sometimes suggested.

Secondly, redefinition may increase the chance of political opportunism and unscrupulous, ad hoc revisionary redescriptions. The most obvious recent example is the foreign policy rhetoric in the US and Britain after 2001 where the idea of 'terror' was adapted to include a range of states that could potentially be made subject to aggression, notably Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. Noam Chomsky charted similar strategies against 'state-directed international terrorism' pursued by the Reagan administration in the 1980s.82 Similarly, if theorists worry that the application of 'terrorist' of non-state groups unduly prejudices rhetoric against resistance, say in the occupied territories of Palestine, and in favour of aggressive actions, say by an Israeli state against civilians, they might also pause to consider the

permissiveness in foreign policy opened up by helping the Israeli government to denominate not only Fatah and Hamas but also its neighbouring states as 'terrorist'. Expansionary redefinition could thus sometimes help states rather than non-state groups.

AT Security K

AT Impact/Alternative

There's no root cause of conflict and threat construction is inevitable – even if security is socially constructed, states use balance of power and deterrence to make foreign policy calculations
Moore '04

Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, page 27-31.

As so broadly conceived, <u>there is strong evidence that deterrence</u>, that is, <u>the effect of external factors on the decision to go to war, is the missing link in the war/peace equation</u>. In my War/Peace Seminar, I have undertaken to examine the level of deterrence before the <u>principal wars of the twentieth century.</u>10 This examination has led me to believe that <u>in every case the</u> potential <u>aggressor made a rational calculation that the war would be won,</u> and won promptly.11 In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through conventional attack seems to be the roughly six reeks predicted by the German General Staff as the time necessary) prevail on the Western front in World War I under the Schlieffen Plan. <u>Hitler believed</u> in his attack on Poland that <u>Britain and France could not</u> take the occasion to <u>go to war with him</u>. And he believed his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union that "[w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."12 In contrast, following Hermann Goering's failure to obtain air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace. <u>Calculations in the North Korean attack</u> on South Korea <u>and Hussein's attack on Kuwait were that the operations would be completed in a matter of days</u>. Indeed, <u>virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century,</u> at least those involving conventional invasion, <u>were preceded by</u> what I refer to as a "<u>double deterrence absence</u>." That is, <u>the</u> potential <u>aggressor believed that they had the military force</u> in place <u>to prevail promptly</u> and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic power to prevent this were not dined to intervene. This analysis has also shown that many of the perceptions we have about the origins of particular wars are flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the al historical record of British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the French or to so inform the Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World War I absence of effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the laterrobust NATO alliance and absence of World War III.14 Considerable other evidence seems to support this historical analysis as to the importance of deterrence. Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in 1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.15 In this book heconducts a detailed examination of the <u>Peloponnesian War, World War I, Hannibal's War, and World War II,</u> among other case studies. A careful reading of these studies suggests that <u>each war could have been prevented by achievable deterrence</u> and that <u>each occurred in the absence of such deterrence</u>.16 <u>Game theory seems to offer yet further support</u> for the proposition that appropriate deterrence can prevent war. For example, Robert Axelrod's famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, which is a reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy.17<u>Such a strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through incentives</u>. Similarly, much of <u>the game-theoretic work on crisis bargaining</u> (and danger of asymmetric information) in <u>relation to war and the democratic peace assumes the importance of deterrence</u> through communication of incentives.18 The well-known correlation between war and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military achievability of aggression in many such settings. It should further be noted that the democratic peace is not the only significant correlation with respect to war and peace, although it seems to be the most robust. Professors Russett and Oneal, in recently exploring the other elements of the Kantian proposal for "Perpetual Peace," have also shown a strong and statistically significant correlation between economically important bilateral trade between two nations and a reduction in the risk of war between them. Contrary to the arguments of "dependency theorists," such economically

important trade seems to reduce the risk of war regardless of the size relationship or asymmetry in the trade balance between the two states. In addition, there is a statistically significant association between economic openness generally and reduction in the risk of war, although this association is not as strong as the effect of an economically important bilateral trade relationship.° Russett and Oneal also show a modest independent correlation between reduction in the risk of war and higher levels of common membership in international organizations.[20] And they show that a large imbalance of power between two states significantly lessens the risk of major war between them.[21] All of these empirical findings about war also seem to directly reflect incentives; that is, a higher level of trade would, if foregone in war, impose higher costs in the aggregate than without such trade,[22] though we know that not all wars terminate trade. Moreover, with respect to trade, a, classic study, Economic Interdependence and War, suggests that the historic record shows that it is not simply aggregate levels of bilateral trade that matters, but expectations as to the level of trade into the future.[23] This directly implicates expectations of the war decision maker as does incentive theory, and it importantly adds to the general finding about trade and war that even with existing high levels of bilateral trade, changing expectations from trade sanctions or other factors affecting the flow of trade can directly affect incentives and influence for or against war. A large imbalance of power in a relationship rather obviously impacts deterrence and incentives. Similarly, one might incur higher costs with high levels of common membership in international organizations through foregoing some of the heightened benefits of such participation or otherwise being presented with different options through the actions or effects of such organizations. These external deterrence elements may also be yet another reason why democracies have a lower risk of war with one another. For their freer markets, trade, commerce, and international engagement may place them in a position where their generally higher level of interaction means that aggression will incur substantial opportunity costs. Thus, the "mechanism" of the democratic peace may be an aggregate of factors affecting incentives, both external as well as internal factors. Because of the underlying truth in the relationship between higher levels of trade and lower levels of war, it is not surprising that theorists throughout human history, including Baron de Montesquieu in 1748, Thomas Paine in 1792, John Stuart Mill in 1848, and, most recently, the founders of the European Union, have argued that increasing commerce and interactions among nations would end war. Though by themselves these arguments have been overoptimistic, it may well be that some level of "globalization" may make the costs of war and the gains of peace so high as to powerfully predispose to peace. Indeed, a 1989 book by John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday,[24] postulates the obsolescence of major war between developed nations (at least those nations within the "first and second worlds") as they become increasingly conscious of the rising costs of war and the rising gains of peace. In assessing levels of democracy, there are indexes readily available, for example, the Polity III[25] and Freedom House [26] indexes. I am unaware of any comparable index with respect to levels of deterrence that might be used to test the importance of deterrence in war avoidance?' Absent such an accepted index, discussion about the importance of deterrence is subject to the skeptical observation that one simply defines effective deterrence by whether a war did or did not occur. In order to begin to deal with this objection and encourage a more objective methodology for assessing deterrence, I encouraged a project to seek to develop a rough but objective measure of deterrence with a scale from minus ten to plus ten based on a large variety of contextual features that would be given relative weighting in a complex deterrence equation before applying the scaling to different war and nonwar settings.[28] On the disincentive side of the scale, the methodology used a weighted calculation of local deterrence, including the chance to prevent a short- and intermediate-term military victory, and economic and political disincentives; extended deterrence with these same elements; and contextual communication and credibility multipliers. On the incentive side of the scale, the methodology also used a weighted calculation of perceived military, economic, and political benefits. The scales were then combined into an overall deterrence score, including, an estimate for any effect of prospect theory where applicable.[2] This innovative first effort uniformly showed high deterrence scores in settings where war did not, in fact, occur. Deterring a Soviet first strike in the Cuban Missile Crisis produced a score of +8.5 and preventing a Soviet attack against NATO produced a score of +6. War settings, however, produced scores ranging from -2.29 (Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in the Gulf War), -2.18 (North Korea's decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War), -1.85 (Hitler's decision to invade Poland in World War II), -1.54 (North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords), -0.65 (Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo), +0.5 (the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor), +1.25 (the Austrian decision, egged on by Germany, to attack Serbia, which was the real beginning of World War I), to +1.75 (the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I). As a further effort at scaling and as a point of comparison, I undertook to simply provide an impressionistic rating based on my study of each pre-crisis setting. That produced high positive scores of +9 for both deterring a Soviet first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO's deterrence of a Warsaw Pact attack and even lower scores than the more objective effort in settings where wars had occurred. Thus, I scored North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords and the German decision to invade Poland at the beginning of World War II as -6; the North Korean/Stalin decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War as -5; the Iraqi decision to invade the State of Kuwait as -4; Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo and the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I as -2; and the Austrian decision to attack Serbia and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor as -1. Certainly even knowledgeable experts would be likely to differ in their impressionistic scores on such pre-crisis settings, and the effort at a more objective methodology for scoring deterrence leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, both exercises did seem to suggest that deterrence matters and that high levels of deterrence can prevent future war. Following up on this initial effort to produce a more objective measure of deterrence, two years later I encouraged another project to undertake the same effort, building on what had been learned in the first iteration. The result was a second project that developed a modified scoring system, also incorporating local deterrence, extended deterrence, and communication of intent and credibility multipliers on one side of a scale, and weighing these factors against a potential aggressor's overall subjective incentives for action on the other side of the scale.[3]° The result, with a potential range of -5.5 to +10, produced no score higher than +2.5 for eighteen major wars studied between

1939 and the 1990 Gulf War.[31] Twelve of the eighteen wars produced a score of zero or below, with the 1950-53 Korean War at -3.94, the 1965-75 Vietnam War at -0.25, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War at -1.53, and the 1990-91 Gulf War at -3.83. The study concluded that in more than fifty years of conflict there was "no situation in which a regime elite/decision making body subjectively faced substantial disincentives to aggressive military action and yet attacked."[32] Yet another piece of the puzzle, which may clarify the extent of deterrence necessary in certain settings, may also assist in building a broader hypothesis about war. In fact, it has been incorporated into the just-discussed efforts at scoring deterrence. That is, newer studies of human behavior from cognitive psychology are increasingly showing that certain perceptions of decision makers can influence the level of risk they may be willing to undertake, or otherwise affect their decisions.[33] It now seems likely that a number of such insights about human behavior in decision making may be

useful in considering and fashioning deterrence strategies. Perhaps of greatest relevance is the insight of "prospect theory," which posits that individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point and that they may be more risk averse in settings posing potential gain than in settings posing potential loss.[34] The evidence of this "cognitive bias," whether in gambling, trading, or, as is increasingly being argued, foreign policy decisions generally, is significant. Because of the newness of efforts to apply a laboratory based "prospect theory" to the complex foreign policy process generally, and particularly ambiguities and uncertainties in framing such complex events, our consideration of it in the war/peace process should certainly be cautious. It does, however, seem to elucidate some of the case studies. In the war/peace setting, "prospect theory" suggests that deterrence may not need to be as strong to prevent aggressive action leading to perceived gain. For example, there is credible evidence that even an informal warning to Kaiser Wilhelm II from British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, if it had come early in the crisis before events had moved too far, might have averted World War I. And even a modicum of deterrence in Kuwait, as was provided by a small British contingent where Kuwait was earlier threatened by an irredentist Iraqi government in 1961, might have been sufficient to deter Saddam Hussein from his 1990 attack on Kuwait. Similarly, even a clear United States pledge for the defense of South Korea before the attack might have prevented the Korean War. Conversely, following the July 28 Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Serbia in World War I, the issue for Austria may have begun to be perceived as loss avoidance, thus requiring much higher levels of deterrence to avoid the resulting war. Similarly, the Rambouillet Agreement may have been perceived by Milosevic as risking loss of Kosovo and his continued rule of Serbia and, as a result, may have required higher levels of NA-TO deterrence to have prevented Milosevic's actions in defiance. Certainly NATO's previous hesitant responses in 1995 against Milosevic in the Bosnia phase of the Yugoslav crisis and in 1998-99 in early attempts to deal with Kosovo did not create a high level of deterrence.[35] One can only surmise whether the killing in Kosovo could have been avoided had NATO taken a different tack, both structuring the issue less as loss avoidance for Milosevic and considerably enhancing deterrence. Suppose, for example, NATO had emphasized that it had no interest in intervening in Serbia's civil conflict with the KLA but that it would emphatically take action to punish massive "ethnic cleansing" and other humanitarian outrages, as had been practiced in Bosnia. And on the deterrence side, it made clear in advance the severity of any NATO bombardment, the potential for introduction of ground troops if necessary, that in any assault it would pursue a "Leadership Strategy" focused on targets of importance to Milosevic and his principal henchmen (including their hold on power), and that it would immediately, unlike as earlier in Bosnia, seek to generate war crime indictments of all top Serbian leaders implicated in any atrocities. The point here is not to second-guess NATO's actions in Kosovo but to suggest that taking into account potential "cognitive bias," such as "prospect theory," may be useful in fashioning effective deterrence. "Prospect theory" may also have relevance in predicting that it may be easier to deter (that is, lower levels are necessary) an aggression than to undo that aggression. Thus, much higher levels of deterrence were probably required to compel Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait than to prevent him initially from invading that state. In fact, not even the presence of a powerful Desert Storm military force and a Security Council Resolution directing him to leave caused Hussein to voluntarily withdraw. As this real-world example illustrates, there is considerable experimental evidence in "prospect theory" of an almost instant renormalization of reference point after a

gain; that is, relatively quickly after Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, a withdrawal was framed as a loss setting, which he would take high risk to avoid. Indeed, we tend to think of such settings as settings of compellance, requiring higher levels of incentive to achieve compulsion producing an action, rather than deterrence needed for prevention. One should also be careful not to overstate the effect of "prospect theory" or to fail to assess a threat in its complete context. We should remember that a belated pledge of Great Britain to defend Poland before the Nazi attack did not deter Hitler, who believed under the circumstances that the British pledge would not be honored. It is also possible that the greater relative wealth of democracies, which have less to gain in all out war, is yet another internal factor contributing to the "democratic peace."36 In turn, this also supports the extraordinary tenacity and general record of success of democracies fighting in defensive settings as they may also have more to lose. In assessing adequacy of deterrence to prevent war, we might also want to consider whether extreme ideology, strongly at odds with reality, may be a factor requiring higher levels of deterrence for effectiveness. One example may be the extreme ideology of Pol Pot leading him to falsely believe that his Khmer Rouge forces could defeat Vietnam.37 He apparently acted on that belief in a series of border incursions against Vietnam that ultimately produced a losing war for him. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's 9/11 attack against America, hopelessly at odds with the reality of his defeating the Western World and producing for him a strategic disaster, seems to have been prompted by his extreme ideology rooted in a distorted concept of Islam at war with the enlightenment. The continuing suicide bombings against Israel, encouraged by radical rejectionists and leading to less and less for the Palestinians, may be another example. If extreme ideology is a factor to be considered in assessing levels of deterrence, it does not mean that deterrence is doomed to fail in such settings but only that it must be at higher levels (and properly targeted on the relevant decision elites behind the specific attacks) to be effective, as is also true in perceived loss or compellance settings.38 Even if major war in the modern world is predominantly a result of aggression by nondemocratic regimes, it does not mean that all nondemocracies pose a risk of war all, or even some, of the time. Salazar's Portugal did not commit aggression. Nor today do Singapore or Bahrain or countless other nondemocracies pose a threat. That is, today nondemocracy comes close to a necessary condition in generating the high risk behavior leading to major interstate war. But it is, by itself, not a sufficient condition for war. The many reasons for this, of course, include a plethora of internal factors, such as differences in leadership perspectives and values, size of military, and relative degree of the rule of law, as well as levels of external deterrence.39 But where an aggressive nondemocraticregime is present and poses a credible military threat, then it is the totality of external factors, that is, deterrence, that become crucial.

Alternative Fails

Rejection of current IR paradigm magnifies hierarchy – emancipation rhetoric gives powerful states a basis for intervention and robs the Third World of agency – traditional security models solve their impacts better
McCormack 10 – Lecturer in International Politics

Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield's important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are 'insured' – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

Transition Wars DA

Transition to the alternative guarantees war – radical changes in existing security architecture collapse threat perception

Yoon 03 – Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea (Young-Kwan, "Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations", International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8)

In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states. If the balancing process begins too late, the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger than if the process had been started much earlier. For example, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the "automatic" working through of the process turned out to be problematic. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. In order to prevent this instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role, adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world. According to Doran, when the "tides of history" shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system (Rosecrance, 1963) but the transformation from one system to another. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war (Doran, 1971). A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to foreign policy expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for major war, not the nature of a particular type of international system.

Institutions 1st FW

Governments' obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decisionmaking – that's true regardless of this debate
Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. 'Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.' At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This 'lattice-work' of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures **despite changes in the individuals occupying them**. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: 'people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents'. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the 'point of contact' between human agency and social structures. This is known as a 'positioned practice' system. In many respects, the idea of 'positioned practice' is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood **solely in terms of individual decision-making**, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu's notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a 'social field'. According to Bourdieu, a social field is 'a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined'. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals' subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of 'internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.' Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of

the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar's stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, **their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness** or to the attributes **of individuals**. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, 'a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables'.

AT Ontology 1st

Ontology not come first - questions of ethics are contingent and political, not ontological - their attempt to ground ethics in ontology leads to epistemic closure and prevents democratic challenges to existing relationships of violence
Beasley & Bacchi 7

(Chris, Prof. of Politics @ University of Adelaide, Carol, Prof. Emeritus @ University of Adelaide, "Envisaging a new politics for an ethical future: Beyond trust, care and generosity -- towards an ethic of `social flesh'", *Feminist Theory*, 2007 8: 279)

How does our concept of 'social flesh' draw on, yet differ from, existing vocabularies? Following on from the second generation care ethicists we suggest that the ethico-political ideal of 'social flesh' is not so much to be understood as a moral quality, usually perceived in relation to individuals, but rather as a political ethic concerning existing and future practices, a political challenge specifically to the neo-liberal ethos of atomistic individualism. We do not stress ontology in this account of interconnection. Diprose argues – in keeping with Levinas – that embodied interconnection between self and other makes 'being' possible, is a fixed universal, and hence precedes history and politics. Ethical responsibility for the other, connectedness, becomes unquestionable and inescapable. We feel that this reliance on ontology to do the work of social responsibility may be **overly hopeful** and may also **relegate important political debates to the sidelines**, while framing embodied interconnection in strongly prescriptive and normative terms. While we agree, along with care ethicists, that sociality is embodied (and consequently involves care), this is a very preliminary and thin ontological foundation which **does not presume in advance that forms of recognition which flow from it are necessarily laudable** or predictable, **let alone self-evidently altruistic**. While embodied interconnection is the preexisting condition of 'being' human and therefore of sociality,2 in concert with Borgerson we are inclined to assert that **what human beings do with this ontological state of connection is not ontological**. In other words, **the ontological starting point** of embodied interconnection does get us very far. It **does not entail a particular ethics**. Rather ethics – a relation of responsibility – remains firmly in the realm of the political possibilities and political will within particular forms of sociality, a matter of history.3 Hence, **the question remains, what is to be done**? Like Borgerson, we think that an overemphasis on the ontological leads to an **'epistemic closure'** (Gordon, 2000: 145–7 in Borgerson, 2001: 183) and to an **essentializing as fundamental and inevitable**. This is importantly contingent and a matter of political debate. Thus, at least at the level of the political imaginary, **such an overemphasis blocks the necessary and fruitful contestation required in order to undertake the democratic project of overhauling neo-liberalism**.

Extinction 1st

Extinction 1st – pre-requisite to formation of value
Wapner '3

Paul, Associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, DISSENT, Winter, http://www.dissentmgazine.org/menutest/artiles/wi03/wapner.htm

The third response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, hut how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings wc ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

Elevating Human extinction to a real possibility encourages a new social ethic to solve conflicts and create meaning to life.
Epstein and Zhao 9 [Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao, Laboratory of Computational Oncology,Department of Medicine,University of Hong Kong, Professorial Block, Queen Mary Hospital, Hong Kong. "The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Human Extinction". Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, volume 52, number 1 (winter 2009):116–25. Project Muse.-

Final ends for all species are the same, but the journeys will be different. If we cannot influence the end of our species, can we influence the journey? To do so—even in a small way—would be a crowning achievement for human evolution and give new meaning to the term civilization. Only by elevating the topic of human extinction to the level of serious professional discourse can we begin to prepare ourselves for the challenges that lie ahead. The difficulty of the required transition should not be underestimated. This is depicted in Table 3 as a painful multistep progression from the 20th-century philosophical norm of Ego-Think—defined therein as a short-term state of mind valuing individual material self-interest above all other considerations—to Eco-Think, in which humans come to adopt a broader Gaia-like outlook on themselves as but one part of an infinitely larger reality. Making this change must involve communicating the non-sensationalist message to all global citizens that "things are serious" and "we are in this together"—or, in blunter language, that the road to extinction and its related agonies does indeed lie ahead. Consistent with this prospect, the risks of human extinction—and the cost-benefit of attempting to reduce these risks— have been quantified in a recent sobering analysis (Matheny 2007). Once complacency has been shaken off and a sense of collective purpose created, the battle against self-seeking anthropocentric human instincts will have only just begun. It is often said that human beings suffer from the ability to appreciate their own mortality—an existential agony that has given rise to the great religions— but in the present age of religious decline, we must begin to bear the added burden of anticipating the demise of our species. Indeed, as argued here, there are compelling reasons for encouraging this collective mind-shift. For in the best of all possible worlds,

the realization that our species has long-term survival criteria distinct from our short-term tribal priorities **could spark a new social ethic to upgrade** what we now all too often dismiss as "human nature" (Tudge 1989).

Consequentialism Good

Moral absolutism creates tunnel vision and error replication – focus on consequences is a pre-requisite to ethical decisionmaking
Isaac '2

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, <u>an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it</u> suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It <u>fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters</u>; (2) it fails to see that <u>in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics</u>--as opposed to religion--<u>pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand.</u> In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) <u>it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant.</u> Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, <u>it is often</u> the <u>pursuit of "good" that generates evil</u>. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

AT Impact/Alternative

There's no root cause of conflict and threat construction is inevitable – even if security is socially constructed, states use balance of power and deterrence to make foreign policy calculations

Moore '04

Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, page 27-31.

As so broadly conceived, <u>there is strong evidence that deterrence</u>, that is, <u>the effect of external factors on the decision to go to war, is the missing link in the war/peace equation</u>. In my War/Peace Seminar, I have undertaken to examine the level of deterrence before the <u>principal wars of the twentieth century.</u>10 This examination has led me to believe that <u>in every case the</u> potential <u>aggressor made a rational calculation that the war would be won,</u> and won promptly.11 In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through conventional attack seems to be the roughly six reeks predicted by the German General Staff as the time necessary) prevail on the Western front in World War I under the Schlieffen Plan. <u>Hitler believed</u> in his attack on Poland that <u>Britain and France could not</u> take the occasion to <u>go to war with him</u>. And he believed his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union that "[w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."12 In contrast, following Hermann Goering's failure to obtain air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace. <u>Calculations in the North Korean attack</u> on South Korea <u>and Hussein's attack on Kuwait were that the operations would be completed in a matter of days</u>. Indeed, <u>virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century,</u> at least those involving conventional invasion, <u>were preceded by</u> what I refer to as a "<u>double deterrence absence</u>." That is, <u>the</u> potential <u>aggressor believed that they had the military force</u> in place <u>to prevail promptly</u> and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic power to prevent this were not dined to intervene. This analysis has also shown that many of the perceptions we have about the origins of particular wars are flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the al historical record of British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the French or to so inform the Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World War I absence of effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the laterrobust NATO alliance and absence of World War III.14 Considerable other evidence seems to support this historical analysis as to the importance of deterrence. Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in 1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.15 In this book heconducts a detailed examination of the <u>Peloponnesian War, World War I, Hannibal's War, and World War II,</u> among other case studies. A careful reading of these studies suggests that <u>each war could have been prevented by achievable deterrence</u> and that <u>each occurred in the absence of such deterrence</u>.16 <u>Game theory seems to offer yet further support</u> for the proposition that appropriate deterrence can prevent war. For example, Robert Axelrod's famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, which is a reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy.17<u>Such a strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through incentives</u>. Similarly, much of <u>the game-theoretic work on crisis bargaining</u> (and danger of asymmetric information) in <u>relation to war and the democratic peace assumes the importance of deterrence</u> through communication of incentives.18 The well-known correlation between war

and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military achievability of aggression in many such settings. It should further be noted that the democratic peace is not the only significant correlation with respect to war and peace, although it seems to be the most robust. Professors Russett and Oneal, in recently exploring the other elements of the Kantian proposal for "Perpetual Peace," have also shown a strong and statistically significant correlation between economically important bilateral trade between two nations and a reduction in the risk of war between them. Contrary to the arguments of "dependency theorists," such economically important trade seems to reduce the risk of war regardless of the size relationship or asymmetry in the trade balance between the two states. In addition, there is a statistically significant association between economic openness generally and reduction in the risk of war, although this association is not as strong as the effect of an economically important bilateral trade relationship.° Russett and Oneal also show a modest independent correlation between reduction in the risk of war and higher levels of common membership in international organizations.[20] And they show that a large imbalance of power between two states significantly lessens the risk of major war between them.[21] All of these empirical findings about war also seem to directly reflect incentives; that is, a higher level of trade would, if foregone in war, impose higher costs in the aggregate than without such trade,[22] though we know that not all wars terminate trade. Moreover, with respect to trade, a, classic study, Economic Interdependence and War, suggests that the historic record shows that it is not simply aggregate levels of bilateral trade that matters, but expectations as to the level of trade into the future.[23] This directly implicates expectations of the war decision maker as does incentive theory, and it importantly adds to the general finding about trade and war that even with existing high levels of bilateral trade, changing expectations from trade sanctions or other factors affecting the flow of trade can directly affect incentives and influence for or against war. A large imbalance of power in a relationship rather obviously impacts deterrence and incentives. Similarly, one might incur higher costs with high levels of common membership in international organizations through foregoing some of the heightened benefits of such participation or otherwise being presented with different options through the actions or effects of such organizations. These external deterrence elements may also be yet another reason why democracies have a lower risk of war with one another. For their freer markets, trade, commerce, and international engagement may place them in a position where their generally higher level of interaction means that aggression will incur substantial opportunity costs. Thus, the "mechanism" of the democratic peace may be an aggregate of factors affecting incentives, both external as well as internal factors. Because of the underlying truth in the relationship between higher levels of trade and lower levels of war, it is not surprising that theorists throughout human history, including Baron de Montesquieu in 1748, Thomas Paine in 1792, John Stuart Mill in 1848, and, most recently, the founders of the European Union, have argued that increasing commerce and interactions among nations would end war. Though by themselves these arguments have been overoptimistic, it may well be that some level of "globalization" may make the costs of war and the gains of peace so high as to powerfully predispose to peace. Indeed, a 1989 book by John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday,[24] postulates the obsolescence of major war between developed nations (at least those nations within the "first and second worlds") as they become increasingly conscious of the rising costs of war and the rising gains of peace. In assessing levels of democracy, there are indexes readily available, for example, the Polity III[25] and Freedom House [26] indexes. I am unaware of any comparable index with respect to levels of deterrence that might be used to test the importance of deterrence in war avoidance?' Absent such an accepted index, discussion about the importance of deterrence is subject to the skeptical observation that one simply defines effective deterrence by whether a war did or did not occur. In order to begin to deal with this objection and encourage a more objective methodology for assessing deterrence, I encouraged a project to seek to develop a rough but objective measure of deterrence with a scale from minus ten to plus ten based on a large variety of contextual features that would be given relative weighting in a complex deterrence equation before applying the scaling to different war and nonwar settings.[28] On the disincentive side of the scale, the methodology used a weighted calculation of local deterrence, including the chance to prevent a short- and intermediate-term military victory, and economic and political disincentives; extended deterrence with these same elements; and contextual communication and credibility multipliers. On the incentive side of the scale, the methodology also used a weighted calculation of perceived military, economic, and political benefits. The scales were then combined into an overall deterrence score, including, an estimate for any effect of prospect theory where applicable.[2] This innovative first effort uniformly showed high deterrence scores in settings where war did not, in fact, occur. Deterring a Soviet first strike in the Cuban Missile Crisis produced a score of +8.5 and preventing a Soviet attack against NATO produced a score of +6. War settings, however, produced scores ranging from -2.29 (Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in the Gulf War), -2.18 (North Korea's decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War), -1.85 (Hitler's decision to invade Poland in World War II), -1.54 (North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords), -0.65 (Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo), +0.5 (the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor), +1.25 (the Austrian decision, egged on by Germany, to attack Serbia, which was the real beginning of World War I), to +1.75 (the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I). As a further effort at scaling and as a point of comparison, I undertook to simply provide an impressionistic rating based on my study of each pre-crisis setting. That produced high positive scores of +9 for both deterring a Soviet first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO's deterrence of a Warsaw Pact attack and even lower scores than the more objective effort in settings where wars had occurred. Thus, I scored North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords and the German decision to invade Poland at the beginning of World War II as -6; the North Korean/Stalin decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War as -5; the Iraqi decision to invade the State of Kuwait as -4; Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo and the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I as -2; and the Austrian decision to attack Serbia and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor as -1. Certainly even knowledgeable experts would be likely to differ in their impressionistic scores on such pre-crisis settings, and the effort at a more objective methodology for scoring deterrence leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, both exercises did seem to suggest that deterrence matters and that high levels of deterrence can prevent future war. Following up on this initial effort to produce a more objective measure of deterrence, two years later I encouraged another project to undertake the same effort, building on what had been learned in the first iteration. The result was a second project that developed a modified scoring system, also incorporating local deterrence, extended deterrence, and communication of intent and credibility multipliers on one side of a scale, and weighing these factors against a potential aggressor's overall subjective incentives for action on the other side of the scale.[3]° The result, with a potential range of -5.5 to +10, produced no score higher than +2.5 for eighteen major wars studied between

1939 and the 1990 Gulf War.[31] Twelve of the eighteen wars produced a score of zero or below, with the 1950-53 Korean War at -3.94, the 1965-75 Vietnam War at -0.25, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War at -1.53, and the 1990-91 Gulf War at -3.83. The study concluded that in more than fifty years of conflict there was "no situation in which a regime elite/decision making body subjectively faced substantial disincentives to aggressive military action and yet attacked."[32] Yet another piece of the puzzle, which may clarify the extent of deterrence necessary in certain settings, may also assist in building a broader hypothesis about war. In fact, it has been incorporated into the just-discussed efforts at scoring deterrence. That is, newer studies of human behavior from cognitive psychology are increasingly showing that certain perceptions of decision makers can influence the level of risk they may be willing to undertake, or otherwise affect their decisions.[33] It now seems likely that a number of such insights about human behavior in decision making may be useful in considering and fashioning deterrence strategies. Perhaps of greatest relevance is the insight of "prospect theory," which posits that individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point and that they may be more risk averse in settings posing potential gain than in settings posing potential loss.[34] The evidence of this "cognitive bias," whether in gambling, trading, or, as is increasingly being argued, foreign policy decisions generally, is significant. Because of the newness of efforts to apply a laboratory based "prospect theory" to the complex foreign policy process generally, and particularly ambiguities and uncertainties in framing such complex events, our consideration of it in the war/peace process should certainly be cautious. It does, however, seem to elucidate some of the case studies. In the war/peace setting, "prospect theory" suggests that deterrence may not need to be as strong to prevent aggressive action leading to perceived gain. For example, there is credible evidence that even an informal warning to Kaiser Wilhelm II from British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, if it had come early in the crisis before events had moved too far, might have averted World War I. And even a modicum of deterrence in Kuwait, as was provided by a small British contingent when Kuwait was earlier threatened by an irredentist Iraqi government in 1961, might have been sufficient to deter Saddam Hussein from his 1990 attack on Kuwait. Similarly, even a clear United States pledge for the defense of South Korea before the attack might have prevented the Korean War. Conversely, following the July 28 Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Serbia in World War I, the issue for Austria may have begun to be perceived as loss avoidance, thus requiring much higher levels of deterrence to avoid the resulting war. Similarly, the Rambouillet Agreement may have been perceived by Milosevic as risking loss of Kosovo and his continued rule of Serbia and, as a result, may have required higher levels of NA-TO deterrence to have prevented Milosevic's actions in defiance. Certainly NATO's previous hesitant responses in 1995 against Milosevic in the Bosnia phase of the Yugoslav crisis and in 1998-99 in early attempts to deal with Kosovo did not create a high level of deterrence.[35] One can only surmise whether the killing in Kosovo could have been avoided had NATO taken a different tack, both structuring the issue less as loss avoidance for Milosevic and considerably enhancing deterrence. Suppose, for example, NATO had emphasized that it had no interest in intervening in Serbia's civil conflict with the KLA but that it would emphatically take action to punish massive "ethnic cleansing" and other humanitarian outrages, as had been practiced in Bosnia. And on the deterrence side, it made clear in advance the severity of any NATO bombardment, the potential for introduction of ground troops if necessary, that in any assault it would pursue a "Leadership Strategy" focused on targets of importance to Milosevic and his principal henchmen (including their hold on power), and that it would immediately, unlike as earlier in Bosnia, seek to generate war crime indictments of all top Serbian leaders implicated in any atrocities. The point here is not to second-guess NATO's actions in Kosovo but to suggest that taking into account potential

"cognitive bias," such as "prospect theory," may be useful in fashioning effective deterrence. "Prospect theory" may also have relevance in predicting that it may be easier to deter (that is, lower levels are necessary) an aggression than to undo that aggression. Thus, much higher levels of deterrence were probably required to compel Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait than to prevent him initially from invading that state. In fact, not even the presence of a powerful Desert Storm military force and a Security Council Resolution directing him to leave caused Hussein to voluntarily withdraw. As this real-world example illustrates, there is considerable experimental evidence in "prospect theory" of an almost instant renormalization of reference point after a gain; that is, relatively quickly after Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, a withdrawal was framed as a loss setting, which he would take high risk to avoid. Indeed, we tend to think of such settings as settings of compellance, requiring higher levels of incentive to achieve compulsion producing an action, rather than deterrence needed for prevention. One should also be careful not to overstate the effect of "prospect theory" or to fail to assess a threat in its complete context. We should remember that a belated pledge of Great Britain to defend Poland before the Nazi attack did not deter Hitler, who believed under the circumstances that the British pledge would not be honored. It is also possible that the greater relative wealth of democracies, which have less to gain in all out war, is yet another internal factor contributing to the "democratic peace."36 In turn, this also supports the extraordinary tenacity and general record of success of democracies fighting in defensive settings as they may also have more to lose. In assessing adequacy of deterrence to prevent war, we might also want to consider whether extreme ideology, strongly at odds with reality, may be a factor requiring higher levels of deterrence for effectiveness. One example may be the extreme ideology of Pol Pot leading him to falsely believe that his Khmer Rouge forces could defeat Vietnam.37 He apparently acted on that belief in a series of border incursions against Vietnam that ultimately produced a losing war for him. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's 9/11 attack against America, hopelessly at odds with the reality of his defeating the Western World and producing for him a strategic disaster, seems to have been prompted by his extreme ideology rooted in a distorted concept of Islam at war with the enlightenment. The continuing suicide bombings against Israel, encouraged by radical rejectionists and leading to less and less for the Palestinians, may be another example. If extreme ideology is a factor to be considered in assessing levels of deterrence, it does not mean that deterrence is doomed to fail in such settings but only that it must be at higher levels (and properly targeted on the relevant decision elites behind the specific attacks) to be effective, as is also true in perceived loss or compellance settings.38 Even if major war in the modern world is predominantly a result of aggression by nondemocratic regimes, it does not mean that all nondemocracies pose a risk of war all, or even some, of the time. Salazar's Portugal did not commit aggression. Nor today do Singapore or Bahrain or countless other nondemocracies pose a threat. That is, today nondemocracy comes close to a necessary condition in generating the high risk behavior leading to major interstate war. But it is, by itself, not a sufficient condition for war. The many reasons for this, of course, include a plethora of internal factors, such as differences in leadership perspectives and values, size of military, and relative degree of the rule of law, as well as levels of external deterrence.39 But where an aggressive nondemocraticregime is present and poses a credible military threat, then it is the totality of external factors, that is, deterrence, that become crucial.

Alternative Fails

Rejection of current IR paradigm magnifies hierarchy – emancipation rhetoric gives powerful states a basis for intervention and robs the Third World of agency – traditional security models solve their impacts better
McCormack 10 – Lecturer in International Politics

Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield's important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are 'insured' – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

Transition Wars DA

Transition to the alternative guarantees war – radical changes in existing security architecture collapse threat perception

Yoon 03 – Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea (Young-Kwan, "Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations", International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8)

In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states. If the balancing process begins too late, the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger than if the process had been started much earlier. For example, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the "automatic" working through of the process turned out to be problematic. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. In order to prevent this instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role, adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world. According to Doran, when the "tides of history" shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system (Rosecrance, 1963) but the transformation from one system to another. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war (Doran, 1971). A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to foreign policy expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for major war, not the nature of a particular type of international system.

Institutions 1st FW

Governments' obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decisionmaking – that's true regardless of this debate
Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, <u>Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology</u>, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these <u>relations constitute our identity as social actors</u>. <u>According to this</u> relational <u>model</u> of societies, <u>one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded</u>. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. 'Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.' <u>At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects</u>. <u>This</u> 'lattice-work' of relations <u>constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures</u> **despite changes in the individuals occupying them**. Thus, the <u>relations</u>, the structures, <u>are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them</u>. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: '<u>people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents</u>'. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. <u>If there is an ontological difference between society and people</u>, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that <u>we need</u> a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, <u>a system of concepts designating the 'point of contact' between human agency and social structures. This is known as a 'positioned practice' system</u>. In many respects, the idea of 'positioned practice' is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*. <u>Bourdieu</u> is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He <u>is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood</u> **solely in terms of individual decision-making**, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu's notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, <u>the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to</u> the concept of <u>a 'social field'</u>. According to Bourdieu, <u>a social field is 'a network</u>, or a configuration, <u>of objective relations between positions objectively defined'</u>. <u>A social field</u>, then, <u>refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants</u>. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals' subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. <u>The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit</u> and habituation, <u>rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted</u> and encoded <u>in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge</u>, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of 'internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.' <u>Thus social practices are produced</u> in, and <u>by, the encounter between</u>: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) <u>the constraints and demands of</u>

the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar's stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, **their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness** or to the attributes **of individuals**. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, 'a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables'.

AT Ontology 1ˢᵗ

Ontology not come first - questions of ethics are contingent and political, not ontological - their attempt to ground ethics in ontology leads to epistemic closure and prevents democratic challenges to existing relationships of violence
Beasley & Bacchi 7

(Chris, Prof. of Politics @ University of Adelaide, Carol, Prof. Emeritus @ University of Adelaide, "Envisaging a new politics for an ethical future: Beyond trust, care and generosity -- towards an ethic of `social flesh'", *Feminist Theory*, 2007 8: 279)

How does our concept of 'social flesh' draw on, yet differ from, existing vocabularies? Following on from the second generation care ethicists we suggest that the ethico-political ideal of 'social flesh' is not so much to be understood as a moral quality, usually perceived in relation to individuals, but rather as a political ethic concerning existing and future practices, a political challenge specifically to the neo-liberal ethos of atomistic individualism. We do not stress ontology in this account of interconnection. Diprose argues – in keeping with Levinas – that embodied interconnection between self and other makes 'being' possible, is a fixed universal, and hence precedes history and politics. Ethical responsibility for the other, connectedness, becomes unquestionable and inescapable. We feel that this reliance on ontology to do the work of social responsibility may be **overly hopeful** and may also **relegate important political debates to the sidelines**, while framing embodied interconnection in strongly prescriptive and normative terms. While we agree, along with care ethicists, that sociality is embodied (and consequently involves care), this is a very preliminary and thin ontological foundation which **does not presume in advance that forms of recognition which flow from it are necessarily laudable** or predictable, **let alone self-evidently altruistic**. While embodied interconnection is the preexisting condition of 'being' human and therefore of sociality,2 in concert with Borgerson we are inclined to assert that **what human beings do with this ontological state of connection is not ontological**. In other words, **the ontological starting point** of embodied interconnection does get us very far. It **does not entail a particular ethics**. Rather ethics – a relation of responsibility – remains firmly in the realm of the political possibilities and political will within particular forms of sociality, a matter of history.3 Hence, **the question remains, what is to be done**? Like Borgerson, we think that an overemphasis on the ontological leads to an **'epistemic closure'** (Gordon, 2000: 145–7 in Borgerson, 2001: 183) and to an **essentializing as fundamental and inevitable**. This is importantly contingent and a matter of political debate. Thus, at least at the level of the political imaginary, **such an overemphasis blocks the necessary and fruitful contestation required in order to undertake the democratic project of overhauling neo-liberalism**.

Ableism K – NDI 2015

a bunch of cards that can be used to construct a language PIC, an offensive reason to vote against the other team, a kritik if you're really ambitious, etc. applies spec. to metaphors used for disability in their cards. check at the end of cites in small text to see if there's anything particular about the card that's useful/important to know

what even is ableism? and why does it matter? Leibowitz 14 = what ableism is; Brown 14 A2 Censorship=why it matters

but wait! why do so many of these cards have ableist slurs in them??? 1. most of the cards were written by people with disabilities (Jean, Leibowitz, Brown, FWD) who have the choice to reclaim slurs which apply to them 2. using slurs in their context to analyze them isn't offensive in that they're not directed and used to study the words themselves 3. example usages in the card are offensive, but are then deconstructed and critiqued, unlike the evidence read by the other team, which uncritically uses ableist language. control+f "potential for offensive language" for questionable contexts.

NDI GGAL 2015, devon bright-patterson

Critical Biometrics Consciousness K

1NC

Strategies of critical consciousness are exclusionary – posits those with cognitive disabilities as aligned with the moral failing of racism

Clifford 11 [Stacy Clifford, Hegarty Fellow in the MSU-DOCTRID program, educational background in political science and disability studies; "Indispensable Idiocy: Cognitive Disability and The Social Contract" pg 120-122; Dissertation for 2012 PhD of Philosophy in Political Science @ Vanderbilt; 12/2011; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-12022011-135421/unrestricted/Clifford_Dissertation113011.pdf>.] You can read this as a PIC/Counter-advocacy and instead advocate for an epistemology of disavowal of biometrics

Conversely, Charles Mills describes the racial contract as promoting an epistemology of ignorance amongst (most) whites in which white people are ignorant of their own complicity with racism. In many ways, the racial and disabled contracts promote similar epistemic faults: both require the "cultivation of patterns of affect and empathy that are only weakly, if at all, influenced by nonwhite [disabled] suffering" (1997, 95); "[e]vasion and self-deception thus become the epistemic norm" (97); both instill a "cult of forgetfulness" (97) as certain [nonwhite/disabled] "realities were made invisible" (92). Although Mills employs the language of ignorance, it is often abutted by descriptions of invisibility and "structured blindness"—and so these epistemologies are not entirely dissimilar. But there are important reasons to avoid the language of ignorance, especially for a project on cognitive disability, most important of which is the way in which the familiar Enlightenment category of ignorant/cognizant maps onto morally wrong/right. Mills often emphasizes the ways in which racism causes "cognitive dysfunctions" leaving whites "unable to understand" because they live in a "cognitive model that precludes self-transparency (1997, 18). If the problem is ignorance, then the answer is to become more cognizant, both for whites and nonwhites. If whites live in a "racial fairyland" (18), nonwhites' must launch a cognitive voyage to overturn racism. Mills answer to racism requires a series of cognitive feats: One has to learn to trust one's own cognitive powers, to develop one's own concepts, insights, modes of explanation, overarching theories, and to oppose the epistemic hegemony of conceptual frameworks designed in part to thwart and suppress the exploration of such matters; one has to think against the grain. (119) Mills is not the first to propose **cognitive self-consciousness raising as a first step to emancipatory politics**, but **judged from the lens of cognitive disability**, this familiar route to empowerment **is troublesome**. In this epistemic model, the ignorant are always in the role of morally wrong and inferior while the cognitively superior are also morally superior. Better politics mutates into smarter people. An **epistemology of disavowal, however, can rely on other tools to dismantle oppression and it doesn't require individuals to pursue an intellectual** mystic **journey** before they can effectively politically advocate for themselves. Understanding a model of advocacy detached from cognition is more than this present chapter can handle, but it will be the subject of chapter five. For now, let me just say that—if ignorance presupposes cognizance as a political answer— then disavowal requires confrontation and affirmation of disabled lives.

Turns the aff's claims about the unmarked nature of whiteness by replicating the unmarked ablebodiedness of their politics

Ferri and May 5 (Beth, Assoc Prof Disability Studies, Syracuse Univ; Vivian, Asst Prof Women's Studies, Syracuse Univ; , "Fixated on Ability: Ableist metaphors in feminist theories of resistance," Prose Studies, v27, http://syr.academia.edu/BethFerri/Papers/160692/Fixated_on_Ability_Questioning_Ableist_Metaphors_in_Feminist_Theories_of_Resistance]

Just as whiteness frequently operates as an unstated/unmarked racial norm (in, for example, analogies between homophobia and racism (Carbado 291**)), able-bodiedness continues to operate as the unstated/unnoticed bodily norm both in analogies to disability and in metaphors for freedom and agency. This dynamic obscures the fact that able-bodied people are, in fact, embodied and that disabled persons are disenabled by systems of power. Additionally, it denies the myriad forms of unearned able-bodied privilege accorded to non-disabled persons.**

Vote negative to refuse this replication of oppression, obligation as judge and educator

Ben-Moshe 5 (Liat, Ph.D. student in Sociology, Disability Studies and Women Studies at Syracuse University. ""Lame Idea": Disabling Language in the Classroom," in Building Pedagogical Curb Cuts: Incorporating Disability into the University Classroom and Curriculum, http://www.syr.edu/gradschool/pdf/resourcebooksvideos/Pedagogical%20Curb%20Cuts.pdf)

When we use terms like "retarded," "lame" or "blind"— even if we are referring to acts or ideas and not to people at all— we perpetuate the stigma associated with disability. By using a label which is commonly associated with disabled people to denote a deficiency, a lack or an ill-conceived notion, we reproduce the oppression of people with disabilities. As educators, we must be aware of the oppressive power of "everyday" language and try to change it. False Beliefs Contained in Disabling Phrases We learn about disability through everyday use of language. In the same way that racist or sexist attitudes, whether implicit or explicit, are acquired through the "normal" learning process, so too are negative assumptions about disabilities and the people who are labeled as having them. Our notions of people who are blind, deaf or labeled as mentally retarded come into play when we use disabling phrases, and these notions are usually far from accurate. They do not convey the complexity of living in a society that regards people with disabilities as the Other on the basis of perceived mentally or bodily difference. The use of disability as a metaphor perpetuates false beliefs about the nature of impairment and disability. People who are blind, for example, do not lack in knowledge; they simply have different ways of obtaining it. Paralysis does not necessarily imply lack of mobility, stagnancy or dependence since there are augmentative instruments, such as wheelchairs and personal aids, that secure independence and mobility. The continued use of disabling language in the classroom perpetuates ignorance and misconceptions in regards to the lived experience of people with disabilities. Power Relations in the Classroom As Marxists, feminists and anti-racist activists and scholars have claimed for decades, the world is viewed mostly from the perspective of the rulers, and language is created in their image as well. Therefore, we must not be surprised that the use of disabling language not only persists, but is neither contested nor acknowledged. Disabling language is language that accepts the assumption that disabilities are bad, unfortunate or denote lack/deficiency; that they are invisible and insignificant to society as a whole; and that disabilities belong to the Other and are distinct from what we would term as normal. What this language hides is that there is a power struggle of definitions, that normalcy is culturally determined and ever-changing, and that there are more people who are defined as having disabilities than we acknowledge. The question that disability activists and scholars are asking is not who is disabled, but who gets to be defined as blind, mentally retarded or crippled and under what power relations? Using an oppressive abelist language to denote deficiency reproduces the same hierarchy and power relations in the classroom, and renders these phrases unproblematic. Disability is not a metaphor. It is an identity. Using disability as a metaphor to represent only negative aspects of a situation is problematic. It is made worse by the fact that blindness, deafness, paralysis, etc., are not floating signifiers, but have real referents behind them—people with disabilities. When using disabling language, we do not only de-value the lived experience of people with disabilities, but we also appropriate these lived experiences for our own use.

2NC

The affirmative's appeal to rationality exclude people with cognitive disabilities – the urge toward consciousness requires ablenormative ideas of competency and self-awareness

Clifford 11 [Stacy Clifford, Hegarty Fellow in the MSU-DOCTRID program, educational background in political science and disability studies; "Indispensable Idiocy: Cognitive Disability and The Social Contract" pg 121; Dissertation for 2012 PhD of Philosophy in Political Science @ Vanderbilt; 12/2011; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-12022011-135421/unrestricted/Clifford_Dissertation113011.pdf>.] Potential for offensive language: glang

The shock that Briggs-Wall described is attributed entirely to the injustice of situating women alongside these other stigmatized groups. Here we can see how dehumanization of the feebleminded is used to as an appeal to certain classes of women and similarly is used to build cross-class solidarity among women. Even within the disability rights movement, **appeals to rationality are difficult to resist**. Mitchell and Snyder argue that physically disabled activists have been complicit with using cognitive disability as the "true" insufficiency (2006). James Charlton's Nothing About Us Without Us: Disability Oppression Empowerment is a foundational text analyzing ableist oppression and the disability rights movement (1998). Charlton laments the absence of people with cognitive disabilities from his analysis, but fails to see how his reliance on a Marxist understanding of oppression enforces exclusion. Under this logic, each individual must undergo a profound change in consciousness to understand their own oppression, but **this assumes that an individual can conceptualize himself as disabled**. Likewise, Justin Dart, a disability activist proclaims, "Empowerment is the issue of the age…. Nobody is going to give it to us. We have to empower ourselves" (quoted in Fleischer and Zames 2001, 109). R.R. Anspach similarly insists that the first step of a successful disabilities movement is to convince others by their actions that they are "independent, rational beings, capable of self-determination and political action" (1996, find page number). Charlton, Anspach, Dart and Anspach endorse the logic of exclusion when they argue that full inclusion necessitates competency, independence, and self-awareness—all of which pose real problems for the severely cognitively disabled. Researchers point out that establishing these kinds of self-concepts may prove especially difficult for people with cognitive disabilities, who thus remain ostracized within their own movement (Finlay and Lyons 1998).

And, their focus on mobility and border crossing reinforces ablenoremative notions of the relationship between mobility and politics

Ferri and May 5 (Beth and Vivian, "Fixated on Ability: Questioning Ableist Metaphors in Feminist Theories of Resistance", Prose Studies, 27 (1&2)

In addition to the use of explicitly ableist metaphors, it is equally important to think about how ableism plays out in more implicit ways. In this vein, **we wonder about many of the metaphors of movement being used in contemporary discourse**. Consider this query posed to incite innovative action toward a more positive future: "What... if we were to tap into the lifeforce that confers upon us the right to live and work toward possibility as opposed to remaining paralyzed and dissatisfied.. .*V* (Cervenak et al. 354). A life of possibility, and even the lifeforce itself, is constructed here in opposition to "paralysis" and dissatisfaction: in other words, being moved to act and live in fulfilling ways requires a form of *movement* that is understood in ableist terms. Iliis example is not unique, however. **References to roving subjects, boundary crossers, and migrating subjects abound: is the movement invoked to signal freedom conceptualized in ways that account for or include disability? Our suspicion is that it is not**. Are **contemporary theorists imagining rolling down the road to freedom or is there an assumption of marching as the authoritative sign of collective group action? What notions of motility are at use in the idea of crossing borders, leaving home, or exile?** What of the ideas of unrestrained movement at work in the many references to untethered subjectivities or "figures of hybridity and excess jsuch as the cvborgj" (Thomson, *Inicfitaiinn* 9)?
Just as whiteness frequently operates as an unstated/unmarked racial norm (in, for example, analogies between homophobia and racism (Carbado 291)), **able-bodiedness continues to operate as the unstated/unnoticed bodily norm both in analogies to disability and in metaphors for freedom and agency. This dynamic obscures the fact that able-bodied people are, in fact, embodied and that disabled persons are disenabled by systems of power.** Additionally, it denies the myriad forms of unearned able-bodied privilege accorded to non-disabled persons. *l*he **able-bodied or "ambulist"** (Keith) **notions of mobility and movement used to define and imagine liberation, resistance,**

and transformation require an unstated, but understood, notion of stasis as their figurative, disabled doppelganger. Here, we turn again to our own writing to further illustrate our point. In our discussion of the character Nichole in Atom Kgoyan's film adaption of the novel, *The Sweet Hereafter,* we analyze Nichole's newfound agency, which rests on her astute uses of ableism to refuse sexual exploitation by her father. Yet in our article, we problematically celebrate the scene at the close of the film when she wheels herself away from the deposition table. Ironically, in analyzing the interdependent nature of ableism and sexism, we privileged autonomy and a narrow notion of motility as signifiers of freedom and agency (May and rerri, 145). The *motility* that is imagined, in our example and in many others, as signaling freedom, political action or movement, or agency often (directly or indirectly) constructs disability as a state of being that is dependent, relational, "stuck," broken, and/or in need of a cure in contrast, of course, to the critical or postmodern subject who seems unfettered, on the move, independent, and whole. Such a framework replicates a troubling figure/ground dichotomy and stymies our ability to rethink diverse modes of motility, movement, agency, freedom, and subjectivity.

Any permutation that calls for an attempt to engage in consciousness is compulsory rationality – the argument that people with cognitive impairments are pitiful or nonexistent unless they work toward abledness – political discourse must be reshaped around accessibility

Clifford 11 [Stacy Clifford, Hegarty Fellow in the MSU-DOCTRID program, educational background in political science and disability studies; "Indispensable Idiocy: Cognitive Disability and The Social Contract" pg 128-130; Dissertation for 2012 PhD of Philosophy in Political Science @ Vanderbilt; 12/2011; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-12022011-135421/unrestricted/Clifford_Dissertation113011.pdf>.] You can read this as a PIC/Counter-advocacy and instead advocate for an epistemology of disavowal of biometrics

Dominant conceptions of personhood hinge political membership on a cluster of cognitive capacities. In this dissertation, I have argued that this conception of personhood is an inheritance from Locke's disabled contract, the terms of which deny the political and human equality of people with cognitive disabilities. Prior chapters examined the disabled contract in liberal political thought and in the historical practices surrounding people with cognitive disabilities. In this chapter, I turn to contemporary self-advocacy groups dedicated to the political empowerment of people with cognitive disabilities. Given the disabled contract's troubled legacy in theory and history, how do contemporary self-advocates with disabilities and their allies frame political claims for inclusion? Do they demand political membership based on the traditional norm of cognitive competence established within social contract theory? Or do they contest the legitimacy of cognitive competence as a marker of political equality and thus aim to transform the foundation of political equality more broadly? In fact, self-advocates and their allies pursue both strategies. They demand recognition as cognitively competent persons in order to gain political standing while simultaneously contesting narrow norms of personhood that enforce their exclusion. Self-advocacy efforts thus straddle an uncomfortable paradox of personhood at the heart of social contract theory: the promise of human and political equality amid profound differences in cognitive disability. More specifically, I argue that the paradox of personhood enforces a threshold measure of cognitive capacity even when self-advocates' aim to displace cognitive competence as a marker for political and human membership. I explore this tension between equality and disability through my observations of People First, a state-wide self-advocacy organization run by and for people with disabilities, and SABE, Self Advocates Becoming Empowered, a national organization largely made-up of People First chapters. Just one of many self-advocacy organizations found in the United States, People First operates through a network of local chapters that serve as political outlets for members to address concerns around employment, transportation, healthcare, and housing. Like the broader disability rights movement, People First directly challenges the idea that people with cognitive disabilities are personally and politically incompetent. This adamant denial of incompetence, however, threatens to intensify the normative commitment to the disabled contract and, in addition, evades the hard question prompted by people with profound cognitive disabilities whose impairment precludes conformity with cognitive competence. Importantly, my analysis of self-advocates with disabilities is driven by a feminist research ethic and feminist theory. My analysis builds on prior feminist scholarship that relies on the empirical experiences of women, women activists, and noncitizens engaged in political struggle to inform the development of normative theory (Beltrán 2009; Ackerly 2000; Mahmood 2004). Methodologically, incorporating disabled voices is congruent with the disability rights movement's motto of "nothing about us, without us" and rectifies scholarship about disability that excludes the involvement or insight of disabled persons. Relying on advocates' voices also momentarily suspends the epistemological

authority of the researcher with the intent to allow the experiences of those most marginalized to guide the development of theoretical claims. In addition, my understanding of key concepts—including compulsory rationality and the paradox of personhood—is derived from feminist theory. I use these concepts to describe in more detail the ways in which the disabled contract enforces conformity. Compulsory rationality builds on feminist and queer theorists' understanding of compulsory heterosexuality in which "lesbian experience is perceived on a scale ranging from deviant to abhorrent, or simply rendered invisible" (Rich 1980, 632). Within disability studies, Robert McRuer similarly argues that the "problem" of disability is not situated in disabled bodies but rather the "inevitable impossibility, even as it is made compulsory, of an able-bodied identity" (2006, 10 emphasis added). I argue in this chapter that a similar dilemma undergirds the lives of people with cognitive disabilities and, insofar as they are unable to cultivate a rational identity, their lives are marked as pitiful, repulsive, or nonexistent. My understanding of the paradox of personhood is also informed by feminist theory and is specifically indebted to Wendy Brown's work on the paradox of rights (2000). For Brown, "Women both require access to the existence of this fictional subject and are systematically excluded from it by the gendered terms of liberalism, thereby making our deployment of rights paradoxical" (239). Brown describes the paradox accordingly, even as invocations of rights for a particular subject (e.g. women) on a particular issue (e.g. sexuality) in a particular domain (e.g. marriage), all of which have been historically excluded from the purview of rights, may work to politicize the standing of those subjects, issues, or domains, rights in liberalism also tend to depoliticize the conditions they articulate. Rights function to articulate a need, a condition of lack or injury, that cannot be fully redressed or transformed by rights, yet can be signified in no other way within existing political discourse. (239)

Call for Consciousness=Root Cause

Their underlying engagement with the social contract of personhood gatekeeps with the ability to think and reason – excludes people with cognitive impairments as deformed, inhuman monsters

Clifford 11 [Stacy Clifford, Hegarty Fellow in the MSU-DOCTRID program, educational background in political science and disability studies; "Indispensable Idiocy: Cognitive Disability and The Social Contract" pg 56-; Dissertation for 2012 PhD of Philosophy in Political Science @ Vanderbilt; 12/2011; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-12022011-135421/unrestricted/Clifford_Dissertation113011.pdf>.] You can read this as a PIC/Counter-advocacy and instead advocate for an epistemology of disavowal of biometrics

According to Locke, <u>human parents and birth does not bestow species membership</u>. Instead, <u>a species is distinctive because of its essence</u> and the possession of this essence confers membership. "<u>To be a man, or of the species man, and have the essence of a man, is the same thing</u>" (298). Locke argues that <u>the faculty of thinking separates the meaning of man from person. Man</u>, according to Locke, <u>is "nothing but a participation of the same continued life</u>…united to the same organized body" (215). <u>A person, however, "is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self"</u> (217). In contrast, <u>a man cannot be considered a person without the ability to reason</u>. Locke is adamant on this point, <u>repeatedly stressing the dependence of personhood on consciousness</u>. Accordingly, "<u>without consciousness, there is no Person</u>" (344), and again, "<u>Self is that conscious thinking thing</u>" (341, see also 335). C.F. Goodey articulates Locke's argument that to belong to the species of man in Locke's Essay, "<u>each single member must conform with our idea of man and thus with our idea of what it is to be rational</u>" (1996, 93). By using man instead of person, Goodey's own analysis of Locke reiterates <u>the slippery conceptual demarcations between categories</u>. The bodily difference of idiocy—<u>lodged in the faculty of thinking</u>—is directly situated on the border between man and person. Locke does not evade the questionable personhood status of idiots, but faces it directly in his discussion of changelings. In the seventeenth century, a changeling was defined as a "halfwitted person, idiot, [and] imbecile," as well as a "child (usually stupid or ugly) supposed to have been left by fairies in exchange for one stolen child" (Oxford 2007). Locke himself describes changelings as "drivelling, unintelligent, [and] intractable," "half Beast, and half Man," and "ill-formed and mis-shaped productions" (571-2). Changelings are used by Locke to debunk two misplaced assumptions: "That all Things that have the outward Shape and Appearance of a Man, must necessarily be designed to an immortal future Being, after this Life. Or, secondly, that whatever is of humane Birth must be so" (570). For Locke, <u>being born of two rational humans is not enough to bestow human membership</u>. <u>When Locke conjoins the driveling intelligence of idiots with the misshapen form of beasts, **the result is hardly human, but rather monstrous.**</u>

Monstrous projections of disability are cultural wounds that engender replication and fear-mongering – means no solvency as the label of disability is projected onto other marginalized groups

Cohen 96 [Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, Professor of English, Director of Institute for Medieval & Early Modern Studies at Columbian College of Arts and Sciences; "Monster Culture" pg 4; University of Minnesota Press; 1996; accessed 06/29/2015; < http://ptfaculty.gordonstate.edu/rscoggins/Cohen,%20Monster%20Culture%20(Seven%20Theses),%203-20.pdf>.]

Thesis I: <u>The Monster's Body Is a Cultural Body</u> Vampires, burial, death: inter the corpse where the road forks, so that when it springs from the grave, it will not know which path to follow. Drive a stake through its heart: it will be stuck to the ground at the fork, it will haunt that place that leads to many other places, that point of in- decision. Behead the corpse, so that, acephalic, <u>it will not know itself as subject, only as pure body</u>. <u>The monster is born only at</u> this me<u>taphoric Crossroads, as an embodiment of a certain cultural moment-of a time, a feeling, and -a place</u>.1 <u>The monster's body</u> quite literally <u>incorporates fear, desire, anxiety, and fantasy (ataractic or incendiary), giving</u> them <u>life and an uncanny independence. The monstrous body is pure culture. A construct and a projection, the monster exists only to be read</u>: the monstrum is <u>etymologically "that which reveals," "that which warns,"</u> a glyph that seeks a

hierophant. Like a letter on the page, **the monster signifies** something other than itself: it is always **a displacement**, always inhabits the gap between the time of upheaval that created it and the moment into which it is received, to be born again. These epistemological spaces between the monster's bones are Derrida's familiar chasm of différance: a genetic uncertainty principle, the essence of the monster's vitality, the reason it always rises from the dissection table as its secrets are about to be revealed and vanishes into the night.

Their fear of the dangerous, deviant, impaired body justifies human rights abuses, murder, and devalued lives – discrimination against people of color, women, and immigrants has always been through their alignment with disability

Siebers 10 [Tobin Siebers, Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Michigan; "The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification"; University of Michigan Press; 10/28/2010; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdisabilities.temple.edu%2Fmedia%2Fds%2Flecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.doc&ei=LWz4T6jyN8bHqAHLkY2LCQ&usg=AFQjCNGdkDuSJkRXMHgbXqvuyyeDpldVcQ&sig2=UCGDC4tHbeh2j7-Yce9lsA>.]

Surprisingly little thought and energy have been given to disputing the belief that nonquality human beings do exist. This belief is so robust that it supports the most serious and characteristic injustices of our day. Disqualification at this moment in time justifies discrimination, servitude, imprisonment, involuntary institutionalization, euthanasia, human and civil rights violations, military intervention, compulsory sterilization, police actions, assisted suicide, capital punishment, and murder. It is my contention that disqualification finds support in the way that bodies appear and in their specific appearances—that is, **disqualification is justified through the accusation of mental or physical inferiority** based on aesthetic principles. Disqualification is produced by naturalizing inferiority as the justification for unequal treatment, violence, and oppression. According to Snyder and Mitchell, disability serves in the modern period as "the master trope of human disqualification." They argue that disability represents a marker of otherness that establishes differences between human beings **not as acceptable or valuable variations but as dangerous deviations**. Douglas Baynton provides compelling examples from the modern era, explaining that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States **disability identity disqualified other identities defined by gender, race, class, and nationality.** Women were deemed inferior because they were said to have mental and physical disabilities. People of color had fewer rights than other persons based on accusations of biological inferiority. Immigrants were excluded from entry into the United States when they were poor, sick, or failed standardized tests, even though the populations already living there were poor, sick, and failed standardized tests. In every case, disability identity served to justify oppression by amplifying ideas about inferiority already attached to other minority identities. Disability is the trope by which the assumed inferiority of these other minority identities achieved expression. The appearance of lesser mental and physical abilities disqualifies people as inferior and justifies their oppression. It is now possible to recognize disability as a trope used to posit the inferiority of certain minority populations, but it remains extremely difficult to understand that mental and physical markers of inferiority are also tropes placed in the service of disability oppression. Before disability can be used as a disqualifier, disability, too, has to be disqualified. Beneath the troping of blackness as inbuilt inferiority, for example, lies the troping of disability as inferior. Beneath the troping of femininity as biological deficiency lies the troping of disability as deficiency. The mental and physical properties of bodies become the natural symbols of inferiority via a process of disqualification that seems biological, not cultural—which is why disability discrimination seems to be a medical rather than a social problem. If we consider how difficult it is at this moment to disqualify people as inferior on the basis of their racial, sexual, gender, or class characteristics, **we may come to recognize the ground that we must cover in the future before we experience the same difficulty disqualifying people as inferior on the basis of disability**. We might also recognize the work that disability performs at present in situations where race, sexuality, gender, and class are used to disqualify people as physically or mentally inferior.

Cyborg K

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The essentializing claim "we are all cyborgs" ignores the visceral hatred of the use of technology in disability – that Othered people with disabilities must only be <u>as</u> good as, or striving for, the abled body, but their cyborgization must not extend beyond that. Even if "we" are all cyborgs, the abled body cannot challenge these categories

Wanenchak 12 [Sarah Wanenchak, contributor to cyborgology, fifth year doctorate candidate, MA in gender and sexuality studies, their work focuses on exploring social movements from the perspective of analysis of events, and the way movement dynamics work in the context of a world augmented by digital technology; "Disabled Bodies and Ableist Acceptance"; Sociological Images; 01/16/2012; accessed 07/26/2015; <http://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2012/01/16/disabled-bodies-and-ableist-acceptance/>.]

My angle was to begin with the idea of <u>able-bodied society's instinctive, gut-level sense of discomfort and fear regarding disabled bodies</u>, which is outlined in disability studies scholar Fiona Kumari Campbell's book Contours of Ableism. Briefly, Campbell distinguishes between disableism, which are the set of discriminatory ideas and practices that construct the world in such a way that it favors the able-bodied and marginalizes the disabled, and ableism, which <u>is the set of constructed meanings that set disabled bodies themselves apart as objects of distaste and discomfort</u>. In this sense, <u>disabled bodies are imbued with a kind of queerness – they are Other</u> in the most physical sense, outside and beyond accepted norms, <u>unknown and unknowable, uncontrollable</u>, disturbing in how difficult they are to pin down. Campbell identifies <u>this quality of unknowability and uncontainability as especially, viscerally horrifying</u>. Campbell connects more directly to <u>Haraway's cyborgs</u> when she opens a discussion of biotechnology and disabled bodies: The fortunes of techno-science continue to <u>disrupt the fixity of defining disability and normalcy especially within the arenas of law and bioethics</u>. Whilst anomalous bodies are undecidable in being open to endless and differing interpretations, <u>an essentialised disabled body is subjected to constant deferral</u> – standing in reserve, awaiting and escaping able(edness) <u>through morphing technologies and as such exists in an ontologically tentative or provisional state</u>. Anomalous and <u>disabled bodies are</u> both <u>unsettling to the able-bodied</u>, therefore, because they implicitly lay open to question our assumptions about essential definitions of embodied humanity. <u>Throw technology into the mix and the questions become even more explicit. What is human?</u> What does human mean? And where is the line between organic human and machine – if there even is one? <u>Haraway's position is</u>, of course, <u>that there is no meaningful line, and that we are all</u>, in some sense, <u>cyborgs</u> — that <u>the relationship between the organic and the machine is so complex that it is no longer sensible to attempt to untangle it</u>. And thanks to <u>advances in prostheses and other biotechnologies, the boundary between "disabled" and "augmented" is becoming increasingly problematic</u>, despite the essentializing power that the label of <u>"disabled" contains</u>. In order to introduce my students to the ideas behind the relationship of different kinds of organic bodies to different kinds of technology, and how we culturally process those embodied relationships, I invited them to consider the cases of two <u>amputee athletes</u>, Aimee Mullins and Oscar Pistorius. These are the pictures I used: Mullins and Pistorius present interesting examples. They are both known for being both accomplished athletes and for being physically attractive – Mullins has done modeling work. They <u>present inspiring stories</u> that have generated a fair amount of sports media coverage. And <u>yet</u> things have not been altogether smooth – <u>there has been</u> some <u>controversy regarding the degree to which the carbon fiber prostheses they use</u> for running <u>confer</u> any form of <u>advantage</u> on the runners who use them. <u>Questions over the effect of the prostheses have threatened Pistorius's bids</u> to compete <u>in the Olympics alongside able-bodied athletes</u>. I think <u>the combination of positive and negative reactions is worth noting</u>, in light of Campbell's writing on culture and disability. Mullins and Pistorius are <u>admired for "overcoming" a perceived disability, and this admiration feels especially safe for people embedded in able-bodied culture</u> because they are conventionally attractive in every other respect. But <u>this is a story with which we only feel comfortable provided that it doesn't present any kind of threat to our conventional categories of abled and disabled bodies. It is unacceptable for a disabled body to be better at what it does than an abled body. It is even slightly uncomfortable when a disabled body manages to be "just as good".</u> After the images of Mullins and Pistorius, I also showed my students an image of speed skater

<u>Apollo Ohno</u>: Like the images of Mullins and Pistorius, Ohno's body is explicitly being presented here as an attractive object. By most standards, Ohno is as able-bodied as one can get. But as I pointed out to my students, he <u>manages</u> this <u>on the back of technology</u> – on specially designed skates, in special aerodynamic suits, with the help of carefully balanced exercise and nutrition plans; almost no athlete is really "natural" anymore. <u>But</u> at least in part <u>because of the closeness of his body to an able-bodied ideal, this presents no explicit threat to our categories. Ohno fits the accepted model of "human".</u> Who would look at him and doubt it? And if Mullins and Pistorius are perhaps not as close to that ideal, they at least fall into line with it, by virtue of the fact that they don't explicitly question its legitimacy as an ideal – unless they seek to transcend it. My point, in short, is this: we <u>are uncomfortable with disabled bodies that question or trouble our accepted, hierarchical categories of abled and disabled</u>, of human and non-human, of organic and machine. <u>We are far more comfortable with them when they perform in such a way that they reinforce the supremacy of those categories</u>. They become acceptable to us.

To be seen as a cyborg is not a radical choice for people with disabilities and the elderly – the ability to choose obscures the psycho-emotional effects of perception of cyborgism, and ignores the economic and survival struggles of those perceived as cyborgs

Reeve 12 [Donna Reeve, Department of Applied Social Science at Lancaster University, specializing in Feminist Disability Studies; "Cyborgs, cripples and iCrip: Reflections on the contribution of Haraway to disability studies" pg 96-98; Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions; 2012; accessed 07/26/2015; <http://donnareeve.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ReeveChapter2012c.pdf>.]

As part of her critique of the poststructural disabled subject Erevelles (2001) argues strongly that <u>there is danger in viewing disabled subjects as being able to seek</u> a <u>pleasurable survival as a border-crosser in the ironic political myth of a cyborgean materiality</u>. (Erevelles, 2001: 97) Whilst many disabled people do have intimate relationships with technology, guide dogs and ventilators which are necessary to everyday survival, this <u>playful transgressing of boundaries so favoured by Haraway</u> and subsequent theorists <u>neglects the materiality of disablism</u>, in other words, the social practices and cultural beliefs that underpin the disadvantage and exclusion experienced by people with impairments (Thomas, 2007: 13). <u>The ease with which cyborg politics offers a new language and possibilities</u> for marginalised groups <u>risks **erasing the actual struggles that many disabled people face for economic survival**</u>, especially in the majority world. Here the extreme poverty in some countries is exacerbated by the high numbers of people who become amputees as a result of war and landmines (Yeo and Moore, 2003) - <u>cyborg politics would appear to have little relevance to these disabled people struggling simply to survive</u>. Reality of living as a cyborg Another criticism which has been made by scholars in disability studies is that <u>the cyborg imagined by Haraway fails to take account of the reality of living with a body which is hybridised with technology</u>. As Siebers (2008) puts it so well: <u>Haraway's cyborgs are spunky, irreverent, and sexy; they accept with glee the ability to transgress old boundaries</u> between machine and animal, male and female, and mind and body. … [However] <u>Haraway is so preoccupied with power and ability that **she forgets what disability is**</u>. <u>Prostheses</u> always increase the cyborg's abilities; they <u>are a source only of new powers, never of problems. The cyborg is always more than human</u> – <u>and never risks</u> to be seen as <u>subhuman</u>. To put it simply, **the cyborg is not disabled**. (Siebers, 2008: 63) Siebers describes how his plastic leg brace helps ease the pain in his lower back, but in summer it chafes his calf causing pain and soreness. Long-term wheelchair users can develop painful shoulder problems in later life and implanted devices such as nerve cord stimulators can have wires break and batteries that need replacing; these are examples of 'impairment effects' (Thomas, 2007: 136), restrictions of activity due to bodily variation and ways of managing that difference, rather than from externally imposed disablism. In addition to these physical problems that prosthetics can cause, there are also potential psycho-emotional barriers. For example, whilst using a wheelchair can be enabling, allowing the user to move more freely in space, that person then becomes subject to the prejudices that exist in society about the perceived inabilities of wheelchair users (Cromby and Standen, 1999). This example of <u>psycho-emotional disablism</u> (Reeve, 2006; Reeve, 2008; Thomas, 2007) <u>is a form of social oppression that undermines emotional well-being, self-esteem and ontological security, impacting on 'being' rather than 'doing' as seen in examples of</u>

structural disablism such as inaccessible buildings. This experience of psycho-emotional disablism may make someone decide to abandon their prosthetic because they don't want to be marked out as different and subject to stigma; this has implications for professionals such as physiotherapists who need to rework their notion of 'non-compliance' through the lens of psycho-emotional disablism. Another form of psycho-emotional disablism can emerge when people feel 'forced' to use a prosthetic or assistive device because of the reactions of others. For example, there is social pressure on women to wear a prosthetic or have breast reconstruction surgery following breast cancer (Herndl, 2002); not only does this retain the cultural image of women as feminine but it also hides the unspeakable spectre of cancer from public view. People using prosthetic devices can be stared at by strangers which is another example of psycho-emotional disablism. Alongside questions about how someone lost their hand for example, there are also questions about how the mechanical hand works (Garland-Thomson, 2009). Some people choose to wear an 'aesthetic prosthetic' which has no function, but helps reduce this experience of psycho-emotional disablism. It is not just impaired bodies that have been seen as potential cyborgs – increasingly the ageing body can also be seen as a cyborg if one considers the use of stents, pacemakers, artificial hips and so on, that are offered to shore up worn out joints and other body parts near their sell-by date. Ihde (2008) who self-identifies as a 'partial cyborg' has written an excellent paper describing how these prosthetics do not work as well as the original body part and so they are 'quasi-transparent'. Although implants such as replacement hip and knee joints are common operations in the UK at least, they have a limited lifespan in practice and so people delay surgery as long as possible, aiming for 'late life, rather than mid-life cyborg parts!' (Ihde, 2008: 400). Although prosthetics 'fall far short of the bionic technofantasies so often projected in popular culture' (Ihde, 2008: 403), adopting cyborg options is one common way of attempting to counteract the processes of ageing.

We must reject ableism in the context of the 1AC – creates trauma, normalizes and perpetuates systemic violence and abuse, and is rooted in the same linguistic and representational connotations as misogyny, heteronormativity, racism, and binarist

Brown 14 [Lydia Brown, activist, public speaker, and writer focused on violence against multiply-marginalized disabled people, such as LGBTQ+ (queer and trans), poor, undocumented, and people of color groups within the disability community, Board of Directors for TASH New England, Project Assistant at the Autistic Self Advocacy Network, and previously involved in writing disability policy; "Violence in Language: Circling Back to Linguistic Ableism"; Autistic Hoya; 02/11/2014; accessed 07/27/2015; < http://www.autistichoya.com/2014/02/violence-linguistic-ableism.html>.] this card is on fire!!!!!! please, pull a fire alarm like asap

One of the most common (inaccurate and mischaracterizing) criticisms, however, both from inside and outside the disability community, is the accusation that the list is a tool for policing language or censoring words. So what's the purpose of the list? Why compile it at all? Because linguistic ableism is part of the total system of ableism, and it is critical to understand how it works, how it is deployed, and how we can unlearn our social conditioning that linguistic ableism is normal and just how things are or should be. As important as it is to recognize and uncover the violence of linguistic ableism (how ableism is specifically embedded into our language), it is also critical to understand why this is important. (And this is where those who jump the gun and leap to accusations of pedantic, holier-than-thou, smug language-policing or censorship **have not yet come to understand why this** page, and those like it, **need to exist**.) Linguistic ableism: a) is part of an entire system of ableism, and doesn't exist simply by itself, b) signifies how deeply ableist our societies and cultures by how common and accepted ableism is in language, c) reinforces and perpetuates ableist social norms that **normalize violence and abuse against disabled people**, d) actively creates less safe spaces by **re-traumatizing disabled people**, and e) **uses ableism to perpetuate other forms of oppression**. Language is not the be all end all. This isn't about policing language or censoring words, but about critically examining how language is part of total ableist hegemony. This is about being accountable when we learn about linguistic ableism, but it is also about being compassionate to ourselves and recognizing that to varying extents, we have all participated in ablesupremacy and ablenormativity. **This is about understanding** the connections between linguistic ableism and other forms of ableism, such as medical ableism, scientific ableism, legal ableism, and cultural ableism. Language reflects and influences society and culture. That's why students of any foreign language often study the cultures where that language is dominant. (And that's not to dimiss the many valid

criticisms of the ethnocentrism and colonialism in much area and language studies programs.) Language isn't important for silly semantic reasons, but because it cannot be separated from the culture in which it is deployed. Feminist theory, queer theory, and race theory have all analyzed how **sexism, heterosexism, cissexism, binarism, and racism are embedded in language. This is the same** process. Using the language of disability (either directly or through metaphor) as a way to insult other people, dismiss other people, express your vehement loathing for them/their viewpoints, or invalidate their viewpoints is actually extremely ableist (and often sanist, neurotypicalist, audist, or vidist). For example, I am talking about using the language of mental illness ("crazy," "insane," "psycho," or "wacko," for example), cognitive disability ("retarded," "slow," or "moron," for example), or physical disability ("crippled" or "completely blind/deaf," for example). In another example, I am also talking about using disability as metaphor. Using the language of disability to denigrate or insult in our conversations and organizing presumes that a.) people who hold undesirable or harmful viewpoints must hold them because they are mentally ill/have psych disabilities/are mentally disabled/are disabled in some way, b.) having mental illness/psych disability/mental disability/any disability is actually so undesirable and horrible that you can insult someone that way (the same underlying reason why socially embedded linguistic heterosexism lets people use "gay" as an insult), c.) it's acceptable to use ableism against one disability group while decrying ableism against another disability group (creating horizontal or intra-disability oppression) or another form of oppression against another marginalized group (creating horizontal oppression), and d.) and that no one who is disabled in any way might actually share your opinion or be on your side, thus actually actively excluding and marginalizing this part of our community, and making our spaces less safe and less inclusive.

2NC

Cyborgism eschews people with disabilities as already cyborgs in need of no further consideration – using people with disabilities as cyborgs ignores their poverty and inherent capitalist slant of prosthetics while managing to disregard their experiences

Reeve 12 [Donna Reeve, Department of Applied Social Science at Lancaster University, specializing in Feminist Disability Studies; "Cyborgs, cripples and iCrip: Reflections on the contribution of Haraway to disability studies" pg 93-95; Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions; 2012; accessed 07/26/2015; <http://donnareeve.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ReeveChapter2012c.pdf>.]

In addition, <u>the cyborg</u> is an individual and the whole, <u>representing 'transgressed boundaries</u>, potent fusions, <u>and dangerous possibilities'</u> (Haraway, 1991: 154). The hybrid figure of the cyborg bl<u>urs categorical distinctions such as human/machine, human/animal and nature/culture and moves beyond the dualisms which contribute to the domination of those marked as Other. Cyborgs can unsettle the existing order</u> by creating new modes of 'resistance and recoupling' (Haraway, 1991: 154) which undermine the implicit hierarchies within these dualisms. <u>This</u> theoretical approach <u>raises new ethical and epistemological questions; for example, how does the cyborg</u> (often seen as posthuman) <u>question what it means to be human?</u> I have briefly identified some of the key points about the cyborg figure described by Haraway in A Cyborg Manifesto. <u>Whilst [Haraway]</u> she <u>engages with issues of difference such as gender, ethnicity and class, her discussion about disability is restricted to a passing comment</u> that many disabled people are already cyborg. Perhaps <u>paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and</u> sometimes <u>do) have the most intense experiences of complex hybridization</u> with other communication devices. (Haraway, 1991: 178) <u>This omission is particularly striking when one takes into account the fact that Haraway's father was disabled from childhood</u> which meant he used under-arm crutches to walk (Haraway, 2008). Whilst Haraway talks about the cyborg relationship her father had with his crutches and various wheelchairs, <u>there is no discussion of disability per se</u>; this seems odd given that it is likely she grew up with a father who would probably have experienced environmental barriers of some kind during his life as a crutch user before the disability rights movement started in the US in the 1970s. <u>Whilst there is potential value in exploring disability</u> within the larger 'bodies' of cyberculture, the internet and telecommunications technologies, such as disability activists working together across the world via internet technology (Goodley, 2010), **that has been set aside for another day**. This chapter sets out to revisit the figure of the individual cyborg and to consider its relevance for disability studies in the 21st century. <u>The impaired body as contemporary cyborg</u> For people with impairments, the <u>hybridisation of machine/human or animal/human is often synonymous with lived experience</u>, particularly for those with physical or sensory impairments (which will form the focus for this chapter). Potential cyborg figures can be seen in the wheelchair user, the person with a cochlear implant, artificial leg or pacemaker, someone who uses an assistance dog. In this section I want to look at the issues which are raised <u>if the impaired body is viewed as a potential contemporary cyborg</u>. Access to cyborg technology There <u>have been various criticisms within disability studies about the cavalier use of impaired bodies within mainstream theorising about cyborgs</u>. For example Mitchell and Snyder describe how <u>A Cyborg Manifesto provides an example of how disabled people exemplify</u>, in a footnote, the <u>self-evident cyborgs of modernity</u> – transhuman subjects who rework the nature/culture divide. (Mitchell and Snyder, 1997: 28-29, my emphasis) This <u>footnoting is common; discussion of prosthetics and impaired bodies is often limited to consideration of how technology either restores functionality or normalises the person</u> with little discussion of the cultural/social implications of prosthetics, or of the lived experience of body and prosthetic. <u>Discussions of the connections between 'cyborg' and 'disabled' are rarely made</u> (Campbell, 2009). Mitchell and Snyder (1997) also point out the insensitivity that many <u>social theorists and philosophers display when using impaired bodies and technology to illustrate cyborg thinking</u>. It is all very well to fantasise about the couplings of human and technology which have developed over time to include prosthetics, implants, artificial organs and technological aids - human trials will start by 2012 on a prosthetic arm which is directly controlled by micro arrays which have been implanted into the brain (Drummond, 2010). This is close to the stuff of science fiction. But at the same time, <u>disabled people are amongst the poorest group in society and so access to adequate prosthetics or technology so that they can participate in society as an 'active citizen' is seriously</u>

<u>curtailed</u> (Mitchell and Snyder, 1997). Therefore improvements in technology do not always relate to improvements in the quality of life of disabled people because <u>[t]echnology is always already social – which in our culture means it is shaped and informed by market forces</u> and the requirements of powerful vested interests. (Cromby and Standen, 1999)

Recognizing and stopping use of ableist language is only the first step in addressing the larger problem it symptomizes – they need to accept critiques through the lens of disability

FWD 10 [Anna, writer for the now defunct Feminists with Disabilities;"Why Talking About Language Isn't Enough"; FREEDOM: Feminists with Disabilities; 05/25/2010; accessed 07/27/2015; <http://disabledfeminists.com/2010/05/25/awp-why-writing-about-language-isnt-enough/>.] Also explains why indicts of blogs are bad in the case of disability studies

In social justice blogging circles, especially feminist-focused ones, <u>it's not unusual to have conversations about language, and why language matters</u>. Those conversations can vary from explaining why it's problematic to call women & girls "females", why using "he" and "mankind" to be a generic non-gendered term is sexist, reclaiming – or not – of words like "bitch", and what it means to refer to "undocumented immigrants" rather than "illegals". These conversations often focus on how sexist or racist language is a symptom of a problem that needs to be addressed. <u>We can talk about how calling women bitches is a sign of sexism, or referring to people as "illegals" is dehumanizing to immigrants</u>. And <u>yet</u>, when trying to have <u>discussions about ableist language</u>, we're back to the silo of disability. Instead of talking about ableist language <u>as part of the manifestation of the disdain and abuse of people with disabilities, it's treated as isolated – the problem, instead of a symptom of the problem. Ableism is not simply a language problem</u>. Ableism manifests in the social justice blogosphere in so many different ways. They can vary from just not thinking about disability at all when writing about social justice issues to <u>shrugging off critiques from disability-focus</u>ed bloggers <u>as being "too sensitive".</u> It can be <u>ignoring posts about disability-focused issues or only linking to non-disabled people writing about disability-issues instead of to disabled</u> bloggers. It can be as apparent as declining to acknowledge disability exists to as "subtle" (to some) as declining to make your blog template accessible to screen readers. <u>There are also choices</u> that social justice bloggers make <u>about how we educate ourselves, and whose voices we highlight, who we approach about their writing, and who we ask to be mediators</u>. <u>If we're not reading disability-focus</u>ed blogs, then <u>we're not learning about disability-focus</u>ed issues – and, in turn, <u>we're not highlighting those voices, bringing attention to those issues, or thinking about that analysis</u> when writing our own posts. Thirdly, <u>ableism manifests in whose voices we trust</u>. For all that I'm very happy to provide people with book lists, I'm a bit suspicious of people who decline lists of disability-focused bloggers they could be reading as well. <u>Why does someone's voice have to go through the publishing-sphere (and usually through academia</u> for the books you're going to get from me) **before it counts as worth-reading?** I get why people talk about language, and I agree that <u>language is important. But I'm not giving cookies out for publicly declaring</u> your ally-status by saying <u>you won't (or will try not to) use ableist language anymore. That's a great first step. Now move on.</u>

Feminism K

1NC

<Link – specific metaphor>

Ableist language in feminist scholarship positions disability as oppositional to feminism, hurts political potential, and limits intersectional participation

Schalk 13 [Sami Schalk, assistant professor at Albany Arts, PhD in Gender Studies at Indiana University, research focuses on the representation of disability in contemporary African American literature; "Metaphorically Speaking: Ableist Metaphors in Feminist Writing"; Disability Studies Quarterly Vol 33 No 4; 2013; accessed 07/28/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3874/3410>.]

The two interactions that I describe above offer important lessons about <u>the relationship between language and ableism</u>. In fact, these interactions motivated me to seriously <u>reflect upon the ways that our ability to recognize diverse embodiment is limited by figurative language that conceptually distances us from the reality of impairment</u>. In particular, I began to question the function and impact of <u>disability metaphors</u> and the role that such figures of speech play <u>in feminist scholarship</u>. In this article, I consider how disability is used as metaphor in two feminist texts: bell hooks's The Will to Change: Men, Masculinity and Love (2004) and Tania Modleski's Feminism without Women: Culture and Criticism in a "Postfeminist" Age (1991). Beginning with a broad understanding of feminism as a movement <u>to end sex and gender oppression in the lives of all people</u>, a movement aligned with anti-racist, anti-homophobic, anti-classist, and (most importantly for this piece) anti-ableist movements, I make connections between <u>sexist and ableist rhetoric</u> in order to ex<u>pose the political and intellectual repercussions of the use of disability as metaphor</u> in these feminist texts in particular and in feminist theory more generally. I argue, for instance, that <u>when feminists use metaphors of disability to represent the negative effects of patriarchy, they conceptually and theoretically position feminism and disability in opposition to each other and</u> thereby <u>imply that the goals of feminism are two-fold: to end patriarchy and to erase disability</u>. I insist, furthermore, that <u>this theoretical and conceptual strategy runs counter to the goals of contemporary, intersectional feminist politics</u>, activism, and scholarship. Insofar as I make these connections, I may seem to enter into a broader <u>discussion</u> about what is often <u>derisively referred to as "political correctness."</u> Such discussions 1 tend to <u>devolve into accusations of censorship</u> and battles over what is, or is not, offensive, <u>and who does, or does not, have the "right" to be offended in the first place</u>. 2 In some mainstream and feminist philosophical contexts, these discussions have tended to revolve around the use of ocular metaphors to represent a lack of knowledge and information (as in "blind review") or to refer to forms of moral negligence (for example, "blindly followed"). Although this article will address negative metaphoric uses of disability, my aim is not to argue that certain words and phrases are inherently offensive, nor do I assert that politically-engaged feminist scholars should act as arbiters or censors of each other's linguistic practices; rather, I aim to show the impact that such language-use has on feminist scholarship and for feminist politics at the structural, as opposed to the individual, level. In short, I contend that <u>feminist scholars should recognize that these negative metaphorical uses of disability variously impact, limit, and contradict the aims of their arguments</u>, in addition to <u>compromising their professed political goals</u>, <u>regardless of whether or not everyone</u> in a targeted disabled group <u>is offended by any given disability metaphor</u>. To advance my argument, I draw on the insights about metaphor that disability scholars such as Vivian M. May and Beth A. Ferri have made.

Must reject ableism in the context of the 1AC – creates trauma, normalizes and perpetuates systemic violence and abuse, and is rooted in the same linguistic and representational connotations as misogyny, heteronormativity, racism, and binarist

Brown 14 [Lydia Brown, activist, public speaker, and writer focused on violence against multiply-marginalized disabled people, such as LGBTQ+ (queer and trans), poor, undocumented, and people of color groups within the disability community, Board of Directors for TASH New England, Project Assistant at the Autistic Self Advocacy Network, and previously involved in writing disability policy; "Violence in Language: Circling Back to Linguistic Ableism"; Autistic Hoya; 02/11/2014; accessed 07/27/2015; < http://www.autistichoya.com/2014/02/violence-linguistic-ableism.html>.] this card is on fire!!!!!! please, pull a fire alarm like asap

<u>One of the most</u> common (<u>inaccurate and mischaracterizing) criticisms</u>, however, both from inside and outside the disability community, <u>is the accusation</u> that the list is a tool <u>for policing language or censoring words.</u> So what's the

purpose of the list? Why compile it at all? Because linguistic ableism is part of the total system of ableism, and it is critical to understand how it works, how it is deployed, and how we can unlearn our social conditioning that linguistic ableism is normal and just how things are or should be. As important as it is to recognize and uncover the violence of linguistic ableism (how ableism is specifically embedded into our language), it is also critical to understand why this is important. (And this is where those who jump the gun and leap to accusations of pedantic, holier-than-thou, smug language-policing or censorship have not yet come to understand why this page, and those like it, need to exist.) Linguistic ableism: a) is part of an entire system of ableism, and doesn't exist simply by itself, b) signifies how deeply ableist our societies and cultures by how common and accepted ableism is in language, c) reinforces and perpetuates ableist social norms that normalize violence and abuse against disabled people, d) actively creates less safe spaces by re-traumatizing disabled people, and e) uses ableism to perpetuate other forms of oppression. Language is not the be all end all. This isn't about policing language or censoring words, but about critically examining how language is part of total ableist hegemony. This is about being accountable when we learn about linguistic ableism, but it is also about being compassionate to ourselves and recognizing that to varying extents, we have all participated in ablesupremacy and ablenormativity. This is about understanding the connections between linguistic ableism and other forms of ableism, such as medical ableism, scientific ableism, legal ableism, and cultural ableism. Language reflects and influences society and culture. That's why students of any foreign language often study the cultures where that language is dominant. (And that's not to dimiss the many valid criticisms of the ethnocentrism and colonialism in much area and language studies programs.) Language isn't important for silly semantic reasons, but because it cannot be separated from the culture in which it is deployed. Feminist theory, queer theory, and race theory have all analyzed how sexism, heterosexism, cissexism, binarism, and racism are embedded in language. This is the same process. Using the language of disability (either directly or through metaphor) as a way to insult other people, dismiss other people, express your vehement loathing for them/their viewpoints, or invalidate their viewpoints is actually extremely ableist (and often sanist, neurotypicalist, audist, or vidist). For example, I am talking about using the language of mental illness ("crazy," "insane," "psycho," or "wacko," for example), cognitive disability ("retarded," "slow," or "moron," for example), or physical disability ("crippled" or "completely blind/deaf," for example). In another example, I am also talking about using disability as metaphor. Using the language of disability to denigrate or insult in our conversations and organizing presumes that a.) people who hold undesirable or harmful viewpoints must hold them because they are mentally ill/have psych disabilities/are mentally disabled/are disabled in some way, b.) having mental illness/psych disability/mental disability/any disability is actually so undesirable and horrible that you can insult someone that way (the same underlying reason why socially embedded linguistic heterosexism lets people use "gay" as an insult), c.) it's acceptable to use ableism against one disability group while decrying ableism against another disability group (creating horizontal or intra-disability oppression) or another form of oppression against another marginalized group (creating horizontal oppression), and d.) and that no one who is disabled in any way might actually share your opinion or be on your side, thus actually actively excluding and marginalizing this part of our community, and making our spaces less safe and less inclusive.

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The academic sphere is the best place to interrogate ableism and deconstruct it, specifically in the context of feminism. Our methodology of tolerance of what is often considered too sensitive solves rolelessness and the intersection of sexism and ableism

Garland-Thomson 1 [Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Professor of English at Emory University, where her fields of study are disability studies, American literature and culture, feminist theory, and bioethics; "Re-shaping, Re-thinking, Re-defining: Feminist Disability Studies" pg 18-20; Center for Women Policy Studies; Barbara Waxman Fiduccia Papers on Women and Girls with Disabilities; 2001; accessed 07/28/2015; <http://www.centerwomenpolicy.org/pdfs/DIS2.pdf>.]

Activism: Feminist Disability Studies also focuses on <u>activism for change</u>, which <u>augments and remedies the accompanying focus on negative representations of women and disabled people</u>, the pathologizing of their bodies, and the politics of appearance. <u>Important activist strands</u> have <u>developed</u> in both feminism and Disability Studies <u>that shift</u> them <u>from</u> the constant task of <u>exposing just how relentless and pervasive oppression</u> has been – and <u>is</u>. <u>This is a different kind of activism from demonstrations and marches</u>. While less theatrical, the <u>activism focused on integrating education, in the very broadest sense of that term, is no less ardent</u>. And higher education is <u>the grass roots of the educational enterprise</u>. College and university teachers shape the communal knowledge base that is disseminated from kindergarten through the university. A<u>ctivist academic practices include exposing the workings of oppression, constructing a tradition of disability culture, historical and textual retrieval</u>, canon reformation, finding and being role models, mentoring, curriculum reform, course and program development, and integrating disability into existing syllabi. Part of the <u>activism inherent in Feminist Disability Studies emerges in its commitment to study</u> the lives and artistic products of women with disabilities. To analyze who disabled women are and what they create expands our understanding of human variation and enriches our collective knowledge of humankind, especially the ways that gender operates. <u>For example, the judgment that the disabled woman's body is asexual and unfeminine creates</u> what Michelle Fine and Adrienne Asch term <u>"rolelessness," a social invisibility and cancellation of femininity that can prompt disabled women to claim the female identity that the culture denies them</u>. Cheryl Marie Wade insists upon a harmony between her disability and her womanly sexuality in a poem characterizing herself as "The Woman With Juice."37 As Mairs' exploration of <u>selfnaming and</u> Wade's <u>assertion of sexuality suggest, a feminist disability politics would uphold the right of women to define their physical differences and their femininity for themselves</u> rather than conforming to received interpretations of their bodies. Wade's poem of self-definition echoes Mairs by maintaining firmly that she is "not one of the physically challenged." Rather, she claims, "I'm the Gimp/I'm the Cripple/I'm the Crazy Lady." Affirming her body as at once sexual and different, she asserts, "I'm a French kiss with cleft tongue." Resisting the cultural tendency not only to erase her sexuality but to deprecate and objectify her body, she characterizes herself as "a sock in the eye with gnarled fist." <u>This image of the disabled body as a visual assault, a shocking spectacle to the nondisabled eye, captures a defining aspect of disabled experience.</u> Whereas <u>feminists claim that women are objects of the evaluative male gaze</u>, Wade's image of her body as "a sock in the eye" subtly reminds us that <u>the disabled body is the object of the stare. If the male gaze makes the normative female a sexual spectacle, then the stare sculpts the disabled subject into a grotesque spectacle.</u> The stare is the gaze intensified, <u>framing her body as an icon of deviance</u>. Indeed, as Wade's poem suggests, the stare is the gesture that creates disability as an oppressive social relationship. And as every person with a visible disability knows intimately, managing, deflecting, resisting, or renouncing that stare is part of the daily business of life. One example of <u>academic activism</u> that is exemplary in Feminist Disability Studies is what m<u>ight be called a methodology of intellectual tolerance. This is not tolerance in the more usual sense of tolerating each other – although that would be useful</u> as well. Rather, <u>it is the intellectual position of tolerating what has previously been thought of as incoherence.</u>

Disability rhetoric promotes exclusion from feminism and ultimate ineffectiveness of the feminist movement – they need to take responsibility for what they said and seek a new dialogue

Schalk 13 [Sami Schalk, assistant professor at Albany Arts, PhD in Gender Studies at Indiana University, research focuses on the representation of disability in contemporary African American literature; "Metaphorically Speaking: Ableist Metaphors in Feminist Writing"; Disability Studies Quarterly Vol 33 No 4; 2013; accessed 07/28/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3874/3410>.] Explains why they can't kick their reps/language

Reacting to characterizations of being weak or inferior as slander, feminists deflected such portrayals by distancing themselves from these categories, and denying association of feminine gender with disability. Using an ableist line of thinking still in place today, nineteenth-century women agreed that there was a category of hopelessly, inherently dependent defectives that should be subjected to social control, but they argued against women being included in this defective class simply by virtue of their sex. …The move by feminists to separate themselves from the devalued group of defectives without challenging the hierarchical value-system that produced it served to make disability central to feminism as a negative marker. (emphasis in Lamp) Notable historical examples of this feminist "distancing" from disability include Charlotte Perkins-Gilman and Margaret Sanger, both of whom used disability rhetoric and metaphor in the context of the widely-popular late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century eugenics movement as a way to promote women's rights (Lamp 2006, 14; Lamp and Cleigh 2011, 176-182; Seitler 2003). Both women, that is, used "positive" eugenic rhetoric and rhetoric about women's roles as breeders in order to encourage better education and treatment of white, middle-class, able-bodied women who would give birth to the next generation of eugenically-sound, rather than "weak" or "feeble-minded," children. This sort of ableist rhetoric within feminist political organizations and movements has historically distanced (nondisabled) feminists from disability, making alliances between disabled feminists and nondisabled feminists hard to establish. Though this history does not explain away or excuse the use of ableist disability metaphors today, it provides a context within which to situate the habitual positioning of feminist women against disability and the conceptualization of patriarchal power as disabling. The issue at hand now is how to resist this historical usage without losing the important purpose of previous feminist work. What does the lesson of this discussion mean for feminists in the present (and future) who want to align themselves with disability rights scholars and activists and resist the use of negative and monolithic representations of disability? Does my argument in this article entail that one should never use disability metaphorically? Not exactly. Rather, the problem is the use of disability as a negative source domain to represent inability, loss, and lack in a simplistic and uncritical way. As I have shown, this use of disability as metaphor creates problems for understanding lived embodiment and ultimately limits or contradicts the feminist arguments that are proffered. Despite the problems in most past and current uses of disability metaphors, I nonetheless encourage creativity, nuance, and experimentation in feminist writing because innovative, politically-accountable uses of metaphor could make people think more deeply and alternatively about embodiment than conventional metaphors currently allow. For example, Vidali (2010) suggests that we alter the sensory experiences that have traditionally been used in a metaphor by (for instance) asking "students to find the 'scents' of previous course" concepts rather than asking if they can "see" connections (49). She writes that this sort of "creative engagement with disability metaphors can further complicate, or 'denaturalize,' ideas of how bodies and metaphors interact" (ibid.). Furthermore, Moya Bailey (2011, 142), in "'The Illest': Disability as Metaphor in Hip Hop Music," writes that in "the liminal spaces of hip hop, the reappropriation of ableist language can mark a new way of using words that departs from generally accepted disparaging connotations." It is indeed possible and even desirable to use disability metaphorically in ways that are empowering and that acknowledge the complexity of disabled minds and bodies. To do so, feminist scholars could take cues from disabled creative writers such as Eli Clare (2007) who describes tremors as a bodily experience that prevents playing the piano, provokes stares and taunts, and also causes a lover to rise up in pleasure and beg for more (34, 79, 82). How, we might ask, would a creative metaphor of tremors attend to the multiplicity of that experience? Attempts to use metaphor creatively do not release anyone from responsibility. The growing corpus of work on disability and rhetoric will clearly be useful to feminists (nondisabled and disabled alike) who aim to use metaphor more responsibly in their work. As Titchkosky points out, however, "Texts never just get it right or get it wrong insofar as they are also a 'doing'—right or wrong, texts are always oriented social action, producing meaning" that involves both the writer and the reader (Titchkosky 2007, 21; emphasis in Titchkosky). We can never fully predict the way in which our metaphors will be read or used once our words are out in the world. Although I never contacted hooks to ask about her use of "emotional cripples" (as so many folks at the conference wanted me to do), nor did I point out to the pilot that he had misunderstood the woman's use of "Deaf," my experience of these two events and my further research into the topic of disability as metaphor have made clear to

me that better incorporation of disability issues into feminist work is not simply a matter of using more inclusive, politically-correct language; rather, **we must be willing to engage in difficult dialogues**, to acknowledge the open-endedness of our inherently metaphoric language and communicate with one another across differences—in whatever ways and with whatever modes we use to do so. I contend, therefore, that a feminist philosophy of language—that is, language conveyed in any format or mode of communication, not just scholarly writing alone—ought to incorporate insights from disability studies and be premised on the following general concepts. Note that this feminist philosophy of language is a process, not a product, "an art, not a science" (Hall 2012, 31). First, do no harm. Do not use language that aligns negative concepts or connotations with another marginalized group, even if that language is what seems most powerful, evocative, and effective. Many of us have taught our students and our peers to consider the meanings that are embedded in phrases such as "throwing like a girl" and "acting like a pussy." We have likely shunned the use of the term gay to refer to something as silly and discouraged use of the term retard in order to insult; yet, some of us cling to the terms blind, deaf, dumb in order to insult, invalidate, and demean. Therefore, second: **be responsible. Language is never neutral. We make choices about the words we use and we have a responsibility to understand both the denotation and connotation of the words we choose**. We must interrogate metaphors and other forms of speech in the same rigorous way and to the same extent that we would investigate and understand any theory or concept before we use it in our work. Metaphors have political content and effect; they are not merely the creative, stylistic delivery of the "real" meaning of a given phrase or argument. On the contrary, the content and style of delivery of these rhetorical practices are inseparable: they inform and inflect one another. Third, and finally: be accountable and open to criticism. Despite our best feminist intentions, we cannot always get it right. Nevertheless, we must be willing to let go of words or concepts that do damage to others and develop new words, new metaphors, and new ideas that better serve and further our feminist goals. This feminist philosophy of language allows for us to enact an affective politics that embraces the linguistic utility of metaphor, yet remains intellectually rigorous and committed to the social justice mission of the feminist movement.

Links

"Able-Bodied"

Able-bodied doesn't mean non-disabled – this use denies cognitive disabilities and the experience of people who have them

Clark and Marsh 2 [Laurence Clark, internationally-acclaimed comedian, presenter, writer and actor who has cerebral palsy; Stephen Marsh, inventor and entrepreneur writing on disability; "Patriarchy in the UK: The Language of Disability" 2nd Draft; 2002; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Clark-Laurence-language.pdf>.]

Able-bodied: This term is also often incorrectly used, in this case to refer to people who are not disabled. This ignores the fact some disabled people, for example people with learning difficulties may also be 'able-bodied'. Morris (1993, page x) explains: "the term non-disabled people is used rather than able-bodied people because the point is that people who do not experience physical, sensory or intellectual impairments are not disabled by the prejudice and discrimination which denies opportunities to people who do experience such impairments." Similarly the British movement rejected American terms that revolve around ability, such as 'differently-abled' and 'temporarily able-bodied' (Rae, 1989).

Agamben

Agamben's state of exception resecures political authority – but this same idea creates the state as opposed to a disabled body excepted from participation in the work of the state

Baker 13 [Bernadette M. Baker, Curriculum and Instruction Professor @ University of Wisconsin-Madison, research areas of philosophy, history, and post-foundationalist curriculum studies; "William James, Sciences of Mind, and Anti-Imperial Discourse" pg 233; Cambridge University Press; 09/30/2013; accessed 07/30/2013; Google Books.]

Two Innovations: Distributive Causality and the Bottom-line Lunatic The problems that the state of exception poses for constitutional law in Agamben's account can only arise as such under the belief that one is operating within a humanist notion of the rational decision-making and volitional perceiver. What James elaborates in the Lowell lectures goes far beyond that, and then returns to it, and what nonetheless indirectly results is a rationale for political philosophy and expectation for governance that maintains the aporia at the heart of democratic traditions. This occurs in the very midst of - even via - the sensitivity to or empathy for the suffering of "the insane" and the talents of "the psychic." Taylor's cautious insights regarding the bigger picture of disciplinary formations, the Iamesian oeuvre, and the relative bypassing of some of Iames' work since its publication can be coupled, then, to how "internalist" debates within emergent scientific disciplines had implication for strategies of nation- building, social diagnosis, and criticism. If, as Agamben suggests, claiming a state of exception has become a way of resecuring and enlarging political authority in contemporary Western democracies and is in turn transforming the very nature of governance into more totalitarian forms, then it proves interesting to examine what happens when the state is considered mental rather than geopolitical and the exceptionalism could disqualify one from actively participating in any form of political authority, totalitarian or otherwise."5 As alluded to earlier, the subject at the heart of political philosophies such as Agamben's usually carries "ableist" and "adultist" presumptions indicative of a historically and implicitly masculinized public sphere, with contemporary borders between nations, races, religions, or languages operating as "the context," nuancing the frame of reference - for example, the differences between German and Italian constitutions. Through James' Exceptional Mental States, the dependencies of discourse that inextricably intertwine political philosophy's obsession with governance and the requirement for the "normal" subject become more thoroughly exposed. At the same time, the philosophical stakes in the trajectories that Taylor fruitfully lays out become understandable in regard, not to the political authority of elected officials, but the condition of being "able to" be worked upon on earth." As noted earlier, James' introduction of Myers' version of "the subliminal consciousness" was his reference to the unconscious and a crucial turn in the objectification of mind - he proffered it as the most likely explanation for multiplicity - an explanation that if fully indebted to Myers had to rely on apparently mystical themes that loosely resonated both with reincarnation theses and/or with spiritism. As Taylor notes, James in the end could not…(page ends)

"Autistic"

Using "autistic" to mark difficult communication equates developmental disabilities to be pathetic, less-than, and an insult – only becoming sensitized to the words can lead to the end of their usage

BBC 9 [Tamsyn Kent for BBC News Magazine, a section of BBC news online not related to particular categories; "Has 'autism' become a term of abuse?"; BBC; 11/06/2009; accessed 07/27/2015; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8345282.stm>.]

It is not the first time a politician has caused a furore by using the word autism. Three years ago the shadow chancellor, George Osborne, appeared to suggest Prime Minister Gordon Brown could be "faintly autistic". Now, France's Minister for Europe, Pierre Lellouche, has accused David Cameron of "castrating" Britain's position in Europe, adding that his approach was "pathetic". He has since said his use of the word "pathetique" has been misunderstood and can mean sad or unfortunate in French. But it was his use of the word "autism" which caused most offence. He says he did not realise the word "autism" could been seen as offensive in English and has retracted his remark. Whatever way he meant it, "autistic" is often used as an insult and it's insensitive to use a term that describes a disability or a condition in this way, says the National Autistic Society. "I thought we'd got over that from the 1970s when people used to use the term 'spastic' in the playground," says Benet Middleton from the society. "To have senior politicians doing that is thereby signalling that it's ok and that is deeply worrying." 'Vogue' term For many the complex nature of autism makes the pejorative use of the term even more misguided and unhelpful. Alexis Miller was diagnosed with Asperger syndrome, a form of autism, 14 years ago. "I want him to apologise and take it back. I think it's wrong. Even if someone is autistic, it should not be used in an insulting way because he is basically calling us pathetic autistics. I'm not pathetic, I'm a person." More than half a million people in the UK have the condition which affects the way they communicate and relate to those around them. People with the condition often have difficulties with everyday social interaction. Relatively unheard of or even recognised years ago, autism is now firmly in the public domain, partly due to films like Rain Man in 1988. And, some lexicographers argue its slang usage is down to it becoming a "vogue" term. It has become part of people's vocabulary following the same route slang often does. It is very often originated by teenagers at street or playground level. "There aren't many constraints on youngsters, especially when they're talking to each other," says Tony Thorne, Language and Innovation Consultant at King's College London. "What they say is meant to be traded among themselves and therefore anything goes. They use a lot of racist, sexist and ageist language." He explains it could also have originated from media slang which comes mainly from the United States and is a mixture of showbiz and therapy terms. But what accounts for the use of the term by people in power, those, who it is deemed, should know better? Offensive slang "The minister hasn't picked it up from street slang, he's picked it up from the media and the current vogue-ish language for the purpose of rhetoric, for effect. You could say for cheap effect, both on behalf of George Osbourne and this French minister," says Mr Thorne. Lexicographers argue it is a powerful tool used to dramatise the idea of impaired communications, to taunt those deemed not able to articulate or understand a range of ideas. "People have very limited knowledge or awareness of autism and they think it's something to do with the way people communicate and so they use that sometimes as a way to insult people if they think they're communicating in a way that's different," says Mr Middleton. And, once slang enters the public's vocabulary it is difficult to eradicate. Some argue that it is only when whole societies undergo a process of sensitisation - what some might call political correctness - that certain terms are outlawed. Much of the power of slang derives, undoubtedly, from its novelty. Experts say most terms have a shelf life of around three or four years. It eventually seeps into everyday language and then the people at the cutting edge, the inventors, abandon it and move on to something else. "People think that slang kind of disappears. It doesn't completely go away, it relapses into the slang underworld," says Mr Thorne.

"Crazy"

In political terms, "crazy" is a cheap shot that dismisses uncommon policies to the margins, replicating its use against people with disabilities to silence and other them

Jean 10 [Abby Jean, writer for Feminists with Disabilities since its founding, speaking on the intersection of the welfare state, feminism, capitalism, and disability; "Ableist Word Profile: Crazy to Describe Political Viewpoints or Positions"; FREEDOM: Feminists with Disabilities; 05/28/2010; accessed 07/27/2015; <http://disabledfeminists.com/2010/05/28/ableist-word-profile-crazy-to-describe-political-viewpoints-or-positions/>.]

Crazy Aunt, Unleashed – about Sarah Palin Mainstreaming the Crazy – lamenting the Right's reaction to Obama speaking to schoolchildren about health reform, and implying that the fringe "crazy" element of the party had infected the mainstream Meet the Crazy Caucus – a listing of Republican congresspeople who espouse "crazy" views and are implied to have a caucus, equivalent to existing formalized congressional caucus groups Postcards From the Crazy – about Frank Gaffney Crazy Arizona – about the recent immigration law and other racial laws passed in the state Crazy 101 – about the Texas revisions to history textbooks This is just a sampling of the posts with headlines including the term "crazy" and is not at all comprehensive. Even within this sample, we can see that the term is used to describe viewpoints with which TPM does not agree (like revising history textbooks or arguing, like Gaffney, that the Pentagon logo indicates a secret plan to subject the United States to Shariah law) and thinks are biased, bigoted, racist, or otherwise offensive (such as the protests about Obama speaking to schoolchildren or the racial laws in Arizona). None of the posts, though, engage or critique those viewpoints or speakers in a substantive way – simply describing them as "crazy" is seen as self-evident and no further discussion is needed to demonstrate these views or people should be excluded from reasonable political discussion. There's been an even more recent explosion of use of the term to describe Rand Paul and Paul's views, after he won a Republican congressional primary in Kentucky.1 Paul favors the free market and freedom of private business, to the extent that he seems to believe that anti-discrimination laws are an unreasonable restriction on businesses. Now I am no fan of Mr. Paul – and wrote about my problems with him previously on FWD – but that doesn't mean I approve of political cartoons like this: To my mind, characterizing Rand as "mad" or "crazy" and not saying anything further is a lazy way to dismiss him and his ideology without actually having to engage with it. There is a lot to say about Rand's ideas: how prioritizing private business over human rights preserves existing institutional structures that will continue to perpetuate racism, sexism, ableism, and other oppression if not checked by a larger force like the government; how the line between private and public realms is a lot fuzzier and less distinct than Paul implies it to be; that the Gulf of Mexico oil spill and BP's seemingly inadequate safety protections and near complete inability to effectively respond are strong indications that business will prioritize profits over public goods like environmental safety; how an attitude of business before anything else will influence Rand's views on everything from the minimum wage to immigration policy to climate control to internet neutrality. Those are all important discussions to have, discussions where we can't assume that everyone in the audience will come down on the same side, but calling him "crazy" or "mad" and leaving it at that elides all of those complicated issues. Even more strongly, it implies that those discussions are not even worth having because it is so evident that the views or person being dismissed are wrong and absurd and laughable. In Newsweek, Conor Friesdorf made an interesting observation about the policies and people who are dismissed as "crazy": Forced to name the "craziest" policy favored by American politicians, I'd say the multibillion-dollar war on drugs, which no one thinks is winnable. Asked about the most "extreme," I'd cite the invasion of Iraq, a war of choice that has cost many billions of dollars and countless innocent lives. The "kookiest" policy is arguably farm subsidies for corn, sugar, and tobacco—products that people ought to consume less, not more. These are contentious judgments. I hardly expect the news media to denigrate the policies I've named, nor do I expect their Republican and Democratic supporters to be labeled crazy, kooky, or extreme. These disparaging descriptors are never applied to America's policy establishment, even when it is proved ruinously wrong, whereas politicians who don't fit the mainstream Democratic or Republican mode, such as libertarians, are mocked almost reflexively in these terms, if they are covered at all. What I conclude from that is that the media doesn't consistently use "crazy" and other ableist terms to refer to absurd policies or those that lack rational support, but instead reserves those terms for people outside of mainstream politics. Which in turn implies that the term is used primarily to further marginalize and dismiss people who don't fit expectations of what a politician is or what are common or popular political arguments. To me, this is even more evidence that the implicit subtext of terming a person or policy "crazy" is **"shut up and go away, or start blending in better."** Which, again, is exactly the message leveled at people with mental illness when they're called "crazy" or "loony" or "unhinged" or any number of synonyms. This selective usage is even more reason the term "crazy" shouldn't be used in the

political context – partly because it's a lazy out for commentators who refuse to engage with the actual policy issues or political ideas being proposed on a substantive level, and partly because it fiercely underlines and reinforces marginalization and dismissal of people with mental illness. It reminds me that when people call me "crazy," what they really mean is "**stop existing in my consciousness – either disappear or become normal.**" To see progressive writers and organizations rely on the marginalization of people with mental illness to score easy points against unpopular politicians is upsetting not only because of their perpetuation of ableism, but also because it puts me in the extremely uncomfortable position of defending people like Palin and Paul against this kind of criticism.

"Cripple"

Cripple has been used to mean both powerless and able only to creep – it's undesirable, and only reclamation of 'crip' by disabled people is acceptable

Clark and Marsh 2 [Laurence Clark, internationally-acclaimed comedian, presenter, writer and actor who has cerebral palsy; Stephen Marsh, inventor and entrepreneur writing on disability; "Patriarchy in the UK: The Language of Disability" 2nd Draft; 2002; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Clark-Laurence-language.pdf>.]

3.6 'Cripple' Reiser (2001) credits the derivation of the word 'cripple' to the Middle German word 'Kripple' meaning: "to be without power". Whilst this may be currently true in the political sense, the inference is a lack of physical or intellectual power. On the other hand, Crowley and Crowley (2000) date its usage back to before 950 AD, the earliest form being the Old English 'crypel' which is a form of 'creep'. Therefore a 'cripple' would be one who can only creep. The word is only used once in the King James bible: "and there sat a certain man at Lystra, impotent in his feet, being a cripple his mother's womb, who never had walked" (Acts 14:8). However it is used a number of times by Shakespeare: "And chide the cripple tardy-gaited night Who, like a foul and ugly witch, doth limp So tediously away." (Henry V, act IV chorus) The word is still commonly used as an adjective: e.g. "crippling pain", "crippling debts" and "the health service is crippled"; or as an undesirable fate: "to end up a cripple". More recently the abbreviated form 'crip' has been reclaimed and used by disabled people in the United Kingdom in the same positive way that 'queer' was adopted by lesbians and gay men, however it could not be used in that same way by non-disabled people.

Discourse

The politics of language reflect and shape ableist world views and must be first brought to the forefront to combat microaggressions and ableism

Brown 13 [Lydia Brown, activist, public speaker, and writer focused on violence against multiply-marginalized disabled people, such as LGBTQ+ (queer and trans), poor, undocumented, and people of color groups within the disability community, Board of Directors for TASH New England, Project Assistant at the Autistic Self Advocacy Network, and previously involved in writing disability policy; "Ableism/Language"; Autistic Hoya; 13 06/13/2013; accessed 07/27/2015; <http://www.autistichoya.com/p/ableist-words-and-terms-to-avoid.html>.] Always point to specifically what portion of their argument was ableist

Language is inherently political. Both as individuals and as larger social and cultural groups, it is self-evident that the language we use to express all sorts of ideas, opinions, and emotions, as well as to describe ourselves and others, is simultaneously reflective of existing attitudes and influential to developing attitudes. The terms that are listed below are part of an expanding English-language glossary of ableist words and terms. I have chosen to include words or phrases that I know of or that are brought to my attention that meet two criteria: 1) Their literal or historical definition derives from a description of disability, either in general or pertaining to a specific category of disability, and 2) They have been historically and or currently used to marginalize, other, and oppress disabled people. The rationale for including some of these words may be readily apparent to many visitors as meriting inclusion on this list, such as for "retarded" and "invalid." For others, however, there may be the lingering suspicion that I have opted to be overinclusive and thus, extremely hypersensitive and obsessed with being politically correct. The reason that I have listed words that may not readily come to mind when asked to consider "insults and slurs targeting disability" is precisely because so much of this ableist language is utterly pervasive both in everyday colloquy and formal idiom with hardly any notice or acknowledgement, even by fellow disabled people not using the language as part of any reclamation project. On that note, the list is not intended to condemn or scold disabled people who use any of the words included in the spirit of reclamation or as self-descriptors. Its primary purpose is to serve as a reference for anyone interested in learning about linguistic microaggressions and everyday, casual ableism. And to the observation that some of the terms offered as alternatives carry analogous meanings, I have stated that the reason some words are included while others are not is because some words have oppressive histories and others do not. For example, the word "dumb" has a disability-specific history (referring to people who cannot speak, and often used to refer to Deaf people), whereas the word "obtuse" does not (deriving from a meaning of "beating against something to make it blunt or dull").

The rhetoric of disability allows ableism to be learned and promote a culture of discrimination, only challenging that which seems innocuous can change the widespread, unwitting acceptance of ableist thinking

Cherney 11 [James L Cherney, former college debater, PhD in Communication and Culture @ Westminster, and undergraduates in Public Speaking, Body Rhetoric, and the Disability Rights Movement; "The Rhetoric of Ableism"; Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol 31 No 3; 2011; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606>.]

As Disability Studies continues its exploration of disability in society, scholars have paid growing attention to the rhetoric of disability. This scholarship approaches the subject from different angles, but it generally works with similar premises including the position that rhetoric can shape the way disability is understood and (in)forms its political implications. These studies range from considering how rhetoric crafts disability to examining how ideas of disability impact theories of rhetoric. Brenda Jo Brueggemann explores how rhetoric constructs the disability of deafness, revealing how Hearing culture oppresses Deaf culture.1 Jay Dolmage shows how contemporary histories have "imported [exclusion] into the classical world" and oversimplified the complex views of disability that informed that era's influential theories of rhetoric.2 James C. Wilson and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson's Embodied Rhetorics collects several works covering the terrain between these studies.3 I seek to build upon these authors' valuable work by continuing to examine rhetoric but turning to a related yet different focus: I analyze ableism instead of disability. While disability and ableism clearly relate, I consider attending to the latter to be similar to studying racism

instead of race. Neither project makes sense without the other, and arguably studying disability has greater potential for promoting awareness and emancipatory politics, but studying ableism promises unique results such as identifying the identical mechanisms that propagate different types of discrimination. In this essay I analyze ableism as a rhetorical problem for three reasons. First, ableist culture sustains and perpetuates itself via rhetoric; the ways of interpreting disability and assumptions about bodies that produce ableism are learned. The previous generation teaches it to the next and cultures spread it to each other through modes of intercultural exchange. Adopting a rhetorical perspective to the problem of ableism thus exposes the social systems that keep it alive. This informs my second reason for viewing ableism as rhetoric, as revealing how it thrives suggests ways of curtailing its growth and promoting its demise. Many of the strategies already adopted by disability rights activists to confront ableism explicitly or implicitly address it as rhetoric. Public demonstrations, countercultural performances, autobiography, transformative histories of disability and disabling practices, and critiques of ableist films and novels all apply rhetorical solutions to the problem. Identifying ableism as rhetoric and exploring its systems dynamic reveals how these corrective practices work. We can use such information to refine the successful techniques, reinvent those that fail, and realize new tactics. Third, I contend that any means of challenging ableism must eventually encounter its rhetorical power. As I explain below, ableism is that most insidious form of rhetoric that has become reified and so widely accepted as common sense that it denies its own rhetoricity—it "goes without saying." To fully address it we must name its presence, for cultural assumptions accepted uncritically adopt the mantle of "simple truth" and become extremely difficult to rebut. As the neologism "ableism" itself testifies, we need new words to reveal the places it resides and new language to describe how it feeds. Without doing so, ableist ways of thinking and interpreting will operate as the context for making sense of any acts challenging discrimination, which undermines their impact, reduces their symbolic potential, and can even transform them into superficial measures that give the appearance of change yet elide a recalcitrant ableist system.

Foucault

Engaging fully with disability studies at the forefront allows a breaking down of binaries – identity politics fail as they necessarily rely on boundaries

Anders 13 [Abram Anders, Assistant Professor of Business Communication, English PhD @ Penn State; "Foucault and "the Right to Life": From Technologies of Normalization to Societies of Control"; Disability Studies Quarterly; Vol 33 No 2; 2013; accessed 07/29/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3340/3268>.]

Considered from the genealogical perspective such claims and protest are of a piece with the landscape of biopower rather than an effective challenge to it. In the following study, my aim is to reevaluate disability studies in terms of the configuration of social relations that have produced disability as identity and motivated claims for social protection. Technologies of normalization are not solely or primarily about the exclusionary, prohibitive functions of social neglect, stigmatization, and institutional paternalism. Rather, the primary danger we face today is the continued intensification of power relations through increasingly invasive and privatized mechanisms of rehabilitation. As Jeffrey Nealon writes in Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications since 1984 (2008), "societies of control extend and intensify the tactics of discipline and biopower (by linking training and surveillance to ever-more-minute realms of everyday life), they also give birth to a whole new form" (68). Ultimately, I argue that we have already moved past a point where rights discourse is the primary front in the battle against disablism. As reform efforts have begun to focus on quality of life issues and empowering "consumers" of health services, we have entered into a new era of grappling with problems unique to societies of control. The Failure of Rights Discourse It is commonplace in disability studies to assert that we are all only "temporarily-abled." On the one hand, the statement points to the likelihood that most of us will experience some form or period of disablement during our lifetimes. On the other, as Eva Kittay points out, even those of us who lead full and healthy lives will experience dependency at least twice, "when we are infants and when we are very old" (qtd. in Squier 24). At times, this invocation almost seems to suggest that if only the mythical "normal subject" would accept that it too will be disabled someday, then a primary obstacle to the social acceptance and accommodation of disability would disappear. 5 In this formulation, we might recognize a version of what Nealon characterizes as the theoretical success of identity politics. Namely, the linguistic turn of identity politics arrives at the recognition that "any state of sameness actually requires difference in order to structure itself" (4). Yet, the realization of a common intersubjective ground to social and linguistic identity formation does not entail a political success. As Nealon goes on to argue: …because intersubjective theories argue that we need each other for recognition and happiness, such theories continue to harbor a regulatory ideal of complete subjective freedom, which is actually freedom from recognition, freedom from difference itself. It is not necessarily surprising, then, that needing the other often shows itself as resenting the other. (Alterity Politics 7) Insofar as identity politics are thematized through reference to a lack, a failure of wholeness, and the instability of identity in the same, it tends to reinscribe as an object of desire the very privileges it seeks to deconstruct. Thus, identity politics have often been haunted by the unacknowledged goal of **attaining the privileges from which certain categories of people are excluded** and thereby maintains as ideal the configuration of power relations that produce these politicized identities as effects (Brown 7). As an example, we might consider Lennard Davis's "dismodernist" approach to identity politics, an approach that is founded on the radical version of "lack" discovered in disability. Davis sees the disability movement as having a unique potential to **destabilize the "normal subject" insofar as it presents a "real," physical** (i.e., not merely discursive) **lack** that not only problematizes identity, but materially challenges the illusion of independence: In a dismodernist mode, the ideal is not a hypostatization of the normal (that is, dominant) subject, but aims to create a new category based on the partial, incomplete subject whose realization is not autonomy and independence but dependency and interdependence. This is a very different notion from subjectivity organized around wounded identities; rather, all humans are seen as wounded. Wounds are not the result of oppression, but rather the other way around. Protections are not inherent, endowed by the creator, but created by society at large and administered to all. The idea of a protected class in law now becomes less necessary since the protections offered to that class are offered to all. (Bending Over Backwards 30) Whereas, Davis wants to **unsettle the privilege of the "normal subject," his invocation of the lack or "wound" creates a platform for extending this very privilege** (elided as "protections" in the passage) to the disabled. Precisely because

everyone is recognized as lacking, the goal remains to achieve wholeness through dependence on each other: "The dismodernist subject is in fact disabled, only completed by technology and interventions" (Davis 30). Davis's argument for a "right to be ill" ends up becoming an argument for a right to be protected from illness or even a "right to be normal" for all. Of course, it is not particularly the commitment or goal that is problematic, but the appeal to rights discourse itself. The essential and unavoidable problem with rights discourse is that it appeals to a liberal notion of equality that " insofar as it neither constitutes political community nor achieves substantive equality, guarantees only that all individuals will be treated as if they were sovereign and isolated individuals" (Brown 110). As Brown argues, the formal equality of liberalism abandons the individual to the social forces that produce her or him as a politicized identity. Thus, the problem with rights discourse and the desire to seek melioration within its institutions is that "[it] continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest—a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive (and often deconstructive) cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture" (Brown 59). Along these lines, we might consider Brown's example of the way in which an identity such as the "welfare subject" is produced and regulated through categories of "motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth" (59). While such subjects seek the intervention of the state, that is, a political solution for social inequity, the response is further reform and administration by the institutions that produced these subjects as effects. In other words, the entire system becomes a closed circuit: "Thus, disciplinary power politically neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, while liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities" (Brown 59).

Janelle Monae

Janelle Monáe's use of abelist metaphors for freedom obscures the experience of disability and props up ableism, despite intentions

Bailey 12 [Moya Bailey, Graduate student at Emory's Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies program with a focus on African-American Studies, Digital Humanities, Disability Studies, History of Medicine, Media Studies & Popular Culture, Queer Theory/Sexuality Studies, Women's & Gender Studies; "Vampires and Cyborgs: Transhuman Ability and Ableism in the work of Octavia Butler and Janelle Monáe"; Social Text Journal; 01/04/2012; accessed 07/28/2015; <http://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/vampires_and_cyborgs_transhuman_ability_and_ableism_in_the_work_of_octavia_butler_and_janelle_monae/>.] Janelle Monae's work is used in a lot of fugitivity affs.

Like Butler, Janelle Monáe is interested in the transhuman possibilities of the body. Her alter ego, Cindi Mayweather, is an android from the distant future who does the impossible: falls in love with a human. This taboo animates a droid army to hunt and destroy her. Monáe's album The ArchAndroid is the rock opera of Mayweather's life on the run. As she attempts to remain true to her feelings, she struggles with the perceptions of the power structure who see her as wild, unstable, and crazy as she flouts the conventions of an ableist and human-centered world. Her body, like Shori's is a threat to the conventions of her community, troubling the meticulously maintained division of man and machine. The ArchAndroid provides a window into Cindi Mayweather's experience. The track "Faster" highlights her escape from the Droid Army. The invocation of the ableist slur "schizo" is supposed to be liberatory. She is talking about running for freedom, and schizophrenia is representative of the liberation she hopes to achieve. She sings: "I'm running, I'm running, running, running. I'm shaking like, shaking like a schizo." Similarly, in the track "Alive" Monáe makes schizophrenia a metaphor for heightened consciousness. In reference to dance, she sings "That's when I come alive, like a schizo running wild, that's when I come alive, now let's go wild!" If you've seen a Monáe live show, she does, as the kids say, "go off," with dance moves that rival James Brown in their explosiveness. It is when Cindi feels most alive that society, in the form of medication, the droid army and institutional pressure, tries to squelch her boundary-breaking expression by forcing her to conform to an unanimated norm. **Monáe's critique is powerful but the sting of words that support ableism remains**. Janelle Monae Feat. Big Boi – Tightrope from Fred Romano on Vimeo. The video for "Tightrope" portrays Monáe and fellow institutionalized patients trying to break free of the repressive watchful eye of the powers that be through dance and song. She goes through walls and into the woods to escape those who would limit her expression. The video provides a visual critique of the ways in which disability is policed through showing the nurse's attempts to medicate and thwart the revolutionary dance party of the patients. The audience is privy to the soul-crushing nature of the institution and we delight in the patients' stolen moments of freedom of expression in dance, their powerful and uncontrollable hidden magic exposed. For Butler and Monáe, transhuman disabled bodies offer possibility and freedom that simple humanity forecloses. Monáe's use of disability as metaphor supports her alter ego's search for a freedom in a world much like our own. However, **by reducing disability to metaphor and by using ableist language, the real lives of disabled people are obscured**. Butler's depiction of Shori's hybrid body serves as a flash point for eugenic impulse, allowing an investigation of the deep seated racial prejudices of our time. However, punishing characters through impairment makes disability into retribution, a just sentence for wrongdoing in an ableist world that doesn't make accommodations for people who need them. Butler and Monáe open up conversations about disability that are messy and fraught, but they do so in arenas that traditional disabilities studies scholarship neglects.

"People with Disabilities"

The term "people with disabilities" conflates disability and impairment, and refuses to recognize that disability is the fault of the social sphere

Clark and Marsh 2 [Laurence Clark, internationally-acclaimed comedian, presenter, writer and actor who has cerebral palsy; Stephen Marsh, inventor and entrepreneur writing on disability; "Patriarchy in the UK: The Language of Disability" 2nd Draft; 2002; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Clark-Laurence-language.pdf>.]

The British civil rights movement has rejected the term 'people with disabilities', as it implies that the disabling effect rests within the individual person rather than from society. The term 'disabilities' when used in this context refers to a person's medical condition and thus confuses disability with impairment. In addition it denies the political or 'disability identity' which emerges from the disabled people's civil rights movement in a similar way to the Black and Gay political identities (Barnes, 1992, page 43; Oliver and Barnes, 1998, page 18). Indeed some are now going further and writing Disabled with a capital 'D', in order to emphasise the word's political connotations. The Deaf people's movement largely does not identify with the term 'disabled people', instead adopting a cultural model and defining themselves as a linguistic minority. Corker (2002) defines Deaf people as "that group of people with hearing impairments who are excluded from the dominant areas of social and cultural reproduction by the perpetuation of a phonocentric world-view." Deaf people too have adopted a capital 'D' in order to politicise the word. None of the rest of the terms discussed here come from disabled people themselves and portray the social construction of disability.

Performativity (Gender/Queerness)

The performativity of gender is based on the ability to move and present oneself – this expression is especially pervasive in queer communities

Ndopu and Moore 12 [Edward Ndopu, Top 200 Young South African, public speaker, graduate of the African Leadership Academy, founder of Global Strategy for Inclusive Education, advocate for CWD in developing countries, consultant with the World Economic Forum, administrative coordinator of the GLBTG Center @ Carleton university, board member for Insitute of Research, Education, Accessibility, and Design; Darnell Moore, Senior Editor for Mic, Visiting Scholar @ Yale Divinity, previous Women and Gender Studies professor @ Rutgers, 2012 Humanitarian Award Winner for developing the Queer Newark Oral History Project; "On Ableism within Queer Spaces, or, Queering the "Normal""; Pretty Queer Activism; 12/07/2012; accessed 07/30/2015; <http://prettyqueer.com/2012/12/07/on-ableism-within-queer-spaces-or-queering-the-normal/>.]

Our daily existence as two black queer men—one a (dis)abled queer femme man and the other an able-bodied (sometimes) masculine queer man—informs our belief that our quest for liberation from oppressions based on sexuality and gender expression must also account for the ways that ableism also often subjugates some queer people. Ableism shapes attitudes, policies and systems that ultimately dehumanize, pathologize and criminalize people whose bodies do not fit into socially constructed notions of what constitutes a "normal" human being. Indeed, ableism shapes our understandings of gender expression. As Eli Clare brilliantly puts it, "the mannerisms that help define gender—the way in which people walk, swing their hips, gesture with their hands, move their mouths and eyes when they talk, take up space—are all based upon how non disabled people move…The construct of gender depends not only upon the male body and female body, but also on the non disabled body." Ableism renders invisible those bodies not privileged by dominant definitions of ability, those bodies that do not fit the conceptions of gender that we often imagine. We "read" the movement of bodies, the ways people walk, hair styles, and the ways our bodies interact with other bodies in social spaces without ever realizing that all of the aforementioned performances are gendered expressions that center on the privilege of physical movement. We tend to place a lot of emphasis on the body, and one's use of the body, without attending to the fact that for some the use of the body is an impossibility. Indeed, for one of us, a queer who relies on attendants for personal care and grooming, such understanding wholly ignores the ways he exists in the world. As a result, it is time to fully acknowledge ableism as a pervasive form of oppression within our queer communities. Take, for example, Pride Parades, which are visual representations of queer and trans* communities. Pride Parades are organized around the notion of marching and, therefore, requires that people are able to physically move to showcase their belonging. This does not account for the experiences of those who are not able to walk or who have to use special equipment to move. And so when we rely on our physical abilities to express ourselves, we inadvertently reproduce disability oppression. In addition, consider the ways that ablesim functions in queer dating spaces, virtual or otherwise. Pervasive in many queer and trans* dating spaces is a type of self-expression that centers on the body and the need to make ourselves desirable to others. Queer and trans* folks of different abilities, who live with chronic illnesses, or battle with addictions are left out of so many of the spaces that purport to be designed for "us." The "party culture" that is ubiquitous within many of our communities alienates those who are not able to feel safe, validated, and affirmed within these contexts. Our lack of access to such spaces has an impact on our ability to claim our identifications and belonging within these communities.

Posthumanism

Posthumanist scholars' refusal to examine disability which is situated in the center of their research proves an implicit bias

That <u>posthuman scholars have not closely examined the cultural implications of the American eugenics movement</u> is puzzling for a few reasons. First of all, <u>scholars of posthumanism often concern themselves with the margins of humanity: animals, others, monsters, and similar figures</u>. In both medical and sociological discourse, <u>people with physical and mental disabilities—referred to in this essay as victims of eugenics—have been described as others, animals, retards, monsters and anomalies, among other pejoratives</u>. Writing for a 1950 edition of the American Journal of Mental Deficiency, <u>eugenicist Leonard le Vann states that Indeed the picture of comparison between the normal child and the idiot might almost be a comparison between two separate species</u>. On the one hand, <u>the graceful, intelligently curious, active young homo sapiens, and</u> on the other <u>the gross, retarded, animalistic, early primate type individual.</u> (470) <u>Since victims of eugenics are identified as animals or as a different species, we would think that scholars of posthumanism would draw a precise connection between their area of expertise and the specifics of eugenics: the historical context, the propagandistic practices, the formal medical tests and procedures. Unfortunately, such scholarship is scarce.</u>

Science Fiction

Science fiction is solely an outlet for social fears – their construction of a binary implicit hearkens back to eugenics and the elimination of people with disabilities

Pottle 13 [Adam Pottle, author, pursuing a doctoral degree in English Literature; "Segregating the Chickenheads: Philip Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? and the Post/humanism of the American Eugenics Movement"; Disability Studies Quarterly; Vol 33 No 3; 2013; accessed 07/29/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3229/3262>.]

Ever since science fiction emerged as a bonafide genre, its writers have consistently allegorized social fears. As Istvan Csicsery-Ronay argues, "'[t]he boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion'" ("The Science Fiction of Theory: Baudrillard and Haraway," conference paper). Both film and literature have tackled subjects ranging from nuclear anxiety (1954's Godzilla, 1954's Them!) to scientific exploration (Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, Jules Verne's Journey to the Centre of the Earth, H.G. Wells's At the Mountains of Madness), and the western eugenics movement is no different. Writers such as Robert Sawyer and Mikhail Bulgakov have allegorized the difficulties and pitfalls of attempting to improve human beings through (often extreme) scientific measures. In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, Dick situates his discussion of eugenics in a specifically American context. As shown here in the novel's opening chapter, when bounty hunter Rick Deckard considers the precariousness of his current situation, the novel quickly establishes a discourse of normalcy, a common theme during the heyday of the eugenics movement: So far, medical checkups taken monthly confirmed him as a regular: a man who could reproduce within the tolerances set by law. Any month, however, the exam by the San Francisco Police Department doctors could reveal otherwise….The saying currently blabbed by posters, TV ads, and government junk mail, ran: "Emigrate or degenerate! The choice is yours!" (Dick 439) Four key American eugenics associations arise within this passage. First of all, the word "regular" indirectly establishes a dichotomy, on the other side of which is "irregular," or, as we see later in the novel, "special." Using similar language, **eugenicists sought to separate "normal" and "abnormal" people**: after World War I, American eugenic scientists undertook extensive studies to establish mental and physical norms for men and women, emerging with a "hypothetical" average American (Christina Cogdell 193). The "average" American man and woman were later represented in statues called Normman and Norma, sculpted by Abram Belskie and based on research by Dr. R.L. Dickinson (197). The dichotomy is emphasized by the phrase "'Emigrate or degenerate! The choice is yours!'" yet complicated when we consider the novel's characters. The choices of emigrate or degenerate speak to the normal and abnormal portions of the novel's population; ironically, however, the entire novel takes place on Earth, from which most of the "regular" population has emigrated. Deckard remains on Earth because of his job, choosing to subsist in the radioactive dust-choked city of San Francisco so he can hunt and kill renegade androids (439). Deckard is one character who blurs the lines of the regular/special dichotomy. Although he is physically and mentally a regular, his choice to remain on Earth suggests otherwise; continued residence on Earth is the telltale sign of a special, meaning someone who is too poor to emigrate or who chooses not to emigrate. 3 Even though he is not officially declared a special, Deckard fulfills the criteria. Another special, John Isidore, also blurs the lines between regular and special, as demonstrated below. A second point about the above passage concerns the prevalence of the law. The phrase "the tolerances set by law" underscores the judicial reach of American and especially Californian eugenicists. Scientists, politicians, judges and the general public frequently discussed the legal boundaries of reproduction, seeking to promote strong unions between fertile, regular people and limit—if not totally prevent—the feebleminded, the insane and the criminal from reproducing. In California, such legal handcuffing arose in a variety of measures: in addition to establishing the sterilization law in 1909, a law which "granted the medical superintendents of asylums and prisons the authority to 'asexualize' a patient or inmate if such action would improve his or her 'physical, mental, or moral condition'" (Stern 99), the California government created several commissions and departments that gave eugenicists an imposing legal presence. Such commissions and departments included the State Commission in Lunacy (52), the Department of Institutions (87) and the Board of Charities and Corrections (87). Each of these organizations had their own agenda for controlling or manipulating victims of eugenics. The Department of Institutions was especially influential, as Alexandra Stern points out: the implementation of eugenic programs would not have reached such extremes in California without the active involvement of the Department of Institutions, which led the country in the expulsion of foreigners and undesirables, the development of large-scale intelligence testing, and the sterilization of those deemed unfit. (113) The government of California undertook these initiatives under the guise of improving life for victims of eugenics; in reality, eugenicists wanted to prevent the victims from reproducing in order to promote racial purity and avoid the financial and moral burdens these people supposedly placed on the state (88). All told, the eugenics program had a pervasive legal reach, a fact of which Dick seems keenly aware. Thirdly, the passage reveals the anxiety that the novel's regulars endure: the anxiety that at any moment they may become sterile, and therefore useless. This anxiety arose in reality as well. Victims of eugenics faced

derision precisely because they reflected the discomfort of the general population: "eugenicists tended to group together all allegedly 'undesirable' traits. So, for example, **criminals, the poor, and people with disabilities might be mentioned in the same breath**" (Davis 35). Because the victims were sterilized, they took on the additional association of impotence; as a result, they were often mistreated: "Psychologists persecuted their patients. Teachers stigmatized their students. Charitable associations clamored to send those in need of help to lethal chambers they hoped would be constructed" (Black xvi). Later in the novel, John Isidore takes on the stigma of impotence, adding to his stigma of being a "chickenhead."

"Special"

The multiple meanings of "special" complicate its meaning, and requires an evaluation of it before proceeding

Pottle 13 [Adam Pottle, author, pursuing a doctoral degree in English Literature; "Segregating the Chickenheads: Philip Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? and the Post/humanism of the American Eugenics Movement"; Disability Studies Quarterly; Vol 33 No 3; 2013; accessed 07/29/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3229/3262>.]

Even though "special" and "chickenhead" are separate things, the terms are often used interchangeably in the novel: And there existed chickenheads infinitely stupider than Isidore, who could hold no jobs at all, who remained in custodial institutions quaintly called "Institute of Special Trade Skills of America," the word 'special' having to get in there somehow, as always. (447) The word "special" carries a number of contradictory associations. Being called "special" can be either a compliment, meaning someone who is precious or unique, or it can be an insult; both meanings arise in the novel, complicating how we must read the character of John Isidore. Is he an inferior, animalistic human, or a superior, empathetic human? As I mentioned earlier, Isidore, like Deckard, blurs the lines between regular and special, allowing us to question the validity of such categories. While Deckard is a physical and mental regular who chooses to stay on Earth, Isidore is a mental special/chickenhead who has more empathy than any other character in the novel. Like animals, the quality of empathy is highly prized; the Voigt-Kampff test separates humans from androids based on their ability to empathize. When Isidore vows to protect the three androids Pris, Irmgard and Roy, the trio, desperate for shelter, lauds him:

"The Disabled"

The totalizing phrase creates a burden of "The Disabled" ignores individual experiences

Anna 10 [Anna, permanent contributor to FWD; "AWP: The Disabled"; FREEDOM: Feminists with Disabilities; 06/18/2010; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://disabledfeminists.com/2010/06/18/awp-the-disabled/>.] Potential for offensive language: damned. Read this version if the aff also says 'people with disabilities'.

The short form of why this is a problem: <u>People with disabilities/the disabled are not a collective group that all agree on anything</u>. <u>Asking what</u> "the disabled" want or <u>"the disabled" are doing is exactly like asking</u> what "women" want and <u>what "women" are doing. Women are individuals. Some of them are women with disabilities! We don't all want the same things, but grouping everyone</u> under the same umbrella, <u>as though we are a Collective</u> rather than Individuals With Opinions and Needs <u>is</u>… well, it's <u>pretty</u> damned <u>ableist</u>, as well as being arrogant, ignorant, and irritating. Long Version: <u>We're</u> still <u>living in a society that makes a lot of casual assumptions about people with disabilities</u> and their experiences. <u>When people start talking about "the disabled" they are generally about to launch into some sort of stereotype</u> – "the disabled are the pawns of the religious right", for example. <u>This boils down a lot of complicated people</u> – people <u>who have a wide variety of needs, wants, opinions, thoughts, and experiences – into one homogeneous group</u>. <u>This contributes to the de-humanization of disabled people. "The disabled" aren't people, they're a big collective noun who</u> can't be reasoned with, <u>can't be talked to, can't be considered – they're just to be placated, and dealt with</u>, and put out of our minds as quickly as possible in case they sue us.

Choosing to say "The Disabled" is a totalizing phrase which ignores individual experience of people with disabilities

Anna 10 [Anna, permanent contributor to FWD; "AWP: The Disabled"; FREEDOM: Feminists with Disabilities; 06/18/2010; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://disabledfeminists.com/2010/06/18/awp-the-disabled/>.] Potential for offensive language: damned. Read this if the aff only says 'The Disabled' and you want to PIC out to say people with disabilities instead. Be aware of DAs to 'people first' wording, like Fiona Kumari Campbell's work.

The short form of why this is a problem: <u>People with disabilities/the disabled are not a collective group that all agree on anything</u>. <u>Asking what</u> "the disabled" want or <u>"the disabled" are doing is exactly like asking</u> what "women" want and <u>what "women" are doing. Women are individuals. Some of them are women with disabilities! We don't all want the same things, but grouping everyone</u> under the same umbrella, <u>as though we are a Collective</u> rather than Individuals With Opinions and Needs <u>is</u>… well, it's <u>pretty</u> damned <u>ableist</u>, as well as being arrogant, ignorant, and irritating. Long Version: <u>We're</u> still <u>living in a society that makes a lot of casual assumptions about people with disabilities</u> and their experiences. <u>When people start talking about "the disabled" they are generally about to launch into some sort of stereotype</u> – "the disabled are the pawns of the religious right", for example. <u>This boils down a lot of complicated people</u> – people <u>who have a wide variety of needs, wants, opinions, thoughts, and experiences – into one homogeneous group</u>. <u>This contributes to the de-humanization of disabled people. "The disabled" aren't people, they're a big collective noun who</u> can't be reasoned with, <u>can't be talked to, can't be considered – they're just to be placated, and dealt with</u>, and put out of our minds as quickly as possible in case they sue us. <u>Saying "people with disabilities" or "disabled people" may seem like a pretty minor thing</u>. It is, so <u>it shouldn't be that difficult</u>. The reason for it, <u>though</u>, is that <u>it can be that small reminder: that people with disabilities are people</u>. <u>That disabled people have opinions and thoughts and experiences and needs that are not universal</u> to all people with disabilities. That <u>we are, in fact, people, and it would be nice if we could be treated as such</u>. <u>Language doesn't change everything</u>. It isn't an end in and of itself. <u>But it can be the first step in</u>

combating the sort of ableism that makes it okay for many people – including editors and writers for major and minor news sources – to dismiss us as pawns without thought.

Blocks

A2 Censorship

The language of disability isn't censorship – it's an educative project that seeks to disrupt the ableist hegemony of the status quo

Brown 14 [Lydia Brown, activist, public speaker, and writer focused on violence against multiply-marginalized disabled people, such as LGBTQ+ (queer and trans), poor, undocumented, and people of color groups within the disability community, Board of Directors for TASH New England, Project Assistant at the Autistic Self Advocacy Network, and previously involved in writing disability policy; "Violence in Language: Circling Back to Linguistic Ableism"; Autistic Hoya; 02/11/2014; accessed 07/27/2015; < http://www.autistichoya.com/2014/02/violence-linguistic-ableism.html>.] this card is on fire!!!!!! please, pull a fire alarm like asap

One of the most common (inaccurate and mischaracterizing) criticisms, however, both from inside and outside the disability community, is the accusation that the list is a tool for policing language or censoring words. So what's the purpose of the list? Why compile it at all? Because linguistic ableism is part of the total system of ableism, and it is critical to understand how it works, how it is deployed, and how we can unlearn our social conditioning that linguistic ableism is normal and just how things are or should be. As important as it is to recognize and uncover the violence of linguistic ableism (how ableism is specifically embedded into our language), it is also critical to understand why this is important. (And this is where those who jump the gun and leap to accusations of pedantic, holier-than-thou, smug language-policing or censorship **have not yet come to understand why this** page, and those like it, **need to exist**.) Linguistic ableism: a) is part of an entire system of ableism, and doesn't exist simply by itself, b) signifies how deeply ableist our societies and cultures by how common and accepted ableism is in language, c) reinforces and perpetuates ableist social norms that **normalize violence and abuse against disabled people**, d) actively creates less safe spaces by **re-traumatizing disabled people**, and e) **uses ableism to perpetuate other forms of oppression**. Language is not the be all end all. This isn't about policing language or censoring words, but about critically examining how language is part of total ableist hegemony. This is about being accountable when we learn about linguistic ableism, but it is also about being compassionate to ourselves and recognizing that to varying extents, we have all participated in ablesupremacy and ablenormativity. **This is about understanding** the connections between linguistic ableism and other forms of ableism, such as medical ableism, scientific ableism, legal ableism, and cultural ableism. Language reflects and influences society and culture. That's why students of any foreign language often study the cultures where that language is dominant. (And that's not to dimiss the many valid criticisms of the ethnocentrism and colonialism in much area and language studies programs.) Language isn't important for silly semantic reasons, but because it cannot be separated from the culture in which it is deployed. Feminist theory, queer theory, and race theory have all analyzed how **sexism, heterosexism, cissexism, binarism, and racism are embedded in language. This is the same** process. Using the language of disability (either directly or through metaphor) as a way to insult other people, dismiss other people, express your vehement loathing for them/their viewpoints, or invalidate their viewpoints is actually extremely ableist (and often sanist, neurotypicalist, audist, or vidist). For example, I am talking about using the language of mental illness ("crazy," "insane," "psycho," or "wacko," for example), cognitive disability ("retarded," "slow," or "moron," for example), or physical disability ("crippled" or "completely blind/deaf," for example). In another example, I am also talking about using disability as metaphor. Using the language of disability to denigrate or insult in our conversations and organizing presumes that a.) people who hold undesirable or harmful viewpoints must hold them because they are mentally ill/have psych disabilities/are mentally disabled/are disabled in some way, b.) having mental illness/psych disability/mental disability/any disability is actually so undesirable and horrible that you can insult someone that way (the same underlying reason why socially embedded linguistic heterosexism lets people use "gay" as an insult), c.) it's acceptable to use ableism against one disability group while decrying ableism against another disability group (creating horizontal or intra-disability oppression) or another form of oppression against another marginalized group (creating horizontal oppression), and d.) and that no one who is disabled in any way might actually share your opinion or be on your side, thus actually actively excluding and marginalizing this part of our community, and making our spaces less safe and less inclusive.

A2 Intent/Didn't Mean It

Unconscious ableism is worse – uses language while ignoring its history, otherization, and the violence behind it. Their defensive response proves their need to learn a lesson

Leibowitz 14 [Cara Leibowitz, disability activist in several campus and off-campus organizations, studying for a Master's Degree in Disability Studies at the CUNY School of Professional Studies; "Just because it's ableist, doesn't mean it's bad."; 01/03/2014; accessed 07/27/2015; <http://thatcrazycrippledchick.blogspot.com/2012/03/just-because-its-ableist-doesnt-mean.html>.]

Ableism doesn't mean you hate disabled people. It doesn't mean you're an evil person. It doesn't even mean you think disabled people aren't capable of anything, although all of those qualifiers can certainly fall under ableism. Ableism is the system of oppression that faces disabled people in our society, a system that marks disabled people as inferior and most importantly, other. It doesn't have to be done with malice to be ableism. It doesn't even have to be done with conscious intent. Ableism is separating society into us and them, sequestering disabled people into this category of not-entirely-human, mythical type people that are: a) so sad and tragic and/or b) sooo inspiring!! Ableism is dictating that there is a right, a "normal" way to be, and disabled people aren't it. Ableism is merely "tolerating" us instead of accepting us for who we are and embracing the differences that make us unique. Ableism is preaching that diversity makes us stronger, and then conveniently leaving disability out of that equation. Ableism is believing that we have a lesser life, that we suffer, because we are disabled. Ableism is "otherizing" us. Ableism is using language that really has been used over generations to attack disabled people, to tell us that we are not normal and as such, we are less than human. And ableism is using that language without any idea what it has done, how many people it's hurt, because society doesn't want us to know how, in a society that's supposed to have conquered discrimination the way we conquered countries, millions and millions of people were systematically threatened, bullied, and slaughtered. Ableism is never speaking about disability history, never even knowing that there is a history, because our history is not considered history. At best, our struggle for rights is largely viewed as a cute little adolescent rebellion, complete with whining protests and stomping of feet. At worst, it is completely wiped from the collective consciousness, because the world doesn't want to see us, hear us, acknowledge our existence beyond using us, our stories, as a tool to make the privileged feel better about themselves. Ableism is using us as scare tactics, as examples of what you don't want to be. Ableism is assuming that our lives are inherently less worth living than yours. Ableism is having only one definition of disability, and only viewing a disabled person as one way. Ableism is calling the rest of us fakers and benefit scroungers, because we don't fit your definition of disability. Ableism is cutting the services that we need to survive. Ableism is putting disabled people in a box, a box that is never opened and has very clear edges. Ableism is never recognizing that you or someone you know may be disabled, because they have a productive life. Ableism is thinking that it is okay, even commendable, for disabled people to want to die, because our lives are not worth living. Ableism is killing us before we have the chance to live, all because of a pre-conceived notion of what our lives will be like. Ableism is warping the public notion of an entire group of people as "so smiley and happy all the time!" Ableism is reducing us to a caricature of human beings, painting us all as one shade of a color, when in fact we are as diverse as any other group of people. Ableism is dividing a diverse community into "high functioning" and "low functioning" and deciding that only those who fit your idea of "high functioning" can possibly have anything to say. Ableism is defining disability as solely an unfortunate happening, and not recognizing the social and cultural factors that oppress us. Ableism is denying that you have privilege, that you can feel safe, because you are nondisabled. Ableism is a world that is centered on the nondisabled, instead of being welcoming for everyone. And truth be told? Ableism is claiming that there is no ableism. You don't have to know that ableism exists to be an ableist. Nor does being an ableist mean that you are a horrible, soulless person. Being an ableist just means that you have privilege you need to acknowledge, and patterns of thought that you need to change. So what should you do if someone calls you out on your ableism? Take a step back. Reflect on your privilege and what you said or did. Recognize why someone may take offense at that. If you don't understand why it's ableist, don't start pointing fingers at the other person, claiming that they are oversensitive. Ask politely, and think on their answer. Apologize, and

<u>learn a lesson</u>. You are not evil because you are an ableist. You are simply an ableist. So take the opportunity to learn about your own privilege. Hopefully, you'll come away knowing more than you did before.

A2 Just Words

Recognizing and stopping use of ableist language is only the first step in addressing the larger problem it symptomizes – they need to accept critiques through the lens of disability

FWD 10 [Anna, writer for the now defunct Feminists with Disabilities;"Why Talking About Language Isn't Enough"; FREEDOM: Feminists with Disabilities; 05/25/2010; accessed 07/27/2015; <http://disabledfeminists.com/2010/05/25/awp-why-writing-about-language-isnt-enough/>.] Also explains why indicts of blogs are bad in the case of disability studies

In social justice blogging circles, especially feminist-focused ones, <u>it's not unusual to have conversations about language, and why language matters</u>. Those conversations can vary from explaining why it's problematic to call women & girls "females", why using "he" and "mankind" to be a generic non-gendered term is sexist, reclaiming – or not – of words like "bitch", and what it means to refer to "undocumented immigrants" rather than "illegals". These conversations often focus on how sexist or racist language is a symptom of a problem that needs to be addressed. <u>We can talk about how calling women bitches is a sign of sexism, or referring to people as "illegals" is dehumanizing to immigrants</u>. And <u>yet</u>, when trying to have <u>discussions about ableist language</u>, we're back to the silo of disability. Instead of talking about ableist language <u>as part of the manifestation of the disdain and abuse of people with disabilities, it's treated as isolated – the problem, instead of a symptom of the problem. Ableism is not simply a language problem</u>. Ableism manifests in the social justice blogosphere in so many different ways. They can vary from just not thinking about disability at all when writing about social justice issues to <u>shrugging off critiques from disability-focus</u>ed bloggers <u>as being "too sensitive".</u> It can be <u>ignoring posts about disability-focused issues or only linking to non-disabled people writing about disability-issues instead of to disabled</u> bloggers. It can be as apparent as declining to acknowledge disability exists to as "subtle" (to some) as declining to make your blog template accessible to screen readers. <u>There are also choices</u> that social justice bloggers make <u>about how we educate ourselves, and whose voices we highlight, who we approach about their writing, and who we ask to be mediators</u>. <u>If we're not reading disability-focus</u>ed blogs, then <u>we're not learning about disability-focus</u>ed issues – and, in turn, <u>we're not highlighting those voices, bringing attention to those issues, or thinking about that analysis</u> when writing our own posts. Thirdly, <u>ableism manifests in whose voices we trust</u>. For all that I'm very happy to provide people with book lists, I'm a bit suspicious of people who decline lists of disability-focused bloggers they could be reading as well. <u>Why does someone's voice have to go through the publishing-sphere (and usually through academia</u> for the books you're going to get from me) **before it counts as worth-reading?** I get why people talk about language, and I agree that <u>language is important. But I'm not giving cookies out for publicly declaring</u> your ally-status by saying <u>you won't (or will try not to) use ableist language anymore. That's a great first step. Now move on.</u>

Use of metaphor is a commitment to a speech act – based in universal presupposition of experience

Schalk 13 [Sami Schalk, assistant professor at Albany Arts, PhD in Gender Studies at Indiana University, research focuses on the representation of disability in contemporary African American literature; "Metaphorically Speaking: Ableist Metaphors in Feminist Writing"; Disability Studies Quarterly Vol 33 No 4; 2013; accessed 07/28/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3874/3410>.] Explains why they can't kick their reps/language

Much <u>contemporary scholarship on metaphor</u> is based upon the work of George Lakoff and his colleagues, most notably a book that he co-authored with Mark Johnson in 1980: Metaphors We Live By. In this text, Lakoff and Johnson <u>establish cognitive metaphor theory which argues that metaphors are not merely creative or literary devices, but rather are **essential speech acts**</u>. 3 They contend that <u>the way in which we understand and use metaphor is informed by our **(presumed to be universal) experiences of embodiment**</u> as <u>evidenced by</u> the preponderance of <u>concrete bodily and experience-based conceptual metaphors</u>. 4 Though I do not accept these philosophical assumptions nor the conclusions that Lakoff and Johnson derive from them, I use some of their analytical terminology in my argument below. That is, I use Lakoff

and Johnson's term source domain (also referred to as the vehicle) in order to refer to the main concrete concept—namely, disability—that is used to explain another, usually abstract, idea. As Elena Semino explains it, typically, under Lakoff and Johnson's cognitive metaphor theory, source domains are (what they regard as) "concrete, simple, familiar, physical and well-delineated experiences, such as motions, bodily phenomena, physical objects and so on" (Semino 2008, 6). Alternatively, I use their term target domain to refer to the abstract concept (in this case, the bad, deficient, or painful effect of patriarchy) that is assumed to be represented through the invocation of the source domain (disability). I should point out that the metaphors I discuss in this context do not fit within the category of conventional or dead metaphors, which have become "lexicalized" or officially incorporated into dictionary meanings. Rather, the two metaphors I examine (hooks's "emotional cripples" and Modleski's "mute body") should be considered as novel metaphors, to use Semino's term: ones which are "likely to be conscious and deliberate on the part of its user, and recognized and/or processed as such by its receivers" (19). In the terms of scholarship on metaphor in language, they could also be referred to as creative metaphors: "those which a writer/speaker constructs to express a particular idea or feeling in a particular context, and which a reader/hearer needs to deconstruct or 'unpack' in order to understand what is meant. They are typically new…although they may be based on pre-existing ideas or images" (Knowles and Moon 2006, 5). Though the terms novel metaphors and creative metaphors signify similar figures of speech, for the sake of parsimony, in this argument, I refer only to the term creative metaphors.

A2 Not Accountable

Indirectly ableist language doesn't take responsibility for itself – removed from its origin yet retaining its negative connotations, we must commit to an alternative understanding of disability metaphor

Schalk 13 [Sami Schalk, assistant professor at Albany Arts, PhD in Gender Studies at Indiana University, research focuses on the representation of disability in contemporary African American literature; "Metaphorically Speaking: Ableist Metaphors in Feminist Writing"; Disability Studies Quarterly Vol 33 No 4; 2013; accessed 07/28/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3874/3410>.] Explains why they can't kick their reps/language

I've had the craziest day. The snowstorm completely paralyzed the city. That's such a lame excuse. What are you blind? What are you deaf? Idiot! Moron! Retard! Disability too has become part of everyday language, and not positively so. In order to demonstrate this negative state of affairs, disability activists and rhetoricians have drawn lessons from feminist philosophy/theory of language scholarship, utilizing some of the same language-reform techniques in response to overt ableism that feminists have employed to resist overt sexism, including the introduction of alternative terms and phrases (such as the replacement of handicap with disability and the use of person-first language 6) and the revaluation of pejorative words (for example, the reclaiming of the terms crip and gimp). Although Mills (2008, 73), for instance, is concerned to make connections between overt sexism and overt racism, homophobia, and ableism, I am concerned to show the connections between indirect sexism and indirect ableism in language-use, in addition to the overt connections that can made between these axes of power. Indeed, by interrogating metaphors of disability and their underlying presuppositions about bodies, disability theorists can challenge indirect ableism in feminist writing just as third-wave feminists have challenged indirect sexism in mainstream (and alternative) popular culture, academia, the mainstream media, and public policy. Disability rhetoricians have brought attention to the fact that "when Americans think, talk, and write disability, they usually consider it as a tragedy, illness, or defect that an individual body 'has,'... as personal and accidental, before or without sociopolitical significance" (Wilson and Lewiecki-Wilson 2001, 2). In other words, when disability is used in figurative and metaphorical ways, it is primarily understood in terms of inability, loss, lack, problems, and other forms of negation (Titchkosky 2007, 8). Although, unlike gender, disability is not centrally implicated in the basic grammatical system, the use of disability as a metaphorical construct is nonetheless prevalent and implicit in our language. Just as a word such as seminal has lost its original etymological connection (in this case, to male ejaculation) in our contemporary connotations, so too many words that refer to disability have transitioned from medical discourse into common speech and slang and have lost their linguistic connection to the original referent. In this regard, Jay Dolmage (2005, 113) gives as examples the words crippled, retarded, and handicapped, to which I would add idiot (once a medical category of cognitive disability), dumb (once used to refer to lack of oral speech communication, as in the phrase "deaf and dumb"), lame, crazy, and insane. Though most of these disparaging words are no longer generally recognized as connected to, or associated with, specific impairments, they have nevertheless retained connotations of insult, inability, and lack due to more widespread negative conceptions of disability. This, then, is indirect ableism. Vidali, May and Ferri, and Dolmage are among the disability studies scholars who have explored disability metaphors, that is, the way that metaphors of disability are used as a source domain that confers negativity upon things not themselves directly associated with disability due to the retention of broader negative cultural connotations of disability itself. As I indicate above, the work of these scholars has tended to deal primarily with conventional, rather than creative, metaphors by citing a variety of brief examples, rather than considering the role that these metaphors play within the wider context of the original text's argument. By analyzing the creative disability metaphors of "emotional cripples" and "the mute body" in the feminist texts of hooks and Modleski, I expand on the work of these scholars, modeling a process of transgressive reading that reveals how extended disability metaphors impact the overall argument of the texts. Knowles and Moon (2006, 12) note that metaphors allow an open-endedness that is less precise than literal language, which gives metaphor its creative, emotional, and intellectual potential. A transgressive reading of disability metaphors mines these creative, emotional, and intellectual potentialities with a "commitment to retelling the stories of disability in such a way that resists the illusion that disability is a limit without possibility" (Titchkosky 2007, 131).

A2 Oversensitive

Dismissal of disability studies as oversensitive or a fad reifies the idea that disability is worthless, flawed, and inferior – yet ableism is used to promote insidious discrimination against people with impairments

Siebers 10 [Tobin Siebers, Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Michigan; "The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification"; University of Michigan Press; 10/28/2010; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdisabilities.temple.edu%2Fmedia%2Fds%2Flecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.doc&ei=LWz4T6jyN8bHqAHLkY2LCQ&usg=AFQjCNGdkDuSJkRXMHgbXqvuyyeDpldVcQ&sig2=UCGDC4tHbeh2j7-Yce9lsA>.]

Many beholders choose to reject disability, but what would the other choice involve? "If the Venus de Milo had arms," Quinn observes, "it would most probably be a very boring statue" (4). Quinn's work trades in the bewildering idea that the same properties that strengthen works of art disqualify the actual people who possess them—the same bewildering idea on which modern art establishes itself. Modern art discovers in the eye drawn to the difference of disabiliity one of its defining aesthetic principles. The interviews included in the catalogue of The Complete Marbles insist again and again on this idea. Quinn repeatedly asks the subjects of his sculptures what they think about fragmentary classical statuary, whether it is beautiful and, if yes, whether their bodies are therefore beautiful as well. Lapper poses the same question: "Why shouldn't my body be considered art?" (Freeman). The crucial point here is to recognize that Lapper's body, once turned into an aesthetic representation, has a better chance of being accepted as art than a nondisabled body, despite the fact that disabled bodies, outside of aesthetic contexts, are still dismissed as repulsive and ugly. Disability is not merely unwanted content, political or otherwise, introduced into art but a mode of appearance that grows increasingly identifiable over time as the aesthetic itself. In February 1998 New York Press published an essay by Norah Vincent that attacks the emerging discipline of disability studies as "yet another academic fad" (40). Nevertheless, disability studies apparently fails as a discipline not because it is too chic but because it attracts incompetent, weak, and dishonest people. Camille Paglia calls disability studies "the last refuge for pc scoundrels" (40), but if we believe Vincent, disability studies is also a refuge for ordinary scoundrels, not to mention scholars and students of poor quality. Disability studies supposedly attracts people of questionable moral character— "academic careerists" and "ambulance-chasing publishers" who want to profit from the newest fad—as well as mediocre and flawed minds—the "victim-obsessed," the "second-rate," and the psychologically dependent (40). Vincent seems especially keen to discredit disability studies by associating it with intellectually inferior and psychologically damaged scholars, and when she interviews various leading lights in the field, she is more intent on exposing their psychological weak spots than on capturing what is original about their contribution to disability studies. Lennard Davis, Vincent tells us, melts into "self-righteous goodspeak" at the mere mention of disability, while Michael Bérubé speaks in a voice that is "silky and kind" when he argues that disability is an idea necessary to understand human rights (40). Disability studies deserves no place in the university, it seems, and no self-respecting scholar should have anything to do with it. If there is any doubt that Vincent wants to disqualify disabled people as physically defective, morally degenerate, or psychologically damaged, the cartoon accompanying the essay should make her purpose obvious. The cartoon, drawn by Gary Leib, pictures a man in a wheelchair being pushed by a woman in a nurse's uniform (fig. 16). Leib overlays the drawing with a variety of disqualifying aesthetic markers: some associate the disabled with physical ugliness and lack of intelligence, while others attempt to promote the idea, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the disabled enjoy a privileged, exclusive, and wealthy life style. For example, as beads of sweat run down his face, the disabled man in the wheelchair grips a cigarette holder in his mangled teeth and toasts his public with a martini. Behind him and pushing the wheelchair is his nurse attendant. Her eyes are vapid, and her breasts are bursting out of her tight-fitting uniform. Most hateful, however, is the fact that Leib draws the cartoon in a way that re-envisions people with disabilities as Nazi soldiers. The disabled man in the wheelchair wears a monocle, summoning the image of an SS officer. The message of the cartoon is shocking and direct in its attack on disabled people; it manages to represent the disabled as poor, inferior, and undeserving creatures who have managed somehow to attain a position of wealth and power superior to other people. The cartoon asks its beholders to believe that the disabled as a group belong to the privileged few, to a dominant class, and to an infamous story of genocide and military expansionism, deserving comparison with the Nazis, some of the greatest criminals in human history.

A2 Perm Do Both

The permutation's ableism casts disability as non-human, and fails to account for the societal oppression that comes with disability before rushing to a political solution

Campbell 9 [Dr Fiona Kumari Campbell, long time Covener of Disability Studies, boardmember of the International Advisory Board of the Socio-Legal Review, Italian Journal of Disability Studies, Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, and Ethnographica: Journal of Disability and Culture; "Disability Advocacy & Ableism:Towards a re-discovery of the disability Imagination" pg 1-4; Keynote Address @ 2nd Strengthening Advocacy Conference; 11/17-18/2009; accessed 07/31/2015;<http://griffith.academia.edu/FionaKumariCampbell/Papers/118483/Disability_Advocacy_and_Ableism_Towards_a_re-discovery_of_the_disability_Imagination>.]

Working models (often called conceptual frameworks) are very important as they help us work out which questions to ask, help us interpret and process things and events. We all have conceptual frameworks that shape our beliefs as to why thing happen – even if we do not use that language. In a keynote speech I made at a DPI conference in Adelaide 1984 I said it was important for disabled people to understand the nature of social change "so that we will not be fooled by any token one off gestures or initiatives handed out by government and disability agencies" (1984, 91). I still hold to that idea and add that we always need to test new ideas by asking "what is this proposal or idea saying about disability, does it assume that disability is terrible, or that diversity and difference are terrible or is the idea on about celebrating and bringing out difference"? **From the perspective of political activism, the necessity to have a theory of disability before deciding strategies** of political action was well understood as early as 1975 by the Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation UPAIS in the UK whose minutes of a debate between 2 advocacy groups produced a document called The Fundamental Principles of Disability. They decided that disability should not be understood medically as a broken down body, mind or heart, rather society and the way that it is organized had something to do with us becoming disabled …. Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society. … To understand this it is necessary to grasp the distinction between the physical impairment and the social situation, called "disability", of people with such impairment. Thus we define … disability as the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organization which takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them from participation in the mainstream of social activities. …**Disability is therefore a particular form of social oppression**.(UPAIS, quoted in Oliver 1995: 16 – 17).I have not so much rejected this model as extended it through my work in Studies in Ableism and adoption of a model out of Europe called the Relational model of Disability. First to the relational model… the French concept of disability ('situation de handicap ') defines… disability as a confrontation between the ability of a person and situations she encounters in life" 'macro-situations', such as work or schooling, or 'micro-situations' such as cutting meat or using the keyboard of a computer. The disabling situations are not only structural and material, they are also(especially) cultural (Hamonet, 2006, 1, cited in Campbell,2009). The model moves beyond abilities and limitations and embraces our sense of Self acknowledging our own perception of difference in our bodies, thinking or emotions. This notion of disability as a relational concept says that disability is made through our faulty interaction with differences in mentalities and bodies. The choice of language is no accident – what we have in that description is a process ripe with tension, a pushing through of impairment in its encounter with the environment. The environment includes the spiritual & emotional life of the disabled person as we try to negotiate our sense of self in a world that is uncomfortable and negative about disability. It is hard to be positive about oneself (and disabled people as a group) when disability is seen as a form of harm or is harmful! This understanding is similar to the framework contained in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The Preamble[Opening section] of the Convention describes: disability [a]s an evolving concept and that disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others (emphasis added).Whilst many of the barriers to inclusion are external to the disabled person (laws, resources, environmental and educational barriers) –barriers also exist that are internal to the person (self-image, internalization of negative views of disability, learned helplessness, and the legacies of institutionalisation).Now to a definition of ableism, by ableism I refer to... a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the …[bodily] standard) that is projected as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then, is cast as a diminished state of being human (Campbell, 2001: 44).Ableism tells us what a healthy body

means – a normal mind, how quickly we should think and the kinds of emotions that are okay to express. Of course these characteristics then are put out as an ideal. These beliefs do not take account of differences in the ways we express our emotions, use our thinking and bodies in different cultures and in different situations. There is pressure in modern societies for us to show we are always productive (doing sometime useful) and contributing. Ableist belief values certain things as useful and particular kinds of contributions. Disabled people are often seen as a burden, a problem, a drain of the system, making no contribution – or a Hitler said 'useless eaters'. According to our understanding of Ableism, 'disability' refers to people who do not make the grade, are unfit in someway – and therefore are not properly human. Central to a system of ableism are two elements, namely the notion of the normative (and normal individual) and the enforcement of a divide between perfect humanity (how humans are supposedly meant to be) and the aberrant, the unthinkable, and therefore not really-human. Studies in Ableism instead of looking directly at disability focuses more on how the able, ablebodied, non-disabled identity is maintained – we look at elements of what it is to be normal. According to ableism, while in a democracy we should treat (most)disabled people fairly through a belief in toleration. this does NOT mean that we think disability is okay – that disability is an acceptable form of diversity, that disability can be celebrated. • [All] Disability (irrespective of type & degree) is assumed to be unacceptable and negative. Disability is harmful and a form of harm. In my work I refer to this view as disability being provisional and tentative – it is always subject to being erased if a solution comes along (cure, correction, elimination). Disabled people have not yet established their entitlement to fully exist as disabled people as part of human diversity. There are many people in the disability services field and working in universities who if pushed hold this view. It is assumed that disability always equals suffering. If disabled people suffer, people think it is always because of the impairment and not others issues like lack of support and belongingness. So it is not surprising that we get mixed messages about disability – "be kind and nice to the disabled!" … "but there is no real right to exist, and how dare you be happy because of your disability and not in spite of it" …. [Paragraph ends with ellipses]

A2 Policy Affs About Disability

Disability movements, no matter where they start from, become coopted into legalistic solutions which only reify surveillance and victimhood

Anders 13 [Abram Anders, Assistant Professor of Business Communication, English PhD @ Penn State; "Foucault and "the Right to Life": From Technologies of Normalization to Societies of Control"; Disability Studies Quarterly; Vol 33 No 2; 2013; accessed 07/29/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3340/3268>.]

For another example, <u>political efforts to address racism culminate in</u> affirmative action legislation, which in turn becomes a mean of <u>regulating ethnic identities through institutional and legal procedures</u>. <u>This effectively shifts debates and conflicts over racism from a political issue to one addressed in the educational system</u> and through workplace litigation. At the same time, <u>conservatives characterize such programs as reverse discrimination that unfairly provides "rewards" based on characteristics</u> (i.e. race) <u>which the government should disregard</u>. Brown describes a two-stage process whereby <u>political claims against social inequalities are depoliticized and privatized through disciplinary administration and the logic of formal justice</u>. This pattern holds equally true for the disability movement. Though <u>intended to politically contest social inequalities pertaining both to the allocation of resources and the self determination of the disabled, measures such as the ADA ultimately depoliticize and privatize these claims</u> by reinserting them into the purview of judicial institutions: "It converts social problems into matters of individualized, dehistoricized injury and entitlement, into matters in which there is no harm if there is no agent and not tangibly violated subject" (Brown 124). Furthermore, such measures <u>not only neutralize political claims as private interest, but through bureaucratic codification reify the subject categories that are meant to protect</u> and serve as a means of further disciplinary regulation. In consideration of the latter claim, it is important to recognize the way in forms of disciplinary discourses imply and reinforce one another. Historically, this has been particularly true of the relationship between medical and judicial discourse. In his lecture series on this very topic, <u>Foucault reiterates the fundamental thesis of much of his work, that power is productive, that it "multiplies itself on the basis of its own effects" and operates primarily through the "formation of knowledge"</u> (Abnormal 48). Disability scholars have pointed out that a <u>primary aspect of court decisions pertaining to disability has been the reliance on medical knowledge</u>. As Hahn points out, "courts have viewed medical evidence of a functional impairment as an essential pre-condition for legal findings about disability" (185). <u>Even legislation designed specifically to aid and accommodate the disabled is often administered in ways that undermine its positive impact</u>. For example, in her critique of the <u>questionnaire that determines eligibility for the Disability Living Allowance</u> (DLA), Shildrick characterizes the way in which <u>state administered aid becomes an opportunity for **oppressive surveillance**</u>: "<u>No area of bodily functioning **escapes the requirement of total visibility, and further the ever more detailed subdivision of bodily behavior into a set of discontinuous functions speaks to a fetishistic fragmentation**</u> of the embodied person" (qtd. in Hughes 69). In this way, <u>disabled people are made subject to the invasive examinations, surveillance, and objectification that are the hallmark and most obviously oppressive aspect of technologies of normalization</u>. Fiona Campbell argues that, more insidiously, legal proceedings depend on an "inherently negative" conception of disability that frames all disabled people as abject victims of a "personal tragedy" (109). Following Wendy Brown, Campbell argues <u>legal proceedings reify and codify the interrelation of disability, dependency, and victimhood</u>. Most profoundly, <u>they require "disabled people to trade in trade in, negotiate, and maintain" an identity of "social injury"</u> (115). Rights discourse unavoidably appeals to legal processes and procedures that subjugate disabled people in the dual sense already cited from Foucault: they are made "subject to … control and dependence, and tied to … identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" ("The Subject and Power" 130). A primary goal of disability activism is to contest the traditional view of disability as a private problem that should be fixed by adapting disabled bodies to a normalized society. It is thus ironic and tragic that the discourse of rights through which such claims have been advanced is, when viewed in light of Brown's analysis, a further mechanism of depoliticizing difference as private; appeals to rights and their codification may actually deepen the social injuries they to address. However, as I will argue further, <u>it is important to recognize that these injuries are not simply injuries of exclusion</u>. Though in one sense political claims for a "right to life" are rejected by disciplinary justice, in another sense these <u>claims for a "right to life" are channeled, redirected, and quarantined within the productive apparatus of juridical</u>

and medical institutions. A collective, political protest is referred and deferred to the site of the individual's confrontation with technologies of normalization.

Ableism = Prior Question

The question of (dis)ability must be at the forefront of debate over what is dehumanizing and what makes life worth living – it shapes our perceptions

Taylor 13 [Ashley Taylor, PhD in Cultural Foundations of Education @ Syracuse, specialization in Disability Studies; ""Lives Worth Living:" Theorizing Moral Status and Expressions of Human Life"; Disability Studies Quarterly Vol 33 No 4; 2013; accessed 07/30/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3875/3404>.] read this card against k affs

Despite the increasing social visibility of people labelled with intellectual disabilities 1 and the gains made to include them in all of the major institutions of society, popular rhetoric and political discourses continue to call into question the worth of a life lived with intellectual disability. Over the last decade, policy-makers, popular media, and diverse advocacy groups have publicly debated about the rights to bodily integrity, the reproductive capacities and self-determination of people with intellectual disabilities, their access to adequate education, and their right to community-based living (rather than confinement in institutions). In contemporary moral, political, and bioethical philosophy, there has been growing discussion of the relationship between individual humans and their moral status, raising questions that bear significantly on the lives of people with intellectual disabilities: To whom shall the rights and duties of political or civic membership be accorded? Who qualifies as a person in considerations of ethical treatment and care? Who, or what, is a subject of justice and to whom is justice owed? At the center of these inquiries is the question of the social, moral, and political place of individuals with intellectual disabilities and, in particular, the extent to which individuals so labelled or defined can be said to have moral personhood. Such efforts to clarify the moral status of individuals with intellectual disabilities have, for the most part, been intended to produce more just and equitable social arrangements and ensure individual welfare, though, at times, they respond to concerns over scarce resources. As public debates continue over what counts as a life worth living, a life of human dignity, and even what constitutes life itself, disability studies scholars—especially those working at the intersections of gender, race, sexuality, and disability—have linked this preoccupation with definitions of human life and lives worth living to the **prevailing social regard of the disabled body as questionably human**, as aberrant, abhorrent, as an unfortunate existence (for instance, Garland Thomson 1997; Garland-Thomson 2006; Johnson 2003; Linton 1998; Schweik 2009; Siebers 2009). In her description of the disabled body as the representation of "contradiction, ambiguity, and partiality incarnate," Garland-Thomson considers what she calls "the will to normalize" as the prevailing will to expunge human differences, to ignore the messiness and non-uniformity of nature, and to control, shape, and regulate bodies (Garland-Thomson 2006, 262). This well-documented new eugenics of the contemporary world consists in what disability scholars have called the "ideology of ability" (Siebers, 2009), "compulsory able-bodiedness" (McRuer, 2006), or simply "ableism:" the persistent perception—both conscious and unconscious—that disability precludes human well-being and agency and is the quintessential representation of the precariousness of the human condition (Siebers 2009, 5; see also Bogdan and Biklen 1977). Feminist disability theorists and feminist philosophers of disability argue that prevailing ideas about which lives are worth living have real and sometimes deadly material consequences, insofar as they inform policies on genetic testing, euthanasia, selective abortion, and rights to bodily integrity, as well as political attitudes towards war and its material repercussions, including loss of life, physical, mental, and emotional disablement, extreme poverty, and more (See Asch 1999; Erevelles 2011; Tremain 2006; Garland-Thomson 2006; Johnson 2003; Lamp and Cleigh 2011; Shapiro 1993). The theoretical basis of these arguments is especially apparent in the wealth of literature that analyzes disability from a Foucauldian perspective, showing that the social and political forces that individualize and categorize people according to particular social norms effectively produce subjects as particular kinds of people, kinds which are taken to be natural and have pre-discursive existence (see Allen 2005; Tremain, 2002, 2005; Carlson, 2010). Furthermore, feminist philosophers of disability and other philosophers of disability have waded into these debates in order to comment on the gendered and racialized assumptions of rationality, independence, and normalcy that uphold dominant philosophical views of personhood (see Carlson 2010; Kittay 2002, 2010; Wong 2010; Stubblefield 2007, 2010). For example, Kittay (2002) describes how liberal definitions of personhood rely on beliefs about normal human ability that are grounded in masculinist ideas about the capacities—

including the capacities for rationality and self-sufficiency—and behavior of the white independent adult male (see also Lanoix 2007). To take another example, Stubblefield (2007, 2010) traces the construction of the contemporary Western understanding of "intellect" to historical intersections between gender and race ideology and the label of mental retardation, arguing that the concept of cognitive disability cannot be abstracted from the social and political forces that shape the meaning of intellect. In addition to exposing the ways that deep-seated cultural biases and prejudices against disability steer these public and academic debates, many of the aforementioned authors issue a call to philosophers, bioethicists, and feminist philosophers and theorists to recognize how their own approaches to these fundamental ethical questions can themselves reproduce wrongful and harmful views of disability and the humanity of disabled lives. I propose that in order to attend to these important insights and philosophical claims about disability and human life and the dehumanizing discourse that surrounds people with intellectual disabilities in particular, we should consider a **prior question** in regard to normative theories about the moral status and humanity of people with intellectual disabilities, noting the question's significant import and impact on policy and law: Do these philosophical questions about human life and moral status, politically and practically necessary though they may be, also function to obscure or distort emerging and alternative conceptions of competency, intellect, human behavior, ability, and well-being? Indeed, I maintain that philosophy in general and feminist philosophy in particular **would benefit from asking this question in advance of other questions about human life and moral status**. To understand the deep discomfort that people with disabilities, 2 parents of children with disabilities, 3 as well as advocates and theorists of disability have about normative theories of moral status, we should reframe the question of moral personhood to address the social conditions under which the qualifying conditions for moral status and human belonging arise, in addition to asking what the qualifying conditions for moral status or human belonging are. Kim Q. Hall (2011) has suggested that the question of a life worth living is not foremost "a question about whether disability impoverishes or enhances quality of life. Rather the question is, following [Judith] Butler, what makes possible a life that can be lived" (6). In her recent work, Butler has explored what she calls "normative violence" and its relationship to social recognition and physical violence (Butler 2004, 2005, 2009). As Butler explains it, normative violence makes one intelligible through cultural and social norms of gender, race, sexuality, ability, and so on in ways that render one vulnerable to erasure and exclusion from social, political, and cultural recognition and potentially exposed to physical harm. I aim to consider how the above philosophical debates about human life and moral personhood perform a normative violence of their own. Where these approaches measure political recognition and moral status in terms of individuals' intelligibility through norms, they involve a potentially violent exclusion of possible alternative ways of expressing human life, capability, and well-being. For Butler, social justice requires not the delineation of what counts as human in the service of politics, but rather the creation of the conditions under which moral and political recognition is always fluid and what counts as human is always subject to social contestation. I will argue that Butler's view of normative violence offers us a way to consider how the identification of moral status, though possibly unavoidable within the scope of political theorizing, is ultimately a precarious method for creating the conditions of social justice.

Alt=Aesthetics

Disqualification on the basis of perceived disability is the root of sexism, racism, and classism – only learning about the aesthetic discrimination against non-normative bodies solves widespread oppression

Of course, when bodies produce feelings of pleasure or pain, they also invite judgments about whether they should be accepted or rejected in the human community. People thought to experience more pleasure or pain than others or to produce unusual levels of pleasure and pain in other bodies are among the bodies most discriminated against, actively excluded, and violated on the current scene, be they disabled, sexed, gendered, or racialized bodies. Disabled people, but also sex workers, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people, and people of color, are tortured and killed because of beliefs about their relationship to pain and pleasure (Siebers 2009). This is why aesthetic disqualification is not merely a matter for art critics or museum directors but a political process of concern to us all. An understanding of aesthetics is crucial because it reveals the operative principles of disqualification used in minority oppression. Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves "groups," and not "individuals," means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call "in-built" or "biological" inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. "Racism" disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. "Sexism" disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. "Classism" disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. "Ableism" disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it.

This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.

Alt=Imagination

note: it's not necessary to win, or even read, an alt – or the alt can simply be to refuse ableist language, and have the judge vote on discourse.

The alternative is an imagination centering around disability – it rehumanizes but does not assimilate, and makes room for alternate perceptions of the world

Campbell 9 [Dr Fiona Kumari Campbell, long time Covener of Disability Studies, boardmember of the International Advisory Board of the Socio-Legal Review, Italian Journal of Disability Studies, Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, and Ethnographica: Journal of Disability and Culture; "Disability Advocacy & Ableism:Towards a re-discovery of the disability Imagination" pg 5-6; Keynote Address @ 2nd Strengthening Advocacy Conference; 11/17-18/2009; accessed 07/31/2015;<http://griffith.academia.edu/FionaKumariCampbell/Papers/118483/Disability_Advocacy_and_Ableism_Towards_a_re-discovery_of_the_disability_Imagination>.]

I am mindful of the time, so want to move onto my final topic, that of imagination – creating a positive imagination about disability, developing a Crip Horizon. Since 1981, the International Year of Disabled Persons, legal & policy discourses of disability have gravitated towards an equality as sameness model declaring that disabled people should be integrated into mainstream society and be able to claim the entitlements of citizenship. What has become clear is that the project of inclusion has become conditional. The working model of inclusion is really only successful to the extent that people with disabilities are able to 'opt in', or be assimilated (normalized). A drive towards self-independence may mean that it is not possible for some disabled people to be truly 'free' within the confines of liberal society. These people may lose person status because they fail to meet certain criterion. The conditions of disability acceptability are about the capacity of disabled people to mimic abledness, be seen to be productive and accept the reality of the provisionality of their impairment until an obliterating remedy comes along. We might want to imagine how life might be different if instead of trying to change our unacceptability that we instead embrace it – to explore the richness of the disability experience whilst at the same time fighting for the entitlements of citizenship but on a new basis – not sameness but recognition ,recognition of our difference. In the same way that some of our indigenous brothers and sisters have said 'no' to assimilation and 'yes' to self-determination and difference. What would it mean for us to acknowledge and explore our ways of moving differently in the world …. Crippin' the human(putting disability back into human) involves a different gaze (way of viewing & sensing the world) – where sometimes signs and gestures predominate, where there is a different mind style such as Tourette's or autism, or a centring on visuality or tactility. Groundedness to earthiness can be 'different' through echolocation, waist heightness and shadows. I suggest maybe the way we use and live time can be different. Cripped time can be staggered, frenzied, coded, meandering and be the distance between two events. Some of our time is shaped according to another's doing – service time –the segmenting and waiting on assistive agencies. Aside from service time, there is a transient time whereby our cripped selves rub up against biology, environmental barriers and relationality.

Alt="Step Outside Language"

note: it's not necessary to win, or even read, an alt – or the alt can simply be to refuse ableist language, and have the judge vote on discourse.

Ableist rhetoric promotes interpretations which construct understanding of disability – we have a responsibility to step outside this rhetoric to recognize the impacts of ableist speech

Cherney 11 [James L Cherney, former college debater, PhD in Communication and Culture @ Westminster, and undergraduates in Public Speaking, Body Rhetoric, and the Disability Rights Movement; "The Rhetoric of Ableism"; Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol 31 No 3; 2011; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606>.]

Every orientation, perspective, and ideology has its basis somewhere; we are taught to understand the world as we do. In other words, we learn meaning—it does not arise naturally from objects or relationships. In Hall's words, "there is no one, final, absolute meaning—no ultimate signified, only the endlessly sliding chain of signification."6 Earlier, Kenneth Burke argued similarly that "Stimuli do not possess an absolute meaning" and pointed out that "Even a set of signs indicating the likelihood of death by torture has another meaning in the orientation of a comfort-loving skeptic than it would for the ascetic whose world-view promised eternal reward for martyrdom." Burke concludes: "Any given situation derives its character from the entire framework of interpretation by which we judge it."7 From the perspective of ableism as a framework of interpretation, we identify its dimensions by examining the linguistic codes and rhetorical assumptions that govern sense making. As Burke put it, "We discern situational patterns by means of the particular vocabulary of the cultural group into which we are born. Our minds, as linguistic products, are composed of concepts (verbally molded) which select certain relationships as meaningful." In other words, meaning exists primarily as a function of language rather than a natural or necessary consequent of material objects or bodies. Our comprehension of reality itself arises from our perspective, so "different frameworks of interpretation will lead to different conclusions as to what reality is."8 Complicating the simple materiality of things does not necessarily entail rejecting material existence: things can exist as simultaneously material and rhetorical constructs. Material might be experienced "directly" by a body, but what—and how—this material "is" depends on filters that shape perception. Repeated stress on a knee may promote swelling, strain ligaments, and alter the shape of cartilage. Depending on the way it is described, this might be understood as "injury," expected "wear and tear," or "a natural consequence of running long distances." If the condition causes pain, it might be considered "trauma," a "danger signal," or the simple "cost that one pays for extraordinary performance." To say and understand what happened we use "stress," "swelling," "ligaments," and "cartilage" as concepts that we have created to relate to the experience in particular ways. Substitute "stress" with "strenuous activity," "work," "play," or "abuse" and the condition changes yet its materiality remains the same. Exchange "swelling," with "inflammation," "being sore," "recovery mechanisms," or "cushioning," and this alters the proscribed treatments. Replace "ligaments" and "cartilage" with "tissues," "sinews," "flesh," or "well designed structural components" and the anatomy itself becomes something else. The event could not be explained at all if the words were lost or it involved something unnamed. The context in which observers place something and the implications of the words used to make it meaningful rhetorically construct the experience. We say what happened, and if we do not or cannot, then the characteristics of the event remain undefined, unfixed, and mutable. Material may exist independently of our subjective awareness, but what something is, how it should be, and why it matters cannot exist except as a function of language. Whatever the factual (or material, or empirical, or scientific) status of disability, my only concern here is the concept's meaning. Disability is a loaded term, weighted down with tools and supplies sufficient for the task of making difference. Such baggage begs to be unpacked. But the project quickly becomes complicated because the ropes that bind the luggage are largely invisible as common sense. Racism and sexism may have no legitimate place in this "civilized" world, but the precepts governing modern civility continue to allow an ableist orientation. This requires those who would undermine ableist thinking to **step outside of the rhetorical foundations bounded by ableist assumptions in order to recognize ableism as a destructive and dangerous perspective.** In rhetorical terms, the problem is one of studying from within a rhetoric that denies its own rhetoricity.

Alt Solves

Recognizing ableist speech is an act against ableism on the whole – ableism is so ingrained as to not be questioned, yet their language sanctions and reinforces it

Cherney 11 [James L Cherney, former college debater, PhD in Communication and Culture @ Westminster, and undergraduates in Public Speaking, Body Rhetoric, and the Disability Rights Movement; "The Rhetoric of Ableism"; Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol 31 No 3; 2011; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606>.]

Recognizing ableism requires a shift in orientation, a perceptual gestalt framed by the filter of the term "ableism" itself. The same texts that broadcast "Ableism!" to those oriented to perceive it are usually read innocently even when viewed from a liberal, humanitarian, or progressive perspective. Ableism is so pervasive that it is difficult to identify until one begins to interrogate the governing assumptions of well-intentioned society. Within the space allowed by these rhetorical premises, ableism appears natural, necessary, and ultimately moral discrimination required for the normal functioning of civilization. Consider a set of stairs. An ableist culture thinks little of stairs, or even sees them as elegant architectural devices—especially those grand marble masterpieces that elevate buildings of state. But disability rights activists see stairs as a discriminatory apparatus—a "no crips allowed" sign that only those aware of ableism can read—that makes their inevitable presence around government buildings a not-so-subtle statement about who belongs in our most important public spaces. But the device has become so accepted in our culture that the idea of stairs as oppressive technology will strike many as ludicrous. Several years ago when I began to study ableism, a professor—unconvinced of the value of the project—questioned my developing arguments by pointing to a set of steps and exclaiming, "Next you'll be telling me that those stairs discriminate!" He was right. The professor's surprise suggests that commonplace cultural assumptions support themselves because the very arguments available against them seem unwarranted and invalid.

Interrogating stairs was such an outrageous idea that a simple reductio ad absurdum argument depicted the critique of ableism as a fallacy. As an ingrained part of the interpretive frameworks sanctioned by culture, ableism gets reinforced by the everyday practice of interpreting and making sense of the world. Using this idea of what ableism does at the intersection of rhetoric and ideology, I next develop a way of understanding how it operates. I argue that this way of conceiving ableist thinking as rhetorical practice identifies potential approaches for challenging ableism

Root Cause

Their fear of the dangerous, deviant, impaired body justifies human rights abuses, murder, and devalued lives – discrimination against people of color, women, and immigrants has always been through their alignment with disability

Siebers 10 [Tobin Siebers, Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Michigan; "The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification"; University of Michigan Press; 10/28/2010; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdisabilities.temple.edu%2Fmedia%2Fds%2Flecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.doc&ei=LWz4T6jyN8bHqAHLkY2LCQ&usg=AFQjCNGdkDuSJkRXMHgbXqvuyyeDpldVcQ&sig2=UCGDC4tHbeh2j7-Yce9lsA>.]

Surprisingly little thought and energy have been given to disputing the belief that nonquality human beings do exist. This belief is so robust that it supports the most serious and characteristic injustices of our day. Disqualification at this moment in time justifies discrimination, servitude, imprisonment, involuntary institutionalization, euthanasia, human and civil rights violations, military intervention, compulsory sterilization, police actions, assisted suicide, capital punishment, and murder. It is my contention that disqualification finds support in the way that bodies appear and in their specific appearances—that is, **disqualification is justified through the accusation of mental or physical inferiority** based on aesthetic principles. Disqualification is produced by naturalizing inferiority as the justification for unequal treatment, violence, and oppression. According to Snyder and Mitchell, disability serves in the modern period as "the master trope of human disqualification." They argue that disability represents a marker of otherness that establishes differences between human beings **not as acceptable or valuable variations but as dangerous deviations**. Douglas Baynton provides compelling examples from the modern era, explaining that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States **disability identity disqualified other identities defined by gender, race, class, and nationality.** Women were deemed inferior because they were said to have mental and physical disabilities. People of color had fewer rights than other persons based on accusations of biological inferiority. Immigrants were excluded from entry into the United States when they were poor, sick, or failed standardized tests, even though the populations already living there were poor, sick, and failed standardized tests. In every case, disability identity served to justify oppression by amplifying ideas about inferiority already attached to other minority identities. Disability is the trope by which the assumed inferiority of these other minority identities achieved expression. The appearance of lesser mental and physical abilities disqualifies people as inferior and justifies their oppression. It is now possible to recognize disability as a trope used to posit the inferiority of certain minority populations, but it remains extremely difficult to understand that mental and physical markers of inferiority are also tropes placed in the service of disability oppression. Before disability can be used as a disqualifier, disability, too, has to be disqualified. Beneath the troping of blackness as inbuilt inferiority, for example, lies the troping of disability as inferior. Beneath the troping of femininity as biological deficiency lies the troping of disability as deficiency. The mental and physical properties of bodies become the natural symbols of inferiority via a process of disqualification that seems biological, not cultural—which is why disability discrimination seems to be a medical rather than a social problem. If we consider how difficult it is at this moment to disqualify people as inferior on the basis of their racial, sexual, gender, or class characteristics, **we may come to recognize the ground that we must cover in the future before we experience the same difficulty disqualifying people as inferior on the basis of disability**. We might also recognize the work that disability performs at present in situations where race, sexuality, gender, and class are used to disqualify people as physically or mentally inferior.

A2 Ableism K

Alt Fails

Language arguments are unable to create deep change to systems – just leads to new words coded for disability, being offensive our of round, and subtlety in language they can't critique out of

Roskoski and Peabody 91 [Matthew Roskoski, and Joe Peabody, debate coaches and former debaters writing on theory issues, critiques, and risk management; "A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language "Arguments""; Florida State University; 1991; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>.]

Language "Arguments" Are Counterproductive There are several levels upon which language "arguments" are actually counterproductive. We will discuss the quiescence effect, deacademization, and publicization. The quiescence effect is explained by Strossen when she writes "the censorship approach is diversionary. It makes it easier for communities to avoid coming to grips with less convenient and more expensive, but ultimately more meaningful approaches" (Strossen 561). Essentially, the argument is that allowing the restriction of language we find offensive substitutes for taking actions to check the real problems that generated the language. Previously, we have argued that the language advocates have erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and reality. We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that **we may often be fooled into thinking that language "arguments" have generated real change**. As Graddol and Swan observe, "when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern," further noting "there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change" (Graddol & Swan 195). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of any objectionable reality, **while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated**. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a "backlash" effect that raises the consciousness of people exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that "ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtably have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem…" (560). The second major reason why language "arguments" are counterproductive is that they contribute to deacademization. In the context of critiquing the Hazelwood decision, Hopkins explains the phenomenon: To escape censorship, therefore, student journalists may eschew school sponsorship in favor of producing their own product. In such a case, the result would almost certainly be lower quality of high school journalism… The purpose of high school journalism, however, is more than learning newsgathering, writing, and editing skills. It is also to learn the role of the press in society; it is to teach responsibility as well as freedom. (Hopkins 536). Hyde & Fishman further explain that to protect students from offensive views, is to deprive them of the experiences through which they "attain intellectual and moral maturity and become self-reliant" (Hyde & Fishman 1485). The application of these notions to the debate round is clear and relevant. If language "arguments" become a dominant trend, **debaters will not change their attitudes. Rather they will manifest their attitudes in non-debate contexts**. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch is worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a critic to provide negative though not punitive feedback. The publicization effects of censorship are well known. "Psychological studies reveal that whenever the government attempts to censor speech, the censored speech - for that very reason - becomes more appealing to many people" (Strossen 559). These studies would suggest that language which is critiqued by language "arguments" becomes more attractive simply because of the critique. Hence language "arguments" are counterproductive.

Not a Voting Issue

Not a voting issue – in round education, cross-x, and out of round discussion solve, we won't do it again

Roskoski and Peabody 91 [Matthew Roskoski, and Joe Peabody, debate coaches and former debaters writing on theory issues, critiques, and risk management; "A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language "Arguments""; Florida State University; 1991; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>.] Potential for offensive language: glang

The battle against {offensive speech} will be fought most effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership rather than through punishment and coercion... The sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and tolerance, is the pervasive ethos. But that ethos should be advanced with education, not coercion. It should be the dominant voice of the university within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that marketplace. (Smolla 224-225).1 We emphatically concur. It is our position that a debater who feels strongly enough about a given language "argument" ought to actualize that belief through interpersonal conversation rather than through a plea for censorship and coercion. Each debater in a given round has three minutes of cross-examination time during which he or she may engage the other team in a dialogue about the ramifications of the language the opposition has just used. Additionally even given the efficacy of Rich Edwards' efficient tabulation program, there will inevitably be long periods between rounds during which further dialogue can take place. It is our position that interpersonal transactions will be more effective methods of raising consciousness about the negative ramifications of language. These interactions can achieve the goals intended by language "arguments" without the attendant infringements upon the freedom of speech.

Language ≠ Reality

Language doesn't create reality – they assume the Sair-Whorf hypothesis, but can't defend it – means no reason to vote neg

Roskoski and Peabody 91 [Matthew Roskoski, and Joe Peabody, debate coaches and former debaters writing on theory issues, critiques, and risk management; "A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language "Arguments""; Florida State University; 1991; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>.]

It has become fashionable lately for CEDA debaters to present language "arguments" in CEDA debate rounds. The essential defining element of a language "argument" is that it critiques not the actual arguments of the debater but rather the language or rhetoric the debater offers. It will be our position that such "arguments" are inadequate for several reasons. These reasons cluster around our analysis of the syllogism that comprises language "arguments." The major premise of language "arguments" is that language creates reality, the minor premise is that certain language is undesirable, and the conclusion is that the debater using the unacceptable language ought to be sanctioned with a ballot. We will deny the first premise and offer three reasons why the conclusion is incorrect. Language Does Not Create Reality Language "arguments" assume the veracity of the Sapir- Whorf hypothesis. Usually, this is made explicit in a subpoint labeled something like "language creates reality." Often, this is implicitly argued as part of claims such as "they're responsible for their rhetoric" or "ought always to avoid X language." Additionally, even if a given language "argument" does not articulate this as a premise, the authors who write the evidence comprising the position will usually if not always assume the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Perhaps the most common example is the popular sexist language "argument" critiquing masculine generic references. Frequently debaters making this "argument" specifically state that language creates reality. The fact that their authors assume this is documented by Khosroshahi: The claim that masculine generic words help to perpetuate an androcentric world view assumes more or less explicitly the validity of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis according to which the structure of the language we speak affects the way we think. (Khosroshahi 506). We believe this example to be very typical of language "arguments." If the advocate of a language "argument" does not defend the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, then there can be no link between the debater's rhetoric and the impacts claimed. This being the case, we will claim that a refutation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is a sufficient condition for the refutation of language "arguments". Certainly no logician would contest the claim that if the major premise of a syllogism is denied, then the syllogism is false. Before we begin to discuss the validity of the hypothesis, we ought first to note that there are two varieties of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The strong version claims that language actually creates reality, while the weak version merely claims that language influences reality in some way (Grace). As Bloom has conceded, the strong version - "the claim that language or languages we learn determine the ways we think" is "clearly untenable" (Bloom 275). Further, the weak form of the hypothesis will likely fail the direct causal nexus test required to censor speech. The courts require a "close causal nexus between speech and harm before penalizing speech" (Smolla 205) and we believe debate critics should do the same. We dismiss the weak form of the hypothesis as inadequate to justify language "arguments" and will focus on the strong form. Initially, it is important to note that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis does not intrinsically deserve presumption, although many authors assume its validity without empirical support. The reason it does not deserve presumption is that "on a priori grounds one can contest it by asking how, if we are unable to organize our thinking beyond the limits set by our native language, we could ever become aware of those limits" (Robins 101). Au explains that "because it has received so little convincing support, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has stimulated little research" (Au 1984 156). However, many critical scholars take the hypothesis for granted because it is a necessary but uninteresting precondition for the claims they really want to defend. Khosroshahi explains: However, the empirical tests of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity have yielded more equivocal results. But independently of its empirical status, Whorf's view is quite widely held. In fact, many social movements have attempted reforms of language and have thus taken Whorf's thesis for granted. (Khosroshahi 505).

Language is a reflection of our understanding of reality – changing language won't change perceptions

Roskoski and Peabody 91 [Matthew Roskoski, and Joe Peabody, debate coaches and former debaters writing on theory issues, critiques, and risk management; "A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language "Arguments""; Florida State University; 1991; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>.]

The second reason that the hypothesis is flawed is that there are problems with the causal relationship it describes. Simply put, it is just as plausible (in fact infinitely more so) that reality shapes language. Again we echo the words of Dr. Rosch, who says: {C}ovariation does not determine the direction of causality. On the simplest level, cultures are very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and not to have names for objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exists, there are words to refer to them. However, it would be difficult to argue that the objects are caused by the words. The same reasoning probably holds in the case of institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their names. (Rosch 264).

Perm – Do Both

Permutation solves – can do aaff and incorporate disability issues

Ho 5 (Anita,The College of St. Catherine, Assistant professor of philosophy and a cocoordinator of the Center for Women, Economic Justice and Public Policy, "Mainstreaming Disability: A Case in Bioethics," 2005, http://www.syr.edu/gradschool/pdf/resourcebooksvideos/Pedagogical%20Curb%20Cuts.pdf, Page 21-22)

In promoting diverse perspectives, we also need to pay attention to **how we incorporate disability issues**. It is not enough that instructors include materials about disabilities. As previously mentioned, some textbooks do discuss disability issues, but they do so from an able-bodied bias, which can perpetuate various stereotypes regarding disability. An inclusive course must balance various perspectives and incorporate the voices of people with disabilities. **Students need to critically examine how and why the existing structure may affect individuals of various characteristics and experiences differently**. Some may worry that incorporation of disability issues will distract students from the most important topics. Some instructors have told me that, just as it is often impossible to add an extra course to the curriculum, they have no time for a disability topic in their already-full schedules. I challenge the uncritical assumption that the current able-bodied curriculum is best, such that any change would compromise the quality of the learning. Some instructors mistakenly assume that incorporation of disability issues means that we must replace the mainstream topics with disability topics. However, as previously mentioned, disability is not an additional "topic" that is separate from other issues. It is not enough to spend a week "tackling" disability issues. Rather, disability perspectives are an important part of most topics. Many issues have important implications for people with and without disabilities. The strategy is not to replace 6 mainstreaming disability "traditional topics" with "disability topics." Instead, the strategy is to examine or incorporate the disability perspective in these "traditional" topics.

Blackness Perm

\<Permutation text\>

Only a combined focus on race and disability can combat the double edged sword of racism and ableism which are historically intertwined – our use of the language of disability resolves the contradiction

Newman 12 [Adam Newman, earning a PhD in English from Emory; "Blackness and Disability: Critical Examinations and Cultural Interventions. Ed. Christopher M. Bell. Germany: LIT Verlag, 2011. 161 pp."; Disability Studies Quarterly; Vol 32, No 3; 2012; accessed 07/28/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3285/3119>.]

Bell's choice to <u>focus on black</u>, and more precisely, African American, <u>experiences of disability</u> in this volume <u>highlights the ways in which blackness and disability have been historically conjoined in the American imagination</u>. Leonard Kriegel refers to this fact in "Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections On The Cripple as Negro," one of the earliest works of DS to deal with both disability and race, albeit quite problematically, when he directly places the experiences of African Americans in parallel with those of Americans with disabilities by suggesting that in light of the success of the Civil Rights Movement for African Americans, "No one can teach the cripple … [or] serve as so authoritative a model in the quest for identity, as can the black man" (417). But in spite of these previously recognized parallels and convergences between blackness and disability, as Bell points out in his introduction to the volume, "<u>too much critical work in African American studies posits the African American body politic in an ableist</u> (read non-disabled) <u>fashion … [and] too much critical work in Disability Studies is concerned with white bodies</u>" (3). Thus, Bell offers his volume as <u>a dual intervention, into both the "structuralist body politics underpinning African American studies and the whiteness at the heart of Disability Studies</u>" (3). While Bell presents his anthology as a <u>dual intervention</u>, too often the <u>pieces</u> contained therein <u>seem unable to speak to both fields</u>. The reason for this failure, in my opinion, is the decision Bell and many of the contributors make <u>to eschew the vocabulary of DS and even the word "disability" altogether</u>. According to Bell, this conscious decision <u>"points the reader to the notion of disability in all its ambiguity,"</u> thus "call[ing] to mind the shifting parameters of disability definition" (3). While the <u>interrogation of disability as a stable category is certainly important</u>, considering the book's status as an introductory volume for this area of inquiry, the lack of explicit engagement with DS scholarship in some of the essays makes disability feel overlooked or assumed rather than interrogated. <u>Blackness and Disability would have benefitted from more explicit and direct exposition on the intersectionality of blackness and disability, perhaps in the form of explanatory apparatuses</u> around the contributions, but more preferably in the essays themselves. Of the volume's essays, the one which manages most successfully to engage with the issues and scholarship on both race and disability is Michelle Jarman's, "Coming Up from Underground: Uneasy Dialogues at the Intersections of Race, Mental Illness, and Disability Studies." Focusing on Bebe Moore Campbell's final novel, 72-Hour Hold (2005), Jarman attempts to untangle the "many <u>ruptures, gaps, and potential areas of discussion around historical and contemporary intersections of psychiatric treatment, disability, and race"</u> that appear in Campbell's specific depiction of mental illness/disability (10). In particular, Jarman <u>concentrates on the parallels</u> Campbell draws betw<u>een mental disability and race by depicting mental disability in the novel through the language of slavery, and subsequently the experimental psychiatric interventions in the novel through the language of the Underground Railroad</u>. As Jarman suggests, this unique figuration "provides Campbell with a foundation to connect contemporary resistance and distrust of the dominant medical establishment to racialized histories of mental illness, and <u>the very real dangers of being read as both "black" and "crazy" in the United States"</u> (11). Further, Jarman <u>argues</u> that the <u>connections</u> that the novel draws, <u>though often uneasy and problematic, especially for disability studies scholars, make it an excellent starting point for further consideration of the intersecting narratives of race and mental difference</u>. 3

Coalitions Perm

Even for the non-disabled, disidentifying through the process of ableist language such as "crip" allows transformative coalition building processes between race, ethnic, gender and sexuality studies

Schalk 13 [Sami Schalk, assistant professor at Albany Arts, PhD in Gender Studies at Indiana University, research focuses on the representation of disability in contemporary African American literature; "Coming to Claim Crip: Disidentification with/in Disability Studies"; Disability Studies Quarterly Vol 33 No 2; 2013; accessed 07/30/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3705/3240>.] All the cards in this block speak specifically from the point of view of queer WOC. Potential for offensive language: crip/crippled by a nondisabled person (she explains herself as 'crip-identified')

As a young gender, race, and disability studies scholar, my entry into and relationship with/in this last field of study is not the story many expect when I tell them that I do disability studies. Unlike many people in the field, I am not (yet) a person with a disability and I am not (yet) the parent, guardian, sibling, or partner of a person with a disability. Ten to 15 years ago, being a nondisabled 1 disability studies researcher 2 with no immediate, personal experience with disability would have been relatively unusual. However, due to the growth of disability studies as an academic field since the 1990s, more people are encountering disability theory in the course of their academic careers whether or not they identify as or have a personal relationship with a person with a disability. Although I do not identify as a person with a disability, I nonetheless have come to identify with the term "crip" as elucidated by feminist and queer crip/disability theorists such as Carrie Sandahl, Robert McRuer, and Alison Kafer. As a fat, black, queer woman, my experiences have led me to have particular personal and political connections to the term "crip" and a disidentified relationship with disability studies. In what follows, I argue that disidentification can be used by minoritarian subjects to disidentify with other minoritarian subjects, communities, and/or representations and that this kind of disidentifying process among/across/between minoritarian subjects can allow for coalitional theory and political solidarity. By coalitional theory, I mean theories which are inclusive of multiple minority groups without being limited to only those people who occupy multiply minoritized positions. Regarding political solidarity, I follow Chandra Talpade Mohanty who defines solidarity as follows: In terms of mutuality, accountability, and the recognition of common interests as the basis for relationships among diverse communities…who have chosen to work and fight together. Diversity and difference are central values here—to be acknowledged and respected, not erased in the building of alliances (2003, p. 7). My goal here is to show through both my own experiences and existing theory how disidentification with/in disability studies and identification with crip offers transformative possibilities for disability studies to make stronger academic and political connections to other identity-based fields, particularly race/ethnic and sexuality/queer studies—connections that the field has not yet been able to make thus far in substantive and lasting ways. 3

Disidentification allows the potential for critical understandings of multiple intersecting fields within a radical frame of identification – it relies on representations and theories which are used, yet left behind

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I am primarily using disidentification as elucidated by José Esteban Muñoz (1999) in Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics. He defines disidentification as a strategic survival strategy of identification for/of/by those with multiple intersecting marginal identities whom Muñoz refers to as minoritarian subjects. Muñoz's theorization of disidentification relies upon Michel Pecheux's reworking of Louis Althusser's theory of interpellation in which disidentification is defined as a third identification stance in relation to dominant ideology that refuses to either fully conform or fully resist. Muñoz uses disidentification similarly to understand how queers of color relate and/or respond

to dominant representations, particularly through performance. For example, Muñoz opens the book with a description of Marga Gomez's performance piece, Marga Gomez Is Pretty, Witty, and Gay, in which Gomez sees lesbians on television for the first time and is captivated by their mysterious allure because the women are all depicted wearing raincoats, wigs, and sunglasses to hide their identities. Muñoz uses this as an example of a minoritarian subject negotiating and reinterpreting a mainstream image intended as negative. He insists that the act of disidentification is neither assimilationist nor anti-assimilationist, but rather, it's an alternative political resistance strategy that works with and against dominant ideology at the same time for the performative and political purposes of minoritarian subjects. In Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique, Roderick A. Ferguson (2004) makes similar claims about the possibilities of disidentification regarding queer of color critique's disidentification with historical materialism. Ferguson writes that to disidentify means to take up with revisions, to determine "the silences and ideologies that reside within critical terrains" (p. 5) and refuse to take up or extend legacies of racism, sexism, or homophobia in theory and research. 10 Disidentification is therefore a way to locate one's self within, take up and (re)use representations and theories in ways that were not originally intended. Disidentification is not, however, the only useful minoritarian political strategy and may not be appropriate or effective for all subjects or situations (Muñoz, 1999). Despite the fact that both Ferguson and Muñoz focus on queers of color (minoritarian subjects) disidentifying with dominant (majoritarian) representations and theories, both indirectly suggest that disidentification can be used by minoritarian subjects in relation to other minoritarian representations. For example, Muñoz suggests that a queer woman might disidentify with the work of Frantz Fanon (2004), being critical of its sexist and homophobic moments while still finding and revising useful aspects of the text. Fanon, a black psychiatrist and postcolonial philosopher, is not a majoritarian subject, however, he is privileged on multiple fronts and his discussions of women and homosexuals in Black Skins, White Masks, for example, adheres to majoritarian ideology in regard to these other minoritarian subjects. As documented by intersectionality scholars such as Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991), Lisa Duggan (2002), and Jasbir Puar (2007), different subjects can simultaneously resist certain hegemonic ideologies while being complicit in others. Taking up this adapted understanding of disidentification, I find myself, a minoritarian subject, disidentifying with disability studies, a minoritarian field of research, because although the field's resistance to the pathologization of non-normative bodies appeals to me as a nondisabled, fat, black, queer woman, the shortage of substantive race analysis within the field and the relatively minor attention given to issues of class and sexuality trouble me deeply and disallow me any direct Good Subject 11 identification. The whiteness of disability studies has already been noted by Chris Bell (2006) in his essay "Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal." However, the ubiquitous citation of this essay as the reference for disability studies scholars attempting to acknowledge race in relation to disability simply underscores the need for more critical scholarship on race in the field at this time. 12 While this lack of a substantial amount of research on race and disability does not necessarily mean there are also no people of color within the field (because people of color do not necessarily do research on race), the racial diversity of the disability studies researcher population that I've witnessed is minimal. The continued conspicuous presence of my racialized body at disability studies conferences and events disconcerts me and makes me wary of being tokenized. These emotions further facilitate my disidentification with/in disability studies. Following Ferguson and Muñoz, because this collection of theories and practices do not seem originally intended for me, as a researcher I must take up and revise disability theories and scholarship while refusing to extend its legacy of whiteness and racism. Despite the disjuncture I experience in the field as it currently exists, I still have a deeply personal, emotional affinity with disability studies scholar and activist communities. This affinity is what facilitates my coming to claim and identify with crip. Note here, that there are a few key differences between disidentification and identifying with as I am using them. Disidentification is primarily in respect to representations, ideologies, and theories which have important, useful aspects that the disidentifying subject takes up, uses, or revamps while leaving behind or being critical of other problematic or damaging elements. To identify with, as I will explain more below, is to personally and politically align oneself with a group one may or may not belong to, but with which one feels a positive connection. I discuss these concepts separately in order to distinguish my relationship to the field of disability studies from my relationship to the concept of crip, not to claim one form of identification is more positive or useful than the other. In fact, disidentification and identifying with have important areas of overlap and intersection. Crip is a term many people within disability studies and activist communities use not only in reference to people with disabilities, but also to the intellectual and art culture arising from such communities. Crip is shorthand for the word "cripple" which has been (and is) used as an insult toward people with disabilities, but which has been re-appropriated as an intra-group term of empowerment and solidarity. Thus, crip "is a term which has much currency in disability activism and culture but still might seem harsh to those outside those communities" (Kafer, 2013, p. 15). An early proponent of

crip's social and political potential, Carrie Sandahl (2003) describes crip as a "fluid and ever-changing" term which "expanded to include not only those with physical impairments but those with sensory or mental impairments as well" (p. 27). In a footnote to her use of the term, Sandahl recognizes the still-developing state of disability studies and writes: "If I had my druthers, I would replace the term disability studies with crip theory or crip studies to represent its radical edge" (p. 53; original emphasis).

Claiming identification within disability studies creates potential for solidarity in intersectionality

Schalk 13 [Sami Schalk, assistant professor at Albany Arts, PhD in Gender Studies at Indiana University, research focuses on the representation of disability in contemporary African American literature; "Coming to Claim Crip: Disidentification with/in Disability Studies"; Disability Studies Quarterly Vol 33 No 2; 2013; accessed 07/30/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3705/3240>.] Potential for offensive language: crip/crippled by a nondisabled person (she explains herself as 'crip-identified')

I know that my body/mind/desire/behavior (and the culture which interprets it) is not fixed. I am **crip-identified because I am not afraid of this instability**. I am not afraid of this instability because I am crip-identified. My identification with crip is neither simply personal nor purely academic. It is both of these things as well as highly political and it is this politics of claiming crip as a nondisabled, fat, black, queer woman that I believe has the most value for the future of disability studies. My identification with crip is not a cure-all for the problems of race, class, and sexuality within the field of disability studies. It also certainly does not fix the problem of disability being left out of intersectional analyses in race and ethnic studies, queer and sexuality studies, and women's and gender studies. However, I believe being crip-identified is an enactment of solidarity which can be beneficial politically, socially, and academically for multiple minoritarian groups. I want disability studies scholars not only to consider how to bring disability to, for example, black studies or to bring blackness to disability studies, but also consider how we as disability studies scholars and activists might disidentify with people of color, women, queers, or gender non-conforming people. How can we identify with social categories we don't identify as and how can this benefit us all? What are the similar, but not same, aspects of the lived experiences of people of color and people with disabilities? We would do well to ask those who identify as both, but the burden of proof should not lie with them alone. Disability studies has a long history of borrowing from work in other fields and civil rights movements, but this borrowing tends to emphasize the difference or exceptionality of disability 19 rather than its similarities or overlap—the places where disidentification across/between/among minoritarian subjects could occur. This coalitional politics through minoritarian subjects disidentifying with other minoritarian subjects, representations, theories or practices need not, however, be for political or intellectual purposes alone. It can also be, like my coming to claim crip, deeply personal and affective. For me, no space is more emblematic of the creative, affective possibilities of minoritarian disidentification and identifying with than the Society for Disability Studies dance. As Petra Kuppers (2011) contends, disability culture, and thus disability dance space, is more process than product. Therefore the things I describe here are examples of the work and values which go into creating disability dance space. Since my first SDS in 2008, I have returned each year ready to dance. I'd like to now return to these lived experiences and explore how Society for Disability dances have helped me claim crip. I earlier described the dances as having an ethos of community and love. This ethos that first drew me into SDS is established by a firm commitment to access and inclusion on the part of those who plan the conference and dance as well as individual members. Although many members are old-timers who return to the annual conference to re-connect with activist and scholar friends whom they may only see once or twice a year, everyone still dances with everyone else across (dis)ability, generational, and academic/activist divides, welcoming newcomers to the mix with encouraging smiles, shouts, signs, and applause. The SDS dance is a space of non-judgment, not only about people's individual dance styles and movements, but also individual's choices about how to engage. Although sometimes a group of friends may egg on a shyer companion, for the most part, people are free to dance, mill around, stay still, or take breaks on the side and outside of the room for food, drink, and general respite. For example, if a person who finds social situations taxing decides to abruptly walk out, they can do so without needing to make excuses or worry about raising eyebrows from others. There is no single way to participate. There are no "best" dancers who take up the entire floor doing all the "right" moves to Beyoncé's "Single Ladies" because at these dances there are no wrong moves. We're all right.

Censorship Bad

Freedom of speech is key to the future of society – censorship corrupts the first amendment and totalitarian states

Roskoski and Peabody 91 [Matthew Roskoski, and Joe Peabody, debate coaches and former debaters writing on theory issues, critiques, and risk management; "A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language "Arguments""; Florida State University; 1991; accessed 07/31/2015; <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>.]

If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought - not free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate. (Holmes 654). Certainly this principle would prohibit the enforcement of any language "argument." If one despised the rhetoric of a given debater enough to vote against that debater, then as Holmes suggests, the principles of the Constitution require one to refrain from censorship. The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts articulated the essence of this argument so eloquently that their entire statement deserves repetition here: When language wounds, the natural and immediate impulse is to take steps to shut up those who utter the wounding words. When, as here, that impulse is likely to be felt by those who are normally the first amendment's staunchest defenders, free expression faces its greatest threat. At such times, it is important for those committed to principles of free expressions to remind each other of what they have always known regarding the long term costs of short term victories bought through compromising first amendment principles. (Strossen 487). Certainly debaters and debate coaches, whose entire activity is premised upon the freedom of expression, ought to be among the staunchest defenders of that freedom. When we are asked to censor the rhetoric of a debater, as the C.L.U. warns, we ought to think long and hard about the risks associated with playing fast and loose with free speech. As Brennan notes, the mandate "to inculcate moral and political values is not a general warrant to act as 'thought police' stifling discussion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position." (Brennan 577). Not only does the first amendment create a moral or deontological barrier to language "arguments", the principles it defends also create a pragmatic barrier. The free and sometimes irreverent discourse protected by the first amendment is essential to the health and future success of our society. History has borne out the belief that the freedom to challenge convictions is essential to our ability to adapt to change. As Hyde and Fishman observe, university scholars must be allowed to "think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable" because "major discoveries and advances in knowledge are often highly unsettling and distasteful to the existing order." This leads them to conclude that "we cannot afford" to impose "orthodoxies, censorship, and other artificial barriers to creative thought" (Hyde & Fishman 1485). Given the rapid pace of political and technological change that our society faces, and given that debates often focus around the cutting edge of such changes, the imposition of linguistic straitjackets upon the creative thought and critical thinking of debaters would seem to uniquely jeopardize these interests. This is not just exaggerated rhetoric, nor is it merely our old debate disadvantages in new clothes. Hyde & Fishman's claims have been repeatedly validated by historical events. Had Elie Wiesel debated in Germany, a "Zionist language" argument would not have been unlikely. As Bennett Katz has argued, The essentiality of freedom in the community of American Universities is almost self-evident... To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation... Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. (Katz 156).

Commodification Turn

Turn – Making it a voting issue only exacerbates the power relations they claim to resist – commodifying the lived experiences of PWD for their own academic gain
Kitchin 2000 (Rob, Prof of Geography, Nat'l Univ of Ireland, "The Researched Opinions on Research: Disabled People and Disability Research," Disability & Geography, v15, #1, pp25-47)

Many disabled academics, such as Oliver (1992), are unhappy at the widespread exclusion of disabled people from disability discourse and call for the adoption of research strategies that are both emancipatory (seeking 'positive' societal change) and empowering (seeking 'positive' individual change through participation). They suggest that current research on disability issues is flawed and problematic in a number of respects. Most crucially, they **argue that disability research is not representative of disabled peoples' experiences and knowledges.** This is because, as noted, the vast majority of research is conducted by non-disabled researchers. **They contend that it is only disabled people who can know what it is like to be disabled and so only disabled people who can truly interpret and present data** from other disabled people. **Moreover, they argue that research concerning disability research is invariably researcher-orientated, based around the desires and agendas of the (non-disabled) researcher** and able-bodied funding agencies, **rather than subject(s) of the research (disabled people**; Sample, 1996). Indeed, Oliver (1992) argues that **the traditional 'expert' model of research** represents a 'rape model of research' that is alienating, and **disempowers and disenfranchises disabled research participants by placing their knowledge into the hands of the researcher to interpret and make recommendations on their behalf; that researchers are compounding the oppression of disabled respondents through exploitation for academic gain.**

Race Turn

Disability studies replicates whiteness

Bell 10 (Christopher M. Bell was Disabilities Studies Fellow at the Center of Human Policy, Law, and Disability Studies at Syracuse University (deceased), "Introducing White Disability Studies A Modest Proposal, The Disability Studies Reader, edited by Lennard J. Davis, p.275)

Bubba Gumps matter-of-fact rejoinder to Dorian Gray is, I think, indicative of the whiteness of Disability Studies in its present incarnation. The fact that Disability Studies is marketed as such when it is in actuality an artificial (read: limited and limiting) version of the field does nothing to prevent it from being understood as Disability Studies, which is what Bubba, by extension, apprised Dorian of. I contend that it is disingenuous to keep up the pretense that the field is an inclusive one when it is not. On that score, I would like to concede the failure of Disability Studies to engage issues of race and ethnicity in a substantive capacity, thereby entrenching whiteness as its constitutive underpinning. In short, I want to call a shrimp a shrimp and acknowledge Disability Studies for what it is, White Disability Studies. In contradistinction to Disability Studies, While Disability Studies recognizes its tendency to whitewash disability history, ontology and phenomenology. White Disability Studies, while not wholeheartedly excluding people of color from its critique, by and large focuses on the work of white individuals and is itself largely produced by a corps of white scholars and activists. White Disability Studies envisions nothing ill-advised with this leaning because it is innocently done and far too difficult to remedy. A synoptic review of some of the literature and related aspects of Disability Studies bears this out.

Defense of Crip

The word "crip" and derivatives has multi-use potential, and that transgressivity is meaningful

Schalk 13 [Sami Schalk, assistant professor at Albany Arts, PhD in Gender Studies at Indiana University, research focuses on the representation of disability in contemporary African American literature; "Coming to Claim Crip: Disidentification with/in Disability Studies"; Disability Studies Quarterly Vol 33 No 2; 2013; accessed 07/30/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3705/3240>.] Potential for offensive language: crip/crippled by a nondisabled person (she explains herself as 'crip-identified')

Sandahl, McRuer and Kafer all emphasize the relationship of crip and queer. Sandahl (2003) insists that li<u>ke queer, crip is not only a noun and adjective, but also a verb: to "crip" means to spin "mainstream representations or practices to reveal able-bodied assumptions and exclusionary effects [...to] expose the arbitrary delineation between normal and defective and the negative social ramifications of attempts to homogenize humanity"</u> (p. 37). Crip as verb can therefore be understood as a specific form of disidentification. Making further connections between crip and queer, Sandahl writes: As a pejorative, the term queer was originally targeted at gays and lesbians, yet its rearticulation as a term of pride is currently claimed by those who may not consider themselves homosexual, such as the transgendered, transsexuals, heterosexual sex radicals, and others. [...Although] I have never heard a n<u>ondisabled person seriously claim to be crip (as heterosexuals have claimed to be queer)</u>, I would not be surprised by this practice. <u>The fluidity of both terms makes it likely that their boundaries will dissolve</u> (p. 27). This specific aspect of the <u>relationship between queer and crip</u>, the possibility of these terms referring to or <u>being claimed by people not previously referenced by them, is critical to the current direction of crip theory and to my own identification with the term</u>. Kafer (2013) writes that <u>crip, or crip affiliation, could include both "those who lack a 'proper'</u> (read: medically acceptable, doctor-provided, and insurer-approved) <u>diagnosis</u> for their symptoms" <u>and, more complexly, "people identifying with disability and lacking not only a diagnosis but any 'symptoms' of impairment"</u> (p. 12-13). In a related vein, McRuer (2006) writes that <u>although one must be "attuned to the dangers of appropriation," it is both theoretically and politically "important to raise issues about what it means, for the purposes of solidarity, to come out as something you are—at least in some ways—not"</u> (p. 37). I align myself with McRuer's "coming out crip" and Kafer's "crip affiliation" by claiming crip and declaring myself a crip-identified, fat, black, queer woman. Kafer writes: <u>Claiming crip can be a way of acknowledging that we all have bodies and minds with shifting abilities</u>, and that <u>such shifts have political and social meanings and histories</u>. It can be a way of imagining multiple futures, <u>claiming crip as a desired and desirable location, regardless of one's own embodiment or mental/psychological processes</u>... thinking through what nondisabled claims to crip might entail will require exploring whether such claims might be more available, more imaginable, to some people than others (and on what basis) (pp. 13). I argue that my particular <u>relationship to racial, gender, and sexuality systems of oppression and privilege is what makes claiming crip available to me</u>. The ways in which my fat, black, queer, woman's body/mind/desire/behavior is constantly read and reacted to as non-normative, sometimes excessively so, makes me feel particularly akin to those who identify as disabled and/or crip, people whose bodies/minds/desires/behaviors are also outside the social norm. In this way, I argue that I am similarly situated in regard to many vectors of power as people with disabilities and that interrogation into the processes which have so situated us are needed in order <u>to develop coalitional theory and political solidarity</u>. It is important to emphasize that I am calling myself <u>crip-identified</u>, meaning that <u>I identify with not as crip</u>, a distinction McRuer (2006) suggests in his work, but does not make sufficiently clear. I use identify with to mean having acknowledged and prioritized political and personal connections to a group with which one does not identify as a member. <u>To identify with means to feel implicated by the culture and politics of another group and seek to better understand this link</u>. While to identify with could be understood as analogous to being an ally, I contend that there is something more personal, sustained, and affective about it. <u>Identifying with is a careful, conscious joining—a standing/sitting among rather than by or behind a group</u>—which seeks to reduce separation while acknowledging differences in privileges and oppression. I connect identifying with to Cathy Cohen's (2005) call for a radical politics of shared resistance built on identities as they are impacted by and invested with different degrees of normative power. Identifying with is particularly important in the case of disability which, as many have noted, is the only identity category which one can join at any moment without intent. <u>I use crip-identified as something different than disability ally because it is an almost-not-quite-yet identification</u>. I

am crip-identified not only because my body/mind/desire/behavior is non-normative in terms of race, gender, sexuality, and size, but also <u>because of its precarious relationship to disability as this term is currently culturally understood.</u>

Defense of Hip Hop

The language of hip hop is a unique form of reclamation – it flips the script to make disability an admired trait and creates new meanings

Porco 14 [Alex S. Porco, Ph.D. in poetic theory State University of New York at Buffalo, with a research focus in hip hop and culture; "Throw Yo' Voice Out: Disability as a Desirable Practice in Hip-Hop Vocal Performance"; Disability Studies Quarterly; Vol 34 No 4; 2014; accessed 07/28/2014; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3822/3790>.]

Hip-hop culture is a form of vernacular theory and practice.3 The vernacular is rooted in an archive of everyday language and images shared by disenfranchised citizens. The vernacular is grounded in local communities and concerns yet, in accordance with the logic of late capitalism and globalization, transmissible and adaptable to distant locales. The vernacular is also synonymous with improvisation, which requires sensitivity to, and awareness of, changing situational exigencies. Finally, the vernacular is a renewable resource, perpetually engaged in the dialectical process "of tearing down old vocabularies and proposing new ones" (Magee 9). In hip-hop culture, the idiomatic phrase, flip the script, describes an act of tactical resistance to dominant power structures: it means to invert or, at least, interrupt the value system that privileges certain language rules, technological imperatives, cultural spaces and objects, and master narratives. As vernacular theory and practice, **hip-hop flips the script on disability, transforming a physical condition and social stigma into a desirable aesthetic value**. The history of hip-hop provides numerous analogous instances of flippin' the script. In 1988, recording duo Eric B. and Rakim released "Follow the Leader," an Afrofuturistic riff on the Pied Piper of Hamelin legend. The song includes Rakim's oft-quoted couplet, "I can take a phrase that's rarely heard, flip it, / Now it's a daily word." Rakim's punning turn of phrase establishes the relationship between language, style, and currency. More importantly, it speaks to the influence of hip-hop slang on contemporary popular culture: it's ubiquitous— from the playground to the classroom, from the stoop to the White House. Hip-hop culture's influence on the English language is more formally recognized through governing bodies like the editorial board of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED). In recent years, the OED has made headlines by including "crunk," "bling," "jiggy," "dope," "phat," and "balla." Rappers have used these words and **invested them with hip-hop-specific meanings**.

Hip hop has the potential to challenge ableism through historical connections to blackness and their intersectional experiences

Porco 14 [Alex S. Porco, Ph.D. in poetic theory State University of New York at Buffalo, with a research focus in hip hop and culture; "Throw Yo' Voice Out: Disability as a Desirable Practice in Hip-Hop Vocal Performance"; Disability Studies Quarterly; Vol 34 No 4; 2014; accessed 07/28/2014; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3822/3790>.]

Finally, hip-hop culture flips the script on strategies of representation, too. Rappers provide alternative or "minority" perspectives on significant political events, historical figures, and cultural objects and symbols.6 So, for example, Public Enemy's "Fight the Power" interrogates representations of popular history that advocate exclusively for white cultural heroes: Elvis was a hero to most But he never meant shit to me you see Straight up racist that sucker was Simple and plain Motherfuck him and John Wayne Cuz I'm Black and I'm proud I'm ready and hyped plus I'm amped Most of my heroes don't appear on no stamps Chuck D. proposes a new black hero rescued from the sediment of popular culture. In response to (white) visuals, Chuck D. presents (black) audio: "the sounds" of James Brown's "funky drummer," designed to generate racial pride and to inspire social change. Thus, Chuck D. situates his listener at what Jennifer Stoever-Ackerman calls "the sonic color-line … a socially constructed boundary where racial difference is produced, coded, and policed through the ear" (par. 1). And Chuck D.'s witty rhyme, "amped" and "stamps," highlights the competition between audio and visual epistemologies.7 The foregoing genealogy of hip-hop's flip the script aesthetic and ethic is meant to situate hip-hop in unique relation to disability as a practice and Disability Studies as a field. Hip-hop artists emphasize that cultural meanings, norms, and values— including (but not limited to) ableism— are open to social agents and processes that stage "the intersection of different 'accentings' in the same discursive terrain" (Hall 298). But to quote Tricia Rose, "Without historical

contextualization, aesthetics are naturalized, and cultural practices are made to appear essential to a given group of people. On the other hand, without aesthetic considerations, Black cultural practices are reduced to extensions of socialhistorical circumstances" ("Black Text/Black Context" 223). Disability is a key "vanishing mediator" between the hip-hop aesthetic and its social-historical context (Jameson 26). This essay aims to make disability present and audible as a mediating practice; and it proposes that hip-hop's self-conscious acts of transvaluation challenge the discursive dominance of ableism.8

Generic

Just because words are insulting to people with disabilities does not moot their utility and uniqueness in language – not using it after being called out solves

Watson 14 [Rebecca Watson, previous podcast host, travels around the globe giving speeches on science, tech, art, skepticism, and critical thinking; "Insults, Slurs, and Stupidity"; Skepchick, a collection of works focused on science and critical thinking; 02/15/2014; accessed 07/27/2015; <http://skepchick.org/2014/02/insults-slurs-and-stupidity/>.] Potential for offensive language: stupid. This card also might be pretty offensive in a few other ways, read through it first.

There is currently a, er, lively discussion happening in the comments of Surly Amy and Elyse's DDoS Valentine post over the use of words like "stupid" and "idiot" to describe people who are ignorant. A few commenters are arguing that those words are triggering for people with mental disabilities and so they should not be used. I disagree, and as of right now I'm content allowing words like "stupid" to continue to be used across the Skepchick Network. I might consider requesting that writers include a content note at the top of posts that contain that language, but I'm still not really sure it's necessary at this point. There are a few points in this discussion that I felt it necessary to highlight. First of all, if you are a person who is triggered by the word "stupid," you have my immense sympathy. Last night I was considering this discussion while watching Netflix, and I must have heard the word "stupid" or a synonym at least once every ten minutes. Even in conversation with friends, it happens near-constantly: my stupid cat woke me up with his butt in my face. The stupid PS3 controller isn't working. The stupid me forgot to take the cloth bags from the car into the grocery store. I've been triggered once before and it was extremely unpleasant, to the point that I laid in bed in the fetal position crying for a few hours. A person who is triggered by words like "stupid" and "idiot" must quite seriously live a horrific life dominated by fear and pain, and I sincerely hope they get therapeutic help. I have no doubt that there are such people, just as there are probably people who are triggered by other insults. I could certainly imagine a person with a newly installed colostomy bag being triggered by words like "shitty." Perhaps someone who was orally raped is triggered when someone says that something "sucks." Maybe someone with a cleft palate is triggered when the word "ugly" is used to describe everything from faces to personalities to carpets. And if I was friends with any of those people and I used one of those words in their presence and they took me aside and told me about their pain, **I would absolutely avoid saying those words in their presence**. I would not, though, avoid saying those words elsewhere, because those words are not slurs. Compare any of them to the word "kike," for instance. "Kike" is a word that has no other usage besides dehumanizing and marginalizing Jewish people. Yes, it has been thrown at me, a gentile through and through, but even then it was meant to insult some perceived Jewishness in my person. The word "retard" has been thrown at me, a person with no developmental disabilities, but it is quite obviously always meant to shame me by aligning me with people with disabilities. The word "cunt" is thrown at men, but every time it is meant to unambiguously connect them with the disgusting, lesser vagina. "Stupid," on the other hand, accurately describes a thing or a person or an action that is foolish, ignorant, or vapid, and we cannot drop useful words like that from our vocabulary entirely because some people find them upsetting. Elyse's valentine specifically addressed people who were incapable of learning that silencing us is impossible – a fool's errand, if you will. The word "stupid" and its synonyms must be used to make that clear, even if those words are **also** used to insult people with developmental disabilities. So yes, just as we won't stop using the word "creep" to accurately describe people and behaviors that we deem "creepy," we won't stop using words like "stupid" to accurately describe people and behaviors that we deem ignorant or foolish.*

Biopower

A focus on biopower is key – exclusion on the basis of disability is fading as surveillance otherizes people with disability as a threat to norms and the health of the population

Anders 13 [Abram Anders, Assistant Professor of Business Communication, English PhD @ Penn State; "Foucault and "the Right to Life": From Technologies of Normalization to Societies of Control"; Disability Studies Quarterly; Vol 33 No 2; 2013; accessed 07/29/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3340/3268>.]

<u>Bodies</u>, through their <u>history, development, and functionality are penetrated thoroughly and effectively by force and are thereby enmeshed in relations of power</u>. <u>Through these relations of power, individuals and eventually forms of subjectivity are constituted as objects to be studied</u> and sites of the application of techniques of power. If for Canguilhem norms are a polemical concept, then for Foucault they are a "technique of intervention" (Foucault, Abnormal 50). In one of Foucault's most famous formulations, he argues that the <u>institutions of biopower do not primarily employ the model of</u> **the exclusion of lepers, but rather the inclusive models of quarantine, surveillance, and regulation of the plague**: "<u>Rather than the massive, binary division between one set of people and another, it called for multiple separations</u>, individualizing distributions, an organization in depth of surveillance and control, an intensification and a ramification of power" (Discipline and Punish 198). Under the quarantine model, <u>the prohibitive function of the law is increasingly replaced with a process of normalization that seeks to maximize the life of both the individual and the species</u>: Such a power has <u>to qualify, measure, appraise, hierarchize</u>, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from his obedient subjects; it effects distributions around the norm … (Foucault, The History of Sexuality 144) In the age of biopower, <u>the oppressed, pathologized, and criminalized are no longer excluded as enemies; they become necessarily integrated as endemic threats to the health of the body politic</u>. In administering the life of both the society and the individual, in terms of both social deviance and pathological dysfunction, the norm is the common tool: "<u>The norm is something that can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize</u>" (Foucault, Society Must Be Defended 252-3).

<mark>\<Permutation text\></mark>

Changing surveillance surround disability is the best way to solve – some state intervention is necessary, but not to the current paternalistic extent, and the aff can solve the individualization of the state through a reconception of power.

Anders 13 [Abram Anders, Assistant Professor of Business Communication, English PhD @ Penn State; "Foucault and "the Right to Life": From Technologies of Normalization to Societies of Control"; Disability Studies Quarterly; Vol 33 No 2; 2013; accessed 07/29/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3340/3268>.]

Of course, <u>no one wants the social stigma associated with disability, but social recognition of disability determines the practical help a person receives</u> from doctors, government agencies, insurance companies, charity organizations, and often from family and friends. (Wendell 264) Though the primary goal of this study has been <u>a historical-critical understanding of the ways in which biopower has sought to grasp or circumscribe the human differences associated with disability, it is also important to recognize that disabled people have generally benefited from these "advances."</u> One of the most perplexing aspects of <u>engaging in disability studies and activism is that it is difficult to imagine doing without these forms of intervention</u>. Yet, <u>this difficulty only foregrounds the fact that disabled people are uniquely vulnerable to the control of disciplinary mechanisms</u> through their dependence on medical care and intervention. <u>What makes contemporary forms of power so insidious is that they are productive</u>. While <u>political accommodations</u> extended through legislation and medical care is clearly valuable and necessary, they <u>are clearly problematic to the degree that they have been structured as</u>

paternalistic; that is, interventions to improve the health or quality of life of the individual are often administered in ways that imbed forms of control and governance. In structuring the possible field of others, these disciplines not only configure material and social contexts for the actions of individuals, but discursively shape the identity of individuals with disabilities through the authority of scientific knowledge. Undoubtedly, this is the reason why a great deal of critique has focused on disciplines and institutions. In a very sober account of the current state of disability studies, Snyder and Mitchell support the value of disciplinary critique as it has been made through the work of Foucault for one. However, they also point to a need for speaking to the experience of disability: The theoretical diagnosis had been limited to an archaeology of institutional power that sought artificially to stabilize meanings of the body. To narrate a phenomenology of the body requires an approach that can capture its defining elasticity—not as an established fact, but rather as a mutable, temporal, "first-person" organism. Such is the domain of literature and art. (381-2) The point is not to recover some authentic self prior to relations of power, but rather to reconfigure our status as subjects through the manipulation of our relation to our selves. Certainly, art or literature that involves discovering new modes of "self-knowledge" is one way to begin challenging the modes of subjugation characteristic of disability as an identity. Through Foucault, we should recognize that the call for a "right to life" emerges along with the disciplinary forms of governmentality that increasingly structure relationships of the self to the self. Ultimately, the struggle against the modes of subjugation concomitant with institutional attempts to ameliorate conditions of "suffering and limit" should be recognized as a crucial aspect of the experience of disability: The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization linked to the state. (Foucault, "The Subject and Power" 134) Individual human beings have never been and will never be completely independent; they will never exist outside of relations of power. Similarly, dependence on disciplinary forms of care will continue to be a fact of life for many. Thus, disability studies should focus on critique of disciplines and institutions as a means of challenging the degree of control involved in relations of dependence, along with attempts to discover new modes of subjectivity or forms of self-knowledge—ultimately, to challenge the ways in which we are subjugated through and made subject to technologies of normalization.

Foucault's perception of the body has always been inclusive of disability – the disability rights movement was born out of biopower to create a politic against universalizing liberalism

Anders 13 [Abram Anders, Assistant Professor of Business Communication, English PhD @ Penn State; "Foucault and "the Right to Life": From Technologies of Normalization to Societies of Control"; Disability Studies Quarterly; Vol 33 No 2; 2013; accessed 07/29/2015; <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3340/3268>.]

First and foremost, Foucault's work is relevant for contemporary disability studies because of his theorization of the body as a thoroughly and inexorably politicized space. In his genealogical studies, Foucault undertakes the task to "expose a body totally imprinted by history and by the process of history's destruction of the body" ("Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" 357). Foucault's work challenges the traditional "social model" of disability insofar as it reifies and naturalizes "impairments" as the transhistorical and neutral foundations of disability. Building on continuing critique of the "social model," Tremain employs Foucault's work to argue that impairments themselves are not "intrinsic defects that demand to be corrected or eliminated (as the 'medical model' assumes)" but rather are "created by social and economic arrangements and conditions that can be transformed" (Tremain, "Biopower …" 598). Foucault's work challenges us to recognize that the "difficult physical realities" of disability are themselves socially constructed and to undertake the task of diagnosing the forces that produce them. 4 There is no outside to the historical effects and socio-political operations of power on the body. Second, and complementarily, Foucault theorizes the modern social field in terms of biopolitics. He argues any attempt to understand modern political struggles and the claims of rights

discourse must begin by recognizing such claims as a political response to what he characterizes as the triumph of biopower. As Foucault describes it, biopower is the proper name for the emergence and integrated exercise of both a technology of discipline, which produces docile bodies, and the normative regulation of populations; it takes life itself as the object of its exercise: "One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it the point of death" (The History of Sexuality 138). While biopower takes life as its object of exercise, it does so by applying itself to the "everyday life categories of the individual." Biopower extends the mechanisms of disciplinary societies through an intensification of individuals' relationships to themselves and their own self-governance: "it is a form of power that makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" (Foucault, "The Subject and Power" 130). In light of Foucault's analysis, the disability studies movement should be understood as an effect of biopower; that is, it constitutes disabled people as subjects who claim a "right to life," a claim that relies on the essential promise of a form of power that produces "disability" as a socially and politically marginalized identity. As Wendy Brown argues in States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (1995), in liberal societies such claims are filtered through the discourse of universal human rights: In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal—the transparent fiction of state universality—combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary productions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. (58)

Cyborgs Addendum

Sexism

The aff's binarist embrace of cyborgs allows implicit male neutrality to continue, and their queer project fails to recognize the queerness at the heart of cyborgs and AI

Zimmer 14 [A. E. Zimmer, writer on theater, gender performance, film, and technology; "CYBORG INTELLIGENCE: DISMANTLING GENDER IN THE AGE OF CHATBOTS"; Topical Cream, womens' magazine covering fashion, art, technology, and topical issues, based in New York; 07/07/2014; accessed 07/25/2015; <http://topicalcream.info/editorial/cyborg-intelligence-dismantling-gender-in-the-age-of-chatbots/>.]

Eugene Goostman: smart name for the smart robot crowned champion of the infamous Turing Test, the standard for determining machine intelligence created by British mathematician and computer scientist Alan Turing. At the 2014 Turing Test At The Royal Society in London, the robot, under the guise of a 13-year-old Ukrainian boy, answered questions about his hometown of Odessa, his Jewishness, his pet guinea pig, and his father, a gynecologist ("My friends say he is a "beaver-doctor" – but I guess they lie – he is not a veterinary!"). After successfully convincing 33% of visitors that he was indeed human, Eugene was hailed as a long-coveted, shining bit of proof: at long last, our technologies were approaching fantastic, sci-fi proportions. Media outlets lit digital torches, sounding the news of this cyborg heir apparent, only to find out later that by most qualifications, this star pupil Eugene had actually failed. The reason for our star pupil's flunking? It turns out Eugene's satisfying performance was less about his abilities to "think" intelligently , than it was about his programmer's abilities to account for his flaws. The bot's programmers admitted that the description of Eugene as a 13-year-old with "a boyish personality", with English as a second language, greatly helped convince judges of the robot's humanity. Such a description allowed for more human "forgiveness" for Eugene's mistakes of syntax, grammatical errors, misspellings, and the like. Blunders aside, what's perhaps most interesting about Eugene's personality is the decision to call him male. After all, what does it mean when the most "intelligent" machine "passes" as a boy? How important is it that **when a machine pretends to be a young, (presumably straight) white male , it is lauded for its success and intelligence**? Eugene Goostman is a chatterbot– the kind of algorithm that made you waste hours on AIM with Smarter Child, or Cleverbot. They are systems of relatively simple strategy: programmers wire robots with lists of potential phrases and through matching these phrases to data, generate a response. They also frequently use techniques like phrase repetition as well. Algorithmically speaking, there have been plenty of chatterbots equally capable, as Eugene in "faking human" that've received far less hype and adulation. This is particularly true of those bots gendered female. Consider ELIZA (note the Pygmalion namesake), a famous 1964 program modeled after your most infuriating psychotherapist. You can even ask SIRI about her. Though her programming logic was fairly simple, ELIZA was revolutionary for her appeal with humans , as many of her "patients" reported growing attachment to the bot. While its newfound popularity pinned ELIZA as a contender for passing Turing's Test, her victory never came to fruition. Eventually her programming was used in new chatterbots with new names, some of them gender neutral, most of them male-identified. Before you knew it, that was the last "female" chatbot given any shred of Turing Test credibility. It only takes a quick Google Search to see how the second-wave feminist chatbots have fared: There's Athena, the loftily-titled GoddessBot, a "nice and unpretentious" french bot named Jane, Mitsuku, "your new virtual friend... here 24 hours a day just to talk to you". You catch the idea. None of these chatterbot programs convince humans of much of anything other than some validation for their latest fetish, yet Eugene's "personality" absolved him of these shortcomings. It's not that the Ukrainian bot was smart enough to pass the Turing Test, but–unlike its feminized counterparts– the qualities of its imagined gender, age and sexual identity allowed the robot's "passing" to the public. What's the value of gendering our Artificial Intelligence? Perhaps it's a programmer's matter of habit, a partiality to A.I.'s history of a "neutral" standard that's categorically male. And yet, **A.I.'s history has never been "neutral"– it is implicitly gendered, and implicitly queer**–Alan Turing himself, godfather of Artificial Intelligence, led his life as an openly gay man of the 1940s. The very concession of his queerness found him **criminally prosecuted for homosexuality, subjected to horrific violence** that would lead to his suicide: one apple bite, laced with cyanide. Many A.I. enthusiasts rarely, if ever, entertain the truth of their hero's life. Similarly, the gender politics at the core of Turing's original "test" are often disregarded–which of course is no test at all, but something entirely different. "Turing never proposed a test in which a computer pretends to be human," says Karl MacDorman, associate professor of human-

computer interaction at Indiana University. "Turing proposed an imitation game in which a man and a computer compete in pretending to be a woman. In this competition, the computer was pretending to be a 13-year-old boy, not a woman, and it was in a competition against itself, not a man." Though it's no secret that <u>tech has a gender problem, what's makes A.I.'s problem with gender particularly hard to stomach</u> is how this study tends to thrive on imagination. <u>Robots</u>, after all, <u>are</u> ridiculous things, <u>stuff of dreams and nightmares</u>. <u>In them we plant</u> very human <u>hopes and fears for the future– the considerations of robot bodies and the constructions of robo-minds are</u> often chrome negotiations of <u>our human lives</u> and their fleshy experiences. So <u>when the "smartest" machine in the world is a 13-year old boy,</u> cracking vulgar genital jokes about his gyno dad, what fiction are we selling ourselves? <u>When the very inventor of machine consciousness was an openly gay man, chemically castrated</u> for this very admission?

Cyberfeminism, borne from the Cyber Manifesto, has lost its radical political power by participation in hegemonic masculinity as "empowerment" and coopted by racism as society recognizes the cyborg as legitimate

Fernandez 1 [Maria Fernandez, art historian (Ph.D. Columbia University, 1993) whose interests centre on post-colonial studies, electronic media theory, Latin American art and the intersections of these fields.; "WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE CYBORG MANIFESTO?"; MUTE VOL 1, NO. 20 – DIGITAL COMMONS; 07/10/2001; accessed 07/25/2015; http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/whatever-happened-to-cyborg-manifesto.] Aff fails

In an era <u>when nearly everything</u>, from small seeds to large computer networks, <u>entails practical or metaphorical organic and machinic fusions, the 'cyborg'</u>, that product of early Cold War cybernetic theory, and <u>detourned by Haraway</u> a generation later, **has lost its political clout**. Haraway's cyborg, "not of woman born", the illegitimate <u>offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism</u>, <u>was modeled upon the 'meztisaje' (racial mixing) of Mexican Americans</u>. Acknowledging that <u>she wrote the piece</u> at a particular historical moment and <u>primarily for women, Haraway's cyborg was an inconstant figure able to incorporate spiral dancers, electronic factory workers, poets, and engineers</u>; a figure <u>that allied diverse oppositional strategies</u>, from writing to biotechnology. Given this radical theoretical openness, <u>what did the Cyborg Manifesto (CM) really manage to achieve?</u> 1> CM was <u>an early recognition of</u> the fundamental and <u>irreversible changes</u> brought about by digital technologies. Pre-dating Dolly, the Visible Man, the Visible Woman, and the (purported) completion of the Genome Project, <u>Haraway discerned society's transformation into a "polymorphous information system"</u> and "the translation of the world into a problem of coding," both phenomena with specific effects for women worldwide. In the 1980s, Haraway was one of a handful of cultural critics to write about the double-edged possibilities of biotechnology, a major focus of cultural work today. Her prediction that <u>control strategies applied to women to give birth to new human beings would be developed using the language "of goal achievement for individual decision-makers" had, by the 1990s, has been all too fully borne out</u>. 2> <u>CM urged feminists to embrace new technologies</u> as tools for feminist ends. This was a pressing antidote to the pernicious notion, popular at the time, that women belonged exclusively to 'nature'. The manifesto proposed <u>that feminists definitely could and should **use the master's tools to destroy**</u> (or at least disrupt) **the master's house**. 3> CM contributed to the growth of a pan-global labour consciousness, acknowledging the key role of women as workers in the global economy. It also inspired the development of '<u>cyberfeminism'</u> in various parts of the world. But <u>in contrast to Haraway's feminist, socialist and antiracist politics</u>, cyberfeminism <u>eschewed definitions</u>, political affiliations (including feminism) **and even goals**.<*> **The political effectiveness of so undirected a movement is still to be determined**. <u>Issues of race and racism</u>, primary in Haraway's formulation of the cyborg, <u>have been avoided in cyberfeminism</u>. <u>This silence could prove</u> as <u>destructive</u> here as it was to second wave US feminism. One can only hope that cyberfeminism is still open to transformations. 4> <u>CM proposed feminist associations based on affinities</u>, not identity. Haraway wrote the manifesto in response to endless fragmentation of the US Second Wave feminist movement along the lines of ethnic, racial and sexual identity. The manifesto called for the <u>crossing</u> of <u>boundaries</u> and <u>for a re-organisation of women</u> on the basis of affinities of political kinship. <u>Cyberfeminists</u> followed

Haraway's lead to associate on the basis of affinities, but at present, with some exceptions, these affinities tend to be career-oriented rather than political. 5> CM reinforced and popularised earlier Utopian feminist imaginings of a world rendered gender free by technology. Effectively, what this really meant was that those who could afford medical services and technology would be able to 're-generate' themselves at will. For a small segment of the world's population this has indeed been liberating and empowering. Previously 'monstrous' prostheses became beautiful. If the original radicality of Haraway's cyborg lay in its illegitimacy, the ubiquity of digital, ex-military, and genetic technologies suggest that the cyborg is now a recognised legal citizen, much more a creature of social reality than of fiction. The utilisation of the cyborg as an image of edgy radicalism was, and still is, the territory of electronics and the fashion industry. As cyberfeminism emphasises the cyber and backpedals the feminism, the most radical politics of the manifesto have been largely ignored.

Cyborgs are expected to conform to gender norms – violating gender-social expectations makes them inaccessible and unacceptable

Park et al 14 [Benedict Tay, quals; Younbo Jung, quals; Taezoon Park, quals; "When stereotypes meet robots: The double-edge sword of robot gender and personality in human–robot interaction" pg 82-83; Computers in Human Behavior; Vol 38; 2014; Science Direct.]

The results of the current study support our objectives to ascertain the underlying social schema that can influence users' acceptance of social robots. Participants more easily accepted social robots with gender and personality that conformed to their respective occupational role stereotypes. Except for the perceived behavioral control, various factors of TPB and perceived trust are predictive of user acceptance of social robots. It is possible that perceived behavioral control could be significant beyond experimental settings where people have incomplete volitional control over their interaction with social robots. Having said that, future research needs to be conducted in field settings. With respect to user responses, we have successfully separated the effects of personality-stereotype violations from those of gender-stereotype violations. The results showed that in-role personality had a greater impact than in-role gender in terms of user response to a social robot. In spite of the interesting findings, the current study is subject to some limitations. First, this study focuses on initial acceptance rather than on long-term usage or satisfaction. Although acceptance is important in new technological implementations, user behavior could still vary in the long term. Therefore, longitudinal research needs to be designed taking into consideration other factors that may influence user behavior in the long term, including the novelty of social robots and service quality of the manufacturer. Second, we should be cautious not to over-generalize the findings. Although we included two different roles for the social robots, the experiment was conducted solely with a humanoid robot. As such, the findings may not be fully applicable to nonhumanoid robots. Future research needs to explore the effect of role stereotypes in other types of social robots, e.g., pet robots. In a similar vein, the results may vary depending on the occupational roles, such as that of an administrative assistant. Hence, future studies need to examine the effects of in-role trait violations in occupations that may be more generic with fewer associative stereotypes. Such studies would provide a more holistic understanding of social stereotypes across different occupational roles. Last but not least, one important limitation of this research is the convenience in sampling young college students. Future research is suggested to look at the stereotype effect in human– robot interactions on other potential user groups, such as the elderly. On the surface, we expect the effect of role stereotypes on elderly users to hold since they are supposed to have a greater personal need for structure and may have stronger stereotypes. As a final remark, our findings confirm that social stereotypes can be applied to human–robot interactions, and these stereotypes can provide good insight for the design of social robots by demonstrating how the three different social stereotypes of gender, personality, and occupational role interact together to influence user responses.

AT: Tuck And Yang

Commodification is inevitable there is no way to avoid it. People of colors bodies are inevitably always available for consumption.
Moten 2003

(Fred In the Break: The aesthetics of the black Radical Tradition) pgs 12-14

The value of the sign, its necessary relation to the possibility of (a universal science of and a universal) **language, is only given in the absence** or supercession **of,** or the abstraction from, **sounded speech— its essential materiality is rendered ancillary by the crossing of an immaterial border or by a differentializing inscription**. Similarly, **the truth about the value of the commodity is tied precisely to the impossibility of its speaking**, for **if the commodity could speak it would have intrinsic value, it would be infused with a certain spirit, a certain value given not from the outside, and would, therefore, contradict the thesis on value**—that it is not intrinsic—that Marx assigns it. The speaking commodity thus cuts Marx; but **the shrieking commodity cuts** Saussure, thereby cutting Marx doubly: this **by way of an irruption of phonic substance** that cuts and augments meaning with a phonographic, rematerializing inscription. **That irruption breaks down the distinction between what is intrinsic and what is given** by or of the outside; here what is given inside is that which is out-from-the-outside, **a spirit manifest in its material expense or aspiration**. For Saussure **such speech is degraded,** say, by accent, **a deuniversalizing, material difference**; for Chomsky it is degraded by a deuniversalizing agrammaticality, but Glissant knows that "the [scarred] spoken imposes on the slave its particular syntax." **These material degradations**—Wssures **or invaginations of a foreclosed universality, a heroic but bounded eroticism—are black performances**. There occurs **in such performances a revaluation or reconstruction of value, one disruptive of the oppositions of speech and writing, and spirit and matter.** It moves by way of the (phono-photo-porno-)graphic disruption the shriek carries out. **This movement cuts and augments the primal. If we return again and again to a certain passion, a passionate response to passionate utterance**, horn-voice-horn over percussion, a protest, an objection, **it is because it is more than another violent scene of subjection too terrible to pass on; it is the ongoing performance**, the preWgurative scene **of a (re)appropriation—the deconstruction and reconstruction, the improvisational recording and revaluation—of value,** of the theory of value, of the theories of value.13 **It's the ongoing event of an antiorigin** and an anteorigin, replay and reverb of an impossible natal occasion, **the performance of the birth and rebirth of a** new science, a phylogenetic **fantasy that (dis)establishes genesis, the reproduction of blackness in and as (the) reproduction of black performance(s). It's the offset and rewrite,** the phonic irruption and rewind, of my last letter, my last record date, my Wrst winter, casting of effect and affect in the widest possible angle of dispersion. **It is important to emphasize that the object's resistance is, among other things, a rupture** of two circles, the familial and the hermeneutic. The protocols of this investigation demand the consideration of that resistance as we'll see Douglass both describe and transmit it. More precisely, we must be attuned to the transmission of the very materiality that is being described while noting the relay between material phonography and material substitution.

AT: OPACITY

Their strategy of opaqueness accepts the foundational premises of racism as its starting point instead of directly challenging white supremacy. This positon of internalization leads to communal hopelessness.
Hooks, City Univeristy New York English professor, 1996

[bell, "Killing Rage: Ending Racism" http://books.google.com/books?id=3JlNFYKLheUC&q=unitary+representations#v=snippet&q=unitary%20representations&f=false, p.249-50, accessed 3-21-14, TAP]

269More than ever before in our history, ==black Americans are== succumbing to and ==internalizing== the ==racist assumption that there can be no meaningful== bonds of intimacy between blacks and whites. It is fascinating to explore why it is that black people trapped in the worst situation of racial oppres sion—enslavement—had the foresight to see that it would be disempowering for them to lose sight of the capacity of white people to transform themselves and divest of white supremacy, even as many black folks today who in no way suffer such extreme racist oppression and exploitation are convinced that white people will not repudiate racism. Con temporary black folks, like their white counterparts, have passively accepted the internalization of white supremacist assumptions. Organized ==white supremacists have always taught that there can never be trust== and intimacy ==between the superior white== race ==and== the ==inferior black race. **When black people internalize these sentiments, no resistance** to white supremacy **is taking place; rather we become complicit** in spreading racist notions==. It does not matter that so many black people feel white people will never repudiate racism because of being daily assaulted by white denial and refusal of accountability. We must not allow the actions of white folks who blindly endorse racism to determine the direction of our resistance. Like our white allies in struggle we must consistently keep the faith, by always sharing the truth that 270white people can be anti-racist, that racism is not some immutable character flaw. ¶ ==**Of course** many white people are comfortable with a rhetoric of race that suggests racism cannot be changed==, that all white people are "inherently racist" simply because they are born and raised in this society. ==Such misguided thinking socializes white people both to remain ignorant== of the way in which white supremacist attitudes are learned and to assume a posture of learned helplessness as though they have no agency—no capacity to resist this thinking. Luckily we have many autobiographies by white folks committed to anti-racist struggle that provide documentary testimony that many of these individuals repudiated racism when they were children. Far from passively accepting It as inherent, they instinctively felt it was wrong. Many of them witnessed bizarre acts of white racist aggression towards black folks in everyday life and responded to the injustice of the situation. Sadly, in our times so many white folks are easily convinced by racist whites and bLack folks who have internalized racism that they can never be really free of racism.¶ These feelings aíso then obsc]re the reality of white privi lege. As long as white folks are taught to accept racism as 'natura]" then they do not have to see themselves as con sciously creating a racist society by their actions, by their political choices. This means as well that they do not have to face the way in which acting in a racist manner ensures the maintenance of white privilege. Indeed, denying their agency allows them to believe white privilege does not exist even as they daily exercise it. If the young white woman who had been raped had chosen to hold all black males account able for what happened, she would have been exercising white privilege and reinforcing the structure of racist thought which teaches that all black people are alike. Unfortunately,¶ 271so many white people are eager to believe racism cannot be changed because internalizing that assumption downplays the issue of accountability. No responsibility need be taken for not changing something ¡fit is perceived as immutable. To accept racism as a system of domination that can be changed would demand that everyone who sees him- or herself as embracing a vision of radai social equality would be required to assert anti-racist habits of being. We know from histories both present and past that white people (and everyone else) who commit themselves to living in anti-racist ways need to make sacrifices, to courageously endure the uncomfortable to challenge and change.¶ ==Whites, people of color, and black folks are reluctant to commit themselves== fully and deeply ==to an anti-racist struggle== that is ongoing ==because there is== such a **pervasive feeling of hopelessness—a conviction that nothing will ever change**. **How any of us can** continue to hold those feelings when we study the history of racism in this society and see how much has changed makes no logical sense. ==Clearly we have not gone far enough==. In the late sixties, Martin Luther King posed the question "Where do we go from here." To live in anti-racist society ==we must **collectively** renew our commitment to a democratic vision of racial justice== and equality. ==Pursuing that vision we create a culture where beloved community flourishes and is sustained==. Those of us who know the joy of being with folks from all walks of life, all races, who are fundamentalls' anti-racist in their habits of being. need to give public testimony. Ve need to share not only what we have experienced but the conditions of change that make such an experience possible. The interracial circle of love that I know can happen because each individual present in it has made his or her own commitment to living an anti- racist life and to furthering the struggle to end white supremacy 272 will become a reality for everyone only if those of us who have created these communities

share how they emerge in our lives and the strategies we use to sustain them. Our devout commitment to building diverse communities is cen tral. These commitments to anti-racist living are just one expression of who we are and what we share with one an other but they form the foundation of that sharing. <u>Like all beloved communities we affirm our</u> differences. It is this generous spirit of affirmation that gives us the courage to challenge one another, to work through misunderstandings, especially those that have to do with race and racism. <mark><u>In a beloved community solidarity</u></mark> and trust <mark>are grounded in</mark> profound <mark>commitment to a shared vision</mark>. Those of us who are always anti-racist long for a world in which evezyone can form a beloved community where borders can be crossed and cultural hybridity celebrated. Anyone can begin to make such a community by truly seeking to live in an anti-racist world. <u>If that longing guides our vision and our actions, the new culture will be born and anti-racist communities of resis tance will emerge everywhere. That is where we must go from here.</u>

Attempts to be hidden make you more visible there I no way to get away from the gaze big brother always has eyes on you
Tuhkanen, 2009

(Mikko. The American Optic: Psychoanalysis, Critical Race Theory, and Richard Wright. Albany: State U of New York, pgs 122-124)

<u>The experience</u> of the literary, in other words, <u>would remove the African American subject from his or her fixed position in visibility,</u> from his or her subjection to the "surveillance, suspicion, reading, and rape of others" (D. A. Miller 162). Of course, taking his cue from Foucault, Miller sees such freedom as illusory: he suggests that, <u>seemingly free from surveillance, the "liberal" subject becomes in fact all the more entangled in the networks of power.</u> The experience of the novel constitutes <u>a form of disciplinary subjection that avoids the crudity of blatant, even spectacular, punishment and subjugation. The subject is embedded in the network of discipline</u> that it sees itself <u>avoiding while enjoying the sight</u> of its functioning around him or her. Indeed, <u>while in the cultural imagination of the United States,</u> literacy and education have figured as the passwords for social mobility, they have also functioned as <u>disciplinary methods guaranteeing the continuing existence of a stratified society</u>. Dana Nelson Salvino argues that, despite its promise, the dissemination of literacy among whites and blacks in antebellum America was institutionalized in "an educational system that would not radically alter the existing social balance" (144). <u>The consequences of this tendency for slaves and freedmen were felt</u> in the United States from antebellum to post-Reconstruction time. Salvino argues that "[l]iteracy could lead blacks out of physical, but not cultural and economic, bondage" (153). For Miller, <u>the novel-reading subject's experience of uninterrupted privacy, his sense of seeing without being seen, is, then, illusory. "It is built into the structure</u> of the Novel," he writes, "that every reader must realize the definitive fantasy of the liberal subject, who imagines himself free from the surveil- lance that he nonetheless sees operating everywhere around him" (162). <u>a confirmation of freedom is</u>, Miller continues, <u>essential for</u> the subject: <u>the liberal subject "seems to recognize himself most fully only when he forgets or disavows his functional implication in a system of carceral restraints or disciplinary injunctions"</u> (x). The distance that the novel-reading subject is able to take from surveillance is, in Miller's phrase, "thoroughly imaginary" (x). <u>The freedom and voyeurism of the</u> novel-reading <u>subject is imaginary</u> also in the Lacanian sense. <u>The subject, imagining himself</u> seeing <u>not seen, is all the more immobilized in the specular capture where he is caught seen without seeing,</u> as Lacan notes in his reading of Edgar Allan Poe's "The Purloined Let- ter." The subject misrecognizes <u>his position as that of an outside observer</u>, a voyeur <u>unimplicated in the field of vision, separate from the scene of "carceral restraints" that s/he assumes to survey from a distance.</u> Yet, as Wright and slave narrators make clear, <u>African American readers and writers are unable to sustain this imaginary comfort of seeing without being seen.</u> That is, as much as masters and mistresses saw in slave literacy the dangers of a pharmakon — where "the inch" of slave instruction was likely to turn into "the ell" of rebellion (Douglass, Narrative 40)—<u>the experience of the literary did not free the black subject in any unambiguous way.</u>

Afrofuturism K

Afrofuturism Bad – US Focus

Afrofuturism's unquestioning use of the United States as a central site and science fiction as a genre reinscribes racial oppression.

McCutcheon 2011 (Mark A. McCutcheon, PhD. Associate Professor, English, Athabasca University. Review: "Debating the Histories and Futures of Black SF" Published in Extrapolation Vol. 52, No. 2)

In other words, Afro-Futurism produces a kind of cyborg, anti-realist identity politics that seeks not to overcome alienation but to deepen it as a mode of resis-tance to hegemonic ontologies. Afro-Futurism's alienating effects thus take aim equally at a technocratic modern society founded on white capitalist patriarchy and the racialized terrors of slavery, and at the dominant forms of subjectivity such a society has engendered. So the consistent, conspicuous absence here of any references to Eshun, Nelson, or Rose (among others), while presumably unintended, nonetheless tends more to suppress than to enable a dialogue with Afro-Futurism—an effect exacerbated by the editor's insistent self-positioning as a "pioneer" in this field (251; cf. ix, 245). Barr's editorial self-positioning (with its problematically colonialist figuring) relates the collection's highly selective representation of Afro-Futurist history to a similarly selective representation of its territorial ambit: that is, the collec-tion frequently arrogates black Atlantic writers to black American contexts. The collection shares this kind of arrogation with Dery and Nelson, who both simply assume the U.S. supplies the defining and exemplary national site of Afro-Futurist production (Youngquist 183). In Afro-Future Females, this kind of presumptive, territorial arrogation arises among several contributors, in descriptions of sf as an unproblematically American literature, and in related assumptions about black American culture as tacit synecdoche for Other black diasporic cultures around the Atlantic or around the world. Only Dubey connects the magic-infused speculative fiction of black women writers with Paul Gilroy as well as Toni Mor- rison (35). Henton invokes "diaspora" only to describe the African-American imagination (110) and the diversities of sf form (101). That Hopkinson and some contributors to Mojo are African-Canadian (or African-Caribbean-Canadian, in Hopkinson 's case) is only mentioned in passing by Kilgore (120), who inscribes them nevertheless in "African-American involvement in fantastic fiction" (119). A salutary illustration of the collection's U.S.-centric assumptions occurs in Rogan's essay on Due and Hopkinson. Rogan reads their representations of "the reproduction of mothering" according to a provocative historical-materialist premise: that "the master/slave dialectic… reinscribe[s] itself in the relation of the black woman to capitalist patriarchy… victimized by institutionalized neglect rather than by the close scrutiny she bore as an object of property" (77). On this premise, Rogan builds an insightful reading of mother figures in the subject authors' novels. However, notwithstanding the overall perspicacity of Rogan's reading of Hopkinson according to the globalized continuities of postcolonial cultures and neoliberal hegemony, the critic is on unfamiliar ground in discussing the Canadian setting of Brown Girl in the Ring (1999), whose antagonist Rogan describes as "Canada's Premier Uttley" (90). This misreading of a provincial government leader as Canada's head of state costs Rogan's argument a relevant point about globalization: the provincial political setting makes the novel legible as a satire on Ontario's hard right turn in the mid-1990s under the neoconserva-tive regime of Premier Mike Harris, which so drastically slashed social programs and attacked minoritized groups that Hopkinson's image of downtown Toronto as a gutted inner city reads more like a shrewd urban-planning projection than a post-apocalyptic dystopia.

Afrofuturism masks Eurocentrism and colonial oppression

Albiez, 05 (Sean Albiez is Senior Lecturer in Popular Music at Southampton Solent University. He has lectured in popular music studies, music technology and media and cultural studies since 1991, and has been involved in electronic music making since the mid-1980s., Published in 2005 as 'Post Soul Futurama: African American cultural politics and early Detroit Techno' in European Journal of American Culture. Vol 24. No 2. 2005, TAM)

Cosgrove, in creating <u>a thesis that emphasizes the innovatory futurism of techno, rides roughshod over the sensitivities of the black American racial and personal subjectivity of Atkins.</u> This controversial thesis lingered in later writing on techno, with Sinker stating 'Techno ... explicitly and contemptuously refused community with Motown and motorcity gospel [in favour of] Gary "Me, I Disconnect From You" Numan'.39 Though there is some evidence to suggest Numan was more important musically to Juan Atkins than Motown, no disrespect was intended to the symbolic achievements of Gordy, and Atkins very specifically acknowledges the key role of electronic and synthesizer experimentation by Bernie Worrell (Funkadelic) and early 1970s Stevie Wonder in his music. Furthermore<u>, to cast European electronic music as an escape route for black musicians from the USA's racially antagonistic environment is to create a comforting story that perhaps helps European writers excise memories of the colonial enslavement of Africans, recasting Europe as a post-industrial sanctuary.</u>

Afrofuturism Bad - Solvency

AfroFuturism outdated and no longer works as a movement – it is open ended and message is ambiguous depending on the person

Miller '11 (Miller, Paul D. a Washington DC-born electronic and experimental hip hop musician whose work is often called by critics or his fans as "illbient" or "trip hop". He is a turntablist, a producer, a philosopher, and an author The Book of Ice. Brooklyn, NY: Mark Batty, 2011. Print.)

Every movement has its sell-by date. I think that there were a lot of flaws in the way that Afro-Futurism unfolded, and I think it missed certain pressure points in the flow of how culture evolves in this day and age. It wasn't digital enough, it didn't have a core group of people with any kind of coherent message. It was conceptually open ended without any kind of narrative. People tend to like that kind of thing. I speak of Afro-Futurism in the past tense because I think that the culture at large caught up to and bypassed many of the issues it was dealing with. Forget the idea of the "permanent underclass" that people like Greg Tate (no disrespect) kept pushing. Forget the idea that blacks are outside of any system—we are the system. I guess that many people outside of the arts have awakened to the day and age and moved on. It seemed like Afrofuturism just didn't have a cohesive situation to have music, art and literature evolve from. Sure, Afrofuturism can be used, as you put it to be a "descriptor of a body of knowledge, which does not die and outlives its progenitors (like jazz, hip-hop, deconstruction, or philosophy itself)"—but only by sleight of hand (which is sampling, anyway). It's basically a hall of mirrors, a smoke and fog routine in a middle brow cheap magic show. But hey... even that can be interesting sometimes.

Afrofuturism = Sexist

Even if their small selection of 1AC authors cite feminist principals, the Afro-Future is overwhelmingly imagined as a male dominated space. Sexism and the alienation of black woman inevitably dooms the movement.

AH 2011 (From a collection of short posts on the blog of Jakeya Caruthers, PhD Candidate in Anthropology of Education at Stanford University where she teaches courses on Black Childhood, Queer Afrofuturism and occasionally guest-lectures on representations of race, sex, and gender in popular culture. Her courses have earned her a Middlebrook Prize for Graduate Teaching and a teaching fellowship with Stanford's Center for the Comparative Study of Race and Ethnicity. June 2, 2011 http://queeringafrofuturism.tumblr.com/post/6126537901/female-presence-in-the-afro-future)

In J. Griffith Rollefson's work "The Robot Voodoo Power Thesis: Afrofuturism and anti-anti-essentialism from Sun Ra to Kool Keith" the author argues that afrofuturism, though often viewed as a constructed fantasy and sort of post human, futurist sensibility, has "real" productive potential towards the larger project of cultural theory. He argues specifically that, "By stepping out side of the white liberal tradition and rewriting blackness in all its complexity, afrofuturism offers a novel form of revolution that is rooted in a long history of black opposition". In his work Rollefson sites artists that while productive in their audacity to (re)envision and reproduce alter-destinies, still through practice and position reify notions of hetro-patriarchy and sexism. In all of his examples he presents male-bodied individuals as the leaders of this new wave of cultural thought and progression into the future. The first is the highly noted Sun Ra, band leader for the Arkestra. Rollefson highlights the leader's ability to institute a new wave of futurist thought through an insistence that he was not of this planet and neither is any black person. The author notes that Sun-Ra creates a new space through which black people can begin to let go of desires towards equal citizenship through an indoctrination into an alternate world, that of the uni-verse. Rollefson, notes that Sun Ra and other noted leaders such as George Clinton and Parliament-Funkadelic, as well as MC's such as Kool Keith "established the core tenet of anti-anti-essentialist collapsed binaries". He continues further: " I would like to assert that they do have real political efficacy because they problematize the rigid binary of blackness/whiteness and the matrix of binaries that are inscribed up this central set." Such reimagining works to blur the lines of whiteness and blackness perhaps, however, they do little to renegotiate the history of sexism and erasure that these same histories present (as an opposition) to the project of feminist politics. Through Rollefson's reading **we find that the female presence is non-existent in the theorized** (and thus archived) **afrofuture**. It is problematic to me that **no space, imaginary or otherwise, has been offered with which to combat the issues of patriarchy and sexism** that override our present quests for "Freedom". **Until** the way we think about **afro futurism is inclusive off all black bodies, the project towards liberation will continue to be stunted.** -AH

And, where women are imagined in the afro-future they remain fetishized subjects of the male gaze.

AVM 2011 (From a collection of short posts on the blog of Jakeya Caruthers, PhD Candidate in Anthropology of Education at Stanford University where she teaches courses on Black Childhood, Queer Afrofuturism and occasionally guest-lectures on representations of race, sex, and gender in popular culture. Her courses have earned her a Middlebrook Prize for Graduate Teaching and a teaching fellowship with Stanford's Center for the Comparative Study of Race and Ethnicity. 4/24/2011 http://queeringafrofuturism.tumblr.com/page/4)

To begin, these readings helped me better understand the role of music in complementing or expanding one's own identity and vision of the world. Weheliye effectively delineates the politics of the 'vocoder' effect and how it has different meanings for black and white people in relation to their perceived humanity (37). Indeed, ze effectively shows how musical effects can be used not just to carry the musician and the spectator to a new space (or an audotopia), but also to construct anew body for the musician. Foster takes on this notion in hir essay. Ze delineates how cyberspace is used by people to experience trans identification with races, genders, and sexualities 'different' than their prescribed 'bodies.' In hir reading of science fiction texts, Foster depicts cyberspace as a utopian space, where people are able to experience strength and empowerment in their identities. James in hir essay on Robo-Diva perhaps best fleshes out this phenomenon. Ze reads the work of Beyonce and Rihanna to convey how "afro-futurist robo-diva R&B can be understood as reverse-engineering the body, using music to rewire the way whiteness and patriarchy are programmed into our bodies and structures of feeling" (419). For James, "to adopt the aesthetic of the robo-diva is to throw in white patriarchy's face what it most fears – black women and black femininity not as some 'redeeming' path to 'whole-ness...' that exists solely for the purpose of nursing white culture and maintaining patriarchal privilege" (417). While I certainly appreciate James's reading of these music videos, I almost feel as if ze is glamorizing the radical potential of the robo diva. Indeed, for James, the robo diva is the embodiment of an empowered critique of a white patriarchal regime. While I agree that the robo diva can be a feminist figure, I am circumspect at James's universalizing claim. I posit that while the robo diva can be read as a reactionary, subversive feminist figure, she also can be read as a product if a patriarchal regime. From my understanding, one of the core notions of feminist theory and history is that women's bodies have been demonized by the patriarchy. Indeed, considering the historical associations of women with witches, demons, and other ill-intentioned creatures it is pretty easy to recognize that women's bodies – especially women's menstrual cycles – have been delegitimized by men. Part of the project of second wave feminism was reclamation of women's bodies. Indeed, with books like Our Bodies Ourselves, women began to educate themselves about their bodies and, in the process, empower themselves. Even with the dawn of third wave feminism, women's bodies still continue to be held under the scrutiny of the patriarchal gaze. Depictions of women in media and other public outlets still present a skinny, large-breasted figure – a paragon of beauty unattainable by women. Rates of eating disorders, diets, and self-mutiliation are still issues for the women's rights movement. This is why I am circumspect of immediately labeling the robo diva a feminist icon. Certainly, her cyborg status in many ways bolsters her body. The technology of herself can be said to fortify her from the predatory, penetrative gaze of patriarchy. However, can we not also view this re-configuration and performance of the body as yet another product of a patriarchal capitalist society? James's analysis features Beyonce and Rihanna without thinking about the type of women and the type of bodies these artists have sought to construct. Both of these women still aspire toward dominant (white) notions of beauty – they are still ridiculously toned, often perm their hair, and wear sensational, skimpy clothing to broadcast their bodies as part of their image. Both of these women are known for their bodies. Male consumers and fans often comment on how 'hot' they are. I wonder – could the robot diva simply be a fetish of the patriarchal gaze? Have Beyonce and Rihanna figured out that by playing dress up as a robot, they can further titillate the male gaze? From the discipline of ecofeminism we learn how the domination and degradation of our earth and natural resources can be read with a comparable framework as the trauma inscribed on the woman's body and experiences by patriarchy. Men have historically used technology to rape the land of its resources. Is the robo-diva just another one of these tools? Is her cyborg image really an indication of her colonization? In Kanye's "Love Lockdown" music video alien-inspired tall women stand with their arms at their shoulders as Afrofuturist men dance behind them. The camera takes a curious focus. It features the dancers dancing in-between the legs of the woman. In this moment I began to recognize – could the reproductive capacity of women simply being appropriated for by the afro-futuristic impulse for a new world, for a new body? I think it's important that we approach issues of gender difference within the afro-futuristic project with a critical eye. We cannot simply exalt the 'robo-diva; we must continue to complicate her politics and presence in order to better understand the feminist implications of afro-futurism.

Sci-Fi Bad - Feminism

The Alt can't solve- examining science from a feminist perspective reinforces sterotypes of women- as incompetent

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Although it has been said before by such leading philosophers as Sandra Harding (1987) and Helen Longino (1987), the point that feminist theorists do not and should not endorse a single feminist method, or of a single way that women do (or ought to do) science bears repeating for at least three reasons. First, Donna Haraway (1985) has pointed out that feminism and science need to be intertwined if we are to exercise our responsibility for the practices and products of science and technology. By drawing a line between women's science and science itself, we lose our ability to address current problems within scientific practice, and we don't investigate ways in which the traditional practice of science can be interrogated and improved. Second, presuppositions of a single feminist science reinforce the cultural stereotype that women can't do science as it is traditionally construed. This further removes an already marginalized group from mainstream scientific discourse and fails to give credit to women who have fought to succeed as researchers in what continues to be a man's game. Finally, we need to guard against essentializing women's intellectual or cognitive characteristics. Advocating a single feminist science suggests that there is a single, feminine manner way in which women think or relate to other people or organize their experiments and their laboratories. This is not the case. Because of the latter two concerns, pluralism is an appropriate attitude to take toward feminism and science. Instead of endorsing a feminist method, I hope to create space for a variety of approaches.

Sci-Fi Bad – Cedes Political

We should build plausible and specific scenarios—that's key to improve policymaking and avoid existential threats

HUNTLEY et al 2010 (Wade L. Huntley, US Naval Postgraduate School; Joseph G. Bock, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; Miranda Weingartner, Weingartner Consulting; "Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space," Space Policy 26)

On 16 March 1966 <u>Neil Armstrong</u> deftly piloted the Gemini VIII within 0.9 meters of the pre-launched Agena Target Vehicle, then slowly <u>accomplished the world's first orbital docking</u>. Armstrong and co-pilot David Scott were still in a celebratory mood, when Scott noticed the Gemini beginning to roll. Armstrong used the Orbit Attitude and Maneuvering System thrusters, but the moment he throttled down, they started to roll again. Turning off the Agena seemed to stop the problem for a few minutes. But when it began again, the roll was accelerating. They undocked and with a long burst of translation thrusters moved away from the Agena. But the roll continued to accelerate. Tumbling now at one revolution per second, the astronauts were in danger of impaired vision and loss of consciousness. But <u>Armstrong was able to bring</u> the <u>wild oscillations under control thanks</u> in part <u>to preparation by a flight simulation training exercise that many pilots disliked, believing the simulation was</u> too <u>unlikely</u> to waste their scarce training time and energy on.26 <u>Fortunately, NASA</u> did not plan the astronauts' training based on the most likely scenarios. Instead, they <u>planned on the basis of plausible and important scenarios</u>. <u>Developing plausible scenarios helps us take the long view in a world of great uncertainty</u>.27 Scenarios are narratives of the future defined around a set of unpredictable drivers, <u>intended to expand insight</u> by identifying unexpected but important possible directions and outcomes. <u>Scenarios</u> have a timeline over which meaningful change is possible. They <u>are a useful tool for examining a number of different possible futures. They provide a means to stimulate new thinking, challenge assumptions, and provide an effective framework for dialogue</u> among a diverse group of stakeholders. <u>They can inspire new ideas and innovations</u> by helping identify common goals <u>and</u> interests that <u>transcend current political divides</u>. <u>Scenarios thus help to develop the means to work towards preferred futures.</u>28 Scenarios are stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow; they do not need to be likely, but they ought to be plausible, internally consistent, and relevant. <u>It is precisely by considering possible</u>, even if not necessarily likely, <u>scenarios that we are best prepared for the unpredictability of the future. By encouraging creative thinking beyond the future we anticipate, scenarios help us become more resilient to unexpected events.</u> With respect to their utility in guiding policy development, three features distinguish good scenarios from simple speculations, linear predictions or fanciful musings of the future: Scenarios are decision focused. Successful scenarios begin and end by clarifying the decisions and actions the participants must make if they are to deal successfully with an uncertain future. <u>One common misconception of scenarios is that they are prescient, path dependent predictions of the future. On the contrary, scenarios are used to order our thoughts amid uncertainty, build common ground among differing perspectives, and think rationally about our options. The value of a set of scenarios accrues not from their accuracy or likelihood, but from their plausibility and the insights they generate</u>. Scenarios are imaginative. In examining a decision within the context of a number of different futures, scenarios require us to look behind fixed assumptions. They encourage participants to challenge conventional wisdom, create new contexts for existing decisions, and think creatively about options for surmounting obstacles. At their core, then, scenarios are about learning.29 Scenarios are logical. The scenario process is formal and disciplined in its use of information and analysis. The creativity and imagination inspired by scenarios can only be as effective as it is based in realistic assessments. In requiring participants to challenge each others' thoughts, perceptions, and mind-sets, the process helps clarify that reality. Scenarios first emerged following World War II as a method of military planning. This approach was reflected in Herman Kahn's assertion of the need to ''think the unthinkable'' concerning the possibilities and implications of war in the atomic age. ''In our times'', Kahn wrote in 1966, <u>''thermonuclear war may seem</u> unthinkable, immoral, insane, hideous, or <u>highly unlikely, but it is not impossible''.</u> 30 Kahn's motivation was, in part, recognition of the counter-intuitive notion that <u>planning could be a necessary means of avoidance.</u> Analyzing scenarios reached greater methodological sophistication with the work of Pierre Wack, a planner at the London offices of Royal Dutch/Shell. Wack and his colleagues refined the application of scenario thinking to private enterprise. This work helped Shell anticipate the consequences of the emergence of a cartel among oil exporting countries, and to develop various plans to cushion the blow that would (and did) result from formation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. Shell was also able to anticipate massive economic and political change in the then USSR in the late 1980s.31 Scenario analysis came to be used in the political arena when associates of Wack assisted stakeholders in South Africa in the peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy. Many doubted the country's prospects; in 1987, the Guardian Weekly quoted Margaret Thatcher's former spokesman Bernard Ingham as saying that anyone who believed the African National Congress (ANC) would one day rule South Africa was ''living in cloud cuckoo land.''32 But with operations in South Africa and an interest in preventing anarchy following the downfall of apartheid, Shell sent some of Wack's prote´ge´s, including Adam Kahane, to convene meetings of top governmental, religious, civic and business leaders at a conference site there called Mont Fleur. From February 1990, when Nelson Mandela was released from prison, to April 1994, when the first all-race elections were held, participants identified relatively certain and uncertain but plausible factors, and then formed into teams to research various alternative futures. In the midst of deep conflict and uncertainty, ''Mont Fleur'' brought people together from across ideological and political divides to think creatively about the future of their country. The collaboratively drafted scenarios were not a panacea, but did contribute to establishing a common vocabulary and enough mutual understanding

for participants to find common ground on complex decisions. In particular, the consensus on the undesirability of three particular scenarios contributed to developing the perception of shared interests that was an important element in the success of the governmental transition.33 <u>Scenario-building and analysis has become a distinct tool of US government policy making, and has been applied directly to future space security issues</u>. For example, one major US Air Force scenario-based study evaluated 25 emerging technologies and 40 separate potential weapons systems through the lens of six ''alternative futures'' in an effort to guide future Air Force policy choices.34 <u>This exercise </u>(and others like it) <u>exemplifies the potential for applying nonlinear future planning methodologies to large-scale public policy topics, including the future of space</u>. The principal deficiency of such government-sponsored efforts is simply the narrowness of their focus e they are, by design, only concerned about a single government's decision points and are shaped by the goals, dilemmas and uncertainties most relevant to that single party. Lacking is a parallel process to achieve the same kind of expansive thinking while also incorporating a full range of stakeholders. Such exercises can hardly be generated by governments.

Sci-fi empirically can't understand or affect policy

Berger 1976 – award winning science fiction author (July, Albert I., " The Triumph of Prophecy: Science Fiction and Nuclear Power in the Post-Hiroshima Period" Science Fiction Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, JSTOR)

This <u>naivete about politics and preoccupation with technological solutions was the obverse of the prevailing SF distaste for politics</u>. Politics had <u>always had a bad press in the science-fiction magazines, being portrayed as the captive of technologically, if not socially reactionary special interests</u>. The appalling <u>scientific ignorance and prejudice displayed by Congress after Hiroshima, and its general unwillingness to be educated, merely compounded the problem in the eyes of science-fiction writers</u> and readers. This distaste for politics was testified to not only by letters-to-the-editor in Astounding and the fan magazines but also by an article by W.B. de Graeff, "Congress is too Busy" (Sept 1946), detailing with a gleeful contempt the most mundane and ridiculous chores of a member of Congress. By <u>1950 even an old stalwart like E.E. Smith could take up nearly a third of a novel-First Lensman</u> (not serialized; Fantasy Press 1950)-<u>with a detailed account of an election in which military heroes act both as police forces and as candidates arrayed against a corrupt political machi</u>ne. The <u>use of conspicuously armed poll watchers and what amounts to a military coup are justified by the criminal tactics of the opposition. Smith's villains are supposed to be the pawns of a sinister conspiracy of aliens, but their methods are described as normal American practice.</u>

SF alone isn't enough – new socio-literary techniques are needed for public engagement

Miller and Bennett 2008 - Associate Director of the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Associate Director and CoPI of the Center for Nanotechnology in Society, and Chair of the PhD Program in Human and Social Dimensions of Science and Technology at Arizona State University. He is also a Senior Fellow in the Center for World Affairs and the Global Economy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He holds a PhD in electrical engineering from Cornell University AND PhD in biochemistry from Arizona State University in 2003 and today is an Assistant Research Professor in the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes and the Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University (October, Clark A. and Ira, " Thinking longer term about technology: is there value in science fiction-inspired approaches to constructing futures? " Science and Public Policy, 35(8), Ebsco)

<u>Even if science fiction offers an alternative approach to fostering thinking about longer-term developments in technology</u> — one that focuses as much or more on the social dimensions of technological change than the technological — <u>new kinds of socio-literary techniques would still be needed in order to exploit this approach in public engagement or technology assessment exercises</u>. In the past two years, <u>we have undertaken or participated in several exercises that have explored how aspects of science fiction might be used in interesting ways that we describe in brief here</u>. We do not mean these to rise to the standard of proof of concept, by any stretch of the imagination. Nevertheless, we offer them as illustrations of a couple of possible approaches we have taken, early on in our explorations of how we might use science fiction-inspired techniques to advance the objectives of societal reflection on technological futures.

Predictions about the future of space must be rigorous and realistic—their science fiction stories don't qualify

HUNTLEY et al 2010 (Wade L. Huntley, US Naval Postgraduate School; Joseph G. Bock, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; Miranda Weingartner, Weingartner Consulting; "Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space," Space Policy 26)

Few space security analysts have focused on the possibilities for cooperation to function more organically as an element of the evolution of human space activities, rather than simply as a structure applied to that evolution. The more organic possibility reflects the potential over time for cooperative agreements and institutions to change state interests themselves. Processes facilitating such evolution include strategic interest convergence, information creation and sharing, "spillover" and "feedback" effects, issue scope expansion and integration, and the facilitation of transnational linkages. Interacting synergistically with the interests they are influencing, such cooperation evolves dynamically as well. As such cooperation deepens its roots among all parties, it can begin to endure self-sustainably.21 The potential for more organic principles and cooperative institutions to shape the nature of political relations themselves suggests a more expansive concept of the underlying nature of interstate relations e one that need not always resemble the realist image of a Hobbesian "war of all against all". Hedley Bull's "anarchical society" and Daniel Deudney's "negarchy," for example, capture the past and present existence of international political orders that, despite the absence of hierarchical government, have functioned as qualitatively distinct governance systems.22 Application of concepts of qualitatively distinct political ordering principles to developing governance conditions of the future human presence in space is as yet largely unexplored.23 The fluidity of interests and capabilities with respect to space activities suggests a relatively large potential for organized cooperation to influence their evolution. Such cooperative principles and institutions would then become intrinsic to the dynamic political forces shaping the expanding human presence in space, growing and evolving with them, rather than acting as exogenous static structures seeking to constrain those forces.24 <u>The rate and uncertainty of change in both the technological and political dimensions of expanding human space activities complicates this task. Herein lies the value of "realistic visions". Rigorous articulations of the interplay of the wide variety of constraints, tradeoffs, uncertainties, and values entailed in human expansion into space can facilitate evaluation of the applicability of alternative governance concepts to human space activities in the context of dynamic change.</u> Among other things, such visions can explore how alternative futures in space are intimately linked to terrestrial conditions. As the human presence in space develops into an integral aspect of global life, it will increasingly reflect the prevailing conditions of global life. Anticipation of space weaponization premises continued earthly insecurity and conflict, while ambitions for growing commercial and exploratory development of space presume increasing international integration and collaboration. A future in which space becomes a domain of conflict and arms race competition may be irreconcilable with visions for increasing peaceful human presence embodied in today's growing commercial and exploratory activities. <u>Choices among alternative futures for the human presence in space may depend upon choices among</u> alternative futures for life on Earth as well. The following section reviews the potential for scenariobuilding techniques to inform these choices by providing rigorous detailed visions of future worlds that account for a wide range of current realities and span the spectra of the most important uncertainties. <u>The resulting plausible, integrated visions can yield feasible policy-relevant insights that demonstrably enable current policy making to be more farsighted.</u> Beyond the fruits of the exercises themselves, the longer time-frames entailed in scenario building also facilitate dialogue among diverse parties divided on nearer-term questions. <u>The collaboration enabled can inspire innovation and integrated analysis among diverse experts, leading to the development of a productive "epistemic community"25 addressing the full scope of future human space activities.</u> Vision development is only one aspect of long-term planning. Comprehensive knowledge generation and strategies for policy making are also required. But vision development is currently the least well advanced. <u>All global policy debate, including US national security policy making, can benefit from having a fuller range of rigorous and credible assessments of long-term prospects from which to draw</u>.

Science fiction conflates fantasy with fact—this undermines civic engagement and scientific literacy

Kluger 7/11/11 - senior writer for TIME (Jeffery, " Scientific Illiteracy After the Shuttle: Are America's Smartest Days Behind Her?" http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2082213,00.html)

The problem is, <u>the land of the free</u> and home of the brave <u>is in danger of becoming</u> — not to put too fine a point on it — <u>the land of the dunderhead</u>, and my trip to Cape Canaveral, Fla., drove that point home. It's no secret that <u>as a people, we're rapidly losing the basic fund of knowledge we need if we're going to function well in a complex world</u>. Just last week, another dispiriting poll was released revealing how little some of us know about our national history. Only 58% of Americans can say with certainty what happened on July 4, 1776 — a figure that falls to a jaw-dropping 31% in the under-30 cohort. Fully 25% of Americans who do know that we seceded from some country or another to become a nation don't know what that former parent country was. This follows on the heels of other polls showing similar numbers of folks believing that we fought the Russians in World War II and beat them with the help of our stalwart German allies. Being historically illiterate is bad. Being scientifically illiterate, however, is even worse — if only because <u>having a working knowledge of how the world operates is essential to understanding critical areas of national policy</u>. Type the words "global warming" and "hoax" into Google and you get an appalling 10.1 million hits. The polls are all

over the map on this one, but they show that rising numbers of Americans think climate science is fraudulent or exaggerated — up to 41% in one survey. It's not merely opinion to say that those people are simply wrong. There may be raging debates among scientists about the precise severity, mechanisms and trajectory of global warming, but the basic science is established and accepted, whether you want to admit it or not. Then of course there are the 18% of Americans who believe the sun revolves around Earth and the 28% who think the moon landings were faked. Google that last one and you're taken to sites that profess to be forums for political debate. Political debate? About faking the moon landings? This isn't the Roman Senate, folks, it's fantasyland. What got me thinking about all this was a stop I made after the launch at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex — a combination museum and theme park on the Cape Canaveral grounds. The center's special feature this season is called Sci-Fi Summer 2011 — and it delivers just what it promises. Adjacent to the rocket garden, with its full-size mock-ups of the U.S.'s most legendary boosters, is a massive maplike display comparing the sizes of the Saturn 1B, the Saturn 5, the Mercury Redstone, the space shuttle and the International Space Station to the Starship Enterprise. Which is fine, except that all the other spacecraft actually existed and the Enterprise, um, didn't. The spacesuits worn by Neil Armstrong, Gordon Cooper and other astronauts are similarly commingled throughout the exhibit with uniforms worn by the Klingons and Romulons. There is also an entire pavilion set aside for a Star Trek display. O.K., it's cranky to begrudge people a little fun and Star Trek is undeniably cool. But do we really not get enough fun and cool elsewhere? Is there anyone alive who thinks that what Americans need right now are more ways to divert and amuse ourselves? Mix Cooper with the Klingons or the shuttle Enterprise with the Starship Enterprise long enough and the kids who consume all this stuff will no longer be able to tell them apart. Scientific literacy is part of good citizenship. And when it comes to space science, you don't need a lick of fiction to make it fun. An engineer at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory who works in the interplanetary program once explained why he loves his job by saying, "If you can't have a good time coming to work and building robots to send to Mars, give it up, man." The same used to be true of merely learning about such things. It must become true again if the U.S. is going to keep its edge.

Futurism Bad - General

Futurism is unproductive

Salam '06(Salam, Reihan. American political commentator, columnist, and author. He is the executive editor of "National Review" "The Future of Futurism." Slate. The Slate Group, 09 June 2006. Web. <http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2006/06/the_future_of_futurism.html>.)

The problem is that we mean different things by "future." The reality is that there are other ways of imagining our relationship to time. Steffen outlines six 1. THE PAST. Character is history; character is destiny. We have a way of rewriting history to suggest what the future will be. To wit: The Alamo. It has been purposed and repurposed to be a lesson that substantiates Manifest Destiny, multi-cultural origins, and even anti-tax rhetoric. It positions where we're going in the past. Steffen suggests that it's worth knowing that there is often a huge gap between what professional historians think/believe and how retellers of these stories reflect these stories. 2. SIMPLE PREDICTION. Most predictions are glaringly wrong. It is important to know the difference between predictions grounded on data and articulated as probabilities, and predictions that are simply personal opinion founded on a set of individual, qualitative beliefs. The latter is not always wrong, but the inquirer needs to be careful about them. One huge example: Climate Change. One side has assigned a set of probabilities, data, and created peer-reviewed work to predict our trajectory. Based on this scientific effort, the globe is on a track toward 7 degrees warming. There are very few predictions about what 7 degrees means because it represents such a profound change; there is no meaningful prediction. So academics and media talk about is 4 degrees and 2 degrees. "Business as usual" will land us at 4. But business as usual is not a fair way of dealing with the future. The climate models accepted by the scientific community give us budgets, curves and timelines; these are effectively predicting our future scientifically. If we want to have a more reasonable task, we must start to lower our emissions on an individual and national level. In fact, what we do now about carbon matters in a way that few moments have mattered. Impacts will be with us for thousands of years. All of this is a direct read of the world's largest peer reviewed process of prediction. This is very real. We can look and feel despair, but Steffen believes that in fact there are many incentives aligning for the private sector to re-think its relationship to carbon. One of the reasons why change will happen is that the sheer size of the assets at risk from climate change, added to how much can be made from switching to new platforms and technologies, far outweigh the fossil fuel business. Steffen maintains that, fundamentally, there is only one question: how long will politics allow this delay to continue? 1. PREDICTING THE PRESENT. Building on William Gibson, author of Neuromancer, this way of approaching time suggests that we predict the future by looking at things that have already been built in the present. (Gibson's famous quote is some semblance of: "The Future is here; it's not evenly distributed.") We can look for things in our current environs that suggest where change will take place. 1. ANTICIPATION OR PROVOCATION. This relationship to time uses new products as provocation. Steffen put up a fake-product picture of "panda jerky" (lab-grown panda meat, made into jerky, and packaged like any other FMCG). Concept cars brought to the auto shows are an example of anticipation or provocation. The TV show "Black Mirror" is this sort of speculative science fiction; its construct is that it takes one unintended consequence of a new technology and "blows it out," trying to see how technology would change the future if its taken to an extreme conclusion. Many other types of science fiction (e.g., Mad Max) are themselves provocations, and not all of them are silly. (The Red Mars, Green Mars, Blue Mars Trilogy by Kim Stanley Robinson is one such example. Its premise: What if we tried settling Mars and the people who settled decided to rethink society?). Provocation can become the grounds for more detailed

and thoughtful examination. 2. VISIONARY FUTURES. "Dune" is a detailed systems future using things that aren't possible, but an excellent vision of a different reality. These works are often about "world building." World building itself has become a popular cultural activity. It's evident in role-playing games, and the way people look at programs like "Lost". Often these visionary futures are pure entertainment. We can think of this as escapism being a future function of our society. We don't necessarily believe in what this outlines, but we are entertained.

Futurism Bad – Edelman

Embrace the death drive to allow a space for the queer

Edelman, 98 (Lee Edelman is a professor in the English Department at Tufts University, "The Future is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification, and the Death Drive", Jan. 1998, date accessed 7/17/15, TAM)

<u>Choosing to stand</u>, as many of us do, <u>outside the cycles of reproduction</u>, choosing to stand, as we also do, by the side of those living and dying each day with the complications of AIDS, <u>we know the deception of the societal lie that endlessly looks toward a future whose promise is always a day away.</u> We can tell ourselves that with patience, with work, with generous contributions to lobbying groups, or generous participation in activist groups, or generous doses of political savvy and electoral sophistication, <u>the future will hold a place for us-a place at the political table that won't have to come</u>, as it were, <u>at the cost of our place in the bed, or the bar, or the baths. But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers. The future itself is kid stuff, reborn each day to postpone the encounter with the gap, the void, the emptiness, that gapes like a grave from within the lifeless mechanism of the signifier that animates the subject by spinning the gossamer web of the social reality within which that subject lives. If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cuts the thread of futurity, if the jouissance, the excess enjoyment, by which we are defined would destroy the other, fetishistic, identity-confirming jouissance through which the social order congeals around the rituals of its own reproduction, then the only oppositional status to which our queerness can properly lead us depends on our taking seriously the place of the death drive</u> as which we figure and insisting, against the cult of the child and the political culture it supports, that we are not, to quote Guy Hocquenghem, " <u>"the signifier of what might become a new form of 'social organization' (138), that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter future, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement,   in the form of the future by construing futurity itself as merely a form of reproduction</u>. Instead we choose not to choose the child, as image of the imaginary past or as identificatory link to the symbolic future; we would bury the subject in the tomb that waits in the hollow of the signifier and pronounce at last the words we are condemned from the outset for having said anyway: that we are the advocates of abortion; that the child as figure of futurity must die; that <u>we have seen the future and it's every bit as lethal as the past; and thus what is queerest about us, queerest within us, and queerest despite us, is our willingness to insist intransitively: to insist that the future stops here.</u>

Utopianism = Passivism

Post-colonial futurism and utopianism are non-falsifiable and make it impossible to create coalitions or enact political change – its built on a flawed foundation

Niezen, 07 (Ronald Niezen holds the Katharine A. Pearson Chair in Civil Society and Public Policy in the faculties of Law and of Arts, a Tier 1 Canada Research Chair in the Anthropology of Law, and is a Professor and former Chair of the Department of Anthropology., "Postcolonialism and the Utopian Imagination", 21 September 2007)

Postcolonial futurism has no answer to the problems and paradoxes of cultural claims and collective strivings toward distinctiveness and selfdetermination other than to imagine a world in which they do not exist. Recalling that postcolonialism also encourages nationalist essentialism, this means that there are two antipathetic, mutually negating versions of postcolonial liberation: one looking toward a future of borderless global cultural liberation, another toward a more immediate, intellectuallyinspired era of cultural affirmation and autonomy. Postcolonial futurism commits the fundamental error, once widely attributed to Marxism, of anticipating a global state of collective being that underestimates the propensity toward national or minority identities based on affirmation of the rights of peoples, today often expressed in terms of cultural distinctiveness coupled with claims of political self-determination. But the national and universalist versions of postcolonial liberation are, at least in one sense, complementary. The utopian imagination is able to make particular cultural allegiances seem more palatable for global consumption, to mask the unpleasant flavours of indigenophilism and small-scale identity politics with saccharine promises of unconditional liberation from the levelling powers of nation-states. It is able to reconfigure particular cultural aspirations in a way that removes from view their tensions, contradictions and proclivities to intolerance, while leaving intact their most compelling promises of inclusion, spiritual awareness, intimacy and affirmation. This brings us to the most important question that follows from the recent resurgence of utopian visions: what is wrong with hope? Why should we deny dreamers the consolation of their fantasies? Is not the capacity to imagine a different and better world the most important component of our ability to change the world for the better? And does it POSTCOLONIALISM AND THE UTOPIAN IMAGINATION 727 Downloaded by [] at 07:10 18 July 2015 not follow that denying the possibility of imagining a radically different future might result in a crippling of the capacities to criticize present institutional injustices and dysfunctions and to create better institutions and forms of governance? There is a relatively simple answer to this: hope for the future goes astray whenever it is built upon a mistaken understanding of present conditions; and there is no definitive way to correct its errors. The utopian imagination is by its very nature free to elaborate radically different-from-the-present visions of a yet-to-be-realized society, founded on misleading, irrational understandings of the present circumstances or propensities of human social life. There is a sense in which utopianism, when tolerated as a form of intellectual discourse, can wreak havoc on recognized forms of critical etiquette. How might one, as a critic, point conclusively to a misrepresentation of the collective future? One of the appeals of utopianism is its immunity from falsification. Certain dreams are inherently adverse to the stimulants of facts, practicalities and openness to revision. The postcolonial utopian imagination is especially fraught with dilemmas and improbabilities. Although being largely premised on postmodernism's rejection of 'grand narratives', and although expressing its vision of the future as one of permissiveness and cultural freedom, it indirectly possesses its own civilizing agenda to which all others are expected to conform. Insofar as it does articulate a specific vision of future change, it anticipates the dismantling of existing structures of

nation-states and institutions of global governance, while maintaining a naı̈ve faith in the emergence, out of conditions of revolutionary change and insecurity, of a free-flowing global cultural ecumene. Does this mean that there is no form of utopian imagination applicable to conditions of planetary integration, one that can offer realizable inspiration without engaging in obscurantism, cultural fundamentalism or civilizing agendas? My perspective suggests that postcolonial idealism makes it almost impossible to learn from the actual disorderly processes of negotiating and overcoming differences. But perhaps it is yet possible to construct a vision of the future that acknowledges the untidiness and disarray of human identities. Whatever other qualities it might have, such futurism would begin with the following premise: we have more to learn from those who have struggled through conflict, compromise and reconciliation to achieve a condition of peace than from those who are content to imagine away the obstacles to an otherwise unachievable ideal.

Iconoclastic and Blueprint Utopianism Worthless.

Jacoby 5 (Jacoby, Russell. is a professor of history at the University of California Los Angeles an author, and critic of academic culture. Preface. Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age. New York: Columbia UP, 2005. Ix. Print. Preface xv)

I turn instead to the iconoclastic utopians, those who dreamt of a superior society but who declined to give its precise measurements. In the original sense and for the original reasons, they were iconoclasts; they were protesters and breakers of images. Explicitly or implicitly they observed the biblical prohibition on graven images of the deity. "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image. . . . Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them" (Exodus ⬜⬜:⬜–⬜). This prohibition, of course, entailed no disrespect of God. On the contrary: it honored Him by refusing to circumscribe Him. In the same way that God could not be depicted for the Jews, the future could not be described for the iconoclastic utopians; it could only be approached through hints and parables. One could "hear" the future, but not see it. Ernst Bloch's ⬜⬜⬜⬜ Spirit of Utopia, the classic work in this genre, offers no concrete details about the future. He invokes a utopian spirit purely by his reflections on music, poetry, and literature. I survey the roots and contours of such iconoclastic utopianism—iconoclastic inasmuch as it eschews blueprints and utopian inasmuch as it evokes a future "bliss of the fully contented."11 The blueprint utopians have attracted the lion's share of attention—both scholarly and popular. They describe utopias in vivid colors; their proposals can be studied and embraced or rejected. From Thomas More to Edward Bellamy, their utopias took the form of stories in which travelers report of their adventures from an unknown future or land. They offered characters, events, and particulars. Bellamy's Looking Backward, a classic of blueprint utopianism, commences with a straightforward Preface xv JACOBY FM 1/24/05 9:29 PM Page xv narrative. "I first saw the light in the city of Boston in the year ⬜⬜⬜⬜." By contrast, the iconoclastic utopians offer little concrete to grab onto; they provide neither tales nor pictures of the morrow. Next to the blueprinters they appear almost as ineffable as they actually are. They vanish into the margins of utopianism. Bloch's Spirit of Utopia opens mysteriously. "I am. We are. That is enough. Now we have to begin." In regard to the future the iconoclasts were ascetic, but they were not ascetics. This point must be underlined inasmuch as iconoclasm sometimes suggests a severe and puritanical temper. If anything, it is a longing for luxe and sensuousness that defines the iconoclastic utopian, not a cold purity. In an image-obsessed society such as our own, I suggest that the traditional blueprint utopianism may be exhausted and the iconoclastic utopianism indispensable. The iconoclastic utopians resist the modern seduction of images. Pictures and graphics are not new, of course, but their ubiquity is. A curtain of images surrounds us from morning till night and from

childhood to old age. The word—both written and oral—seems to retreat in the wake of these images. "Everything," writes the theologian Jacques Ellul in his defense of modern iconoclasm, The Humiliation of the Word, "is subordinated to visualization, and nothing has meaning outside it." We are living in an "age of extreme visualization."12

Utopianism papers over the most crucial aspects of creating a new future – fully rendered political utopias are not useful roadmaps to change

Niezen, 07 (Ronald Niezen holds the Katharine A. Pearson Chair in Civil Society and Public Policy in the faculties of Law and of Arts, a Tier 1 Canada Research Chair in the Anthropology of Law, and is a Professor and former Chair of the Department of Anthropology., "Postcolonialism and the Utopian Imagination", 21 September 2007)

Attempting to define the concept of utopia introduces the multi-dimensional inconvenience of a rich literature in which there are paradigmatic historical transformations leading up to a confusion of meanings in the present. In the most general terms possible, utopianism is a literary form that describes the essential features of an ideal future society. The modern utopian tradition therefore begins with the rise of lay literacy and the development (or rediscovery) of a secular, humanistic, practical approach to human perfectibility. The term utopian imagination does not necessarily mean the disposition toward elaboration of fully formed visions of humanity's future. It also refers to more subtly rendered dreams of the future, based on assumptions of human perfectibility, usually accompanied by expectations of their actualization. It describes a future world that has already gone through revolutionary transformation, without the nature of that revolution (particularly its traumas) being fully elaborated. If there is a common logic to the many different dreams of utopia, it can be found simply in the expectation of better things tomorrow, projecting into the indeterminate future the amelioration of present deficiencies, a kind of wish fulfilment for humanity. The utopian imagination does not just depict alternative worlds, but worlds that somehow transcend the conflicts and dysfunctions of lived reality. What are the particular forms of utopian imagination that might find root in the current intellectual terrain? This question is complicated by the fact that until fairly recently there was a general consensus among social theorists that utopian thinking had dramatically declined, having been suppressed in one way or another by conditions of late modernity. Manuel and Manuel's epic survey of Western utopian thought, for example, concludes with the observation that, unlike previous ages in which there was a rich imaginary of ingenious and often bizarre alternatives to the state, family, sexual mores, private property, and so on, there was in the late twentieth century a 'discrepancy between the piling up of technological and scientific instrumentalities for making all things possible, and the pitiable poverty of goals'.5 Only two decades ago Habermas argued that the West's successful projects of social democracy and the welfare state had taken much of the allure out of utopian projects, mainly by creating a politico-economic order that forbade any radically different alternative, placing limits on dissent and particularly on radical designs for a better future.6 Views may have differed on the causes of the steep decline in utopianism in late modernity—the dampening effect of the spectacular failure of several major forms of political imperialism driven by ideological futurism, notably fascism and Soviet communism, has been the most common and straightforward explanation—and they may have differed on the significance that should be attached to the decline, ranging from 716 ISRAEL AFFAIRS Downloaded by [] at 07:10 18 July 2015 nostalgic regret to celebration of an end to a politically dangerous form of irrationalism, but until very recently there was broad consensus surrounding the view that utopian projects came quietly to an end some time during the post-World War II period of the twentieth century. Part of the reason

for this perception of decline has been an undue emphasis on fully rendered political utopias with less consideration given to alternative, comparatively formless visions of the future. But just because the modernist visions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are now largely discredited does not mean that the propensity to envision an ideal future, particularly in times of accelerated global change, has diminished. We must be alert to the possibility that it has simply taken new forms, not just those familiar ideas that reject the dystopias of uncontrolled science and global tyranny, but more often creative varieties of ambitious optimism. Today, universal ideals of liberation seem to be keeping pace with new perspectives on globalization, and we should expect that out of the promise and insecurities of a rapidly integrating world there would again emerge hopeful visions of the human future.

Utopianism = Violence

Utopianism paves the way to totalitarianism and endless
Jacoby 2005

(Jacoby, Russell. professor of history at the University of California Los Angeles an author, and critic of academic culture Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age. New York: Columbia UP, 2005. Print. Page 12-13)

The common wisdom that <u>utopias inexorably lead to dystopias not only derives from texts, it appeals to history</u> to make its case. New words help make the argument. Like "dystopia," the term "genocide" belongs to the twentieth century. Inevitably these new terms seem related; they seem to address kindred experiences. Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish refugee, coined "genocide" in 🯄🯄🯄🯄 "to denote an old practice in its modern development"—the annihilation of a national or ethnic group. He believed the Nazi practices occasioned a new word.43 While Lemkin worked tirelessly to spread the news about genocide—with few rewards44—he did not associate it with either utopia or dystopia.45 Yet <u>scholarly and conventional opinion today consistently links genocide and utopia and bills the blood bath of the twentieth century to "utopians" such as Stalin, Hitler, and Mao</u>. From Hannah Arendt's 🯄🯄🯄🯄 Origins of Totalitarianism to Martin Malia's 🯄🯄🯄🯄 Soviet Tragedy—its last chapter is titled "The Perverse Logic of Utopia"—scholars have thrown communism, Nazism, and utopia into one tub. Prestigious savants like Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper have persuasively argued that <u>utopia leads to totalitarianism and mass murder.</u> "We must beware of Utopia," wrote Ralf Dahrendorf. "<u>Whoever sets out to implement Utopian plans will in the first instance have to wipe clean the canvas, on which the real world is painted. This is a brutal process of destruction;" it leads to hell on earth.</u>46 To question this approach requires asking what utopias are actually about—and why, for instance, Nazism should not be deemed a utopian enterprise. Even the vaguest description of utopia as a society inspired by notions of happiness, fraternity, and plenty would apparently exclude Nazism with its notion of Ayrans dominating inferiors in a Thousand Year Reich. What An Anarchic Breeze 🯄🯄 JACOBY CH 01 1/24/05 9:23 PM Page 13 connects Thomas More's Utopia and Hitler's Mein Kampf? Virtually nothing.47

Utopianism is Tyranny disguised as ideology.

Levin '12 (Levin, Mark R. Lawyer, worked in the administration of President Ronald Reagan and was a chief of staff for Attorney General Edwin Meese. Ameritopia: The Unmaking of America. New York: Threshold Editions, 2012. Print. Page 5.)

<u>Tyranny,</u> broadly define, i<u>s the use of power to dehumanize the individual and delegitimize his nature</u>. Political <u>utopianism is tyranny disguised as a desirable</u>, workable, and even paradisiacal governing ideology. <u>There are</u>, of course, <u>unlimited utopian constructs, for the mind is capable of infinite fantasies. But there are common themes</u>. <u>The fantasies take the form of grand social plans or experiments</u>, the impracticability and impossibility of which, in small ways and large, lead to the individuals subjugation. Karl <u>Popper</u>, a philosopher who eloquently <u>deconstructed the false assumption and scientific utopianism, arguing it is totalitarian in form and substance</u>, observed that "<u>[a]ny social science which does not teach the impossibility of rational social construction is entirely blind to the most important facts of social life, and must overlook the only social laws of real validity and of real importance.</u> Social sciences seeking to provide a background for social engineering cannot, therefore, be true descriptions of social facts. They are impossible in themselves. Popper argued that <u>unable to make detailed or precise sociological</u>

predictions, long-term forecasts it considers worth pursuing. (Although Popper differentiated between "piecemeal social engineering" and "utopian social engineering," it is an ahistorical, or at least a leap of faith, to suggest that one unleashed, the social engineers will not become addicted to their power; and Popper never could enunciate a practical solution.)

Utopianism is pseudo-science and reasoning, stripping individuals of their personal Identity and making them a subject of whomever is in charge.

Levin 12 (Levin, Mark R. Lawyer, worked in the administration of President Ronald Reagan and was a chief of staff for Attorney General Edwin Meese. Ameritopia: The Unmaking of America. New York: Threshold Editions, 2012. Print. Page 5.)

Utopianism substitute's glorious predictions and unachievable promises for knowledge, science, and reason, while laying claim to them all. Yet there is nothing new in deception disguised as hope and nothing original in abstraction framed as progress. A heavenly society is said to be within reach if only the individual surrenders more of his liberty and being for the general good, meaning the good as prescribed by the state. If he refuses, he will be tormented and ultimately coerced into compliance, for conformity is essential. Indeed, nothing good can come of self-interest, which is condemned as morally indefensible and empty. Through persuasion, deceit, and coercion, the individual must be stripped of his identity and subordinated to the state. He must abandon his own ambitions of the state. His first duty must be to the state - not family, community, and faith, all of which challenge the authority of the state. Once dispirited, the individual can be molded by the state with endless social experiments and lifestyles calibrations.

Utopianism is a way to try to shape individuals and divide them creating more violence and recreating the same oppressive society

Levin '12 (Levin, Mark R. Lawyer, worked in the administration of President Ronald Reagan and was a chief of staff for Attorney General Edwin Meese. Ameritopia: The Unmaking of America. New York: Threshold Editions, 2012. Print. Page 7.)

Utopianism also attempts to shape and dominate the individual by doing two things at once: it strips the individual of his uniqueness, making him indistinguishable from the multitudes that form what is commonly referred to as "the masses," but it simultaneously assigns him a group identity based on race, ethnicity, age, gender, income, etc., to highlight differences within the masses. It then exacerbates old rivalries and disputes or it incites new ones. This way it can speak to the well-being of "the people" as a whole while dividing them against themselves, thereby stampeding them in once direction or another as necessary to collapse the existing society or rule over the new one.

'Afro' K

Their use of the pre-fix 'afro' to avoid a wider discussion of futurism begs the question of why they called their args futurist in the first instance – it only creates racial dissonance that causes their argument to become incoherent
Tshepo Mahasha, black philosopher and filmmaker, 13 – Phetogo, "Art Criticism: is the prefix 'Afro-' (as in "Afro-futurism") arresting our imagination and manifesto salesmanship?" July 14, http://www.thisisafrica.me/visual-arts/detail/19943/art-criticism-is-the-prefix-afro-as-in-afro-futurism-arresting-our-imagination-and-manifesto-salesmanship.

A prefix modifies a word/statement. The prefix 'Afro-' as used in art criticism modifies existing manifestos. In my opinion, it does not promote the generation of wholly new ideas and manifestos, but only the modification of the creativity of others. The prefix 'afro-' has acquired a parasitic character, leeching off manifestos: Afro-Surrealism, Afro-Punk, Afro-Futurism and Afro-etc. I think it has the capacity to arrest African imagination, so that the African imagination only follows other manifestos, only to attach itself to them and never coming up with an original of its own. I wouldn't have a problem with it because creativity is about modifying elements that are already there to create something new, but given what's out there at this point I have an objection. Just a quick internet search reveals that the movie The Matrix is listed as Afro-futurism on some websites. It can go to the point where Afro-futurism can only be about a person of colour in a future space, when in fact for a project like 'The Matrix', the faces and races are interchangeable, it would still be what it is without black people in it. I read an Afro-Surrealist manifesto written by D. Scot Miller and it had me asking a few questions. In this manifesto, Miller outlines what isn't Afro-Surrealism. He writes, "Afro-Surrealism is not surrealism." "…Leopold Senghor, poet, first president of Senegal, and African Surrealist, made this distinction: 'European Surrealism is empirical. African Surrealism is mystical and metaphorical.'" And then he says of Afro-Surrealism, "[it] presupposes that beyond this visible world, there is an invisible world striving to manifest, and it is our job to uncover it." And he goes on to say, "Afro-Surrealists restore the cult of the past. We revisit old ways with new eyes. We appropriate 19th century slavery symbols, like Kara Walker, and 18th century colonial ones, like Yinka Shonibare. We re-introduce 'madness' as visitations from the gods, and acknowledge the possibility of magic. We take up the obsessions of the ancients and kindle the dis-ease, clearing the murk of the collective unconsciousness as it manifests in these dreams called culture" Miller claims that Afro-Surrealism is NOT Surrealism. And then he goes on to define something that's different from 'Surrealism' and calls it 'Afro-Surreal'. My question when I read Miller's Manifesto was why call it Afro-Surrealism if it is not Surrealism? Why prefix the word Surrealism with 'Afro-'? Most importantly, since it is so different from surrealism, why not call it something entirely new? Miller considers The Neptunes early music Afro-futurist. Would that same music if it was produced by a person of a different race still be considered Afro-futurist? What made it fundamentally Afro-futurist except for race?

Their use of 'afro' as a signifier to modify and distinguish their argument from other forms of criticism must be rejected – it limits imaginative possibilities and homogenizes experience

Tshepo Mahasha, black philosopher and filmmaker, 13 – Phetogo, "Art Criticism: is the prefix 'Afro-' (as in "Afro-futurism") arresting our imagination and manifesto salesmanship?" July 14, http://www.thisisafrica.me/visual-arts/detail/19943/art-criticism-is-the-prefix-afro-as-in-afro-futurism-arresting-our-imagination-and-manifesto-salesmanship.

As I have explored my views, I concluded: a) The use of the prefix 'afro-' needs to be minimized for the sake of **freeing African imagination**. Since I can't foresee and cover the entire use of the prefix, I am referring to the points that I've covered in this essay in relation to art-criticism. I see it as a **necessity** for the sake of encouraging imagination to grow, and not be restricted to – or attached to - other pre-existing manifestos and make it harder for ourselves to come up with something unique. **Minimizing the 'afro' prefix would promote fresh thinking**. Afro-manifestos have a "leeching" tinge to them. They are forms of reacting to things instead of all out attempt at 'originality' - Black people reacting to other manifestos: Punk (Afro-Punk), Surrealism (Afro-Surrealism) etc. I haven't even taken into account that Afro-futurism may be a misnomer, when looked at with the "Futurism" manifesto. b) Art critics need to be bold enough to give things stand-alone names. Everything is about encouraging invention. 'High-life' music is highlife. The implication being that any person of any descent can do Highlife music; can the same be easily said for any of the 'Afro-' prefixed semi-manifestos? Or does it pivot on race? Can a Japanese person do 'Afro-punk' and if so, would it require another prefix to be Japanese-Afro-Punk? I have difficulty answering these questions. I don't think I'm way off in imagining the South American manifesto of 'Magic Realism' would be called 'Afro-something' if it was being done by people of African descent. We need to encourage new names and manifestos. c) The African Renaissance is about creating a floor in a much larger context, one that aims for African people to be free amongst other free people. It's about freeing the African from the "struggle for reason" by collecting and restoring artefacts, and projecting these into the future so that this base will always be available to future generations. It is either within the context of ultimate freedom (Free to explore and create new black African identities, new Manifestos) and/or the offsetting of "the struggle for reason" that cultural production takes place and should be evaluated in. It must be recognized that 'some' current African Art cannot be contextualized without mention of the Renaissance and its excavations. Even as I write this I have doubts that of course I may be biased. It took a long time to finish this essay and to publish it. I wouldn't like to speak only for myself, I'd like to believe that there must be others who feel the same as I do. I don't, for a second, doubt the force of my imagination. My mind may change in time about the contents of this essay but at this point I am convinced.

Cap Links

Afro-futurism is a form of anti-historicism which abandons materialism in favor of textual and rhetorical determinations of reality. Historical disengagement abdicates power and guarantees the continuation of a white capital regime.
Foster '97 (John Bellamy, Department of Sociology at Oregon, "In Defense of History, In Defense of History, ed. Foster & Wood)

The weaknesses of postmodernism-from an emancipatory perspective- thus far overshadow its strengths. Missing from Foucault's analysis, like that of postmodernism generally, is any conception of a counter-order to the disciplinary orders described. In the more extreme case of "textual postmodernists"-those postmodernist thinkers like Derrida, as distinct from Foucault, who deny any reality outside the text-the political and historical weaknesses from a left perspective are even more glaring. By undermining the very concept of history-in any meaningful sense beyond mere story-telling-such theorists have robbed critical analysis of what has always been its most indispensable tool.'8 The denial within postmodernist theory of the validity of historical cri- tique covers up what is really at issue: the denial of the historical critique of capitalism, leading to a convergence between left thought infected by Nietzsche and the dominant liberal "end of history" conception. The danger of such ahistorical or anti-historical views, as E.P. Thompson observed, is that one loses sight not of "reason in history" in some abstract sense, but rather of "the reasons of power and the reasons of money."9 Historical materialism at its best provides a way out of this dilemma. This is not to ignore the fact that Marxism-which has sometimes given rise to its own crude interpretations and historical travesties, as in the case of Stalinism-has frequently been identified with the kind of "totalizations" and "essentialisms" that postmodernist theorists have singled out. As Thompson pointed out in a 1977 essay on Christopher Caudwell, Marxism has sometimes relied on " `essentialist' tricks of mind," the "tendency to intellectualize the social process"-"the rapid delineation of the deep proc- ess of a whole epoch." These are things that the historian (and social scientists in general) should guard against. But to abandon theory and historical explanation entirely in order to avoid "essentialism" and "foun- dationalism" is a bit like throwing out the baby in order to keep the bathwater clean. Marx himself provided another model, actively opposing theory (even "Marxist" theory) that purported to be "suprahistorical." In his Theses on Feuerbach, he presented what still ranks as the most thorough- going critique of what he called the "essentialist" conception of human beings and nature. Indeed, historical materialism has long engaged in its own self-critique, precisely in order to expel the kinds of "essentialisms," "positivisms," and "structuralisms" that have intruded on the philosophy of praxis itself-a self-critique that has produced the insights of theorists like Gramsci, Sartre, Thompson, and Raymond Williams.20 These thinkers distanced themselves from the positivistic "official Marx- ism" that grew out of the Second International and later turned into a caricature of itself in the form of Stalinism. Yet they held firm to the critique of capitalism and their commitment to the struggles of the oppressed. Moreover, these particular examples tell us that if what has sometimes been called "the postmodern agenda"-consisting of issues like identity, culture, and language-is to be addressed at all, this can only be accomplished within a historical context. And here one might openly wonder with Foucault "what difference there could ultimately be between being a historian and being a Marxist." When placed within a more holistic historical materialist context-ani- mated by the concept of praxis-the problems raised by postmodernism look entirely different. As David McNally says, "Language is not a prison- house, but a site of struggle." What the contributions in this volume have in common is the insistence that issues like language, culture, nationality, race, gender, the environment, revolution, and history itself are only effec- tively analyzed within a context that is simultaneously historical in charac- ter, materialist (in the sense of focusing on concrete practices), and revolutionary. Such analyses do not abandon the hope of transcending capitalism, nor of the notion of human progress as a possible outcome of historical strug- gles. It is said that Nicholas I, Czar of Russia, issued an order banning the word "progress." Today we no longer believe, in a nineteenth century sense, in automatic human progress, embodying some definite content-the idea that the Czar found so threatening. But this does not mean, as the philoso- pher Michael Oakeshott contended with respect to political activity in the 1950s, that we "sail a boundless and bottomless sea" that has "neither starting-point nor appointed direction" and that our only task is "to keep afloat on an even keel." History-as centuries of struggle and indeed pro- gress suggest-is more meaningful than that. To abandon altogether the concept of progress, in the more general sense of the possibility of progres- sive human emancipation, would only be to submit to the wishes of the powers that be. Such political disengagement by intellectuals on the left in the present epoch could only mean one thing: the total obeisance to capital.21 The irony of post-modernism is that while purporting to have transcended

modernity, it abandons from the start all hope of transcending capitalism itself and entering a post-capitalist era. Postmodernist theory is therefore easily absorbed within the dominant cultural frame and has even given rise recently to texts such as Postmodern Marketing, which attempts to utilize the insights of thinkers like Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and Baudillard to market goods within a capitalist economy. Perhaps this will be the final destiny of postmodernist theory-its absorption by the vast marketing apparatus of the capitalist economy, adding irony and color to a commercial order that must constantly find new ways to insinuate itself into the every- day lives of the population. Meanwhile, historical materialism will remain the necessary intellectual ground for all those who seek, not to revel in the "carnival" of capitalist productive and market relations, but to transcend them.22

Afrofuturism operates within the assumptions of capitalism, making liberation impossible.

Greer 09 (Olivia J. Greer, MA in Performance Studies from NYU, author and contributor to HuffPo, Alternet, "Yes We Can: (President) Barack Obama and Afrofuturism," published in Anamesa http://www.nyu.edu/pubs/anamesa/archive/fall_2009_intersections/yes_we_can_president_barack_obama_and_afrofuturism.pdf)

Multiculturalism: Yes You Can In the 1993 article in which Dery coined the term Afrofuturism, he suggested to author Samuel Delany that "the young urban blacks responsible for vital art forms such as hip-hop live in what might be called 'beeper culture,' where miniatured digital technology is everywhere at hand."19 Dery posits that technology had become omnipresent—in the United States at least—and was available now even to those members of the populace to whom access to societal advances had generally been denied. Delany took issue with Dery's assessment, responding: I can detect the possibility of a naïve assumption that the redistribution of commodities is somehow congruent with the redistribution of wealth—which it is not. Just as seriously, I can detect an assumption that the distribution of commodities is at one with access to the formation of those commodities and the commodity system... When one talks about "black youth culture as a technological culture," one has to specify that it's a technological culture that's almost entirely on the receiving end of a river of "stuff," in which the young consumers have nowhere near what we might call equitable input.20 (emphasis in original) Delany's critique of consumerism disguised as participation and power is at the root of Žižek's assertion in 1997 that the "ideology of cyberspace capitalism" obliterates individuality and the "particularity of social position." For Žižek, "cyberspace capitalism" obfuscates a crucial reality that the market— and, as he notes, the World Wide Web—relies on power relations, political decisions, and institutional conditions that necessarily remove ordinary people from proximity to power, but do so by perpetuating a fantasy of "equitable input," to use Delany's words. 21 "Yes We Can" operates within the fantasy of equitable input. It perpetuates a vision of solidarity and togetherness, but it is created and disseminated within a system in which will.i.am and his celebrity participants hold a rarified position. They are privileged because they have access to Delany's "equitable input;" they are participants in the production of technology, of the market. As Ricardo Dominguez writes in Electronic Disturbance, "the celebrity acts as empirical proof positive that electronic appearance is but a record of the natural world."22 However, without proximity, "the many" can never verify the truth of the celebrity's manifestation. It is for this very reason that Bould cautions against viewing Afrofuturism as a pure mode of resistance. Cultural production operates increasingly within a capitalist frame that, despite best intentions, can be precipitous to navigate. Žižek, like Delany and Bould, argues against the idea that subversion could exist within the structures of the market. Against the image, all-present in cultural criticism, of a radical subversive discourse or practice "censored" by the Power, one is even tempted to claim that today, more than ever, the mechanism of censorship intervenes predominantly to enhance the efficiency of the power discourse itself...The gesture of self-censorship is co-substantial with the exercise of power.23 For Žižek, the mechanism of censorship (which upholds existing power structures) is multiculturalism, which he conceives as a destructive force born out of capitalism, operating from figures of capital ("the multiculturalist") outwards. The multiculturalist "respects" (in Žižek's own scare quotes) the identity of the Other, while maintaining the distance of a "privileged universal position," and thus asserting

his own superiority. In other words, multiculturalism is an invention of capitalism that encourages the separation of cultural differences as a means to uphold the homogeneity of capitalist systems. Since, as we might put it, everybody silently accepts that capitalism is here to stay—critical energy has found a substitute outlet in fighting for cultural differences which leave the basic homogeneity of the capitalist world-system intact. So we are fighting our pc battles for the rights of ethnic minorities, of gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, and so on, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march—and today's cultural theory, in the guise of "cultural studies," is doing the ultimate service to the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible.24 will.i.am's "Yes We Can"—with its development out of the most commercial arms of the entertainment industry, its dependence on celebrity, and its strained reach toward multiraciality—raises important questions about the silent acceptance of systems of oppression. The video's vision of multicultural unity, while not presenting a clear power source, operates entirely within the capitalist homogeneity Žižek outlines. Its beautiful representatives of diversity mask the capitalist ideology behind it, which goes unquestioned by anyone in the video, or by Obama himself. Bould cites Žižek's critique, stating that science fiction's "color-blind future is multiculturalist in this way."25 For Bould, "Afrofuturism tends towards the typical cyberpunk acceptance of capitalism as an unquestionable universe and working for the assimilation of certain currently marginalized peoples into a global system that might, at best, tolerate some relatively minor (although not unimportant) reforms, but within which the many will still have to poach, pilfer, and hide to survive."26 The lack of attention to "the many" who will continue to suffer under capitalism, even if a certain disrupted contemporary appearance of racism also characterizes will.i.am's video. "Yes We Can" uses the ghosting of the past, with traces of Martin Luther King, Jr. and John F. Kennedy—images of liberation not achieved, but deferred—to push for a nostalgic hope. But hope for what: the present, the future, or even the past? The sections of Obama's speech that will.i.am chooses to highlight are those that harken back to another time. "A king who took us to the mountaintop" directly conjures up images of the civil rights movement, but also harkens back to the Bible. In other parts of his full speech, Obama spoke to the challenges of the present; but these sections are not part of the video.27 The words are moving, especially when redeployed over a soundtrack of many voices, but by the end when the word "hope" turns to "vote" what is left is a sense of what DeClue calls "survival by futurity."28 This begs the question of whether mere survival is—or should be—the end goal, or whether a more radical break for future freedom is needed. Survival, Žižek might argue, is multiculturalism. will.i.am probably does not imagine "Yes We Can" adhering to Žižek's model of multicultural censorship. Yet, "Yes We Can" is part of what Henry Jenkins describes as "new participatory culture," which is forming at the intersections of new tools and technologies that "enable consumers to archive, annotate, appropriate and recirculate media content," the promotion of "do-it-yourself (DIY) media production," and the interaction of multiple forms of media.29 Jenkins writes that these trends seem to encourage active modes of spectatorship, in which audiences gain power and autonomy in a "new knowledge culture." However, Jenkins notes—recalling Žižek—"it is wrong to assume that we are somehow being liberated through improved media technologies."30 We are more often being given the idea that we are being liberated, what Néstor García Canclini calls the "illusion of participation."31 As Žižek and Bould remind us, the idea of liberation may very well be a trap.

Conclusion The purpose of this study has not been to dislocate will.i.am's "Yes We Can" video and Obama's presidential campaign and victory from the field of Afrofuturism. It is rather to caution, as Bould does from within the field, against the dangerous assumption that Afrofuturism—or any artistic movement, for that matter—is synonymous with cultural or political resistance. DeClue's conceptualization of Obama as Afrofuturist has a relationship with Victor Turner's concept of an intercultural transmission of experience that consists of a "living through," a "thinking back," and a "willing or wishing forward."32 While hypothetically this transmission might move a society forward progressively, that it will do so is not a forgone conclusion. Particularly in electoral politics, a symbolic system rife with shared rhetoric, poll numbers, familiar gestures, and inscribed public spaces (both offline and online) allow for the equal possibility of either reenacting our political reality and stabilizing the status quo, or of finding ways to resist. Even since the election of Barack Obama, the United States (and arguably the rest of the world) faces a discouraging political climate in which capitalism is an unchallenged omnipresence, even as it collapses before our eyes. Under such circumstances, it is tempting to find signs of resistance and change in our cultural and political production. Certainly these signs can be found readily, and are heartening and galvanizing. It is important though that we "stay awake," as Octavia Butler would have us do, and be wary of simple answers. 33 Artistic production, technological advance, and future visioning will not take us the whole way to political transformation. This is a position that Žižek complicates: "Even when the change is not substantial but a mere semblance of a new beginning, the very fact that a situation is perceived by the majority of the population as a 'new beginning' opens up the space for important ideological and political rearticulations."34 "Yes We Can" shows that the navigation between status quo and resistance is problematic; outcomes can be characterized not as good or bad, positive or negative, but more in terms of what they open up. Obama—and the cultural production that has developed with him—has certainly opened up an enormous space for possibility. But if that space is filled with a status quo that is called a new beginning, we may find ourselves in a multicultural morass of pretty pictures that ask only for complacency.

Cap or Wilderson Link

If Wilderson:

Afrofuturism relies on a grammar of futurity which assumes a chronopolitical landscape in which blackness has agency. This naïve simulation allows whiteness to predetermine and maintain predictable market futures.

If Cap:

The future is pre-determined by Capitalism's drive to create predictable markets. Afrofuturism engages in product placement through a non-neutral science fiction which creates self-fulfilling demand for new technologies.

Eshun 2003 (Kodwo Eshun, Writer/Filmaker, MA in English, "Further Considerations on Afrofuturism" pubished in *The New Centennial Review*
http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wakehealth.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v003/3.2eshun.html)

For African artists, there were good reasons for disenchantment with futurism. When Nkrumah was deposed in Ghana in 1966, it signalled the collapse of the first attempt to build the USAF. The combination of colonial revenge and popular discontent created sustained hostility towards the planned utopias of African socialism. For the rest of the century, African intellectuals adopted variations of the position that Homi Bhabha (1992) **[End Page 288]** termed "melancholia in revolt." This fatigue with futurity carried through to Black Atlantic cultural activists, who, little by little, ceased to participate in the process of building futures. *Imagine the archaeologists as they use their emulators to scroll through the fragile files. In their time, it is a commonplace that the future is a chronopolitical terrain, a terrain as hostile and as treacherous as the past. As the archaeologists patiently sift the twenty-first-century archives, they are amazed by the impact this realization had on these forgotten beings. They are touched by the seriousness of those founding mothers and fathers of Afrofuturism, by the responsibility they showed towards the not-yet, towards becoming.* **Control through Prediction** Fast forward to the early twenty-first century. A cultural moment when digitopian futures are routinely invoked to hide the present in all its unhappiness. In this context, inquiry into production of futures becomes fundamental, rather than trivial. The field of Afrofuturism does not seek to deny the tradition of countermemory. Rather, it aims to extend that tradition by reorienting the intercultural vectors of Black Atlantic temporality towards the proleptic as much as the retrospective. It is clear that power now operates predictively as much as retrospectively. Capital continues to function through the dissimulation of the imperial archive, as it has done throughout the last century. Today, however, power also functions through the envisioning, management, and delivery of reliable futures. In the colonial era of the early to middle twentieth century, avant-gardists from Walter Benjamin to Frantz Fanon revolted in the name of the future against a power structure that relied on control and representation of the historical archive. Today, the situation is reversed. The powerful employ futurists and draw power from the futures they endorse, thereby condemning the disempowered to live in the past. The present moment is stretching, slipping for some into yesterday, reaching for others into tomorrow. **[End Page 289]** *SF Capital* Power now deploys a mode the critic Mark Fisher (2000) calls *SF* (science fiction) *capital.* SF capital is the synergy, the positive feedback between future-oriented media and capital. The alliance between cybernetic futurism and "New Economy" theories argues that information is a direct generator of economic value. Information about the future therefore circulates as an increasingly important commodity. It exists in mathematical formalizations such as computer simulations, economic projections, weather reports, futures trading, think-tank reports, consultancy papers—and through informal descriptions such as science-fiction cinema, science-fiction novels, sonic fictions, religious prophecy, and venture capital. Bridging the two are formal-informal

hybrids, such as the global scenarios of the professional market futurist. Looking back at the media generated by the computer boom of the 1990s, it is clear that the effect of the futures industry—defined here as the intersecting industries of technoscience, fictional media, technological projection, and market prediction—has been to fuel the desire for a technology boom. Given this context, it would be naïve to understand science fiction, located within the expanded field of the futures industry, as merely prediction into the far future, or as a utopian project for imagining alternative social realities. Science fiction might better be understood, in Samuel R. Delany's statement, as offering "a significant distortion of the present" (*Last Angel of History* 1995). To be more precise, science fiction is neither forward-looking nor utopian. Rather, in William Gibson's phrase, science fiction is a means through which to preprogram the present (cited in Eshun 1998). Looking back at the genre, it becomes apparent that science fiction was never concerned with the future, but rather with engineering feedback between its preferred future and its becoming present. Hollywood's 1990s love for sci-tech fictions, from *The Truman Show* to *The Matrix,* from *Men in Black* to *Minority Report,* can therefore be seen as product-placed visions of the reality-producing power of computer networks, which in turn contribute to an explosion in the technologies they hymn. As New Economy ideas take hold, virtual futures generate capital. A subtle oscillation between prediction and control is being engineered in **[End Page 290]** which successful or powerful descriptions of the future have an increasing ability to draw us towards them, to command us to make them flesh. **The Futures Industry** Science fiction is now a research and development department within a futures industry that dreams of the prediction and control of tomorrow. Corporate business seeks to manage the unknown through decisions based on scenarios, while civil society responds to future shock through habits formatted by science fiction. Science fiction operates through the power of falsification, the drive to rewrite reality, and the will to deny plausibility, while the scenario operates through the control and prediction of plausible alternative tomorrows. Both the science-fiction movie and the scenario are examples of cybernetic futurism that talks of things that haven't happened yet in the past tense. In this case, futurism has little to do with the Italian and Russian avant-gardes; rather, these approaches seek to model variation over time by oscillating between anticipation and determinism. *Imagine the All-African Archaeological Program sweeping the site with their chronometers. Again and again, they sift the ashes. Imagine the readouts on their portables, indicators pointing to the dangerously high levels of hostile projections. This area shows extreme density of dystopic forecasting, levels that, if accurate, would have rendered the archaeologists' own existence impossible. The AAAP knows better: such statistical delirium reveals the fervid wish dreams of the host market.* **Market Dystopia** If global scenarios are descriptions that are primarily concerned with making futures safe for the market, then Afrofuturism's first priority is to recognize that Africa increasingly exists as the object of futurist projection. African social reality is overdetermined by intimidating global scenarios, doomsday economic projections, weather predictions, medical reports on AIDS, and life-expectancy forecasts, all of which predict decades of immiseration. These powerful descriptions of the future demoralize us; they command us to bury our heads in our hands, to groan with sadness. Commissioned by multinationals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), these developmental futurisms function as the other side of the corporate utopias that make the future safe for industry. Here, we are seduced not by smiling faces staring brightly into a screen; rather, we are menaced by predatory futures that insist the next 50 years will be hostile. Within an economy that runs on SF capital and market futurism, Africa is always the zone of the absolute dystopia. There is always a reliable trade in market projections for Africa's socioeconomic crises. Market dystopias aim to warn against predatory futures, but always do so in a discourse that aspires to unchallengeable certainty.

Agamben K

at: cosmo

The Kritik terminally reinforces state power --- retrenches 1ac impacts
Pallitto and Heyman 8 – Political Science, Seton Hall University; Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The University of Texas at El Paso (Robert and Josiah, "Theorizing Cross-Border Mobility: Surveillance, Security and Identity", 2008, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/viewFile/3426/3389) KW

One such analysis involves the concept of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism covers various phenomena within which political and cultural imaginations become relatively unbounded, losing their localized prejudices and sentiments, and thus cosmopolitanism is, predictably, often celebrated as a triumph of technology, or of social-cultural development (Vertovec and Cohen, 2002). However, its benefits are **unequally distributed, and they come at a cost**. The mobility freedom enjoyed by some depends on an **"authoritarian underside" that denies movement to others** (Sparke, 2006: 173, 174). Mobility freedom can be seen as a right or as a privilege, but either way it usually comes with greater speed of movement and lower designation of risk; that is, high rights and high speed are mutually reinforcing, and they are associated with lower risk. Those designated as "higher-risk," on the other hand, will experience risk in a double sense: they are seen to pose a higher risk of harm to others, and at the same time they themselves are more at risk for state scrutiny, detention and even mistreatment. Ulrich Beck (1992,1999) sees risks as products of modern and post-modern technological, social, and economic processes, creating new, shared domains of political collectivity that cut across traditionally bounded polities. Risk calculations made on a global scale can drive political decisionmaking, with the resulting calculations shaping the space for action in a postmodern context. This may be plausible for some issues (such as global warming), but as our analysis of securitization of movement after 9/11 shows, world risk may also result in greater differentiation of treatment and potentially segmentation of subjectivities. When applied to social groups, risk calculation is problematic because of its stratifying effect that entrenches the unequal position of those at the losing end of the rights/risk/speed calculus.

at: deleuze

Sovereign surveillance imposes self-regulation upon the populace --- we become objectified through the gaze of an unseen seer

Yet what emerges is, on the one hand, a theory of the top-down management of a population that is controlled through governmental mechanisms such as statistics-guided surveillance and police practices, and, on the other hand, the bottom-up subjectivization of population through the regulation of actions confronted with state power relations; this may also be regarded as biopolitical population control and individualizing discipline, respectively. These two streams of governmentality surface in Foucault's later writings from time to time, but he never clearly reconciles the art of government and subjectivization. This subjective 'conduct' or 'governing the self' is a self-disciplining that is made possible through the knowledge of oneself as 'the other', as the object of an unseen seer (as is discussed with the panoptic model in Discipline and Punish). This self-conduct, however, is framed in terms of the problematic of government that uses the power relation techniques of governing others to govern themselves (Foucault 2000, 340-342); but again, where do these two points converge and differ? It seems as though we must look to surveillance to answer this question. We know that surveillance is certainly a governmental 'technique' for the management and control of the population, but we also see that subjectivization is only possible via surveillance, as just mentioned with the panoptic model. However, panoptic surveillance is an ancient notion, developed at least as far back as EBII, sometime around 3000-2650BC (Yekutieli 2006, 78). The relation between the seer and the subject is no longer that of a physical perspective from a point fixe, nor is it localised in a contained space, as with Bentham's prison model. Rather, as Paul Virilio would argue, surveillance is making the traditionally confined space of the camp the very centre of the city. However, before examining the juridical-political applications of this notion, we must understand Giorgio Agamben's conception of biopolitics in terms of "bare life" and "the state of exception".

at: derrida

Derrida fundamentally misunderstands Agamben

Donahue 13 (Luke Donahue is a writer who specializes in deconstruction, "Erasing Differences between Derrida and Agamben" 2013 Oxford Literary Review p. 29-30)///CW

While Part One of Homo Sacer focuses on the sovereign who appears¶ most in the law, Part Two focuses on the banished ex-citizen who¶ appears most devoid of law and most animal. This exile is homo sacer,¶ excluded from the legal order. But while exiled from the polis, he is¶ not completely abandoned to animal life: just as the sovereign state¶ of exception still holds a relation to law, so too does homo sacer. When¶ Agamben calls homo sacer bare life, he does not mean that bare life is the¶ pure, unqualified life of zoe. Rather, bare life is a 'zone of indistinction'¶ between zoe and bios, between life that is absolutely animal and life¶ that is qualified as human and political. While bare life is commonly¶ confused with zoe, Agamben says clearly: 'Neither political bios nor¶ natural zoe, sacred life is the zone of indistinction in which zoe and bios¶ constitute each other in including and excluding each other' (HS, 90).7¶ What is more, while bare life is the play between bios and zoe, there is¶ no bios or zoe prior to the bare life of homo sacer. Just as nature and¶ culture only appear after the originary confusion between them, so the¶ condition of possibility of the appearance of either pure bios or pure¶ zoe is the originary co-contamination that 'precedes' either of them.¶ Derrida continually misunderstands these points when he identifies¶ bare life with zoe, as in the following apposition: 'bare life (zoe)'.8¶ This confusion gives Derrida the impression that 'Agamben is required¶ to demonstrate that the difference between zoe and bios is absolutely¶ rigorous' (BS, 326). But Agamben's point is just the opposite: the¶ distinction never was rigorous. There never was an original unity or¶ an original and secure difference.

Derrida misunderstands Agamben's argument --- the fact that bios and zoe cannot be separated is the entire point

Kotsko 12 (Adam Kotsko is Assistant Professor of Humanities at Shimer College in Chicago and the translator of Giorgio Agamben's Sacrament of Language: An Archeology of the Oath, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, and Opus Dei: An Archeology of Duty "On Derrida's critique of Agamben" 6/30/12 https://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/30/on-derridas-critique-of-agamben/)///CW

I have not closely studied Derrida's critique of Agamben from The Beast and the Sovereign, yet given how frequently it's been deployed by Agamben skeptics, I feel comfortable giving a brief, blog-style response to it: that bios and zoē cannot be neatly distinguished does not undermine Agamben's project, but is indeed the entire point. Agamben reads the Western tradition as a series of increasingly destructive failed attempts to separate them out in some kind of stable and sustainable way. The reason these attempts fail is that the neat distinction is impossible — indeed, even in the encounter between the sovereign (the very embodiment of bios as political life) and the homo sacer (the emblem of zoē as bare life), which should surely count as the starkest possible contrast between these two concepts of life, an uncanny overlapping occurs wherein both are included through their very exclusion.¶ Agamben is thus not trying to get rid of bios in favor of a pure zoē — i.e., to abolish politics and allow us all to return to our raw animality or unblemished nature — but to get at another politics, another form of life that would not be governed by this founding opposition of the contingent historical reality that is Western politics.¶ There is doubtless a lot to be said in critique of Agamben's project, but Derrida's critique misses its target as far as I can tell.

at: give back the land

We internal link turn --- biopolitical control produces a logic that culminates in <u>global colonization</u> --- nobody is safe, not even the colonizers

Mendieta, 4/25/**2002** – associate professor of Philosophy at Stony Brook University (Eduardo, "'To make live and to let die' –Foucault on Racism", American Psychological Association Central Division Meeting, p. 1-2)//roetlin

Briefly, in Stoler's work I discern two main criticisms. On the one hand that Foucault failed to give enough attention to <u>the colonial dimensions of the emergence of biopolitics</u>. On the hand, Stoler affirms that Foucault abandoned the line of investigation pursued in the 1976 lectures. The first criticism is only acceptable if we weaken its claims. In other words, Foucault did fail to pay attention to the details of the way in which <u>the normalization of the political body of a population was related to projects of **foreign colonization**</u>. Yet, Foucault is not conceptually and theoretically <u>unaware of their complicity and interdependence</u>. At one point in the lectures he explicitly talks about the way in which the emergence of <u>the biopower state is a form of **internal colonization**</u>, in which <u>the tactics of the domestication and normalization of the colonized body are applied on the colonizing body</u>. The second criticism would not stand if we read the 1976 lectures, along with those in 1977, as well as his Tanner lectures, and the lectures gathered in the volume edited by Martin, Gutman, and Hutton (1988). I think that the two last volumes of the history of sexuality to be printed during Foucault's life time eclipsed his work on governmentality and political rationality (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991) 2 Nonetheless, let me just offer the following synoptic overview of the lectures. The lectures dealt with: First and foremost a retrospective look at what Foucault had been doing over the last five years, since he had been elected to the Collège de France. This retrospective look sought to cull the conceptual elements of the approach that have been used in works like the Archeology of Knowledge, and Discipline und Punish. In the first two lectures, published in the 1980 volume edited by Colin Gordon, Knowledge/Power, Foucault lays out his understanding of the relationship between archeology, genealogy, and subjugated knowledges, on the one hand, and legitimate, official, and erudite forms of knowledge on the other. Foucault also distinguished between two paradigms or forms of understanding power. On one side we have what he calls <u>the economicist form of power that attributes to the sovereign a legitimate right that this then can exert upon subjects as a form of contract</u>. The key words of this representation of power are: **right, law, and jurisprudence**. This is <u>the juridical idea of power. On the other side we have</u> what Foucault calls <u>a disciplinary form of power,</u> which is above all anti-sovereign, and anti-judicial. It <u>is a form of control that exerts force by normalizing, and creating the conditions of **surveillance** that lead to subjects' docility. It is a form of power that</u> is diffused and does not act on individuals, but <u>determines a horizon of action.</u> It does not discipline, but normalizes. It does not operate on juridical rules, or rights, but on norms and standards that refer to a social technology. It is a power that emerges with the development of the human sciences, and in particular the sciences of normalization. In this way, this power is not centralized, but diffused, not owned, but anonymous, not exerted, but relayed and lived.

at: neoliberalism

Case turns the K --- the system's motor will never be jammed in a world of security's state of exception

Agamben, 2000 (Giorgio Agamben, professor of philosophy at the European Graduate School; "Means Without End," Univ. Minnesota Press, 2000, pg. 133)

Nothing is more nauseating than the impudence with which those who have turned money into their only raison d'etre periodically wave around the scarecrow of economic crisis: the rich nowadays wear plain rags so as to warn the poor that sacrifices will be necessary for everybody. And the docility is just as astonishing; those who have made themselves stolidly complicitous with the imbalance of the public debt, by handing all their savings over to the state in exchange for bonds, now receive the warning blow without batting an eyelash and ready themselves to tighten their belts. And yet those who have any lucidity left in them know that <u>the crisis is always in process and</u> that <u>it constitutes the internal motor of capitalism</u> in its present phase, much as <u>the state of exception is today the normal structure of political power</u>. And <u>just as the state of exception requires that there be increasingly numerous sections of residents deprived of political rights</u> and that in fact at the outer limit all citizens be reduced to naked life, <u>in such a way crisis, having now become permanent, demands</u> not only that the people of the Third World become increasingly poor, but also that <u>a growing percentage of the citizens of the industrialized societies be marginalized and without a job</u>. And <u>there is no so-called democratic state today that is not</u> compromised and <u>up to its neck in such a massive production of human misery</u>.

Capitalism isn't the root cause of anything --- pretending it is justifies the worst violence --- empirics prove

Aberdeen, 3 (Richard Aberdeen; 2003 "THE WAY A Theory of Root Cause and Solution" http://freedomtracks.com/ uncommonsense/theway.html)

<u>A view</u> shared by many modern activists is <u>that capitalism</u>, free enterprise, multi-national corporations <u>and globalization are the primary cause of</u> the current global <u>Human Rights problem and that by striving to</u> change or <u>eliminate these, the root problem of</u> what <u>ills</u> the modern world <u>is being addressed. This is</u> a rather unfortunate and <u>historically myopic</u> view, <u>reminiscent of early "class struggle" Marxists who soon resorted to violence as a means to achieve rather questionable ends.</u> And like these often brutal <u>early Marxists</u>, modern anarchists who <u>resort to violence to solve the problem</u> are walking upside down and backwards, <u>adding to rather than correcting, both the immediate and long-term Human Rights problem. Violent revolution</u>, including our own American revolution, <u>becomes a breeding ground for poverty, disease, starvation and often mass oppression leading to future violence</u>. Large, publicly traded corporations are created by individuals or groups of individuals, operated by individuals and made up of individual and/or group investors. These business enterprises are deliberately structured to be empowered by individual (or group) investor greed. For example, a theorized 'need' for offering salaries much higher than is necessary to secure competent leadership (often resulting in corrupt and entirely incompetent leadership), lowering wages more than is fair and equitable and scaling back of often hard fought for benefits, is sold to stockholders as being in the best interest of the bottom-line market value and thus, in the best economic interests of individual investors. Likewise, <u>major political and corporate exploitation</u> of third-world nations <u>is rooted in the individual and joint greed of corporate investors and others who stand to profit from such exploitation</u>. More than just investor greed, <u>corporations are driven by the greed of all those involved</u>, including individuals outside the enterprise itself who profit indirectly from it. If one examines "the course of human events" closely, it can correctly be surmised that <u>the "root" cause of humanity's problems comes from individual human greed and similar negative individual motivation</u>. The Marx/Engles view of history being a "class" struggle [1] does not address the root problem and is thus fundamentally flawed from a true historical perspective (see Gallo Brothers for more details). <u>So-called "classes"</u> of people, unions, corporations and political groups <u>are made up of individuals who support the particular group or organizational position based on their own individual needs, greed and desires</u> and thus, an apparent "class struggle" in reality, is an extension of individual motivation. Likewise, <u>nations engage in wars of aggression, not because capitalism</u> or <u>classes</u> of society <u>are at root cause, but because individual members of a society are individually convinced</u>

<u>that it is in their own economic survival best interest. War, poverty, starvation and lack of Human and Civil Rights have existed on our planet since long before</u> the rise of modern <u>capitalism</u>, free enterprise and multi-national corporation avarice, <u>thus the root problem obviously goes deeper than this</u>. Junior Bush and the neo-conservative genocidal maniacs of modern-day America could not have recently effectively gone to war against Iraq without the individual support of individual troops and a certain percentage of individual citizens within the U.S. population, each lending support for their own personal motives, whatever they individually may have been. While it is true that corrupt leaders often provoke war, using all manner of religious, social and political means to justify, often as not, entirely ludicrous ends, very rare indeed is a battle only engaged in by these same unscrupulous miscreants of power. And though a few iniquitous elitist powerbrokers may initiate nefarious policies of global genocidal oppression, it takes a very great many individuals operating from individual personal motivations of survival, desire and greed to develop these policies into a multi-national exploitive reality. <u>No economic or political organization and no political or social cause exists unto itself but rather, individual members power a collective agenda</u>. A workers' strike has no hope of succeeding if individual workers do not perceive a personal benefit. And similarly, <u>a corporation will not exploit workers if doing so is not believed to be in the economic best interest of those who run the corporation</u> and who in turn, must answer (at least theoretically) to individuals who collectively through purchase or other allotment of shares, own the corporation. Companies have often been known to appear benevolent, offering both higher wages and improved benefits, if doing so is perceived to be in the overall economic best interest of the immediate company and/or larger corporate entity. Non-unionized business enterprises frequently offer 'carrots' of appeasement to workers in order to discourage them from organizing and historically in the United States, concessions such as the forty-hour workweek, minimum wage, workers compensation and proscribed holidays have been grudgingly capitulated to by greedy capitalist masters as necessary concessions to avoid profit-crippling strikes and outright revolution.

at: psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis has enabled modern governmentality --- its techniques are used manage populations and develop disciplinary society

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For Foucault, the very genesis of the discipline of psychoanalysis is itself linked to historical changes in the exercise of power-relations, and in particular to the emergence of governmentality. According to the later Foucault, modern power-relations cannot be grasped on the basis of political theory's traditional model of power-law-sovereignty-repression. This juridical model of power, which still dominates political theory, and sees power as emanating from a sovereign, from the top down, ignores the fact that power today also comes from below. As Leslie Paul Thiele has argued in his explication of Foucault's contribution to a theory of power: "Power forms an omnipresent web of relations, and the individuals who support this web are as much the producers and transmitters of power as they are its objects." In place of the juridical model of power, Foucault argues that modern power-relations are instantiated through what he designates as "governmentality." For Foucault: The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government. This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. `Government' did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. .... To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others. For Foucault, then, the operations of the modern state are not restricted to interdiction or repression in the political sense, but have expanded to incorporate the practices of governmentality. Government, in the Foucauldian sense, depends on the knowledge generated by the human sciences, by the disciplines, in particular psychoanalysis; indeed, the state claims that it governs on the basis of that knowledge. Here, the central role of the human sciences in the operation of the developing disciplinary society, and its techniques for the control and management of its citizens becomes especially clear. Moreover, governmentality, and the technologies for the control of individuals, are by no means limited to the state. Indeed, according to Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, modern, liberal societies do not leave the regulation of conduct solely or even primarily to the operations of the state and its bureaucracies: "Liberal government identifies a domain outside 'politics,' and seeks to manage it without destroying its existence and its autonomy." This is accomplished through the activities of a host of institutions and agents not formally part of the state apparatus, including psychoanalytic facilities and analysts. As Nikolas Rose has pointed out, psychoanalysis, like "All the sciences which have the prefix `psy-' or `psycho-' have their roots in this shift in the relationship between social power and the human body, in which regulatory systems have sought to codify, calculate, supervise, and maximize the level of functioning of individuals. The

`psy sciences' were born within a project of government of the human soul and the construction of the person as a manageable subject." As a manifestation of governmentality and its power-relations, psychoanalysis is implicated in the control of the individual. For Foucault, psychoanalysis is a **discipline that "disciplines**," that helps to **create politically and economically socialized, useful, cooperative**, and -- as one of the hallmarks of bio-power -- **docile individuals**. Indeed, according to John Forrester, for Foucault, psychoanalysis is "the purest version of the social practices that exercise domination in and through discourse, whose power lies in words, whose words can never by anything other than instruments of power." Of course, the aim of the analyst is not control, but the "mental health" of the individual and the "betterment" of society. Nonetheless, the result of the psychoanalytic management-oriented conception of the subject is an individual who is susceptible to techno-medical control. Moreover, as Nikolas Rose has suggested, the power-knowledge obtained by psychoanalysis (and indeed all of the psy sciences) and its technologies for the control of the individual: fed back into social life at a number of levels. Individuals could be classified and distributed to particular social locations in the light of them -- in schools, jobs, ranks in the army, types of reformatory institutions, and so forth. Further, in consequence, new means emerged for the codification and analysis of the consequences of organizing classrooms, barracks, prisons, production lines, the family, and social life itself....Hence, the psy knowleges could feed back into more general economic and social programs, throwing up new problems and opportunities for attempts to maximize the use of the human resources of the nation and to increase its levels of personal health and well-being. Whatever its impact or health and welfare, this power-knowledge enhanced the degree of control to which the person was subject, and made it possible to effectively discipline the individual. Indeed, **the existence of our developing disciplinary society is inconceivable without the psy sciences**, and the power-relations which they consolidate. The discipline and control of the individual to which psychoanalysis made its signal contribution, was linked to its conception of, and commitment to, normalization. Foucault signalled the increasing role of normality and normalization in the functioning of the developing disciplinary society in Discipline and Punish: "The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the `social worker'-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements." For Foucault, discipline and normalization were inseparable components of the emergence of the human sciences, and their technologies. Indeed, he asserted that "a normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life." Psychoanalysis did not break with this complex. Indeed, according to Foucault, "Freud was well aware of all this. He was aware of the superior strength of his position on the matter of normalization." Indeed, psychoanalysis was thoroughly implicated in the societal process in which the norm increasingly supplanted the law, in which the West was "becoming a society which is essentially defined by the norm." For Foucault: "The norm becomes the criterion for evaluating individuals. As it truly becomes a society of the norm, medicine, par excellence the science of the normal and the pathological, assumes the status of a royal science." Lest one conclude that Foucault is not referring to psychoanalysis here, he is quick to point out that "psychoanalysis, not only in the United States, but also in France, functions massively as a medical practice: even if it is not always practiced by doctors, it certainly functions as therapy, as a medical type of intervention. From this point of view, it is very much a part of this network of medical 'control' which is being established all over." Deviation from the norm, in the establishment of which psychoanalysis played a signal role, the anomaly, became the object of the technologies and therapeutic techniques of the psy sciences, psychoanalysis among them. The theological conception of evil had given way to the psychoanalytic conception of deviance, in the combat against which the analyst was now enlisted to play a leading role. As Hubert Dreyfus has claimed, "Freudian theory thus reinforces the collective

practices that allow norms based on alleged sciences of human nature to permeate every aspect of our lives." These practices then become a **lynchpin** of the developing disciplinary society and its techniques for managing people.

The negative attempts to put us on the couch, interpreting our fantasies for us until we don't know what we want anymore --- the rule of psychoanalysis is regardless of what you say, you mean something else --- this paradox makes politics impossible --- the impact is the 1ac
Deleuze 2004 – (Gilles, thinker, *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974*, pg. 274-280 [Originally published in Italian. "Relazione di Gilles Deleuze" and discussions in Armando Verdiglione, ed., Psicanalisi e Politica; Atti del Comvegno di studi tenuto a Milano l'8-9 Maggio 1973. Milan: Feltrinelli, 19-3, pp. 7-11, 17-21, 37-40, 44-45, 169-172. Abridged and edited.])
I would like to present five propositions on psychoanalysis. The first is this: psychoanalysis today presents a political danger all of its own that is different from the implicit dangers of the old psychiatric hospital. The latter constitutes a place of localized captivity; psychoanalysis, on the other hand, works in the open air. The psychoanalyst has in a sense the same position that Marx accorded to the merchant in feudal society: working in the open pores of society, not only in private offices, but also in schools, institutions, departmentalism, etc. This function puts us in a unique position with respect to the psychoanalytic project. We recognize that psychoanalysis tells us a great deal about the unconscious; but, in a certain way, it does so only to reduce the unconscious, to destroy it, to repulse it, to imagine it as a sort of parasite on consciousness. For psychoanalysis, it is fair to say there are **always** too many desires. The Freudian conception of the child as polymorphous pervert shows that there are always too many desires. In our view, however, there are never enough desires. We do not, by one method or another, wish to reduce the unconscious: we prefer to produce it: there is no unconscious that is already there; the unconscious must be produced politically, socially, and historically. The question is: in what place, in what circumstances, in the shadow of what events, can the unconscious be produced. Producing the unconscious means very precisely the production of desire in a historical social milieu or the appearance of statements and expressions of a new kind. My second proposition is that psychoanalysis is a complete machine, designed in advance to **prevent people from talking**, therefore from producing statements that suit them and the groups with which they have certain affinities. As soon as one begins analysis, one has the impression of talking. But one talks in vain; the entire psychoanalytical machine exists to suppress the conditions of a real expression. Whatever one says is taken into a sort of tourniquet, an interpretive machine; the patient will never be able to get to what ~~he~~ really has to say. Desire or delirium (which are in a deep sense the same thing), desire-delirium is by its nature a libidinal investment of an entire historical milieu, of an entire social environment. What makes one delirious are classes, peoples, races, masses, mobs. Psychoanalysis, possessed of a pre-existing code, superintends a sort of destruction. This code consists of Oedipus, castration, the family romance; the most secret content of delirium, i.e. this divergence from the social and historical milieu, will be destroyed so that no delirious statement, corresponding to an overflow in the unconscious, will be able to get through the analytical machine. We say that the schizophrenic has to deal not with family, nor with ~~his~~ parents, but with peoples, populations, and tribes. We say that the unconscious is not a matter of generations or family genealogy, but rather of world population, and that the psychoanalytical machine destroys all this. I will cite just two examples: the celebrated example of president Schreber whose delirium is entirely about races, history, and wars. Freud doesn't realize this and reduces the patient's delirium exclusively to his relationship with his father. Another example is the Wolfman: when the Wolfman dreams of six or seven wolves, which is by definition a pack, i.e. a certain kind of group, Freud immediately reduces this multiplicity by bringing everything back to a single wolf who is necessarily the Father. The entire collective libidinal expression manifested in the delirium of the Wolfman will be unable to make, let alone conceive of the statements that are for him the most meaningful. My third proposition is that psychoanalysis works in this way because of its automatic interpretation machine. This interpretation machine can be described in the following way: **whatever you say, you mean something different**. We can't say enough about the damage these machines cause. When someone explains to me that what I say means something other than what I say, a split in the ego as subject is produced. This split is well known: what I say refers to me as the subject of an utterance or statement, what I mean refers to me as an expressing subject. This split is conjured by psychoanalysis as the basis for castration and

prevents all production of statements. For example, in certain schools for problem children, dealing with character or even psychopathology, the child, in his work or play activities, is placed in a relationship with his educator, and in this context the child is understood as the subject of an utterance or statement; in his psychotherapy, he is put into a relationship with the analyst or the therapist, and there he is understood as an expressing subject. Whatever he does in the group in terms of his work and his play will be compared to a superior authority, that of the psychotherapist who alone will have the job of interpreting, such that the child himself is split; he cannot will acceptance for any statement about what really matters to him in his relationship or in his group. He will feel like he's talking, but he will not be able to say a single word about what's most essential to him. Indeed, what produces statements in each one of us is not ego as subject, it's something entirely different: multiplicities, masses and mobs, peoples and tribes, collective arrangements; they cross through us, they are within us, and they seem unfamiliar because they are part of our unconscious. The challenge for a real psychoanalysis, an anti-psychoanalytical analysis, is to discover these collective arrangements of expression, these collective networks, these peoples who are in us and who make us speak, and who are the source of our statements. This is the sense in which we set a whole held of experimentation, of personal or group experimentation, against the interpretive activities of psychoanalysis. My fourth proposition, to be quick, is that psychoanalysis implies a fairly peculiar power structure. The recent book by Castel, Le Psychanalysme, demonstrates this point very well. The power structure occurs in the contract, a formidable liberal bourgeois institution. It leads to "transference" and culminates in the analyst's silence. And the analyst's silence is the greatest and the worst of interpretations. Psychoanalysis uses a small number of collective statements, which are those of capitalism itself regarding castration, loss, and family, and it tries to get this small number of collective statements specific to capitalism to enter into the individual statements of the patients themselves. We claim that one should do just the opposite, that is, start with the real individual statements, give people conditions, including the material conditions, for the production of their individual statements, in order to discover the real collective arrangements that produce them.

Lacanian theory genders human activities --- makes patriarchy inevitable
Iréne **Matthis, '4** (Associate Duke Prof, "Dialogues on Sexuality, Gender, and Psychoanalysis", p. 108-109)//roetlin

From a feminist and historicizing point of view, Lacan's introduction of post-Saussurean linguistics into psychoanalysis was a mistake. Precisely because the relationship of femininity to the phallus is a purely symbolic equation for Lacan, patriarchy can never disappear. Lacan's theory of sexual difference is a watertight system, one that will always impose its own normative language of sexual difference on whatever people actually do. The historical content of the structure will change, but the structure itself will remain forever intact.[34] I may find that sixteenth-century notions of what counts as "feminine" are vastly different from our own, but the grid that produces the notion of "the feminine" in the first place remains unchanged. What I am objecting to, then, is that Lacanian theory is structured so as to formally require the "gendering" or "sexing" of a vast array of human activities. **Lacanian theory is a printing machine for gender labels**. It is incumbent on those who believe that this is an excellent thing for feminism and for psychoanalysis to justify their belief.

Gender inequality causes extinction
Bem, '93 (Psych Professor -- Cornell, The Lenses of Gender, pg. 195)//roetlin

In addition to the humanist and feminist arguments against gender polarization, there is an overarching moral argument that fuses the antihumanist and antifeminist aspects of gender polarization. The essence of this moral argument is that by polarizing human values and human experiences into the masculine and the feminine, gender polarization not only helps to keep the culture in the grip of males themselves; it also keeps the culture in the grip of highly polarized masculine values. The moral problem here is that these highly polarized masculine values so emphasize making war over keeping the peace, taking risks over giving care, and even mastering nature over harmonizing with nature that when allowed to dominate societal and even global decision making, they create the danger that humans

Agamben K—BEFJR

Perm Answers

A2: Permutation—Top

Negotiating with sovereign power is a question of where to draw lines between forms of life and a submission to the source of sovereign power. Only a refusal to distinguish between forms of life can evade biopolitics.

Edkins & Pin-Fat '04 (Jenny – University of Wales Aberystwyth international politics professor, Veronique – University of Manchester IR lecturer, *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics*, Ed. Edkins, Pin-Fat, and Shapiro, p. 18)

What this tells us is that **to contest sovereign power we need something different. In challenging sovereign power, we are** not **facing** a power relation but **a relationship of violence**, one **that denies a political voice to the form-of-life it has produced. Resistance** such as would be possible from within a power relation, and indeed as an inherent part of it, **cannot take place. Other forms of opposition must be found**, forms **that seek to reinstate a properly political relationship by producing sovereign power as a form of power relation.** Two strategies of contestation were suggested: a refusal and an acceptance. **First, the refusal. The abstract drawing of lines is the way in which sovereign power produces bare life.** This drawing of lines must be refused, wherever the lines are drawn. **Negotiating the precise location of the lines remains within the violence of sovereignty power.** On the other hand, **a refusal to draw any line takes away the ground upon which sovereign power is constituted.** It insists instead on the politics of decisioning and particular distinctions and demands that specifics of time, place, and circumstance be attended to in each instance. **Second, the acceptance. When life is produced as bare life, it is not helpful for that life to demand its reinstatement as politically qualified life. To do so would be to validate the very drawing of lines upon which sovereignty depends and which produces life as bare life in the first place. An alternative strategy is the acceptance** or what we have called the assumption **of bare life.** Through this strategy, **the subject** at one and the same time both acknowledges its status as nothing but life and demands recognition as such. It **refuses the distinction between bare life and politically qualified life and demands that all life as such is worthy of recognition.**

As is apparent, **the two strategies are the same at heart. Both seek to overturn the denial of politics that has taken place under biopolitics and to reinstate properly political power relations**, with their accompanying freedoms and potentialities. We have discussed examples of what such contestation of sovereign power might look like. Practices that contest sovereign power are apparent in many places: whether in hunger strikes, grassroots communitas, or street demonstrations, creative ways of provoking sovereign power and embroiling it into a political or power relation have been and are being found.

We must not falter in our call for subjectivity, the permutation is an attempt to negotiate the rights of the populace back into the sovereign's control

Agamben, 2000 - Professor of philosophy at the University of Verona (Giorgio; "*Means without End: Notes on Politics*"; conference; Pg. 113; DOA: 7/16/15 || NDW)

Sovereignty, therefore, is the guardian who prevents the undecidable threshold between violence and right, nature and language, from coming to light. We have to fix our gaze, instead, precisely on what the statue of Justice (which, as Montesquieu reminds us, was to be state of exception) was not supposed to see, namely, what

nowadays is apparent to everybody: that the state of exception is the rule, that naked life is immediately the carrier of the sovereign nexus, and that, as such, it is today abandoned to a kind of violence that is all the more effective for being anonymous and quotidian. If there is today a social power [potenza], it must see its own impotence [impotenza] through to the end, it must decline any will to either posit or preserve right, it must break everywhere the nexus between violence and right, between the living and language that constitutes sovereignty.

The affirmative's defense of sovereignty makes liberation impossible – their "lesser evil" logic culminates in absolute evil.

Prozorov, 2009 - Professor of Political Science at the University of Helenski (Sergie; "*The Appropriation of Abandonment: Giorgio Agamben on the State of Nature and the Political*"; Article; http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p313215_index.html; DOA: 7/16/15 || NDW)

In order to understand this claim let us consider Agamben's criticism of Schmitt's use of the notion of the katechon in his defense of state sovereignty. In Schmitt's political theology, sovereign power is analogous to the figure of the katechon in the Catholic tradition, the force that delays the advent of the Antichrist, which in turn would eventually lead to the messianic redemption (Schmitt 2003, 59-60). It is as this delaying force, as opposed to a direct agent of the Good, that the state must be appreciated. In contrast, Agamben's interpretation of the famous passage in St. Paul's Second Letter to the Thessalonians on the katechon asserts that rather than grounding something like a Christian 'doctrine of State power' (Agamben 2005b, 109), this passage harbours no positive valuation of the katechon whatsoever. Instead, the katechon (every form of constituted power) merely conceals the 'absence of law' that already characterizes the messianic present and thus does nothing other than defer or 'hold back' the moment of the messianic suspension of the law (see ibid., 95-107). Instead, in the Pauline messianic logic the semblance of the law, maintained by the katechon, must be stripped off and all power revealed as the 'absolute outlaw' (Agamben 2005b, 111). As Agamben (2005b, 110) claims, 'every theory of the State, including Hobbes's – which thinks of it as a power to block or delay catastrophe – can be taken as a secularization of this [traditional] interpretation of 2 Thessalonians 2.' Indeed, in the Schmittian reading, which characterizes most contemporary political theories, including those extremely hostile to Schmitt, the secularized katechon is legitimized as the only force that wards off the Antichrist [the anomie of the state of nature] and thus the end of the social order as we know it. On the contrary, Agamben's reading of Paul posits the katechon as an obstacle to the advent of the messianic kingdom and thus accuses the proponents of the 'Christian doctrine of state power' of a thinly disguised nihilism. '[T]he katechon is the force – the Roman Empire as well as every constituted authority – that clashes with and hides katargesis, the state of tendential lawlessness that characterizes the messianic, and in this sense delays unveiling the 'mystery of lawlessness'.' (Agamben 2005b, 111) It is as if the erstwhile champions of a Christian doctrine of power have forgotten their creed and embraced the imperfection of humanity as 'all there is'. Their valorization of the katechon obscures a simple question: 'if we longed for parousia, should we not be impatient with the interference of the katechon?' (Rasch 2007, 106) This, as Agamben shows, is precisely Paul's attitude, which is diametrically opposed to the attitude of the philosophers of the political, for whom the katechon has assumed an autonomous value: What if, after two thousand years and untold promises, we have lost our faith in the parousia and grown weary of waiting for the arrival of divine violence? Then would not delaying the Antichrist be what we should hope for? [...] The katechon, as a figure for the political, rejects the promise of the parousia and protects the community from the dangerous illusions of both ultimate perfection and absolute evil. (Rasch 2007, 107) In Rasch's view, what the defenders of the katechon fear is not so much the Antichrist but the Messiah himself, who, moreover, might well appear to them indistinct from the Antichrist: both are 'figures who promise us perfection, figures who offer us redemption and bestow upon us the guilt of failing perfection or rejecting their offer.' (Ibid., 107) There is certainly a certain irony in the 'Christian doctrine of state power' ultimately coming down to the apostasy of any recognizable Christianity in vision of an exhausted humanity that can no longer distinguish between the Antichrist and the Messiah. However, Agamben's reading of Paul leads us to a

different case of indistinction. If the katechon conceals that all power is 'absolute outlaw' and thereby defers the reappropriation of this anomie by the messianic community, then would it be too much to suggest that the katechon is the Antichrist, who perpetuates its reign by concealing the fact of its long having arrived? Absolute Evil would thus attain domination precisely by pretending, as a 'lesser evil', to ward off its own advent. By converting the seekers of redemption into the guardians of its perpetual inaccessibility, the katechon ensures the survival of greater evil in the guise of the lesser one. Thus, Agamben argues that '[it] is possible to conceive of katechon and anomos [Antichrist] not as two separate figures, but as one single power before and after the final unveiling. Profane power is the semblance that covers up the substantial lawlessness of messianic time.' (2005b, 111) As Rasch sums up Agamben's claim about the insidious manner of the self-perpetuation of sovereign power, 'embracing the political is equivalent to building concentration camps while awaiting the Antichrist' (Rasch 2007, 106). The relation to the katechon indicates nothing less than one's stand on the possibility of the transcendence of the political. While for the Schmittian orientation the political is 'all there is' and its disappearance is only thinkable as the self-destruction of humanity (cf. Laclau 2007, 20-22), Agamben's messianic approach welcomes the demise of the katechon as the condition of possibility of life beyond sovereignty that remains concealed 'only until the person now holding it back gets out of the way' (2 Thessalonians 2, 7; cited in Agamben 2005b, 110). In Walter Benjamin's messianic politics (1986), this demise of the sovereign takes the form of 'divine violence' that is neither law-preserving nor law-making and transforms the 'fictive' state of exception, inscribed within the legal order, into a 'real state of exception' that has severed all links to the law and the state form. Agamben's work from his earliest writings onwards may be viewed as an engagement with this admittedly arcane and disconcerting idea of divine violence: 'Only if it is possible to think the Being of abandonment beyond every idea of the law (even that of the empty form of law's being in force without significance) will we have moved out of the paradox of sovereignty towards a politics freed from every ban.' (Agamben 1998, 59. See also Mills 2004; Kaufman 2008) Prior to addressing the specific features of Agamben's post-sovereign politics, let us consider this idea of a politics freed from every ban in relation to the figure of state of nature.

A2: Perm—Reject Divisons of Life

Only a complete refusal to draw lines between forms of life can escape the dilemma of sovereign power.
Edkins & Pin-Fat '04 (Jenny – University of Wales Aberystwyth international politics professor, Veronique – University of Manchester IR lecturer, *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics*, Ed. Edkins, Pin-Fat, and Shapiro, p. 13)

One potential form of resistance to sovereign power consists of a refusal to draw any lines between zoe and bios, inside and outside, human and inhuman. As we have shown, **sovereign power** does not involve a power relation in Foucauldian terms. It **is** more appropriately **considered to have become a form of governance or technique of administration through relationships of violence that reduce political subjects to mere bare or naked life.** As Michael Dillon puts it, "Sovereign power [is] a form of rule gone global [that] has come to develop and deploy modes of destruction whose dissemination it finds increasingly impossible to control because these have become integral to its propagation and survival."

In asking for a refusal to draw lines as a possibility of resistance, then, **we are not asking for the** elimination of power relations and, consequently, we are not asking for the **erasure of the possibility of a mode of political being that is empowered and empowering, is free and that speaks**: quite the op¬posite. Following Agamben, **we are suggesting that it is only through a refusal to draw any lines at all (and, indeed, nothing less will do) that sovereign power (as a form of violence) can be contested** and a properly political power relation can be reinstated.

We could call this escaping the logic of sovereign power. Our overall argument is that **we can escape sovereign power and reinstate a form of power relation by contesting its assumption of the right to draw lines**, that is, by contesting the sovereign ban. **Any other resistance always inevitably remains within this relationship of violence.** To move outside it (and return to a power relation), we need not only contest its right to draw lines in particular places, but also resist the call to draw any lines of the sort sovereign power demands.

Co-Option DA

Pure alt framing is key—the state coops individual action

Tran-Creque 13 Bard College, interdisciplinary research, education and art community working to understand unmanned and autonomous vehicles. By bringing together research from diverse academic and artistic perspectives which have, up until now, remained fairly silent on the issue, we aim to encourage new creative thinking and, ultimately, inform the public debate. We want to encourage dialogue between the tech world and the non-tech world, and explore new vocabularies in diverse disciplines. This is an online space for people to follow the latest news, encounter disparate views, access good writing and art, find resources for research, and engage a diverse community of thinkers and practitioners with the shared goal of understanding the drone. (Steven, Center for the Study of the Drone, "The Forever War is Always Hungry", July 5, 2013, http://dronecenter.bard.edu/the-forever-war-is-always-hungry/ //SRSL)

No War but the Forever War What exactly is one supposed to make of John Brennan's admission that the war against Al Qaeda will continue for another decade? **How did the AUMF and the Patriot Act together come to constitute something like America's Article 48, creating a permanent state of exception in which something like the NSA's "giant automated Stasi" is simply accepted as the new normal?** How did drones become an inevitable part of the near future in New York City? After all, the War on Terror really isn't anything like a war at all— at least, not in the conventional imaginary of nation states commanding disciplined military forces on established fields of battle. The United States commands a degree of military power and comparative dominance simply unprecedented in human history—what is elegantly referred to, in the anodyne language of military planners, as "asymmetry." There are no strictly defined battlefields, and the formal enemies in the War on Terror have rarely amounted to more than the insurgent army of a deposed dictator (funded and armed by the U.S., albeit long ago) and a few hundred religious students in the mountains of Central Asia. It is in fact genuinely strange how resiliently this conventional image seems to persist in both popular and intellectual imagination. Even scholarly responses to the War on Terror begin from the assumption that something new and strange is happening when battlefields and opponents alike are no longer delimited but rather always and everywhere. If one limits oneself to legal documents, this is pretty much the only possible conclusion. The conventional imagery really seems to be most useful in obscuring the more fundamental realities of what war really is. In part, war consists of the far more common practice of civil wars, guerrilla wars, genocide and internal repression—but also, in a larger sense, the fundamental state of war between the sovereign and his people that is the originary, constitutive state for sovereign power itself. The forever war, then, has effectively allowed the United States to claim sovereignty to farthest reaches of the earth. Certainly, this is not a question purely of drones: the apparatus also consists of a deep surveillance state, total international digital surveillance, a military larger than the combined militaries of the rest of the world, and extralegal rendition and detention programs. But at the edges of this arrangement, one finds Agamben's homo sacer, Fiskesjö's barbarians: those excluded from the legal order, stripped of rights, subject to death at any time—the point at which an empire converts those beyond its reach into obedient subjects or corpses. This is the logic of sovereign violence taken to its most extreme—and not insignificantly, this has been accomplished in part by euphemizing that violence, whether in the sanitized parlance of the military—"focused obstruction," "targeted killing," "kinetic action"—or the more artful, ideological euphemization by which assassination programs become complex and debatable moral issues in the liberal press. It should come as no surprise that this has been accompanied by the infinite expansion of an apparatus of domestic surveillance and control unprecedented in human history. One should never forget that the instruments of sovereignty—drones, militarized police, mass surveillance apparatus—were always directed inwards as much as outwards, because the security state secures one thing: the safety of the sovereign above all. From the perspective of sovereign power, there is no inside and there is no outside. There is only the violence to which we are all subject.

A2: Krishna

The aligment of "progressive" projects with the established political order makes systemic change impossible and guarantees the preservation of the status quo.
Agamben 2k [Giorgio – prof. philosophy European Graduate School, *Means Without End*, Univ. Minnesota Press, p. 136-138]

<**Today, the political parties that define themselves as "progressive" and the so-called leftist coalitions have won in the large cities where there have been elections. One is struck by the victors' excessive preoccupation with presenting themselves as the establishment and with reassuring at all costs the old economic, political, and religious powers.** When Napoleon defeated the Mamluks in Egypt, the first thing he did was to summon the notables who constituted the old regime's backbone and to inform them that under the new sovereign their privileges and functions would remain untouched. Since here one is not dealing with the military conquest of a foreign country, the zeal with which the head of a party-that up until not too long ago used to call itself Communist-saw fit to reassure bankers and capitalists by pointing out how well the lira and the stock exchange had received the blow is, to say the least, inappropriate. This much is certain: these **politicians will end up being defeated by their very will to win at all costs. The desire to be the establishment will ruin them just as it ruined their predecessors.**6

It is important to be able to distinguish between defeat and dishonor. The victory of the right in the 1994 political elections was a defeat for the left, which does not imply that because of this it was also a dishonor. If, as is certainly the case, this defeat also involved dishonor, that is because it marked the conclusive moment of a process of involution that had already begun many years ago. There was dishonor because the defeat did not conclude a struggle over opposite positions, but rather decided only whose turn it was to put into practice the same ideology of the spectacle, of the market, and of enterprise. One might see in this nothing other than a necessary consequence of a betrayal that had already begun in the years of Stalinism. Perhaps so. What concerns us here, however, is only the evolution that has taken place be-ginning with the end of the 1970s. It is since then, in fact, that the complete corruption of minds has taken that hypocritical form and that voice of reason and common sense that today goes under the name of progressivism.

In a recent book, Jean-Claude Milner has clearly identified and defined as "progressivism" the principle in whose name the following process has taken place: compromising. The revolution used to have to compromise with capital and with power, just as the church had to come to terms with the modem world. Thus, **the motto that has guided the strategy of progressivism during the march toward its coming to power slowly took shape: one has to yield on everything, one has to reconcile everything with its opposite, intelligence with television and advertisement, the working class with capital, freedom of speech with the state of the spectacle, the environment with industrial development,**

science with opinion, democracy with the electoral machine, bad conscience and abjuration with memory and loyalty.

Today one can see what such a strategy has led to. The left has actively collaborated in setting up in every field the instruments and terms of agreement that the right, once in power, will just need to apply and develop so as to achieve its own goals without difficulty.

It was exactly in the same way that the working class was spiritually and physically disarmed by German social democracy before being handed over to Nazism. **And while the citizens of goodwill are being called on to keep watch and to wait for phantasmatic frontal attacks, the right has already crossed the lines through the breach that the left itself had opened up.**>

A2: Pragmatism

Overcoming sovereign power is impossible as long as political options are confined to the application of praxis to sovereign goals. The very relationship between liberatory potential and sovereignty must be abandoned in order to achieve a politics of pure means where life is not reduced to a specific form to be judged and regulated.

Agamben 98 (Giorgio – Univ. Verona Philosophy professor, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford UP, p. 43-44)

<The strength of Negri's book lies instead in the final perspective it opens insofar as it shows how **constituting power, when conceived in all its radicality, ceases to be a strictly political concept and necessarily presents itself as a category of ontology. The problem of constituting power then becomes the problem of the "constitution of potentiality"** (Il potere costituente, p. 383), **and the unresolved dialectic between constituting power and constituted power opens the way for a new articulation of the relation between potentiality and actuality**, which requires nothing less than a re-thinking of the ontological categories of modality in their totality. The problem is therefore moved from political philosophy to first philosophy (or, if one likes, politics is returned to its ontological position). **Only an entirely new conjunction of possibility and reality, contingency and necessity**, and the other path(' tou ontos, **will make it possible to cut the knot that binds sovereignty to constituting power. And only if it is possible to think the relation between potentiality and actuality differently-and even to think beyond this relation-will it be possible to think a constituting power wholly released from the sovereign ban. Until a new and coherent ontology of potentiality** (beyond the steps that have been made in this direction by Spinoza, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger) **has replaced the ontology founded on the primacy of actuality** and its relation to potentiality, **a political theory freed from the aporias of sovereignty remains unthinkable.**> <43-44>

A2: Reform

Reform is impossible in the current apparatus - exclusion is the foundation to the modern juridicial-political system of the west

Agamben 13 [Giorgio Agamben is an Italian continental philosopher best known for his work investigating the concepts of the state of exception, "What is a destituent power?" http://www.envplan.com/fulltext_temp/0/d3201tra.pdf, pg. 6, omak]

What was my intention when I began the archeology of politics that developed into the Homo Sacer project? For me it was not a question of criticizing or correcting this or that concept, this or that institution of Western politics. It was, rather, first and foremost a matter of shifting the very site of politics itself. (For centuries, politics remained in the same place where Aristotle, then Hobbes and Marx, situated it.) The first act of investigation was therefore the identification of bare life as the first referent and stake of politics. The originary place of Western politics consists of an ex-ceptio, an inclusive exclusion of human life in the form of bare life. Consider the peculiarities of this operation: life is not in itself political, it is what must be excluded and, at the same time, included by way of its own exclusion. Life—that is, the Impolitical (l'Impolitico)—must be politicized through a complex operation that has the structure of an exception. The autonomy of the political is founded, in this sense, on a division, an articulation, and an exception of life. From the outset, Western politics is biopolitical. 2. The structure of the exception was identified in Homo Sacer 1 starting from Aristotle. The exception is an inclusive exclusion. Whereas the example is an exclusive inclusion (the example is excluded from the set to which it refers, in as much as it belongs to it), the exception is included in the normal case through its exclusion. It is this inclusive exclusion that defines the originary structure of the archē. (1) The dialectic of the foundation that defines Western ontology since Aristotle cannot be understood if one does not understand that it functions as an exception in the sense that we have seen. **The strategy is always the same: something is divided, excluded, and rejected at the bottom, and, through this exclusion, is included as the foundation**. This is true for life, which is said in many ways —vegetative life, sensitive life, intellectual life, the first of which is excluded to function as the foundation for the others— but also for being, which is also said in many ways (to on legetai pollakos), one of which will act as foundation. In the sovereign exception that founds the juridical-political system of the West, what is included through its exclusion is bare life. It is important not to confuse bare life with natural life. Through its division and its capture in the dispositif of the exception, life assumes the form of bare life, life that was divided and separated from its form. It is in this sense that one must understand the assertion at the end of Homo Sacer 1 that "the fundamental activity of sovereign power is the production of bare life as the originary political element." And it is this bare life (or 'sacred' life, if sacer designates primarily a life that can be killed without committing murder) that, in the juridical-political machine of the West, acts as a threshold of articulation between zoē and bios, natural life and politically qualified life. **And it will not be possible to think another dimension of life if we have not first managed to deactivate the dispositif of the exception of bare life.** (If we relate the dispositif of the exception to anthropogenesis, it is possible that it will be clarified through the original structure of the event of language. Language, in its taking place, both separates from itself and includes in itself life and the world. It is, in the words of Mallarmé, a beginning that is based on the negation of every principle, on its own situation in the archē. The ex-ceptio, the inclusive exclusion of the real from the logos and in the logos, is thus the original structure of the event of language.)

A2: Solves Labeling

The government cannot be included—the people and the sovereign perpetually create each other

Tran-Creque 13 Bard College, interdisciplinary research, education and art community working to understand unmanned and autonomous vehicles. By bringing together research from diverse academic and artistic perspectives which have, up until now, remained fairly silent on the issue, we aim to encourage new creative thinking and, ultimately, inform the public debate. We want to encourage dialogue between the tech world and the non-tech world, and explore new vocabularies in diverse disciplines. This is an online space for people to follow the latest news, encounter disparate views, access good writing and art, find resources for research, and engage a diverse community of thinkers and practitioners with the shared goal of understanding the drone. (Steven, Center for the Study of the Drone, "The Forever War is Always Hungry", July 5, 2013, http://dronecenter.bard.edu/the-forever-war-is-always-hungry/ //SRSL)

The Only War there Is Beginning with his observation that states are "at the same time forms of institutionalized raiding or extortion, and utopian projects," David Graeber's definition of sovereignty is simple enough: "**the right to exercise violence with impunity.**" Graeber offers the example of the Ganda kingship to the south of the Shilluk. In the late 19th century, European visitors to the court of King Mutesa offered a gift of firearms. Mutesa responded by firing the rifle in the street and killing his subjects at random. When David Livingstone asked why the Ganda king killed so many people, he was told that "if [the king] didn't, everyone would assume that he was dead." However, the notoriety of the Ganda kings for arbitrary, random violence towards their own people did not prevent Mutesa from also being accepted as supreme judge and guardian of the state's system of justice. Indeed, it was the very foundation for it. Specifically, Graeber is interested in the transcendent quality of violence: the violence and transgression of the king makes him "a creature beyond morality." Paradoxically**, the sovereign may be arbitrarily violent—the etymology here is telling—and nevertheless seen as the supreme source of justice and law.** Graeber calls this transcendent aspect of violence "divine." It isn't just that kings act like gods; it's that they do so and get away with it. This remains the case in the modern state. Walter Benjamin's famous distinction between "law-making" and "law-maintaining" violence refers to the same phenomenon. We often say that no one is above the law, but if this were true, there would be no one to bring the legal order into being in the first place: the signers of the Declaration of Independence or the American Constitution were all traitors by the legal order under which they were born. There really is no resolution to this paradox. The solution of the left is that the people may rise up periodically and overthrow the existing legal regime in a revolution. The solution of the right is Carl Schmitt's exception: that sovereignty is exercised by the head of state in putting aside the legal order. But whichever solution one prefers, this really just defers the dilemma: all sovereignty is built on a foundation of illegal acts of violence, and it always carries the immanent potential for arbitrary violence. In 19th-century accounts of rainmakers in Southern Sudan, the function of violence is even clearer. With rainmakers, as with Shilluk kings, the health of the land is tied to the health of the king. If the rains fail to fall, first people will bring petitions, then gifts. But after a certain point, if the rains still don't come, the rainmaker must either flee or face a community united to kill him. It isn't hard to see why rainmakers would want something like the state's monopoly on violence or a retinue of loyal, armed followers. But the crucial point is that insofar as "the people" could be said to exist, they were essentially seen as the collective enemy of the king. European explorers in the region often found kings raiding enemy villages only to find that the villages contained the king's own subjects. They were delivering arbitrary violence to the people they were supposed to protect. So Graeber reminds us, "predatory violence was and would always remain the essence of sovereignty." Such is the hidden logic of sovereignty. Above all, it depends on the transcendent quality of violence that allows the sovereign to become, as Hobbes put it, a "mortal god." But this is also means that arbitrary violence is the constitutive principle of sovereignty, defining the relationship between the sovereign and everything else: What we call 'the social peace' is really just a truce in a constitutive war between sovereign power and 'the people,' or 'nation'—both of whom come into existence, as political entities, in their struggle against each other. There is no inside or outside here. Contra Schmitt and his friend-enemy distinction, this constitutive war precedes wars between nations and peoples. From the perspective of sovereign power, "**there is no fundamental difference in the relation between a**

sovereign and his people, and a sovereign and his enemies," explains Graeber. **This constitutive war is a war the sovereign can never win—a forever war that can never end.**

A2: Inevitability Claims

TURN: The dominance of biopolitics is what has made these institutions inevitable. Extend our 1NC Caldwell evidence. Whatever being is an abandonment of the tradition of identity and teleology that has maintained the current political philosophy. Its refusal to accept any finite end and stay permanently in potentiality refuses the logic of supposedly inevitable metanarratives.

TURN: Inevitability claims posit a monolithic view of the present that destroys the potential to effectuate change. Rather, the present is constituted by variety of contingencies that can each be resisted.

Barry, Osborne, & Rose '96 (Andrew - lecturer in the Department of Sociology Goldsmiths College, University of London. Thomas - lecturer in the Department of Sociolou, University of Bristol, Nikolas - Professor of Sociology at Goldsmiths College, University of London, Foucault and Political Reason, "Introduction: Writing the History of the Present," London, GBR: U C L Press, Limited p. 4-5)

Foucault might be said to approach the question of the present with a particular ethos but not with any substantive or aptiti understanding of its status. His concern is not to identify some current, perhaps definitive, "crisis" in the present. **Foucault makes no reference to concepts such as post-fordism, postmodernity, "McDonaldization" or late capitalism that have often been used to characterize a certain kind of break with the past. Nor is he concerned simply with a blanket denunciation of the present. No political programmatics follow automatically from his work in this field.** Foucault once argued in an interview, that **one of the "most destructive habits of modern thought. . . is that the moment of the present is considered in history as the break, the climax, the fulfilment, the return of youth, etc." - confessing that he had himself found himself at times drawn into the orbit of such a temptation** (Foucault 1989~: 251). But if it is the case that, for example, the closing pages of Madness and civilization are unquestionably apocalyptic in their pronouncements on the present, and that Foucault himself was to regret the adoption of such apocalyptic tones, in a sense, the conception of the present does retain a certain stability across his work. Above all, one might say, **Foucault was concerned to introduce an "untimely" attitude in our relation towards the present. Untimely in the Nietzschean sense: acting counter to our time, introducing a new sense of the fragility of our time, and thus acting on our time for the benefit, one hopes, of a time to come** (Nietzsche 1983: 60, cf. Rose 199313: 1, Bell 1994: 155). **Our time, that is to say, is not presumed to be the bearer or culmination of some grand historical process, it has no inevitability, no spirit, essence or underlying cause. The "present", in Foucault's work, is less an epoch than an array of questions**; and the coherence with which the present presents itself to us - and in which guise it is re-imagined by so much social theory - is something to be acted upon by historical investigation, to be cut up and decomposed so that it can be seen as put together contingently out of heterogeneous elements each having their own conditions of possibility. **Such a fragmentation of the present is** not **undertaken** in a spirit of poststructuralist playfulness. It is undertaken with a more serious, if hopefully modest, ambition - **to allow a space for the work of freedom.** Here, indeed, the place of ethics is marked in Foucault's thought. **Analyses ofthe present are concerned with opening up "a virtual break which opens a room, understood as a room of concrete freedom, that is possible transformation";** the received fixedness and inevitability of the present is destabilized, shown as just sufliciendy fragile as to let in a little glimpse of freedom - as a practice of difference - through its fractures.

Framework Answers

Alt = Pre-Req

We're a pre-req to a productive politics

Agamben, 1998 – professor of philosophy at the College International de Philosophie in Paris (Giorgio, "Homo Sacer", Stanford University Press, p. 10)//roetlin

Foucault's death kept him from showing how he would have developed the concept and study of biopolitics. In any case, however, the entry of zoē into the sphere of the polis – the politicization of bare life as such – constitutes the **decisive event of modernity** and signals a radical transformation of the political- philosophical categories of classical thought. It is even likely that if politics today seems to be passing through a lasting eclipse, this is because politics has failed to reckon with this foundational event of modernity. The "enigmas" (Furet, L'Allemagne nazi, p.7) that our century has proposed to historical reason and that remain with us (Nazism is only the most disquieting among them) will be solved only on the terrain – biopolitics – on which they were formed. Only within a biopolitical horizon will it be possible to decide whether the categories whose opposition founded modern politics (right/left, private/public, absolutism/democracy, etc.) – and which have been steadily dissolving, to the point of entering today into a real zone of indistinction – will have to be abandoned or will, instead, eventually regain the meaning they lost in that very horizon. And only a reflection that, taking up Foucault's and Benjamins suggestion, thematically interrogates the link between bare life and politics, a link that secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one another, will be able to bring the political out of its concealment and, at the same time, return thought to its practical calling.

Alternative

Whatever Being k2 Ptx

-- Whatever being is characterized by pure belonging free from identity. This is conducive to a new form of politically charged community freed from domination.
Agamben 93 (Giorgio – Prof Philosophy University Macerata, *The Coming Community*, Trans. Michael Hardt, U Minnesota Press, p. 9-11)

One concept that escapes the antinomy of the universal and the particular has long been familiar to us: the example. In any context where it exerts its force, the example is characterized by the fact that it holds for all cases of the same type, and, at the same time, it is included among these. It is one singularity among others, which, however, stands for each of them and serves for all. On one hand, **every example is treated in effect as a real particular case; but on the other, it remains understood that it cannot serve in its particularity. Neither particular nor universal, the example is a singular object that presents itself as such, that shows its singularity.** Hence the pregnancy of the Greek term, for example: para-deigma, that which is shown alongside (like the German Bei-spiel, that which plays alongside). **Hence the proper place of the example is always beside itself, in the empty space in which its undefinable and unforgettable life unfolds. This life is purely linguistic life.** Only life in the word is undefinable and unforgettable. **Exemplary being is purely linguistic being. Exemplary is what is not defined by any property, except by being-called.** Not being-red, but being-called-red; not being-Jakob, but being-called-Jakob defines the example. Hence its ambiguity, just when one has decided to take it really seriously. **Being-called-the property that establishes all possible belongings** (being-called-Italian, -dog, -Communist)-**is also what can bring them all back radically into question. It is the Most Common that cuts off any real community. Hence the impotent omnivalence of whatever being. It is neither apathy nor promiscuity nor resignation. These pure singularities communicate only in the empty space of the example, without being tied by any common property, by any identity.** They are expropriated of all identity, so as to appropriate belonging itself, the sign e. Tricksters or fakes, assistants or 'toons, they are the exemplars of the coming community.

Whatever Being k2 Ethics

Whatever being is being as it always matters. It cannot be divided into forms to be valued over one another, rather it is being without particular essence, attributes, or distinguishable qualities. The example of love is telling in that love is only given to a whatever singularity, to a loved one as whatever they may be, regardless of their attributes.

Agamben '93 (Giorgio – prof of philosophy at College of International Philosophy - Paris, *The Coming Community*, p. 1-2)

<**THE COMING being is whatever being.** In the Scholastic enumeration of transcendentals (quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum seu perfectum-whatever entity is one, true, good, or perfect), the term that, remaining unthought in each, conditions the meaning of all the others is the adjective quodlibet. The common translation of this term as **"whatever"** in the sense of "it does not matter which, indifferently" is certainly correct, but in its form the Latin says exactly the opposite: Quodlibet ens **is** not "being, it does not matter which," but rather **"being such that it always matters."** The Latin always already contains, that is, a reference to the will (libet). **What-ever being has an original relation to desire.**

The Whatever in question here relates to singularity not in its indifference with respect to a common property (to a concept, for example: being red, being French, being Muslim), but **only in its being such as it is. Singularity is thus freed from the false dilemma that obliges knowledge to choose between the ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of the universal. The intelligible**, according to a beautiful expression of Levi ben Gershon _(Gersonides), **is neither a universal nor an individual included in a series, but rather "singularity insofar as it is whatever singularity."** In this conception, **such-and-such being is reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class** (the reds, the French, the Muslims) -**and it is reclaimed not for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being-such, for belonging itself.** Thus being-such, which remains constantly hidden in the condition of belonging ("there is an x such that it belongs toy") and which is in no way a real predicate, comes to light itself: The singularity exposed as such is whatever you want, that is, lovable.

Love is never directed toward this or that property of the loved one (being blond, being small, being tender, being lame), **but neither does it neglect the properties in favor of an insipid generality** (universal love): **The lover wants the loved one with all of its predicates, its being such as it is.** The lover desires the as only insofar as it is such-this is the lover's particular fetishism. Thus, **whatever singularity** (the Lovable) **is never the intelligence of some thing, of this or that quality or essence, but only the intelligence of an intelligibility.** The movement Plato describes as erotic anamnesis is the movement that transports the object not toward another thing or another place, but toward its own taking-place-toward the Idea.

A2 Ks of Agamben

AT: Derrida

Derrida fundamentally misunderstands Agamben – he's a dumbass

Donahue 13 (Luke Donahue is a writer who specializes in deconstruction, "Erasing Differences between Derrida and Agamben" 2013 *Oxford Literary Review* p. 29-30)///CW

While Part One of Homo Sacer focuses on the sovereign who appears¶ most in the law, Part Two focuses on the banished ex-citizen who¶ appears most devoid of law and most animal. This exile is homo sacer,¶ excluded from the legal order. But while exiled from the polis, he is¶ not completely abandoned to animal life: just as the sovereign state¶ of exception still holds a relation to law, so too does homo sacer. When¶ Agamben calls homo sacer bare life, he does not mean that bare life is the¶ pure, unqualified life of zoe. Rather, bare life is a 'zone of indistinction'¶ between zoe and bios, between life that is absolutely animal and life¶ that is qualified as human and political. While bare life is commonly¶ confused with zoe, Agamben says clearly: 'Neither political bios nor¶ natural zoe, sacred life is the zone of indistinction in which zoe and bios¶ constitute each other in including and excluding each other' (HS, 90).7¶ What is more, while bare life is the play between bios and zoe, there is¶ no bios or zoe prior to the bare life of homo sacer. Just as nature and¶ culture only appear after the originary confusion between them, so the¶ condition of possibility of the appearance of either pure bios or pure¶ zoe is the originary co-contamination that 'precedes' either of them.¶ Derrida continually misunderstands these points when he identifies¶ bare life with zoe, as in the following apposition: 'bare life (zoe)'.8¶ This confusion gives Derrida the impression that 'Agamben is required¶ to demonstrate that the difference between zoe and bios is absolutely¶ rigorous' (BS, 326). But Agamben's point is just the opposite: the¶ distinction never was rigorous. There never was an original unity or¶ an original and secure difference.

Derrida misunderstands Agamben's argument – the fact that bios and zoe cannot be separated is the entire point

Kotsko 12 (Adam Kotsko is Assistant Professor of Humanities at Shimer College in Chicago and the translator of Giorgio Agamben's Sacrament of Language: An Archeology of the Oath, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, and Opus Dei: An Archeology of Duty "On Derrida's critique of Agamben" 6/30/12 https://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/30/on-derridas-critique-of-agamben/)///CW

I have not closely studied Derrida's critique of Agamben from The Beast and the Sovereign, yet given how frequently it's been deployed by Agamben skeptics, I feel comfortable giving a brief, blog-style response to it: that bios and zoē cannot be neatly distinguished does not undermine Agamben's project, but is indeed the entire point.¶ Agamben reads the Western tradition as a series of increasingly destructive failed attempts to separate them out in some kind of stable and sustainable way. The reason these attempts fail is that the neat distinction is impossible — indeed, even in the encounter between the sovereign (the very embodiment of bios as political life) and the homo sacer (the emblem of zoē as bare life), which should surely count as the starkest possible contrast between these two concepts of life, an uncanny overlapping occurs wherein both are included through their very exclusion.¶ Agamben is thus not trying to get rid of bios in favor of a pure zoē — i.e., to abolish politics and allow us all to return to our raw animality or unblemished nature — but to get at another politics, another form of life that would not be governed by this founding opposition of the contingent historical reality that is Western politics.¶ There is doubtless a lot to be said in critique of Agamben's project, but Derrida's critique misses its target as far as I can tell.

AT: Foucault Wrong

Agambens theory of Biopower si fundamentally different than Foucoults analysis
Kendrick 2012 Victoria University of Wellington (Foucault, Biopower & IR)

In summary, both sets of authors discussed above commit, **from a Foucauldian perspective**, **fundamental methodological errors.** Hardt & Negri explain power relations according to a transcendent logic, and explicitly break one of Foucault's methodological rules; "not to attempt some kind of deduction of power starting from its centre and aimed at the discovery of the extent to which it permeates into the base, of the degree to which it reproduces itself down to and including the most molecular elements of society."48 Meanwhile**, Agamben's analysis is also anti-genealogical, in that it places the present need of explaining zones of exception at the supposed origin of sovereignty, albeit an origin that perpetually re-inscribes itself as the function of sovereignty.** Yet both sets of authors have a predominant influence in the IR literature, over a dearth of more accurate Foucauldian readings**. It should seem odd then, that when the shortcomings of biopower in IR literature are identified**, it is Foucault that gets the blame. This is especially so when Foucault made it quite clear that, although his concepts and insights were produced to be freely interpreted and redeployed according to the directions of others' investigations, **certain methodological principles were integral to** his **work**. I maintain that a Foucauldian IR can only be built upon a certain level of methodological adherence to these principles. **The direction in which Agamben**, and Hardt & Negri have **ultimately led biopower is** best represented by Michael Dillon, **probably the most explicit and prolific theorist of biopower** in IR.49 Dillon is particularly interested in the ramifications of Foucault's insights into security, war, and race, and views biopolitics from this perspective. For Dillon, the central import of biopower is not that it is a strategy which promotes life, but that in promoting life its central concern is to differentiate between the fit and unfit. "Biopolitics is therefore always involved in the sorting of life for the promotion of life. Sorting life requires waging war on behalf of life against life forces that are inimical to life."**50War becomes a central concern** for Dillon because, as Foucault first states in The History of Sexuality, vol 1, **biopower not only is a power that fosters life, but concomitantly disallows life**. 51 **Foucault, however, did not pursue this line of inquiry to fully develop its implications,** and Dillon's project launches itself from the point made by Bigo that **"[t]he question of security as it relates to war, and to international war, is not really discussed by Foucault and the Foucaultians."** 52

TAG
Kendrick 2012 Victoria University of Wellington (Foucault, Biopower & IR)

Due to Agamben's view of sovereignty, it is clear that his conception of biopower is fundamentally dissimilar to Foucault. Some go so far as to say they are not talking about the same thing.40 **Agamben's biopower rests on the idea** that **'bare life' is** its object, **a mode of life that is exposed to an unconditional threat of death via the suspension of sovereignty**, a foundational practice that serves to perpetually constitute sovereign power. **Bare life exists in a 'state of exception'**, a constitutive operation that links bare life directly to sovereign power. The state of exception thus

produces **bare life which is the hidden foundation of biopolitics, which itself had been concealed** until Foucault identified practices of government that made it explicit. This objectification of bare life is absolutely incongruent with Foucault's subjectification of the life processes of a population. **It also directly contradicts Foucault**. For **Agamben, sovereign biopower produces bare life to establish itself, a process that is "immensely reductive,"**41 while for Foucault, the practice of biopower is productive – to turn the mere "being" of life into "well-being."42 Ojakangas sums up **the problem with Agamben's perspective** most succinctly when he says that **is"[b]io-power needs a notion of life that corresponds to its aims."43 The necessary correspondence between biopower and 'more-than-life' does mean Agamben is effectively talking about something different to what Foucault meant.** Schinkel (2010) even resolves this divergence in a model based on citizenship as a technology of government. On this reading **Foucauldian biopolitics is directed towards the bios, taking as its object the social body, while Agambean biopower is a zoēpolitics externally directed to persons outside the state**.44 This is an important and helpful distinction, but it leaves unresolved what branch of biopower is most pertinent to the study of international relations. Like Hardt & Negri, **the influence Agamben's work wields within the discipline of IR forces a complete appraisal of his conceptualisation**, and from a Foucauldian perspective methodological problems upset his argument. In Nietzsche, Genealogy, **History Foucault** eschews the **search for truth in origins**, whereby history becomes a handmaiden to philosophy.45 **Agamben does not observe this methodological precaution** and effectively identifies an originary moment, whereby the articulation of the concepts of zoë and bios by Aristotle constitute the birth-moment of sovereignty. **Not only does this "naively and problematically [assume] that there was once a separation between zoë and bios,"46 Blencowe points out that this reading also de-historicises biopower in a dual sense**. First it removes Foucault's work from its contexts of concern with constructed and historical statuses, which "[forecloses] any transhistorical distinctions such as zoë/bios, bare life/human life, or nature/culture". Second, "the historical specificity of notions that are central to biological thinking, such as species, is obliterated while all thought of living physicality is subsumed under a 'mere' physicality."47 **The genealogical component of Foucault's insight is thus completely removed, and an abstract transhistorical category –zoë – is introduced.**

AT: Hall***

Some biopolitics might be good, but that's not the aff --- we specifically critique the juridical biopolitics of the 1ac

THEIR AUTHOR Hall, 5/7/**2007** – Master of Arts in Political Science (Lindsay, "Death, Power, and the Body: A Bio-political Analysis of Death and Dying", Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, p. 9)//roetlin

Foucault was careful to distinguish sovereign power from the mechanisms of power that emerged in modernity. For him, an essential aspect of modern power is its surreptitious nature–it works so well precisely because we are intent on looking for power in rules and laws; in prohibitive mechanisms **rather than in productive ones**. While Damiens' execution was perhaps the last great hurrah for pure sovereign authority–as it would only be a few decades later that the French King himself would see his power stripped away by the cold steel blade of the guillotine–Foucault famously contended that, "in political thought and analysis, we still [have yet to] cut off the head of the king" (1978, 88-89). In other words, for Foucault, power is still represented in **juridical terms** despite the fact that deduction, the primary manifestation of sovereign authority, has become merely one element in a range of mechanisms "working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize and organize the forces under it" (1978, 136).

AT: Holocaust Trivialization

He's obviously not being literal --- he's not even claiming our experiences are on par with nazi victims

Van Munster, 5/28/**2014** – Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and teaches security studies at the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark (Rens, "The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule", Danish Institute for International Studies, p. 144)//roetlin

Supra fn. 4, at p. 181, passim , <u>Agamben's</u> outspoken <u>statement that the concentration camp is the political paradigm of the West **does not** purport that life today faces the **same horrors** that inhabitants of concentration camps had to confront.</u>

Biopolitics generates the groundwork for <u>racism</u> and <u>eugenics</u> --- these invisible violences outweigh any purported benefits of biopolitics --- FYI we also don't link to h triv

Van Munster, 5/28/**2014** – Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and teaches security studies at the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark (Rens, "The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule", Danish Institute for International Studies, p. 144-146)//roetlin

Taking his cue from Michel Foucault, Agamben maintains that <u>the sovereign right to take life has become supplemented and permeated by a right to make life</u>. In modern societies <u>the sovereign threat of death has been complemented with a concern to **take charge** of biological life</u> in order to make it more productive, fertile, healthy, etc. 11 <u>Instead of threatening with death, biopolitics is a form of power that is concerned with the correction, administration and regulation of populations</u>. Seeking to take charge of life, ''<u>it does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies</u> of the sovereign <u>from</u> his <u>obedient subjects</u>; it effects distributions around the norm.'' 12 The inclusion of pure life in politics, then, also marks a shift from law to the (statistical) norm in the sense that <u>bare life is not only, or not even first and foremost, produced in the sovereign process of taking life, but through the process of making life</u>, i.e. through the distribution of human life around a norm with the purpose of reducing life's distance to this norm. <u>Although the incorporation of bare life in the political realm has made it possible to reduce</u>, amongst others, <u>famine and mortality</u> in the West<u>, it has also given rise to 'caring' practices such as **racism and eugenics**: ''What follows is a kind of bestialization of man achieved through the most sophisticated political techniques. For the first time in history ... it becomes possible both to protect life and to authorize a holocaust.</u>'' 13 Agamben's rendering of sovereign power and bare life is driven by an ethical drive to lay bare the <u>juridico-political mechanisms of power</u> that <u>make it possible to commit acts of violence that do not count as crime.</u> 14 While **not denying the uniqueness of the suffering** in the Nazi concentration camps, <u>Agamben discovers similar structures</u> in contemporary society. He points out that <u>camp-like structures such as detention centres for illegal migrants, airport holding zones and humanitarian relief camps all produce bare life</u> in the sense that decisions on the life of people can be taken outside the normal framework of rule, but which nevertheless are not completely illegal and without connection to that law. In the context of this paper, the <u>Guantanamo Bay</u> detention centre for suspected terrorists <u>is another case in point</u>. 15 However, as Edkins has noted, Agamben has not inquired deeper into the politics of emergency or the politics of the ban in which the sovereign and homo sacer are constituted as each other's mirror image. 16 Therefore, the following sections aim to provide insight into the ways in which the American governance of the emergency of 9/11 constitute global American sovereignty on the one hand and reduce political subjects to the naked life of homo sacer .

AT: Schmitt**

The affirmation of enmity re-creates violent states of exception in which the sovereign is able to enact racialization as a tool of colonial domination

To draw out this relationship between biopolitics, capitalism and resistance I begin with the zombie's mythic origins in Haiti. For Achille Mbembe, the figure of the zombie perfectly captures the self-undermining way in which biopolitics, through ever-widening gaps of permanent emergency and states of exception, has always been as much a technology of death as of life - in his [End Page 175] memorable terminology, a necropolitics. In his essay of that name, Mbembe, echoing Agamben in proclaiming death camps the 'nomos of the political world in which we still live', argues that in the contemporary moment 'the human being truly becomes a subject - that is, separated from the animal - in the struggle and the work through which he or she confronts death (understood as the violence of negativity)' (14). Consequently, 'the state of exception and the relation of enmity have become the normative basis of the right to kill…. power (and not necessarily state power) continuously refers and appeals to exception, emergency, and a fictionalized notion of the enemy. It also labors to produce that same exception, emergency, and fictionalized enemy' (16). Extending Foucault's theory that race war is the constitutive foundation of the modern state, as well as Hannah Arendt's argument in The Origins of Totalitarianism that the two world wars reflected the reimportation of technologies of violence from the colonies (in which they were first developed) into 'civilised' metropolitan Europe, Mbembe argues that the declaration of enmity required by the state of exception is an act of racialisation that has its origins in colonialism and imperialism, as well as plantation economics and the slave trade ('Necropolitics' 18). Sovereignty in this (post)colonial valence operates in accordance with a zombic logic of quarantine and extermination: 'sovereignty means the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not' ('Necropolitics' 27). This basic assumption of disposability, and the reign of terror it engenders, has necessarily taken many different forms in the many different locations and contexts in which it has been deployed; Mbembe's own examples range from the '"savages" of the colonial world' to refugees, stateless persons, enslaved persons and the working class. Mbembe's work suggests that colonialism's assignation of nonhuman disposability to human beings can be abstracted as modernity's foundational theoretical investment, its original (and ongoing) sin. For Mbembe, the history of this assignation of disposability and the consequent 'rise of modern terror' begins not with state action but with the plantation system and the figure of the slave, which he notes 'could be considered one of the first instances of biopolitical experimentation' ('Necropolitics' 21). But the exclusion of the slave from the body politic and her subsumption into the market as an object-commodity can never be completely realised; the productive capacity, creativity and intentional mind of the enslaved are required to produce wealth for the slave-owner, but these same human values must be denied in order for the practice of slavery to be justified in the first place. This is to say, the humanity of the slave must be retained even as it is denied: [End Page 176]

Schmitts ontology leads to marginalizing violence – don't trust their apologism

Farr 9 [Evan, PhD Student in Political Science. With Friends Like These...Carl Schmitt, Political Ontology, and National Socialism]

In the next section, I will work from this foundation to map Schmitt's ontology. In doing this, I will demonstrate that Schmitt's errors involve much more than bath water. 2: Problems with the Schmittian Ontology As seen above, the agonistic attempt to salvage Carl Schmitt focuses upon Schmitt's attacks on a certain universalistic understanding liberalism. In this reading, it is liberalism that suppresses the possibility of difference, while Schmitt's antagonism and decisionism merely recognize reality: that the political always inevitably involves conflict and difference, and – no matter the insufficiency of Schmitt's solution – the key goal for political theorists is to navigate the seemingly incommensurable struggle between sometimes violently different theories of democratic legitimacy. But how compatible are the agonist and Schmittian perspectives? In this section, I will argue that Schmittian antagonism and democratic agonism

are more deeply conflicting than Chantal Mouffe and others recognize. Because Schmitt is oriented toward a statist and action-centric ontology, **his theory is significantly more dangerous** than his apologists admit.

Schmitts epistemology is flawed – his arguments are based around a defense of Nazism – prefer this evidence, its from the top of the article and cut by a straight beast

Emden 2009 [J. Emden, Department of German Studies, Rice University. How to Fall into Carl Schmitt's Trap. July.]

This is a long review and perhaps a controversial one. The much-awaited English translation of Raphael Gross's seminal book on Carl Schmitt's antisemitism, based on a doctoral dissertation at the University of Essen and first published by Suhrkamp ten years ago to much media attention in Germany, and subsequently in France, makes a substantial contribution to contemporary scholarship on Schmitt, one of the most influential public lawyers and constitutional theorists of the Weimar Republic. Preceded by a well-balanced preface by Peter C. Caldwell, which elegantly situates Gross's argument in the contemporary intellectual field, Joel Golb's translation is accurate and precise. It is, however, the argument of Gross's study which seems initially strikingly persuasive, but emerges as increasingly problematic. On the one hand, no doubt remains that Schmitt held deeply entrenched antisemitic views throughout his life. As such, Gross's study serves as a warning against the uncritical Schmitt enthusiasm that occasionally marks contemporary cultural studies, that is, a kind of desire for political Eigentlichkeit now that poststructuralist theories have run their course. On the other hand, Gross's study has a far more ambitious goal than simply providing an account of Schmitt's antisemitism and, in this respect, it does have severe limitations that require a more detailed assessment. Most importantly, Gross unwittingly falls into Carl Schmitt's trap. The central question of Gross's study is not whether Schmitt really was antisemitic--not even the most enthusiastic Schmitt apologists would seriously deny this. Neither is the central question whether traces of Schmitt's antisemitic convictions can be found throughout his political thought and his work as a constitutional scholar--needless to say, they can. Rather, Gross's project seeks to reduce Schmitt's entire way of thinking about the political and about law to the binary opposition between "friend" and "enemy"--introduced in Der Begriff des Politischen (1932)--which Gross interprets from the perspective of Schmitt's involvement in the Nazi state as the difference between a homogeneous German Volk and a perceived "other," that is, Judaism, that is not only "alien" to this Volk but threatens the latter's existential survival.[1] Seen from this perspective, Gross claims, not only does Schmitt's thought stand in clear opposition to the tradition of the liberal Rechtsstaat--indeed, the very source of his critique of the modern democratic state is to be found in his antisemitic convictions.

The alternative is the state of exception – makes the aff's impacts inevitable

Boersma, 5 (Jess Boersma teaches courses in Peninsular literatures, critical thought, and Spanish language at U of NC, "What About Schmitt? Translating Carl: Schmitt's Theory of Sovereignty as Literary Concept", published in *Discourse*, 27.2&3, Spring & Fall 2005, pp. 215-227 (Article), accessed 7/16/13, projectMUSE)

It would be too hasty to conclude that Schmitt's current critical standing indicates any kind of resolution of the polemics between left and right regarding the legacy of his legal thought and his political association with the Nazi party. It almost goes without saying that the extreme right has taken pains to revive the friend-enemy distinction, developed in Schmitt's The Concept of the Political and, in many cases, has reduced it further to a friend-foe distinction in order to justify strategies of total war and cultural, religious, and ethnic cleansing.3 On the other side of the spectrum, Giorgio Agamben, in his Homo Sacer series argues that the possibly tyrannical consequences of Schmitt's thinking on the friend-enemy distinction and the sovereign decision are not isolated to the followers of the ''Crown Jurist of the Third Reich,'' but rather are only too alive and well within the practices of present day liberal democratic states.4 Let me give one quick example of Agamben's line of thought in the form of biopolitics and the sovereign decision. In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life Agamben argues

that the state of exception is fast becoming the rule, with the consequence that the state of nature and the state of law are nearly indistinguishable (38). Rather than a pure Hobbesian state of nature of all against all, the sovereign state maintains the monopoly over violence and yet the demand for obedience is no longer contingent upon the guarantee of protection. In Remnants of Auschwitz, the Nazi concentration camp is shown to be the end result of a legal process which produces a separation between the living being (zoe) and the speaking being (bios) with the aim ''no longer to make die or to make live, but to survive'' (155). Agamben then seeks to illustrate how states of exception have played out in American history by following the sovereign decisions of presidents Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and George W. Bush. In the last case, he states that as a result of September 11 ''Bush is attempting to produce a situation in which the emergency becomes the rule, and the very distinction between peace and war (and between foreign and civil war) becomes impossible'' (State of Exception 22). Evidence for Agamben's claims would appear to be provided externally by the suspended legal status of the Guanta´- namo prisoners; and internally by the recent ethical and legal battles over the coma case of Terri Schiavo (whose last name happens to mean slave in Italian), along with the present debates between the legislative and the executive branches in which Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has defended the constitutional legality of President Bush's decision to not fully disclose matters regarding domestic spying.5

Schmitt's politics lead to Nazism – don't discard the obvious in favor of his apologists Farr, 9

Evan, With Friends Like These...Carl Schmitt, Political Ontology, and National Socialism, PhD Student in Political Science, University of Virginia Graduate Student Conference, http://www.virginia.edu/politics/grad_program/print/Farr_gradconference09.pdf

3: Schmitt's Nazism: Interlude or Inevitability? Carl Schmitt's membership in the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1936 is the most obvious problem for his apologists, and it has spawned a thriving body of literature seeking to demonstrate that his involvement with the Third Reich was negligible.49 According to his defenders, if Schmitt was a Nazi he was only a Nazi of opportunity, stringing along the NSDAP leadership (especially Hermann Goering) in order to retain his academic posts. Like Heidegger or Pound, Schmitt is forgiven his transgression for the sake of ostensibly non-fascist work elsewhere. This section will argue that it is a **mistake to discount Schmitt's Nazism** as an opportunistic interlude. Although he certainly did not share the millenarian, mystical mania marking the hardcore Nazi ideologues, the ontological commitments described in the foregoing section predisposed Schmitt to **sympathize with a totalitarian – and ultimately genocidal – regim**

Agamben K- Northweatern

2nc at

2nc – at: h-triv

Agamben isn't making a direct comparison, and his theories have clear reasons for the parallels he draws

Robinson 11 (Andrew – political theorist, activist based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, "In Theory Giorgio Agamben: the state and the concentration camp," in Ceasefire Magazine, 1-7-11, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-giorgio-agamben-the-state-and-the-concentration-camp/)

Doubtless some will reject his theories for violating "Godwin's Law", or because they feel it is trivialising or decontextualising the camp to compare it to every instance of repression. This, I suspect, is based on a misunderstanding. For one thing, Agamben is not actually saying that we are all treated like camp inmates, simply that we're all at risk from being treated as if we are of this status – we could be killed by the state with impunity, even if we aren't. Also, this is not just a case of Agamben calling people he dislikes Nazis. There are clear, structural reasons for the parallels he draws. I would argue that, in contrast, the tabooing of discussion of fascistic elements of present state practices is based on a kind of irrational splitting, which wards off the subversive implications of "never again" by keeping them at a distance, pretending they "don't apply to us", they only apply to issues behind some imaginary boundary (in "undemocratic" societies for instance) which historically would prove to be far more porous. It is, I think, a peculiar perspectival blockage of radicalisms in countries like Britain to confine anti-fascism to opposing small neo-Nazi groups. In contrast, German antifa have long recognised the parallels between the repressive practices (and even the personnel) of the current German state and those of the Third Reich; so have radicals in Italy, Spain, Greece and Japan. It is only in countries like Britain and America, with no recent fascist past to compare to, where the existence of a continuum between fascism and the 'deep state' is something of a public secret, even among radicals.

The Holocaust happened for contingent, historical reasons but the camp was a key precondition

Robinson 11 (Andrew – political theorist, activist based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, "In Theory Giorgio Agamben: the state and the concentration camp," in Ceasefire Magazine, 1-7-11, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-giorgio-agamben-the-state-and-the-concentration-camp/)

The concentration camp, and Nazi death camps such as Auschwitz in particular, are for Agamben particularly definitive or telling examples of sovereignty. The camp (which preceded the Holocaust by a long time) was a turning-point for Agamben because it made the temporary state of exception permanent, locating it in space instead of time (unlike the declaration of a state of emergency), and local to the core area of power, within its territory but outside its law (unlike the colony or warzone). This fixing of the state of exception as a permanent feature at a site in time and space intensifies the danger to people declared homo sacer. Formerly, an outlawed person would be literally banished, becoming a wandering figure driven into exile. Now, an outlawed person is not allowed to go into exile (think for instance of the immense efforts put into catching high-profile fugitives), but rather, is put in a situation suspended between inside and outside, constantly at risk of arbitrary power. For Agamben, camps differ from other disciplinary spaces (prisons, asylums and so on) because in them, anything is possible, and the guard is absolutely sovereign. The Nazi Holocaust marks a second turning point in which the horrors of the camp are revealed in all their monstrosity. The Holocaust happened when and where it did for contingent historical reasons, but its real causes were the creation of a particular kind of space, the 'camp', where people were defined as having lives not worth living, and as being vulnerable to being killed with impunity. Auschwitz is the high point of the logic of sovereignty, showing its ontological nature in its realisation: it shows where the combination of biopolitics and sovereignty leads. Auschwitz marks the point of no return which reveals the nature of sovereignty for what it really is. It thus marks the starting point for a new politics.

2nc – at: try or die

Timeframe based try or die calculations justify consolidation of power and radical, unprecented violence

The ways that authoritative institutions **invoke and order time** as a means of consolidating and expressing power often **engender violence**. Conflicting interpreta- tions of holy writ and spiritual obligation have incited bloody religious persecutions and armed conflicts for centuries. Slavoj Zizek contends that secular (not only religious) regimes justify **radical police or military action** by **invoking apocalyptic senses of time**: "Apocalyptic time is the time of the end of time, the time of emergency, of the state of exception when the end is nigh."[2] States of exception in liberal-democratic nations are also times of exception: **executive authorities** exercise unprecedented forms of violence both within and without national borders by **citing as justification allegedly temporary episodes of state emergency**.[3]

2nc – at: determinate site

Sovereign exceptionalism is spatializing, not spatially bounded

Belcher et al. 8 (Oliver Belcher – postdoctoral researcher on the RELATE Center of Excellence located at the University of Oulu, Finland, former postdoctoral researcher on the BIOS Project at the Arctic Center, University of Lapland, Finland, Lauren Martin – Academy of Finland, Postdoctoral Researcher, RELATE Centre of Excellence, Department of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland, PhD in Geography, Department of Geography, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, Anna Secor – Full Professor, University of Kentucky, Geography Department, PhD, University of Colorado, Stephanie Simon, Tommy Wilson, "Everywhere and Nowhere: The Exception and the Topological Challenge to Geography," Published in Antipode, Volume 40, Issue 4, pages 499–503, September 2008, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2008.00620.x/abstract)

Geography's use of Giorgio Agamben's work has proliferated in recent years. While approaches and interpretations of Agamben's political theory have varied, a common aim has been to apply his theory of exception to socio-geographical phenomena and to disclose "the ban" as the "originary political relation" (Diken and Laustsen 2005:24–25; Ek 2006:363; Kearns 2006; Minca 2005, 2006). The result has been a focus on the "space" of the exception as a determinate socio-temporal site, such as Guantanamo Bay. We argue that this focus on determinate spaces elides the real spatializing work of the exception, which, we emphasize, is topological (see also Coleman 2007). The problem with focusing on a static geometry of exceptional spaces is that it obscures the ways in which the exception operates as an unlocalizable process of transformation. As Brian Massumi (2002:184) puts it, the distinction between topology and static geometry is the distinction "between the process of arriving at a form through continuous deformation and the determinate form arrived at when the process stops" (see also Hannah 2006). Topologies, unlike topographies, do not map discreet locations or particular objects. While it is true that we can identify operative spaces of exception, the exception also materializes ordinary spaces. As a topological figure that creates the conditions for particular materialized sites, the exception is emergent, which is to say that it is not a preformed category but a dynamic set of techniques of power. In this way, we emphasize Agamben's relationship with Foucault, an affinity that is often lost in various interpretations of his writings. The implications of a topological and emergent understanding of the exception become clearer in the context of Agamben's idea of sovereignty as potential and actual. At the same time, our intervention aims to show how a topological, emergent understanding of the exception might open up a potential for radical politics. If the spatiality of Agamben's political theory has been treated in too fixed a manner, this tendency might in no small part be due to a confusion between Agamben's political theory and that of the primary theorist of the sovereign exception, Carl Schmitt. Schmitt argues that juridical rule and State authority are made possible by the decision on what constitutes the "normal" case (where the rule of law holds) versus the exception (where the law is suspended) (Schmitt 1985). Schmitt's idea of the "ordering of space" involves above all the decision on the exception that establishes the inside and the outside of the law. The state of exception, according to Schmitt, "designated a zone of free and empty space", that is, "a suspension of all law for a certain time and in a certain space" (Schmitt 2003:99). For Schmitt, therefore, the decision on the exception performs a juridical and territorial ordering at the same time as it demarcates a specific spatio-temporal order—the space of the exception. Agamben's departure from Schmitt on the question of space is clear in Homo Sacer, where he writes: In its archetypal form, the state of exception is therefore the principle of every juridical localization, since only the state of exception opens the space in which the determination of a certain juridical order and a particular territory first becomes possible. As such, the state of exception itself is thus **essentially unlocalizable** (even if definite spatio-temporal limits can be assigned to it from time to time) (Agamben 1998:19). Thus for Agamben the state of exception is the principle of territorialization (ordering and orienting) but is itself essentially unlocalizable. While Schmitt explicitly renders the state of exception as spatially and temporally bounded, Agamben's contribution to the theory of the exception is to reread Walter Benjamin's engagement with Schmitt and to bring into sharp relief its contemporary relevance. For Agamben, this state inaugurates a rupture within the Schmittian correspondence between order and orientation, between law and space. For Schmitt the decision on the exception merely demarcates the inside and the outside of the law, but for Agamben the exception also produces and diffuses a "zone of indistinction" within which the law and its suspension become indistinguishable. This state of exception is not itself a kind of space, but rather a technique of

government (Agamben 2005:2) that produces a topographical juridical-territorial order by determining the inside and the outside of law (as Schmitt also argues); establishes the principles by which we distinguish law from its application; and produces a topological relationship between the inside and outside of law such that they become indistinguishable (delocalization). Because topological space is always a process of becoming, we use analytics of governmentality, which itself refers to the everyday emergence of power and control, to think through how the exception works. For Foucault, governmentality refers to a field of everyday practices, organized by a complex of techniques of power that govern and optimize processes immanent to a population. In this field, discipline, government, and sovereignty are imbricated and indistinguishable, so that the exception operates as a potential (dis)ordering principle, a potential technique of government (Foucault 1991:102). For Agamben, "the declaration of the state of exception has gradually been replaced by an unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government" (Agamben 2005:14). This governmentalization of the structure of the exception forms a "complex topological figure in which not only the exception and the rule but also the state of nature and law, outside and inside, pass through one another" (Agamben 1998:37). As a technique of government, then, the exception is never completely hidden, nor is it purely manifested. The state of exception produces material effects, even when it remains virtual. This poses an important question for geographers: how do we analyze the material effects of the virtual? If the topological character of the state of exception means that it operates at the edges of materiality, how should we make use of Agamben's theories to understand the spatiality of the exception (and governmentality, for that matter)? We argue that Agamben's limit case, the state of exception, is spatializing, not spatialized. When we say that the exception is spatializing, we emphasize processes of transformation and emergence (the topological) and fold the operation of spatialization into the field of potential. The exception thus produces a governmental potential to link specific arrays of discursive objects, procedures, and rationalities towards particular ends. Based on this understanding of Agamben, which emphasizes the emergent spatialization of the exception rather than its determinate spaces, we argue for foregrounding the idea of potentiality in geographical analyses of the exceptional. Situated on the edge of materiality, the state of exception has the potential to materialize or not to materialize actual spaces of exception. Potentiality, for Agamben, is the tension between actuality (materialization) and the potential not to be—the faculty to say "I can", without the action being materialized (Agamben 1999:179). To have a faculty, argues Agamben, means "to have a privation", ie the potential not to be. This potentiality, argues Agamben, "maintains itself in relation to actuality in the form of its suspension; it is capable of the act in not realizing it, it is sovereignly capable of its own im-potentiality" (Agamben 1998:45). For example, in his discussion of sovereignty, Agamben poses "abandonment", the rationality of power that marks the exception, as topological in that it has the ability not to be: it is potential. The exception is the zone of indistinction between constituting and constituted power. The decision on the exception "realizes itself by simply taking away its own potentiality not to be, letting itself be" (Agamben 1998:46). Topological space is therefore not only emergent and governmental, but also always potential—that is, both capable of becoming and of not becoming. It is no coincidence that in the denouement of his essay "On potentiality" that Agamben finds the "root of freedom" also within the "abyss of potentiality" (Agamben 1999:183). Agamben's political praxis is one of radical desubjectivation, a desubjectification that refuses to be captured in a topological state of exception [a synthesis between Walter Benjamin's "divine violence" (1996) and Gilles Deleuze's (2006) "Immanence: a life …"]. He writes, "We can say that between immanence and a life there is a kind of crossing with neither distance nor identification, something like a passage without spatial movement" (Agamben 1999:223). This "passage without a spatial movement" is a matrix of infinite desubjectification (Agamben 1999:232). Absolute immanence (ie potential freedom) is a call for Benjamin's barbarians: those law-destroying lives that cannot be captured in a sovereign's state of exception. It is "a life …" whose principle is "infinite desubjectification", which cannot be abandoned—a de-subject that preempts the potential state of exception, and therefore cannot be striated into the biopolitical subject of bare life, that succubus that haunts our political landscape. Just as the subjective homo sacer is the material kernel for the sovereign exception, Agamben's radical desubjectification is the material kernel for freedom. This praxis of Agamben's may be what Deleuze once said was "philosophy, nothing else but philosophy" (cited in Ek 2006:363) in response to a question on the utility of A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 1980). This poses a challenge to geographers of how to produce knowledge and geographical imaginaries that at once promote just political and intellectual projects and refuse to produce subjects that can be captured.

2nc – at: 'state of exception' bad

Misreading --- our point is the duality of power <u>feeds into itself</u>

Prozorov 10 (Sergei – Professor of Political and Economic Studies at the University of Helsinki, "Why Giorgio Agamben is an optimist," in Philosophy Social Criticism, Volume 36, Number 9, p. 1056-1057, November 2010, http://psc.sagepub.com/content/36/9/1053.abstract)

<u>This</u> totalized <u>image of the global</u> ==state of exception has been criticized== as both hyperbolically excessive and internally contradictory. Paul Passavant has argued that Agamben's theory suffers from a contradictory concept of the state that also plagues his affirmative vision of the 'coming politics'.7 <u>While</u> ==Agamben== <u>is most famous for his deconstruction of the logic of sovereignty that radicalizes Schmitt's conception</u>,8 <u>he</u> ==has also==, <u>from his earliest work</u> onwards, ==confronted== <u>the more</u> ==dispersed==, 'governmentalized' modes of ==power relations characteristic of late capitalism== <u>in the manner highly influenced by</u> Guy <u>Debord's work on the society of the spectacle</u>.9 Against the argument that this conjunction of sovereignty and governmentality in the analysis of late-modern power relations constitutes a contradiction, we must recall that ==this duality of the contemporary apparatus of power is **explicitly affirmed by Agamben himself**==, <u>who</u>, similarly to Foucault's claim for the indissociability of sovereignty, discipline and government,10 <u>regularly</u> ==insists that '==<u>the system is always double</u>'.11 The inextricable link between the two aspects of the contemporary social order consists in the nihilistic deployment of life itself as a (post-)historical task. ==Both state sovereignty and the late-capitalist society of the spectacle are biopolitical and thus permanently feed into each other==. The contemporary neo-liberal governmentality extends the operation of economic rationality to life itself, whereby life is conceived as a paradigmatic form of enterprise,12 and in this manner expropriates the being-in-language that defines human existence and subjects it to the laws of exchange-value or, in Agamben's later works, 'exhibition value'.13 Conversely, sovereign power expropriates the potentiality of human existence, transforming it into the bare life that it then grounds itself in and applies itself to in the perpetual state of exception. The state does nothing more than sustain the spectacle with its apparatuses of security, while the spectacle does nothing more than perpetually produce the degraded forms-of-life that sovereign power can apply itself to.

2nc – at: utopian/mwajeh 5

We are manifestly anti-utopian --- possibility for change is <u>always already present</u>

Prozorov 10 (Sergei – Professor of Political and Economic Studies at the University of Helsinki, "Why Giorgio Agamben is an optimist," in Philosophy Social Criticism, Volume 36, Number 9, p. 1057, November 2010, http://psc.sagepub.com/content/36/9/1053.abstract)

It is evident that the danger at issue in Agamben's work is nihilism in its dual form of the sovereign ban and the capitalist spectacle. If, as we have shown in the previous sec- tion, the reign of nihilism is general and complete, we may be optimistic about the pos- sibility of jamming its entire apparatus since there is nothing in it that offers an alternative to the present 'double subjection'. Yet, where are we to draw resources for such a global transformation? ==**It would be easy to misread Agamben as an utterly utopian thinker**==, **whose intentions may be good and whose criticism of the present may be valid if exaggerated**, **but whose solutions are completely implausible if not outright embarras- sing**.23 Nonetheless, ==**we must rigorously distinguish Agamben's approach from utopian- ism**==. As Foucault has argued, ==**utopias derive their attraction from their discursive structure of a fabula**==, which makes it possible to describe in great detail a better way of life, precisely because it is manifestly impossible.24 While utopian thought easily pro- vides us with elaborate visions of a better future, it cannot really lead us there, since its site is by definition a non-place. In contrast, ==**Agamben's works**== **tell us quite little about life in a community of happy life that has done away with the state form**, **but** ==**are remark- ably concrete about the practices that are constitutive of this community**==, **precisely because** ==**these practices require nothing that would be extrinsic**== to the contemporary condition of biopolitical nihilism. Thus, ==**Agamben's coming politics is manifestly anti-utopian and draws**== **all** ==**its resources from the condition of contemporary nihilism**==.

This is offense against you --- an <u>inability to imagine</u> a different world doesn't change its <u>possiblity</u>

Kelly 14 (Mark GE – Senior Lecturer in Humanities at the University of Western Sydney, "Against prophecy and utopia: Foucault and the future," in Thesis Eleven, Volume 120, Number 1, p. 112-113, http://the.sagepub.com/content/120/1/104.full.pdf+html)

<u>It might be said that such a position is itself utopian</u>, positing a utopian vision of a world devoid of utopianism, by which to condemn the present, predicting, without knowing it, that things will work better without utopianism. Neither Foucault nor I do this, however. We offer no vision of how a world without utopianism might operate, no claim that it will lead to any particular practical consequence. ==We only identify a certain== <u>form of practice existing in the present</u> that ==we advocate==, ==over other practices== <u>in the present that I argue are immanently self-contradictory</u>. I make no claim about the dangers or lack thereof in non-utopian procedures, only that they avoid the specific dangers of utopianism and prophecy. Another possible line of objection is that anti-utopianism is associated today with reactionary politics. Alain Badiou (2001: 13) points out that today <u>any positive political project is attacked as utopian</u>, <u>which is to say as unrealistic</u>. It is true that <u>such criticisms are widespread</u>, <u>but they are often incorrect</u>. While there are utopianisms on the left, ==revolutionary thought is not generically utopian==. Revolution is compatible with my position, in the form of an immanent revolution from below, in which the participants attend to and deal with the radically new and unforeseeable conditions as they emerge in a revolutionary situation. The point is to prevent revolution being utopian or prophetic. <u>The critique that castigates left-wing politics in general as utopian is the inverse of our critique of utopianism</u>. Where we claim that utopianism fails because it attempts to say how society should work, <u>critiques of left-wing thought as utopian tend to claim that left-wing positions are insufficiently articulated, hence 'utopian' because they cannot offer an alternative vision</u>. We would argue that ==utopianism is marked **not by the absence of a utopian vision**==, **but** ==**by its presence**==. According to my argument, ==the inability to imagine how something would work is **no argument against its possibility**==, ==just as the ability to imagine how something would work **does not adequately demonstrate that it is actually possible**==, ==since the complexity of the social outstrips our ability to model society in our minds==. ==There is nothing utopian about saying that 'another world is

possible', where this slogan is raised without detailing what this world would look like. Badiou's own position is utterly non-utopian, because it is a matter of fidelity to a truth event in the past that is neither about reviving the past situation nor aiming at producing any particular future situation. Badiou's philosophy is one of profound openness which is inimical to utopianism as I have described it. Conversely, however, it is problematic to say that another world is not possible, that 'there is no alternative'. Such pronouncements are prophetic. The claim that communism is impossible has the same flaw as the claim that communism is inevitable: we cannot know whether a determinate form of social organization is either inevitable or impossible, possible or desirable, in advance. Grand historical claims are prophetic, even if they are negative, like Fukuyama's famous neo-Hegelian diagnosis of the end of history

2nc – at: ojakangas 5

Ojakangas elides the intrinsic relation between caring for living and adjudicating death

Dillon 5 (Michael – Professor of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, "Cared to Death: The Political Time of Your Life," in Foucault Studies, No. 2, p. 37-38, May 2005, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/viewFile/858/876)

The key point of dispute with Ojakangas concerns the self-immolating logic of biopolitics. "Not bare life that is exposed to an unconditional threat of death," he says in the introduction to his paper, "but the care of 'all living' is the foundation of biopower." (emphasis in the original). Ojakangas says: "Foucault's biopower has nothing to do with that [Agamben] kind of bare life." I agree. Foucault's biopolitics concerns an historically biologised life whose biologisation continues to mutate as the life sciences themselves offer changing interpretations and technical determinations of life. This biologised life of biopolitics nonetheless also raises the stake for Foucault of a life that is not a biologised life. So it does for Agamben, but differently and in a different way. For Foucault, the biologised life of biopolitics also raises the issue of a life threatened in supremely violent and novel ways. So it does for Agamben, but again differently and for the same complex of reasons. In contesting Agamben in the ways that he does, Ojakangas marks an important difference, then, between Foucault and Agamben. That done, perhaps the difference needs however to be both marked differently and interrogated differently. I have argued that there is a certain betrayal in the way Agamben reworks Foucault. There is however much more going on in this 'betrayal' than misconstruction and misinterpretation. There is a value in it. Exploring that value requires another ethic of reading in addition to that of the exegesis required to mark it out. For Agamben's loathing of biopolitics is I think more 'true' to the burgeoning suspicion and fear that progressively marked Foucault's reflections on it than Ojakangas' account can give credit for, since he concentrates on providing the exegetical audit required to mark it out rather than evaluate it. In posing an intrinsic and unique threat to life through the very ways in which it promotes, protects and invests life, 'care for all living' threatens life in its own distinctive ways. **Massacres have become vital.** The threshold of modernity is reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own (bio) political strategies. Biopolitics must and does recuperate the death function. It does teach us how to punish and who to kill. Power over life must adjudicate punishment and death as it distributes live across terrains of value that the life sciences constantly revise in the cause of life's very promotion. It has to. That is also why we now have a biopolitics gone geopolitically global in **humanitarian wars of intervention** and martial doctrines of virtuous war. Here, also, is the reason why the modernising developmental politics of biopolitics go racist: "So you can understand the importance - I almost said the vital importance - of racism to such an exercise of power." In racism, Foucault insists: "We are dealing with a mechanism that allows biopower to work." But: "The specificity of modern racism, or what gives it its specificity, is not bound up with mentalities, ideologies or the lies of power. It is bound up with the techniques of power, with the technology of power." In thus threatening life, biopolitics prompts a revision of the question of life and especially of the life of a politics that is not exhaustively biologised; comprehensively subject to biopolitical governance in such a way that life shows up as nothing but the material required for biopolitical governance, whether in terms posed by Foucault or Agamben. Emphasising care for all living - the promotion, protection and investment of the life of individuals and populations - elides the issue of being cared to death. Being cared to death poses the issue of the life that is presupposed, nomologically for Agamben and biologically for Foucault, in biopolitics. Each foregrounds the self-immolating logic that ineluctably applies in a politics of life that understands life biologically, in the way that Foucault documents for us, or nomologically, in the way that Agamben's bare life contends. When recalling the significance of the Christian pastorate to biopolitics, Ojakangas seems to emphasize a line of succession rather than of radical dissociation. One, moreover, which threatens to elide the intrinsic violence of biopolitics and its **essential relation with correction and death**.

If life is a production of biopolitics it is circular to claim biopolitics saves lives

Dillon 5 (Michael – Professor of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, "Cared to Death: The Political Time of Your Life," in Foucault Studies, No. 2, p. 37-38, May 2005, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/viewFile/858/876)

The nomological concerns the law, the biological concerns 'life' and the theological concerns the relation of life to transcendence in the form of divinity. At a philosophical level, the life of politics may be said to find its bearings in relation to the changing interpretations and correlations of force that characterise the intimate relationality of this trinity of nomos, bios and theos. Agamben takes Foucault's account of biopolitics away from history and relocates it back in the centre of these key determinants of political philosophy. Whereas Agamben's nomological account of biopolitical violence threatens a certain kind of political paralysis, however, in as much as it ontologises that violence, Ojakangas' insistence on the productivity of biopolitics threatens to elide the violent inner logic of biopolitics and to miss what Agamben's nomologically driven

ontologisation nonetheless does rigorously expose. Incomparably the most interesting thinker thinking today, one of the things that Agamben is thinking in response to the provocations of biopolitics is the question of life undetermined by the life of biopolitics, a life elevated in addition by a refiguration of transcendence without a godhead, in the form of the immanence of the messianic. He also thinks the facticity of a corporeality beyond the reduction of the body to biology. It is in these moves, among others, that he thinks beyond the initial provocation to political thought that he takes from Foucault's biopolitics. Like any such response, the issue becomes less the degree of faithlessness than the worth of the betrayal.

Death is a function of biopolitics --- it must eliminate the threat to life

Dillon 5 (Michael – Professor of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, "Cared to Death: The Political Time of Your Life," in Foucault Studies, No. 2, p. 37-38, May 2005, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/viewFile/858/876)

Moreover, in the biopolitical context of the circulation of life as species being, Foucault says death is not so much disqualified, but, "something to be hidden away." It loses that spectacular ritual character it once had, marking the move from one power, that of secular sovereignty, to another power, that of a sovereign God. Death does not disappear from biopolitics. Neither is it attenuated beyond political concern, quite the contrary. It changes its character, undergoing political transformation as biopolitics re-inscribes death in the process of 'recuperating the death function'. Whereas no power can ultimately exercise power over death, biopower can and does exercise power over life. One of the means by which it does so is via the biopolitical preoccupations with mortality, morbidity, pathology and mutation. Concerned with death in terms of the vital signs of life, biopolitics is also increasingly concerned these days with the re-inscription of the vital signs of life in terms of code, both molecular and digital. Contra Ojakangas, then, biopolitics does reclaim the death function, for a number of reasons and in a variety of changing ways. It must do so. Reclaiming the death function is integral to its logic. It also reflects the changing operational dynamics of biopolitics. In relation to biopolitical logic: "In the biopower system... killing, or the imperative to kill, is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race." It is acceptable and biopolitically necessary to kill, if not necessarily in the nomological sense of being exposed to death formulated in Agamben's thesis of bare life. In relation to the operationalisation of biopolitics: if biopolitics is to promote, protect and invest life, it must engage in a continuous assay of life. This continuous biopolitical assaying of life proceeds through the epistemically driven and continuously changing interrogation of the worth and eligibility of the living across a terrain of value that is constantly changing. It is changing now, for example, in response to what the life sciences are teaching about what it is to be a living thing. It is changing as biopolitical investment analysts (politicians, risk analysts, governmental technologisers) also interrogate where the best returns on life investment happen to be located in the manifold circulation and transformation of life locally and globally. Life itself mutates in and through these very circuits, not least in relation to molecular biology and electronic communication. We can broadly interpret life science now to range from molecularised biology, through digitalization, to the new social and managerial sciences of development now prominent in the fields of global governmentality, global development policies, human security and even military strategic discourse including, for example, 'Operations Other than War".

The division between white and black is not ontological---it's contingent

Peter **Hudson 13**, Writer at the Political Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand, "The state and the colonial unconscious", Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies, 7/12/13, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02533952.2013.802867

Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself.¶ There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated¶ as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject¶ derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn't¶ excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity¶ may be universal (may be considered "ontological"), its content (what fills it) – as¶ well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other¶ words, the meaning of the signifier of

exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled. Put differently, the "curvature of intersubjective space" (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific modes of the "othering" of "otherness" are nowhere decided in advance¶ a certain ontological fatalism might have it. The social does¶ not have to be divided into white and black, and the meaning of these signifiers is¶ never necessary – because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in¶ a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the¶ side of the ontic – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the¶ ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or¶ lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn't exist, the black man¶ doesn't exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself,¶ including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the¶ social, not the colonial division.

Rebellion and opposition to the system is possible but requires concrete change

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Be **this** as it may, whiteness and blackness are **(**sustained by) determinate and contingent practices of signification; the "structuring relation" of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how tight, can always be undone. Anti-colonial – i.e., anti-"white" – modes of struggle are not (just) "psychic**"6** but involve the "reactivation" (or "de-sedimentation")**7** of colonial objectivity itself. No matter how sediment**ed** (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism**.** Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other**. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside** (Other) **into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility**.8 All symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it can't totalise or make sense of, where its production of meaning falters. This is its internal limit point, its real:9 an errant "object" that has no place of its own, isn't recognised in the categories of the system but is produced by it – its "part of no part" or "object small a."10 Correlative to this object "a" is the subject "stricto sensu" – i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an identity that pins it down.11 **That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from "subject" position based on a determinate identity**. As we've seen **under colonialism**, (the real of) **non-meaning is brought into the logic of the system – the colonised directly experiences the void of non-identity as the meaning of its subject-position (or social "identity**"). Under capitalism, "proletariat" designates this (non-designated) "part of no part," this object without a designated place, this non-totalisable excess produced by the system that can't integrate it, however, as it is not recognised in its categories. Note that under capitalism, the

working class first has to separate itself from itself qua working-class before it can become proletariat – it has to "go through" self-dissolution, whereas the colonised is always already "dissolving."

The system of white colonialism in opposition to the black body doesn't not have to exists in the strict binary that we identify it as

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Fundamentally, for Fanon, colonialism is about the construction of white subjects and black subjects – these are in no sense necessary identities **(as racist discourse claims). Secondly,** flowing from this**,** there is no foundation to colonialism: it doesn't rest on Man or History, it is just a contingent social relation – a differential (over-determined) relation, which it's got to be if it is a contingent construction that can be transformed and replaced. Neither white nor black has value independently of their relationship – white is the difference between it and black, and vice versa. The whiteness of white, where "whiteness" = "brimming with identity self-posses- sion and sovereignty" depends on the blackness of black, where 'blackness' = without identity and self-control. Colonialism satisfies the conditions of a signifying dyad in that its elements (coloniser and colonised) do not exist independently of the relations into which they enter and through which they determine each other reciprocally (Deleuze 1973, 302). On their own, they don't have a determinate value but only acquire one through their reciprocal determination in relation. This is a differential relation, because whiteness only has its colonial meaning in its relation to blackness, and vice versa. The presence of the one in the other precludes either from attaining full identity to itself. Neither is a self-sufficient substance that can rest on itself; rather, each only exists through its relational–differential tension vis-à-vis the other in the colonial matrix. This latter is itself a contingent set of signifying practices, notwith- standing the fact that the fundamental social division they institute presents itself as "ontological". But – and this is crucial – within this interdependence, there is asymmetry: "whiteness" is the master signifier, and it has both white and black subjects in its grip. White subjects identify with it and thus see themselves through it as whole and in control of themselves – it invests them with at least the illusion of self- sufficiency and full autonomy. But black subjects also identify with it – they want to be white (a central theme of Black Skin, White Masks) and so they look at them- selves (blacks) through the white signifier also but what they see (which is exactly the same as what the white subject sees when he looks at the black) is a "body manqué" – not the "corporeal schema" (Fanon 1968, 78) the white sees when he looks at himself which gives him a body image and an image of himself which is "structurally harmonious" **(114)** but something "undefinable" and "unassimilable**" (114)** into the white order of being with which he seeks to identify – the black sees himself as "non-existent" (98, 139), with nothing to hold onto. Torn between two impossibles – to be white and to be black – the first barred and second an impossi- bility in its own terms as there is no black "being" – blackness produces no "ontological resistance" (77, 78) – "turn white or disappear**"** (71) sums up the ontological void of the black colonised subject. Made to want to be white, but incapable of this – he is black; and his blackness seen through his own "white" eyes reduces him to "nothing." The colonial symbolic is so constructed as to give the black subject nothing to hold onto – no orthopaedic support for an identity – just a whiteness

forever eluding him and a blackness that doesn't "exist" in any case. Within the colonial matrix, this is the ontological vortex that is the elementary colonial identity and lived experience of the colonised black subject; and all his compulsive (self-destructive) pathologies, his specific repertoire of "reactional" conduct, have their source in this primary ontological differential. So, fundamen- tally, colonialism is an ontological differential between white and black subjects; and this orders each and every sphere or sector of colonial society (including the economy).

While present racial movements have not been as successful as possible, there is still the possibility for systematic change we must consider first

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So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti- miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his 'interest convergence hypothesis' effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 ⏃ 'We have lost the South for a generation' ⏃ count as 'convergence'? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorpora- tion of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime ⏃ under movement pressure ⏃ was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms ⏃ which he calls 'passive revolutions' ⏃ cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again**, we are in the realm of politics,** not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society**.** Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined 'others' and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially- defined experience and identit**y. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but**

also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other 'new social movements': second- wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others.

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The unstable nature of the IR sphere itself makes it so that new competitors will always rise and fall but our method of pre-emption is key to prevent conflicts

John J. **Mearsheimer 14**, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, "Can China Rise Peacefully?", *The national interest,* 10/25/14, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204

After 1989, however, American policymakers hardly had to worry about fighting against rival great powers, and thus the United States was free to wage wars against minor powers without having to worry much about the actions of the other great powers. Indeed, it has fought six wars since the Cold War ended: Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001–present), Iraq again (2003–11), and Libya (2011). It has also been consumed with fighting terrorists across the globe since September 11, 2001. Not surprisingly, there has been little interest in great-power politics since the Soviet threat withered away. The rise of China appears to be changing this situation, however, because this development has the potential to fundamentally alter the architecture of the international system. If the Chinese economy continues growing at a brisk clip in the next few decades, the United States will once again face a potential peer competitor, and great-power politics will return in full force. It is still an open question as to whether China's economy will continue its spectacular rise or even continue growing at a more modest, but still impressive, rate. There are intelligent arguments on both sides of this debate, and it is hard to know who is right. But if those who are bullish on China are correct, it will almost certainly be the most important geopolitical development of the twenty-first century, for China will be transformed into an enormously powerful country. The attendant question that will concern every maker of foreign policy and student of international politics is a simple but profound one: can China rise peacefully? The aim of this chapter is to answer that question. To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how the other states in the system will react to them. We must rely on theory because many aspects of the future are unknown; we have few facts about the future. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: "The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all." Thus, we must use theories to predict what is likely to transpire in world politics. Offensive realism offers important insights into China's rise. My argument in a nutshell is that if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. Most of Beijing's neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will join with the United States to contain Chinese power. The result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. In short, China's rise is unlikely to be tranquil. It is important to emphasize that my focus is not on how China will behave in the immediate future, but instead on how it will act in the longer term, when it will be far more powerful than it is today. The fact is that present-day China does not possess significant military power; its military forces are inferior to those of the United States. Beijing would be making a huge mistake to pick a fight with the U.S. military nowadays. Contemporary China, in other words, is constrained by the global balance of power, which is clearly stacked in America's favor. Among other advantages, the United States has many consequential allies around the world, while China has virtually none. But we are not concerned with

that situation here. Instead, the <u>focus is on a future world in which the balance of power has shifted</u> <u>sharply against the United States, where China controls much more relative power than it does today</u>, and where China is in roughly the same economic and military league as the United States. In essence, <mark>we are talking</mark> <mark>about</mark> a <mark>world</mark> in <mark>which</mark> <mark>China is</mark> much <mark>less constrained</mark> <mark>than</mark> it is <mark>today</mark>.

Realism makes rising powers and power conflict inevitable --- predictions of conflict are key to prevention

John J. **Mearsheimer 14**, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, "Can China Rise Peacefully?", *The national interest,* 10/25/14, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204

In its simplest form, my theory maintains that <mark>the</mark> basic <mark>structure of</mark> the <mark>international</mark> <mark>system forces</mark> <mark>states</mark> concerned about their security <mark>to compete with each other</mark> for power. <mark>The</mark> ultimate <mark>goal</mark> of every great power is <mark>to maximize</mark> its <mark>share</mark> <mark>of</mark> world <mark>power</mark> <mark>and</mark> eventually <mark>dominate</mark> the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world while also ensuring that no rival great power dominates another area. The theory begins with five assumptions about the world, which are all reasonable approximations of reality. <u>First</u> of all, <mark>states</mark> <mark>are</mark> the <mark>key actors</mark> in international politics, <mark>and</mark> <mark>no</mark> <mark>higher</mark> <mark>authority</mark> <mark>stands</mark> <mark>above</mark> them. There is no ultimate arbiter or leviathan in the system that states can turn to if they get into trouble and need help. <u>This is</u> <u>called an anarchic system</u>, as opposed to a hierarchic one. The <u>next</u> two assumptions deal with capabilities and intentions, respectively. <u>All</u> <mark>states have offensive military capabilities</mark>, although some have more than others, indeed <u>sometimes many more than others</u>. Capabilities are reasonably easy to measure because they are largely composed of material objects that can be seen, assessed, and counted. <u>Intentions</u> are a different matter. States <mark>can</mark> <mark>never</mark> <mark>be</mark> <mark>certain</mark> <mark>about</mark> <mark>the intentions of other</mark> <mark>states</mark>, because intentions are inside the heads of leaders <mark>and</mark> <mark>thus</mark> virtually <mark>impossible</mark> <mark>to see</mark> and <u>difficult to measure</u>. In particular, <u>states can never know with complete confidence whether another</u> <u>state might have its gun sights on them</u> for one reason or another. The problem of discerning states' intentions is especially acute when one ponders their future intentions, since it is almost impossible to know who the leaders of any country will be five or more years from now, much less what they will think about foreign policy. <u>The</u> <mark>theory</mark> also <mark>assumes</mark> that <mark>states</mark> <mark>rank</mark> <mark>survival</mark> <mark>as</mark> their <mark>most</mark> <mark>important</mark> goal. This is not to say it is their only goal, for <u>states</u> invariably <u>have numerous</u> ambitions. <u>However</u>, when push comes to shove, <mark>survival</mark> <mark>trumps</mark> <mark>all</mark> other goals, basically because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals. Survival means more than merely maintaining a state's territorial integrity, although that goal is of fundamental importance; it also means preserving the autonomy of a state's policymaking process. <u>Finally,</u> <mark>states are assumed</mark> <mark>to be</mark> <mark>rational</mark> actors, which is <mark>to say they</mark> are <mark>reasonably</mark> <mark>effective</mark> at designing <mark>strategies</mark> <mark>that</mark> <mark>maximize</mark> their <mark>chances of</mark> <mark>survival</mark>. These assumptions, <mark>when</mark> <mark>combined,</mark> <mark>cause states to behave in particular ways</mark>. Specifically, in a world where there is some chance—even just a small one—that other states might have malign intentions as well as formidable offensive military capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by what I call the "9-1-1" problem—the fact that there is no night watchman in an anarchic system whom states can call if trouble comes knocking at their door. <u>Accordingly,</u> <mark>they</mark> recognize they must <mark>look</mark> <mark>out</mark> <mark>for their own</mark> <mark>survival</mark>, and the best way to do that is to be especially powerful.

China is increasing it's sphere of influence now in attempt to become the new world hegemon --- recognition of impending power shift is a pre-requisite

John J. **Mearsheimer 14**, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, "Can China Rise Peacefully?", *The national interest,* 10/25/14, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204

If China continues its striking economic growth over the next few decades, it is likely to act in accordance with the logic of offensive realism, which is to say it will attempt to imitate the United States. Specifically, it will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It will do so primarily because such domination offers the best way to survive under international anarchy. In addition, China is involved in various territorial disputes and the more powerful it is, the better able it will be to settle those disputes on terms favorable to Beijing. Furthermore, like the United States, a powerful China is sure to have security interests around the globe, which will prompt it to develop the capability to project military power into regions far beyond Asia. The Persian Gulf will rank high on the new superpower's list of strategically important areas, but so will the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, China will have a vested interest in creating security problems for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, so as to limit the American military's freedom to roam into other regions, especially Asia. Let us consider these matters in greater detail. Chinese Realpolitik If my theory is correct, China will seek to maximize the power gap with its neighbors, especially larger countries like India, Japan, and Russia. China will want to make sure it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries. One major difference between China and the United States is that America started out as a rather small and weak country located along the Atlantic coastline that had to expand westward in order to become a large and powerful state that could dominate the Western Hemisphere. For the United States, conquest and expansion were necessary to establish regional hegemony. China, in contrast, is already a huge country and does not need to conquer more territory to establish itself as a regional hegemon on a par with the United States. Of course, it is always possible in particular circumstances that Chinese leaders will conclude that it is imperative to attack another country to achieve regional hegemony. It is more likely, however, that China will seek to grow its economy and become so powerful that it can dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, and make it clear they will pay a substantial price if they do not follow the rules. After all, this is what the United States has done in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in 1962, the Kennedy administration let both Cuba and the Soviet Union know that it would not tolerate nuclear weapons in Cuba. And in 1970, the Nixon administration told those same two countries that building a Soviet naval facility at Cienfuegos was unacceptable. Furthermore, Washington has intervened in the domestic politics of numerous Latin American countries either to prevent the rise of leaders who were perceived to be anti-American or to overthrow them if they had gained power. In short, the United States has wielded a heavy hand in the Western Hemisphere. A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region, much as the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect China to devise its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as imperial Japan did in the

1930s. In fact, we are already seeing inklings of that policy. For example, Chinese leaders have made it clear they do not think the United States has a right to interfere in disputes over the maritime boundaries of the South China Sea, a strategically important body of water that Beijing effectively claims as its own.

The rise of china already feared in the status quo meaning action inevitable

John J. **Mearsheimer 14**, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, "Can China Rise Peacefully?", *The national interest,* 10/25/14, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204

The historical record clearly demonstrates how American policymakers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. Since becoming a great power, the United States has never tolerated peer competitors. As it demonstrated throughout the twentieth century, it is determined to remain the world's only regional hegemon. Therefore, the United States will go to great lengths to contain China and do what it can to render it incapable of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, the United States is likely to behave toward China largely the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China's neighbors are certain to fear its rise as well, and they, too, will do whatever they can to prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China's ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join an American-led balancing coalition to check China's rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and eventually China, joined forces with the United States during the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union. China is still far from the point where it has the military capability to make a run at regional hegemony. This is not to deny there are good reasons to worry about potential conflicts breaking out today over issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea; but that is a different matter. The United States obviously has a deep-seated interest in making sure that China does not become a regional hegemon. Of course, this leads to a critically important question: what is America's best strategy for preventing China from dominating Asia? The optimal strategy for dealing with a rising China is containment. It calls for the United States to concentrate on keeping Beijing from using its military forces to conquer territory and more generally expand its influence in Asia. Toward that end, American policymakers would seek to form a balancing coalition with as many of China's neighbors as possible. The ultimate aim would be to build an alliance structure along the lines of NATO, which was a highly effective instrument for containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The United States would also work to maintain its domination of the world's oceans, thus making it difficult for China to project power reliably into distant regions like the Persian Gulf and, especially, the Western Hemisphere.

Neg Biopower K

AT Perm

Perm doesn't solve

Bio-poltical control is constantly shifting – the permutation doesn't solve

Dillon & Guerrero 2008 (Michael and Luis L., Phd in international studies and head of Department of Security and War at Lancaster University, Deputy Postgraduate Research Director, Research Institute for Law, Politics and Justice, Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century, Review of International Studies, January 2008, pp.4-6)

This paper does precisely that. It explains how **the biopolitics of biopower is necessarily also allied with freedom and what kind of 'freedom' is understood to be at work in it**. In explaining precisely what Foucault understands, in addition, by 'security', and how this understanding of security differs from traditional geopolitical accounts of security derived from ontologies and anthropologies of political subjectivity, the paper also clarifies why Foucault concludes that biopolitics simply is a "dispositif de sécurité". Strictly speaking, therefore, **there is no biopolitics which is not simultaneously also a security apparatus**. There is no biopolitics of this, or a biopolitics of that. **When one says biopolitics one says security**; albeit in a certain way. Biopolitics arises at the beginning of the modern age but it does not spring fully formed at its beginning. It would run entirely counter to Foucault's approach to the analytic of power relations to pretend otherwise. While acknowledging a certain kind of precursor in the pastoral power of the Church, with which it appears superficially similar but from which it diverges in its specificities, what Foucault begins to draw-out is the logic of formation which takes hold when power takes species life as its referent object, and the securing of species life becomes the vocation of a novel and emerging set of discursive formations of power/knowledge. **This biopolitical logic of formation also expresses a new and emergent experience of the real. A logic of formation is therefore** historical, local and **particular. It also installs an ontopolitics as it experiments with novel ensembles or technologies of social practice.** However generalised it may become, **biopolitics is not itself a universal phenomenon. It is the actualisation instead of a specific historical and, we would argue, evolving economy of power relations. Such ensembles of practices do not actualise themselves in perfect realisation of their logic. First, because their logic is always a contested epistemic object for them**. Second, because things always change in unintended ways. **Biopolitical security practices do not articulate a design in nature. They are contingent achievements reflecting the partial realisation of designs which seek to enact 'natures'. In the process, there are** slippages and breakages, **shifts and revisions, for which the original drivers and concerns of biopolitics no longer account.** There is nothing unusual in this. It would be unusual if it did not happen. **Mutation of the biopolitical order of power relations has continued tomerely entailed a change at the level of practice. Any change in practice is simultaneously also accompanied by a change in the experience of the real.** In general terms the shift in the nature of the real associated with biopolitics, now, is captured by the term 'emergence'.

The alternative is a process of agonism against the affirmative – we can create a space for freedom and for resistance against the bio-political notions of peace the affirmative endorses

Shinko Ass't Prof of IR at Bucknell **2008** Rosemary Millennium – Journal of International Studies Sage Publishing

According to Foucault **agonism refers to a political relationship which opens up a site from within which relations of power can be resisted and altered.**59 **In this** agonistic space individuals encounter one another and carve out the parameters of their ethical interactions. Foucault identifies the unmasking of political violence as the 'real political task in a society' because it is only by making the operation of

power visible that we can then strategise how to fight against it**.** Thus we engage in power struggles in order to alter power relations.60 **What we seek to alter are those processes of governmental individualisation** which 'separates the individual, breaks his links with others, splits up community life, forces the individual back on himself, and ties him to his own identity in a constraining way'.61 Agonism functions as the critical terrain located between the interplay of power and freedom where 'the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom' emerge as constant provocations.62 **Agonism involves a 'relationship that** is **at the same time mutual incitement and struggle', however; such a struggle is intended to remain open and serve as a type of permanent provocation rather than devolving into a paralysing confrontation.**63 Foucault specifically rejects the idea of an essential antagonism, but he does indicate that there is an essential obstinacy affiliated with the exercise of freedom. Thus **our relations with one another are not characterised by a primordial essence that would determine our relations to be fundamentally antagonistic, but principles of freedom on the other hand, do indicate points of insubordination and struggle.**

An agonistic stance emerges in response to a political determination that an intolerability has been identified, which according to Foucault, **threatens to break our connections** (whether personal or communal) **with one another, isolate us, and/or attempt to bind us to an identity which limits and constrains us. Agonism is a particular type of resistant response that seeks to change the political dynamic that would usher in and or sustain such isolating and constraining effects.** Agonistic engagements are characterised by the search for difficult truths where morality itself is at stake, because within the terms of an agonistic encounter 'the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion [emphasis added]'.64

The permutation engages in a normalizing form of resistance – cannot solve the criticism and independently risks our impact arguments

Thomas **Dumm 96**, Professor of Political Science @ Amherst College, 1996 "Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom." P. 116-117

Here I am slightly ahead of myself. The problem of the normalization of norms is perhaps better discussed under the rubric "bio-power." The emergence of this more complete normalizing discourse is itself not neatly or completely separate from its own genealogy within disciplinary society. However, in working to normalize even that which resists normalization, **in normalizing** the **forms of resistance** as they emerge from delinquency, **those who engage in contemporary exercises of power may have been able to put at risk more than just a mode of freedom but the very possibility of** free **existence itself.** Normalizing the norm—is there a more succinct definition of cybernetics than that? **Normalizing the norm---is this not the great** (unannounced) **end of the various strategies aimed at human extinction?** A question that emerges for us at the end of the twentieth century is whether **the style of freedom that has accompanied disciplinary society and that has been nurtured by it**—and for the sake of brevity let us call that freedom liberal freedom---**has itself been the reason leading humankind to this moment of terminal risk**. But even if it has, this does not mean that liberal freedom has not been a way of being free. Instead, what it may suggest is that the freedom that has been so long associated with a particular organization under the banner of sovereign right may need to be rethought so that we may better understand and give shape to a politics of freedom more commensurate with the conditions of late modernity. I believe that this is what Foucault may be thinking when he urges us to rethink the form that the idea of right might take as sovereignty and normalization vitiate the very possibility of repression in a disciplinary age.

Reject the perm

Reject their spin about the aff complementing the alt—they prefigured the debate to occur on liberal terms—if we can't contest ideological framing then alternative orientations are impossible

Knox 12 [Robert, PhD Candidate, London School of Economics and Political Science, paper presented at the Fourth Annual Conference of the Toronto Group for the Study of International, Transnational and Comparative Law and the Towards a Radical International Law workshop, "Strategy and Tactics"]

This warning is of great relevance to the type of 'strategic' interventions advocated by the authors. there are **serious perils** involved in making any intervention in liberal-legalist terms for critical scholars. the first is that – as per their own analysis – liberal legalism **is not a neutral ground**, but one which is likely to favour certain claims and positions. Consequently, it will be incredibly difficult to win the argument. Moreover, even if the argument is won, the victory is likely to be a very particular one – inasmuch as it will foreclose any wider consideration of the structural or systemic causes of any particular 'violation' of the law. All of these issues are to some degree considered by the authors.44 However, given the way in which 'strategy' is understood, the effects of these issues are generally confined to the immediate, conjunctural context. As such, the emphasis was placed upon the way that the language of liberal legalism blocked effective action and criticism of the war.45 Much less consideration is placed on the way in which advancing such argument impacts upon the long term effectiveness of achieving the strategic goals outlined above. Here, the problems become even more widespread. **Choosing to couch the intervention in liberal legal terms ultimately reinforces the structure** of liberal legalism, rendering it **more difficult** to transcend these arguments.46 In the best case scenario that such an intervention is victorious, this victory would precisely seem to **underscore** the liberal position on international law. Given that international law is in fact bound up with processes of exploitation and domination on a global scale, such a victory contributes to the **legitimation of this system,** making it very difficult to argue against its logic. this process takes place in three ways. Firstly, by intervening in the debate on **its own terms,** critical scholars reinforce those very **terms, as their political goals are incorporated** into it.47 It can then be argued the law is in fact neutral, because it is able to encompass such a wide variety of viewpoints. Secondly, in discarding their critical tools in order to make a public intervention, these scholars abandon their **structural critique** at the very moment when they should hold to it most strongly. that is to say, that at the point where there is actually a space to publicise their position, they choose instead to cleave to liberal legalism. thus, even if, in the 'purely academic' context, they continue to adhere to a 'critical' position, in public political terms, **they advocate liberal legalism**. Finally, from a purely 'personal' standpoint, in advocating such a position, they undercut their ability to articulate a critique in the future, precisely because they will be contradicting a position that they have already taken. the second point becomes increasingly problematic absent a guide for when it is that liberal legalism should be used and when it should not. **Although the 'embrace' of liberal legalism is always described as 'temporary' or 'strategic',** there is actually very little discussion about the specific conditions in which it is prudent to adopt the language of liberal legalism. It is simply noted at various points that this will be determined by the 'context'.48 As is often the case, the term 'context' is invoked49 without specifying precisely which contexts are those that would necessitate intervening in liberal legal terms. Traditionally, such a context would be provided by a strategic understanding. that is to say, that the specific tactics to be undertaken in a given conjunctural engagement would be understood by reference to the larger structural aim. But here, there are simply **no considerations of this.** It seems likely therefore, that again context is understood in purely tactical terms. Martti Koskenniemi can be seen as representative in this respect, when he argued: What works as a professional argument depends on the circumstances. I like to think of the choice

lawyers are faced with as being not one of method (in the sense of external, determinate guidelines about legal certainty) but of language or, perhaps better, of style. the various styles – including the styles of 'academic theory' and 'professional practice' – are neither derived from nor stand in determinate hierarchical relationships to each other. the final arbiter of what works is nothing other than the context (academic or professional) in which one argues.50 On this reading, the 'context' in which prudence operates seems to the immediate circumstances in which an intervention takes place. this would be consistent with the idea, expressed by the authors, that the 'strategic' context for adopting liberal legalism was that **the debate was conducted in these terms**. But the problem with this understanding is surely evident. As critical scholars have shown time and time again, the contemporary world is one that is deeply saturated with, and partly constituted by, juridical relations.51 Accordingly, there are really very few contexts (indeed perhaps none) in which political debate is not conducted in juridical terms. A brief perusal of world events would bear this out.52 the logical conclusion of this would seem to be that in terms of abstract, immediate effectiveness, the 'context' of public debate will almost always call for an intervention that is couched in liberal legalist terms. This raises a final vital question about what exactly distinguishes critical scholars from liberal scholars. If the above analysis holds true, then the 'strategic' interventions of critical scholars in legal and political debates will almost always take the form of arguing these debates in their own terms, and simply picking the 'left' side. thus, whilst their academic and theoretical writings and interventions may (or may not) retain the basic critical tools, the public political interventions **will** basically **be 'liberal'.** The question then becomes, in what sense can we really characterise such interventions (and indeed such scholars) as 'critical'? The practical consequence of understanding 'strategy' in essentially tactical terms seems to mean **always struggling within the coordinates of the existing order**. Given the exclusion of strategic concerns as they have been traditionally understood, there is no practical account for how these coordinates will ever be transcended (or how the debate will be reconfigured). **As such, we have** a group of **people struggling within liberalism, on liberal terms**, who may or may not also have some 'critical' understandings which are never actualised in public interventions. We might ask then, apart from '**good intentions'** (although liberals presumably have these as well) what differentiates these scholars from liberals? Because of course liberals too can sincerely believe in political causes that are 'of the left'. It seems therefore, that **just as** – in practical terms – **strategic essentialism collapses into essentialism, so too does 'strategic' liberal legalism collapse into plain old liberal legalism**.53

Sequencing DA—jumping to include legal reform whitewashes the biopolitical security project and sidelines criticism

Krasmann 12 [Susanne, Institute for Criminological Research, University of Hamburg, "Law's knowledge: On the susceptibility and resistance of legal practices to security matters" Theoretical Criminology 16 (4) p. 380-382]

In the face of these developments, **a new debate on how to contain governmental interference in the name of security has emerged**. What is remarkable about **this debate** is that, on the one hand, it **aims at** establishing **more civil** and human **rights and** attendant **procedural safeguards** that allow for systematically calling into question the derogation of laws and the implementation of new laws in the name of security. **On the other hand, it recognizes the existence of a new dimension of threats**, particularly **in** the aftermath of the **terror attacks** of 11 September 2001. As John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino (2004: 228), for instance, contend: We are faced, nowadays, with serious threats to the public safety that can occur anywhere and that cannot terminate definitively. … If we think that the capacity to deal effectively with emergencies is a precondition for republican government, then it is necessary to ask how emergency powers can be controlled in modern circumstances. **Adequate legal frameworks and**

institutional designs are required that would enable us to 'reconcile' security with (human) rights, as Goold and Lazarus (2007b: 15) propose, and enduring emergency situations with the rule of law. Traditional problems in the relationship between law and security government within this debate form a point of departure of critical considerations:2 emergency government today, rather than facing the problem of gross abuses of power, has to deal with the persistent danger of the exceptional becoming normal (see Poole, 2008: 8). Law gradually adjusts to what is regarded as 'necessary'.3 Hence, law not only constrains, but at the same time also authorizes governmental interference. Furthermore, **mainstream approaches that try to balance security and liberty are rarely able**, or **willing, to expose fully the trade-offs of their normative presuppositions**: '[T]he metaphor of balance is used as often to justify and defend changes as to challenge them' (Zedner, 2005: 510). Finally, political **responses to threats never overcome the uncertainty** that necessarily accompanies any decision addressing future events. To ignore this uncertainty, in other words, is to ignore the political moment any such decision entails, thus exempting it from the possibility of dissent. Institutional arrangements that enforce legislative control and enable citizens to claim their rights are certainly the appropriate responses to the concern in question, namely that security gradually seizes political space and transforms the rule of law in an inconspicuous manner. They establish political spaces of dispute and provide sticking points against all too rapidly launched security legislation, and thus may foster a 'culture of justification', as David Dyzenhaus (2007) has it: political decisions and the exercise of state power are to be 'justified by law', in a fundamental sense of a commitment to 'the principles of legality and respect for human rights' (2007: 137). Nonetheless, **most of these accounts**, in a way, **simply add more of the same legal principles and institutional arrangements that are well known** to us. **To frame security as a public good** and ensure that it is a subject of democratic debate, as Ian Loader and Neil Walker (2007) for example demand, is a promising alternative to denying its social relevance. **The call for security to be 'civilized', though,** once again **echoes the** truly **modern project of dealing with its inherent discontents**. **The limits of such a commitment to legality and a political 'culture of justification'** (so termed for brevity) will be illustrated in the following section. Those normative endeavours **will be challenged** subsequently by a Foucauldian account of law as practice. **Contrary to the idea that law can be addressed as an isolated, ideal body and thus treated like an instrument according to normative aspirations**, the present account renders law's reliance on forms of knowledge more discernable. **Law is susceptible**, in particular **to security** matters. **As a practice, it constantly transforms itself and**, notably, **articulates its normative claims depending upon the forms of knowledge brought into play**. Contrary to the prevailing debate on emergency government, this perspective enables us, on the one hand, to capture how **certain forms of knowledge become inscribed into the law in a way that goes largely unnoticed**. This point will be discussed on the example of automated surveillance technologies, which facilitate a particular rationality of pre-emptive action. **The conception of law as a practice, on the other hand, may also be** understood as **a tool of critique and dissent**. The recent torture debate is an extreme example of this, whereby torture can be regarded as a touchstone of law's resistance to its own abrogation. Law and reasoning The idea that a political and juridical 'culture of justification' would be able to bring about the desired results should be treated with caution—for one thing, with regard to the particular logic of legal reasoning and justification and, for another thing, because of at least two empirical observations that shed light on law's limitations vis-a-vis the governance of security. First of all, the establishment of a 'culture of justification' itself presupposes what has yet to arise, namely a common concern about governmental encroachment in the name of security and a willingness of all parties to join in that discourse, if not share in its related arguments. This presupposition, to be sure, is indispensable for inspiring communication and facilitating the exchange of arguments. Moreover, in order to take effect the tried and true liberal legal principles, like that of proportionality and necessity, clearly need to be concretized by reasoning about actual cases. Yet, **the assumption of a common concern goes**

hand in hand with a general trust in a form of communicative reason that will allow for transparency eventually on the matters at stake. Reason and to reason within 'a transparent, structured process of analysis to determine what degree of erosion is justifiable, by what measure, in what circumstances, and for how long' (Zedner, 2005: 522), **is considered basic to the solution. However, just as legal norms and principles are open to interpretation, they do not determine any normative orientations underlying the interpretative process**. As Benjamin Goold and Liorna Lazarus (2007b: 11; see also Poole, 2008: 16) observe: **'[P]re-emptive measures designed to increase security can never be truly objective or divorced from our political concerns and values**.' **Typical for the acknowledgement of competing claims still to be weighed** (Zedner, 2005: 508), **therefore, is that they end up being couched in a rather appealing rhetoric ('we should', 'judges should').** In a liberal vein, this requires a resorting to the least intrusive measures. **Competing claims are thus relegated** to the normative framework of balance (see Waldron, 2003; Zedner, 2005: 528). As regards the empirical observations, there is, first, a move in security legislation that is noticeable in western countries in which the threshold of governmental intervention has been gradually disposed in order to forestall actual offences, concrete suspicion and danger. 9/11 may be regarded as a catalyst here, as well as the fight against terrorism in general. But rather than being recent phenomena, these transformations in fact represent a continuity over decades in the identification of ever new dimensions of threats, from sexual offenders and organized crime right up to transnational terrorism.4 Although a tendency can be discerned, this is not to suggest that there have not been any disruptions to it. **Civil and human rights organizations have time and again countered these developments**, and so have higher-court rulings. Even new basic rights have been established.5 **Though** successful, **these processes were unable to thwart the general trend of making** private **space accessible to surveillance in a way that would have been unimaginable decades ago**. In this sense, paradoxically, new basic rights are rather indicators of new spaces of vulnerability. A closer look at higher courts' decisions on security legislation and additional recommendations by human rights bodies suggests that **these lead to the amendment of the laws in question but not necessarily to a change in practice. 'For, as law becomes ever more closely intertwined with a proliferating assemblage of expertise, risk consulting, administration, and discretion, it inhabits an inescapable paradox'**, as Louise Amoore (2008: 849) neatly put it. **Law for civil and human rights activists and lawyers is the very medium for challenging governmental encroachment, and, notably, the 'rule of law' represents the very principle to be defended. Under review, however, law encounters its own legislation—the modes of risk management it once itself authorized, and that will now have to be amended in accordance not only with the principles of the rule of law but also with the identified necessities of security government**.

AT Alt

AT Alt fails

The world is in a constant state of change – proper theorization is necessary to mobilize effective counter-discourses that can combat liberalism

Guillaume and Der Derian 10 [Laura, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth University, and James, Michael Hintze Chair of International Security Studies and Director of the Centre for International Security Studies and Research Professor of International Studies at Brown University, "Revolutionizing Virtual War: An Interview with James Der Derian," *Theory & Event* 13:2, 2010]

This means that **the world order**, to the extent we can even call it such, **is permanently becoming different,** and, pace Foucault, that this century, the twenty-first, might well become known as Deleuzian. **A premium will be placed on how quickly we will adapt to de-territorialized global events, networked accidents**, and the other in your face with every 24/7 global news cycle. **On how easily we will feel at home rather than seek refuge from the singularities of world politics that appear as paradoxes**, synchronicities, feedback, white noise, phase shifts, spatio-temporal rifts, and, not least, dreams. **On how easily technologies, especially those in the service of war, can actualize the worst as well as the best possibility. Or how important, when observation (l**et alone participation) **can actualize an event, reflexivity and responsibility becomes.** This all comes with a hard-earned caveat. We need to recognize that **such open-ended attitudes often produce defensive actions** in others **and even inactivity** in oneself; or as William Connolly once told me, 'a little vertigo is a good thing but a lot can turn you into a zombie.' Back to the undead! **The social sciences**—more so than the latest theories in the physical sciences—**are least comfortable with these free-floating ideas of spatio-temporal rifts where simulacra reverses causality**, being is simultaneously here and there, **and identity is deterritorialised by interconnectivity.** It's easy to theorize but how to live in this interzone, where critical ethical interventions routinely precede the retrieval of facts (empirical or social) and technical media constitute new virtual states of meaning and being? Obviously, both war and peace still need approaches that study what actually happened (realism) and what needs to be changed (idealism). But **what Deleuze teaches us is how world politics is also in need of virtual approaches that explore how reality is seen, framed, read, and generated in the conceptualisation and actualisation of the global event**. I understand why **this kind of talk makes many traditional scholars of international politics nervous. I have witnessed firsthand the displacement of global contingency as an unease or even anger toward the messenger rather than the mess itself**. **Identifying conditions of relativism and nihilism is not the same as advocating them; but that does not stop critics of Deleuze et al from disparaging them as 'cultural relativists' or 'nihilists.**' I've taken a few licks like this, and **not matter how often you repudiate the shoddy thinking behind it, you know there will always be more to come**. I have also witnessed how the narcissism of petty differences among social critics can lead to radically impossible prescriptions. This makes me reluctant to offer any of my own as universally applicable across differing historical epochs and political circumstances. Guillaume I suppose what I am asking is: what is the status of the idea of newness as applied to twenty first century war and politics? And, what are the tensions contained within the idea of being Critical itself, taking into account everything Deleuze has to say about flight and breakthrough. **In deploying Deleuze to diagnose and critique contemporary machinations of power**, are we actually missing what is most potentially productive in his thinking? Der Derian I **think the answer lies less in Deleuze's philosophy per se and more in what he**—along with Benjamin, Heidegger, Barthes, Virilio, Baudrillard and others—**chose to philosophize about: the newest technologies of reproduction that were changing how we frame the world**. That means we need to not just study and critique but to create media as ubiquitous, diffuse, and appealing as what the infosphere currently has on offer. Contrary to what uber-pundit Thomas Friedman

said recently—and perhaps prematurely—about the role of Facebook, blogs, and Twitter in the fraudulent elections in Iran, **sometimes tweet-tweet can beat bang-bang**. **We have seen how global media has become essential for the global circulation of power**, the waging of war, and the imagining of peace**. It is now an unparalleled force in the organisation, execution, justification, and representation of global violence**, as witnessed in the first Gulf War, the Kosovo campaign, 9/11, the Iraq War, and what has followed. **Global media continues**, in spite of concentrated efforts by a variety of countries and technical fixes**, to evade national management and control. Networked terror, network-centric warfare, and network attacks will continue to** have an intense if intermittent transnational impact. We need to respond with new strategies, concepts, and policies. But how? Fighting fire with fire, media with media, and infowar with infopeace. That **means dispensing with the conceit,** stretching from Descartes through Marx to Chomsky, **that there exists a universal truth waiting to be discovered once the veil of superstition**, **religion, media**, or false consciousness **of one sort or another is lifted** by the right technology of knowledge. It might once have been true but in our current multicultural, multimedia, heteropolar world; it **is one more truth competing among a host of others. To counter the ubiquitous surveillance, information overload, and fundamentalist thinking that has transformed global media into weapons of mass distraction**, deception, and destruction, we need to not just consume but produce counter-media now. It will not happen by primetime broadcast or even on public television: whatever independence they once enjoyed has been hijacked by corporate interests, partisan politics, and the need to meet the lowest common denominator of public culture. I think **it falls upon universities and non-governmental organizations,** as the last quasi-independent institutions, **to develop the content as well as techniques for counter-media**.

AT No Alternative

Outlining a specific discourse of resistance is a totalitarian means of exercising power: we must outline a broad alternative means of resistance to power
Pickett 05 Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College 2005 [*On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics* pp. 47]

Any reasonable interpretation of Foucaultian **resistance will necessarily have a large amount of indeterminacy. While it is non-hierarchical and concerned with memory and the body and the negation of power while still potentially affirmative of something else**, these various elements of **resistance** are compatible with a range of practical political engagements, such as broadly liberal or even anarchist positions. This is because Foucault **cannot lay down how or why one should struggle. Such a globalistic theory would become one more agent of power; a totalizing theory is itself "totalitarian."**66 Still**, it is possible to draw a broad political orientation out of Foucault's celebration of struggle.67 If resistance is worthwhile**, as Foucault clearly believes it is, then **the conditions which make struggle possible should be fostered.** This is why Foucault believes **there is a daily "ethico-political" choice to be made.68 We need to decide what constitutes the greatest danger and struggle against it.** From this vantage point it is possible to see why the charge of pessimism or hopelessness that is frequently brought against Foucault is misguided. He is accused of presenting power as something so ubiquitous and overwhelming that all resistance becomes pointless. On the contrary, the fact that everything is dangerous means that there are multiple opportunities for resistance. And far from being pointless, Foucault maintains that engagement presents several possibilities. Resistance gives us the possibility of changing the practices he labels 'intolerables.' Once the asylum inmate, factory worker, or "sexual deviant" is enabled to speak, and his memory of struggles and subjugated knowledge is allowed its insurrection, those who are subjected to power can force change.

AT Impacts

AT Biopower Good

We have never said all biopower is bad --- just the biopolitical surveillance of life in liberal modernity – our alternative's conception of power is key to transformative change

Chambon 99 [Adrienne, director of Ph. D program at U Toronto, Ph. D in Social Work from U Chicago, Columbia University Press New York , Reading Foucault for Social Work, "Foucault's Approach," p. 67-8]

More fundamentally, **Foucault spoke to the transformative potential of his work**. **Transformative work shows that the present is not natural and need not be taken as inevitable or absolute**. Change can come from the realization of the precarious nature of established ways and by inviting the development of alternatives. **This holds true for the client and for the worker and is of particular relevance to the academic social worker, researcher, and educator**. We come close here to the definition of **the role of the intellectual**, as well as its limits: "**The work of the intellectual ... is fruitful in a certain way to describe that-which-is by making it appear as something that might not be, or that might not be as it is**" (Foucault 1983:206). Foucault concluded: **These [forms of rationality] reside on a base of human practice and human history; and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they were made**.... **Any description must always be made in accordance with these kinds of virtual fracture which open up the space of freedom understood as a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible transformation**. (206) **Because power is productive, it is up to us to produce new forms, after seeing through that which is all too familiar, and to realize that those new forms will generate new possibilities as well as new constraints.**

AT Biopolitics Solves War

The biopolitical imperative to secure life, in any instance, through the prevention of war by liberal means, powers a global war machine that exponentially expands in lethality

Evans and Hardt 10 [Brad, lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds, Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian at Duke University, "Barbarians to Savages: Liberal War Inside and Out," *Theory & Event* 13:2, 2010]

Evans: **One of the most important aspects of your work has been to argue why the original sentiment which provoked Deleuze and Guattari's Nomadology narrative needed to be challenged**. **With the onset of a global war machine which showed** absolutely **no respect for state boundaries**, **matched by the rise of many local fires of resistance** which had no interest in capturing state power, the sentiment that "History is always written from the victory of States" could now be brought firmly into question. On a theoretical level alone, the need to bring the Nomadology Treatise up to date was an important move. However, there was something clearly more at stake for you than simply attempting to canonise Deleuze and Guattari. **One gets the impression** from your works that **you were deeply troubled by what was taking place with this new found humanitarianism**. Indeed, as you suggest, **if we accept that this changing political terrain demanded a rewriting of war itself—**away from geo-political territorial struggles which once monopolised the strategic field, **towards bio-political life struggles whose unrelenting wars were now to be consciously fought for** the politics of all life itself, **then it could be argued that the political stakes could not be higher**. For not only does a bio-political ascendency force a re-conceptualisation of the war effort—to include those forces which are less militaristic and more developmental (one can see this best reflected today in the now familiar security mantra "War by Other Means"), but through this process a new paradigm appears which makes it possible to envisage for the first time in human history a Global State of War or a Civil War on a planetary scale. Whilst **it was rather easy to find support for this non-State paradigm during the 1990's**—especially **when the indigenous themselves started writing of the onset of a Fourth World War** which was enveloping the planet and consuming everybody within, some have argued that the picture became more clouded with the invasion of Iraq which was simply geo-politics as usual. **The familiar language that has been routinely deployed** here **would be of US Exceptionalism**. My concern is not really to attend to this revival of an out-dated theoretical persuasion. I agree with your sentiments in Multitude that **this account can be convincingly challenged with relative ease**. Foucault has done enough himself to show that **Liberal War does not demand a strategic trade-off between geo-political and biopolitical aspirations**. **They can be mutually re-enforcing, even, or perhaps more to the point, especially within a global Liberal Imaginar**y. And what is more, we should not lose sight of the fact that **it was when major combat operations were effectively declared over**, **that is when the borderlands truly ignited**. My concerns today are more attuned to the post-Bush era, which going back to the original War on Terror's life-centric remit is once again calling for the need to step up the humanitarian war effort in order to secure the global peace. Indeed, perhaps more worrying still, given that the return of the Kantian inspired humanitarian sensibility can now be presented in an altogether more globally enlightened fashion, offering a marked and much needed departure from the destructive but ultimately powerless (in the positive sense of the word) self-serving neo-con, then it is possible to detect a more intellectually vociferous shift taking place which is rendering all forms of political difference to be truly dangerous on a planetary scale. With this in mind, I would like your thoughts on the Global State of War today. What for instance do you feel have been the most important changes in the paradigm since you first proposed the idea? And would you argue that war is still the permanent social relation of global rule? Hardt: The notion

of **a global civil war starts from the question of sovereignty. Traditionally war is conceived** (in the field of international relations, for instance, or in international law) **as armed conflict between two sovereign power**s whereas civil war designates conflict within a single territory in which one or both of the parties is not sovereign. War designates, in other words, a conflict in some sense external to the structures of sovereignty and civil war a conflict internal to them. It is clear that few if any of the instances of armed conflict around the world today fit the classic model of war between sovereign states. And perhaps even the great conflicts of the cold war, from Korea and Vietnam to countries throughout Latin America, already undermined the distinction, draping the conflict between sovereign states in the guise of local civil wars. Toni Negri and I thus claimed that in our era there is no more war but only civil wars or, really, a global civil war. It is probably more precise to say instead that the distinction between war and civil war has been undermined, in the same way that one might say, in more metaphorical terms, not that there is no more outside but rather that the division between inside and outside has been eroded. This claim is also widely recognized, it seems to me, among military and security theorists. The change from the framework of war to that of civil war, for instance, corresponds closely to thinking of armed conflicts as not military campaigns but police actions, and thus a shift from the external to the internal use of force. The general rhetorical move from war to security marks in more general terms a similar shift. The security mantra that you cite – "war by other means" – also indicates how the confusion between inside and outside implies the mixture of a series of fields that are traditionally separate: war and politics, for example, but also killing and generating forms of social life. This opens a complicated question about the ways in which contemporary military actions have become biopolitical and what that conception helps us understand about them. Rather than pursuing that biopolitical question directly, though, I want first to understand better how the shift in the relationship between war and sovereignty that Toni and I propose relates to your notion of liberal and humanitarian war. **In a war conventionally conceived, it is sufficient for the two sovereign powers to justify their actions primarily on the basis of national** interest as long as they remain within the confines of international law. Whereas those inside , in other words, are at least in principle privilege to the liberal framework of rights and representation, those outside are not. **When the relationship of sovereignty shifts**, however, and the distinction between inside and outside erodes**, then there are no such limits of the liberal ideological and political structures**. This might be a way of understanding why **contemporary military actions have to be justified in terms of discourses of human rights and liberal values**. And this might be **related**, in turn, **to** what many political theorists analyze as **the decline of liberal values in the US political sphere** at the hands of neoliberal and neoconservative logics.1 In other words, perhaps when the division declines between the inside and outside of sovereignty, on the one hand, the liberal logic must be deployed (however inadequately) to justify the use of violence over what was the outside while, on the other, liberal logics are increasingly diluted or suppressed in what was the inside. Evans: What I am proposing with the "Liberal War Thesis" borrows from some pioneering works which have already started to cover the main theoretical ground2 . Central to this approach is an attempt to critically evaluate global Liberal governance (which includes both productive and non-productive elements) by questioning its will to rule. **Liberal Peace is** thus **challenged**, not on the basis of its abstract claims to universality—juridical or **otherwise, but precisely because it's global imaginary shows a remarkable capacity to wage war— by whatever means—in order to govern all species life**. This is not, then, to be confused with some militaristic appropriation of the democratic body politic—a situation in which Liberal value systems have been completely undermined by the onslaught of the military mind. More revealing, it exposes the intricate workings of a Liberal rationality whose ultimate pursuit is global political dominance. Traces of this account can no doubt be found in Michael Ignatieff's (completely sympathetic) book Empire Lite, which notes how the gradual confluence between the humanitarian and the military has resulted in the onset of an ostensibly humanitarian empire that is less concerned with territory (although the State no

doubt still figures) than it is with governing life itself for its own protection and betterment. **Liberalism as such is considered here** (à la Foucault) **to be a technology of government or a means for strategising power which taking life to be its object** feels compelled to wager the destiny of humanity against its own political strategy. **Liberalism can therefore be said to betray a particularly** novel **strategic field in which the writing of threat assumes both planetary** (macro-specific) **and human** (micro-specific) **ascriptions**. Although it should be noted that **it is only through giving the utmost priority to life itself**—**working to secure life from each and every threat**s posed to an otherwise progressive existence, **that its global imaginary could ever hold sway**. No coincidence then that the dominant strategic paradigm for Liberals is Global Human Security. What could therefore be termed **the Liberal problematic of security of course registers as a Liberal bio-politics of security, which in the process of promoting certain forms of life equally demands a re-conceptualisation of war in the sense that not every life lives up to productive expectations, let alone shows its compliance**. In a number of crucial ways, **this approach offers both a theoretical and empirical challenge** to the familiar IR scripts which have tended to either valorise Liberalism's visionary potential or simply castigate its misguided idealism. Perhaps the most important of these is to insist upon a rewriting of the history of Liberalism from the perspective of war. Admittedly, there is much work to be done here. Not least, there is a need to show with greater historical depth, critical purpose, and intellectual rigour how Liberal war (both externally and internally) has subsequently informed its juridical commitments and not vice versa. Here I am invariably provoking the well rehearsed "Laws of War" sermon, which I believe more accurately should be rephrased to be the "Wars of Law". Nevertheless, despite this pressing need to rewrite the Liberal encounter in language whose familiarity would be capable of penetrating the rather conservative but equally esoteric/specialist field of International Relations, sufficient contemporary grounds already exist which enable us to provide a challenging account of global civil war from the perspective of Liberal bio-political rule. Michael Dillon and Julian Reid's The Liberal Way of War encapsulates these sentiments, with the following abridged passage worth quoting: **A bio-political discourse of species existence is also a bio-political discourse of species endangerment.** As a form of rule whose referent object is that of species existence, the liberal way of rule is simultaneously also a problematisation of **fear and danger involving threats to the peace and prosperity of the specie**s. Hence **its allied need**, in the pursuing the peace and prosperity of the species, **to make war on whatever threatens it. That is the reason why liberal peacemaking is lethal**. Its violence a necessary corollary of the aporetic character of its mission to foster the peace and prosperity of the species... There is, then, a martial face to liberal peace. The liberal way of rule is contoured by the liberal way of war**... Liberalism is therefore obliged to exercise a strategic calculus of necessary killing, in the course of which calculus ought to be able to say how much killing is enough...**[However] it has no better way of saying how much killing is enough, once it starts killing to make life live, than does the geopolitical strategic calculus of necessary killing'3 . This brings me to the problem of the inside/outside. On the face of it, it **is quite suggestive to account for this conflation by acknowledging the onset of a global political imaginary** that no longer permits any relationship with the outside. **One could then support the types of hypothesis you mention, which rather than affirming the best of the enlightened Liberal tradition actually correlate the hollowing out of Liberal values** to the inability to carve out any meaningful distinctions between inside/outside, peace/war, friend/enemy, good/evil, truth/falsehood and so forth. However, whilst this approach would no doubt either re-enforce the militaristic paradigm or raise further critical doubts about the post-modern/post-structural turn in political thought, it is nevertheless misleading. **The collapses of these meaningful distinctions are not inimical to Liberal rationality**. To the contrary, **the erosion of these great dialectical interplays now actually provides Liberalism with its very generative principles of formation**. I felt that you began to explore this in Empire by noting how Foucault's bio-politics was inadequate to our complex, adaptive and emergent times. To rectify this,

Deleuze's notion of Control Societies was introduced which is more in line with contemporary systems of rule.

AT Democracy Checks Biopolitics

Group their liberalism defenses – they are ultimately all semantic redefinitions, saying "well, if we called liberalism something else, and that system was good, then liberalism is good" – our alternative is crucial to foment that transformation

Beaulieu 10 [Alain Beaulieu, professor of philosophy at Laurentian University in Canada, "Towards a Liberal Utopia: The connection between Foucault's reporting on the Iranian revolution and the ethical turn," Philosophy and Social Criticism, 801-818, sage]

As we know, the principle of calculation is constitutive of biopower which 'gave itself the function of administering life [of the population]'.25 In a 'post-biopolitical' context (i.e. in a neo-liberal environment), this calculation paradigm remains effective. It finds its expression in various techniques of domination that administer virtual possibilities (not facts) considered to be dangerous. However, calculation is not the only component of the new liberal art of governing. Foucault states that **in a socio-political environment where technologies of domination prevail** over disciplines there is also room for a specific mode of counter-conduct associated with **the spiritualization of the self**. Foucault's interest in **spiritual exercises** (**techniques of liberation**) is part of a larger topic he explores in his ethics. Therein, Foucault 'commemorates' the old traditions of the 'care of the self' (epimeleia heautou) and the 'art of living' (techneˆ tou biou), which he now presents in terms of 'aesthetics of existence', 'ethopoietic' or '**art of existence'** to better designate the transformative process of the self in a world deprived of cosmic and divine orders. Are the spiritual transformations of the self merely irrational? It is perhaps this interesting question that opened the dialogue between the later Foucault and the Frankfurt School. The representatives of the Frankfurt School (at least those of the first generation) worked and thought on the opposition between power and freedom: the less capitalistic power is exercised over it, the higher level of freedom this consciousness will ideally attain. According to Foucault, this view is typical of the '**general intellectual' who, in search of universalities, misses the subtleties of power**. For Foucault, **freedom cannot be dissociated from power, and escape from all forms of power relations is impossible**. Therefore, let us use forms of power intelligently, **to liberate ourselves**. In a neo-liberal environment, certain types of power over the self, namely spiritual exercises, can be useful for giving a specific sense of resistance and liberation. This is precisely what spiritual improvement is about. Foucault's '**critical ontology of ourselves'** presented in the various versions of his text on Kant and the Enlightenment 26 constitutes an answer to the Frankfurt School's 'critical theory of society'. The critical ontology of ourselves states that **we are not merely theoretical observers**, but rather are directly, unceasingly and locally involved in practical process of transformation. Above all, critique for Foucault pursues ethical aims of self-transformation; for instance, those associated with the creation of innovative relations with the media, the creation of new duties for independent journalists, the formation of non-ideological views by individuals who put themselves in danger, etc. Foucault believes that the creative process of self-transformation eventually leads to the creation of **a 'better' or more tolerant society**. This self-fashioning has nothing to do with individualism. Indeed, **Foucault vigorously denounced what he once called the 'Californian cult of the self'**,27 clearly **pointing out that the veritable control of the self 'can only be practiced within the group'28 and that it implies a 'functional relation** [lien de finalite´] **between taking care of the self and taking care of others'**.29 Therefore, for two reasons **one must answer 'No' to the question 'Are the spiritual exercises irrational**?' First, and as we mentioned earlier, Foucault's spirituality has no religious finality. Therefore, any attempt to show that the later

Foucault became some kind of enlightened Christian mystic is bound to fail. Second, secularized spiritual power developed through a series of rational exercises shows a sense of responsibility towards the improvement of the self and others. Thus, any attempt to show that 'anything goes' in Foucault's ethics is also **predestined for failure**. Foucault's conception of spirituality can perhaps be considered to be 'irrational' in a narrow sense in that spiritual exercises are not universal. In order to maximize improvement, some of those exercises have to be adapted and others have to be created knowing that, unlike Marx and his followers, emancipation is given in a series of singular and local processes which are never and will never be achieved once and for all. Towards the end of (or right after) his coverage of the Iranian events, it became obvious to Foucault that, although revolutionary, the introducing of a spiritual dimension into practical life, is not a universal driving force of history. In that sense, Foucault's interest in multiple spiritual exercises developed within the western tradition can be understood as part of the self-critique of his journalistic experience in Iran. The Iranian Revolution gave Foucault the opportunity he needed to see **spirituality as a condition of revolutions to come**; after his condemnation of the Khomeini regime, however, it became obvious that society does not need to regress to an age of spiritual leaders or create a new, identical era. Therein lies the importance of reading Foucault's texts on the Iranian Revolution and those on the Enlightenment in tandem. If there is hope of reorganizing society, this transformative impulse will come from **autonomous, yet singular**, subjects able to select spiritual exercises and **use these exercises to improve themselves**. This rational government of the self will lead to a different, and **likely better or more tolerant, government of others**. This freedom of selection of spiritual exercises has the highest chance of being fulfilled in a liberal environment. However, liberalism left without guidance tends to develop a **roughly hewn and materialistic vision of the world**. This is why we can see Foucault's post-Iranian writings and meditations as an attempt to **spiritualize the liberal tradition**. Presenting Foucault's ethics in terms of a 'Khomeinization of the Shah' may sound baroque. Nonetheless, this seems to be the case. **By introducing a spiritual dimension into liberalism, the later Foucault's ethics combine the best of the two worlds he saw in action during the Iranian uprising**. In his dialogue with Iranian writer Baqir Parham, Foucault asserts that there have been two 'painful experiences' in the last two centuries of western culture. 30 The first was the 'theory of the all-powerful state' endorsed by the French and German intellectuals of the late 18th and early 19th centuries; Foucault is referring here to the Napoleonic Empire resulting from the French Revolution and the Prussian Empire legitimized by German idealists. The second was the Marxist socialist state. Foucault's (unachieved) 'political spirituality' is **an alternative to those experiences**. Is it Utopian to think that the spiritualization of liberalism will neutralize the principle of calculation? Is it Utopian to think that the technologies of the self will help improve ourselves and resist the technologies of domination? Is it Utopian to think that the tradition of the care of the self can still play a concrete role in the reorganization of society? Is it Utopian to think that spiritual exercises are not other means to discipline bodies? The answer to all of these questions is Yes. But would not there be different types of Utopias? The search for a 'liberal Utopia' was one of the later Foucault's preoccupations. Beaulieu 8118

Liberalism can't check the worst excesses of biopolitics.

Mitchell **Dean**, Professor of Sociology at Macquarie University, **2OO1** ("Demonic Societies: Liberalism, biopolitics, and sovereignty." Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State, ed. Hanson and Stepputat, p. 50-1)

Finally, **although liberalism may try to make safe the biopolitical imperative** of the optimization of life, **it has shown itself permanently incapable of arresting**—from eugenics to contemporary genetics---**the emergence of rationalities that make the optimization of the life of some dependent on the**

disallowing of the life of others. I can only suggest some general reasons for this. **Liberalism is fundamentally concerned to govern through what it conceives as processes that are external to the sphere of government limited by the respect for rights and liberties of individual subjects. Liberal rule thus fosters forms of knowledge of vital processes and seeks to govern through their application.** Moreover, **to the extent that liberalism depends on the formation of responsible and autonomous subjects through biopolitics and discipline, it fosters the type of governmental practices that are the ground of such rationalities.** Further, and perhaps more simply, we might consider the possibility that **sovereignty and biopolitics are so heterogeneous to one another that the derivation of political norms from the democratization of the former cannot act as a prophylactic for the possible outcomes of the latter**. We might also consider the alternative to this thesis, that **biopolitics captures and expands the division between political life and mere existence, already found within sovereignty.** In either case, **the framework of right** and law **can act as a resource for forces engaged in contestation of the effects of biopower; it cannot provide a guarantee as the efficacy of such struggle and may even be the means of the consolidation of those effects.**

Mills' and other liberalism apologists are so vague and amorphous that it's political useless – even if there is a theoretical philosophy of perfect liberalism that can exist, our links and DAs to the aff prove it's not them

Schmitt 12 [Richard, professor emeritus of philosophy at Brown University, "Comment on Charles Mills, "Occupy Liberalism!"," *Radical Philosophy Review*, Volume 15 number 2 (2012): 331-336]

Mills's argument begins with a distinction between Liberalism (capital "L") as theory and liberalism as practices and institution. **The dominant liberalism that radicals are so critical of is not the core Liberal theory but a particular incarnation of that theory**. Liberalism as theory is an "umbrella" that can be constitutive of the views of Rawls, as well as of Nozick. It can also be at the heart of both exclusionary liberalism—what Mills likes to call "Her- renvolk liberalism"—and the egalitarianism of genuine radicals. **What is this protean Liberalism?** It **involves a commitment to universal equality, to individualism. But since these key terms—individualism, equality, universality—remain indeterminate in Liberalism as a theory**, the sharp disagreements between radicals and liberals are, indeed, as Mills claims not disagreements about theory. **The theory is so abstract and**, frankly, **vague that there is little to disagree about** (unless, as a Fascist, one rejects equality altogether). **And so long as we stick to airy generalities we can all agree that equality is very desirable.** It is only when we begin to talk about what that means, that we will find radicals and liberals at each other's throats. **If they accept Mills's distinction between Liberalism**—**indeterminate declarations about the great value of equality**—**and liberalism**—**the repugnant practice of praising equality while oppressing people who are not white men**—**radicals can** do one of two things: they can follow Mills's recommendation and **stick to Liberalism as theory and thus stick to extremely abstract declarations about equality, making very sure that they never explain what they mean by equality**. (**We might call this "Commencement Address Liberalism**.") That might make them more acceptable to actually existing liberals but only at the price of giving up the fight for justice and equality as radicals understand it. **Or they can confront their political enemie**s, e.g., **contractarian liberals** ("Herrenvolk liberals") **and then they will have to draw sharp lines between themselves and the individualist**, impoverished **understanding of inequality that dominant liberalism uses to disguise the glaring injustices of our society.** Then the cat is out of the bag: the commonalities between liberals and radicals are very tenuous.

You cannot mouth the liberals' platitudes and fight against sexist, racist, and other group oppressions and hope that liberals will still agree with you. Once you talk about race and class they will discover what you are hiding under your liberal sheep's clothing. Mills supports his plea to radicals to employ the language of liberalism by claiming that, for instance, liberal denial of group oppression is not something their theory forces them to do but that it is "contingent." But it is not clear to me what that means. **Liberals have denied, overlooked, looked away from group subjugation** for 400 years at least, since the accusation of class oppression was first raised by the Diggers and Levellers in seventeenth-century England. **That's simply what liberals do**; **they make the clearly false empirical claim that prince and pauper, cleaner and billionaire owner are fundamentally the same except that one is more successful than the other due to greater effort**. **Calling that "contingent" makes it no less predictable**. **There is no reason to think that liberals will not do that for a long time to come**. Calling the denial of group oppression "contingent" suggests that liberals do not have to act as if we were all separate individuals endowed with more or less the same opportunities. Well, no, of course they don't have to do it but they have been doing it for centuries to the point where today they have managed to make "class struggle" a dirty word. **Do we have any reason to think that they are going to stop distorting reality in the near future? Talking vaguely about equality will not make them change.** If there is any hope of overcoming liberalism, it can only be through sharp confrontations of liberal distortions of the facts about equality and inequality in capitalist society. **This is more or less what Charles's paper says, when read as an answer to the question: "what can we do to persuade liberals to take us radicals seriously?"** But in the background, there is the esoteric message which answers a very different question: "What does it mean to be a radical today? What should we be thinking about and what should we be doing?" Here the question is not about how to change liberals. The question is about us, ourselves, and what it means to be a radical today. **Charles's answer** to that question **goes** more or less as follows: **Radicals and liberals share some extremely abstract principles, such as a commitment to freedom and equality. Many Liberals tend to interpret those commitments in ways that are demonstrably inadequate.**

Modern biopolitics guarantees an abstract racism that necessitates sovereign intervention—there's no such thing as perfect liberalism

Hoffmann 7 [Kasper Hoffmann, professor of International Development Studies at Roskilde University, May, Militarised Bodies and Spirits of Resistance, http://diggy.ruc.dk:8080/handle/1800/2766]

In modern forms of government, concepts of the norm and normal have played a kind mediating role in the formulation and execution of normative projects (Canguilhem 2005 [1966]; Ewald 1990). **It is through the systematic accumulation of knowledge about certain social problems and deviations that we come to know the normal and the norm that stabilise and indicate it in social contexts** (Ewald 1990: 140). **By aligning delinquent or abnormal subjectivities** (through, for instance, techniques of pedagogy, health, economic development, human development, spirituality etc.) **to the norm, the normal order, can be restored allowing normative goals to be considered "for the good"**: "[T]he good is figured in terms of adequacy – the good product is adequate to the purpose it was meant to serve. **Within the normative system, values are not defined a priori, but instead through an endless process of comparison and normalization**" (Ewald 1990: 152). Rose has made the point that the "very notion of normality has emerged out of a concern with types of conduct, thought, expression deemed troublesome or dangerous" (Rose 1996: 26), so that normality can only be understood in relation to the

abnormal. Therefore, **even if the norm has allowed modern biopower to transform negative restraints of power into more positive controls or normalisation, it is still producing dangerous subjectivities. Within liberal forms of government**, at least, **there is a long history of people who, for one reason or another, are deemed not to possess or to display the attributes** (e.g. autonomy, responsibility) **required of the juridical and political subjects of rights and who are therefore subjected to all sorts of disciplinary, bio-political and even sovereign interventions.** (Dean 1999: 134) The list of those so subjected would include at various times those furnished with the status of the indigent, the degenerate, the feeble-minded, the native, the savage, the homosexual, the delinquent, the dangerous etc. Modern so-called **"liberal" practices of government therefore also entail 'illiberal' aspects** (see Hindess 2001; Dean 1999 Chapter 7). **Liberalism always contains the possibility of non-liberal interventions in the lives of those who do not possess the attributes required to be a "citizen".** However, bio-politics is not confined to liberal forms of rule: liberalism just makes the articulation in a specific way. Other types of rule, such as **authoritarian or totalitarian forms**, also **depend on the elements of a bio-politics that is concerned with the detailed administration of life**. Rather than denying that non-liberal practices are indeed an integral part of all forms of liberal democratic government, we could see the will to establish the authority of liberal democracy – this will to power – as an element of sovereignty in the heart of the "democracy". **In modern processes of government, the focus is on the fostering and promotion of life, though in certain circumstances this fundamental "security" of the population is experienced as threatened. In such circumstances the community calls upon its fundamental right to exist as such and thus evokes its right to deny the right to life of those who are seen as a threat to the life of that same population. This** allows us to consider what **might be** thought of as **the dark side of bio-politics** (Dean 1999: 139). In Foucault's account, **bio-politics**, as concrete political method of security, **does not put an end to the practice of war; it provides it with renewed scope. This new scope allows the actual** neutralization, or even **elimination of life at the level of entire populations**, or micro populations. **It intensifies the killing, whether by "ethnic cleansing" that visits holocausts upon whole groups or by the mass slaughter of classes and groups in the name of the utopia to be achieved. Governance is now exercised at the level of life and of the population, and wars will be waged at that level on behalf of the "security" of each and all**. This brings us to the heart of Foucault's challenging thesis about bio-politics, namely that **there is an intimate connection between the exercise of a life-administering power and the commission of genocide: "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers […] it is because power is located at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population**" (Foucault 1976: 180, my translation). Thus, **there seems to be a kind of inescapable connection between the power to foster life and the power to disqualify life which is characteristic of bio-power. The emergence of a bio-political racism in the** nineteenth and twentieth centuries **can be approached as a trajectory in which the demand for a homogenous social space articulated by the norm appears to turn into a life necessity.** Through the establishment of the norm, **abnormality is inscribed upon individual "other" bodies, casting certain deviations as both internal dangers to the body politic and as inheritable legacies that threatens the well-being of race: On behalf of the existence of everyone entire populations are mobilised for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of the life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many** men **to be killed…at stake is the biological existence of a population**. (Foucault 1976: 180, my translation, emphasis) **Bio-politics** presides over the processes of birth, death, production and illness. It **acts on the human species. Within this bio-political practice the sovereign right to kill appears in a new form; as an "excess" of biopower that does away with life in the name of securing it, and in its most radical form it is a means of introducing a fundamental distinction between those who must live and those who must**

die. It fragments the biological field and establishes a break within the biological continuum of human beings by defining a hierarchy of races, a set of subdivisions in which certain races are classified as "good", fit and superior (Stoler 1995: 84). **It** therefore **establishes a positive relation between the right to kill and the assurance of life.** It posits that, **the more you kill and let die, the more you will live**. Thus, in modern biopolitical practice, **war does more than reinforce one's own kind by eliminating a racial adversary: it "regenerates" one's own race** (Stoler 1995: 56). It is essential to note that **racism as a bio-political practice does not draw on a particular theory of race – it does not need to. Instead racism designates a much more general practice which introduces a rift in the biological continuum that is the human species between those who are worthy of citizenship and those who are not. Internal threats to the health and wellbeing of a social body come from those who were deemed to lack an ethics of "how to live" and thus the ability to govern themselves. It is worth remembering that the Nazi concentration camps housed not only Jews, but also Gypsies, homosexuals, Bolsheviks and other inassimilable elements.** To sum up, **Foucault understands racism as a sort of permanent feature of biopower** and not as the paroxysmal convulsion of a decaying moral order (Stoler, 1995: 64). Foucault's argument is that **racism is not only confined within those obviously racist forms of authoritarian government such as the German Nationalist Socialist state, but that it is intrinsic to the nature of all modern, normalising governmental rationalities and their bio-political technologies.** By showing how racism possesses a polyvalent mobility, he shows that **racism is not merely an ideological discourse of exceptionally cruel regimes, but a fundamental feature of modern processes of government.**

AT Impact Defense

Maintaining liberalism's legitimacy cements violent grand strategy and disdain for democracy

Morrissey 11 [John, Lecturer in Political and Cultural Geography, National University of Ireland, Galway, has held visiting research fellowships at University College Cork, City University of New York, Virginia Tech and the University of Cambridge, Geopolitics, 16.2, "Liberal Lawfare and Biopolitics: US Juridical Warfare in the War on Terror", DOI DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2010.538872]

A bigger question, of course, **is what** the US military practices of **lawfare and juridical securitization say about our contemporary moment. Are they** essentially **'exceptional'** in character, prompted by the so-called exceptional character of global terrorism today? **Are** they therefore enacted in 'spaces of exceptions' **or are they**, in fact, **simply** contemporary **examples of** Foucault's 'spaces of **security'** that are **neither exceptional nor indeed a departure from**, or perversion of, **liberal democracy**? As Mark Neocleous so aptly puts it, has the "liberal project of 'liberty"' not always been, in fact, a "project of security"?116 This 'project of security' has long invoked a powerful political dispositif of 'executive powers', typically registered as 'emergency powers', but, as Neocleous makes clear, of the permanent kind.117 For Neocleous, the pursuit of 'security' – and more specifically 'capitalist security' – marked the very emergence of liberal democracies, and continues to frame our contemporary world. In the West at least, that world may be endlessly registered as a liberal democracy defined by the 'rule of law', but, as Neocleous reminds us, **the assumption that the law**, decoupled from politics, **acts as the ultimate safeguard of democracy is simply false** – a key point affirmed by considering the US military's extensive waging of liberal lawfare. As David Kennedy observes, **the military lawyer who "carries the briefcase of rules and restrictions" has long been replaced** by the lawyer who "participate[s] in discussions of strategy and tactics".118

The US military's liberal lawfare reveals how the **rule of law is simply a**nother **securitization tactic in liberalism**'s **'pursuit** of security'; a pursuit that paradoxically eliminates fundamental rights and freedoms in the 'name of security'.119 **This is a 'liberalism' defined by** what Michael Dillon and Julian Reid see as a commitment to waging 'biopolitical war' for the securitization of life – '**killing to make live'**.120 **And** for Mark Neocleous, **(neo)liberalism's fetishisation of 'security'** – as both a discourse and a technique of government – **has resulted in a world defined by anti-democratic** technologies of **power**.121 In the case of the US military's forward deployment on the frontiers of the war on terror – and its juridical tactics to secure biopolitical power thereat – this has been made possible by constant reference to a neoliberal 'project of security' registered in a language of 'endless emergency' to 'secure' the geopolitical and geoeconomic goals of US foreign policy.122 The US military's continuous and indeed growing military footprint in the Middle East and elsewhere can be read as a 'permanent emergency',123 the new 'normal' in which geopolitical military interventionism and its concomitant biopolitical technologies of power are necessitated by the perennial political economic 'need' to securitize volatility and threat.

CONCLUSION: ENABLING BIOPOLITICAL POWER IN THE AGE OF SECURITIZATION

Law and force flow into one another. We make war in the shadow of law, and law in the shadow of force.

— David Kennedy, Of War and Law 124

Can a focus on lawfare and biopolitics help us to **critique our contemporary moment's** proliferation of **practices** of securitization – practices that appear to be primarily concerned with coding, quantifying, governing and anticipating life itself? In the context of the US military's war on terror, I have argued above that it can. If, as David Kennedy points out, **the** "emergence of a **global** economic and commercial **order has amplified the role of background legal regulations as** the **strategic terrain** for transnational activities of all sorts", this also includes, of course, 'warfare'; and for some time, the US military has recognised the "opportunities for creative strategy" made possible by proactively waging lawfare beyond the battlefield.125 As Walter Benjamin observed nearly a century ago, **at the very heart of military violence is a "lawmaking character".**126 And it is this 'lawmaking character' that is integral to the biopolitical technologies of power that secure US geopolitics in our contemporary moment. **US lawfare focuses "the attention of the world on this or that excess" whilst simultaneously arming "the most heinous human suffering in legal privilege", redefining horrific violence as** "collateral damage, **self-defense, proportionality, or necessity".**127 **It involves a mobilisation of the law that is precisely channelled towards "evasion", securing classified Status of Forces A**greement**s and "offering at once the experience of safe ethical distance and careful pragmatic assessment, while parcelling out responsibility**, attributing it, denying it – even sometimes embracing it – **as a tactic of** statecraft and **war".**128

Since the inception of the war on terror, the US military has waged incessant lawfare to legally securitize, regulate and empower its 'operational capacities' in its multiples 'spaces of security' across the globe – whether that be at a US base in the Kyrgyz Republic or in combat in Iraq. I have sought to highlight here these tactics by demonstrating how the execution of **US geopolitics relies upon a proactive legal-**biopolitical **securitization** of US troops **at the frontiers** of the American 'leasehold empire'. For the US military, legal-biopolitical apparatuses of security enable its geopolitical and geoeconomic projects of security on the ground; they plan for and legally condition the 'milieux' of military commanders; and in so doing they render operational the pivotal spaces of overseas intervention of contemporary US national security conceived in terms of 'global governmentality'.129 In the US global war on terror, it is lawfare that facilitates what Foucault calls the "biopolitics of security" – when life itself becomes the "object of security".130 For the US military, this involves the eliminating of threats to 'life', the creating of operational capabilities to 'make live' and the anticipating and management of life's uncertain 'future'.

Some of the most key contributions across the social sciences and humanities in recent years have divulged how **discourses of 'security', 'precarity' and 'risk' function centrally in the governing dispositifs of our contemporary world**.131 In a society of (in)security, **such discourses have a profound power to invoke danger as "requiring extraordinary action".**132 In the ongoing war on terror, registers of emergency play pivotal roles in the justification of military securitization strategies, where 'risk', it seems, has become permanently binded to 'securitization'. As Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster point out, the "perspective of **risk management" seductively effects practices of military securitization to be seen as necessary,** legitimate and indeed therapeutic.133 US tactics of liberal lawfare in the long war – the conditioning of the battlefield, the sanctioning of the privilege of violence, the regulating of the conduct of troops, the interpreting, negating and utilizing 24 of international law, and the securing of SOFAs – are vital security dispositifs of a broader 'risk- securitization' strategy involving the deployment of liberal technologies of biopower to "manage dangerous irruptions in the future".134 It may well be fought beyond the battlefield in "a war of the pentagon rather than a war of the spear",135 but **it is lawfare that ultimately enables the 'toxic combination' of US geopolitics and biopolitics defining the current age of securitization**.

The impact is extinction

Szentes 8 [Tamas, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. "Globalisation and prospects of the world society," 4/22/08, http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav.pdf]

It's a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. **Although since 1945 there has been no world war**, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --**arms race and militarisation have not ended with the** collapse of the **Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction **and** misusing enormous **resources** badly needed for development, --**many** "invisible **wars" are** suffered by the poor and oppressed people, **manifested in** mass misery, **poverty**, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, **disguised** forms of **violence**, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., **and** last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the "war against Nature", i.e. the **disturbance of ecological balance**, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. **Behind global terrorism and "invisible wars" we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and "visible" wars**. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. **The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only -**

though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of "invisible wars", of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. **Peace** requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It **cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world** when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. "Sustainability of development" (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, **no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the** deep international **development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced**. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any "zero-sum-games", in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the "negative-sum-games" tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, **the** actual **question is** not about "sustainability of development" but rather about the "sustainability of human life", i.e. **survival of [hu]mankind** – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former "socialist" countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) "development studies" we must speak about and make "survival studies". While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. **The narrow-minded**, election-oriented, selfish **behaviour** motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, **paves the way for** the **final**, last **catastrophe. One cannot doubt**, of course, **that** great **many positive** historical **changes have also taken place** in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. **Nevertheless, the crisis** of the world society **has** extended and **deepened**, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. **Under** the circumstances provided by **rapidly progressing science and tech**nological revolutions, **human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are** soon **eliminated**. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be "negative-sum-games") can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and "invisible wars", as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. **No ideological** or terminological **camouflage can conceal this** real **dilemma any more**, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also **due to irreversible changes** in natural environment.

ST Borders K

Turns Case

Turns case—the aff uses the US-Mexico border as a basis for politics which recreates the ontological divide that has allowed border violence to persist in the first place. Only the alternative can destabilize this understanding of the border as a static function of the law.

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More specifically, Walker argues that <u>the principle of state sovereignty 'offers both a spatial and a temporal resolution to questions about what political community can be</u>, <u>given the priority of citizenship and particularity over universalist claims to a common human identity'</u>.90 The principle of state sovereignty gives a double resolution to the problem of universality and particularity. On the one hand, <u>the existence of an international sovereign states system permits cultural particularity</u> ('<u>citizenship'</u>) <u>within a broader framework of universal norms of interaction ('common human identity')</u>. On the other hand, the generalisation of the sovereign state as a particular cultural form cuts across all cultures in terms of human necessity. In other words the issue of one and many is resolved through the single formula 'one world many states'. Moreover, <u>this resolution enables and depends upon a spatial demarcation between inside and outside which</u>, in the context of the Westphalian system and modern geopolitical imaginary, <u>can be read as the concept of the border of the state</u>. <u>Spatially</u>, according to Walker, **the principle of state sovereignty 'fixes a clear demarcation between life inside and outside** a centred political community'.91 **This allows for the human aims of reason, justice, democracy and so on to be aspired to inside the sovereign state against the backdrop of perpetual warfare and barbarism outside** in the sphere of the international. It also permits notions of here and there, us and them, and affirms the presence of a political community. Temporally, these demarcations provide the condition of possibility for notions of 'progress' and 'development' inside states as defined against what happens outside them: 'between states [...] the lack of community can be taken to imply the impossibility of history as progressive teleology, and thus the possibility of merely repetition and recurrence'.92 As such, Walker argues it is precisely this spatial– temporal resolution provided by the logic of 'inside/outside' that makes 'international relations' and its theories distinctive. Walker's diagnosis of <u>the relationship between sovereignty and the inside/outside</u> problématique <u>adds an important dimension to any attempt to examine the concept of the border of the state</u>. Following his argument, <u>the many paradoxes and contradictions glossed over by the principle of state sovereignty can be 'read as points, lines, and planes, as monopolies of power and authority, borders and territories'</u>.93 These points, lines and planes reflect the emergence in postRenaissance Europe of the link between the principle of state sovereignty and 'a sense of inviolable and sharply delimited space'.94 Such points, lines and planes are often taken for granted as we have already seen, but Walker emphasises that '<u>as historical constructs, conceptions of space and time cannot be treated as some uniform background noise, as abstract ontological conditions to be acknowledged and then ignored'</u>.95 Indeed, the problematisation of these conceptions raises the stakes as far as the importance of the concept of the border of the state is concerned. The recognition that **notions of inside and outside are merely 'Cartesian coordinates that have allowed us to situate and naturalise a comfortable home for power**

and authority' calls into question the politics of global space more generally. As William E. Connolly notes, <u>once global space is reconsidered as ambiguous, contested and unstable, the function of artificially imposed borders becomes highly dubious.</u>97 <u>Against views that read borders between states act as 'limits on violence', it becomes easy to see how state borders are connected to violence in an altogether different sense</u> (a matter to which the analysis will return in Chapter 3). Historically, the transition from a system of overlapping loyalties and allegiances in favour of sharp borders did not happen peacefully. Hence, Walker comments, '<u>One has to ask how have we so easily forgotten the concrete struggles that have left their traces in the clean lines of political cartography and the codifications of international law.</u>'98 Instead of reading borders between states and the principle of state sovereignty together as a form of 'airbrushed achievement' Walker thus challenges us to reappraise this relationship as a 'site of struggle'.99

Impact

The idea that borders are a necessary social construct is based in racist and nationalistic conceptions of what it means to have coherent culture

Whyte et al. '6 (Jessica, PhD candidate in the Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies at Monash U., Australia, Carlos Fernandez, Doctor in Sociology and works as a precarious researcher @ Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain, Meredith Gill, PhD candidate in the Program in Comparative Studies in Discourse and Society @ U. of Minnesota, Imre Szeman, Associate Professor of English and Cultural Studies and an Adjunct Member of the Institute for American Studies @ Humboldt U. in Berlin, "Erasing the Line, or, the Politics of the Border" ephemera 6(4), pgs. 474-477)

Does culture need borders? Is it defenceless without them? Millennia of cultural interactions, borrowings, and transmutations, and a globe populated with hybrid forms whose real origins are likely impossible to map, suggest that culture is constantly on the move, always undergoing changes and transformations, happiest when it finds itself twisted into new shapes and practices. It is safe to say that culture always already exceeds those borders in which some have hoped to confine it – whether these are national borders or aesthetic ones (like the delimitations called 'genre'). To talk about culture in reference to globalization – a time, we are constantly told, when movements of cultural ideas, forms, and practices have become if not more common then more rapid and extensive – would thus seem to require only the unlearning of the conceptual legacy of the past two centuries. It was during this time that 'culture' came of age as a modern concept (Williams, 1985) and was also partitioned off into the discrete, definable entities with which we still associate it – primarily into 'national cultures', but also into the spaces so diligently explored by anthropologists: the tribe, the village, the region, etc. "Every nation is one people", Herder writes, "having its own national form, as well as its own language" (Herder, 1800: 166). We know that such sentiments, which continue to haunt our ideas about the proper space of culture, emerged less as a scholarly or taxonomic response to 'real' cultural divisions and more out of the need to lend support to the emerging political techne of the modern state (no doubt in conjunction with the limits on movements of peoples that we have been tracking thus far.) After all of the disasters wrought by the fictions of national belonging, we global moderns are more likely to heed Adorno's warning about the borders erected around culture: "The formation of national collectivities ... common in the detestable jargon of war that speaks of the Russian, the American, surely also of the German, obeys a reifying consciousness that is no longer really capable of experience. It confines itself within precisely those stereotypes that thinking should dissolve" (Adorno, 1998: 205). And yet: even as new technologies (like the Internet) make it all but impossible to patrol the spaces of culture, the idea that culture needs borders has been given new life. The especially harsh and unforgiving climate of the global economy has created conditions that seem to require that culture be sheltered if it is to survive at all. In the era of neo-liberalism, the strain to make every dollar multiply has forced cultural practitioners to consider turning to the state for assistance – even if the state is well past the point of believing in 'art for art's sake', or in viewing the university ideal as one of 'ideal curiosity' as opposed to envisioning it as an institution where knowledge is produced as a "merchantable commodity" (Ross, 2000: 3). Contrary to what one might expect at a time when financial borders have all but disappeared, national cultures and nationalisms are being taken out of the closet, dusted off and once again worn about proudly and without embarrassment, either as a supposed shield against a global neo-liberal cultural market that is assumed in advance only to produce cultural garbage, or, more recently, as a defence of the values of Enlightenment civilization against the Islamic hordes threatening to engulf North America and Europe (best exemplified by Huntington's grotesque 'clash of civilizations' thesis.) Even in Germany, a nation that has developed an understandable wariness toward nationalisms of all kinds, it has become possible to openly discuss Leitkultur (dominant or hegemonic culture) and the need to ensure that immigrants absorb the ideas and ideals that (supposedly) define Germanic culture. Intellectual debates about globalization and cultural belonging might focus on cosmopolitanisms or a global 'multitude', or look to the myriad ways in which forms of alternative cultural productive have pushed the unlearning of the cultural borders we spoke of above. Everywhere else, it appears that not only has the nation-state survived globalization, but so too has the idea of the nation representing a people and a culture. And while such national-cultural-ethnic borders may not inhibit physical movement, they are certainly meant to block ideas, to define the formation of subjectivities, and to shape the identities and commitments of those contained by them. An essential political act is to assert again and again and again that culture is and should remain unbounded. Cultural practices and

forms have no 'natural' and 'unnatural' spaces: the idea that they do is conceptually specious and, inevitability, politically dangerous insofar as it plays a key role in enabling and legitimating the politics of inclusion and exclusion so central to operation of state sovereignty. And yet (once again): though it might be easy to challenge the regressive character of 'cultural' tests of citizenship (Gumbrecht, 2006), or of right-wing demands that immigrants of necessity assimilate appropriate 'cultural' values and traits (of the kind circulating in France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Hesse in Germany, and elsewhere), the idea that cultural expression needs protection and support in the age of globalization can nevertheless be a tempting one. The same nation-states that are running scared about the threat posed by the immigrant populations that they desperately need (for demographic and economic purposes) are also re-asserting the need for policies to foster and support cultural expression within their borders. In October 2005, member states of UNESCO voted overwhelmingly to support the 'Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions'. The convention allows states to exempt cultural products from trade agreements and permits them "to maintain, adopt, and implement policies and measures that they deem appropriate for the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions on their territory" (UNESCO, 2005). The real intent of this convention is (to no one's surprise) to put a break on US dominance of the international trade in the products of the mass cultural industries (film and television in particular). It also seeks to affirm the relative autonomy of 'cultural expressions' from the larger trade in goods, a separation that other US-led trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, have actively sought to undo (Szeman, 1998). Can't we affirm the (apparently) productive impulses of the state to safeguard culture from the market, while rejecting and criticizing the uses to which national culture and its politics of belonging are being put? Can't we erect cultural borders in some places, while resolutely taking them down in others?

For those critical of the dominance of economic relations to the exclusion of all else in the world – something which neo-liberal globalization has achieved par excellence – it is hard to resist the idea that cultural expression and cultural autonomy need protection from the ravages of the market. And if not the state, then who? In the context of our current neo-liberal governments, the idea of the beneficent Keynesian or social democratic state casts a long political shadow out of whose darkness it has become difficult to move. But move out of it we must. There are numerous assumptions embedded in the idea of state protection of culture – which is to say: the establishment of borders for culture – that need to be carefully disentangled and assessed. Right off, the notion that the state that is intent on patrolling and maintaining existing forms of national culture should be charged with the task of protecting and promoting 'cultural diversity' is, at a minimum, problematic. 'Diversity' is a slippery word. The celebration of diversity against encroaching Americanism or market culture is one thing; enabling diversity within national borders quite another. The defense of Enlightenment values against outsiders and the protection of culture from the market seamlessly fold over into one another: the diversity named here is, for the most part, that of already established forms of national 'high' culture – opera, classical music, museums, the fine arts – which have long had an essential role in legitimating the sovereignty of the state over its borders. As both Roberto Schwarz (1992) and Malcolm Bull (2001) have shown in different ways, anxieties about the protection and promotion of forms of 'authentic' national culture are ones that emerge out of the interests of ruling and intellectual elites, and not from the broad masses, who have little investment or interest in safeguarding the link between culture and state sovereignty. Increasingly, even the impulse to support non-market cultures is done with economic goals in mind: the support of an essential aspect of the affective labour market; the creation of conditions for so-called 'creative classes' to flourish (Florida, 2004); and the establishment of cultural distinctiveness in order to fuel tourist economies organized around encounters with managed difference. It is one thing to be critical and anxious about the impact of the market on culture; it is quite another to see the state – the funding source for the so-called 'public sector' – as heroically intervening to enable non-market social and cultural forms to flourish. The two impulses need to be disengaged. The dangers of giving states the moral authority to protect and promote culture outweigh the potential benefits, which might include strategic use of state funds by arts, cultural institutions, and so on, to engage in efforts to shatter cultural borders instead of assisting the state in reinforcing them. Documents such as the UNESCO Convention pretend to take on what Guy Debord described as 'the spectacle': that haze of mediation which has placed representation and abstraction at the centre of social life. In reality, they do nothing substantive to get at the heart of social drama of accumulation and 'separation' that Debord's concept of the spectacle is intended to capture. Remember: "The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images" (Debord, 1995: 12). To no one's surprise, what is at issue in contemporary anxieties about cultural borders are political ones, whose real object is the maintenance of existing forms of power at all costs. Culture has no borders, it never has. Why then respond to the threat of the market by giving into the fantasy of national-cultural borders, a fantasy which, as Adorno writes, goes against the impulses of cultural practice to attack and dissolve the stereotypes that contain us? Every border erected for culture claims 'diversity' (from the market) or Enlightenment (against the unbelievers). We must refuse to operate within these borders and the easy stereotypes they offer, and direct ourselves to understanding and contesting the global political circumstances that continue to make such forms of reifying consciousness politically viable. No borders for culture! Such a call doesn't cause the threat of the neo-liberal market to culture to fade; it does, however, push us away from the false solution of cultural borders and returns us to the task of culture: the undoing of all borders, maybe even especially that singular psychic border of commodity culture, which transforms creative labour into dead things without origin.

AT: Alternatives

Alternatives to counterterror measures are utopian – we can't emancipate ourselves from the problem of terrorism

Michel and Richards 9 (Torsten Michel and Anthony Richards, May 19th 2009, False dawns or new horizons? Further issues and challenges for Critical Terrorism Studies, Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. 2, No. 3, December 2009, pp. 406-407, accessed 7/17/15) CH

The following will raise some concerns as to how the role of emancipation is conceptualized in current examples of Frankfurt School-inspired approaches to CTS. To begin with, in addition to the critique of positivism which is inherent in various critical projects within and outside the field of International Relations, CTS clearly articulates that one of its main aims – and certainly its main normative aim – is to provide a space for emancipatory rationality (Blakeley 2007, p. 234; also Jackson 2007, pp. 249–250). Emancipation is directed at all those groups and individuals, mainly located in the global South, that suffer from the so far rigid and hegemonic discourse that characterises terrorism research. The close intertwinement with state interests has, in their view, a purely instrumental dimension that aims at reifying and cementing the dominance of Western political and institutional structures on a global and regional scale (Blakeley 2007, p. 231). From these initial observations certain problematic issues follow for the conception of emancipation so far exhibited in CTS. To begin with, on a more practical level, CTS makes the premature and optimistic assumption not only that universalising a specific set of values (i.e. Western) is a good thing but that every community will ultimately, when it comes to its senses, pursue a path of emancipation which will lead to a universalistic conception of a just society and a harmonization of norms and values (McDonald 2009, p. 121). The assumption is made that everybody wants to be 'emancipated' or that if they do not want to they should want to. One is left with the impression that, rather than reflecting the heterogeneity of human existence, CTS represents an elite body of thought derived in the West that is underpinned by the utopian aspiration that everybody wants to, or should want to, to live by a specific set of values which are seen as universally valid as they are derived from an allegedly universal application of reason. And so, rather than being liberating or emancipatory, for the vast bulk of the global population, CTS risks being narrow and itself engaged in a hegemonic project. In order to realise emancipation in this sense it is therefore necessary, presumably, to universalise a specific set of values through a continuous application of self-reflexive emancipatory reason. How emancipatory, however, is it to quash all other forms of ideology and governance that do not conform to our own? It is argued that the politics of emancipation aims to transcend 'oppressive' social divisions. What about those cultures (and indeed people's securities) that revolve around social divisions? Here again we encounter a strange lack of self-reflexivity in FSCT-inspired approaches to terrorism. Although scholars engaged in promoting this normative agenda stress the need for a continuous critical engagement, it remains unclear 'from where' their own normative agenda comes and what exactly makes it legitimate. A simple statement of conviction along the lines of 'we aim to free people from oppression' is certainly not enough to legitimise desired practices. Empirically, it may be abhorrent to us to see that the role of women in many environments apparently renders them 'insecure' from a CTS perspective, but what if this is a cultural imperative? Are we also to attempt to address the 'insecurity' of lower caste tribes and groups in relation to higher castes? Do women in developing countries and members of lower castes feel insecure or is that a state of mind that has been bestowed upon them by relativist observers who deem that they must be insecure according to the latter's own conceptions as to what must define security? As Ayoob argues, such a definition of emancipation 'refuses to acknowledge that a society or group can be emancipated without being secure and vice versa. . . . Such semantic acrobatics tend to impose a model of contemporary Western polities . . . that are far removed from Third World realities' (Ayoob 1997, pp. 126–127)

Responding to terrorism can't be reduced to discursive choices. Problematizing conventional approaches isn't sufficient.

Michel and Richards 9 (Torsten Michel and Anthony Richards, May 19th 2009, False dawns or new horizons? Further issues and challenges for Critical Terrorism Studies, Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. 2, No. 3, December 2009, pp. 409-410, accessed 7/17/15) CH

One example as to where <u>CTS tends to overstate the case for its novelty relates to the perpetual problem of defining terrorism</u>. Ruth Blakeley maintains that one of the main problems with 'orthodox' terrorism studies is that in its conceptions 'the "terrorist label" is used as a political tool to de-legitimize certain groups, rather than as an analytical category' (Blakeley 2007, p. 230). This politicization of the term terrorism leads to a specific narrative, she argues, in which the Northern democratic states are continuously portrayed as victims under constant threat from extremist non-state actors mostly originating in the global South. Therefore, <u>Blakeley suggests that 'critically oriented scholars need to reclaim the term "terrorism" and use it as an analytical tool, rather than political tool in the service of the elite power'</u> (p. 233). The critical edge in this new take on terrorism studies should thereby bring deliverance from the dominant discourse in which terrorism studies serves as a legitimizing tool for oppressive actions conducted by hegemonic states. <u>There are</u>, however, some <u>flaws in this argument</u>. Firstly, Blakeley seems to suggest a bifurcation between a political use embedded in a specific set of structures that empower few, silence many and blame specific non-state actors, and an analytical view that would allow a 'fairer' approach to the analysis of terrorism. She says for instance: 'This means that rather than taking a literal approach to the study of terrorism and then seek instances of the phenomenon to try and determine causes and remedies' (p. 230), we end up with utilizing the terrorism label to further specific state-centric interests and shape security discourses in an advantageous way for the powerful. An analytical rather than political use, she argues, promises a more even – one might even say neutral – basis from which all instances that fit into a 'reasonable' definition of terrorism can be equally addressed (p. 229). Apart from the obvious question of whether and <u>how such an analytical use based on a 'reasonable' definition is achievable, it will certainly not fit well into a critical approach, even when broadly conceptualized.</u> This is because <u>Critical Theory has generally understood itself as a counter-movement to the abstract systematizations of German idealism in its various forms and has objected most strongly against a practical (political, social) and theoretical (abstract analytical) split of human existence</u>. Intuitively, then, Blakeley's call for an analytical use of the term 'terrorism' seems hard to combine with the overall critical outlook that CTS is proposing. Apart from these potential compatibility problems<u>, Blakeley contradicts herself in her pursuit of this analytical use.</u> Only one paragraph after proposing the necessity for critical scholars to reclaim terrorism and use it as an analytical tool within a Critical Theory oriented approach, <u>she states that such an endeavour should be pursued 'with the specific, normative aim of offering suggestions for the emancipation of people in the South from the oppressive practices of Northern powers'</u> (p. 234). <u>Emancipating oppressed people in the South</u>, as laudable as it sounds, <u>is of course a political aim in itself</u>. If CTS takes this as a central concern, however, and the emphasis on emancipation in almost all instances of T. Michel and A. Richards scholarship in this young field suggests it does, <u>then we encounter here a politicization of the terrorism label yet again, this time projected against the global hegemonic North, but nevertheless political</u>. So, we are left somewhat puzzled as to how reclaiming terrorism analytically and thereby overcoming its political abuse can be meaningfully combined with a clear and overt political agenda exhibited in CTS scholarship itself. <u>It seems fair to suggest that given the way that terrorism is used in various language-games in the international arena, a political use is unavoidable in one form or another</u> (Jackson 2007, p. 247). But <u>why then veil this political proclivity in a scholarly jargon that suggests a de-politicization and analytical revival of the term 'terrorism'?</u> On the definition itself, terrorism is surely a method that has been used by a wide variety of actors. There is nothing new in Jackson's (2007, p. 248) proclamation that we need an actor-free definition of terrorism. Such definitions have been put forward by so-called 'orthodox' terrorism scholars for many years (Schmid and Longman 1998). Of course, the terrorism perpetrated by states should not be excluded from any definition (nor should terrorism carried out by any actor) but this is not a new or contemporary revelation. <u>A perpetrator based definition is indeed not only unhelpful but it is also misses the key point that terrorism is first and foremost a method and as such no perpetrator is excluded, be they states, social movements, guerrilla groups, terrorist groups and so on</u>. As Weinberg rightly observed the notion of 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' is confusing the goal with the activity (Weinberg 2005, p. 2). <u>An actor-free definition that strives for neutrality might look something like the following: terrorism is a particular method of force or violence and/or the threat of force or violence that has been carried out by a wide range of actors (both</u>

state and non-state), that often targets civilians, is usually for a political purpose and is usually designed to have a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims. Such a definition is not the product of some new-found momentum towards bringing the 'state back into terrorism studies' but reflects what has always been the case (at least in modern times): that terrorism is a method that has been used by a variety of actors.

They have no criteria for making epistemological and ontological choices about terrorism.

Michel and Richards 9 (Torsten Michel and Anthony Richards, May 19th 2009, False dawns or new horizons? Further issues and challenges for Critical Terrorism Studies, Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. 2, No. 3, December 2009, pp. 407-408, accessed 7/17/15) CH

Smith suggests that 'emancipation seems to be particularly helpful in thinking about September 11 because it forces us to think through the reasons for those undertaking the attacks as well as the complex question of how to respond' (Smith 2005, p. 43). A clear link is made between 9/11, emancipation and human insecurity (which entails the lack of the provision of 'food, shelter, education, health care etc.') (Smith 2005, p. 54). While anyone could reasonably argue that there is a link between economic underdevelopment and human insecurity, to take this further and suggest a link between human insecurity and terrorism is certainly more contentious. The literature on this issue has failed to establish such a link (and indeed, in general, argues against it) (Schmid 2004, pp. 65–66; also Krueger and Maleckova 2003). Terrorism has not, in the main, been the weapon of those in poverty (for example) but of those who aim to fulfil particular political and religious ideologies. Smith therefore makes something of a quantum leap: the apparent 'degree of support' from those in less developed countries who suffer from 'human insecurity' is suddenly and speculatively propelled as a 'possible cause of terrorism' (Smith 2005, pp. 54–55). While the lack of empirical research in terrorism studies has rightly been criticised, critical security studies and CTS are arguably even more culpable in this regard when such claims are made based upon little empirical evidence. On a more abstract level it also seems unclear what the commitment to emancipation in CTS actually signifies. The term is used without any substantial clarification as to its conceptual and practical content. This seems especially troubling as Critical Theory itself is characterised by a variety of conceptualisations regarding not only the content of emancipation but also the differing views as to the possibility of achieving and pursuing in a practical way an emancipatory agenda. In CTS such reflections, however, seem not to be of any particular concern. Rather, the emancipatory potential of human reflection and action is silently assumed to be not only possible but realisable. This is connected to an underlying commitment to a specific form of rationality (Rengger 1998, pp. 82–83) that allows for deducing the problem-laden structure of contemporary academic discourse in the area of terrorism studies and a subsequent prescription for a normative-practical agenda in which the 'emancipation' of mainly the 'global Downloaded by [University of California, Berkeley] at 08:23 15 July 2015 408 T. Michel and A. Richards South' takes a prime spot. Even a quick glance over the main contributions to Critical Theory over the last decades will reveal, however, that both the actual content of emancipation as well as the potential for its realisation are hotly debated. The range of propositions we can find in this respect span from an 'engaged withdrawal' in Adorno and Horkheimer, through to the pragmatist infused communicative action within existing liberal institutionalist structures in Habermas, to the emphasis on recognition as a precondition for 'healthy citizenship' in Axel Honneth (Chambers 2004, pp. 220–239).2 Each of these (and to be clear these are only three specific, through prominent, examples of Critical scholarship) presents a completely distinct representation of the content, aim and potential for the pursuit of emancipation. CTS scholars, for better or worse, cannot simply take 'emancipation' out of these contestations and either claim a deceptive transparency of meaning manifested in 'liberating people from all kinds of violence' or retreat into an anti-foundationalist stand in which 'the concrete content of emancipation cannot and need not be determined in the beginning'. With respect to the first option the questions of the supremacy of their critical ontology as well as the authority of their epistemology remain unresolved, and with respect to the second option, the question arises as to how an emancipatory agenda can be argued for and pursued without any preconception of its substance – thus, how do the self appointed emancipators know that they are in fact emancipating? It turns out that a normative aim (in this case liberating or emancipating or simply helping the oppressed of the world) is not a viable ground on which scholarship or action for that matter can be based. As we can learn from the large trajectory of Critical Theory, such a commitment comes with its shortcomings and flaws and any possibility of following Marx's dictum to change the world must first and foremost start with a self-reflective and

critical stand towards one's own theoretical and practical commitments. A simple desire to better the world and to unmask the abuse of power (as implicitly portrayed in current instances of terrorism scholarship) is not just an external exercise of 'speaking truth to power' but relies in its very possibility on a constant commitment to internal critique and a continuous perpetuation of the 'hermeneutics of suspicion', all of which right now seem dangerously absent in CTS scholarship. In this respect, we can recall Nick Rengger's recent citation of T. S. Elliot: 'The last temptation is the greatest treason: to do the right deed for the wrong reason' (Rengger 2008, p. 961; originally in Eliot 1938, p. 44.1)

AT: Identity

Structural Reform Key

Reform has to be methodologically based around structural reform -- not a purely identity based response

Wills 12 (David Barnard, Research Fellow in the Department of Informatics and Sensors at Cranfield University, "Surveillance and Identity: Discourse, Subjectivity, and the State," 2012, pg. 24-28)//ghs-VA

<u>Resistance to Surveillance</u> There is a rich emerging literature on resistance to surveillance, which Lyon positions as an important corrective to the dystopian trends in surveillance research (2007:160). Much of this research necessarily involves paying attention to subjects of surveillance, their experience and activities. Lyon identifies a number of caveats when considering resistance to surveillance: firstly that <u>surveillance is ambiguous, it is not a purely negative phenomenon</u>, secondly that <u>surveillance is complex, with different institutions or perspectives playing a large part in the specific politics of surveillance</u>. Thirdly, that surveillance technology is not infallible (Lyon 2007:162). In analyzing surveillance, we should be wary of taking the claims of those designing or promoting surveillance technologies and practices as social fact, although intentions of technologists are important. Marx suggests that the existence of a potential for surveillance does not mean that this surveillance occurs, and that much of the reason for this is resistance of various types (Marx 2003:294). These three factors affect the way that surveillance is complied with, negotiated, and resisted. As the converse of resistance, surveillance is frequently complied with for reasons of: the widespread presence of surveillance practices, that many practices are taken for granted, that we are unaware of many surveillance practices, and that many systems are accepted as legitimate and necessary (Lyon 2007:164). Resistance can range from ad hoc and individual, (avoiding CCTV cameras by walking a different route) to organized and collective (joining a group to campaign against the introduction of identity cards), instrumental or non-instrumental, direct or strategic. Marx presents a typology of eleven forms of resistance to surveillance These include discovery, avoidance, piggy-backing, switching, distorting, blocking, masking (identification), breaking, refusal, cooperative and counter-surveillance moves (Marx 2003). These moves can be contrasted with explicitly political strategies to remove surveillance systems and practices through democratic political process or direct action. Work in political theory on resistance to surveillance often tends to take the form of analyses of privacy and practices of the regulation of personal data, emphasizing the individual, owned nature of privacy rather than collective or social resistance. Sociology has also contributed research into the experiences of the subject under surveillance. Insights have been drawn from the work of Goffman on the presentation of self (Goffman 1990). including the social work done by individuals to present an appropriate public face to other members of their social group. Additionally there are accounts drawing upon phenomenological and psychological approaches focusing on differing degrees of scopophobia and scopophillia (the fear and love of being watched) (Jay 1994). Many analyses of resistance to surveillance emerge from this level of analysis, focusing on the experience of the individual under surveillance (Ball & Wilson 2000; Koskela 2006; Matheson 2009). as do many of the artistic contributions to a cultural understanding of surveillance practices (Levin et al. 2002; MeGrath 2004). Lyon argues an important part of understanding resistance to surveillance is the subjectivities of those resisting surveillance, especially the alternate identities which can be mobilized against imposed and attributed surveillant representations (Lyon 2007:67). There is a politics of resistance associated with (he subject's own understanding of their identity or identities and interaction with the data double. <u>Another important question involves the connection between individual and collective responses</u> - understanding the ways in which individual resistance acts become taken up in collective and organized ways (Marx 2003:304). Monahan is concerned that <u>current modes of activism tend to **leave institutions, policies and cultural assumptions supportive of surveillance in place** because of their focus upon individualistic resistance to specific instances of surveillance</u> (Monahan 2006a: 1). Sieve Mann (Mann 2002) has popularised the practice and concept of sous-veillance, watching 'from below" in which surveillance technologies are turned upon those in power. Mann has built and advocated wearable cameras to facilitate this. This approach suffers from simple binary models of power, in which 'the powerful" do surveillance, and the less powerful are surveilled. Surveillance is not automatically effective in supporting the ends to which it is put. <u>Sousveillance is</u> therefore best understood as <u>surveillance that is being used to draw attention to power relations</u> (of surveillance) <u>and as a type of consciousness raising activity</u>. There is nothing wrong with this, but to assume the automatic success (or subversiveness) of sousveillance is to perpetuate some of the myths about the automatic functioning of surveillance and visual power. Photojournalists have long realised that <u>simply documenting or creating an image of some immoral or harmful practice is **not sufficient** to bring about its end</u>. Mann argues that photographing low level clerks in department stores1 is an effective way of getting to speak with the manager. This misses that the clerk is already likely under surveillance by in-store CCTV system. Surveillance, as we have seen is not simply an up/down binary Mann's form of resistance is also not available to all, being based upon technological literacy, but also on social capital. <u>Rose identifies a problem with identity based responses to surveillance</u>. He argues <u>experience of the actuarial processes of contemporary surveillance practices **does not produce collective identities** in the same way as the collective experience of</u> workplace <u>exploitation or</u>

racism (Rose 1999:236). Anticipating the same impediments, Ogura provides a potential solution to this problem. He suggests that "identity politics" should be drastically transformed. Rather than attempting to 'establish the collective identity of social minority groups against cultural, ideological or political integration or affiliation by social groups' he points in the direction of a "de-convergent politics' able to resist methodological individualism and biological determinism he sees as present in information technology identity systems. Whilst he acknowledges that we have not yet seen such a social movement or politics based on identity, he identifies "criminal* identity activity, such as fake ID cards and identity theft as manifestations of a surveillance orientated society's focus on methodological individualism and biological determinants of identity (such as biometrics). He predicts the possibility of a politics based around self-determination of identity, potentially associated with the (non-criminal) use of multiple identities, collaborative identities or anonymity (Ogura 2006). If the exploitation of identity expands and deepens, resistance against it to achieve self determination rights of who 'is' will also follow. In the very near future, we may grab hold of an alternative identity politics based on an identity of identities that is against identity exploitation. (Ogura 2006:292) Brian Martin suggests that a sense of unfairness is not inherent in the act of surveillance, but rather people's sense of unfairness is subject to a continual struggle between interests. He places privacy campaigners on one side, trying to increase a sense of concern about surveillance, with surveillance purveyors on the other side. This suggests that motivations for resistance come from understanding and evaluation of the practice of surveillance, as well as the meaning of fairness, the possibility of resistance, subject positions and political alternatives, all of which are contested discursively. One of the key elements of interpretative struggles is language (Martin 2010) Aaron Martin, Rosamunde Van Brakel and Daniel Bernhard conducted an insightful review of the literature on resistance in international relations, social psychology, information systems and education, to counter a tendency in surveillance studies accounts to focus exclusively on the resistance relationship between the surveyor and the surveilled. They address an assumption that the resisting actor, is an autonomous agent capable of interaction with technology and observers, resistance emerging because surveillance is recognised and rejected. They also find this binary in the sousveillance literature. They find instead that resistance is multiple and rhizomatic, and that many actors beyond the surveillance subject are capable of resistance. This includes powerful actors seeking to prevent other resistance, and. drawing upon information systems perspectives, technologies themselves. They find that resistance is not an unavoidable consequence of surveillance, but the result of interpreting surveillance as overbearing, and that this representation is dependent upon specific relational histories of the actors involved, including the content of previous interactions. The ability of an actor to resist, the ways they resist and the actors at whom their resistance is directed are determined in large part by the power relations of the resisting actor to others as well as by the context. (Martin et al. 2009:226) From education contexts they draw the insight that not all authority is resisted, and that authority can be allowed if it is perceived as legitimate and just. On the other hand, resistance is problematic if there is no clearly identifiable figure of dominance. They also identify the way that structural roles affect resistance, showing how different actors are likely to resist at different stages of a technology development and introduction lifecycle. For Martin et al, understanding resistance to surveillance requires understanding the context, roles and relationships of various actors. We can expand this account by suggesting these shared histories and contexts also depend upon conventional representations of the world, and of the structures of legitimate and illegitimate power. Roles are not just structural but are subjective.

AT: Cuomo/Positive Peace

Extinction outweighs and turns structural violence

Matheny 7 – (Jason, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, "Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction," Risk Analysis, Vol 27, No 5) CMR

We may be poorly equipped to recognize or plan for extinction risks (Yudkowsky, 2007). We may not be good at grasping the significance of very large numbers (catastrophic outcomes) or very small numbers (probabilities) over large timeframes. We struggle with estimating the probabilities of rare or unprecedented events (Kunreuther et al., 2001). Policymakers may not plan far beyond current political administrations and rarely do risk assessments value the existence of future generations.18 We may unjustifiably discount the value of future lives. Finally, extinction risks are market failures where an individual enjoys no perceptible benefit from his or her investment in risk reduction. Human survival may thus be a good requiring deliberate policies to protect. It might be feared that consideration of extinction risks would lead to a reductio ad absurdum: we ought to invest all our resources in asteroid defense or nuclear disarmament, instead of AIDS, pollution, world hunger, or other problems we face today. On the contrary, programs that create a healthy and content global population are likely to reduce the probability of global war or catastrophic terrorism. They should thus be seen as an essential part of a portfolio of risk-reducing projects. Discussing the risks of "nuclear winter," Carl Sagan (1983) wrote: Some have argued that the difference between the deaths of several hundred million people in a nuclear war (as has been thought until recently to be a reasonable upper limit) and the death of every person on Earth (as now seems possible) is only a matter of one order of magnitude. For me, the difference is considerably greater. Restricting our attention only to those who die as a consequence of the war conceals its full impact. If we are required to calibrate extinction in numerical terms, I would be sure to include the number of people in future generations who would not be born. A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss—including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. In a similar vein, the philosopher Derek Parfit (1984) wrote: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: 1. Peace 2. A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world's existing population 3. A nuclear war that kills 100% 2 would be worse than 1, and 3 would be worse than 2. Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between 1 and 2. I believe that the difference between 2 and 3 is very much greater . . . . The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between 2 and 3 may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second. Human extinction in the next few centuries could reduce the number of future generations by thousands or more. We take extraordinary measures to protect some endangered species from extinction. It might be reasonable to take extraordinary measures to protect humanity from the same.19 To decide whether this is so requires more discussion of the methodological problems mentioned here, as well as research on the extinction risks we face and the costs of mitigating them.20

Their conception of violence is reductive and can't be solved

Boulding 77¶ Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung¶ Author(s): Kenneth E. Boulding Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86 Published ¶ Kenneth Ewart Boulding (January 18, 1910 – March 18, 1993) was an economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary philosopher.[1][2] He was cofounder of General Systems Theory and founder of numerous ongoing intellectual projects in economics and social science. ¶ He graduated from Oxford University, and was granted United States citizenship in 1948. During the years 1949 to 1967, he was a

faculty member of the University of Michigan. In 1967, he joined the faculty of the University of Colorado at Boulder, where he remained until his retirement.

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to   study because they represent 'breaks' in the systenm rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is Ithe increase in the strength of the system, 'the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand lincreasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people ito know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between percepti'on and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'by one unkind commenltator as anything that Galitung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all 'the problems of poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures whi'ch produce violence. This is not rto say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics lof poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have d'one a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

The status quo is structurally improving

Indur **Goklany 10**, policy analyst for the Department of the Interior – phd from MSU, "Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Part III — Have Higher US Population, Consumption, and Newer Technologies Reduced Well-Being?)", April 24, http://www.masterresource.org/2010/04/population-consumption-carbon-emissions-and-human-well-being-in-the-age-of-industrialization-part-iii-have-higher-us-population-consumption-and-newer-technologies-reduced-well-being/#more-9194

In my previous post I showed that, notwithstanding the Neo-Malthusian worldview, human well-being has advanced globally since the start of industrialization more than two centuries ago, despite massive increases in population, consumption, affluence, and carbon dioxide emissions. In this post, I will focus on long-term trends in the U.S. for these and other indicators. Figure 1 shows that despite several-fold increases in the use of metals and synthetic organic chemicals, and emissions of CO2 stoked by increasing populations and affluence, life expectancy, the single best measure of human well-being, increased from 1900 to 2006 for the US. Figure 1 reiterates this point with respect to materials use. These figures indicate that since 1900, U.S. population has quadrupled, affluence has septupled, their product (GDP) has increased 30-fold, synthetic organic chemical use has increased 85-fold, metals use 14-fold, material use 25-fold, and CO2 emissions 8-fold. Yet life expectancy advanced from 47 to 78 years. Figure 2 shows that during the same period, 1900–2006, emissions of air pollution, represented by sulfur dioxide, waxed and waned. Food and water got safer, as indicated by the virtual elimination of deaths from gastrointestinal (GI) diseases between 1900 and 1970. Cropland, a measure of habitat converted to human uses — the single most important pressure on species, ecosystems, and biodiversity — was more or less unchanged from 1910 onward despite the increase in food demand. For the most part, life expectancy grew more or less steadily for the U.S., except for a brief plunge at the end of the First World War accentuated by the 1918-20 Spanish flu epidemic. As in the rest of the world, today's U.S. population not only lives longer, it is also healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite quantum improvements in diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) now occur 8–11 years later than a century ago. Consistent with this, data for New York City indicate that — despite a population increase from 80,000 in 1800 to 3.4 million in 1900 and 8.0 million in 2000 and any associated increases in economic product, and chemical, fossil fuel and material use that, no doubt, occurred —crude mortality rates have declined more or less steadily since the 1860s (again except for the flu epidemic). Figures 3 and 4 show, once again, that whatever health-related problems accompanied economic development, technological change, material, chemical and fossil fuel consumption, and population growth, they were overwhelmed by the health-related benefits associated with industrialization and modern economic growth. This does not mean that fossil fuel, chemical and material consumption have zero impact, but it means that overall benefits have markedly outweighed costs. The reductions in rates of deaths and diseases since at least 1900 in the US, despite increased population, energy, and material and chemical use, belie the Neo-Malthusian worldview. The improvements in the human condition can be ascribed to broad dissemination (through education, public health systems, trade and commerce) of numerous new and improved technologies in agriculture, health and medicine supplemented through various ingenious advances in communications, information technology and other energy powered technologies (see here for additional details). The continual increase in life expectancy accompanied by the decline in disease during this period (as shown by Figure 2) indicates that the new technologies reduced risks by a greater amount than any risks that they may have created or exacerbated due to pollutants associated with greater consumption of materials, chemicals and energy, And this is one reason why the Neo-Malthusian vision comes up short. It dwells on the increases in risk that new technologies may create or aggravate but overlooks the larger — and usually more certain — risks that they would also eliminate or reduce. In other words, it focuses on the pixels, but misses the larger picture, despite pretensions to a holistic worldview.

War turns structural violence

Bulloch 8

Millennium - Journal of International Studies May 2008 vol. 36 no. 3 575-595

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But **the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are** – in and of themselves – **unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate** the injustice that inspires conflict, namely **poverty.** However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that **it rarely suffers any examination**. To suggest **that war causes poverty is** to utter **an obvious truth, but** to suggest **the opposite is** – on reflection – **quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business** in the twenty-first century, **even asymmetrically.** And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving **the problem of peace and war** in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which **the Peace Prize itself has simply become** an award that reflects a degree of **Western liberal wish-fulfilment**. **It is** perhaps **comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse** a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards **all problems as** fundamentally **economic rather than** deeply – and potentially radically – **political.**

We indict their methodology – the desirability of positive peace is unverifiable

Paris '1

ASSISTANT PROF OF POLITICAL SCIENCE @ UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO BOULDER (ROLAND, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, FALL)

For those who study, rather than practice, international politics, the task of transforming the idea of human security into a useful analytical tool for scholarly [End Page 92] research is also problematic. Given the hodgepodge of principles and objectives associated with the concept, it is far from clear what academics should even be studying. **Human security seems capable of supporting virtually any hypothesis-- along with its opposite--depending on the prejudices** and interests of **the** particular **researcher**. Further, **because the concept of human security encompasses both physical security and more general notions of** social, economic, cultural, and psychological **well-being, it is impractical to talk about certain socioeconomic factors "causing" an increase or decline in human security**, given that these factors are themselves part of the definition of human security. **The study of causal relationships requires a degree of analytical separation that the notion of human security lacks**. 21

Turn: Positive peace undercuts the ability to discriminate between aggressors and victims of organized violence

Khong '1

SENIOR RESEARCH ADVISOR @ INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (YUEN FOONG, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, VOL. 7)

A strong case for taking human security seriously is its assumed impact on international peace and security. As Axworthy puts it, "**Human security puts people first** and recognizes that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security." However, how valid is this generalization? **One problem with this causal generalization is its reluctance to make distinctions between people. Are there certain people who forfeit their right to protection because of their** direct or indirect **actions**? **Would it not be foolhardy to put the safety of** Slobodan **Milosevic and his supporters on par with** that of the **Bosnian Muslims**? The former threatened not only the security of the latter but the peace and stability of the entire Balkans. NATO's bombing of Serbia suggests that states seldom do what the human security agenda recommends. NATO put itself and its organizational credibility first and the plight of the Kosovars second. By bombing Serbia, NATO sought to undermine the safety of the Se rbs and to force Serbian leaders to cease their policy of ethnic cleansing. This example suggests that **the human security approach is far too universalistic**. Like the earlier criticism of its inability to prioritize threats, **it is also unable to discriminate among people**. Thus, the approach's universalism robs it of much of its productive policy content.

Turn: Positive peace undermines stability – it reject necessary measures of insecurity that are needed for the greater good

Khong '1

SENIOR RESEARCH ADVISOR @ INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (YUEN FOONG, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, VOL. 7)

The assumption that "putting people and their safety first brings peace" can also be questioned from a second, related perspective. Is not the real issue how much of our safety we are willing to trade off for how much peace? Consider the case of nuclear deterrence and its contribution to general peace and security during the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, Americans and Russians lived under the constant fear of nuclear war while their leaders continued to build weapons with more powerful and versatile warheads. U.S. schools held drills where students ducked under their desks in anticipation of a nuclear explosion nearby. From the human security perspective, this psychological terror should be addressed by eliminating nuclear weapons. Would the elimination of nuclear weapons contribute to greater peace among nations? Nuclear deterrence, however insecure it made individuals and states, has been critical in maintaining general peace. **The alleviation of human insecurity does not necessarily mean greater peace and security. As the nuclear deterrence example shows, some measure of human psychological insecurity may be necessary for maintaining peace**.

We have to solve large-scale violent conflicts before we can focus on everyday forms of violence – they're a barrier to peace

Goldstein '01

PROF OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS @ AMERICAN UNIV (JOSHUA, WAR AND GENDER, P. 412)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice." Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. **The evidence** in this book **suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause**, although all of these influence wars' outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, **war has** in part **fueled and sustained these and other injustices**. 9 So," **if you want peace, work for peace**." Indeed, **if you want justice** (gender and others), **work for peace**. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to "reverse

women's oppression." The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, **the emphasis on injustice** as the main cause of war **seems** to be **empirically inadequate**.

Turn: National security is a prerequisite for positive peace – case comes first

Luck '2

PROF OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS @ COLUMBIA (EDWARD C., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, JANUARY)

In this respect, it should be recognized that **the recent emphasis on human security**, though welcome, **cannot be** conceptually or operationally **divorced from the parallel pursuit of national security**. **The latter may not be a sufficient** condition **to ensure the former, but it tends to be** a **NECESSARY** one. **Secure states**, it appears, **are less likely to abuse their citizens** or to permit others to do so than are insecure ones. **In an age of** intrastate and transnational **conflicts in which civilian casualties are abhorrently high**, **it is** generally **where states are weakest that human security is most gravely threatened**. In most cases, the first steps toward restoring human security will involve rebuilding or reshaping national institutions so that they are more capable, democratic, inclusive, responsive, transparent, and tolerant. Both international institutions and transnational civil society can play important supporting parts in these efforts--but again as supplements, not substitutes, for the state. For one thing, they can begin by acknowledging the need for stronger, not weaker, states. An underappreciation of the centrality of the state has also encouraged exaggerated rhetoric about the capacities and purposes of international organization and of civil society, as well as about the nature of their relationship. Most serious students of international organization, myself included, are also its advocates. As such, we need to take care not to confuse what we are seeking with what we are assessing. In our fascination with what is new in the world, we must not neglect the enduring importance of what is not. Nonstate actors matter, for example, largely because of the ways they influence the priorities and behavior of states. Likewise, international institutions play a critical role in many fields today precisely because we are still in the midst of the nation-state era. In a time of weapons of mass destruction and of economic globalization, the capacity of states for good or ill is such that the moderating influences of transnational civil society, global norms, and international organization ca n sometimes make a critical difference. But they cannot substitute for the state or for the domestic political processes that ultimately determine its policy choices. The powers of nonstate actors are derivative, their operational capacities limited, and their legitimacy compromised by their lack of accountability, sovereignty, and democratic structures.

AT: Complexity K

Our scenario planning is an essential part of the creative process that is called for by complexity and is essential to communication and mobilizing collective action while disrupting deterministic thinking

McDaniel 2k3

(Reuben R. Chair in Health Care Management at UT-Austin with Michelle E. Jordan-Elementary School Teacher; Brigitte F. Fleeman-Research Associate in Educational Psychology at UT-Austin. "Surprise, Surprise, Surprise! A Complexity Science View of the Unexpected" Health Care Management Review July/Sept 2003)

Scenario Planning **Scenario planning often is used to whittle down possible futures to the most likely, to try and conceive of and develop scenarios that actually could happen**.[65,66] The assumption is that ''everyone working in health care must be able to predict the future in order to prepare for it.''[67(p.43)] **Thinking about the future is important in CAS** but thinking should not be based on confidence that you can predict the future and, therefore, be ready for it. Scenario planning should be about learning how to think in the face of unexpected events—not about learning what to expect. The success of scenario planning is not a function of how well you have predicted possible futures, but of how well you practice dealing with the unexpected. **Scenario planning hones the skills of adapting to surprises and the unexpected**. **We don't know what is going to happen** in the future, **but still we must act. Scenario planning can help facilitate collective mobilization**[68] **by enhancing communication** through common **vocabulary, sharing views, and a wide appreciation of the significant influence of events** outside the manager's control.[67] **Scenario planning can force managers to confront uncertainty by giving them several different future outlooks**,[69] **helping them visualize a broader world of possibilities**, **and sparking creative, ''what-if'' thinking.** [66] **Flexible strategic responses need to be developed**. **In appropriately done scenario planning, ''unspoken assumptions about the future are surfaced, mental models are challenged, and more often than not, the blinders to creativity and resourcefulness are lifted**.''[66(p.71)]

Complexity theory has zero validity as a means of interpreting real world events. Lack of empirical observations means complexity cannot interpret our social reality or improve policy making

Rosenhead, 98

(Jonathan, Professor London School of Economics, Complexity theory and management practice, http://human-nature.com/science-as-culture/rosenhead.html [1/2512])

It hardly needs saying that **there is no formally validated evidence demonstrating that the complexity theory-based prescriptions** for management style, structure and process do produce the results claimed for them. These results are generally to do with long-term survival, a phenomenon not susceptible to study using short-term experimental methods. **Such evidence as is adduced is almost exclusively anecdotal in character**. The stories range from improving tales of successful corporate improvisation, to longer accounts of organisational death wishes or of innovation which bypasses the obstruction of the formal hierarchy; there are also approving quotations from business leaders. **The problem with anecdotal evidence is that it is most persuasive to those who experienced the events in question, and to those who are already**

persuaded. For others it can be hard to judge the representativeness of the sample of exhibits. This is especially so if, even unintentionally, different standards of proof or disproof are used for different sides of an argument. Such distortions do occur in Stacey (1992). Thus the advantage of opportunistic policies is supported by presenting examples of success, while the perils of formal planning methods are driven home by examples of failure. Yet obviously opportunism has its failures, and analytic techniques even have their modest achievements – which are not cited. In the absence of a conclusive case based on evidence of organisational success, it is not surprising that great weight is placed on the authority of science. Wheatley (1992) has it in her title – "Leadership and the New Science". Merry (1995) relegates it to his sub-title, but in the plural: "Insights from the New Sciences of Chaos, Self-Organization and Complexity". Indeed 'New Sciences', always capitalised, runs through his book like the message in Blackpool rock. However all management complexity authors lean heavily on 'science' in their texts. These are liberally peppered with phrases like "Scientific discoveries have shown that…" or "The science of complexity shows that…". The illustrative examples provided are commonly of natural rather than social or managerial phenomena – the behaviour of molecules when the temperature of liquid rises, a laser beam, the weather… This invocation of (natural) science comes out clearly in a passage on page 11 of Stacey (1996). A list of Nobel and other eminent scientists who have developed "the science of complexity" is presented. So far this science has "focused primarily on the evolution of life and the behavior of chemical and physical systems". However "it is not only to natural systems that this science applies; as I will show in Chapter One, we too constitute such systems". These systems which "we" also constitute are complex adaptive systems – precisely those to which the findings of the "new science" apply. Or do they? If we are to accept the argument from scientific authority there are a number of links in the argument. First we have to accept that the "findings" do actually apply to the natural systems which natural scientists have investigated. Then we have to accept that these findings can be generalised to all such systems. Then we have to accept that organisations (let us leave individual humans out of it) do constitute systems of the same kind. And then we have to accept that findings can be transferred across from one domain to a quite different one. This could be a long haul! We should start with the least problematic element – the solidity of those natural science results in their own domains. There are indeed a considerable number of findings which have passed stringent tests of scientific validity. (We should ignore any ultra-Popperian objections that all scientific results can only be provisional, a spur to refutation – or we will have no solid ground to stand on.) Stewart (1989) provides a good source of such examples – the weather (of course), ecological cycles, fluid dynamics, chemical clocks… Experiments are only possible in some cases, but in all observations of real world events fit patterns consistent with aspects of complexity theory. What follows from this is that complexity theory is a field within which some surprising and diverse results have been found, leading on to some further intriguing conjectures. What does not follow is that any such result necessarily applies to all situations which share some of its structural features (for example, mathematical structure). **Many of the 'results' cited in the complexity literature are not**, however, **firmly grounded** in this way **on empirical observations**. **They are the outputs of computer simulations. Typically some simple laws of behaviour and interaction are postulated,** and **the computer is used to see how the operations of these laws would translate into long-term developmen**t or macro-behaviour. For example Kauffman (1993, 1995) models how an organism might evolve through an 'adaptive walk' of mutations across available alternatives, depending on the degree of cross-coupling of the organism's component parts. Krugman (1996) shows how aggregate patterns of land use (eg the formation of multiple business districts, racial segregation) could result from individual responses to purely local conditions. Stacey (1996) reports a wide variety of simulations, mostly produced under the auspices of the Santa Fe Institute, in which simple rules of individual behaviour generate replications of the flocking of birds, the trail-laying of ants, the dynamics of organism-parasite systems…In each case the computer tracks the way in which such simple laws, if they were to hold, could produce patterned order. Evidently **such demonstrations,** absorbing though they may be, **cannot constitute proofs that these laws are indeed the cause of the observed behaviour**. Indeed Kauffman (1993) in the introduction to his 700 page volume, stresses that "this is not a finished book …Premises and conclusions stand open to criticism." Krugman (1996) adopts an informal approach, and allows himself to include "a few wild speculations". That is well and good – but it would be as well if the 'not proven' dimension of complexity theory was prominently acknowledged in this way by all those involved in extrapolating its results into new territory. Mittleton-Kelly (1997) recognises **a further need for circumspection** which **arises in essaying to transfer complexity theory formulations from the natural to the social domain**. **Behaviour in the former may be assumed to be governed by laws; in the latter, awareness of a claimed law may itself generate changed behaviour. In this crucial respect, social systems** (including organisations and their managements) **are fundamentally different from all other complex systems.** It can be seen from this that **scientific authority is an unsafe ground for asserting that specific results from complexity theory necessarily apply to organisations**, or that **complexity-based lessons** constitute imperatives for management practice. Krugman (1996), on the concluding page of his exploration of the relevance of complexity theory for economics, states "at this point I **have no recommendations to offer**." By contrast in the management complexity literature there is a tendency to make just such unwarranted statements – both generalisations and prescriptions. Both tendencies can be amply illustrated from a single work – Stacey (1992).

Complexity theory is unmerited and alienates the public – we need to focus on resolving short terms threats

Rosenhead, 98

(Jonathan, Professor London School of Economics, Complexity theory and management practice, http://human-nature.com/science-as-culture/rosenhead.html [1/2512])

This account of attempts to apply ideas from complexity theory to management practice has been broadly critical – critical of claims for the authoritative status of what would be better presented as stimulating metaphors. **It is indeed curious that a message based on the importance of accepting instability, uncertainty and the limits to our knowledge should be presented with such an excess of certainty**. The explanation for this paradox may lie in the twin heritage of management complexity. **The 'systems' community world-wide has been particularly prone to sectarianism and evangelism**, **while the audience** for management texts is conditioned to **expect large generalisations supported anecdotally**. It can be a heady mixture. **This conceptual imperialism is both unfortunate and unnecessary**.

Unfortunate **because some of those exposed to these ideas may reject them on grounds of over-selling**, **while others** (recall that complexity theory proper is far from transparent) **may be persuaded to place more reliance on the 'findings' than is merited**. Unnecessary, because management complexity has indeed generated metaphorically based insights which are novel and instructive. Many thoughtful managers of complex organisations in turbulent times will, I believe, appreciate them as an enrichment of their world-view. That is to say, they will recognise there features of the organisational world in which they operate, set within a framework which makes them both more understandable and more significant. Evidently any selection of 'added value' insights will depend on personal perspective. For me there are a number of plus points. Consider the handling of the long-term. Long-term planning has taken such a battering that the complexity-based view that it is impossible anyway can hardly classify as startling. However Stacey's extension of this critique to cover the view of 'strategy as vision' is a powerful antidote to much management writing. (I will continue to relate these comments principally to Stacey's work.) He makes a good case (Stacey 1992, pp 126-144) that a single vision to serve as intended organisational future, motivator of behaviour and guarantor of corporate cohesion is a thoroughly bad idea. It produces a culture of dependency, restricts the expression of conflicting views, and generates shared mental models tending towards groupthink. One must hope that this debunking of 'the vision thing' will prove influential. Not that the long-term is dismissed as an effective irrelevance. ==**What is proposed is a refocusing**==: rather than establish a future target and work back to what we do now to achieve it, the sequence is reversed. ==**We should concentrate on the significant issues which need to be handled in the short-term**, **and ensure that the debate about their long-term consequences is lively and engaged**==. Read in this way, the lesson of complexity theory is not to justify short-termism, but ==**to point towards a more practicable way of taking the future into account**==.

--Evaluating high-impact, low-probability events key to prevent catastrophe

Why is surprise the permanent condition of the U.S. political and economic elite? In 2007-8, when the global financial system imploded, the cry that no one could have seen this coming was heard everywhere, despite the existence of numerous analyses showing that a crisis was unavoidable. It is no surprise that one hears precisely the same response today regarding the current turmoil in the Middle East. The critical issue in both cases is the artificial suppression of volatility--the ups and downs of life--in the name of stability. It is both ==**misguided and dangerous to push unobserved risks further into the statistical tails of the probability distribution of outcomes and allow these high-impact, low-probability "tail risks" to disappear from policymakers' fields of observation**==. What the world is witnessing in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is simply what happens when highly constrained systems explode. ==Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks.== In fact, ==they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability== as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artificially constrained systems become prone to "Black Swans"--that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers. ==**Such environments eventually experience massive blowups**, c==atching everyone off-guard and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems. Seeking to restrict variability seems to be good policy (who does not prefer stability to chaos?), so it is with very good intentions that policymakers unwittingly increase the risk of major blowups. And it is the same misperception of the properties of natural systems that led to both the economic crisis of 2007-8 and the current turmoil in the Arab world. The policy implications are identical: ==**to make systems robust, all risks must be visible and out in the open**==--fluctuat nec mergitur (it fluctuates but does not sink) goes the Latin saying.

Complexity theory is too simplistic and results in inaction

Hendrick 9 (Diane; Department of Peace Studies – University of Bradford, "Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications,"
June, http://143.53.238.22/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf)

It is still relatively early days in the application of complexity theory to social sciences and ¶ there are doubts and criticisms, either about the applicability of the ideas or about the ¶ expectations generated for them. It is true that the translation of terms from natural science to ¶ social science is sometimes contested due to the significant differences in these domains, and ¶ that there are concerns that the meanings of terms may be distorted, thus making their use ¶ arbitrary or even misleading. Developing new, relevant definitions for the new domain ¶ applications, where the terms indicate a new idea or a new synthesis that takes our ¶ understanding forward, are required. In some cases, particular aspects of complexity theory ¶ are seen as of only limited applicability, for example, self-organisation (see Rosenau's ¶ argument above that it is only relevant in systems in which authority does not play a role).¶ There are those who argue that much that is being touted as new is actually already known,¶ whether from systems theory or from experience, and so complexity theory cannot be seen as ¶ adding value in that way. There are also concerns that the theory has not been worked out in ¶ sufficient detail, or with sufficient rigour, to make itself useful yet. Even that it encourages ¶ woolly thinking and imprecision.¶ In terms of application in the field, it could be argued that it may lead to paralysis, in fear of ¶ all the unexpected things that could happen, and all the unintended consequences that could ¶ result, from a particular intervention. The proposed adaptability and sensitivity to emerging ¶ new situations may lead to difficulties in planning or, better expressed, must lead to a ¶ different conception of what constitutes planning, which is, in itself, challenging (or even ¶ threatening) for many fields. The criteria for funding projects or research may not fit ¶ comfortably with a complexity approach, and evaluation, already difficult especially in the ¶ field of conflict transformation, would require a re-conceptualisation. Pressure for results ¶ could act as a disincentive to change project design in the light of emergent processes. There ¶ may be the desire to maintain the illusion of control in order to retain the confidence of ¶ funders. On the other hand, there are fears that complexity may be used as an excuse for poor ¶ planning, and implementation, which is a valid concern for funders. In addition, there may be ¶ scepticism that the co-operation and co-ordination between different researchers or ¶ interveners, (let alone transdisciplinary undertakings) appropriate to working on complex ¶ problem domains, will not work due to differing mental models, competing interests and ¶ aims, competition for funding, prestige, etc. Such attempts appear, therefore, unrealistic or ¶ unfeasible.

AT: Terror K

Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid---our authors are self-reflexive

Michael J. **Boyle '8**, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, "A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies," Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed 'Orthodox Terrorism Studies'. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be 'a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism "knowledge"'. **An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological problems**. In fact, **terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own** searching **critiques** of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, 'Understanding Terrorism'). **Some of those scholars** most associated with the critique of empiricism implied in 'Orthodox Terrorism Studies' **have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism**. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by **Schmid and Jongman** (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they **point out** that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the **failure to address** persistent conceptual and **data problems** has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, **Silke's** (2004) **volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function**, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. **A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.**

Terror is a real threat driven by forces the aff can't resolve---we should reform the war on terror, not surrender---any terror attack turns the entire case

Peter **Beinart 8**, associate professor of journalism and political science at CUNY, The Good Fight; Why Liberals – and only Liberals – Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again, vii-viii

APPLYING THAT TRADITION today is not easy. Cold war liberals devel- oped their narrative of national greatness in the shadow of a totalitarian ¶ superpower. Today, the United States faces no such unified threat. Rather, it faces a web of dangers—from disease to environmental degradation to weapons of mass destruction—all fueled by globalization, which leaves America increasingly vulnerable to pathologies bred in distant corners of the world. And at the center of this nexis sits jihadist terrorism, a new totalitarian movement that lacks state power but harnesses the power of globalization instead. ¶ Recognizing that the United States again faces a totalitarian foe does not provide simple policy prescriptions, because today's totalitarianism takes such radically different form. But it reminds us of something more basic, that liberalism does not find its enemies only on the right—a lesson sometimes forgotten in the age of George W. Bush. ¶ Indeed, it is because liberals so despise this president that they increasingly reject his trademark phrase, the "war on terror." Were this just a semantic dispute, it would hardly matter; better alternatives to war on terror abound. But the rejection signifies something deeper: a turn away from the very idea that anti-totalitarianism should sit at the heart of the liberal project. For too many liberals today, George W. Bush's war on terror is the only one they can imagine. This alienation may be understand- able, but that does not make it any less disastrous, for it is liberalism's principles—even more than George W. Bush's—that jihadism threatens. If today's liberals cannot rouse as much passion for fighting a movement that flings acid at unveiled women as they do for taking back the Senate in 2006, they have strayed far from liberalism's best traditions. And if they believe it is only George W. Bush who threatens America's freedoms, they should ponder what will happen if the United States is hit with a

<mark>nuclear</mark> or contagious biological <mark>attack</mark>. **No matter who is president**, Republican or Democrat, **the reaction will make John Ashcroft look like the head of the ACLU**.

--- AT: Root Cause

Solving the root causes of terrorism is impossible because of expansive jihadist demands---the aff's attempt at reconciliation collapses causes global violence

Peter **Beinart 8**, associate professor of journalism and political science at CUNY, The Good Fight; Why Liberals – and only Liberals – Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again, 100-2

While different U.S. policies may be more or less important at differ- ent times, most experts agree that it is American actions ("what we do"), not American values ("who were are") that have made the United States the target of salafist jihad. While in his ideal world Bin Laden would cer- tainly like to see the United States ditch its barbaric culture and convert to Islam, that is low on his list of concerns. As he himself has pointed out, if Al Qaeda were offended primarily by the licentiousness Western societies practice at home, it would have attacked Sweden. ¶ The problem is that while salafists might theoretically leave the United States alone if we left them alone, their concerns are vast and their hostility to liberal values is profound. Salafism is not a universalist ideology in the way that Communism was. (That is not to say its devotees do not dream of a world completely under God's rule—they do—only that the cultural barriers preventing, say, an Argentinean from adopting the religion of Qutb are far greater than the barriers preventing him from adopting the religion of Marx.) But neither is salafism easy to avoid. Bin Laden has said the United States can escape "this ordeal" of terrorism if "it leaves the Arabian Peninsula, and stops its involvement in Palestine, and in all the Islamic world." Unfortunately, Zawahiri, his second in command, has defined the Islamic world as stretching from "Eastern Turkestan [Xinjiang, in western China] to Andalusia [Spain and Portugal]." Azzam has gone further, including among the territory that must be "returned to us so that Islam will reign again" sub- Saharan African countries like Chad, Eritrea, and Somalia and Asian nations like Burma and the Philippines. Salafists want to restore the caliphate that once ruled much of the Islamic world. But even at its eighth- century peak, the caliphate only stretched from In- dia to Spain. Under Al Qaeda's more expansive definition, it seems to include every country or region once under Muslim rule. To comply with those terms, the United States would have to **retreat** virtually **to the Western Hemisphere.** ¶ Needless to say, for the United States to withdraw from a swath of territory stretching from West Africa to Southeast Asia would constitute a **geostrategic revolution**. American power is the guarantor of last resort for the government of Pakistan, which has nuclear weapons, a volatile border with nuclear- armed India, and salafist elements in its security services. It plays the same role in Jordan and Egypt, the lynchpins of peace between Israel and the Arab world. And, of course, America protects the Saudi monarchy, whose kingdom sits atop one quarter of the world's proven oil reserves. As the Bush administration has rightly recognized, these relation- ships are unsustainable in their current form, and America's long-t erm safety requires that its clients evolve in a democratic direction, even if it means they prove less compliant. But were the jihadist movement to force the United States to withdraw its military, political, or economic influence ¶ from these crucial areas—producing governments with dramatically dif- ferent orientations—**the consequences for American security, the world economy, and regional peace could be grave**. ¶ And a withdrawal from the Muslim world would not only imperil American interests, it would also imperil American values. Al Qaeda may not hate us for "who we are"—unless "who we are" obligates us to oppose what might be called "religious cleansing," the violent purification of large swaths of the globe. After all, **if the United States withdrew from its war against salafism, salafism would still be at war**. Al Qaeda's ultimate goal is not to expel the United States from Islamic lands; it is to establish a new caliphate that ushers in God's rule on earth. And the many enemies of that effort—non- Muslims, apostate Muslims, liberated female Muslims, gay and lesbian Muslims—would still blemish the Islamic world, representing jahiliyyah in its myriad sinful forms. ¶ Where those enemies have no army to defend them, the result has been terror. Where they do, the result has been endless war. It is a **virtual axiom** of international politics that salafists will try to seize control of any local conflict— from the Philippines to Chechnya to Kashmir to Iraq—that pits Sunni Muslims against their neighbors. And the more they succeed, the less likely it is that such a conflict will end. Many Muslims, including many non-s alafist

Islamists, also support Muslim insurgencies around the world. In Iraq, they may support attacks on American troops. But since they see jihad as a means to some concrete goal, political compromise is possible. Salafists, however, who see jihad as a means to usher in a messianic age, will accept no outcome that leaves Muslims under non- Muslim rule, because such a compromise threatens the path to paradise.

AT: Terrorism Experts

We should be skeptical of claims of so-called terrorism experts – they assume a distinction between non-state and state sanctioned violence

Toivanen 10 [Reetta Toivanen, Centre of Excellence in Global Governance Research , University of Helsinki, August 12, 2010, "Counterterrorism and expert regimes: some human rights concerns", *Critical Terror Studies,* 3:2, p. 278] //dickies

This article tackles two different but interrelated problems in relation to the peculiar relationship between the governments and expert bodies, which may result in the lowering of human rights standards or in a direct violation of inherent human rights. On the one hand, the governments have used the rhetoric of terrorism to advance their own goals in targeting unwanted groupings in the country by defining them (with the help of experts) as terrorists. On the other hand, and maybe even more fundamentally, the problem is that some of the expert bodies are veiled in deep secrecy and civil society has no effective means to determine the contents of their expert information which impacts the governmental policies in the 'the War on Terror'.3 Without discarding the fact that there is a historical continuum in governmental repression towards persons defined as national enemies, the rhetoric of the global War on Terror gives the phenomenon a new quality.4 More importantly, I shall tackle the question of the potential dangers of using covert security expert information to guide governments in their actions, from the perspective of internationally agreed human rights. In the first part of this article, I shall ponder on the popular rhetoric of the 'War on Terror' and analyse the usefulness of such rhetoric in the production of expert knowledge capable of ignoring fundamental human rights standards. Governments all over the world are troubled in the face of national and international security challenges. However, in their efforts to create stability and security, they seem to carry an inbuilt weakness which results in serious harm to the human rights standards, as some individuals and groups become categorised as the 'others' who deserve less rights or no rights at all. I shall then introduce the theoretical framework for analysing counterterrorism as masked in something that can be called authoritative or expert knowledge. The focus of this section lies on the authoritative knowledge of the security experts who are pivotal in the production of the practice labelled here as 'othering'. At the end of the article, the consequences of such rhetoric for the very core values of democratic societies – human rights and freedoms – are scrutinised. I shall argue that the fact that democratic decision-makers agree to rely on expert knowledge that casts security as an opposite of freedom has the potential to increase terrorist threats.

Their reliance on so-called "experts" reifies governmental control and legitimizes violence against those deemed threats

Toivanen 10 [Reetta Toivanen, Centre of Excellence in Global Governance Research , University of Helsinki, August 12, 2010, "Counterterrorism and expert regimes: some human rights concerns", *Critical Terror Studies,* 3:2, p. 277-278] //dickies

This paper focuses on counterterrorism measures practised by governments and on what is called authoritative or expert knowledge on terrorism and counterterrorism, i.e. the knowledge that affects how the governments plan and carry out their counterterrorism activities. It contends that the expertise behind the governmental positions and actions taken to counter the phenomena defined as terrorism is problematic in various ways: many of the expert bodies are veiled in secrecy, and they cannot be made accountable for their advice. Therefore, there is a danger of abuse and false 'calculation' of risk, as well as a high danger that the experts act in political conformity with the dominant forces in the state. Accordingly, this article poses the following question: what are the consequences of unaccountable and secret expertise for the application of internationally agreed human rights standards? I am especially interested in knowledge which seems to produce a coherent and consistent 'body of facts' which is then used by governments and intergovernmental organisations alike in the creation and application of their counterterrorism policies and strategies. This 'body of facts' has been criticised by some scholars, because it seems to overemphasise non-state terror and to overlook terror that emanates from the states (Jackson 2009, Breen Smyth 2007, Miller and Mills 2009, Toivanen 2008). It is also said to resemble a political ideology through which the actions taken by the government are legitimised and the acts of those opposing the governmental actions are discredited as terrorism. Some researchers have also blamed the terrorism experts for adopting an uncritical view of the sources of terrorism studies,

i.e. the sources from which their 'knowledge' emanates (Jackson 2007, Silke 2004, Breen Smyth 2007, Gunning 2007).1 My recent research has addressed, from a legal–anthropological perspective, the ways in which the <u>expert bodies contribute to the process which is here called 'othering'</u>, i.e. <u>the practice of depicting potential terrorists as foreign and as strange as possible</u>. <u>It is through this process that they are stripped of their basic human rights</u>. In this contribution, I shall argue that <u>governments across the globe have adopted counterterrorism measures which have resulted in human rights violations.</u> This is not just the case in countries such as Nigeria and Myanmar (which are regularly accused of human rights abuses in the media). All countries of the world, even countries with no direct experience of international terrorism, such as Finland,2 have adopted anti-terrorism laws and policies. As the phenomenon of terrorism is highly complex, the governments have relied on both international and national expert bodies to give them advice and consult them on how terrorist attacks could be effectively avoided.

Mainstream terrorism studies reinforce notions of Western prestige – they predetermine causes and responses.

We can find an example of such an approach to knowledge–production in the work of Robert Pape. In his book, Dying to Win, **Pape defines terrorism as that which "involves the use of violence by an organization other than a national government to intimidate or frighten a target audience"** (Pape 2005a, 9, my emphasis). This definition is directly lifted from the US State Department's document "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003" (US Department of State 2004). Acknowledging that such a definition could be broadened to include the actions of states, **Pape maintains that "such a definition would distract attention from what policy makers would most like to know: how to combat the threat posed by non-state actors to the national security of the United States and our allies"** (Pape 2005a, 280). In tying the value of his intellectual project to the governmental requirements of the US and their allies, **Pape's work is fairly typical of mainstream terrorism studies**. For example, Martha Crenshaw's review article on recent work in the field, which criticises the lack of a shared definition of suicide terrorism, cautions that this lack of precision matters "not only for analytical clarity and consistency and data collection but also for the policies of state actors" (Crenshaw 2007, 140). In more general terms, David Miller and Tom Mills' 2009 article on the presence of terrorism expertise in the main- stream media quantitatively examines the political narratives of the top-100 most-cited "terror experts" in the English-speaking news media. They find that **the majority of these experts are "ideologically committed and practically engaged in supporting Western state power"** (Miller and Mills 2009, 414–415). ∂ Terrorism studies accepts as authoritative the state's articulation of terrorism as a security problem and mobilises the authority of the state for the purposes of establishing ∂ the legitimacy of its intellectual project. In return **the state is associated with the prestige and authority of terrorism studies as an academic field, which is itself tied to the institution of the university as a privileged domain** in the production of truth and knowl- edge. A treatment of terrorism studies in terms of an analytics of governmentality forces us to pay attention to these mutually constitutive relations of power and authority**. It** also **requires us to consider terrorism studies not as mere academic exercise, but as a practice; that is, as a specific way of acting in and on the world**. Furthermore, **we are pressed to think about how this practice interacts with myriad other practices that are simultaneously at work in our contemporary regime of governmentality,** one that I am calling counter- terrorism, **and how this "network of practices**" (Rose 1999, 234) **supports, reinforces and guarantees certain conceptions of security.**

Homeland security funding drives terrorism research – academic consensus on terrorism is corrupt.

Altheide 6 [David L. Altheide, Emeritus Regents' Professor in the School of Justice and Social Inquiry at Arizona State University, where he taught for 37 years. His work has focused on the role of mass media and information technology in social control. Dr. Altheide received the Cooley Award three times, given to the outstanding book in symbolic interaction, from the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction, 2006, "Terrorism and the Politics of Fear", Altamira Press, p. 36-37] //dickies

The penchant of universities for <u>chasing large research grants</u> continued following the 9/11 attacks, but now the emphasis <u>shifted from crime to terrorism</u>. As with many institutions in the United States that pursued the multi-billion-dollar largesse to "fight terrorism," <u>universities ramped up their</u> typically slow <u>bureaucratic processes to approve new academic majors by adding terrorism and security to their repertoire</u>: Over the last three years, nearly 1<u>00 private and state colleges have introduced programs in terrorism and emergency management</u>. In New York City, both Metropolitan

College, which changed its name from Audrey Cohen College in 2002, and John Jay College of Criminal Justice have introduced master's programs that specialize in terrorism and disaster management. New York University is putting together a certificate program focusing on homeland security. (Hoffman 2004) Some of the programs were tied to established areas of study involving disaster and emergency preparedness, but more was involved than just offering a timely curriculum to curious students: This year, the Department of Homeland Security has doled out about $70 million in grant money to colleges and universities. With the agency's annual budget of $32 billion, there is the powerful lure of new jobs at state and local agencies, as well as corporations that benefit from its grants. (Hoffman 2004) The universities' most recent linkage to agencies perpetuates the framing of fear rather than offering alternative perspectives that may generate research questions to help uncover other takes on the problem. The politics of fear is self-sustaining, guiding even the "study of fear" along certain directions. Thus, these new programs were not oriented to such questions as, What do the 9/11 attacks (and other events) tell us about the place of the United States in the international order? Rather, the questions deal with reaction and adjustment within a fear framework: "All the students we have been involved with haven't seen this as a political issue, but as a way to come together for their country," said Melvin Bernstein, the director of university

Orthodox terror discourse is inextricably linked to the military-industrial-academic complex

David **Miller &** Tom **Mills** (200**9**) "The terror experts and the mainstream media: the expert nexus and its dominance in the news media", Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2:3, 415-418, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539150903306113

The early experts created an 'invisible college' of terrorism expertise, described by researchers such as Reid who has done more than any other to introduce the term to studies of terrorism expertise (Schmid et al. 2005, Reid 1983, 1993, Reid and Chen 2007). The term has even been used by orthodox authors such as Alex Schmid (Schmid et al. 2005, p. 185). The term 'invisible college' originates in the sociology of science. Although he did not coin it, Derek de Solla Price first developed it in the early 1960s to describe informal communication networks of scientists who come to form an elite and to dominate a field (Price 1963). Price noted that elite scholars come to form an 'in-group' of around 100 people and that: For each group there exists a sort of commuting circuit of institutions, research centers, and summer schools giving them an opportunity to meet piecemeal, so that over an interval of a few years everybody who is anybody has worked with everybody else in the same category. (Price 1986, pp. 74–76) In extensive work on the invisible college of terrorism experts, Reid (and latterly Chen) have noted that the terror experts met the definition of an invisible college because they 'communicated informally, convened periodic terrorism meetings, developed terrorism incident databases . . . shared ideas, and secured funding' (Reid and Chen 2007, p. 43). It is important to note that Price did not conceive of the invisible college as a 'power group' and in fact saw them as an elite resulting from an 'expectable inequality', which 'automatically reinforce their exclusiveness only by their excellence' (Price 1971, p. 74). In our view, this rather sanguine view is certainly mistaken in the case of terror experts. As Reid (1997) notes: In terrorism research, the influence of knowledge producers is severely skewed by the limited types of data used: the invisible college's publications, government documents and media coverage. Thus, development of knowledge in terrorism research has resulted in . . . political bias and policy-oriented studies. (p. 101) However, Price is correct to note that the hierarchical status of the experts is accomplished in part by 'the overpowering effect of their contribution relative to that of the rest' (Price 1971, p. 74). This can be seen in the terrorism field where the control and arbitration of access to the field and to the in-group is tightly organised around a small number of journals (Burnett and Whyte 2005, Raphael 2008, Reid and Chen 2007). But the in-group is not simply a network that whilst politically or ideologically biased exists either in parallel with, or apart from, other structures of power Both counterinsurgency theoryst and 'terrorism studies' have a shared history of intertwined relations with the military, the government and the arms industry. These kinds of connections were famously called the 'military–industrial complex' by President Dwight Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell address (Eisenhower 1961). Later, in the 1960s, Senator William Fulbright spoke out against the military influence on academia, warning that, 'in lending itself too much to the purposes of government, a university fails its higher purposes' (cited in Turse 2004). He also called attention to the existence of a 'military–industrial–academic complex' (Fulbright 1970). This directs our attention to the ideological and

practical role of terror experts in reproducing power relations, as opposed simply to studying and writing about terrorism in a political and social vacuum. Our argument in this article conceives of the official nexus of terror experts as performing useful services for other elements of the 'power elite', to use the phrase coined by the sociologist C. Wright Mills (Mills 1956). Thus, we are interested not just in the network of experts, but the way in which they operate in wider networks of power. We are interested, in other words, in 'embedded expertise' to use the phrase recently adopted by critical authors (Burnett and Whyte 2005). Embedded expertise implies both a network of knowledge and integration with other powerful institutions, including policing, the military, intelligence agencies, the arms and security industry, and last but not least, the media industries. It also implies a conception of orthodox terrorism expertise as part of hegemonic processes, meaning specifically, those which contribute to the reproduction of the 'common sense' consensus of policy and other elite fora (including the mainstream media) (Miller 2001). To be more explicit about this, we are also saying that the contribution that orthodox terror expertise makes is a matter of information management. This puts us squarely on the territory of the discussion of propaganda in Western nations. Noam Chomsky has put this in his characteristically straightforward way. In 'democratic societies', he notes, 'the state is much more limited in its capacity to control behavior by force' than in 'totalitarian' societies: Since the voice of the people is allowed to speak out, those in power better control what that voice says – in other words, control what people think. One of the ways to do this is to create political debate that appears to embrace many opinions, but actually stays within very narrow margins. (Chomsky 1987) While it may be hard for some to accept this characterisation, we are trying here to outline the kind of territory of discussion that is necessary if we are to take the field of terror expertise and the study of the state seriously. In this article, we emphasise just one such arena, that of the mainstream news media.

Terror scholars inevitably support state agendas, upholding traditional notions of terror

David **Miller &** Tom **Mills** (200**9**) "The terror experts and the mainstream media: the expert nexus and its dominance in the news media", Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2:3, 414-415, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539150903306113

Terrorism experts are ubiquitous in mainstream media coverage of political violence. They provide commentary and analysis and are used as a resource especially to fill news space in the absence of hard information. But before the 1970s, there were very few academics who studied 'terrorism'. War, revolution, political violence, social movements, and counterinsurgency were all topics of some note in the social sciences – but not terrorism. Of course, 'terrorism studies' is not sharply divorced from such previous work. It emerges as an academic specialism from these topics and in particular from the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, itself only forged in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to decolonisation and the rise of the United States as a global superpower (Maechling 1988, Schlesinger 1978). The ideas prominent in orthodox terrorism studies, and often the theorists themselves, have strong roots in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice (Klare 1988, McClintock 1992). Orthodox terrorism experts are, in other words, ideologically committed and practically engaged in supporting Western state power. Of course, the defenders of the orthodoxy deny this characterisation of their craft (Horgan and Boyle 2008), but as we will show, it is hard to draw any evidentially based alternative conclusion. This paper reports the first findings of a study of the phenomenon of terrorism expertise.1 It focuses in particular on the relationship between the experts and the mainstream media rather than on their relations with policy processes, the private sector, think-tanks and other private institutes, the legal system, or directly with government, police or armed groups. These will be the subjects of later work. Our analysis of the media is largely quantitative and is not intended to rehearse arguments about how and why the patterns that emerge exist. Rather, we are interested here in questions about the relative status of the experts featured in the media, as compared with other measures of their expertise such as citation or publication analysis. We see terrorism knowledge not as some ideologically neutral expertise on a natural phenomenon, but as being created to reflect the priorities and values of certain social interests. The very existence of 'terrorism

experts' promotes the idea that the surface similarities between acts of violence provide a solid foundation for generalisations about 'terrorism', whatever the political or social context. We use the term 'terrorologist' to designate those writers whose main work is focused explicitly on 'terrorism', as opposed to those active in area studies or in examining some other dimension or macro levels in which 'terrorism' might play a part (Herman and O'Sullivan 1989).

Comprehensive studies prove being considered a terrorism expert requires connections to the military-industrial complex.
David **Miller &** Tom **Mills** (200**9**) "The terror experts and the mainstream media: the expert nexus and its dominance in the news media", Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2:3, 424-418, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539150903306113

The analysis of the top 100 most prominent 'experts' provides a clear picture of the tendency of such experts to be linked to parts of the 'military–industrial–academic complex'. We have also shown that their views coincide with the values and policies pursued by the military–industrial complex to a significant degree. This is no minor point. It is clear that to be regarded as a terror expert it is important though not essential to be close to the institutions of the state, the military and associated industrial interests. But our data does not show which way round the influences run. Is it the centres of power in the military–industrial complex that drives the activities and ideas of the terror experts or the other way around? Do the experts in other words make any difference to the operations of power? To explore this we need to examine the extent to which the terror experts are part of a network including other experts, academic and private institutions and think-tanks, state institutions and corporate entities. We have chosen four experts to profile here. We selected three experts who are very widely cited in the news media (all of them being amongst the top twelve in terms of citations in our sample), together with one outlier to illustrate the similar but not identical paths to prominence of a new breed of 'expert' since 11 September 2001. We chose terror experts who have some university affiliation but who are also very well networked with private and state agencies. It is important that we focus on the academic component of the network because they have more credibility than those whose expertise are based in experience, or is in effect paid advocacy (as in many of the think- tanks). Thus, we did not select Noam Chomsky (number 2, not at the core of the network and very much a lone critical voice), Sidney Jones, Daniel Pipes, Jason Burke, Avi Dichter (numbers 3, 6, 8, and 9, respectively, who do not have academic tenure). We also choose not to focus on Clive Williams (number 4), Francis Fukuyama (number 5), Anthony Cordesman (number 10) or Alan Dershowitz (number 11), on the grounds that Williams is a former intelligence officer, Fukuyama and Dershowitz are not primarily known for their work on terrorism, and Cordesman, though well connected, is no longer at an academic institution but at a think-tank. We selected Rohan Gunaratna, Paul Wilkinson and Bruce Hoffman (numbers 1, 7 and 12) as academics that are also at the centre of the terror expert network and are amongst the most reputable. Our findings on the connections and on the quality of some of the work of these experts is a cautionary tale for those seeking to rely on the information and knowledge supplied by the most credible media experts on terrorism. We also chose Evan Kohlman who does not have academic tenure and is, as we shall see, a representative of the more overtly propagandistic elements of the nexus of interests. Although some 27% of the 100 terror experts with the most press prominence were either alternative or critical in our terms, we excluded them for our current purposes as we want to show how the core of the network coheres. The aim here is not to outline the ideas and views of the experts and subject them to critique, nor to produce an analysis of their impact on the media or on public opinion. Rather, we want to demonstrate how some of the key most prominent experts in global English language press are actually part of an invisible college of interconnected public terror experts whose views are strikingly similar and whose activities are linked to state and corporate priorities. The case studies were compiled using publicly available bio- graphical data in the standard way of Power Structure Research (Domhoff 2007). We have also utilised investigative research techniques to unearth obscure data and hidden information (Northmore 1996).

AT: Framework

We should generate space for debates over the epistemological and ontological assumptions of counter-terrorism.

Jackson 9 (Richard Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, PhD from the University of Canterbury, "Critical Terrorism Studies: An Explanation, a Defence and a Way Forward," p.6-8, 12-15-2009,

In addition to the particular ontological position outlined above, I argue that critical research on terrorism should also exhibit a deep awareness of key epistemological issues, including the way in which knowledge is produced as a social process, the subjectivity of the researcher, and the link between knowledge and power, and consequently, the ways in which knowledge can be employed as „a political technology" in the maintenance of hegemony by elites, institutions, and groups. In other words, a critical approach to terrorism research begins with the fundamental acceptance that wholly objective or neutral knowledge – „truth" – about terrorism is impossible and there is always an ideological, ethical-political dimension to the research process (Toros and Gunning, 2009). This does not mean that all knowledge about the social world is hopelessly insecure, that we reject scholarly standards and procedures in research, or that „anchorages" – relatively secure knowledge claims – cannot be found and built upon (Booth, 2008; Herring, 2008; Toros and Gunning, 2009). Rather, it suggests that, in addition to a commitment to the highest standards of scholarship, research on terrorism should also be characterised by a continuous and critical reflexivity in regards to its epistemology, ethics, and praxis. Importantly, such reflexivity itself opens up new areas of research, starting with the key question: who is terrorism research for and how does terrorism knowledge support particular interests? The ontological position that terrorism is socially constructed and constituted by its context leads us, epistemologically, to call for a broadening of the focus of terrorism research to include both state and non-state terrorism, counter-terrorism, and other forms of violence such as structural or domestic violence, as well as (relevant) non-violent behaviour and social context (see Toros and Gunning, 2009; Gunning, 2009). Such a broadening will serve to de-exceptionalise terrorist violence by placing socio-historical context at the heart of the investigation, restoring a past and a future to terrorism, allowing the concept to evolve along with the social world, and seeing (counter-)terrorism as part of wider political, societal, and economic dynamics. Engaging social movement theory, specific area studies expertise, and ethnographical methods constitute three practical paths to making context more central to terrorism research (Gunning, 2009; Sluka, 2009; Dalacoura, 2009; Breen Smyth, 2009). Similarly, a central concern of CTS scholars must be to expand the set of accepted research topics to include those which have been ignored or silenced as a result of dominant ideological commitments. In particular, besides a greater 7 focus on historical context, there is a real need to „bring the state back in to terrorism studies" (Blakeley, 2007) – to examine the nature and causes of state terrorism, particularly that by Western democratic states. It is also vital to make gender much more central to terrorism research (Sylvester and Parashar, 2009), among many other topics (see below). The ontological rejection of traditional theory"s „fetishization of parts" means, among other things, that epistemologically, a critical approach to terrorism should embed the phenomenon in broader social and political theory. Greater inter-disciplinarity – with a view to eventually doing away with disciplinary boundaries altogether – is one way to do this, although it is important to heed Booth"s warning against lowest common denominator inter-

disciplinarity (Booth 2008). The establishment of an explicitly „critical" field should help to bring in those from cognate disciplines who have so far shunned Terrorism Studies because of its reputation, earned or not, for political bias and lack of theoretical sophistication (see Gunning 2007a; Dalacoura, 2009). Another way to embed terrorism research in broader theory is to link terrorism more explicitly to the broader social processes of which it is part, and study it for what it has to say about these broader processes (see Gunning, 2009). <u>One of the consequences of the ontological and epistemological positions adopted by CTS is a commitment to transparency in regard to the researcher"s own values and standpoints, particularly as they relate to the geo-political interests and values of the society in which they live and work. In turn, this implies an abiding commitment to seeking to overcome the Euro/Westo-centric, Orientalist, and masculinised forms of knowledge which currently characterise the Terrorism Studies and Security Studies fields and social science more generally</u> (see Toros and Gunning, 2009; Gunning, 2009; Sylvester and Parashar, 2009). It also implies a commitment to taking subjectivity seriously, in terms of both the researcher and the research subject (see Breen Smyth, 2009). This means being aware of and transparent about the values and impact of the researcher on the process and outcomes of the research, and being willing to seriously engage with the subjectivity of the „terrorist". Importantly, this latter point implies an additional commitment to engaging in primary research when relevant, as opposed to relying primarily on secondary sources – a long-standing practice in terrorism research due to the perceived difficulties and dangers of face-to-face encounters with „terrorists" (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In terms of methodological issues, as already suggested, CTS is committed to methodological and disciplinary pluralism in terrorism research. In particular, CTS sees value in post-positivist and non-International Relations-based methods and approaches, including discourse analysis, poststructuralism, constructivism, Critical Theory, historical materialism, and ethnography. <u>Importantly, CTS refuses to privilege materialist, rationalist, and positivist approaches to social science over interpretive and reflectivist approaches (</u>in the context of critical international relations, see Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 261), <u>and seeks to avoid an exclusionary commitment to the narrow logic of traditional social scientific explanation based on linear notions of cause and effect. Instead, CTS argues that post-positivist approaches which subscribe to an interpretive „logic of understanding" can usefully open space for questions and perspectives that are often foreclosed by positivism and rationalism.</u> Furthermore, it can be argued that this stance is more than simply methodological; it is also political in the sense that it does not treat one model of social science as if it were the sole bearer of legitimacy (see Smith, 2004: 514).

Current approaches to the study of terrorism reify notions of illegitimate violence. Bringing into the debate questions behind the process of terrorism is necessary to break this cycle

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Although there may exist strategic, even normative, grounds for conceptu- alizing terrorism as a coherent object of knowledge, this essentialist ortho- doxy is unfortunate for two reasons. First, **by attributing terrorism an objective existence, mainstream terrorism studies offers very limited space for reflecting on the historical and social processes through which this** identity, behaviour or threat **has**

been constituted. With the interpretive, symbolic and discursive contexts of its creation – **to say nothing of the power relations traversing these contexts – presumed largely irrelevant for under-standing this phenomenon, terrorism remains consistently and artificially detached from the processes of its construction.** In this sense, we could do far worse than remember Foucault's (1981: 67) famous cautionary note when encountering claims to speak the truth about terrorism: 'We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher'. ∂ Foucault's meta-theoretical caution will not, of course, convince everyone that further critical reflection in this field is needed. By turning to the very specific, and narrow, essence attributed to terrorism within the mainstream debates, however, it may be possible to garner further support for such a programme. As the above discussion suggests, **existing studies remain over-** ∂ **whelmingly structured by a conception of their object as an unconventional form of illegitimate violence**. With relatively few exceptions, the majority of scholars working here are content to tie their understanding of terrorism both to activities of particular non-state actors and to the targeting of par- ticular victims: non-combatants or (more emotively) 'innocent civilians'. **With reflections on the nature and causes of terrorism already framed around this double condemnation, then, discussions relating to the legitimacy of terrorism, or**, indeed, **the possibility of state terrorism, become systematically excluded from this field of enquiry before they emerge**. As outlined below, it is an attempt to contest these exclusionary practices that largely motivates the first, broadening, face of critical terrorism studies. ∂ Given the above preference for a specific and narrow essentialist frame- work, it is perhaps unsurprising that terrorism studies has oriented towards policy-relevant research. In seeking not only to define and explain, but also to prevent or resolve, its object of knowledge, **this structuring of the discipline necessarily mobilizes a very limited conception of academic responsibility**. In Cox's (1996: 88) famous terminology, as noted by Gunning (2007), terrorism studies has overwhelmingly functioned as a problem-solving pursuit that: ∂ takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. **The general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble**. ∂ As Cox's remarks suggest, **the problem-solving approach to the study of terrorism is normatively problematic in reducing academic responsibility to a technical exercise of risk governance or management. At best, such a reduc- tion militates against any notion of critical enquiry aimed at contesting or destabilizing the status quo**: of 'saying the unsayable' in Booth's (2008: 68) terminology. **At worst, it simply reifies a tired and unstable inside/outside dichotomy that legitimizes the state's continued monopoly on violence**. Either way, the continued structuring of the mainstream literature around the above debates fails to offer any meaningful participatory role for engaged, active scholarship. ∂ In sum, although characterized by considerable diversity, the terrorism studies literature suffers from key analytical and normative limitations. Analytically, **the preference for a narrow essentialist framework not only neglects the processes of terrorism's construction, it also reduces the space available for discussing the (il)legitimacy of particular violences.** Norma- tively, the preference for producing policy-relevant, problem-solving research works to detach academic responsibility from any notion of critical enquiry. These limitations, I argue, open considerable space for the emergence of a critical terrorism studies agenda.

We must be willing to debate underlying assumptions of counter-terrorism – procedural limits on debate turn the academy into a tool of state violence.
Rod **Thornton**; School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham , Nottingham, UK. Dec 16 **2011** "Counterterrorism and the neo-liberal university: providing a check and balance? Critical Studies on Terrorism", 4:3, (p421-429)

(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2011.623419#.VakgHflTZ_A)

But <u>universities are not typically ready to deal with extremism</u>. Traditionally, <u>universities are bastions of free-thinking liberalism</u>, establishments <u>that</u>, in the words of many university's statutes, '<u>encourage debate and dissent</u>'. The government's own counterterrorism document Prevent recognises this standpoint. It says that universities 'promote and facilitate the exchange of opinion and ideas and enable debate as well as learning' (Prevent 2011, p. 71). <u>Radicalism</u>, if not indeed extremism, <u>might be seen as part and parcel of such 'exchanges'</u>. However, <u>when</u> the term '<u>national security' starts to be used by government</u>, <u>then this traditional concept of campuses providing a comfortable home to debate and dissent comes under threat.</u>

'<u>Security' is a many-faceted concept</u> when the 'enemy' is terrorism. And it is the nature of counterterrorism <u>that</u> it must, at least to some degree, involve a holistic approach. If the 'enemy' is among us, then the spread of counterterrorist actors must be wide: 'Counterterrorism <u>is not specific to any one agency</u> or department' (Silke 2011, p. 3). Included here are <u>universities</u>. They <u>are now</u> themselves, as one report puts it, '<u>non- traditional security actors</u>' (Beider <u>and</u> Briggs 2010, p. 53). But, of course, if universities do take on such a role then <u>their 'enemy' must include a number of their own students</u>. As Nina Power puts it, in the new security environment, 'lecturers are to become informants; their students the enemy within – "terrorists"' (Power 2011, p. 29). Universities have also to be aware of the 'fear factor' involved in counterterrorism. This leads to one of the principal mantras of any agency tasked with counterterrorism – 'better safe than sorry'. The shooting by police of the innocent Brazilian electrician, Jean Charles de Menezes, in the wake of the 7 July London bombings is indicative of where such thinking can lead. <u>In the climate of fear, terms such as 'debate and dissent'</u> on the campuses of universities – these new security actors – <u>can begin to take on other, sinister, meanings and become euphemisms for the expression of extremist views.</u>

AT: Case Outweighs

The aff's discourse of terror that focuses on *uncertainty* and *pre-emptive action* instead of empirical evidence creates a self-fulfilling prophecy

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Joseba Zulaika (2012, 51) suggests that <u>the epistemological crisis of counterterrorism is characterised by "the perversion of temporality, the logic of taboo, non-hypothetical knowledge, secret information, the passion for 'expert' ignorance, mystical causation and dual sovereignty"</u>. While all these characteristics are indeed present in contemporary counterterrorist thought and practice, it is not clear that they are all necessarily constitutive of the crisis; some are, to my mind, initially, at least, consequences of the crisis. I suggest instead that <u>the epistemological crisis can be identified by four primary characteristics: (1) the rejection of previous knowledge about terrorism and the embrace of total uncertainty or "anti-knowledge"</u> about any aspect of future terrorist threats; (2) <u>the adherence to an extreme precautionary dogmatism in which the "unknown" is reflexively governed through preemptive action</u>; (3) <u>the consequent legitimisation and institutionalisation of imagination and fantasy as a necessary counterterrorist too</u>l; and (4) <u>the acceptance of a permanent ontological condition of "waiting for terror</u>" in relation to the next attack (Zulaika and Douglass 1996, 26). To put it another way, we could say that the epistemological crisis is constituted by a known, an unknown and a moral imperative. <u>The known of the epistemological crisis is the assertion that, no matter what, there will be more terrorist attacks;</u> we are simply waiting for the next inevitable terrorist outrage. <u>As many officials and terror experts have expressed it, "it is not if but when"</u> the next attack occurs, <u>and no matter what, "there will always be terrorism"</u> (Zulaika 2012, 59; original emphasis). For example, <u>officials are prone to argue that even if the Israel-Palestine conflict was settled, or Western forces withdrew from Iraq, or al Qaeda was defeated</u>, or any number of other possible developments took place, <u>it would not matter because there would still be terrorism in any case</u>. Zulaika (2012) argues that <u>this kind of projection</u> (or fatalistic attitude) <u>shares the characteristics of "oracular revelation" in witchcraft societies, in that it is an unfulfilled hypothetical that "will become real with time</u>… the horror will happen no matter what". The unknown is simply that we do not, and cannot, know exactly who, when, where, why or how the next inevitable attack will occur – because the terrorists are shadowy, cunning, adaptive, innovating, etc. <u>Central to this particular state of unknowing are the unknown knowns,</u> or, the "subjugated knowledge" (Jackson 2012b) <u>which is wilfully ignored or suppressed</u>. As I explain below, it is well known within the defence establishment and official policymaking circles that military intervention such as the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan provokes further terrorism, as does the continuing existence of the Critical Studies on Terrorism 35 Downloaded by [University of California, Berkeley] at 07:59 15 July 2015 Guantanamo Bay detention centre, the use of torture and rendition, and the drone killing programme. Nevertheless, as Zulaika (2012, 56; original emphasis) puts it: "These are known facts, yet they are made to be unknown when concrete policies are to be taken". Finally, <u>the moral imperative is that we simply have to do everything in our power to prevent the unknown but inevitable coming terrorist attack</u>. <u>This is an extreme precautionary dogmatism, reflected in Dick Cheney's 1% doctrine</u> (see Zulaika 2012, 61–64), <u>which asserts that "doing something is better than doing nothing</u>", and in Francois Ewald's (2002) notion of "risk beyond risk". <u>The logic of this paradigm "dictates that uncertainty and lack of knowledge can no longer be regarded as an excuse for inaction in the face of a potentially catastrophic threat</u>" (De Goede 2011, 9). In other words, <u>in a reversal of empirically-informed preventive decision-making approaches</u> which proceed on the basis of what is known about a certain risk, such as the risks posed by disease or automobile accidents<u>, the counterterrorist must instead act upon what is unknown as projected through imagination and fantasy</u>. The important point is that <u>not acting is never an option, even if it means constructing a self-fulfilling prophesy or causing unnecessary suffering</u>. In the end, it is in the combination and interaction of these three elements that the epistemological crisis of counterterrorism is constituted. I refer to it as a "crisis" primarily because <u>it produces a state of deep anxiety and even panic about the</u> future, and because it involves an intense state of tension between the known and the unknown. Looking at both the field of terrorism studies and the social practices of counterterrorism, <u>there are a great many actions and attitudes that appear at face value to be nonsensical, irrational, obviously wasteful</u>, or,

at the very least, counterproductive (see Mueller 2006; Mueller and Stewart 2011, 2012; among others, for numerous examples). There are also a great many actions that are highly destructive, unnecessarily abusive of human rights and which lead to evident **self-fulfilling prophesies**. In this section, I provide a brief overview of a few select examples among many, drawn from different areas of counterterrorist thought and practice, to illustrate the diverse ways in which the epistemological crisis manifests itself. I argue that the examples described here are not anomalous or idiosyncratic, but rather illustrative of the internal logic of counterterrorist thought which is constituted by the epistemological crisis. Within the epistemic framework of contemporary counterterrorism, they are in fact, perfectly logical, reasonable, and by now normalised ways of thinking and acting. Importantly, the epistemic crisis is not confined to official counterterrorism. As a number of studies have demonstrated, within terrorism studies there is a persistent epistemic crisis about the nature and threat of al Qaeda itself (see Jackson 2015; Hellmich 2011, 2012) – especially in comparison to what is known about other groups such as Hamas, the IRA, ETA, the Italian Red Brigades, and others. Despite being the most researched and scrutinised group in history, terrorism experts cannot settle on the necessary knowledge base to agree on whether it is a hierarchical organisation, a diffused network, a franchise, an ideology, a figment of the Western imagination – or a combination of all of these. We know it exists, but we seemingly cannot know whether it is still a major threat or not, what really drives it, or how best to respond to it. Despite all the intellectual activity in the field, al Qaeda remains a "known unknown". This academic epistemic crisis is magnified in the world of institutional counterterrorism.

Terrorism threat assessment and journalism relies on government sources – produces threat inflation.

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 A politics of fear rests on the discourse of fear. The politics of fear serves as a conceptual linkage for power, propaganda, news and popular culture, and an array of intimidating symbols and experiences such as crime and terrorism. The politics of fear resides not in an immediate threat from an individual leader (e.g., Senator Joseph McCarthy [Griffith 1987]) but rather in the public discourse that characterizes social life as dangerous, fearful, and filled with actual or potential victims. This symbolic order invites protection, policing, and intervention to prevent further victimization. A public discourse of fear invites the politics of fear. It is not fear per se that is important in social life but rather how fear is defined and realized in everyday social interaction. The role of the news media is very important in carrying selective news sources' messages. News sources are claims makers, and studies of crime news show that government and police officials dominate how crime is framed (Ericson, Baranek, and Chan 1987, 1989; Surette 1992). Likewise, government and military officials also dominated news reports about terrorism and fear: But how men and women interpret and respond to their fear—these are more than unconscious, personal reactions to imagined or even real dangers. They are also choices made under the influence of belief and ideology, in the shadow of elites and powerful institutions. There is, then, a politics of fear. Since September 11, that politics has followed two distinct tracks: First, state officials and media pundits have defined and interpreted the objects of Americans' fears—Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism—in anti-political or non-political terms, which has raised the level of popular nervousness; and, second, these same elites have generated a fear of speaking out not only against the war and US foreign policy but also against a whole range of established institutions. (Robin 2002) Newspapers as well as television network news relied heavily on administration sources that directed the focus and language of news Terrorism and the Politics of Fear 117 coverage. This was particularly apparent with those persons interviewed. A study by the Columbia Journalism Review documented this trend: It exacerbates our tendency to rely on official sources, which is the easiest, quickest way to get both the "he said" and the "she said," and, thus, "balance." According to numbers from the media analyst Andrew Tyndall, of the 414 stories on Iraq broadcast on NBC, ABC, and CBS from last September to February, all but thirty-four originated at the White House, Pentagon, and State Department. So we end up with too much. An analysis by Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) of network

news interviewees one week before and one week after Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United Nations about Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction found that <u>two-thirds of the guests were from the United States, with 75 percent of these being current or former government or military officials, while only one</u>—Senator Kennedy—<u>expressed skepticism or opposition to the impending war with Iraq</u>. Even newsmagazines like Newsweek concurred that the news was being managed: <u>News management is at the heart of the administration's shake-up of Iraq policy</u>. <u>The National Security Council recently created four new committees</u> to handle the situation in Iraq. <u>One is devoted entirely to media coordination— stopping the bad news from overwhelming the good.</u> (Newsweek, October 27, 2003) Very dramatically, <u>journalists cried on camera, wore flag lapels, and often referred to those involved in planning and fighting the Afghanistan and Iraq wars as "we."</u> Moreover, <u>they invoked routinely the claim that the "world is different," that security and safety can no longer be taken for granted</u>, <u>and that many sacrifices would have to be made</u> (Altheide 2004). Numerous observers raised serious questions about the role that journalism played in covering the attacks, the wars with Afghanistan and Iraq that followed, and the increased surveillance and control of United States citizens: The major media fully ignored gangbuster stories reported exhaustively overseas. Among them were: (1). a manifesto that described the invasion of Iraq and pacification of the Mideast penned in 1998 by a think tank whose board included a raft of current administration hawks. . . . In a rare case of breaking ranks, one news "celeb," NBC correspondent Ashleigh Banfield, took her industry to task in a speech at Kansas State University April, averring that it had painted a "glorious, wonderful picture" of war that "wasn't journalism." Quoting Robert McChesney (Professor of Communications at the University of Illinois) "If the Soviet Union cited reasons like this in their invasion of Afghanistan and Pravda reported nothing but what the government said, we 118 Chapter 6 would've dismissed it out of hand. Our press hasn't been much better. That sends a lot of Americans maybe not consciously but intuitively, looking for something our media is not offering." (Grimm 2003, p. 37) <u>The collective identity of victim of terrorist attacks was promoted by news reports stressing communal suffering as well as opportunities to participate in helping survivors and in defeating terrorism</u>. More traditional and culturally resonant narratives about crime, drugs, and evil were transformed into the "terror story." Sorrow, suffering, empathy, and pain were merged with fear and vengeance. <u>National character was played out in scenarios of heroics, sacrifice, suffering, marketing, and spending. This was the context for constructing the politics of fear</u>.

Be skeptical of their authors – government officials dominate news media coverage – this reinscribes the politics of fear and institutionalizes authoritarian control

Altheide 6 [David L. Altheide, Emeritus Regents' Professor in the School of Justice and Social Inquiry at Arizona State University, where he taught for 37 years. His work has focused on the role of mass media and information technology in social control. Dr. Altheide received the Cooley Award three times, given to the outstanding book in symbolic interaction, from the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction, 2006, "Terrorism and the Politics of Fear", Altamira Press, p. 121-131] //dickies

But this is different from the Chandra Levy or O.J. Simpson overreactions. We are a different country from the one that weathered those stories. We feel more vulnerable to terrorism, and no matter how you cut it, this killer is a terrorist. His purpose, or at least one of them, is to spread terror. And the media playing right into his hands, as if Sept. 11 never happened. "We may be entering a time when what has been ghetto-ized in Israel and the Middle East breaks its boundaries," says UC Berkeley dean of journalism Orville Schell, referring to suicide bombers and other acts of terrorism. "The unspoken thought is, 'What if this guy is a Muslim?' The media is feeding this most paranoid fear of all but without acknowledging it. . . . The national climate of fear, energized by this psycho sniper, demands that the media examine its decisions more critically than ever. What kind of coverage serves the public interest? What information helps, and more important what harms?" (Ryan 2002, p. A23) Terrorism and the Politics of Fear 121 Next, figure 6.2 shows the massive increase in reports that associated fear with terrorism. Fear in headlines and terrorism in news reports greatly exceeded the increases in fear and crime. Each of the newspapers increased the linkage of fear with terrorism by more than 1,000 percent, with the San Francisco Chronicle exceeding 4,500 percent (having pub- 122 Chapter 6 Figure 6.1. Percentage Increase of "Fear" in Headlines and "Crime" in Reports for Five Newspapers after 9/11/01 Figure 6.2. Percentage Increase of "Fear" in Headlines and "Terrorism" in Reports for Five Newspapers after 9/11/01 lished only two reports of this nature before 9/11) at time 1. Clearly, terrorism was a relatively new and bold connection for fear. This included a few articles that were critical of the government's use of fear to exact more social control, but the overwhelming majority demonstrated that terrorism was bonded to the discourse of fear. <u>A context of crime reporting proved to be consequential for the seemingly easy public acceptance of governmental proposals to expand surveillance and social control. The resulting measures reflected a foundational politics of fear that promoted a new public discourse and justification for altering everyday life and social interaction</u>. While the following discussion is informed by insights of others about social context and change (Shapiro 1992; Thiele 1993) and various studies about fear and the media (Furedi 1997; Glassner 1999) and especially fear and crime (Chiricos et al. 1997; Ferraro

1995), my focus is on political action that utilizes widespread audience perceptions about fear as a feature of crime, violence, deviance, terrorism, and other dimensions of social disorder. The politics of fear is buffered by news and popular culture stressing fear and threat as features of entertainment that increasingly are shaping public and private life as mass-mediated experience has become a standard frame of reference for audiences, claims makers, and individual actors (Best 1995). Similar to propaganda, messages about fear are repetitious and stereotypical of outside "threats" and especially suspect and "evil others." These messages also resonate moral panics, with the implication that action must be taken to not only defeat a specific enemy but also save civilization. Since so much is at stake, it follows that drastic measures must be taken—that compromises with individual liberty and even perspectives about "rights," the limits of law, and ethics must be "qualified" and held in abeyance in view of the threat. In addition to propaganda effects, the constant use of fear pervades crises and normal times; it becomes part of the taken-for-granted word of "how things are," and one consequence is that it begins to influence how we perceive and talk about everyday life, including mundane as well as significant events. Tracking this discourse shows that fear pervades our popular culture and is influencing how we view events and experience. This is particularly relevant for the use of victims and victimization, particularly in the context of 9/11. Still another consequence of the emphasis on "fear" that foretells the emerging politics of fear is the rise of victimization. Entertaining news emphasizes "fear" and institutionalizes "victim" as an acceptable identity. Other work has shown that "fear" and "victim" are informed by perceived membership (Altheide et al. 2001). While news reports strengthened the connection between terrorism and fear, a critical symbol in the politics of fear is "victim and victimization." Terrorism and the Politics of Fear 123 Figure 6.3 shows the relationship of "fear," "crime," and "victim." This figure demonstrates that there was a much larger increase in the eighteen months after 9/11 in reports with "fear" within two words of "victim" than there was "fear" within two words of "crime." Most striking for our argument about the expanded focus of "fear" and "victim" beyond crime after 9/11 was the clear increases in "fear" within two words of "victim" across the span of nationally prominent newspapers. USA Today increased reports with "fear" within two words of "victim" by 280 percent, while the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, and the Washington Post, often regarded as among the nation's most prestigious newspapers, saw increases of nearly 100 percent. Examining the five newspapers shows that each greatly increased reports with "fear" within two words of "victim" at time 2: Los Angeles Times: 108 percent; New York Times: 89 percent; Washington Post: 91 percent; San Francisco Chronicle: 33 percent; and USA Today: 280 percent. Moreover, three of the five newspapers published fewer reports with "fear" within two words of "crime" during the eighteen months after 9/11. Indeed, all newspapers had either very little increase or a decrease in reports of "fear" within two words of "crime" at time 2. For example, USA Today showed a 20 percent increase and the New York Times a 10 percent increase, while the Los Angeles Times (–25 percent), the Washington Post (–8 percent), and the San Francisco Chronicle (–13 percent) presented less coverage about "fear" within two words of "crime" than they did prior to 9/11. Another way to illustrate the magnitude of change in these newspapers' reports about "fear" within two words of "victim" compared to "fear" and "crime" is to add the percentage increases in the former and the total change (increases minus decreases) in reports about "fear" and "crime." The five newspapers' cumulative increase from time 1 to time 2 in reports with "fear" within two words of "victim" was 493 124 Chapter 6 Figure 6.3. Percent Changes in Report with "Fear" within Two Words of "Victim" and "Fear" after 9/11 percent, with a cumulative decrease of 16 percent in reports showing "fear" within two words of "crime." This means that "fear" and "victim" became more closely linked at time 2 across these major news media. The world of popular culture and news stressing crime and victimization promotes the pervasive awareness of "victimage" that is easily cultivated by officials who respond to terrorist acts. Victims abound in American life. Victims are but the personal side of crisis; a crisis is where victims reside. A personal crisis may affect "one victim," but more generally "crisis" refers to "social crisis," involving numerous people. All take place in a time of fear. All of this requires that citizens have information and constant reminders of the pitfalls and hazards of life, whether potential or realized (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). News reports, talk shows, newsmagazine shows, and a host of police and reality crime dramas seem to proclaim that everybody is a victim of something even though they may not know it. The notion that "life is hard" and that things don't always work out the way we'd like seems to be lost on popular-culture audiences who clamor for "justice," "revenge," and, of course, redemption, often in the form of monetary rewards. And it is not just in the United States: It is in the USA that victimhood is most developed as an institution in its own right. . . . Victimhood is one of the central categories of the culture of abuse. . . . Celebrities vie with one another to confess in graphic detail the painful abuse they suffered as children. The highly acclaimed BBC interview with Princess Diana symbolized this era of the victim. (Furedi 1997, p. 95) Just as our culture has become obsessed with fear, it has also become accepting of victim and victimization. My analysis of news and popular culture indicates that these two terms are linked. We even use the term "victim": when we don't have a victim, as in "victimless crime," although reports are far more likely to stress the "victim" status. And certain domestic violence "presumptive arrest" policies define people as "crime victims" even though they do not perceive themselves as such and refuse to press charges. We even have "indirect victim." Patriotism was connected with an expansive fear of terrorism and enemies of the United States. The term "terrorism" was used to encompass an idea as well as a tactic or method. The waging of the "war on terrorism" focused on the "idea" and the "method," depending on the context of discussion and justification. The very broad definition of terrorism served the central authorities' purposes while also justifying action of others (e.g., Israel) in their own conflicts. Figure 6.4 provides another important piece to the conceptual argument about the politics of fear. These data show that each of the newspapers substantially increased the

number of reports with fear within two Terrorism and the Politics of Fear 125 words of "terrorism" after 9/11: Los Angeles Times: 1,467 percent; New York Times: 986 percent; Washington Post: 1,100 percent; San Francisco Chronicle: 1,620 percent; and USA Today: 2,950 percent. Clearly, terrorism was strongly linked to the discourse of fear. DISCUSSION A brief recap of the argument is that claims makers' accounts of the attacks of 9/11 contributed to an expanding use of "fear" with "victim" and "victimization" that increased much faster than an already established tradition of reports linking "fear" and "crime." "Victim" and "terrorism" did not replace "crime" but simply expanded the "fear" and "victim" connection that has long been associated with "crime." And it is this expansion that is consistent with the politics of fear. The point can be further illustrated. A closer "internal" look at variations in the Los Angeles Times indicates that the emphasis on crime decreased when compared to more attention given to terrorism. Examining other data (not provided here) shows that at time 1 (eighteen months prior to 9/11), only 1 percent of stories with "fear" in the headlines had "crime" and "terrorism" in the report. This increased to 8 percent at time 2. Most striking is the headline changes. There was a 1,600 percent increase in reports with "terrorism" and "fear" in the headlines at time 2. 126 Chapter 6 Figure 6.4. Changes (%) in Reports with "Fear" within Two Words of "Terrorism," after 9/11/01 The upshot is that "terrorism" and "victim" have been more closely joined with "fear" at time 2, while time 1 reporting was more likely to associate "fear" and "victim" with "crime." "Victim" continued to "grow" from "crime" at time 2, but it was engorged by "fear." While "crime" and "terrorism" do coexist and can expand together, "terrorism" became more strongly associated with "victim." The discourse of fear now includes terrorism as well as victimization and crime. Terrorism and fear have been joined through victimization. Crime established a solid baseline in its association with fear, and it continues to grow, but it is terrorism that now occupies the most news space. The primary reason for this, as noted previously in the discussion of news sources, is that government officials dominate the sources relied on by journalists. When journalists rely heavily on government and military officials not only to discuss an immediate war or military campaign but also for information about the security of the country, rationale for more surveillance of citizens, and comments about related domestic and international issues, then the body politic is symbolically cultivated to plant more reports and symbols about the politics of fear. This is particularly true during periods of war, such as the ongoing war with Iraq. Messages that the war on terrorism and the importance of homeland security, including periodic elevated "terror alerts," will not end soon lead journalists to turn to administration news sources for information about the most recent casualties, operations, and reactions to counterattacks as well as the omnipresent reports about soldiers who have perished and those who are still in peril. In this sense, news updates from authoritative sources quickly merge with orchestrated propaganda efforts. Terrorism plays well with audiences accustomed to the discourse of fear as well as political leadership oriented to social policy geared to protecting those audiences from crime. I am proposing, then, that the discourse of fear is a key element of social fears involving crime and other dreaded outcomes in the postmodern world. As rhetoricians have noted, terrorism is easily included within this perspective: Terrorism, then, is first and foremost discourse. There is a sense in which the terrorist event must be reported by the media in order for it to have transpired at all. (Zulaika and Douglass 1996, p. 14) The pervasive threat of terrorism is given credibility by events that are interpreted as part of an unfolding and very uncertain schema for the future: Terrorism discourse singles out and removes from the larger historical and political context a psychological trait (terror), an organizational structure (the Terrorism and the Politics of Fear 127 terrorist network), and a category (terrorism) in order to invent an autonomous and aberrant realm of gratuitous evil that defies any understanding. The ironic dimension of terrorism discourse derives from its furthering the very thing it abominates. (Zulaika and Douglass 1996, p. 22) Terrorism is more than a narrative, but its essence is the definition of the situation, one that extends beyond the present into a distal future, gray but known. The forebodingness of events (e.g., the 9/11 attacks) is cast as a terrible trend inevitability, but the power comes from the uncertainty of "when" and "where." Like the prospective victims of crime in the future, citizens will be made terrorist victims in the future. Terrorism—and especially the attacks of 9/11— enabled political actors to expand the definition of the situation to all Americans as "victims." Moreover, all those fighting to protect actual and potential victims should be permitted to do their work, unimpeded by any concerns about civil liberties or adding context and complexity to the simple analysis that was offered: evil people were attacking good people, and evil had to be destroyed: Victimhood has also been expanded through the concept of the indirect victim. For example, people who witness a crime or who are simply aware that something untoward has happened to someone they know are potential indirect victims. . . . With the concept of the indirect victim, the numbers become tremendously augmented. Anyone who has witnessed something unpleasant or who has heard of such an experience becomes a suitable candidate

for the status of indirect victim. (Furedi 1997, p. 97) <u>Victims are a by-product of fear and the discourse of fear</u>.
I contend that "fear" and "victim" are linked through social power, responsibility, and identity. The linkage involves concerns about safety and perceptions of risk. Thus, President Bush was relying on more than skilled speechwriters in connecting the mafia and terrorism; he was also relying on audiences' acceptance of mythical mafia "dons" and "godfathers" depicted in entertainment to grease the conceptual slide of terrorism as a similar threat. What audiences were presumed to share, then, was the sense that terrorism, like crime (especially "Mafia Crime"), was a monstrous black hand that was invisible, omnipresent, and all powerful and that could be stopped only by a stronger force if ordinary Americans were to survive. I refer specifically to the "role and identity of victim," as held by numerous audiences who expect victims to perform certain activities, speak a certain language, and in general follow a cultural script of "dependence," "lacking," and "powerlessness" while relying on state-sponsored social institutions to save and support them (Garland 2001). Clearly, the terrorists, like their criminal predecessors, had put us all at risk: 128 Chapter 6 The precondition for the emergence of the victim identity was the consolidation of the consciousness of risk. In the UK and the USA, the growing fear of crime and the growing perception of risks have contributed to the sentiment that everyone is a potential victim. However, crime and the fear of crime are only the most striking manifestations of the kind of insecurity that strengthens the belief that everyone is at risk. (Furedi 1997, p. 100) Recall that the politics of fear refers to decision makers' promotion and use of audience beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk, and fear in order to achieve certain goals. <u>The politics of fear promotes attacking a target</u> (e.g., crime or terrorism), <u>anticipates further victimization</u>, <u>curtails civil liberties</u>, <u>and stifles dissent as being unresponsive to citizen needs or even "unpatriotic."</u> The Homeland Security Office advised the American people to buy duct tape and plastic sheeting as a barrier to terrorism. This advisory had little to do with "chemical protection" and much to do with <u>the politics of fea</u>r. As one observer noted, Since September 11, that politics <u>has followed two distinct tracks</u>: First, <u>state officials and media pundits have defined</u> and interpreted the objects of Americans' <u>fears—Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism—in anti-political or non-political terms</u>, which has raised the level of popular nervousness; and, second, <u>these same elites have generated a fear of speaking out not only against the war and US foreign policy but also against a whole range of established institutions</u>. (Robin 2002) This argument has no counterproposal because of the symbolic links that are made between an event, a threat, and the avowed character and purpose of the terrorists, who, like criminals, are construed as lacking any reason, moral foundation, or purpose except to kill and terrify. Not likely to be ravaged by childhood diseases or workplace injuries, postindustrial citizens are prime potential victims, viewing mass-mediated scenarios of crime, mayhem, and destruction; they have no option but to believe and wait: <u>The most typical mode of terrorism discourse in the United States has been</u>, indeed, <u>one of Waiting for Terror.</u> . . . That which captivates every mind is something so meaningless that it may never happen, yet we are forced to compulsively talk about it while awaiting its arrival. In the theater of the absurd, "no significance" becomes the only significance. . . . When something does happen, after decades during which the absent horror has been omnipresent through the theater of waiting, the vent becomes anecdotal evidence to corroborate what has intuited all along—the by-now permanent catastrophe of autonomous Terror consisting of the waiting for terror. (Zulaika and Douglass 1996, p. 26) Terrorism and the Politics of Fear 129 There can be no fear without actual victims or potential victims. In the postmodern age, victim is a status and representation and not merely a person or someone who has suffered as a result of some personal, social, or physical calamity. Massive and concerted efforts by moral entrepreneurs to have their causes adopted and legitimated as "core social issues" worthy of attention have led to the wholesale adaptation and refinement of the use of the problem frame to promote victimization (Best 1995). Often couching their "causes" as battles for "justice," moral entrepreneurs seek to promote new social definitions of right and wrong (Johnson 1995; Spector and Kitsuse 1977). As suggested previously with the examples of hoaxes, victims are entertaining, and that is why they abound. They are evocative, bringing forth tears, joy, and vicarious emotional experience. But victim is more. Victim is now a status, a position that is open to all people who live in a symbolic environment marked by the discourse of fear. We are all potential victims, often vying for official recognition and legitimacy. CONCLUSION I suggest that the politics of fear is a dominant motif for news and popular culture. Moreover, within this framework, news reporting about crime and terrorism are linked with "victimization" narratives that make crime, danger, and fear very relevant to everyday life experiences. The social construction of social problems, as Best (1999) noted, is an ongoing process, building from previous experience. However, the politics of fear as public discourse represents an emergent feature of the symbolic environment: moral entrepreneurs' claims making is easier to market to audiences anchored in fear and victimization as features of crime and terrorism. The politics of fear can be theoretically useful in understanding the relevance of mass-mediated fear in contemporary popular culture and political life. This concept is useful for clarifying the closer ties between entertainment-oriented news and popular culture on the one hand and media-savvy state officials on the other. Consider an example of a news report about a dispute in Phoenix, Arizona, over regulating "low-rider" cruising. An attorney for the low-riders stated, Unfortunately this bill might be considered by some Hispanics as a form of state-sponsored terrorism through vague local ordinances. (Arizona Republic, April 21, 2004, p. B1) On the one hand, the politics of fear is consistent with entertainmentoriented news and mass media, particularly its resonance with "victim" and victimization. On the other hand, the politics of fear helps political 130 Chapter 6 decision makers as news sources and as political actors define social life as dangerous and requiring formal social control and state intervention. The politics of fear joined crime with victimization through the "drug war," interdiction and surveillance policies, and grand narratives that reflected numerous cultural myths about moral and social "disorder." We are in the midst of an emerging politics of fear that discourages criticism and promotes caution and reliance on careful procedures to "not be hasty," to "cover oneself," to "not be misunderstood." The politics of fear promotes extensive use of disclaimers, those linguistic devices that excuse a comment to follow by providing an explanation to not "take it the wrong way," usually taking the form of "I am not unpatriotic, but . . ." or "I support our troops as much as anyone, but . . .". Very few politicians will stand up to the politics of fear because it is the defining bulwark of legitimacy. Skillful propaganda and the cooperation of the most powerful news media enabled simple lies

to explain complex events. Like entertaining crime reporting, anticipation of wars, attacks, and the constant vigilance to be on guard is gratifying for most citizens who are seeking protection within the symbolic order of the politics of fear. The skillful use of heightened "terrorist alerts" to demand attention to the task at hand is critical in avoiding any detractor. And that is the key point: an otherwise sensible or cautionary remark that signals that one is aware, rational, and weighing alternatives marks one as a detractor, someone who is "against the United States." The rituals of control are easier to accept as they become more pervasive and institutionalized. Fear is perceived as crime and terrorism, while police and military forces are symbolically joined as protectors. The politics of fear with a national or international justification is more symbolically compelling than "mere crime in the streets." Accompanying heightened terror alerts are routine frisks, intrusive surveillance, and the pervasive voyeuristic camera, scanning the environment for all suspicious activity. The next chapter discusses how the politics of fear has been extended to control of the Internet.

Terrorist scenarios are based off of speculative fantasy rather than empirical facts

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Another example of the epistemological crisis, and a direct consequence of the epistemic blind within which knowledge about what terrorists have done previously can no longer be considered a reliable guide to what they might do in the future, is the prevalence of fantasy thinking in counterterrorist thought and practice (see Jackson 2012a). As a number of scholars have recently shown (see Zulaika 2012; Heath-Kelly 2012a), fantasy, exaggeration, hyper-caution and even forms of magical realism are now central themes in counterterrorism and security practice, and bizarre fantasy-imbued behaviour by security officials seems to occur on an almost daily basis. The case of James Fitzgerald cited above, in which terrorism books were re-x-rayed, could be viewed as an example of (subconscious) magical realist thinking by counterterrorist officials: it certainly seems bizarre that books could be thought to hide dangerous materials detectable only by a second x-ray, unless they had some magical quality. In addition to the banal everyday examples of security officials at airports searching very elderly passengers and babies' diapers when it is obvious they pose no threat, serious discussions have taken place within official institutions about the possibility that terrorists could introduce biological weapons into the water supply through fire hydrants (Cooper 2007) or that they might use hang-gliders to deliver suicide bombs into urban areas (Clendenning 2012). It has also been seriously suggested that candy machines might be vulnerable to terrorists (Fahim 2007) wanting to poison unwary American children and 40 R. Jackson Downloaded by [University of California, Berkeley] at 07:59 15 July 2015 that hundreds of American amusement and water parks remain vulnerable to attack by terrorists (Department of Homeland Security 2009). More recently, the town of Keene, New Hampshire, "received national attention when it was revealed that the police department had applied to purchase a military-style BearCat mine-resistant armoured vehicle. The application named the pumpkin festival – a traditional local event for the past 24 years, in which thousands of people flock to see numerous displays of jack-o'- lanterns, and other festive jollities – as a possible target for terrorists" (Woolf 2014). What these and many other cases illustrate is the essential role of imagination and fantasy in counterterrorism; that is, officials imagining unrealistic – or at least exaggerated or realityenhanced – possible terrorist scenarios and then treating them as real threats requiring a material response, or at least serious consideration, from officials. What I am suggesting is that the prevalence of fantasy and magical thinking in counterterrorism flows directly from, and is constitutive of, the profound lack of knowledge that officials and experts claim to have about terrorism and the actual threat it poses. It is not antithetical to, but rather illustrative of, the epistemological crisis in which terrorism is perceived as fundamentally unknown, incalculable and unpredictable – a Rumsfeldian "unknown unknown" (see also de Goede's 2011 notion of "threat imaginaries"). Once counterterrorism officials believe that they cannot really know with any certainty who, where, when, how or why terrorists might strike, or what potential danger they may pose (conventional, nuclear, chemical, biological), then the only option to detect and deal with them is to try and imagine what they might do – which of course, inevitably leads to fantasy in counterterrorist thought and

practice. Hollywood and imaginative counterterrorism It is by now well-known that in October 2001, following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, a three-day summit was held at the University of Southern California Institute for Creative Technology (ICT), which brought together counterterrorism officials and Hollywood screenwriters, directors and producers (for an incisive analysis of this meeting, see Frank 2014, 1–8). The aim of the meeting was "to brainstorm about possible terrorist targets and schemes in America and to offer solutions to those threats" (Huck cited in Frank 2014, 1). Frank argues that this meeting grew directly out of the widespread belief that the 9/11 attacks represented, in large part, a failure of imagination: According to this line of reasoning, counterterrorism cannot confine itself to the accumulation of data concerning the goals, strategies, and means of terrorist networks; it also depends on ingenuity in the imagination of future events. In addition to analyzing facts, it must speculatively work through possibilities, think in the subjunctive. And who else would be better suited for this task than screenwriters and directors, who have been tirelessly imagining attacks on domestic targets for several decades? It must have been this thought that prompted Washington to seek the advice of Hollywood, in the hope of being able "to devise plausible ways in which terrorists might launch new attacks against the US." (Frank 2014, 3–4) In other words, preventing future terrorist attacks would necessitate putting the creative imagination to work in devising terrorist scenarios. Later, the 9/11 Commission would reinforce this epistemic reorientation, suggesting: "It is therefore crucial to find a way of routinising, even bureaucratising, the exercise of imagination" (cited in Frank 2014, 3). Frank goes on to rightly note that this episode is a striking example of the epistemological crisis of counterterrorism and makes perfect sense within its internal structure. Moreover, it indicates a reluctance to deal with real or "known" actors, events, histories, Critical Studies on Terrorism 41 Downloaded by [University of California, Berkeley] at 07:59 15 July 2015 subjectivities and conditions of emergence. That is, the fact that terrorism experts were not consulted instead of film makers exemplifies the first condition of the epistemological crisis, namely, the rejection of previous knowledge about terrorism. When we cannot know anything about the real nature of terrorism, except that it is an unknown, unpredictable threat, it makes sense to turn to the experts in fantasy and imagination for advice.

Their threats are not real but constructed by an irrational fear of the unknown

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In a more recent example, the Australian government changed its terrorism alert level to extreme in September 2014 as the crisis involving Islamic State heated up. According to the Australian authorities, "the top level, 'extreme', indicates that a terrorist attack 'is imminent or has occurred'" (Hurst and Murphy 2014). In announcing the change, however, Prime Minister Abbott said: "I want to stress that this does not mean that a terror attack is imminent… We have no specific intelligence of particular plots. What we do have is intelligence that there are people with the intent and the capability to mount attacks" (Hurst and Murphy 2014). In other words, having no evidence that an attack is imminent, we must nonetheless raise the threat level to imminent because we do have evidence of the (universal adversary's) terrorist's intent. The known intent of the terrorists is sufficient to act: "we need to be aware that there are people who wish to do us harm… So we see an increase particularly in intent – I won't go into all of the details but I think it is important that we raise awareness partly by raising the threat level" (Hurst and Murphy 2014). The known intent of the terrorist is sufficient to overrule the unknown time and location of the attack, creating an imperative to act preemptively to raise the threat level to imminent. We are now in an ontological limbo of "waiting for terror": the attack is imminent and not imminent at the same time. While it could be argued that these are exaggerated or exceptional instances easily dismissed as representative of occasional official idiocy, I would argue that in fact, they perfectly illustrate the nature and structure of the epistemic crisis at the heart of counterterrorist thought. The epistemic crisis lies precisely in the tension between what is seen to be "known" for certain (that there are imaginative and capable terrorists who have the intent to attack us again), what remains uncertain or "unknown" (who they are exactly, and when, where, why and how they will attack) and the moral imperative to do something to preempt it.

AT: Pragmatism

Critical terror studies and active engagement with the political process is an effective way to move beyond critique, finding ways to replace political strategies of terror with non-violent ones
<u>Jackson 7</u>

(Richard Jackson, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Penglais, Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, Wales, UK, "the core commitments of critical terrorism studies", European Political Science 2007, pp. 249-250)

<u>In practice, such a standpoint necessarily entails transparency in specifying one's political–normative stance and values, a continuous critical reflexivity regarding the aims, means and outcomes of terrorism research, particularly as it intersects with state counter-terrorism, and an enduring concern with questions of politics and ethics.</u> In turn, this has clear implications for research funding, knowledge production and the ethics of research in 'suspect communities'. <u>It also entails an enduringly critical stance towards projects of state counter-terrorism, particularly as they affect human and societal security. CTS recognises that such a stance involves a delicate and creative balance between avoiding complicity in oppressive state practices through a continual process of critique, while simultaneously maintaining access to power in order to affect change. From this perspective, CTS is determined to go beyond critique and deconstruction and actively work to bring about positive social change – in part through an active engagement with the political process and the power holders in society. In short, based on an acceptance of a fundamental prior responsibility to 'the other', CTS sees itself as being engaged in a critical praxis aimed at ending the use of terror by any and all actors and in promoting the exploration of non-violent forms of conflict transformation. Specifically, this entails a willingness to try to understand and empathise with the mindsets, world views and subjectivities of non-Western 'others' and a simultaneous refusal to assume or impute their intentions and values</u> (Barkawi, 2004). <u>CTS scholars recognise that in relation to the 'terrorist other', this is a taboo stance within Western scholarship. Moreover, it is a taboo that has been institutionalised in a legal framework in which withholding information from the authorities is a crime</u>, in which academics are being asked to report on their students and in which attempting to understand the subjectivities of 'terrorist' suspects could be interpreted as 'glorification of terrorism' – a crime under UK law. Nonetheless, <u>CTS scholars view it as both analytically and ethically responsible and remain committed to defending the intellectual and ethical integrity of such work.</u>

Deconstructing traditional modes of terrorism studies produces practical changes.
<u>Jackson 7</u>

(Richard Jackson, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Penglais, Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, Wales, UK, "the core commitments of critical terrorism studies", European Political Science 2007, pp. 246-247)

Without discounting the contributions of positivist social science, I would argue that <u>CTS rests firstly upon an understanding of knowledge as a social process constructed through language, discourse and inter-subjective practices</u>. From this perspective, it is understood that <u>terrorism knowledge always</u>

reflects the social–cultural context within which it emerges, which means among other things that it tends to be highly gendered and Eurocentric. CTS understands that knowledge is always intimately connected to power, that knowledge is 'always for someone and for some purpose' and that 'regimes of truth' function to entrench certain hierarchies of power and exclude alternative, counter-hegemonic forms of knowledge and practice. CTS therefore begins with an acceptance of the basic insecurity of all knowledge and the impossibility of neutral or objective knowledge about terrorism. It also evinces an acute sensitivity to the ways in which terrorism knowledge can be deployed as a political technology in the furtherance of hegemonic projects and directs attention to the interests that underlie knowledge claims. Thus, CTS starts by asking: who is terrorism knowledge for, and what functions does it serve in supporting their interests? There are at least three practical consequences of this broad epistemological orientation. First, similar to the field of critical security studies (CSS), CTS begins from an analysis of the epistemological and ontological claims that make the discipline possible in the first place (Williams and Krause, 1997); in particular, the false naturalism of traditional theory and the political content of all terrorism knowledge. More specifically, its research focuses in part on uncovering and understanding the aims of knowledge production within terrorism studies, the operation of the terrorism studies epistemic community and more broadly, the social and political construction of terrorism knowledge. Such analysis can be achieved using deconstructive, narrative, genealogical, ethnographic and historical analyses, as well as Gramscian and constructivist approaches. The purpose of such research is not simply descriptive nor is it to establish the 'correct' or 'real truth' of terrorism; rather, its aim is to destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the inherently contested and political nature of the discourse – to reveal the politics behind seemingly neutral knowledge. A second practical consequence for CTS research is a continuous and transparent critical–normative reflexivity in the knowledge-production process (Shaw, 2003). That is, CTS research acknowledges the impossibility of neutral or objective terrorism knowledge and evinces an acute awareness of the political uses to which it can be put, as well as its inbuilt biases and assumptions. It thus attempts to avoid the uncritical use of labels, assumptions and narratives regarding terrorism in ways that would naturalise them or imply that they were uncontested. Crucial in this respect is an appreciation of the inherently gendered and Eurocentric character of dominant knowledge and discourse on terrorism. A third consequence for CTS research is methodological and disciplinary pluralism; in particular, a willingness to adopt post-positivist and non-IR-based methods and approaches. In this sense, CTS refuses to privilege materialist, rationalist and positivist approaches to social science over interpretive and reflectivist approaches (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 261). Avoiding an exclusionary commitment to the narrow logic of traditional social scientific explanation based on linear notions of cause and effect, CTS accepts that constructivist and poststructuralist approaches that subscribe to an interpretive 'logic of understanding' can open space for questions and perspectives that are foreclosed by positivism and rationalism. **This stance is** more than methodological; it is also **political in the sense that it does not treat one model of social science as if it were the sole bearer of legitimacy** (Smith, 2004: 514).

AT: Indicts

AT: Horgan & Boyle

Only critical perspectives on terrorism account for massive levels of state violence.

Ruth **Blakeley**, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent , Canterbury, UK, 7-11-20**08**," The elephant in the room: a response to John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle ," *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 151–165, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539150802184561

An important aim of scholars associated with the CTS agenda is to foster further studies on state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the Global North, since this has been a widely used strategy by the US, Britain, and France, among others, but has received relatively little attention among terrorism scholars within IR, as well as across the social sciences. Horgan and Boyle have suggested that such calls constitute a 'reinventing of the wheel', because they associate those calls with criticisms that CTS scholars have made of how terrorism has been defined, which, they argue, is simply going over old ground. Furthermore, they point out that many terrorism scholars do acknowledge that the state is 'a primary, if not the most important, agent of terror' (Horgan and Boyle 2008, p. 56), and that in this regard, it is not clear how CTS is offering anything novel. My contention here is firstly, that it is not the definitions of terrorism that are being challenged so much as their applications, and secondly, that acknowledging that states, including Northern democratic ones, are perpetrators of terror does not adequately over- come the dearth of research in this area. In this regard, CTS does of original, since it goes well beyond simply reworking definitions or acknowledging the complicity of liberal democratic states in state terrorism. It establishes a credible research agenda and begins the analytical work that is needed. This includes, as I will show below, identifying incidents of Northern state terrorism, situating them within a taxonomy of all forms of political violence, analysing their origins and purposes, identifying which state actors are involved, and assessing their impacts, within the context of wider foreign policy objectives. It is the case that to label acts of repression 'state terrorism', they need to be consistent with accepted definitions of terrorism, and that if state actions fall outside of that remit, they should be understood as another form of political violence. This is not to say that there is a consensus on even the key elements of the definition of terrorism, but that there is a group of themes that do overlap. Nevertheless, I have found that many acts of violence committed by Northern democracies do fit existing definitions of terrorism, and that in turn, existing definitions are more than adequate for encompassing acts of terror committed by the state. One aspect of my own work has been to explore whether the use of torture constitutes a form of state terrorism and I conclude that in some circumstances it does (Blakeley 2007b). Yet Horgan and Boyle argue that 'the underlying point of the CTS critique of current definitions of terrorism appears to be that many other forms of violence – for example, state terrorism – fall out of conventional definitions of terrorism' (Horgan and Boyle 2008, p. 56). This has not been my experience, and neither has it been my intention to rework definitions of terrorism, since, as they note, numerous terrorism scholars have explored the many problems associated with defining and conceptualising terrorism, and have come up with definitions that are adequate. Indeed, as work by Christopher Mitchell, Michael Stohl, David Carleton, and George Lopez shows, accepted definitions do not in and of themselves preclude actions by states. They argue that to be labelled terrorism, acts carried out either by the state or by non-state actors must involve 'purposive behavior or intention on the part of the "terrorist actor"'; 'the act or threat of violent harm to a victim(s)'; 'observation of the effects of the act or harm by some ultimate target(s)'; 'identification by the target with the victim'; 'some degree of terror induced in the target(s) through a "demonstration effect" and the act of identification'; 'altered behavior ("compellance") or abandoned behaviour ("deterrence") as a direct result of the terrorist demonstration' (Mitchell et al. 1986, p. 5). This definition is distinguished from other forms of coercion and violence by the intention of the actor and the direction of the attempt to influence, in the sense that any actor deploying the strategy 'must have the intention of inducing extreme fear in some population of observers as the main objective for the strategy to count as "true" terrorism' (Mitchel l et al. 1986, p. 6). Similarly, as I have previously discussed (Blakeley 2007a), the definition offered by Wilkinson (1992, pp. 228–229), and repeated widely by IR scholars, does not preclude the state as a perpetrator.

Critical terrorism studies focus on state violence can shift the paradigm for counter-terrorism policy.

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Finally, Horgan and Boyle ask 'whether there is a different intellectual project at work here', where 'the goal is to link the causes of "terrorism" to the bad behaviour of Western governments, capitalism or social economic inequalities' (Horgan and Boyle 2008, p. 58). They state that if this is the case, the CTS project needs to be transparent. My own work does not focus on the causes of non-state terrorism, which in the above articulation is set up as a response to Western practices. I will therefore leave that question for others to address. Nevertheless, I, and the few other scholars that have studied state terrorism by liberal democratic states, have always been transparent about one of the main aims of our work, an explicitly normative one, which is to assess and challenge the use of coercive practices by liberal democratic states, particularly state terrorism, to achieve their foreign policy objectives in the Global South, which have included the spread of global capitalism to ensure access to resources and markets. In this regard the work does look specifically at the relationship between state terrorism and capitalism, and where relevant, pursuant social and economic inequalities. Specifically, it is concerned with cases where liberal democratic states consider the use of terror by themselves or by their elite allies in the Global South to be functional to the achievement of their aims (Blakeley 2006, 2007b, Stokes 2005). Indeed, state terrorism only makes sense when we link it to the wider foreign policy objectives it is intended to serve. In my own analysis of US interventions in Latin America during the Cold War, declassified documents indicate that while the US publicly defended such interventions as a means of containing communism, there was often an underlying material imperative. Officials explicitly pointed to the economic threats posed to the US when left-wing governments were elected, and frequently stated that interventions to support repressive regimes would serve US capitalist interests. The coup in Argentina which saw the establishment of a military dictatorship from 1976 to 1982, for example, unleashed widespread, largely indiscriminate repression, in what became known as the Dirty War. Just two days after the coup, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had expressed his approval of the economic benefits that could ensue for the US. William Rogers informed Kissinger that 'we're going to look for a considerable effort to involve the US – particularly in the financial field', and Kissinger replied, 'Yes, but that's in our interest' (Kissinger 1976). Estimates of the numbers of people that were killed or disappeared under the military dictatorship range from 9000 to 30,000, many of whom were also tortured in Argentina's secret detention centres (Amnesty International 2003). The US Embassy in Argentina had itself compiled documentation of nearly 10,000 human rights violations, most of them disappearances by 1979, which it sent to the State Department 'for the Department's permanent records and use' (US Embassy, Argentina 1979). Despite this knowledge, military support for the regime was ongoing. There are many similar examples of US sponsorship of state terrorism in Latin America during the Cold War, where declassified documents show just how much that support was driven by US efforts to protect and promote US capital (Blakeley forthcoming). In analysing these links, there is also an emancipatory goal. In the first instance, this goal is to halt the use of state terrorism by exposing it. The case of the Chilean Diaspora is instructive. Pinochet's regime was gradually undermined in part as a result of efforts by political exiles from Chile, including academics, to raise global awareness of the atrocities committed by the regime, resulting in its condemnation by other states (Ropp and Sikkink 1999). This helped bring an end to the regime and to years of repression, in which the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CNCTR) found that during and in the years following the coup, 2279 people were killed. Of those, 815 were victims of execution and death by torture, 957 disappeared following arrest, and the remainder were killed either as a result of war tribunals, during political protests, alleged escape attempts, or gun battles (CNCTR 1991). Identifying state terrorism and raising awareness about it is one way that CTS scholars can assist those struggling against repression. Emancipation also implies that elites be dissuaded from using or sponsoring terrorism. To date, this is the area in which the least amount of work has been undertaken by those of us studying the issue, but it should be afforded greater attention. State terrorism is often used or sponsored by

liberal democratic states as a response to a perceived threat to its own interests; in Latin America during the Cold War, the US used and sponsored terrorism as a means to counter the perceived threat from left-wing insurgent groups (Blakeley 2006, 2007b). As Ken Booth argues: when powerful states use violence [...] they are not acting in a manner calculated to make violence less likely; if they achieve success in their own terms, they do so only by proving to others that strategic violence can have political utility. (Booth 2005, p. 273) This undermines their moral legitimacy. One of the challenges for scholars within CTS is therefore to challenge the perceptions of elites that consider specific groups of people to constitute security threats. This may help prevent violations of human rights, as well as the undermining of states proclaiming to be liberal democratic. The starting point is to explore the consequences of state terrorism, not only for victims, but for perpetrating states. A leading figure in France's counter-insurgency campaign in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, Jean-Jacques Massu, years late r admitted that the widespread use of torture, often a tool of state terrorism, served no useful or necessary intelligence purpose in overcoming terrorism, but had turned most of the Algerian population against the French, pushing them into the arms of the Front de Libération National (MacMaster 2004, p. 9). One priority for those working on state terrorism with in CTS must be to critically examine state responses to threats that involve the use or sponsorship of state terrorism, evaluate its strategic usefulness as well as its impacts on human rights, and then to challenge elites that deploy such practices.

Useful K Answers

this position.10 **The distinction between government**ality **as a heuristic and government**ality **as a descriptive tool is central for debating political agency** I argue that, notwithstanding their critique of liberalism, **scholars who use government**ality **as a descriptive tool** rely on the same ontological assumptions as the liberal order they criticize and do move away from Foucault's focus on historical practices in order to **privilege abstract theorizations**. By using government**ality** **as a description** of "liberalism" or "capitalism" instead of as a methodology of inquiry on power's contingent modalities and technologies, **these scholars tend to reify** a substantialist ontology that ultimately reinforces a liberal conceptualization of subjects and power as standing in a relation of externality and stifles the possibility of reimagining political agency on different grounds. "**Descriptive governmentality" constructs a critique** of the liberal international order **based** up **on a** n ontological **framework that presupposes that power and subjects are entities** possessing qualities **that preexist relations**. Power is imagined as a "mighty totality," and subjects as monads endowed with potentia. As a result, the problematique of political agency is portrayed as a quest for the "liberation" of a subject ontologically gifted with a freedom that power inevitably oppresses. In this way, the conceptualization of political agency remains confined within the liberal struggle of "freedom" and "oppression." Even researchers who adopt a Foucauldian vocabulary end up falling into what Bigo has identified as "traps" of political science and international relations theorizing, specifically essentialization and ahistoricism. **I argue** here **that** in order to reimagine political agency an ontological and epistemological turn is necessary, one that relies upon a relational ontology. Relational ontological positions question adopting abstract stable entities, such as "structures," "power," or "subjects," as explanations for what happens. Instead, they explore how these pillar concepts of the Western political thought came to being, what kind of practices they facilitate, consolidate and result from, what ambiguities and aporias they contain, and how they are transformed.12 Relational ontologies nurture **"modest" conceptualizations of political agency** and also **question the** overwhelming stability of "mighty totalities," such as for instance the international liberal order or **the state**. **In this framework** **political action has more to do with playing with the cards** that are **dealt to us to produce practical effects in specific contexts than** with **building idealized** "new totalities" **where perfect conditions might exist. The political ethics that results** from non-substantialist ontological positions is one that privileges "modest" engagements and **weights political choices with regard to the consequences and** distributive **effects they may produce** in the context where they are made **rather than based upon** their **universal normative aspirations.** 13 **The New Util Card**

Even a small risk of nuclear war isn't worth taking – preventing existential risk
Baum, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute executive director, 3-14-15

[Seth, Blue Marble Space Institute of Science researcher, Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions affiliate researcher, Pennsylvania State University Geography PhD, Contemporary Security Policy 36(1), "Winter-Safe Deterrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence" http://sethbaum.com/ac/2015_Deterrence.pdf, p.3-5, accessed 4-19-15, TAP]

The concept of nuclear winter was first developed in the early 1980s by scientists including Paul Crutzen, who later won a Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his work on the ozone hole, and legendary astronomer Carl Sagan.3 Sagan went to great lengths to raise awareness about nuclear winter in the 1980s and early 1990s.4 This episode apparently had some influence on policy, with Mikhail Gorbachev citing it as a factor in his desire to cool that era's nuclear tensions and reverse the arms race.5 After fading from

the spotlight, nuclear winter began a bit of a comeback in 2007 with the publication of new research examining nuclear winter with the latest scientific models.6 Several follow-up studies and commentaries have been published since, and research is ongoing.7 In technical terms, 'nuclear winter' refers specifically to a cooling of Earth's surface such that winter-like temperatures occur during summer, as caused by a sufficiently large nuclear war. Cooling to warmer-than-winter temperatures can be called 'nuclear autumn'. Per this definition, nuclear winter/autumn is part of a broader suite of environmental consequences of nuclear war. However, all of the environmental consequences can have profound consequences for the planet and for human civilization, and likewise are important for policy. No separate term has been coined for the full suite of environmental consequences of nuclear war, so this paper will use 'nuclear winter' as shorthand for the full suite. This use of 'nuclear winter' may be interpreted metaphorically: a time of cold, darkness, and death. Nuclear winter is caused by the burning of cities, industrial facilities, trees, and other flammable materials, which sends smoke into the atmosphere. The main effects of the smoke derive from the fact that the smoke rises high up into the atmosphere, past the clouds, into the stratosphere where it will not quickly fall back out in rain. At this altitude, the smoke spreads across the planet and gradually falls back out over the next ten to twenty years. While it is aloft, the smoke absorbs incoming sunlight and blocks it from reaching the surface. As the smoke absorbs sunlight, the stratosphere warms, causing ozone depletion at a potentially massive scale.8 The ozone depletion causes more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Increased UV radiation can harm living organisms, including humans. Harmful effects include skin cancer and eye damage to animals and the inhibition of photosynthesis in plants.9 Meanwhile, the smoke blocking sunlight from reaching the surface causes colder surface temperatures and less precipitation. Precipitation declines because there is less heat to power the hydrological cycle. The main harmful effect that has been identified is a decline in plant growth, including agricultural production. Secondary effects could include disease outbreaks and additional conflicts.10 The effects occur worldwide, regardless of where the detonations occur, though detonation location can affect the spatial distribution of impacts. For both UV radiation and cooling, the magnitude of the disruption is proportionate to the amount of smoke put into the atmosphere, which in turn depends on the number of nuclear detonations, the bombs' yields, the detonation locations, and other factors. Regarding detonation location, a key variable is whether the detonation occurs in a city, and if it does, the population density of the city. Other locations such as industrial zones can also produce significant quantities of smoke. This is why nuclear weapons testing has not caused nuclear winter: The tests were conducted in remote locations or at high altitude, and thus did not have much to burn. The location of a city on the globe can also make a difference given Earth's topography and atmospheric circulation patterns, but this effect is smaller. The most heavily studied nuclear winter scenario involves war between India and Pakistan in which each country uses 50 nuclear weapons, each with a 15 kiloton yield, comparable to the Little Boy weapon dropped on Hiroshima. The studies assume that the weapons are dropped on each country's major cities, and not on e.g. remote military targets, producing 5 teragrams of smoke.11 In this scenario, ozone loss would range from 20% to 70% from low to high latitudes.12 Temperatures would fall about 1.25ºC within the first year. Even ten years after, temperatures would still be about 0.5ºC below normal.13 Crop yields in China and the Midwestern United States are projected to decline by around 10-30%.14 One analysis estimates that at least two billion people would be at risk of starvation.15 A core point is that **even a 'limited' regional nuclear war could have catastrophic global consequences**. It should be emphasized that what drives nuclear winter is the quantity of smoke entering the stratosphere, not where the nuclear war occurs. Thus a comparably large nuclear war between other countries would have similar global climatic and humanitarian effects. The India-Pakistan scenario offers an illustrative and relatively probable case, but any nuclear weapon state except North Korea could produce similar effects. A larger nuclear exchange involving American and Russian arsenals would cause further disruption. An exchange of about 1200 weapons could produce about 50 teragrams of smoke, causing temperatures to fall by about 4ºC. For 4000 weapons—around what New START prescribes—there could be 150 teragrams of smoke, with a temperature fall of about 8ºC. Agriculture failure would

be so severe and widespread that it becomes easier to count the survivors than the fatalities.16 Climate scientist Alan Robock, who has led many of the recent nuclear winter studies, expects some **survivors** 'especially in Australia and New Zealand'.17 While this is hardly a cheerful evaluation, even this **may be too optimistic**. Hopefully some people somewhere would find some way to survive. But the conditions would be harsh enough that **survival is no guarantee**.18 Finally, it should be acknowledged that, over the years, there has been some scepticism of whether nuclear winter would actually occur, or would occur with enough severity to be worth factoring into security policy.19 To an extent, one cannot be sure what would happen, because a large exchange of nuclear weapons has fortunately never occurred. However, there are at least two reasons to believe that the current round of nuclear winter science is yielding results that are at least in the general vicinity of what would actually happen. One reason is that the science uses modern climate models developed for the study of global warming. Global warming has its own sceptics and controversies, which has led to the climate models being heavily scrutinized.20 **Climate science may well be the most carefully vetted of all the sciences. The nuclear winter researchers are themselves distinguished climate scientists and are using state-of-the-art climate models**. And two distinct nuclear winter research groups from two different countries using two different sets of models both report approximately the same results.21 While some uncertainties in the science of nuclear winter remain and additional research could provide additional confidence, it should be expected that the current research results are basically sound. The second reason for believing that nuclear winter would occur is that it has a historical precedent in volcano eruptions. Volcano eruptions, like nuclear weapon detonations, cause large amounts of smoke to rise into the atmosphere. An insightful example is the 1815 Mount Tambora eruption. The Tambora eruption caused temperatures to fall by about 0.5ºC, resulting in major food shortages and other disruptions, such that 1816 is now known as the 'Year Without Summer'.22 While humanity ultimately survived Tambora, nuclear war could put even more smoke into the atmosphere and cause more severe disruption. It thus is important to factor into nuclear security policy. Risk Analysis of Winter-Safe Nuclear Arsenal Limits It is in every country's interest to avoid nuclear winter. No country would benefit from the increased exposure to UV radiation and decreased agricultural yields, among other harms, all of which would occur worldwide regardless of where the weapons were used. This point raises two questions: what is needed to avoid nuclear winter, and how far countries should go to avoid it. Answering both questions suggests adhering to limits to nuclear weapon arsenal sizes that keep the world safe from nuclear winter. Given uncertainty about both what future wars may occur and the severity of nuclear winter if nuclear war does occur, answering these questions benefits from analysis to identify policies that perform well in light of the uncertainty. The severity of nuclear winter is a function of the amount of smoke produced in a nuclear exchange, which in turn depends on the number, yield, and location of detonations in the exchange. How small of a nuclear arsenal would be needed to keep human civilization safe from nuclear winter? The short answer is, nobody knows. Modern climate modelling provides a pretty good understanding of the climatic consequences. There are some important uncertainties in the climate science, but the big uncertainty is how well humans will cope. Research on the allimportant human factor is frighteningly scarce, limited mainly to a few studies connecting the climate science to agricultural models.23 This research is instructive, but it leaves basic questions unanswered about the total human impacts of nuclear winter. Consider one of the most detailed studies of the human consequences of nuclear winter, by Ira Helfand of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.24 This is the study that found at least two billion at risk of starvation from an India-Pakistan exchange of 100 nuclear weapons (50 per country). The two billion estimate comes from converting agriculture declines into nutrition loss for the people who are already malnourished. As the study notes, the figure does not estimate deaths from second-order effects like disease outbreaks and additional conflicts. Perhaps a mild nuclear winter could even trigger a conflict in which additional nuclear weapons are built and used. The stakes may be even higher in the future as developments in synthetic biology, geoengineering, and other technologies render civilization more powerful but less stable.25 The bottom line is that **even a smaller nuclear exchange might have catastrophic global consequences**. But on the other hand, it might not. Nobody knows. Making policy under such heavy uncertainty is a difficult challenge, but it is also a familiar one. One cannot predict the consequences of a military campaign, but decisions on whether and how to wage it must be made. One cannot predict the consequences of a new technology, but decisions about whether and how to regulate it must be made. And so on for quite a large portion of ongoing policy decisions. Here it is important to bring in the ethics of

global catastrophic risk. A global catastrophe is an event that causes great harm to the entirety of global human civilization. Catastrophes of this magnitude take on a special ethical significance. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this in his own discussion of nuclear winter. The astronomer saw the big picture: **Human extinction means the loss of all people who could ever exist into the distant future**.26 Contemporary scholars further understand that even without total human extinction, a permanent collapse of human civilization is of comparable significance.27 **Ultimately what is at stake is the long-term trajectory of human civilization,** its success or its failure.

Frontline – State Heuristic Good

Our heuristic means we learn about the State without being it. It won't entrench dominant norms _BUT WE ALSO_ don't' invert the error and NEVER learn about them. Our framework teaches contingent, but engaged, middle grounds. No _State pessimism bias_ or _optimism bias for extreme Alts_.

-we are defending a contingent state that does not exist now but we can bring it about

-Learning about the state good

-We don't have to say the state is always good. Our model gives us another tool to combat pressing issues

Zanotti '14

Dr. Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech. Her research and teaching include critical political theory as well as international organizations, UN peacekeeping, democratization and the role of NGOs in post-conflict governance."Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World" – <u>Alternatives: Global, Local, Political</u> – vol 38(4):p. 288-304,. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – The Stated "Version of Record" is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013. Obtained via Sage Database.

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects' relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to government al scripts are not limited to "rejection," "revolution," or "dispossession" to regain a pristine "freedom from all constraints" or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and **contingent struggles** that are constituted **within** the scripts of **government** al **rationalities** and at the same time exceed and **transform them**. This approach questions oversimplifications of the **complex** ities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. **Government** ality as a **heuristic** focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonization s of "power," romanticizations of the "rebel" or the "the local." More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms **and** focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also **foster** an ethic s of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to "what happens" instead of fixations on "what ought to be." 83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine "freedom" to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity **on the consequences** of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault "my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So **my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.**" 84

We're "State-as-heuristic", not "State-as-descriptor". That distinction matters for Framework and Links. If "fiat's fake", heuristics still mean we'll learn contingent toolkit items AND avoid pitfalls of foundational "descriptor" frameworks. Those reify and over-value idealism.

Zanotti '14

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While there are important variations in the way international relations scholars use governmentality theory, for the purpose of my argument I identify two broad trajectories.2 One body of scholarship uses governmentality as a **heuristic** tool to explore modalities of local and international government and to assess their effects in the contexts where they are deployed; the other adopts this notion as a **descriptive** tool to theorize the globally oppressive features of international liberalism. Scholars who use governmentality as a heuristic tool tend to conduct inquiries based upon analyses of practices of government and resistance. These scholars rely on ethnographic inquiries, emphasizes the multifarious ways government works in practice to include its oppressive trajectories and the ways uneven interactions of governmental strategies and resistance are contingently enacted. As examples, Didier Bigo, building upon Pierre Bourdieu, has encouraged a research methodology that privileges a relational approach and focuses on practice;3 William Walters has advocated considering governmentality as a research program rather than as a ''depiction of discrete systems of power;''4 and Michael Merlingen has criticized the downplaying of resistance and the use of ''governmentality'' as interchangeable with liberalism.5 Many other scholars have engaged in contextualized analyses of governmental tactics and resistance. Oded Lowenheim has shown how ''responsibilization'' has become an instrument for governing individual travelers through ''travel warnings'' as well as for ''developing states'' through performance indicators;6 Wendy Larner and William Walters have questioned accounts of globalization as an ontological dimension of the present and advocated less substantialized accounts that focus on studying the discourses, processes and practices through which globalization is made as a space and a political economy;7 Ronnie D. Lipschutz and James K. Rowe have looked at how localized practices of resistance may engage and transform power relations;8 and in my own work, I have studied the deployment of disciplinary and governmental tools for reforming governments in peacekeeping operations and how these practices were hijacked and resisted and by their targets. Scholars who use governmentality as a **descriptive tool** focus instead on one particular trajectory of global liberalism, that is on the convergence of knowledge and scrutiny of life processes (or biopolitics) and violence and theorize global liberalism as an extremely effective formation, a coherent and powerful Leviathan where biopolitical tools and violence come together to serve dominant classes or state's political agendas. As I will show, Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and Sergei Prozorov tend to embrace

AT: Hidden Motives

Pointing out hidden motives doesn't work – it doesn't disprove our specific argument and it isn't falsifiable.
Karlsson, Debunking Denialism, 2012

[Emil, "The Role of Motives in Arguments" http://debunkingdenialism.com/2012/07/06/the-role-of-motives-in-arguments/]

What is the role of motives in arguments? Is it important or relevant what motives a person has for arguing for the validity of his or her arguments? Or is it just a convenient way to shield oneself from accepting that one is mistaken?¶ It may be useful to look at the concept of substitution in cognitive psychology. It occurs when one is replacing the actual question with a question that requires fewer cognitive resources to answer. The classic example is when the question being evaluated concerns how common or how statistically likely something is. This is, for many, usually replaced by the simpler question of "how easy can I imagine examples" of this something. The answer most people give to the question "How common is crimes by a certain ethnic minority?" will depend on how easy it is to imagine examples that you know of it, usually corresponding to how frequent it has been portrayed in the media. This is called availability heuristics. Other examples of substitution is replacing "how likely is this product to succeed in the market place?" with "how much do I like it?".¶ Could something similar be going on when people start discussing the motives of an individual instead of the merits of his or her arguments? The harder question, namely "is this a reasonableness argument?", is substituted by the easier question, namely "do I like this person's position?". This is usually no (otherwise there would be little point in having an adversarial argument). So then this has to be expressed, and of course the opponent won't say "well, I don't like your position, therefore your argument is wrong", because that would be weird. Instead, I would wager that the person would start calling into question the motives of the proponent instead, since no actual evaluation of the merits of the argument has taken place.¶ So, in addition to being logically fallacious, the rhetorical technique of appealing to the motives of a person making an argument (instead of addressing the actual argument), it is really a form of cognitive error. Clearly, the merits of a particular claim does not depend on the motives of the person putting forward the argument. It only rests on the evidence and arguments for or against the particular proposition.¶ The action of dismissing the argument by calling into the question or pointing out the motives of the person making the argument can be put into a few different fallacies, such as appeal to motive, argumentum ad hominem circumstantial, genetic fallacy, bulverism, subject/motive shift, red herring, non sequitur or straw man. It will vary depending on the specifics of the situation and sometimes it will fulfill several of these fallacies. Here are some examples of how to categorize it:¶ Appeal to motive: an argument is attacked by calling into question the motives of the person making the argument.¶ Argument ad hominem circumstantial: a more general form, where an argument is attacked by someone pointing out that the person making the argument finds himself in a particular context that he or she tends to take that position.¶ Genetic fallacy: a fallacy where an argument is evaluated based on the personal characteristics of the person making the argument, or on the source of the argument in general.¶ Bulverism and subject/motive shift: a type of argumentum ad hominem circumstantial fallacy where the argument for a position is rejected because it can be explained why a person held that position.¶ Red herring: usually an intentional attempt at distracting the conversation from the actual issue (i.e. the truth or falsity of the argument).¶ Non sequitur: because it does not follow that a person's motives makes the argument he or she puts forward incorrect.¶ Straw man: the person does not actually have the motives that is being assumed.¶ They all are applicable, but one does not want to continue to derail the discussion by getting into the details of why the opponents obsession with one's motives. That is just an intellectual dead-end. Instead, it may be useful to point out that it is an appeal to motive and that the validity of a person's argument has nothing to do with that person's motives. That covers the rational aspect of the rebuttal, but it is also important to state that one does not have that particular motive, and to write a little bit about how one agree with some of the contentions presented by the other person. If you are arguing against the death penalty, it can be beneficial to state that no, you do not secretly want criminals ending the life of children or completely remove personal responsibility from society and that you, in fact, think that a criminal justice system that prevents and reduces crime is of paramount importance. You do not have to have the exact same view of what makes an effective criminal justice system, only that you share some of the same overarching values on the issue. This can defuse some of the antagonism in the debate.

Breaks down dialogue.
Benjamin and Smallwood, CRACKED, 2011

[Kathy and Karl, "5 Logical Fallacies That Make You Wrong More Than You Think" http://www.cracked.com/article_19468_5-logical-fallacies-that-make-you-wrong-more-than-you-think.html]

#3. <u>We Think Everyone's Out to Get Us</u>¶If you're smart and savvy, you know not to trust anyone. <u>This is why we can excuse ourselves for using</u> shady or flat-out <u>dishonest tactics to win an argument</u>. We're sure the other guy is doing much, much worse.¶Getty¶"I will yield that the sky is blue, if you acknowledge that the moon landing was engineered by an unfrozen Walt Disney."¶<u>The world is so full of hidden agendas and stupid ideologies that we have to do whatever we can to keep up</u>. And "whatever we can" is often code for lying.¶The Science:¶Think about all the people you've disagreed with this month. How many of them do you think were being intentionally dishonest? <u>Experts say you're almost definitely overshooting the truth. It's called the trust gap</u>, and scientist see it crop up every time one human is asked to estimate how trustworthy another one is. In one study, subjects were asked to rate the likelihood that strangers would share pretend winnings with them. The subjects figured about half were trustworthy enough to share. When it came time to actually share, about 80 percent came through. The <u>subjects thought the world was almost twice as corrupt as it actually is</u>.¶Getty¶"Most of the people in this calculus class would cut my throat for a value meal."¶<u>The problem, as another study found, is that when you assume someone is lying, you rarely find out that you're wrong. You just walk away congratulating yourself on being able to sniff out an ambush from a mile away</u>.¶"Why would he flee the country? He loves surprise parties, poker and judging blow job contests."¶<u>We start assuming people have ulterior motives and hidden agendas as early as age 7 and from that point on, we never have to lose another argument for the rest of our lives</u>. After all, if we assume the person we're arguing with is lying, the only thing they can prove to us is that they're a really good liar. This is how racism, sexism and any other sort of discrimination work. Once someone's made-up their mind that color is the culprit, convincing them otherwise is going to be close to impossible, no matter how ridiculous the scenario.¶"I can't buy anymore white cars from you, Sneaky Pete. They keep blowing up. What other colors do you have in this model?"¶This is also where you get claims like, "Those conservatives don't really think taxes are too high, they secretly hate poor people!" or "Those liberals don't really think the poor need assistance, they're secretly communists!" <u>It's impossible to learn anything from a conversation with someone who you think is lying to you. The more arguments you get into with those lying extremists from the other side of the aisle, the more you learn about how they lie, the faster your brain turns off after they start talking</u>.

AT: Serial Policy Failure

Alt fails – it is locked in the ivory tower – they can't solve serial policy failure.
Walt, Harvard University international relations professor, 2011

[Stephen, "International Affairs and the Public Sphere" http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/]

On the one hand, **there is a widespread sense that academic research on global affairs is of declining practical value, either as a guide to policymakers** or as part of broader public discourse about world affairs. Former policymakers complain that **academic writing is "either irrelevant or inaccessible to policy-makers. . . locked within the circle of esoteric scholarly discussion."** This tendency helps explain Alexander George's recollection that policymakers' eyes "would glaze as soon as I used the word theory."[1] As **Lawrence Mead noted** in 2010: "**Today's political scientists often address very narrow questions and they are often preoccupied with method and past literature. Scholars are focusing more on themselves, less on the real world. . . . Research questions are getting smaller and data-gathering is contracting. Inquiry is becoming obscurantist and ingrown."[2] Within the field of international affairs, this trend has led to repeated calls to "bridge the gap" between the ivory tower and the policy community**.[3] Consistent with that aim, a number of prominent **scholars** have recently organized workshops or research projects **seeking to challenge this "cult of irrelevance" and** deprogram its adherents, although it is not clear whether these efforts will succeed in reversing the current drift.[4] This online symposium **reflects** a similar **concern: how can the academic world contribute to a healthy public conversation about our collective fate, one that leads to more effective or just solutions to contemporary problems and helps humankind avoid major policy disasters**?

Frontline – AT: Structural Violence

War causes structural violence, not the other way around

Joshua **Goldstein**, American University International Relations Professor, 20**01**, "War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa," p.411-412

I began this book hoping to contribute in some way to a deeper understanding of war—an understanding that would improve the caches of someday achieving real peace, by deleting war from our human repertoire. In following the thread of gender running through war, I found the deeper understanding I had hoped for - a multidisciplinary and multilevel engagement with the subject. Yet **I became** somewhat more **pessimistic about how quickly or easily war may end. The war system emerges**, from the evidence in this book, **as** relatively **ubiquitous and robust. Efforts to change this system must overcome** several **dilemmas** mentioned in this book. First, **peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace.** Many peace **scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice."** Then, **if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice** specifically (perhaps among others) **in order to pursue peace**. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), **but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war**. The evidence in this book suggests that **causality runs** at least as **strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender**, innate aggression, **or any other single cause**, although all of these influence wars' outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, **war has** in part **fueled and sustained these and other injustices**.9 So, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, **if you want justice** (gender and others), **work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too**. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to "reverse women's oppression." The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, the **emphasis on injustice** as the main cause of war **seems** to be **empirically inadequate**.

Structural violence doesn't escalate – prefer proximate causes

Hinde and Pulkkinnen, Cambridge psychology professor and University of

Jyväskylä psychology professor, **2000**

[Robert and Lea, DRAFT Background Paper for Working Group 1: HUMAN AGGRESSIVENESS AND WAR, 50th Pugwash Conference On Science and World Affairs: "Eliminating the Causes of War" Queens' College, Cambridge, UK, 3-8 August http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG1draft1.htm]

People are capable of perpetrating the most **terrible** acts of **violence** on their fellows. From before recorded history humans have killed humans, and violence is potentially present in every society. There is no escaping the fact that the capacity to develop a propensity for violence is part of human nature. **But that does not mean** that **aggression is inevitable**: temporary **anger need not give rise to persistent hostility**, **and hostility need not give rise to** acts of **aggression**. And people also have the capacity to care for the needs of others, and are capable of acts of great altruism and self-sacrifice. A subsidiary aim of this workshop is to identify the factors that make aggressive tendencies predominate over the

cooperative and compassionate ones. **Some degree of conflict** of interest **is often present in relationships between individuals**, in the relations **between groups of individuals** within states, **and in** the **relations between states**: **we are concerned with the factors that make such conflicts escalate into violence.** The answer to that question depends critically on the context. While there may be some factors in common, **the bases of individual aggressiveness are very different from those involved in mob violence, and they differ** yet again **from the factors influencing the bomb-aimer pressing the button in a large scale international war**. In considering whether acts which harm others are a consequence of the aggressive motivation of individuals, **it is essential to recognise the diversity of such acts, which include interactions between individuals, violence between groups, and wars of the WW2 type**. We shall see that, with increasing social complexity, individual aggressiveness becomes progressively less important, but other aspects of human nature come to contribute to group phenomena. Although **research on human violence has focussed too often on the importance of one factor or another, it is essential to remember** that **violence** always **has multiple causes, and the interactions between the causal factors remain largely unexplored**.

EXTN – AT: Structural Violence

Their conception of violence is reductive and can't be solved
Boulding, University of Colorado Boulder economics professor, 1977

[Kenneth, Journal of Peace Research No. 1, Vol. XIV, "Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung" JSTOR, p.83-4]

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of <mark>'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'</mark>. They <u>are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason</u> <mark>are suspect</mark>. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. <u>While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence,</u> although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else.

There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's <u>metaphor of structural violence</u> as he has used it <u>has diverted attention from this problem.</u> <mark>Violence</mark> in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, <mark>is a 'threshold' phenomenon,</mark> rather like the boiling over of a pot. <mark>The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place</mark>. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. <u>Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks' in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'</u>. The metaphor here is that <mark>violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk</mark>. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them.

The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is the increase in the strength of the system, 'the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand increasing strain without breaking down into violence. The <u>strains on the system 'are largely dynamic in character</u>, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. <u>It is very hard for people to know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and resistant to change</u>.

However, what Galitung calls <mark>structural violence</mark> (which has been defined 'by one unkind commentator as anything that Galitung doesn't like) <u>was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept</u> <mark>has been expanded to include all</mark> 'the <mark>problems</mark> of poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for

research and action, but they belong to¶ systems ==which are only peripherally related¶ to '==the structures which produce ==violence==.

This is not to say that the cultures of violence¶ and the cultures of poverty are not¶ sometimes related, though <u>not all poverty¶</u> <u>cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly¶ not all cultures of violence are poverty¶ cultures. But the dynamics of poverty and¶ the success or failure to rise out of it are of¶ a complexity far beyond anything which the¶ metaphor of structural violence can offer.¶ While the metaphor of structural violence¶ performed a service in calling attention to¶ a problem,</u> ==it may have done a disservice in¶ preventing us from finding the answer==.

Negative peace is a prerequisite.

<u>Elshtain</u>, U Chicago Social and Political Ethics Professor, Princeton University Advanced Study Institute Fellow, Rockefeller Foundation Resident Scholar, Guggenheim Fellow, 200**8**

[Jean Bethke, "Peace, Order, Justice: Competing Understandings," Millennium, 36.3, Sage]

We arrive, finally at model III. Let's call this hard-headed peace. This is a ==**peace**== that ==**is mindful**== at every point ==**of justice**== claims **and ==the overriding need for at least a modicum of civil order== and tranquility if ==other worthy goals, including justice== claims, are to be heard and ==worked towards at all==**. Within hard-headed peace, various dichotomies – not only realism/idealism but peace/war – as absolutes, break down. We recognise, with Hedley Bull and others, that ==**war plays a central role in the maintenance of international law** and the preservation of the balance of power, ==**thereby effecting changes that are just**==. Of course, ==**war can** also ==**be a destroyer of order and a force for injustice**== – but we cannot pace, the peace advocates I have criticised - condemn every war in advance as necessarily a paragon of the latter rather than the former.¶ As with every human endeavour this limited – neither absolute nor perpetual – ==**peace is a precious, fragile human achievement.**== Its advocates recognise that we often need disturbers of the peace should a 'peace' be unjust even as we require defenders of the peace against those who would overturn it in the name of some dangerously eschatological political ideology – the triumph of the Aryan race, the triumph of the universal class – with their death camps and gulags to deal with those who stand in the way of the absolutist projects.¶ I recall being haunted by a story I read – an ancient Chinese parable – of the necessary precondition for perpetual peace, namely, that one should be so far removed from any other 'city' that, in the dead calm of night, the echoes of a dog barking could not carry – not alert some other city that aliens, strangers, were within striking distance. Your only options, if you heard that dog bark, were to go kill the inhabitants of the other city and destroy it or to incorporate them – to make them as 'one' with yourself – for the mere existence of this alien entity marred 'peace'. Extreme, yes. But instructive, for it alerts us to the often ontologically suspicious features or absolute or perpetual peace – the presence of the alien suffices to mar it. **As much as I loved the late John Lennon** and remain an unreconstructed Beatlesmaniac – his song '==**Imagine' is the stringing together of empty banalities**==: no states, no religion, **nothing to kill or die for, and ==the world will be as one. Fat chance. I don't know how one gets from== the song's subjectivist ==anarchy to perpetual peace==** but we confront the high hill of moral upmanship yet again in popular, simplistic form.¶ **If**, however, **you find the moral problems of international politics 'infinitely complex, bewildering and perplexing',** in Martin Wight's words**, it makes you a 'natural Grotian'**. I'm going to have to reflect on his claim a bit

more but this much is clear to me: <mark>**War will never be abolished, so we must limit it ethically and politically**</mark> in the manner of just war teaching **and here debates will turn on how 'thick' the restraints must be**;¶**Human nature** – yes, I said it – politically incorrect as it is – **is a complex admixture of** good and evil, nastiness and niceness, good **Harry Potter with a bit of** evil **Voldemortian temptation** thrown in and **this is unavoidable** That means we should be appropriately humble about even our best intentions, for on this earth there is neither absolute good nor absolute evil as a characteristic of either persons or states; We must recall and recuperate an earlier moral conception of sovereignty to live alongside the monopoly of the means of violence definition of the state, namely, an understanding of sovereignty as responsibility; Correlatively, this means sovereigns can 'unsovereign' themselves, as Kings could unking themselves and transmogrify into tyrants: this in the medieval right of resistance tradition. Failed state phenomena indicate a moral as well as a political failure; indeed, the new 'responsibility to protect' norm, it seems to me, requires something of this moral notion of sovereignty as responsibility if, or when, we arrive at the conclusion of failure. A rogue state similarly signifies a failure.¶There is, of course, a question: who is authorised to act on behalf of the normative conception of sovereignty? It is clear to me that, in the history of my own country, notions of our own security come from enlarging our sphere of responsibility.¶How well, or poorly, or wisely, or stupidly, we have done this is, of course, open to fierce contestation, but my point is that a notion of responsibility – not absolute, disinterested responsibility, of course – is a salient feature of American thinking on war and peace. The dangers in this position lie in either overconstruing one's responsibilities or falling into isolationism if, in acting out responsibilities, one encounters intransigent difficulties or failure. Limited notions of peace and justice carry with them notions of limited culpability; no one is in full and absolute control of events. It behooves us to be less than grand in what we propose to undertake and to enact.¶Martin Wight cites Nehru, speaking of Gandhi, as having said that it was 'his supreme ambition to wipe every tear from every eye'. Nehru indicated, dryly, that perhaps <mark>**we could lessen human suffering and misery but eliminating it altogether was beyond our capacity.**</mark> For those of us for whom <mark>**the universe is by no means 'curable'**</mark>, <mark>**those seeking absolute cures are dangerous if,**</mark> at times, <mark>**noble**</mark> people. <mark>**Ambiguity in our thinking about peace, order and justice within international politics is not a shortcoming**</mark> lowing **from some 'imperfectly theorised' perspective or methodological weakness but,** instead, <mark>**inherent in the complexities of the subject matter**</mark>. <mark>**If you make it simple you are**</mark>, quite frankly, <mark>**unreliable**</mark> in some basic sense.¶In a 1996 book, Augustine and the Limits of Politics, I laid out the basis of an Augustinian political ethic – one that does not aspire to and cannot provide a total political catechism or architectonic of world order: The earthly city is never free from the dangers of bloodshed, sedition, and war. A human being cannot even be certain of 'his own conduct on the morrow,' let alone specify and adjudicate that of others in ways he or she foreordains. <mark>**In this world of discontinuities**</mark> and profound yearnings, of sometimes terrible necessities, <mark>**a human being can yet strive to**</mark> maintain or to create an order that approximates justice, **to** <mark>**prevent the worst from happening**</mark>, and to resist the seductive lure of grandiosity.

AT: Root Cause/All Violence

No single cause of violence.
Muro-Ruiz, London School of Economics, 2002

[Diego, Politics Volume 22, Issue 2, pages 109–117, May 2002, "The Logic of Violence" Wiley]

<u>Violence is</u>, most of the time, <u>a wilful choice, especially if it is made by an organi-sation. Individuals present the scholar with a more difficult case to argue for. Scholars of violence have now a wide variety of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even biology – and should escape easy judgements.</u> However, <u>the fundamental difficulty for all of us is the absence of a synthetic, general theory able of integrating less complete theories of violent behaviour. In the absence of such a general theory</u>, researchers should bear in mind that <u>violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations. Future research on violence will have to take in account the variety of approaches, since they each offer some understanding of the logic of violence</u>.

Frontline – AT: V2L

VTL is subjective.

Tännsjö, Stockholm University philosophy professor, 2011

[Torbjörn, "Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing"
https://www.google.com/search?q=Shalt+Thou+Sometimes+Murder%3F+On+the+Ethics+of+Killing&oq
=Shalt+Thou+Sometimes+Murder%3F+On+the+Ethics+of+Killing&aqs=chrome..69i57.227j0j4&sourceid=
chrome&espv=210&es_sm=122&ie=UTF-8]

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, <u>if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide</u> and put an end to humanity. <u>But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide</u>. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶It is a well-known fact that <u>people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash</u>. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, <mark>even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives</mark>, up to now, <mark>have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about</mark> this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶<mark>From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide</mark>. If we set old age to one side, it has <u>poor survival value</u> (of one's genes) <u>to kill oneself</u>. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then <u>theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.</u>¶My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our ¶lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶Let us just for the sake of the argument <u>assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves</u>. As I noted above, <u>this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us</u>. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. <u>If I kill myself, many people will suffer.</u> Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen:¶... <u>suicide "survivors" confront a complex array of feelings</u>. Various <u>forms of guilt are</u> quite <u>common</u>, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. <u>Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind</u>. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶<mark>The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow</mark> my example. <u>They will go on with their lives and their false expectations</u> — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. <u>But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life</u>. It is highly likely that, <u>by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).</u>

<u>Going on with my life in spite of the fact that it lacks meaning</u> (contains a net surplus of pain over happiness) <u>is not such a big deal. Even if the net balance of the rest of my life does consist of pain rather than happiness, this is something I am already used to. I have strategies to cope with it. They are not perfect. After all, given the hypothesis in this section, my net balance will be negative. However, this is a sacrifice, not too heavy, I should make in the best interest of my dear ones.</u>

EXTN – AT: V2L

Value to life is subjective and resilient.
The Onion, 2010

[Issue 46 19, 5-10-10, "Exhausted Noam Chomsky Just Going To Try And Enjoy The Day For Once" http://www.theonion.com/articles/exhausted-noam-chomsky-just-going-to-try-and-enjoy,17404/]

Describing himself as "terribly exhausted," famed linguist and political dissident Noam Chomsky said Monday that he was taking a break from combating the hegemony of the American imperialist machine to try and take it easy for once.¶"I just want to lie in a hammock and have a nice relaxing morning," said the outspoken anarcho-syndicalist academic, who first came to public attention with his breakthrough 1957 book Syntactic Structures. "The systems of control designed to manufacture consent among a largely ignorant public will still be there for me to worry about tomorrow. Today, I'm just going to kick back and enjoy some much-needed Noam Time."¶"No fighting against institutional racism, no exposing the legacies of colonialist ideologies still persistent today, no standing up to the widespread dissemination of misinformation and state-sanctioned propaganda," Chomsky added. "Just a nice, cool breeze through an open window on a warm spring day."¶Sources reported that the 81-year-old Chomsky, a vociferous, longtime critic of U.S. foreign policy and the political economy of the mass media, was planning to use Monday to tidy up around the house a bit, take a leisurely walk in the park, and possibly attend an afternoon showing of Date Night at the local megaplex.¶Sitting down to a nice oatmeal breakfast, Chomsky picked up a copy of Time, a deceitful, pro-corporate publication that he said would normally infuriate him.¶"Yes, this magazine may be nothing more than a subtle media tool intended to obfuscate the government's violent agenda with comforting bromides, but I'm not going to let that get under my skin," Chomsky said. "I mean, why should I? It's absolutely beautiful outside. I should just go and enjoy myself and not think about any of this stuff."¶Added Chomsky, glancing back over at the periodical, "Even if it is just another way in which individuals are methodically fed untruths that slowly shape their perceptions of reality, dulling their ability to challenge and defy a government bent on carrying out its own selfish and destructive—no, no Noam, not today, none of that today."¶According to sources close to the thinker, Chomsky also considered taking time to "plop down on the couch in [his] boxers and watch TV," but grew suddenly enraged when The Price Is Right came on, commodifying the lie of American consumer satisfaction in a pseudo- entertainment context.¶"Just change the channel, just relax and switch to something that isn't mindless pabulum for the masses," said Chomsky, reaching for the remote control. "No need to get furious."¶Chomsky, who often defines himself as a libertarian socialist, then changed the channel to ESPN, taking a moment to acknowledge the role of professional sports as a "weapon of mass distraction," keeping the American people occupied with trivial competitions so they do not focus on opposing the status quo with grassroots movements against foreign and domestic policies that ultimately harm them.¶"Stupid NBA playoffs," Chomsky said. "At least it's better than that NCAA March Madness crap. A university is supposed to be a center of learning that questions the state's crafted messaging, not an entertainment factory."¶Sources said Chomsky took what was supposed to be a refreshing drive in the countryside, only to find himself obsessing over the role petroleum plays in the economic and military policies that collude with multinational corporate powers.¶After stopping at a roadside McDonald's, Chomsky was unable to enjoy the Big Mac he purchased, due to the popular restaurant chain's participation in selling "a bill of goods" to the American people, who consume the unhealthy fast food and thereby bolster the capitalist system

rather than buying from local farmers in order to equalize the distribution of wealth and eat more nutritiously.¶Chomsky also found the burger to be too salty.¶"All right, all right," the noted critic and philosopher said, "I'm going back home, writing one—just one—reasoned, scathing essay, and getting it out of my system. But then I'm definitely going back to the park to walk around and just enjoy the nice weather. I'm serious."¶"Because there's got to be more to life than the way that wage slavery strips the individual of his or her inherent dignity and personal integrity," Chomsky continued. "Right?"

General K Answers

Sokal

The liberal left has lost all meaning in their work – it has devolved to pretty words and flashy philosophical ideas. A physicist was able to get his fake article into a left leaning journal even though it was pure nonsense.

Sokal '95 – Professor of Physics at New York University (Alan, "A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies," http://physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/lingua_franca_v4/lingua_franca_v4.html)//DWB

For some years I've been troubled by an apparent decline in the standards of intellectual rigor in certain precincts of the American academic humanities. But I'm a mere physicist: if I find myself unable to make head or tail of jouissance and différance, perhaps that just reflects my own inadequacy.¶ So, to test the prevailing intellectual standards, I decided to try a modest (though admittedly uncontrolled) experiment: Would a leading North American journal of cultural studies -- whose editorial collective includes such luminaries as Fredric Jameson and Andrew Ross -- publish an article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors' ideological preconceptions?¶ The answer, unfortunately, is yes. Interested readers can find my article, ``Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,'' in the Spring/Summer 1996 issue of Social Text. It appears in a special number of the magazine devoted to the ``Science Wars.''¶ What's going on here? Could the editors really not have realized that my article was written as a parody?¶ In the first paragraph I deride ``the dogma imposed by the long post-Enlightenment hegemony over the Western intellectual outlook'':¶ "that there exists an external world, whose properties are independent of any individual human being and indeed of humanity as a whole; that these properties are encoded in ``eternal'' physical laws; and that human beings can obtain reliable, albeit imperfect and tentative, knowledge of these laws by hewing to the ``objective'' procedures and epistemological strictures prescribed by the (so-called) scientific method".¶ Is it now dogma in Cultural Studies that there exists no external world? Or that there exists an external world but science obtains no knowledge of it?¶ In the second paragraph I declare, without the slightest evidence or argument, that ``physical `reality' [note the scare quotes] ... is at bottom a social and linguistic construct.'' Not our theories of physical reality, mind you, but the reality itself. Fair enough: anyone who believes that the laws of physics are mere social conventions is invited to try transgressing those conventions from the windows of my apartment. (I live on the twenty-first floor.)¶ Throughout the article, I employ scientific and mathematical concepts in ways that few scientists or mathematicians could possibly take seriously. For example, I suggest that the ``morphogenetic field'' -- a bizarre New Age idea due to Rupert Sheldrake -- constitutes a cutting-edge theory of quantum gravity. This connection is pure invention; even Sheldrake makes no such claim. I assert that Lacan's psychoanalytic speculations have been confirmed by recent work in quantum field theory. Even nonscientist readers might well wonder what in heavens' name quantum field theory has to do with psychoanalysis; certainly my article gives no reasoned argument to support such a link.¶ Later in the article I propose that the axiom of equality in mathematical set theory is somehow analogous to the homonymous concept in feminist politics. In reality, all the axiom of equality states is that two sets are identical if and only if they have the same elements. Even readers without mathematical training might well be suspicious of the claim that the axiom of equality reflects set theory's ``nineteenth-century liberal origins.''¶ In sum, I intentionally wrote the article so that any competent physicist or mathematician (or undergraduate physics or math major) would realize that it is a spoof. Evidently the editors of Social Text felt comfortable publishing an article on quantum physics without bothering to consult anyone knowledgeable in the subject.¶ The fundamental silliness of my article lies, however, not in its numerous solecisms but in the dubiousness of its central thesis and of the ``reasoning'' adduced to support it. Basically, I claim that quantum gravity -- the still-speculative theory of space and time on scales of a millionth of a billionth of a billionth of a billionth of a centimeter -- has profound political implications (which, of course, are ``progressive''). In support of this improbable proposition, I proceed as follows: First, I quote some controversial philosophical pronouncements of Heisenberg and Bohr, and assert (without argument) that quantum physics is profoundly consonant with ``postmodernist epistemology.'' Next, I assemble a pastiche -- Derrida and

general relativity, Lacan and topology, Irigaray and quantum gravity -- held together by vague rhetoric about ``nonlinearity'', ``flux'' and ``interconnectedness.'' Finally, I jump (again without argument) to the assertion that ``postmodern science'' has abolished the concept of objective reality. Nowhere in all of this is there anything resembling a logical sequence of thought; one finds only citations of authority, plays on words, strained analogies, and bald assertions.¶ In its concluding passages, my article becomes especially egregious. Having abolished reality as a constraint on science, I go on to suggest (once again without argument) that science, in order to be ``liberatory,'' must be subordinated to political strategies. I finish the article by observing that ``a liberatory science cannot be complete without a profound revision of the canon of mathematics.'' We can see hints of an ``emancipatory mathematics,'' I suggest, ``in the multidimensional and nonlinear logic of fuzzy systems theory; but this approach is still heavily marked by its origins in the crisis of late-capitalist production relations.'' I add that ``catastrophe theory, with its dialectical emphases on smoothness/discontinuity and metamorphosis/unfolding, will indubitably play a major role in the future mathematics; but much theoretical work remains to be done before this approach can become a concrete tool of progressive political praxis.'' It's understandable that the editors of Social Text were unable to evaluate critically the technical aspects of my article (which is exactly why they should have consulted a scientist). What's more surprising is how readily they accepted my implication that the search for truth in science must be subordinated to a political agenda, and how oblivious they were to the article's overall illogic.¶ Why did I do it? While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. At its best, a journal like Social Text raises important questions that no scientist should ignore -- questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters.¶ In short, my concern over the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). There is a real world; its properties are not merely social constructions; facts and evidence do matter. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths -- the utter absurdity of it all being concealed through obscure and pretentious language.¶ Social Text's acceptance of my article exemplifies the intellectual arrogance of Theory -- meaning postmodernist literary theory -- carried to its logical extreme. No wonder they didn't bother to consult a physicist. If all is discourse and ``text,'' then knowledge of the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes just another branch of Cultural Studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and ``language games,'' then internal logical consistency is superfluous too: a patina of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. Incomprehensibility becomes a virtue; allusions, metaphors and puns substitute for evidence and logic. My own article is, if anything, an extremely modest example of this well-established genre.¶ Politically, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystifications promoted by the powerful -- not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. The recent turn of many ``progressive'' or ``leftist'' academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about ``the social construction of reality'' won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics and politics if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.¶ The results of my little experiment demonstrate, at the very least, that some fashionable sectors of the American academic Left have been getting intellectually lazy. The editors of Social Text liked my article because they liked its conclusion: that ``the content and methodology of postmodern science provide powerful intellectual support for the progressive political project.'' They apparently felt no need to analyze the quality of the evidence, the cogency of the arguments, or even the relevance of the arguments to the purported conclusion.¶ Of course, I'm not oblivious to the ethical issues involved in my rather unorthodox experiment. Professional communities operate largely on trust; deception undercuts that trust. But it is important to understand exactly what I did. My article is a theoretical essay based entirely on publicly available sources, all of which I have meticulously footnoted. All works cited are real, and all quotations are rigorously accurate; none are invented. Now, it's true that the author doesn't believe his own argument. But why

should that matter? The editors' duty as scholars is to judge the validity and interest of ideas, without regard for their provenance. (That is why many scholarly journals practice blind refereeing.) If the Social Text editors find my arguments convincing, then why should they be disconcerted simply because I don't? Or are they more deferent to the so-called ``cultural authority of technoscience'' than they would care to admit?¶ In the end, <u>I resorted to parody for a simple pragmatic reason</u>. <u>The targets of my critique have by now become a self-perpetuating academic subculture that typically ignores (or disdains) reasoned criticism from the outside</u>. In such a situation, a more direct demonstration of the subculture's intellectual standards was required. But how can one show that the emperor has no clothes? **Satire is by far the best weapon**; <u>and the blow that can't be brushed off is the one that's self-inflicted</u>. I offered the Social Text editors an opportunity to demonstrate their intellectual rigor. Did they meet the test? I don't think so.¶ I say this not in glee but in sadness. After all, I'm a leftist too (under the Sandinista government I taught mathematics at the National University of Nicaragua). On nearly all practical political issues -- including many concerning science and technology -- I'm on the same side as the Social Text editors. But <u>I'm a leftist (and feminist) because of evidence and logic, not in spite of it. Why should the right wing be allowed to monopolize the intellectual high ground?</u>¶ And why should self-indulgent nonsense -- whatever its professed political orientation -- be lauded as the height of scholarly achievement?

Radical Alts

Alt can't transition from theory to political change

Gibson 8

(John, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Kent, "The Myth of the Multitude: The Endogenous Demise of Alter-globalist Politics," Global Society, Vol. 22, No. 2, April, 2008)

Crucially, such assessments view the rhizomatic structures and reflexive capacities of alter-globalist agents as also negating the internal antagonism and factionalism often associated with social movements. Hardt understands the World Social Forum as fulfilling the promise of anti-hierarchical politics—an infinitesimally open-ended collection of struggles converging around a basic commitment to resist neoliberalism, in which ideological differences cease to produce significant schisms.16 Stephen Gill has argued that alter-globalist practices counter long-standing differences between "new" and "old" social movements, **creating a radically fluid "postmodern Prince"** in the process.17 Similarly, Jackie Smith has argued that the demand for "democracy", functioning as an open signifier for the desire for greater personal control over biopolitics, **is the sole commonality** in otherwise plural alter-globalist spaces.18 Such claims resemble Laclau and Mouffe's model of a Logic of Equivalence, in which a vast collection of particular social movements and political demands resonate in accordance with one another through the use of a central empty signifier (in this case, "democracy") as an open point for infinite re-inscriptions, and whose ontological closure is permanently resisted.19 In such interpretations, the pronoun "we" in alterglobalist contexts is devoid of any fixed subjective content and is radically democratic. The political moment is defined within such discourses by Kingsnorth's "one no". Unity is structured around a shared rejection of transnational neoliberal capitalism, facilitating cross-cultural forms of identification and epistemic exchange, resisting any fixed meaning of the collective subject that undertakes activism. The **central dilemma** for activist life becomes whether the "many yeses" arising in its wake can exert counter-hegemonic power in a long-term war of position.20 However, although such accounts appear to present sources of optimism that dominant technocratic and individualist frames of global politics can be countered successfully**, there are reasons to doubt their claims**. After reaching an early apogee of 250,000 protesters at the Genoa G8 meeting in 2001, in the wake of 11 September 2001 **summit protests have declined significantly**, both in terms of frequency and attendees. The protest in Miami against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement in November 2003, advertised within movement circles as an event that would exceed the importance of Seattle, drew a crowd of below 10,000, and failed to generate any significant media coverage.21 The 2004 G8 summit in Georgia was met by hundreds, rather than thousands of protesters, and planned solidarity actions elsewhere failed to materialise.22 Likewise, the 2004 London May Day gathering was cancelled after poorly attended planning meetings, and in 2005 fewer than two dozen self-declared anti-capitalists played cricket on the lawn south of the House of Commons.23 The direct action protests conducted around the Gleneagles G8 summit **were undertaken by only a few thousand**, and controversial protest tactics, including acts of vandalism in Auchterarder, generated considerable internal schisms.24 Social Forums have also become beset by difficulties. **Intra-movement concerns reflect a growing atrophy**; the absence of a venue for the prospective fifth European Social Forum reflects a scenario in which "there is no more cooperation between our forces than there was before Florence [in 2002]".25 To compound matters, some activists have complained that such events are becoming **dominated by resource-heavy NGOs**.26 The World Social Forum has become frequented by political elites. Gerhard Schro¨der and Jacques Chirac both attended the 2003 event, transgressing its Charter of Principles, in which the WSF exists in "opposition to a process of globalisation commanded by the large multinational corporations and by the governments and international institutions at the service of those corporations' interests, with the complicity of national governments".27 Activists often assert **that the current impasse is temporary**, that as new ways of pushing forward are imagined there will be a corresponding resurgence of antineoliberal politics. However, rather than the **current lull** representing a temporary period of torpor for alter-globalist politics, **a number of entrenched weaknesses within the dominant myths of alter-globalist networks stymie its capacity to embody radical democracy**. Caution is required against the hubris evident in the prevailing accounts of a **fluid subject, conscious of its counter-hegemonic potential** as a source of the dissolution of the neoliberal world order. **Such mythology is ridden with inherent deficiencies**

that are rarely addressed by participants. Rather than a global multitude taking shape, <u>in many respects we see</u> **only the phantasm of such a polis**, **and one that depends upon the active repression of contradictions and flaws in order to maintain the idealised image of the multitude** presented by such prominent movement commentators as Klein and Kingsnorth.

Framework

Surveillance-Specific

Discuss Surveil k Resist

Discussion of surveillance is key to resist the surveillance state – deliberation through the public can bring about change

Rice 15

(Rebecca, University of Montana, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy," pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd YDEL)

Public deliberation can be viewed as a form of resistance through Greenwald's rhetoric.¶Though many scholars have looked at microresistance to surveillance power, Greenwald asks ¶the public to resist through deliberation, which he considers an antidote to surveillance. This¶solution grapples with the contradiction of the US as surveillance state and the US as a¶democracy. The public sphere will continue to discuss these competing values, sharing in¶alternative projections of the future (Goodnight, 2012a). Greenwald encourages the public to¶create a shared vision of a state with transparency in the public sphere and privacy for citizens.¶ Implications for Journalism and Whistleblowing¶ Greenwald's rhetoric also has implications for the practices of journalism and¶ whistleblowing. Though he argues that journalists should do more to question the US¶ surveillance state, he finds himself constrained by journalistic expectations. These lead to a¶debate over the boundaries of journalism and how to portray whistleblowers.¶ Greenwald as journalist or advocate. Greenwald's critique of the media offers¶another path of resistive action for special actors within the public sphere. The media serves¶the public sphere by spreading information, as Habermas (1974) says, "in a large public body¶ this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting information and¶ influencing those who receive it. Today newspapers and magazines, radio and television are¶ the media of the public sphere" (p. 49). Greenwald's critique of the media calls for the media¶to uphold their public sphere function and transmit information, even state secrets, for public¶deliberation. However, differences between Greenwald's Guardian articles and NPTH show¶ that even though Greenwald says journalists should be advocates, he himself is constrained by¶ journalistic expectations.¶ Greenwald's writings in The Guardian fulfill less of an advocacy role than his writings¶ in NTPH. Greenwald's newspaper articles often: 1) explain information about surveillance ¶ programs in common language, 2) quote various organizations' standpoints and knowledge¶ about the programs and, 3) explain why these revelations are significant (e.g. they demonstrate¶ that the NSA concealed programs, they demonstrate that Americans are being spied on without¶ a court warrant). Importantly, many of Greenwald's stronger advocacy claims, like the¶ argument that the NSA functions as a panopticon, are not mentioned until NPTH. Other¶ functions of the book include: 1) demonstrating the negative private effects of surveillance, 2)¶ linking surveillance to the compromise of democratic ideals, and 3) suggesting possible¶ solutions. Though Greenwald encourages journalists to provide a check on the government and¶advocate for change, his claims are tempered in his own newspaper articles. Greenwald¶ discusses this directly as he talks about trouble publishing with The Guardian throughout¶ NPTH. Greenwald prepared his first story about BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, but was told¶ that The Guardian editors would have to meet with their lawyers before publishing. Publishing¶ US government secrets, he was told, could be considered a crime under the Espionage Act.¶ The Guardian agreed to consult with the government to demonstrate that they did not intend to¶harm national security. Greenwald waited impatiently in Hong Kong for three days as his¶ editor conferred with Guardian lawyers. He considered leaving and publishing the documents¶ independently, but admits that "doing it alone, without institutional protection, would be far¶ riskier" than publishing with a large newspaper (2014, p. 69). Though Greenwald says¶journalists should be stronger critics of the US government, he himself struggled with¶institutional and journalistic constraints as he reported the NSA stories.

The public sphere through discussion can combat the surveillance state- the public has the power to remove NSA secrecy resulting in legal reform

Rice 15

(Rebecca, University of Montana, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy," pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd YDEL)

The key finding from Greenwald's case is that the public sphere can be used as¶ resistance to surveillance power, though this solution may not satisfactorily solve the¶ overreaches of surveillance power. Greenwald links Foucauldian ideas of surveillance to the¶ NSA, and then poses the solution of public deliberation. The public sphere may be a strong¶ form of resistance against surveillance because of the incompatibility of the technical values of¶ surveillance with the public sphere: if, as Greenwald says, the NSA is successful in retaining¶ its power because it is secret, a public sphere discussion strips away the NSA's power by¶ removing its secrecy. Central tenets of the public sphere include public access and openness¶ (Asen and Brouwer, 2001), and central tenets of surveillance power include public¶ inaccessibility and technical closure. By framing surveillance as at odds with the public¶ sphere, Greenwald makes the argument that only through the public sphere can we resist¶ surveillance on a large-scale. Greenwald's rhetoric bridges the theoretical gap between public¶ sphere scholarship and Foucault's idea of surveillance power, demonstrating how these¶ conflicting values may overlap in ways that are productive for resistance.¶

Public discussion acts as resistance to NSA surveillance- only engaging in deliberation the state can limit surveillance

Rice 15

(Rebecca, University of Montana, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy," pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd YDEL)

The public sphere as resistance. The resistive subject Greenwald calls into being¶ would be an active public sphere participant who questions the surveillance state through¶ public discussion. Though this subject would take small steps to preserve online privacy,¶ Greenwald spends much of NPTH explaining broader solutions to surveillance. NPTH¶ constitutes an attempt to use the public sphere to resist NSA surveillance.¶ Resistance literature has often focused on small ways to resist surveillance power. ¶ Foucault focuses on personal, transversal struggles against surveillance power, because¶ surveillance power stems from compartmentalization and control over the body The body is¶ "approached as an object to be analyzed and separated into its constituent parts," forging the¶ creation of a docile, useful subject (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 153). As a result, struggles¶ against this control are often anarchistic, immediate, and focused on the individual (Foucault,¶ 1983). Greenwald acknowledges this effect, and argues that surveillance leads to the internal¶ suppression of dissenting thoughts as a result. However, Greenwald does not advocate for just¶ a small, personal solution to this control over the body.¶ Greenwald's appeals are an example of using the public sphere as a form of resistance¶ to surveillance. Though this idea differs from acts of microresistance, Greenwald's suggestions¶ still fit with Foucauldian ideas of resistance, and show how the public sphere can play a part in¶ that resistance. Greenwald argues that citizens can engage in public deliberation to negotiate¶ with the surveillance state. This echoes Foucault's idea of "not being governed quite so much,"¶ or critique (1997, p. 45). Foucault (1997) says that critique is based on several anchoring¶ points, including universal rights. The act of critique asserts that the subject does not want to¶ accept laws because they are unjust. Critique asks "What are the limits of the right to govern?"¶ (Foucault, 1997, p. 46). People may engage in critique to negotiate the way they are being¶ governed if they find the rules of governance to be contrary to natural rights. Greenwald¶ encourages critique through public deliberation about the limits of the surveillance state. He¶ draws on American values like political freedom and freedom of expression, thus using¶ American rights as a basis for critiquing surveillance. Greenwald's call to action echoes¶ Foucault's idea of critique. ¶ Rice 58¶ Greenwald's ideas also run parallel to Habermas's functions of the public sphere.¶ Greenwald's solution is similar to the way Habermas (1974) describes the bourgeois public¶ sphere, which was a medium through which private needs were communicated to the state. A¶ key demand of this bourgeois public was that they "opposed the principle of supervision—that¶ very principle which demands that proceedings be made public" (p. 52). This group was¶ concerned with private autonomy and the restriction of state power to a few areas. Thus,¶ Habermas argues that the public sphere can be used to negotiate private freedoms. This¶ becomes the link between the public sphere and Foucauldian ideas of surveillance: using the¶ public sphere, citizens can collectively negotiate to be governed less. Greenwald demonstrates¶ that the NSA's surveillance is a public problem, calling on the American public to deliberate¶ about the future of surveillance.

Talking about surveillance helps us change policies

Greenwald 2014

(Glenn Edward Greenwald is an American lawyer, journalist and author. He was a columnist for Guardian US from August 2012 to October 2013. He was a columnist for Salon.com from 2007 to 2012, and an occasional contributor to The Guardian. ; No Place to Hide ; May 13, 2014 ; Introduction: 7-8 ; AWEY)

In the fall of 2005, without much in the way of grandiose expectations, I decided to create a political blog. I had little idea at the time how much this decision would eventually change my life. My principal motive was that I was becoming increasingly alarmed by the radical and extremist theories of power the US government had adopted in the wake of 9/11, and I hoped that writing about such issues might allow me to make a broader impact than I could in my then-career as a constitutional and civil rights lawyer. Just seven weeks after I began blogging, the New York Times dropped a bombshell: in 2001, it reported, the Bush administration had secretly ordered the National Security Agency (NSA) to eavesdrop on the electronic had been going on for four years and had targeted at least several thousand Americans. The subject was a perfect convergence of my passions and my expertise. The government tried to justify the secret NSA program by invoking exactly the kind of extreme theory of executive power that had motivated me to begin writing: the notion that the threat of terrorism vested the president with virtually unlimited authority to do anything to "keep the nation safe," including the authority to break the law. The ensuing debate entailed complex questions of constitutional law and statutory interpretation, which my legal background rendered me well suited to address. I spent the next two years covering every aspect of the NSA warrantless wiretapping scandal, on my blog and in a bestselling 2006 book. My position was straightforward: by ordering illegal eavesdropping, the president had committed crimes and should be held accountable for them. In America's increasingly jingoistic and oppressive political climate, this proved to be an intensely controversial stance.

Talking about government policies allow us to become informed

Greenwald 2014

(Glenn Edward Greenwald is an American lawyer, journalist and author. He was a columnist for Guardian US from August 2012 to October 2013. He was a columnist for Salon.com from 2007 to 2012, and an occasional contributor to The Guardian. ; No Place to Hide ; May 13, 2014 ; Introduction: 7-8 ; AWEY)

It was this background that prompted Edward Snowden, several years later, to choose me as his first contact person for revealing NSA wrong-doing on an even more massive scale. He said he believed I could be counted on to understand the dangers of mass surveillance and extreme state secrecy, and not to back down in the face of pressure from the government and its many allies in the media and elsewhere. The remarkable volume of top secret documents that Snowden passed on to me, along with the high drama surrounding Snowden himself, have generated unprecedented worldwide interest in the menace of mass electronic surveillance and the value of privacy in the digital age. But the underlying problems have been festering for years, largely in the dark. There are, to be sure, many unique aspects to the current NSA controversy. Technology has now enabled a type of ubiquitous surveillance that had previously been the province of only the most imaginative science fiction writers. Moreover, the post-9/11 American veneration of security above all else has created a climate particularly conducive to abuses of power. And thanks to Snowden's bravery and the relative ease of copying digital NSA story resonate with numerous episodes from the past, stretching back across the centuries. Indeed, opposition to government invasion of privacy was a major factor in the establishment of the United States itself, as American colonists protested laws that let British officials ransack at will any home they wished. It was legitimate, the colonists agreed, for the state to obtain specific, targeted warrants to search individuals when there was evidence to establish probable cause of their wrongdoing. But general warrants—the practice of making the entire citizenry subject to indiscriminate searches—were inherently illegitimate. The Fourth Amendment enshrined this idea in American law. Its language is clear and succinct: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." It was intended, above all, to abolish forever in America the power of the government to subject its citizens to generalized, suspicionless surveillance. The clash over surveillance in the eighteenth century focused on house searches, but as technology evolved, surveillance evolved with it. In the mid-nineteenth century, as the spread of railways began to allow for cheap and rapid mail delivery, the British government's surreptitious opening of mail caused a major scandal in the UK. By the early decades of the twentieth century, the US Bureau of Investigation—the precursor of today's FBI—was using wiretaps, along with mail monitoring and informants, to clamp down on those opposed to American government policies. No matter the specific techniques involved, historically mass surveillance has had several constant attributes. Initially, it is always the country's dissidents and marginalized who bear the brunt of the surveillance, leading those who support the government or are merely apathetic to mistakenly believe they are immune. And history shows that the mere existence of a mass surveillance apparatus, regardless of how it is used, is in itself sufficient to stifle dissent. A citizenry that is aware of always being watched quickly becomes a compliant and FBI's spying shockingly found that the agency had labeled half a million US citizens as potential "subversives," routinely spying on people based purely on their political beliefs. (The FBI's list of targets ranged from Martin Luther King to John Lennon, from the women's liberation movement to the anti-Communist John Birch Society.) But the plague of surveillance abuse is hardly unique to American history. On the contrary, mass surveillance is a universal temptation for any unscrupulous power. And in every instance, the motive is the same: suppressing dissent and mandating compliance. Surveillance thus unites governments of otherwise remarkably divergent political creeds. At the turn of the twentieth century, the British and French empires both created specialized monitoring departments to deal with the threat of anticolonialist movements. After World War II, the East German Ministry of State Security, popularly known as the Stasi, became synonymous with government intrusion into personal lives. And more recently, as popular protests during the Arab Spring challenged dictators' grasp on power, the regimes in Syria, Egypt, and Libya all sought to spy on the Internet use of domestic dissenters. Investigations by Bloomberg News and the Wall Street Journal have shown that as these dictatorships were overwhelmed by protestors, they literally went shopping for surveillance tools from Western technology companies. Syria's Assad regime flew in employees from the Italian surveillance company Area SpA, who were told that the Syrians "urgently needed to track people." In Egypt, Mubarak's secret police bought tools to penetrate Skype encryption and eavesdrop on activists' calls. And in Libya, the Journal reported, journalists and rebels who entered a government monitoring center in 2011 found "a wall of black refrigerator-size devices" from the French surveillance company Amesys. The equipment "inspected the Internet traffic" of Libya's main Internet service provider, "opening emails, divining passwords, snooping on online chats and mapping connections among various suspects." The ability to eavesdrop on people's communications vests immense power in those who do it. And unless such power is held in check by rigorous oversight and accountability, it is almost certain to be abused. Expecting its temptations runs counter to every historical example and all available evidence about human nature.

Talking about what government surveillance policies do is key to change

Greenwald 2014

(Glenn Edward Greenwald is an American lawyer, journalist and author. He was a columnist for Guardian US from August 2012 to October 2013. He was a columnist for Salon.com from 2007 to 2012, and an occasional contributor to The Guardian. ; No Place to Hide ; May 13, 2014 ; Chapter 5: The Fourth Estate ; AWEY)

Shortly before he died in 2005, the heralded Vietnam war correspondent David Halberstam gave a speech to students at the Columbia Journalism School. The proudest moment of his career, he told them, was when US generals in Vietnam threatened to demand that his editors at the New York Times remove him from covering the war. He had, Halberstam said, "enraged Washington and Saigon by filing pessimistic dispatches on the war." The generals considered him "the enemy" since he had also interrupted their press conferences to accuse them of lying. For Halberstam, infuriating the government was a source of pride, the true purpose and calling of journalism. He knew that being a journalist meant taking risks, confronting rather than submitting to abuses of power. Today, for many in the profession, praise from the government for "responsible" reporting—for taking its direction about what should and should not be published—is a badge of honor. That this is the case is the true measure of how far adversarial journalism in the United States has fallen.

Transparency Key

Public scrutiny solves – transparency is the only mechanism

Rice 15

(Rebecca, University of Montana, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy," pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd)//akim

Greenwald's created public. Warner (2002) encourages scholars to frame publics discursively, saying they exist "**by virtue of being addressed**" (p. 413). Greenwald calls a concerned public into being throughout NPTH, often by discussing his readers as a collective"we." Greenwald's created audience is concerned about surveillance, and willing to take publicaction to advocate for reform. Greenwald emphasizes the choice readers can make with Snowden's leaked NSA documents. He says that Snowden's leaks can create a **new discussion about surveillance**, or they can fade due to public apathy. In the introduction to NPTH, he writes That's what makes Snowden's revelations so stunning and so vitally important. By daring to expose the NSA's astonishing surveillance capabilities and its even more astounding ambitions, he has made it clear, with these disclosures, that we stand at a historic crossroads. Will the digital age usher in the individual liberation and political freedoms that the Internet is uniquely capable of unleashing? Or will it bring about a system of omnipresent monitoring and control, beyond the dreams of even the greatest tyrants of the past? Right now, **either path is possible**. Our actions will determine where we end up. (2014, p. 6). Greenwald gives the audience two choices and links their actions to the two potential paths. In this way, he begins the process of public deliberation, which Goodnight (2012a) describes as a momentary pause in which we examine political paths, both taken and untaken. "As deliberation raises expectations that are feared or hoped for, public argument is a way to share in the construction of the future," he says (Goodnight, 2012a, p. 198). Greenwald shares his interpretation of the choice the public must make with this information. He projects two alternative futures based on the public's deliberation about privacy. This shared future is emphasized through his use of the words "our," "everyone," and "we," which link readers together as the American public. Greenwald's projected paths put the decision into the readers' hand, emphasizing the public's ability to act and intervene in technical surveillance. Through invitations to deliberate, Greenwald addresses his readers as part of a public sphere. Greenwald also argues that deliberation is an effective way to resist surveillance and curb surveillance abuses. Greenwald offers an example from his own life. He says he first learned of the power of deliberation when he heard from Laura Poitras, another journalist who accompanied him on the trip to Hong Kong. She said that she had been detained in airports dozens of times as a result of her writing and filmmaking. Greenwald covered the interrogations of Poitras in a Salon article, which received substantial attention. In the months afterward, Poitras was notdetained again. In NPTH, Greenwald writes "The lesson for me was clear: national security officials do not like the light. They act abusively and thuggishly only when they believe they are safe, in the dark. **Secrecy is the linchpin of abuse of power,** we discovered, **its enabling force Transparency is the only real antidote"** (2014, p. 12). Greenwald generalizes this example to other abuses of power. He says that power without deliberation is "the ultimate imbalance, permitting the most dangerous of all human conditions: the exercise of limitless power with no transparency or accountability" (2014, p. 169). Greenwald presents public deliberation as thesolution and antithesis to surveillance, which he calls for the public to undertake. Afteraddressing readers as members of this public, Greenwald names special actors within the public sphere who can also help to effect change.

Public Sphere Disc k Ref NSA

Public sphere discussions aid in congressional reforms to tighten its reigns on the NSA

Rice 15 (Rebecca, University of Montana, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy," pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd)//akim

Government reform. First, Greenwald says **the government must make changes** in order to curb abuses from the NSA, and that readers should pressure the government to do so. Greenwald says that public branches of the government do not have enough control over the NSA. Giving examples of reform that occurred after his reporting, Greenwald says that he and Snowden were pleased by a bipartisan bill introduced to US Congress. This bill proposed defunding the NSA, which was "by far the most aggressive challenge to the national security state to emerge from Congress since the 9/11 attacks" (2014, p. 249). The bill did not pass, but only by a small margin, which Greenwald portrays as **a hopeful sign of reform**. Additionally, Greenwald suggests "converting the FISA court into a real judicial system, rather than the onesided current setup in which only the government gets to state its case, would be a positive reform" (2014, p. 251). Greenwald's suggestions for change go beyond individual acts to put pressure on government policy reform. By reforming the FISA court, the secrets of the NSA would be public knowledge. Though Greenwald writes about power from a Foucauldian perspective, he proposes large acts of resistance to the public problems created by surveillance in addition to small acts to resist the discipline of individual bodies. These ideas are compatible with Foucault's (1997) idea of critique, however, which he defines as "the art of not being governed quite so much" (p. 45). Greenwald asks the audience to **resist through public sphere discussion** in order to negotiate the way they are governed. He argues that discussion through the public sphere can **alter power relations** between citizens and the US surveillance state. Though the government is considered completely separate from the public sphere by many scholars (Habermas, 1974), others push back on this idea (e.g. Asen & Brouwer, 2001). In the case of the NSA, other government branches are considered members of the public by Greenwald. Greenwald notes that many congressional members were unaware of the tactics used by the NSA, including spying on Congress itself (2014). For these reasons, Greenwald specifically calls on Congress to be part of the solution. This should occur through legislative reform spurred by public pressure. Greenwald's summoned public addresses politicians as well as average citizens.¶

Debate k Surv Policies

Surveillance policies should be questioned through forms of debate

Rice 15 (Rebecca, University of Montana, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy," pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd)//akim

Emphasis on multiple voices. Greenwald also moves the groundings of the surveillance debate by making it just that—a debate. He writes about the variety of voices discussing surveillance, which demonstrates that surveillance is more than just a technical talking point. In his early articles for The Guardian, Greenwald does this by quoting many technical experts, government voices, and special interest groups. In his first article for The Guardian, revealing the program PRISM, Greenwald takes statements from several US senators, including Ron Wyden, who Greenwald says raised concerns about surveillance for years before the leaked documents came to light (2013a). Greenwald also takes statements from Jameel Jaffer, the director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Center for Democracy. Jaffer said that "the military has been granted unprecedented access to civilian communications" (Greenwald, 2013a, p. 6). Greenwald quotes public figures who state their concern about the effects surveillance could have on the public. These statements contrast with quotes from government officials, which are left without commentary. In his articles in The Guardian, Greenwald airs a variety of voices so that **readers may begin to engage in the debate**. Greenwald also moves the debate into the public sphere by revealing information to which the government and technology companies must respond. For example, in NPTH Greenwald tells the story of writing an article for The Guardian about PRISM. He says that NSA documents showed that technology companies cooperated with the NSA, but the companies denied this when contacted. When deciding what to do, Greenwald chose to write both statements into his story: Let's not take a position on who's right. Let's just air the disagreement and **let them work it out in public**,' I proposed. Our intention was that the story would force an open discussion of what the **Internet industry** had agreed to do with their users' communications; if their version clashed with the NSA documents, they would need to resolve it with the world watching, which is how it should be (2014, p. 76). This move parallels one way that Goodnight (2012a) says that technical arguments become public. If a technical argument becomes unreconcilable, "**both groups may take to the public forum governing the technical community's business**, each contesting for leadership and control of scarce resources. If one side or the other is dissatisfied with the verdict, then the boundaries of the special community are in jeopardy, as disgruntled advocates appeal to a more general public" (p. 202). Greenwald forces this eruption of appeals to the public by reporting that technology companies are cooperating with the NSA. Because these reports damage technology companies' reputations, they must respond to their consumer base, or the public. As Goodnight (2012a) says, "An arguer can accept the sanctioned, widely used bundle of rules, claims, procedures and evidence to wage a dispute. Or, the arguer can inveigh against any or all of these 'customs' in order to bring forth a new variety of understanding... In the variety of argument endeavors, this tension is expressed by attempts to expand one sphere of argument at the expense of another" (p. 200). Greenwald **challenges the sanctioned forms** of argument about surveillance. Using common examples mixed with technical evidence, he expands the argument into the public sphere at expense of the technical. Goodnight (2012b) says that "arguments engage social change when the systems of authority embedded in spheres not only fail to provide resolution but the expectations themselves (as implicit norms, conventions of propriety, or explicit rules) become part of the debate" (p. 260). Greenwald makes the technical sphere rules part of the debate by explaining the value of citizen deliberation. He presents the public with options, which serve as the antithesis to the NSA's secrecy, or lack of options, for public participation in their programs. Using these strategies, Greenwald moves arguments about surveillance **out of the technical sphere and into the public sphere**. Greenwald also discusses the effects of surveillance in more detail, and calls the public to resist surveillance. These appeals to privacy look less at the actors, or the technical sphere, and more at the surveillance apparatus itself.

Surv State Resist k Democ

Greenwald reifies Foucauldian ideas through resistance from the public sphere – this challenges the surveillance state and democratic ideals

Rice 15 (Rebecca, University of Montana, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy," pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd)//akim

The public sphere as resistance. The resistive subject Greenwald calls into being¶ would be an active public sphere participant who questions the surveillance state through¶ public discussion. Though this subject would take small steps to preserve online privacy,¶ Greenwald spends much of NPTH explaining broader solutions to surveillance. NPTH¶ constitutes an attempt to use the public sphere to resist NSA surveillance.¶ Resistance literature has often focused on small ways to resist surveillance power. ¶ Rice 57¶ Foucault focuses on personal, transversal struggles against surveillance power, because¶ surveillance power stems from compartmentalization and control over the body. The body is¶ "approached as an object to be analyzed and separated into its constituent parts," forging the¶ creation of a docile, useful subject (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 153). As a result, struggles¶ against this control are often anarchistic, immediate, and focused on the individual (Foucault,¶ 1983). Greenwald acknowledges this effect, and argues that surveillance leads to the internal¶ suppression of dissenting thoughts as a result. However, Greenwald does not advocate for just¶ a small, personal solution to this control over the body.¶ Greenwald's appeals are an example of using **the public sphere as** a form of **resistance¶ to surveillance.** Though this idea differs from acts of microresistance, Greenwald's suggestions¶ still **fit with Foucauldian** ideas of resistance, and show how the public sphere can play a part in¶ that resistance. Greenwald argues that citizens can engage in public deliberation to negotiate¶ with the surveillance state. This echoes Foucault's idea of "**not being governed quite so much,**"¶ or critique (1997, p. 45). Foucault (1997) says that critique is based on several anchoring¶ points, including universal rights. The act of critique asserts that the subject does not want to¶ accept laws because they are unjust. Critique asks "What are the limits of the right to govern?"¶ (Foucault, 1997, p. 46). People may engage in critique to negotiate the way they are being¶ governed if they find the rules of governance to be contrary to natural rights. Greenwald¶ encourages critique through public deliberation about the limits of the surveillance state. He¶ draws on American values like political freedom and freedom of expression, thus using¶ American rights as a basis for critiquing surveillance. Greenwald's call to action echoes¶ Foucault's idea of critique. ¶ Rice 58¶ Greenwald's ideas also run parallel to Habermas's functions of the public sphere.¶ Greenwald's solution is similar to the way Habermas (1974) describes the bourgeois public¶ sphere, which was a medium through which private needs were communicated to the state. A¶ key demand of this bourgeois public was that they "opposed the principle of supervision—that¶ very principle which demands that proceedings be made public" (p. 52). This group was¶ concerned with private autonomy and the restriction of state power to a few areas. Thus,¶ Habermas argues that the public sphere can be used to negotiate private freedoms. This¶ becomes the link between the public sphere and Foucauldian ideas of surveillance: using the¶ public sphere, citizens can collectively negotiate to be governed less. Greenwald demonstrates¶ that the NSA's surveillance is a public problem, calling on the American public to deliberate¶ about the future of surveillance.¶ Greenwald links this solution to personal control, however, by explaining how¶ surveillance impacts our individual thoughts and actions. In these ways, his solution does fit¶ with some of Foucault's ideas of a transversal struggle, namely that his solution struggles with¶ state control over the individual and critiques power for its effects (Foucault, 1983).¶ Greenwald (2014) says that "people radically change their behavior when they know they are¶ being watched" (p. 173) as he demonstrates the effects of surveillance power. He then links¶ these behavioral changes to the suppression of free speech, saying that "mass surveillance kills¶ dissent in a deeper and more important place as well: in the mind" (2014, p. 177-178).¶ Greenwald argues that surveillance power controls the individual and critiques power for its¶ effects. Though Greenwald is encouraging a public debate, he claims that this debate will help¶ negotiate surveillance power that creates control over individual bodies, thus drawing on some ¶ Rice 59¶ of Foucault's ideas of resistance as he talks about the public sphere.¶ This solution demonstrates the tension between the surveillance state and the¶ democratic republic, as Greenwald wrestles with the US as both a security state and a¶ democracy. He ponders this contradiction as he explains the panopticon, saying¶

Democracy requires accountability and consent of the government, which is only¶ possible if citizens know what is being done in their name. The presumption is that,¶ with rare exception, they will know everything their political officials are¶ doing...conversely the presumption is that the government, with rare exception, will not¶ know anything that law-abiding citizens are doing. That is why we are called private¶ individuals, functioning in our private capacity. Transparency is for those who carry¶ out public duties and exercise public power. Privacy is for everyone else (2014, p.¶ 209).¶ The fact that the NSA knows more about US citizens than citizens know about the agency¶ poses challenges to this model of government. As a result, Greenwald encourages the exercise¶ of democratic rights to combat surveillance. The public sphere has the capability to put¶ pressure on government officials and demand surveillance reform. Greenwald asks us to resist¶ using the public sphere. This solution arises as a result of the rhetorical situation, which pits¶ privacy against security. Greenwald encourages the audience to select privacy. He spends time¶ deescalating the permanent emergency of terrorism to demonstrate that NSA surveillance is¶ abusive and unnecessary, and then appeals to values which support public deliberation.¶ Public deliberation can be viewed as a form of resistance through Greenwald's rhetoric.¶ Though many scholars have looked at microresistance to surveillance power, Greenwald asks ¶ Rice 60¶ the public to resist through deliberation, which he considers an antidote to surveillance. This¶ solution grapples with the contradiction of the US as surveillance state and the US as a¶ democracy. The public sphere will continue to discuss these competing values, sharing in¶ alternative projections of the future (Goodnight, 2012a). Greenwald encourages the public to¶ create a shared vision of a state with transparency in the public sphere and privacy for citizens.

Activism k Engage Govt

Political activism is key to engage the public as well as the government. Discussions in debate are the first step to create real change.

Rice '15 – University of Montana (Rebecca, Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers from University of Montana Graduate School, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the Public Sphere Debate about Privacy," Paper 4480, http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd)//DWB

Greenwald's case is itself an example of the groundings of argument shifting between¶ Goodnight's three spheres of argument. Greenwald employed several tactics to move¶ surveillance toward publicly-based appeals. These include demonstration of public effects,¶ explanations of technical jargon, and the inclusion of multiple voices in the surveillance¶ debate. Greenwald drafts proposed solutions which would **engage US citizens, the US¶ government,.** and journalists Notably, these solutions focus on these groups rather than¶ technical communities with the technical capabilities to alter surveillance practices. Thus,¶ Greenwald refuses to contain surveillance within the technical sphere and instead encourages¶ the public to deliberate. This example adds to previous case studies of overlap between the¶ technical and public spheres of argument. Previous scholarship has often focused on the¶ eclipse of the public sphere by the technical (e.g. Farrell & Goodnight, 1981; Hauser, 1987;¶ Schiappa, 2012; Sovacool, 2009). Greenwald's case is an example of pushback on this¶ infiltration, and shows that just as arguments can become insulated within the technical sphere,¶ they can also be removed and placed back into the public. Journalistic activism may be an¶ important part of this move, and will be discussed in a subsequent section. ¶

Individual Actions can impact the government on Surveillance

Greenwald 2014

(Glenn Edward Greenwald is an American lawyer, journalist and author. He was a columnist for Guardian US from August 2012 to October 2013. He was a columnist for Salon.com from 2007 to 2012, and an occasional contributor to The Guardian. ; No Place to Hide ; May 13, 2014 ; Introduction: 10-14 ; AWEY)

Indeed, even before Snowden's revelations, it was already becoming clear that treating the United States as somehow exceptional on the issue of surveillance is a highly naive stance. In 2006, at a congressional hearing titled "The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?," speakers lined up to condemn American technology companies for helping China suppress dissent on the Internet. Christopher Smith (R-NJ), the congressman presiding over the hearing, likened Yahoo!'s cooperation with Chinese secret police to handing Anne Frank over to the Nazis. It was a full throated harangue, a typical performance when American officials speak about a regime not aligned with the United States. But even the congressional attendees couldn't help noting that the hearing happened to take place just two months after the New York Times revealed the vast warrantless domestic wiretapping carried out by the Bush administration. In light of those revelations, denouncing other countries for carrying out their own domestic surveillance rang rather hollow. Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA), speaking after Representative Smith, noted that the technology companies being told to resist the Chinese regime should also be careful regarding their own government. "Otherwise," he warned prophetically, "while those in China may see their privacy violated in the most heinous ways, we here in the United States may also find that perhaps some future president asserting these very broad interpretations of the Constitution is reading our e-mail, and I would prefer that not happen without a court order." Over the past decades, the fear of terrorism—stoked by consistent exaggerations of the actual threat—has been exploited by US leaders to justify a wide array of extremist policies. It has led to wars of aggression, a worldwide torture regime, and the detention (and even assassination) of both foreign nationals and American citizens without any charges. But the ubiquitous, secretive system of suspicionless surveillance that it has spawned may very well turn out to be its most enduring legacy. This is so because, despite all the historical parallels, there is also a genuinely

new dimension to the current NSA surveillance scandal: the role now played by the Internet in daily life. Especially for the younger generation, the Internet is not some standalone, separate domain where a few of life's functions are carried out. It is not merely our post office and our telephone. Rather, it is the epicenter of our world, the place where virtually everything is done. It is where friends are made, where books and films are chosen, where political activism is organized, where the most private data is created and stored. It is where we develop and express our very personality and sense of self. To turn that network into a system of mass surveillance has implications unlike those of any previous state surveillance programs. All the prior spying systems were by necessity more limited and capable of being evaded. To permit surveillance to take root on the Internet would mean subjecting virtually all forms of human interaction, planning, and even thought itself to comprehensive state examination. From the time that it first began to be widely used, the Internet has been seen by many as possessing an extraordinary potential: the ability to liberate hundreds of millions of people by democratizing political discourse and leveling the playing field between the powerful and the powerless. Internet freedom—the ability to use the network without institutional constraints, social or state control, and pervasive fear—is central to the fulfillment of that promise. Converting the Internet into a system of surveillance thus guts it of its core potential. Worse, it turns the Internet into a tool of repression, threatening to produce the most extreme and oppressive weapon of state intrusion human history has ever seen. That's what makes Snowden's revelations so stunning and so vitally important. By daring to expose the NSA's astonishing surveillance capabilities and its even more astounding ambitions, he has made it clear, with these disclosures, that we stand at a historic crossroads. Will the digital age usher in the individual liberation and political freedoms that the Internet is uniquely capable of unleashing? Or will it bring about a system of omnipresent monitoring and control, beyond the dreams of even the greatest tyrants of the past? Right now, either path is possible. Our actions will determine where we end up.

Surveillance Info k Govt Overreach

Becoming informed about surveillance policies allow us to challenge government overreach

Greenwald 2014

(Glenn Edward Greenwald is an American lawyer, journalist and author. He was a columnist for Guardian US from August 2012 to October 2013. He was a columnist for Salon.com from 2007 to 2012, and an occasional contributor to The Guardian. ; No Place to Hide ; May 13, 2014 ; Chapter 5: The Fourth Estate ; AWEY)

One of the principal institutions ostensibly devoted to monitoring and checking abuse of state power is the political media. The theory of a "fourth estate" is to ensure government transparency and provide a check on overreach, of which the secret surveillance of entire populations is surely among the most radical examples. But that check is only effective if journalists act adversarially to those who wield political power. Instead, the US media has frequently abdicated this role, being subservient to the government's interests, even amplifying, rather than scrutinizing, its messages and carrying out its dirty work. In this context, I knew that media hostility toward my reporting on Snowden's disclosures was inevitable. On June 6, the day after the first NSA article ran in the Guardian, the New York Times introduced the possibility of a criminal investigation. "After writing intensely, even obsessively, for years about government surveillance and prosecution of journalists, Glenn Greenwald has suddenly put himself directly at the intersection of those two issues, and perhaps in the crosshairs of federal prosecutors," the paper proclaimed in a profile of me. My NSA reporting, it added, "is expected to attract an investigation from the Justice Department, which has aggressively pursued leakers." The profile quoted the neoconservative Gabriel Schoenfeld of the Hudson Institute, who has long advocated the prosecution of journalists for publishing secret information, calling me "a highly professional apologist for any kind of anti-Americanism no matter how extreme." The most revealing evidence of the Times's intentions came from the journalist Andrew Sullivan, who was quoted in the same profile saying, "Once you get into a debate with [Greenwald], it can be hard to get the last word," and "I think he has little grip on what it actually means to govern a country or run a war." Disturbed by the use of his comments out of context, Andrew later sent me his full exchange with the Times reporter Leslie Kaufman, which included praise for my work that the paper had notably chosen to omit. What was more telling, however, were the original questions Kaufman had sent him: • "He obviously had strong opinions, but how is he as a journalist? Reliable? Honest? Quotes you accurately? Accurately describes your positions? Or is more advocate than journalist?" • "He says you are a friend, is this so? I get the sense that he is something of a loner and has the kind of uncompromising opinions that makes it hard to keep friends, but could be wrong." The second question—that I'm "something of a loner" who has trouble keeping friends—was, in some sense, even more significant than the first. Discrediting the messenger as a misfit to discredit the message is an old ploy when it comes to whistle-blowing, and it often works.

The NSA spies solely to collect data than prevent terrorism

Rice 15 (Rebecca, University of Montana, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy," pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd)//akim

First, Greenwald says the NSA is insulated within the technical sphere, and the agency favors technical reasoning, shifting control over who makes decisions about surveillance from the FISA court to the NSA operatives themselves. "The vast amount of discretion vested in NSA analysts is also demonstrated by the training and briefings given to them by the agency," Greenwald says as he reports on the FISA courts to The Guardian (2013d, p. 8). He cites a leaked NSA memo which instructs analysts to use their own judgment and creativity to determine if a target is inside or outside of the United States. Though the FISA court is supposed to be consulted if a surveillance target could be within the US, Greenwald says "the decisions about who has their emails and telephone calls intercepted by the NSA is made by the NSA itself, not by the FISA court" (2013d, p. 9). Though there are legal limits which keep the government from examining the content of these communications, "there are no technical limits on the ability of either the agency or its analysts to do so" (2013d, p. 9). The NSA analysts have specialized, technical knowledge. Here, the groundings of the argument are not legal (as Greenwald says the FISA court does not review the NSA's decisions), but technical, and insulated within the NSA. Greenwald's description of the NSA parallels Goodnight's idea of the technical sphere. Goodnight (2012b) says that within the

technical sphere, "technical arguments are stamped with procedure and rule where state of the art practice is always at issue" (p. 260). Greenwald similarly argues that within the NSA, technical capabilities are favored over ethical arguments against spying. Greenwald also portrays the NSA and its partners as insulated and secretive, or separated from the public sphere. Greenwald argues that the surveillance community is a revolving door of government officials and large defense companies who work together to produce lucrative and powerful results: The post-9/11 era has seen a massive explosion of resources dedicated to surveillance. Most of those resources were transferred from the public coffers (i.e., the American taxpayer) into the pockets of private surveillance defense corporations…Companies like Booz Allen Hamilton and AT&T employ hordes of former top government officials, while hordes of current top defense officials are past (and likely future) employees of those same corporations. Constantly growing the surveillance state is a way to ensure that the government funds keep flowing, that the revolving door stays greased (p. 168). Greenwald names the actors in the surveillance state frequently in his articles and book. These actors include high-up government officials and government contractors. He says that the groups work together to control information and remain insulated. Large technical companies are also complacent in this surveillance, according to Greenwald. In his articles in The Guardian, Greenwald begins introducing these figures. In his first article, about PRISM, Greenwald names Microsoft, Yahoo, Apple, Facebook, Skype, and AOL as companies that participate in the NSA's information-sharing programs (2013a). He says that "collectively, the companies cover the vast majority of online email, search, video, and communications networks" (2013a, p. 3). In NPTH, Greenwald reflects that Snowden's documents reveal "a slew of secret negotiations between the NSA and Silicon Valley about providing the agency with unfettered access to the companies' systems" (2014, p. 112). These companies control a large share of online communications, and they cooperate with the NSA. Greenwald links the NSA together with other technical experts to demonstrate the vast power of the technical elite. These groups have access to most communications, and can spy on the **majority of online messages.** This is a specialized skill unique to the technical community. Greenwald also emphasizes the breadth of surveillance, and links it to the power of the NSA. Reflecting on the Snowden documents in NPTH, Greenwald says Even as someone who had spent years writing about the dangers of secrecy US surveillance, I found the sheer vastness of the spying system genuinely shocking, all the more so because it had clearly been implemented with virtually **no accountability, no transparency, and no limits.** The thousands of discrete surveillance programs described by the archive were never intended by those who implemented them to become public knowledge (2014, p. 91). Greenwald notes the link between power and the breadth of power. He says that the NSA collects a vast amount of data simply because it can. "The mere fact that it (the NSA) has the capability to collect those communications has become one rationale for doing so" (2014, p. 95). Greenwald says that the NSA uses a "collect it all" philosophy, and "the agency is devoted to one overarching mission: to prevent the slightest piece of electronic communication from evading its systemic grasp" (2014, p. 94). Not only is the surveillance community isolated, **the community is corrupt**: the NSA collects data **not to prevent terrorism but to contain its power.** Displaying many internal NSA memos and presentations, Greenwald demonstrates that the NSA celebrates the gathering of information, and more information is always considered better. In one presentation, Greenwald says, the NSA writes that XKEYSCORE is valuable because "the program captures 'nearly everything a typical user does on the internet'" (2014, p. 153). Greenwald also displays unflattering NSA memos, which demonstrate what he calls the agency's "ego." He points to the title of one presentation designed internally for NSA personnel: "The Role of National Interests, Money, and Egos," and says that "these three factors together…are the primary motives driving the United States to maintain global surveillance domination" (2014, p. Rice 32 167). By discussing the extent of surveillance gathered, Greenwald characterizes the NSA as greedy—the agency grasps at data and hoards it away from the public. Using the "collect it all" philosophy, Greenwald gives the surveillance community, and in this case the technical sphere, a new connotation: the community is not just isolated because of its specializations, but because of its **interest in power.** Greenwald says the NSA has a "contemptuous and boastful spirit of supremacy behind them" (2014, p. 94). As Farrell and Goodnight (1981) say, arguments grounded in the technical sphere preclude practitioners from social responsibility (p. 296). Greenwald argues that the NSA is not interested in the **ethics of surveillance**, but solely in its **technical capabilities to spy.** Greenwald furthers this characterization by discussing oversight of surveillance. He says that the so-called checks on surveillance are ineffective, because they, too, are shrouded in secrecy. Commenting on the FISA court, which issues warrants for NSA surveillance, Greenwald says The uselessness of this institution as a true check on surveillance abuses is obvious because the FISA court lacks virtually every attribute of what our society generally understands as the minimal elements of a justice system. It meets in complete secrecy; only one party—**the government—is permitted to attend** the hearings and make its case; and the court's rulings are automatically designated **'Top Secret'** (2014, p. 128).

Discourse k Challenge Surv State

Our discourse is important to challenge the surveillance state

Greenwald 2013

Edward Snowden predicted more than a month ago while still in hiding in Hong Kong that the US government would seek to demonise him, telling the Guardian that he would be accused of aiding America's enemies. In the second instalment of an interview carried out before he revealed himself as the NSA whistleblower, Snowden insisted that he was a patriot and that he regards the US as a fundamentally good country. But he said he had chosen to release the highly classified information because freedoms were being undermined by intelligence agency "excesses". The interview was conducted on June 6 in a hotel room in Hong Kong. The first part of the interview was released on Sunday June 9, starting a media frenzy and intensifying US efforts to track him down. Snowden has since fled Hong Kong for Moscow, where he is reportedly marooned while resisting US attempts to extradite him to face charges under the Espionage Act. In the newly released interview excerpts, he predicted he would be portrayed not as a whistleblower but a spy. "I think they are going to say I have committed grave crimes, I have violated the Espionage Act. They are going to say I have aided our enemies in making them aware of these systems. But this argument can be made against anyone who reveals information that points out mass surveillance systems," he said. Asked whether he had sought a career in the intelligence community specifically to become a mole and reveal secrets, Snowden, 30, said he had joined government service very young, first enlisting in the US army immediately after the invasion of Iraq out of a belief in "the goodness of what we were doing. I believed in the nobility of our intentions to free oppressed people overseas." But his views shifted over the length of his career as he watched the news, which he saw as propaganda, not truth. "We were actually involved in misleading the public and misleading all the publics, not just the American public, in order to create certain mindset in the global consciousness and I was actually a victim of that." He had not fallen out of love with America, only its government. "America is a fundamentally good country. We have good people with good values who want to do the right thing. But the structures of power that exist are working to their own ends to extend their capability at the expense of the freedom of all publics." In the new excerpts, he explained his motivation for revealing the information. "I don't want to live in a world where everything that I say, everything I do, everyone I talk to, every expression of creativity or love or friendship is recorded," he said. "And that's not something I'm willing to support, it's not something I'm willing to build and it's not something I'm willing to live under." Advertisement He also insisted he had continued with his job while waiting for political leaders to rein in what he decribed as "government excesses". But, he said, "as I've watched I've seen that's not occuring, and in fact we're compounding the excesses of prior governments and making it worse and more invasive. And no one is really standing to stop it." Snowden has been attacked by his critics for first going to Hong Kong, which is part of China, even though it enjoys freedoms not available on the mainland, and to Russia. He has been offered asylum in Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua but faces the practical problem of how to get to any of these countries. The most recent poll, for the Huffington Post and YouGov, suggested a shift in support away for Snowden, with 38% saying they feel he did the wrong thing in leaking documents against 33% who felt he did the right thing. After the first interview, 35% said he did the wrong thing while 38% said he had done the right thing. The interview took place immediately after the Guardian published the first leak about a court order to Verizon ordering it to hand over US customers' call records to the NSA. Snowden explained why he thought that story and the other subsequent leaks about the NSA and its partnership with the corporate sector had to be made public. "They are getting everyone's calls, everyone's call records and everyone's internet traffic as well." In reference to one surveillance system – Boundless Informant – that he said allowed the NSA to track data it was accumulating, he said: "The NSA lied about the existence of this tool to Congress and to specific congressmen in response to previous inquiries about their surveillance activities." He was part of the internet generation that grew up on the understanding that it was free, he said. The partnership between the intelligence agencies and the corporate sector was a "dangerous collaboration", especially for an organisation like the the NSA that has demonstrated time and again "it works to shield itself from oversight".

Key to Policymaking

Discourse about surveillance policies key to effective policy making

Greenwald 2014

(Glenn Edward Greenwald is an American lawyer, journalist and author. He was a columnist for Guardian US from August 2012 to October 2013. He was a columnist for Salon.com from 2007 to 2012, and an occasional contributor to The Guardian. ; No Place to Hide ; May 13, 2014 ; Epilogue ; AWEY)

In the very first online conversation I had with Edward Snowden, he told me he had only one fear about coming forward: that his revelations might be greeted with apathy and indifference, which would mean he had unraveled his life and risked imprisonment for nothing. To say that this fear has gone unrealized is to dramatically understate the case. Indeed, the effects of this unfolding story have been far greater, more enduring, and more wide-ranging than we ever dreamed possible. It focused the world's attention on the dangers of ubiquitous state surveillance and pervasive government secrecy. It triggered the first global debate about the value of individual privacy in the digital age and prompted challenges to America's hegemonic control over the Internet. It changed the way people around the world viewed the reliability of any statements made by US officials and transformed relations between countries. It radically altered views about the proper role of journalism in relation to government power. And within the United States, it gave rise to an ideologically diverse, trans-partisan coalition pushing for meaningful reform of the surveillance state. One episode in particular underscored the profound shifts brought about by Snowden's revelations. Just a few weeks after my first Snowden-based article for the Guardian exposed the NSA's bulk metadata collection, two members of Congress jointly introduced a bill to defund that NSA program. Remarkably, the bill's two cosponsors were John Conyers, a Detroit liberal serving his twentieth term in the House, and Justin Amash, a conservative Tea Party member in only his second House term. It is hard to imagine two more different members of Congress, yet here they were, united in opposition to the NSA's domestic spying. And their proposal quickly gained dozens of cosponsors across the entire ideological spectrum, from the most liberal to the most conservative and everything in between—a truly rare event in Washington. When the bill came up for a vote, the debate was televised on C-SPAN, and I watched it while chatting online with Snowden, who was also watching CSPAN on his computer in Moscow. We were both amazed at what we saw. It was, I believe, the first time he truly appreciated the magnitude of what he had accomplished. One House member after another stood up to vehemently denounce the NSA program, scoffing at the idea that collecting data on the calls of every single American is necessary to stop terrorism. It was by far the most aggressive challenge to the national security state to emerge from Congress since the 9/11 attacks. Until the Snowden revelations, it was simply inconceivable that any bill designed to gut a major national security program could receive more than a handful of votes. But the final vote tally on the Conyers-Amash bill shocked official Washington: it failed by just a tiny margin, 205–217. Support for it was wholly bipartisan, with 111 Democrats joining 94 Republicans to vote for the bill. This discarding of traditional partyline divisions was as exciting to Snowden and me as the substantial support for reining in the NSA. Official Washington depends upon blind tribalism engendered by rigid partisan warfare. If the red versus blue framework can be eroded, and then transcended, there is much more hope for policy making based on the actual interests of the citizenry. Over the following months, as more and more NSA stories were published around the world, many pundits predicted that the public would lose interest in the subject. But, in fact, interest in the surveillance discussion only intensified, not just domestically but internationally. The events of a single week in December 2013—more than six months after my first report appeared in the Guardian—illustrate just how much Snowden's disclosures continue to resonate and just how untenable the NSA's position has become. The week began with the dramatic opinion issued by US federal judge Richard Leon that the NSA metadata collection was likely to be found in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, denouncing it as "almost Orwellian" in scope. As noted, the Bush-appointed jurist pointedly added that the government had not cited a single instance "in which analysis of the NSA's bulk metadata collection" had stopped a terrorist attack. Just two days later, President Obama's advisory panel, formed when the NSA scandal first broke, issued its 308-page report. That report, too, decisively rejected the NSA's claims about the vital importance of its spying. "Our review suggests that the information contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of [the Patriot Act's] section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks," the panel wrote, confirming that in not a single instance would the outcome have been different "without the section 215 telephony meta-data program."

Challenge Govt by Challenge Policy

The government is powerful, we can choose to challenge it by combatting it's policies.

Greenwald 2014

(Glenn Edward Greenwald is an American lawyer, journalist and author. He was a columnist for Guardian US from August 2012 to October 2013. He was a columnist for Salon.com from 2007 to 2012, and an occasional contributor to The Guardian. ; No Place to Hide ; May 13, 2014 ; Chapter 5: The Fourth Estate ; AWEY)

Other steps, too, can be taken to reclaim online privacy and limit state surveillance. International efforts— currently being led by Germany and Brazil—to build new Internet infrastructure so that most network traffic no longer has to transit the United States could go a long way toward loosening the American grip on the Internet. And individuals also have a role to play in reclaiming their own online privacy. Refusing to use the services of tech companies that collaborate with the NSA and its allies will put pressure on those companies to stop such collaboration and will spur their competitors to devote themselves to privacy protections. Already, a number of European tech companies are promoting their email and chat services as a superior alternative to offerings from Google and Facebook, trumpeting the fact that they do not—and will not— provide user data to the NSA. Additionally, to prevent governments from intruding into personal communications and Internet use, all users should be adopting encryption and browsing-anonymity tools. This is particularly important for people working in sensitive areas, such as journalists, lawyers, and human rights activists. And the technology community should continue developing more effective and user-friendly anonymity and encryption programs. On all of these fronts, there is a great deal of work still to be done. But less than a year after I first met Snowden in Hong Kong, there is no question that his disclosures have already brought about fundamental, irreversible changes in many countries and many realms. And beyond the specifics of NSA reform, Snowden's acts have also profoundly advanced the cause of government transparency and reform in general. He has created a model to inspire others, and future activists will likely follow in his footsteps, perfecting the methods he embraced. The Obama administration, which has brought more prosecutions against leakers than all prior presidencies combined, has sought to create a climate of fear that would stifle any attempts at whistle-blowing. But Snowden has destroyed that template. He has managed to remain free, outside the grasp of the United States; what's more, he has refused to remain in hiding but proudly came forward and identified himself. As a result, the public image of him is not a convict in orange jumpsuit and shackles but an independent, articulate figure who can speak for himself, explaining what he did and why. It is no longer possible for the US government to distract from the message simply by demonizing the messenger. There is a powerful lesson here for future whistle-blowers: speaking the truth does not have to destroy your life. And for the rest of us, Snowden's inspirational effect is no less profound. Quite simply, he has reminded everyone about the extraordinary ability of any human being to change the world. An ordinary person in all outward respects —raised by parents without particular wealth or power, lacking even a high school diploma, working as an obscure employee of a giant corporation—he has, through a single act of conscience, literally altered the course of history. Even the most committed activists are often tempted to succumb to defeatism. The prevailing institutions seem too powerful to challenge; orthodoxies feel too entrenched to uproot; there are always many parties with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. But it is human beings collectively, not a small number of elites working in secret, who can decide what kind of world we want to live in. Promoting the human capacity to reason and make decisions: that is the purpose of whistle-blowing, of activism, of political journalism. And that's what is happening now, thanks to the revelations brought about by Edward Snowden.

Nuclear Weapons Impact

Terrorism threats are all <u>fear mongering</u> and justifies many NSA programs used for <u>economic espionage</u> and <u>surveillance</u>

Rice 15 (Rebecca, University of Montana, "Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy," pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd)//akim

Creation of a Permanent Emergency Greenwald also explores how the surveillance community **stifles discussion.** He says that the community draws on **appeals to fear**, particularly of terrorism, to keep the public complacent. These fear appeals confine debate to **technical experts** and keep debate away from the public sphere. This idea functions similarly to Taylor's (2007) discussion of the creation of a **"permanent emergency"** which prevents deliberation about US nuclear policy. Taylor (2007) says that **"secrecy limits public knowledge of nuclear matters, and this limitation is in turn used¶** to justify excluding an 'uninformed' public from subsequent deliberation. Additionally, "'national security' is commonly invoked to discourage public debate of nuclear policy on the **assumption** that such **debate might damage national security** itself" (p. 173). Greenwald attributes squelched discussion to claims of national security as well, and asserts that these claims are unjustified. First, Greenwald says that surveillance advocates have repeatedly cited **prevention of terrorism as justification for the NSA's power.** "The post-9/11 American veneration of security above all else has **created** a climate particularly conducive to **abuses of power**," Greenwald writes as he introduces his encounter with Snowden (2014, p. 2). In NPTH, Greenwald says "Surveillance cheerleaders essentially offer only one argument in defense of mass **surveillance**: it is only carried out to stop terrorism and keep people safe. Indeed, invoking an external threat is a **historical tactic** of choice **to keep the population submissive** to government powers... Ever since the 9/11 attack, US officials reflexively produce the word 'terrorism'" (2014, p. 202). Linking surveillance to a powerful fear appeal, like terrorism, keeps citizens complacent, according to Greenwald. Greenwald says the government often claims there is a need for secrecy surrounding these programs in order to protect national security. "Every time a lawsuit is brought contesting the legality of intercepting Americans' communications without warrants, the Obama DOJ raises claims of secrecy, standing and immunity to prevent any such determination from being made," he writes in an article for The Guardian (2013d, p. 5). Taylor (2007) says that **the US government often cites the need for secrecy and exigency as reasons to limit public discussion on nuclear weapons**. Post-9/11, the Bush administration linked these arguments to rogue states and terrorists (Taylor, 2007). Greenwald says that the threat of terrorism is invoked to keep surveillance away from public scrutiny. The threat of terrorism, along with the secrecy of proceedings previously discussed, allow the government to maintain the state of **permanent emergency** with little evidence of the effectiveness of surveillance.¶ Greenwald, however, finds these claims to be exaggerated. He says, "What is perhaps so¶ remarkable about the bottomless exploitation of the threat of terrorism is that it is so plainly exaggerated. **The risk of any American dying in a terrorist attack is** infinitesimal, **considerably less than the chance of being struck by lightning**" (2014, p. 205). Greenwald finds that statistically, the threat of terrorism is low. Responding to the argument that the NSA could prevent the next 9/11, Greenwald says "the implication is rank **fearmongering and deceitful** in the extreme" (2014, p. 204). He points out that the CIA had several reports about al-Qaeda before 9/11, but failed to act on the warnings. Therefore, collecting more information will not solve the intelligence problems (2014). Additionally, revealing NSA programs does not threaten national security. When writing his first article based off of Snowden's documents, Greenwald says he contemplated any threats to national security, but believed "the idea that 'terrorists' would benefit from exposing the order [to authorize Boundless Informant] was laughable: any terrorists¶ capable of tying their own shoes would already know that the government was trying to monitor their telephone communications" (2014, p. 66). Greenwald argues that the fear of terrorism is overblown, and that reporting about the NSA would not harm national security because terrorists are already on guard against surveillance. Greenwald also says that many NSA programs are not¶ being used to prevent terrorism. Greenwald says that "a substantial number of the agency's¶ activities have nothing to do with antiterrorism efforts or even with national security. Much of¶ the Snowden archive revealed what can only be called **economic espionage**" (2014, p. 134). This¶ refers to NSA documents

that revealed economic spying on foreign energy companies. This¶ spying takes place in order to "gain enormous advantage for American industry" by providing¶ economic and trade information, which the NSA has supplied to the State Department and others¶ during negotiations with other countries (2014, p. 138-139). Greenwald argues that terrorism is¶ an exaggerated threat, and is not the sole motivation for NSA surveillance. These arguments call¶ into question the NSA's main justification for their unchecked power. Greenwald makes the first¶ move toward dismantling the technical sphere isolation of surveillance by claiming that ¶ Rice 36¶ arguments in favor of this isolation are invalid. The creation of a permanent emergency stifles¶ public discussion, keeping surveillance within the realm of technical deliberation. Greenwald¶ thus spends time dismantling the illusion of the constant threat of terrorism, which he sees as¶ created to protect and expand governmental power.

General

Legal Debates Good

Simulated legal debates are crucial for social transformation---teaching legal **precision** is **net-better** for eliminating oppression **even if** one-shot legal solutions don't work the first time

Klare '11

(Karl Klare, George J. & Kathleen Waters Matthews Distinguished University Professor, Northeastern University School of Law, "Teaching Local 1330—Reflections on Critical Legal Pedagogy," ('11). School of Law Faculty Publications. Paper 167. http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20002528)

By now it has begun to dawn that one of the subjects of this class session is how lawyers translate their moral intuitions and sense of justice into legal arguments. Most beginning students have found themselves in the situation of wanting to express their **moral intuitions** in the form of legal arguments but of feeling powerless to do so. A common attitude of Northeastern students is that a lawyer **cannot turn moral and political convictions into legal arguments** in the context of case-litigation. If you are interested in directly pursuing a moral and/or political agenda, at a minimum you need to take up legislative and policy work, and more likely you need to **leave the law altogether and take up grass roots organizing** instead. I insist that we keep the focus on litigation for this class period. After the straw poll, I ask the students to simulate the role of Staughton Lynd's legal assistants and to assume that the court has just definitively rejected the claims based on contract, promissory estoppel, and the notion of a community property right. However, they should also assume, counter-factually, that Judge Lambros stayed dismissal of the suit for ten days to give plaintiffs one last opportunity to come up with a theory. I charge the students with the task of making a convincing common law argument, supported by respectable legal authority, that the plaintiffs were entitled to substantial relief. Put another way, I ask the students to prove that Judge Lambros was mistaken—that he was legally wrong—when he concluded that there was no basis in existing law to vindicate the workers' and community's rights. In some classroom exercises, I permit students to select the side for which they wish to argue, but I do not allow that in this session. All students are asked to **simulate the role** of plaintiffs' counsel and to **make the best arguments they can**—**either because they** actually **believe such arguments and/or because in their simulated role** they are fulfilling their ethical **duty to provide** zealous **representation**. A recurring, instant reflex is to say: "it's simple—the workers' human rights were violated in the Youngstown case." I remind the class that the challenge I set was to come up with a common law theory. The great appeal of human rights discourse for today's students is that it seems to provide a technical basis upon which their fervent moral and political commitments appear to be legally required. "What human rights?" I ask. The usual answers are (1) "they had a right to be treated like human beings" or (2) "surely there is some human right on which they can base their case." To the first argument I respond: "well, how they are entitled to be treated is exactly what the court is called upon in this case to decide. Counsel may not use a re-statement of the conclusion you wish the court to reach as the legal basis supporting that conclusion." To the second response I reply: "it would be nice if some recognized human right applied, but we are in the Northern District of Ohio in 1980. Can you cite a pertinent human rights instrument?" (Answer: "no.") The students then throw other ideas on the table. Someone always proposes that U.S. Steel's actions toward the community were "unconscionable." I point out that unconscionability is a defense to contract enforcement whereas the plaintiffs were seeking to enforce a contract (the alleged promise not to close the plant if it were rendered profitable). In any case, we have assumed that the judge has already ruled that there was no contract. Another suggestion is that plaintiffs go for restitution. A restitution claim arises when plaintiff gives or entrusts something of value to the defendant, and the defendant wrongfully refuses to pay for or return it. But here we are assuming that Judge Lambros has already ruled that the workers did not endow U.S. Steel with any property or value other than their labor power for which they were already compensated under the applicable collective bargaining agreements. If the community provided U.S. Steel with value in the nature of tax breaks or infrastructure development, the effect of Judge Lambros' ruling on the property claim is to say that these were not investments by the community but no-strings-attached gifts given in the hope of attracting or retaining the company's business. At this point I usually give a hint by saying, "if we've ruled out contract claims, and we've ruled property claims, what does that leave?" Aha, torts! A student then usually suggests that U.S. Steel committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).15 I point out that, even if it were successful, this theory would provide plaintiffs relief only for their emotional injuries, but not their economic or other losses, and most likely would not provide a basis for an injunction to keep the plant open. In any event, IIED is an intentional tort. What, I ask, is the evidence that U.S. Steel intends the plant shutdown to cause distress? The response that "they should know that emotional distress will result" is usually not good enough to make out an intentional tort. An astute student will point out that in some jurisdictions it is enough to prove that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for the likelihood that severe emotional distress would result. I allow that maybe there's something to that, but then shift ground by pointing out that a prima facie requirement of IIED is that the distress suffered go beyond what an "ordinary person" may be expected to endure or beyond the bounds of "civilized behavior."16 Everyone knows that plants close all the time and that the distress accompanying job-loss is a normal feature of American life. A student halfheartedly throws out negligent infliction of emotional distress, to which my reply is: "In what way is U.S. Steel's proposed conduct negligent? The problem we are up against here is precisely that the corporation is acting as a rational profit-maximizer." A student always proposes that plaintiffs should allege that what U.S. Steel did was "against public policy." First of all, I say, "public policy" is not a cause of action; it is a backdrop against which conduct or contract terms are assessed. Moreover, what public policy was violated in this case? The student will respond by saying "it is against public policy for U.S. Steel to leave the community devastated." I point out once again that that is the very conclusion for which we are contending—it is circular argument to assert a statement of our intended conclusion as the rationale for that conclusion. This dialogue continues for awhile. One ineffective theory after another is put on the table. Only once or twice in the decades I have taught this exercise have the students gotten close to a viable legal theory. **But this is not wasted time**—learning occurs in this phase of the exercise. The point conveyed is that while law and morals/politics are inextricably intertwined, they are not the same. For one thing, lawyers have a distinct way of talking about and analyzing problems that is characteristic of the legal culture of a given time and place. So-called "legal reasoning" is actually a repertoire of **conventional, culturally approved rhetorical moves and counter-moves** deployed by lawyers to create an appearance of the legal

necessity of the results for which they contend. In addition, good lawyers actually possess useful, specialized knowledge not generally absorbed by political theorists or movement activists. Legal training sensitizes us to the many complexities that arise whenever general norms and principles are implemented in the form of rules of decision or case applications. Lawyers know, for example, that large stakes may turn on precisely how a right is defined, who has standing to vindicate it, what remedies it provides, how the right is enforced and in what venue(s), and so on. We are not doing our jobs properly if we argue, simply, "what the defendant did was unjust and the plaintiff deserves relief." No one needs a lawyer to make the "what the defendant did was unjust" argument. As Lynd"s account shows, the workers of Youngstown did make that argument in their own, eloquent words and through their collective resistance to the shut-downs. If "what the defendant did was unjust" is all we have to offer, lawyers bring no added value to the table. Progressive students sometimes tell themselves that law is basically gobbledygook, but that you can assist movements for social change if you learn how to spout the right gobbledygook. In this view of legal practice, "creativity" consists in identifying an appropriate technicality that helps your client. But in the Youngstown situation, we are way past that naïve view. There is no "technicality" that can win the case. In this setting, a social justice lawyer must use the bits and pieces lying around to generate new legal knowledge and new legal theories. And these new theories must say something more than "my client deserves to win" (although it is fine to commence one"s research on the basis of that moral intuition). The class is beginning to get frustrated, and around now someone says "well, what do you expect? This is capitalism. There"s no way the workers were going to win." The "this-is-capitalism" ("TIC") statement sometimes comes from the right, sometimes from the left, and usually from both ends of the spectrum but in different ways. The TIC statement precipitates another teachable moment. I begin by saying that we need to tease out exactly what the student means by TIC, as several interpretations are possible. For example, TIC might be a prediction of what contemporary courts are most likely to do. That is, TIC might be equivalent to saying that "it doesn"t matter what theory you come up with; 999 US judges out of 1,000 would rule for U. S. Steel."17 I allow that this is probably true, but not very revealing. The workers knew what the odds were before they launched the case. Even if doomed to fail, a legal case may still make a contribution to social justice if the litigation creates a focal point of energy around which a community can mobilize, articulate moral and political claims, educate the wider public, and conduct political consciousness-raising. And if there is political value in pursuing a case, we might as well make good legal arguments. On an alternative reading, the TIC observation is more ambitious than a mere prediction. It might be a claim that a capitalist society requires a legal structure of a certain kind, and that therefore professionally acceptable legal reasoning within capitalist legal regimes cannot produce a theory that interrogates the status quo beyond a certain point. Put another way, some outcomes are so foreign to the bedrock assumptions of private ownership that they cannot be reached by respectable legal reasoning. A good example of an outcome that is incompatible with capitalism, so the argument goes, is a court order interfering with U.S. Steel"s decision to leave Youngstown. This reading of the TIC comment embodies the idea that legal discourse is encased within a deeper, extra-legal structure given by requirements of the social order (capitalism), so that within professionally responsible legal argument the best lawyers in the world could not state a winning theory in Local 1330. Ironically, the left and the right in the class often share this belief. I take both conservative and progressive students on about this. I insist that the claim that our law is constrained by a rigid meta-logic of capitalism—which curiously parallels the notion that legal outcomes are tightly constrained by legal reasoning—is just plain wrong. Capitalist societies recognize all sorts of limitations on the rights of property owners. Professor Singer"s classic article catalogues a multitude of them.18 The claim is not only false, it is a dangerous falsehood. To believe TIC in this sense is to limit in advance our aspirations for what social justice lawyering can accomplish.

Now the class begins to sense that I am not just playing law professor and asking rhetorical questions to which there are no answers. The students realize that I actually think that I have a theory up my sleeve that shows that Judge Lambros was wrong on the law. If things are going well, the students begin to feel an emotional stake in the exercise. Many who voted in the straw poll that the plaintiffs deserved to win are anxious to see whether I can pull it off. Other students probably engage emotionally for a different reason—the ones who have been skeptical or derisive of my approach all term hope that my "theory," when I eventually reveal it, is so implausible that I will fall flat on my face. I begin to feed the students more hints. One year I gave the hint, "What do straying livestock, leaking reservoirs, dynamite blasting, and unsafe products have in common?"—but that made it too easy. Usually my hints are more oblique, as in "does anything you learned about accident law ring a bell?" Whatever the form, the students take the hints, and some start cooking with gas. Over the next few minutes, the pieces usually fall into place. The legal theory toward which I have been steering the students is that U.S. Steel is strictly liable in tort for the negative social effects of its decision to disinvest in Youngstown. I contend that that is what the law provided in Ohio in 1980, and therefore a mechanism was available for the District Court to order substantial relief. A basic, albeit contested theme of modern tort law, which all students learn in first year, is that society allows numerous risky and predictably harmful activities to proceed because we deem those activities, on balance, to be worthwhile or necessary. In such cases, the law often imposes liability rules designed to make the activity pay for the injuries or accidents it inevitably causes. For more than a century, tort rules have been fashioned to force actors to take account of all consequences proximately attributable to their actions, so that they will internalize the relevant costs and price their products accordingly. The expectation is that in the ordinary course of business planning, the actor will perform a cost/benefit analysis to make sure that the positive values generated by the activity justify its costs. Here, I remind the students of the famous Learned Hand Carroll Towing formula19 comparing B vs. PL, where B represents the costs of accident avoidance (or of refraining from the activity when avoidance is impossible or too costly); and P x L (probability of the harm multiplied by the gravity of the harm) reflects foreseeable accident costs.20 The tort theory that evolved from this and similar cost/benefit approaches is called "market deterrence." The notion is that liability rules should be designed to induce the actor who is in the best position to conduct this kind of cost/benefit analysis with respect to a given activity to actually conduct it. Such actors will have incentives to make their products and activities safer and/or to develop safer substitute products and activities.21 Actors will then pass each activity"s residual accident costs on to consumers by "fractionating" and "spreading" such costs through their pricing decisions. As a result, prices will give consumers an accurate picture of the true social costs of the activity, including its accident costs. Consumers are thus enabled to make rational decisions about whether to continue purchasing the product or activity in light of its accident as well as its production costs. In principle, if a particular actor produces an unduly risky product (in the sense that its accident costs are above "market level"), that actor"s products will be priced above market, and he/she will be driven out of business.22 Tort rules have long been crafted with an eye toward compelling risky but socially valuable activities or enterprises to internalize their external costs. My examples—to which the students were exposed in first year—are the ancient rule imposing strict liability for crop damage caused by escaping livestock;23 strict liability under the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher for the escape of dangerous things brought onto one"s property;24 strict liability under Restatement (Second) § 519 for damage caused by "abnormally dangerous activities" such as dynamite blasting;25 and most recently, strict products liability.26 Of course, there are many exceptions to this approach. For example, "unavoidably unsafe" or "Comment k products" are deemed non-defective and therefore do not carry strict liability. And of course the U.S. largely rejected Rylands. Why was that? Because, as memorably stated in Losee v. Buchanan: "We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of all our civilization."27 In assuming that entrepreneurial capitalism would be stymied if enterprises were obliged to pay for the harms they cause, the Losee court accepted a strong version of TIC. Time permitting, I touch briefly on the debate about whether the flourishing of the negligence principle in the U.S. subsidized 19th century entrepreneurial capitalism,28 the possible implications of the Coase Theorem for our discussion of Local 1330,29 and the debate about whether it is appropriate for courts to fashion common law rules with an eye toward their distributive as well as efficiency consequences.30 With this as background, I argue that the District Court should

have treated capital mobility—investors" circulation of capital in search of the highest rate of return—as a risky but socially valuable activity warranting the same legal treatment as straying cattle and dynamite blasting. Capital mobility is socially valuable. It is indispensable for economic growth and flexibility. Capital mobility generates important positive externalities for "winners," such as economic development and job-creation at the new site of investment. However, capital mobility also predictably causes negative external effects on "bystanders" (the ones economists quaintly label "the losers"). We discussed some of these externalities at the outset of the class—the trauma associated with income interruption and pre-mature retirement, waste or destruction of human capital, multiplier effects on the local economy, and social pathologies and community decline of the kind experienced in Youngstown. The plaintiffs should have argued that capital mobility must internalize its social dislocation costs for reasons of economic efficiency, and that this can be accomplished by making investors strictly liable in tort for the social dislocation costs proximately caused by their capital mobility decisions. An investor considering shifting capital from one use to another will compare their respective rates of return. In theory, the investment with the higher return is socially optimal (as well as more profitable for the individual investor). The higher-return investment enlarges the proverbial pie. But investors must perform accurate comparisons of competing investment opportunities in order for the magic hand of the market to perform its magic. A rational investor bases her analysis primarily on price signals reflecting estimated rates of return on alternative investment options. This comparison will yield an irrational judgment leading to a socially suboptimal investment decision unless the estimated rate of return on the new investment reflects its external effects, both positive and negative. Investors often have public-relations incentives to tout the positive economic consequences promised at the new location. To guarantee rational decision making, the law must force investors contemplating withdrawal of capital from an enterprise to also carefully consider the negative social dislocation costs properly attributable to the activity of disinvestment. This can be achieved by making capital mobility strictly liable for its proximately caused social dislocation costs.31 This approach erects no inefficient barriers to capital mobility, nor does it bar all disinvestment decisions that may cause disruption and loss in the exit community. Other things being equal, if the new investment discounted by the social dislocation costs of exit will generate a higher rate of return than the current use of the capital, the capital should be disinvested from the old use and transferred to the new use. However, if investors are not forced by liability rules to take into account the social dislocation costs of disinvestment, the new investment opportunity will appear more attractive than it really is in a social sense. The situation involves a classic form of market failure. The market is imperfect because investors are not obliged to take into account the negative social dislocation costs proximately caused by their decisions. Inaccurate price signals lead to the overproduction of capital movement and therefore to a suboptimal allocation of resources. Apart from any severance and unemployment benefits received by workers at the old plant, the social dislocation costs of disinvestment are almost entirely externalized onto the workers and the surrounding community. Strict tort liability will induce investors and their downstream customers to fractionate and spread the dislocation costs of capital mobility when pricing the products of the new activity. This will provide those who use or benefit from the new activity at the destination community more accurate signals as to its true social costs and oblige them to fractionally share in the misfortunes afflicting the departure community. Suppose, for example, that U.S. Steel invested the money it took out of Youngstown toward construction of a modern, high-tech steel mill in a Sunbelt state. The price of steel produced at the new mill should fractionally reflect social dislocation costs in Youngstown. According to legal "common sense" and mainstream economic theory, the movement of capital from a lesser to a more profitable investment is an unambiguous social good. Allowing capital to migrate to its highest rate of return guarantees that society"s resources are devoted to their most productive uses. Society as a whole is better off if capital is permitted freely to migrate to the new investment and there to grow the pie. In short, the free mobility of capital maximizes aggregate welfare. We are all "winners" in the long run, even if some unfortunate "losers" might get hurt along the way. It follows as an article of faith that any legal inhibition on the mobility of capital is inefficient and socially wasteful. This is why mainstream legal thinking refuses to accord long-term workers or surrounding communities any sort of "property interest" in the enterprise which a departing investor is obliged to buy out before removal.32 An unwritten, bed-rock assumption of US law is that capital is not and should not be legally responsible for the social dislocation costs occasioned by its mobility.33 Such costs are mostly externalized onto employees and the surrounding community, even if the exit community had subsidized the old investment with tax breaks and similar forms of corporate welfare. The legal common sense about capital mobility is mistaken. It is not a priori true that the movement of capital toward the greatest rate of return unambiguously enhances aggregate social welfare. Free capital mobility maximizes aggregate welfare and allocates resources to their most productive uses only in a perfect market; that is, only in the absence of market failure. The claim that free capital mobility is efficient is sometimes true, and sometimes it is not. It all depends on the particular facts and circumstances on the ground. Voilà. Judge Lambros was wrong. In 1980, a mechanism did exist in our law to recognize the plaintiffs" claims and afford them substantial relief for economic, emotional, and other losses.34 All that was required was a logical extension of familiar torts thinking. Had Judge Lambros correctly applied well-known and time-honored torts principles, he would have treated the social dislocation costs of the plant closure as an externality that must be embedded in U.S. Steel"s calculations regarding the relative profitability of the old and new uses to which it might put its capital. This would close the gap between private and social costs, thereby tending to perfect the market. Notice an important rhetorical advantage of this theory—its core value is economic efficiency. The plaintiffs can get this far along in their argument without mentioning "fairness," "equity," or "justice," let alone "human rights," values that are often fatal to legal argument in U.S. courts today.35 I now brace myself for the "you gotta be kidding me" phase of the discussion. Objections cascade in. The progressive students want to be convinced that this is really happening. The mainstream students want to poke holes and debunk. A few of them are grateful at last for an opportunity to show how misguided they always knew my teaching was. Always, students assert that my summary discussion of the cost/benefit analysis omitted various costs and benefits. For example, one year I omitted to say that the social dislocation costs in the exit community must be discounted by ameliorative public expenditures such as unemployment insurance benefits. My response to this type of objection is always the same: "you are absolutely right, that cost or benefit should be included in the analysis. And here are a few more considerations we would need to address to perfect the cost/benefit analysis which I left out only in the interest of time." But I learn from this discussion; not infrequently, students contribute something I had not previously considered. A frequent objection is that the task of quantifying the social dislocation costs associated with capital mobility is just too complicated and difficult. I concede that it is a complex task and that conservative estimates might be required in place of absolute precision. I ask, however, whether it is preferable to allow investors to proceed on the basis of price-signals we know to be wrong or to induce them to use best efforts to arrive at fair estimates. Separation of powers always comes up, as it should. I go through the usual riffs. Yes, I concede, these problems cry out for a comprehensive legislative solution rather than case-by-case adjudication. But standard, well-known counter-arguments suggest that Judge Lambros should nevertheless have imposed tort liability in this case. For one thing, determining the rules of tort liability has always been within the province of courts. Deferring to the status quo (that those who move capital are not legally responsible for negative externalities) is every bit as much a choice, every bit as much "activism" or "social engineering," as altering the status quo. Legal history is filled with cases in which the legislature was only prompted to address an important public policy concern by the shock value of a court decision. Particularly is this so in cases involving the rights and interests of marginalized, insular, and under-represented groups like aging industrial workers. I note that Congress eventually responded to the plant closing problem with the WARN Act, a modest but not unimportant effort to internalize to enterprises some of the social dislocation costs of capital disinvestment. The statute liquidates these costs into a sum equal to sixty days" pay after an employer orders a plant closing or mass layoff without giving proper notice.36 I call the students" attention to the provision of WARN barring federal courts from enjoining plant closings37 and ask why Congress might have included that restriction. Another common objection concerns causation. A student will say: "The closedown of the mills, let alone the shutdown of any particular plant, could not have caused all of the suicides, heart failures, domestic violence, and so on, in Youngstown. Surely many such tragedies would have occurred anyway, even if U.S. Steel had remained. It isn"t fair to impose liability on U.S. Steel for everything bad that happened in Youngstown during the statute-of-limitations period." I immediately say that this is a terrific point, and that I was hoping someone would raise it. I compliment the student by saying that the question shows that he/she is now tapping legal knowledge. Typically, the class is concerned with causation-in-fact or "but for" causation. Their question is, how do we know that a plant shutdown caused any particular case of heart failure or suicide in Youngstown? Problems of causal uncertainty are a familiar issue, and I remind students that they were exposed to several well-known responses in Torts. A time-honored, if simplistic device is to shift the burden of proof regarding causationinfact to the defendant, when everyone knows full well that the defendant has no more information than the plaintiff with which to resolve the problem of causal uncertainty.38 In recent decades, courts have developed more sophisticated responses to problems of causal uncertainty as, for example, in the DES cases. As the court stated in Sindell:39 In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer. The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs. Just as Justice Traynor in his landmark concurring opinion in Escola . . . recognized that in an era of mass production and complex marketing methods the traditional standard of negligence was insufficient to govern the obligations of manufacturer to consumer, so should we acknowledge that some adaptation of the rules of causation and liability may be appropriate in these recurring circumstances . . . .40 At this point, some of the progressive students are beginning to salivate. They came to law school with the hope that legal reasoning would provide them a highly refined and politically neutral technology for speaking truth to power. The first semester disabuses most of them of that crazy idea. They have learned that they will not find certainty or answers in legal discourse, and that legal texts are minefields of gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities with moral and political implications. I can tell from the glint in their eyes that they are beginning to ask themselves whether this economics stuff, which they formerly shunned like the plague, might provide a substitute toolbox of neutral technologies with which to demonstrate that redress for workers and other subordinated and marginalized groups is legally required. I cannot allow them to think that. Therefore, unless an alert student has spotted it, I now reveal my Achilles" heel. The weak link in my argument is the age-old question of proximate causation. Assume we solve the causation-in-fact problem. For example, assume that by analogy to the Sindell theory of market-share liability, the court arrives at a fair method of attributing to the plant shutdown some portion of the social trauma and injuries occurring in the wake of U.S. Steel"s departure from Youngstown. How do we know whether the plant closing proximately caused these harms? What do we mean by "proximate causation" anyway, and why does it matter? These questions present another exciting, teachable moment. Naturally, the students haven"t thought about proximate cause since first year. They barely remember what it is and how it differs from causation-in-fact. Some 3Ls shuffle uncomfortably knowing that the Bar examination looms, and they are soon going to need to know about this. I provide a quick review of proximate causation which addresses the question, how far down the chain of causation should liability reach? I illustrate my points by referring to Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R,41 which all law students remember. Perhaps U.S. Steel might fairly be held accountable for the suicide of steelworkers within ninety days of the plant closing, but we might draw the line before holding U.S. Steel liable for a stroke suffered by a steelworker"s spouse five years later. Now keyed in to what proximate cause doctrine is about, the students eagerly wait for me to tell them what the "answer" is, that is, where proximate causation doctrine would draw the line in the Youngstown case. That"s when I give them the bad news. I explain that proximate causation doctrine does not provide a determinate analytical method for measuring the scope of liability. We pretend that buzzwords like "reasonable foreseeability" or "scope-of-the-risk" give us answers, but ultimately decisions made under the rubric of proximate causation are always value judgments.42 The conclusion that "X proximately caused Y" is a statement about the type of society we want to live in. At this juncture, the 3Ls grumpily realize that I am not going to be much help in preparing

them for their bar review course. I now distribute a one-page hand-out on proximate causation prepared in advance. The handout reprints Justice Andrews' remarkable observation in his Palsgraf dissent: What we . . . mean by the word „proximate" is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics . . . . It is all a question of expediency. There are no fixed rules to govern our judgment. There are simply matters of which we may take account.43 I point out that causation-in-fact analysis, too, always involves perspective and value judgments.44 Why assume that water escaping the reservoir diminished the value of the neighboring coal mining company's land? Why not assume that the coal company's decision to dig close to the border diminished the value of the manufacturer's land (by increasing the cost of using the type of reservoir needed in its production process)? For that matter, why assume that the cattle trample on the neighbors' crops? Why not assume that the crops get in the way of the cattle? My handout also contains my variation on Robert Keeton's famous definition of proximate cause45: When a court states that „the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of (some portion of) the plaintiff's injuries," what the court means is that (1) the defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of that portion of plaintiff's injuries; and (2) the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's specified injuries are so related that it is appropriate, from the moral and social-policy points of view, to hold the defendant legally responsible for that portion of the plaintiff's injuries. What we mean when we ask whether the social dislocation costs associated with the shutdown of the steel plant were proximately caused by capital mobility is whether these costs are, in whole or in part, properly attributable from a moral/political point of view to U.S. Steel's decision to disinvest. Economic "science" does not and cannot establish in a value-neutral manner that the social dislocation costs of the plant shutdown are a negative externality of capital mobility. A conclusion of that kind requires a value judgment that we disguise under

the rubric of "proximate causation," a value judgment about whom it is appropriate to ask to bear what costs related to what injuries. The lesson is that in legal reasoning there is no escape from moral and political choice. If things have gone according to plan, time conveniently runs out, and the class is dismissed on that note. What am I trying to accomplish in a class like this? What are the objectives of critical legal pedagogy? Legal education should empower students. It should put them in touch with their own capacity to take control over their lives and professional education and development. It should enable them to experience the possibility of participating, as lawyers, in transformative social movements. But all too often classroom legal education is deadening. The law student's job, mastering doctrine, appears utterly unconnected to any process of learning about oneself or developing one's moral, political, or professional identity. Classroom legal education tends to reinforce a sense of powerlessness about our capacity to change social institutions. Indeed, it often induces students to feel that they are powerless to shape and alter their own legal education. Much of legal education induces in students a pervasive and exaggerated sense of the constraint of legal rules and roles and the students' inability to do much about it. In capsule form, the goals of critical legal pedagogy are— • to disrupt the socialization process that occurs during legal education; • to unfreeze entrenched habits of mind and deconstruct the false claims of necessity which constitute so-called "legal reasoning"; • to urge students to see their life's work ahead as an opportunity to unearth and challenge law's dominant ideas about society, justice, and human possibility and to infuse legal rules and practices with emancipatory and egalitarian content; • to persuade students that legal discourses and practices comprise a medium, neither infinitely plastic nor inalterably rigid, in which they can pursue moral and political projects and articulate alternative visions of social organization and social justice; • to train them to argue professionally and respectably for the utopian and the impossible; • to alert them that legal cases potentially provide a forum for intense public consciousness-raising about issues of social justice; • to encourage them to view legal representation as an opportunity to challenge, push, and relocate the boundaries between intra-systemic and extra-systemic activity, that is, an opportunity to work within the system in a way that reconstitutes it; and • to show that the existing social order is not immutable but "is merely possible, and that people have the freedom and power to act upon it."46 The most important point of the class is that social justice lawyers never give up. The appropriate response when you think you have a hopeless case is to go back and do more work in the legal medium.

Fiat Good AT: Agency Turn

Fiat good

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["CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management," *Environment and Planning C* 39 (4)]

For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of 'innovation studies', for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we've suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion. However, we are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an **'illusion of agency'**, and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues '**illusions are productive** because they **motivate action** and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved' (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the **dynamics of change**: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are **necessary to processes within**. This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

Warming Debates Good

It's specifically true for climate policy

Mitchell 10

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The watchwords for the intelligence community's debating initiative— collaboration, critical thinking, collective awareness—resonate with key terms anchoring the study of deliberative democracy. In a major new text, John Gastil defines deliberation as a process whereby people "carefully examine a problem and arrive at a well-reasoned solution aft er a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of diverse points of view."40 Gastil and his colleagues in organizations such as the Kettering Foundation and the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation are pursuing a research program that foregrounds the democratic telos of deliberative processes. Work in this area features a blend of concrete interventions and studies of citizen empowerment.41 Notably, a key theme in much of this literature concerns the relationship between deliberation and debate, with the latter term often loaded with pejorative baggage and working as a negative foil to highlight the positive qualities of deliberation.42 "Most political discussions, however, are debates. Stories in the media turn politics into a never-ending series of contests. People get swept into taking sides; their energy goes into figuring out who or what they're for or against," says Kettering president David Mathews and coauthor Noelle McAfee. "Deliberation is different. It is neither a partisan argument where opposing sides try to win nor a casual conversation conducted with polite civility. Public deliberation is a means by which citizens make tough choices about basic purposes and directions for their communities and their country. It is a way of reasoning and talking together."43 Mathews and McAfee's distrust of the debate process is almost paradigmatic amongst theorists and practitioners of Kettering-style deliberative democracy. One conceptual mechanism for reinforcing this debate-deliberation opposition is characterization of debate as a process inimical to deliberative aims, with debaters adopting dogmatic and fixed positions that frustrate the deliberative objective of "choice work." In this register, Emily Robertson observes, "unlike deliberators, debaters are typically not open to the possibility of being shown wrong. . . . Debaters are not trying to find the best solution by keeping an open mind about the opponent's point of view."44 Similarly, founding documents from the University of Houston–Downtown's Center for Public Deliberation state, "Public deliberation is about choice work, which is different from a dialogue or a debate. In dialogue, people oft en look to relate to each other, to understand each other, and to talk about more informal issues. In debate, there are generally two positions and people are generally looking to 'win' their side."45 Debate, cast here as the theoretical scapegoat, provides a convenient, low-water benchmark for explaining how other forms of deliberative interaction better promote cooperative "choice work." The Kettering-inspired framework receives support from perversions of the debate process such as vapid presidential debates and verbal pyrotechnics found on Crossfire-style television shows.46 In contrast, the intelligence community's debating initiative stands as a nettlesome anomaly for these theoretical frameworks, with debate serving, rather than frustrating, the ends of deliberation. The presence of such an anomaly would seem to point to the wisdom of fashioning a theoretical orientation that frames the debate-deliberation connection in contingent, rather than static terms, with the relationship between the categories shift ing along with the various contexts in which they manifest in practice.47 Such an approach gestures toward the importance of rhetorically informed critical work on multiple levels. First, the contingency of situated practice invites analysis geared to assess, in particular cases, the extent to which debate practices enable and/ or constrain deliberative objectives. Regarding the intelligence community's debating initiative, such an analytical perspective highlights, for example, the tight connection between the deliberative goals established by intelligence officials and the cultural technology manifest in the bridge project's online debating applications such as Hot Grinds. An additional dimension of nuance emerging from this avenue of analysis pertains to the precise nature of the deliberative goals set by bridge. Program descriptions notably eschew Kettering-style references to democratic citizen empowerment, yet feature deliberation prominently as a key ingredient of strong intelligence tradecraft . Th is caveat is especially salient to consider when it comes to the second category of rhetorically informed critical work invited by the contingent aspect of specific debate initiatives. To grasp this layer it is useful to appreciate how the name of the bridge project constitutes an invitation for those outside the intelligence community to participate in the analytic outreach eff ort. According to Doney, bridge "provides an environment for Analytic Outreach—a place where IC analysts can reach out to expertise elsewhere in federal, state, and local government, in academia, and industry. New communities of interest can form quickly in bridge through the 'web of trust' access control model—access to minds outside the intelligence community creates an analytic force multiplier."48 This presents a moment of choice for academic scholars in a position to respond to Doney's invitation; it is an opportunity to convert scholarly expertise into an "analytic force multiplier." In reflexively pondering this invitation, it may be valuable for scholars to read Greene and Hicks's proposition that switch-side debating should be viewed as a cultural technology in light of Langdon Winner's maxim that "technological artifacts have politics."49 In the case of bridge, politics are informed by the history of intelligence community policies and practices. Commenter Th omas Lord puts this point in high relief in a post off ered in response to a news story on the topic: "[W]hy should this thing ('bridge') be? . . . [Th e intelligence community] on the one hand sometimes provides useful information to the military or to the civilian branches and on the other hand it is a dangerous, out of control, relic that by all external appearances is not the slightest bit reformed, other than superficially, from such excesses as became exposed in the cointelpro and mkultra hearings of the 1970s."50 A debate scholar need not agree with Lord's full-throated criticism of the intelligence community (he goes on to observe that it bears an alarming resemblance to organized crime) to understand that participation in the community's Analytic Outreach program may serve the ends of deliberation, but not necessarily democracy, or even a defensible politics. Demand-driven rhetoric of science necessarily raises questions about what's driving the demand, questions that scholars with relevant expertise would do well to ponder carefully before embracing invitations to contribute their argumentative expertise to deliberative projects. By the same token, it would be prudent to bear in mind that the technological determinism about switch-side debate endorsed by Greene and Hicks may tend to flatten reflexive assessments regarding the wisdom of supporting a given debate initiative—as the next section illustrates, manifest differences among initiatives warrant context-sensitive judgments regarding the normative political dimensions featured in each case. Public Debates in the EPA Policy Process Th e preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of diff erent kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to

stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions craft ed to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were craft ed to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 107 debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of diff erent policy options. In so doing, the diff ering, oft en tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutinized. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate eff orts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. Th e dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public 108 Rhetoric & Public Affairs debate" diff ers both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 bc), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 Th e few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchesthe, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchesthe, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 109 Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchesthe, as well as

in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft , such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. Th e significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchesthe, alliance formation. Th e intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (hbcus) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in hbcus across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. Th is dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of hbcu-leveraged dissoi logoi diff ers significantly from the intelligence community's eff ort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such diff erence is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: 110 Rhetoric & Public Affairs Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation. Conclusion Dilip Gaonkar's criticism of first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship rests on a key claim regarding what he sees as the inherent "thinness" of the ancient Greek rhetorical lexicon.72 That lexicon, by virtue of the fact that it was invented primarily to teach rhetorical performance, is ill equipped in his view to support the kind of nuanced discriminations required for eff ective interpretation and critique of rhetorical texts. Although Gaonkar isolates rhetoric of science as a main target of this critique, his choice of subject matter Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 111 positions him to toggle back and forth between specific engagement with rhetoric of science scholarship and discussion of broader themes touching on the metatheoretical controversy over rhetoric's proper scope as a field of inquiry (the so-called big vs. little rhetoric dispute).73 Gaonkar's familiar refrain in both contexts is a warning about the dangers of "universalizing" or "globalizing" rhetorical inquiry, especially in attempts that "stretch" the classical Greek rhetorical vocabulary into a hermeneutic metadiscourse, one pressed into service as a master key for interpretation of any and all types of communicative artifacts. In other words, Gaonkar warns against the dangers of rhetoricians pursuing what might be called supply-side epistemology, rhetoric's project of pushing for greater disciplinary relevance by attempting to extend its reach into far-flung areas of inquiry such as the hard sciences. Yet this essay highlights how rhetorical scholarship's relevance can be credibly established by outsiders, who seek access to the creative energy flowing from the classical Greek rhetorical lexicon in its native mode, that is, as a tool of invention designed to spur and hone rhetorical performance. Analysis of the intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives shows how this is the case, with government agencies calling for assistance to animate rhetorical processes such as dissoi logoi (debating different sides) and synerchesthe (the performative task of coming together deliberately for the purpose of joint inquiry, collective choice-making, and renewal of communicative bonds).74 Th is demand-driven epistemology is diff erent in kind from the globalization project so roundly criticized by Gaonkar. Rather than rhetoric venturing out from its own academic home to proselytize about its epistemological universality for all knowers, instead here we have actors not formally trained in the rhetorical tradition articulating how their own deliberative objectives call for incorporation of rhetorical practice and even recruitment of "strategically located allies"75 to assist in the process. Since the productivist content in the classical Greek vocabulary serves as a critical resource for joint collaboration in this regard, demand-driven rhetoric of science turns Gaonkar's original critique on its head. In fairness to Gaonkar, it should be stipulated that his 1993 intervention challenged the way rhetoric of science had been done to date, not the universe of ways rhetoric of science might be done in the future. And to his partial credit, Gaonkar did acknowledge the promise of a performance-oriented rhetoric of science, especially one informed by classical thinkers other than Aristotle.76 In his Ph.D. dissertation on "Aspects of Sophistic Pedagogy," Gaonkar documents how the ancient sophists were "the greatest champions" 112 Rhetoric & Public Affairs of "socially useful" science,77 and also how the sophists essentially practiced the art of rhetoric in a translational, performative register: Th e sophists could not blithely go about their business of making science useful, while science itself stood still due to lack of communal support and recognition. Besides, sophistic pedagogy was becoming increasingly dependent on the findings of contemporary speculation in philosophy and science. Take for instance, the eminently practical art of rhetoric. As taught by the best of the sophists, it was not simply a handbook of recipes which anyone could mechanically employ to his advantage. On the contrary, the strength and vitality of sophistic rhetoric came from their ability to incorporate the relevant information obtained from the on-going research in other fields.78 Of course, deep trans-historical diff erences make uncritical appropriation of classical Greek rhetoric for contemporary use a fool's errand. But to gauge from Robert Hariman's recent reflections on the enduring salience of Isocrates, "timely, suitable, and eloquent appropriations" can help us postmoderns "forge a new political language" suitable for addressing the complex raft of intertwined problems facing global society. Such retrospection is long overdue, says Hariman, as "the history, literature, philosophy,

oratory, art, and political thought of Greece and Rome have never been more accessible or less appreciated."79 Th is essay has explored ways that some of the most venerable elements of the ancient Greek rhetorical tradition—those dealing with debate and deliberation—can be retrieved and adapted to answer calls in the contemporary milieu for cultural technologies capable of dealing with one of our time's most daunting challenges. This challenge involves finding meaning in inverted rhetorical situations characterized by an endemic surplus of

heterogeneous content.

The skills acquired in the process of debating warming policy are necessary and sufficient to overcome political apathy and dissuasion

Herbeck and Isham 10

http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/775

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Herbeck, member of the Rubenstein School of Environment and Natural Resources and the Honors College.

Getting to 350 parts per million CO2 in the atmosphere will require massive investments in clean-energy infrastructure—investments that can too often be foiled by a combination of special interests and political sclerosis. Take the recent approval of the Cape Wind project by the U.S. Department of the Interior. In some ways, this was great news for clean-energy advocates: the project's 130 turbines will produce, on average, 170 megawatts of electricity, almost 75 percent of the average electricity demand for Cape Cod and the islands of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket.1 But, because of local opposition by well-organized opponents, the approval process was lengthy, costly, and grueling —and all for a project that will produce only 0.04 percent of the total (forecasted) U.S. electricity demand in 2010.2,3 Over the next few decades, the world will need thousands of large-scale, low-carbon electricity projects—wind, solar, and nuclear power will certainly be in the mix. But if each faces Cape Wind–like opposition, getting to 350 is unlikely. How can the decision-making process about such projects be streamlined so that public policy reflects the view of a well-informed majority, provides opportunities for legitimate critiques, but does not permit the opposition to retard the process indefinitely? One answer is found in a set of innovative policy-making tools founded on the principle of deliberative democracy, defined as "decision making by discussion among free and equal citizens."4 Such approaches, which have been developed and led by the Center for Deliberative Democracy (cdd.stanford.edu), America Speaks (www.americaspeaks.org), and the Consensus Building Institute (cbuilding.org), among others, are gaining popularity by promising a new foothold for effective citizen participation in the drive for a clean-energy future. Deliberative democracy stems from the belief that democratic leadership should involve educating constituents about issues at hand, and that citizens may

significantly alter their opinions when faced with information about these issues. Advocates of the approach state that democracy should shift away from fixed notions toward a learning process in which people develop defensible positions.5 While the approaches of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, America Speaks, and the Consensus Building Institute do differ, all of these deliberative methodologies involve unbiased sharing of information and public-policy alternatives with a representative set of citizens; a moderated process of deliberation among the selected citizens; and the collection and dissemination of data resulting from this process. For example, in the deliberative polling approach used by the Center for Deliberative Democracy, a random selection of citizens is first polled on a particular issue. Then, members of the poll are invited to gather at a single place to discuss the issue. Participants receive balanced briefing materials to review before the gathering, and at the gathering they engage in dialogue with competing experts and political leaders based on questions they develop in small group discussions. After deliberations, the sample is asked the original poll questions, and the resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions that the public would reach if everyone were given the opportunity to become more informed on pressing issues.6 If policymakers look at deliberative polls rather than traditional polls, they will be able to utilize results that originate from an informed group of citizens. As with traditional polls, deliberative polls choose people at random to represent U.S. demographics of age, education, gender, and so on. But traditional polls stop there, asking the random sample some brief, simple questions, typically online or over the phone. However, participants of deliberative polls have the opportunity to access expert information and then talk with one another before voting on policy recommendations. The power of this approach is illustrated by the results of a global deliberative process organized by World Wide Views on Global Warming (www.wwviews.org), a citizen's deliberation organization based in Denmark.7 On September 26, 2009, approximately 4,000 people gathered in 38 countries to consider what should happen at the UN climate change negotiations in Copenhagen (338 Americans met in five major cities). The results derived from this day of deliberation were dramatic and significantly different from results of traditional polls. Overall, citizens showed strong concern about global warming and support for climate-change legislation, contrary to the outcomes of many standard climate-change polls. Based on the polling results from these gatherings, 90 percent of global citizens believe that it is urgent for the UN negotiations to produce a new climate change agreement; 88 percent of global citizens (82 percent of U.S. citizens) favor holding global warming to within 2 degrees Celsius of pre-industrial levels; and 74 percent of global citizens (69 percent of U.S. citizens) favor increasing fossil-fuel prices in developed countries. However, a typical news poll that was conducted two days before 350.org's International Day of Climate Action on October 24, 2009, found that Americans had an overall declining concern about global warming.7 How can deliberative democracy help to create solutions for the climate-change policy process, to accelerate the kinds of policies and public investments that are so crucial to getting the world on a path to 350? Take again the example of wind in the United States. In the mid-1990s, the Texas Public Utilities Commission (PUC) launched an "integrated resource plan" to develop long-term strategies for energy production, particularly electricity.8 Upon learning about the deliberative polling approach of James Fishkin (then at the University of Texas at Austin), the PUC set up deliberative sessions for several hundred customers in the vicinity of every major utility provider in the state. The results were a surprise: it turned out that participants ranked reliability and stability of electricity supply as more important characteristics than price. In addition, they were open to supporting renewable energy, even if the costs slightly exceeded fossil-fuel sources. Observers considered this a breakthrough: based on these public deliberations, the PUC went on to champion an aggressive renewable portfolio standard, and the state has subsequently experienced little of the opposition to wind-tower siting that has slowed development in other states.8 By 2009, Texas had 9,500 megawatts of installed wind capacity, as much as the next six states (ranked by wind capacity) in the windy lower and upper Midwest (Iowa, Minnesota, Colorado, North Dakota, Kansas, and New Mexico).9 Deliberative democracy has proven effective in a wide range of countries and settings. In the Chinese township of Zeguo, a series of deliberative polls has helped the Local People's Congress (LPC) to become a more effective decision-making body.10 In February 2008, 175 citizens were randomly selected to scrutinize the town's budget—and 60 deputies from the LPC observed the process. After the deliberations, support decreased for budgeting for national defense projects, while support rose for infrastructure (e.g., rural road construction) and environmental protection. Subsequently, the LPC increased support for environmental projects by 9 percent.10 In decades to come, China must be at the forefront of the world's investments in clean-energy infrastructure. The experience of Zeguo, if scaled up and fully supported by Chinese leaders, can help to play an important role. Deliberative democracy offers one solution for determining citizen opinions, including those on pressing issues related to climate change and clean energy.

AT: Discourse First

Discourse fails

Schwartz, 9

(Joseph, Poli Sci Prof @ Temple, "The Future of Democratic Equality," Routledge, pg 64-5)

'Discursive' performance is not the sole manner by which individuals deal with (and express) the material and cultural structural realities that both empower and constrain individuals. For example. **individuals cannot readily "discursively perform" themselves out of their socio-economic or class position.** There is a certain materiality to poverty or to being "bossed" that can't simply be "ironically" and "performatively" transformed. Class relations are structural, as well as discursive. The greater difficulty in forming unions in the United States- as compared to other advanced industrial democracies- has much to do with American legal, ideological, and political constraints and not simply with the rel- ative inefficacy of the "performative," "counter-hegemonic" behavior of (frag- mented) individuals. Even the "parodic" possibilities of "gender" reversal are constrained by the communities in which one resides. **Is the "reversal" of "drag" a viable public possibility in a violently homophobic community?** Were not the "performative" options of a Matthew Sheperd (extremely) more limited than those of a gay or lesbian student at a "progressive" residential liberal arts college (and unsafe-and even degrading and violent-social spaces confront gay and lesbian people and women and students of color in the most allegedly "cosmopolitan" of social spaces). Simply put, **distinct "social spaces" set differ- ential constraints on "performative" choices.** Of course, how individuals express class, race, gender, and sexuality does, in part, involve how we "perform" (or "racist") cultural and discursive "norms." Hence, the inevitable controversies over "authenticity" within racial, sexual, and ethnic communities, as well as criticism of people taking on the mores of a class different from those who share their "place" in the labor process, neighborhood, or income strata. But there are material constraints to **performative "choice": one can't "perform" one's way out of an under-funded inner city school** or out of being a **laid-off auto worker with dim prospects of finding a new job with comparable wages and benefits.** Traditional sociological theories of **"structuration"** provide **greater insight into how these individuals would deal with these social dilemmas** than do **micro-level theories of the discursive construction of subjectivity.** To her credit, Wendy Brown is more concerned with issues of class and political economy than are many post-structuralist political theorists. She expressly claims to bring class back into her political analysis and condemns identity poli- tics as a "phantasmagorical reflection of the 'middle-class' American dream." But there is little attention in her work to developing a political strategy that could promise a structural and material redistribution of power, rather than an alter- ation of how we think of epistemology, discourse, and politics." While ideology and culture play a relatively autonomous role in constituting subjectivity, both have a material structure that must be altered if society is to be democratized. Brown implies that radical social change does not as much involve democratiz- ing social structural relations as it does popularizing a radical epistemological approach to discourse. Brown argues that if we will ourselves to "surrender epis- temological foundations" and give up "specifically moral claims" we will all be able to engage in "the sheerly political: 'wars of position' and amoral contests about the just and good in which truth is always grasped as coterminous with power, as always already power, as the voice of power.""" Even if one resists asking whether democracy can rest on "amoral" principles, one can still ask whether Brown's Foucauldian assertation that power and truth are co-terminous can distinguish between more or less democratic forms of power? The post-structuralist hyper- emphasis on "discourse" and the agonal construction of the self also overly devalues the state as an arena for political reform. Brown's work makes a positive political contribution by warning social movements about fetishing the struggle for group rights within the law as potential minefields of "reversed" power/knowledge formations. State regulation and technocratic control which claim to defend the interests of newly, legally- recognized identities may yield the perverse consequence of "domesticating" the identity of the insurgent social group (e.g. state micro-management of the work place in "comparable worth legislation," or enforcement of patriarchal values in regard to punitive workfare or "child support" regulation)?" Sometimes, as Brown contends, new-found rights may enhance separation and alienation between and within individuals and groups, as well as constitute new forms of state regulation in the name of the impersonal subject. But Brown rejects the possibility (and historical reality) that new "rights" can, in other contexts, con- tribute to human emancipation by enhancing individual choice and freedom. To deny this is to ignore the elective affinity between the struggle for "rights" and struggles to achieve political equality for formerly subordinate peoples. Not all new-found rights are "co-optative" and a "reinscribing of domination.""7 Nor will the conflict within the American polity over how we should interpret and defend

"rights" ever cease. One only has to witness contemporary political con- conflict over "abortion rights," "voting rights," "gun rights," etc. Rights are both politically contested and protective of certain forms of human choice and agency. Rights do not "fix" identities as intransigently as Brown and other post-structuralists claim. Do rights only serve, as Brown contends, to promote "the discursive denial of historically layered and institutionally secured bounds, by denying with words the effects of relatively wordless, politically invisible, yet material constraints"?" Patri- cia Williams and other critical race theorists have argued that being included under the state's equal protection law helped limit violence against people of color." Despite legitimate fears about excessive state regulation of sexuality, would Brown reject the use of state force to limit domestic violence? How does her philosophical fear of the bureaucratic-regulatory powers of the state speak to the experience of hundreds of thousands of women who have been spared the "privatization" of domestic violence by the extension of the rights of state author- ity (e.g. the police) to act against violence within the household? Are such prac- tices solely evidence of the "reconstruction of domination by the regulation of the technocratic-bureaucratic state"? Of course, state regulation of domestic violence may, in Brown's language, produce a female subject "dependent upon the pater- nal state" for protection. But is this not preferable to the prior form of paternal state that let a man be the violent definer of "rights" in his home?

AT: Individual Ethics First

Individual ethical orientations aren't effective – it's more productive to rearticulate systems from the inside

Pugh 10

(Jonathan, Newcastle Postcolonial Geographer, "The Stakes of Radical Politics have Changed: Post-crisis, Relevance and the State", Globalizations, March-June, ebsco)

In this polemical piece I have just been talking about how, following an ethos of radicalism as withdrawal from the state, some from the radical Left were incapable of being able to respond to the new stakes of radical politics. In particular, they were not found at the state, where the passive public turned to resolve the crisis. I will now go on to examine how in recent years significant parts of the radical Left have also tended to prioritise raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities, over capturing state power. I am going to say that it is important to create this awareness. However, in an effort to draw attention to the stakes of politics as we find them now, post-2008, I will also point out that we should not place too much faith in this approach alone. Against the backdrop of what I have just been saying, it is important to remember that while much attention is focused upon President Obama, in many other parts of the world the Right and fundamentalism are gaining strength through capturing state power. The perception that the USA has changed is accompanied by a sense of relief among many radicals. However, the European Elections of 2009, the largest trans-national vote in history, heralded a continent-wide shift to the Right (and far Right) in many places—in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portgual, Slovenia, Spain, Romania, as just some examples (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Despite Obama's election and a near depression, neo-liberalism continues to be implemented through a world spanning apparatus of governmental and intergovernmental organisations, think tanks and trans-national corporations (Massey, 2009; Castree, 2009). The power of the Right in countries like Iran, while checked, remains unchallenged by the Left. Albertazzi et al. (2009) draw attention to how a disconnected Left is leaving power in the hands of the Right in many other countries nationally, like Italy for example. Reflecting upon contemporary radical politics, the British Labour politician Clare Short (2009, p. 67) concludes: In the fog of the future, I see a rise of fascistic movements . . . I am afraid it will all get nastier before we see a rise in generous, radical politics, but I suspect that history is about to speed up in front of our eyes and all who oppose the radicalisation of fear, ethnic hatred, racialism and division have to be ready to create a new movement that contains the solutions to the monumental historical problems we currently face. So, the stakes of politics are clear. The Right is on the rise. Neo-liberal ideology is still dominant. How is the Left responding to these stakes? I have already discussed how some from the radical Left are placing too much faith in civil society organisations that seek to withdraw from the state. I will now turn to how others have too much faith in the power of raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities. Post-crisis, the increasing popularity of David Chandler's (2004, 2007, 2009a, 2009b) work reflects the sense that radicals too often celebrate the ethical individual as a radical force, at the expense of wider representational programmes for change **His central argument is that this leaves radicals impotent**. Chandler (2009a, p. 78–79) says that many radicals argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones– **there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement** It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society. In one way, Chandler's reflective insight here is not particularly unique. Many others also seem to think that radicals today are too isolated and disengaged (Martin, 2009).5 Neither is it particularly original to say that there is too much emphasis upon creativity and spontaneity (what Richard Sennett, 2004, calls 'social jazz'), and not enough upon representational politics. Indeed, go to many radical blogs and you find radicals themselves constantly complaining about how it has become too easy to sign up to ethical web petitions, email complaints, join a variety of ethical causes, without actually developing the political programmes themselves that matter. So it is not Chandler's point about radicals being disengaged from instrumental politics that concerns me here. It is his related point—that there has been a flight into ethics, away from political accountability and responsibility that I find intriguing. Personal statements of ethical awareness have become particularly important within radical politics today. It is therefore interesting to note, as I will now discuss, that we have been here before. In his earlier writings Karl Marx (1982) criticised the German Idealists for retreating into ethics, instead of seizing the institutions of power that mattered for themselves. Unwilling to express their self-interests politically through capturing power, the Idealists would rather make statements about their ethical awareness. Such idealism, along with an unwillingness to be held accountable for political power, often goes hand in hand. For Marx, it is necessary to feel the weight, but also the responsibility of power. Chandler argues that, just as when the early Marx critiqued German Idealism, we should now be drawing attention to the pitfalls of the flights to ethics today. He says: In the case of the German bourgeoisie, Marx concludes that it is their weakness and fragmentation, squeezed between the remnants of the ancien re´gime and the developing industrial proletariat, which explains their ideological flight into values. Rather than take on political responsibility for overthrowing the old order, the German bourgeoisie denied their specific interests and idealised progress in the otherwoldly terms of abstract philosophy, recoiling from the consequences of their liberal aspirations in practice. (Chandler, 2007, p. 717) Today we are witnessing a renewed interest in ethics (Lai¨di, 1998; Badiou, 2002). Fragmented, many radicals retreat into abstract ethical slogans like 'another world is possible', 'global human rights', or 'making poverty history'. As discussed above, we are also of course seeing the return of Kant's cosmopolitanism. While I think we should not attack the ethical turn for its values, as many of these around environmental issues and human rights are admirable, it is equally important to say that the turn to ethics

seems to reflect a certain lack of willingness to seize power and be held accountable to it. For the flight to ethics, as it often plays out in radical politics today, seems to be accompanied by scepticism toward representational politics. Continuing with this theme for a moment, Slavoj Zizek (2008) also sheds some more light upon why ethics (when compared to representational politics) has become so important to the Left in recent years. He says that many of us (he is of course writing for the Left) feel that we are unable to make a real difference through representational politics on a larger scale, when it comes to the big political problems of life. Zizek (2008, p. 453) talks of this feeling that 'we cannot ever predict the consequences of our acts'; that nothing we do will 'guarantee that the overall outcome of our interactions will be satisfactory'. And he is right to make this point. Today, our geographical imaginations are dominated by a broader sense of chaos and Global Complexity (Urry, 2003; Stengers, 2005). These ways of thinking, deep in the psyche of many radicals on the Left may be one other reason why so many have retreated into ethics. When we do not really believe that we can change the world through developing fine detailed instruments, capturing the state, or predictive models, we are naturally more hesitant. It is better to try and raise ethical awareness instead. Whereas in the past power was something to be won and treasured, something radicals could use to implement a collective ideology, today, with the risk posed by representation in fragmented societies, top-down power often becomes a hazard, even an embarrassment, for many on the Left (Laï¨di, 1998). This is, as I have already discussed, where the Right and neo-liberal ideologues are seizing the opportunity of the moment. Putting what I have just said another way, there is a need to be clear, perhaps more so in these interdisciplinary times—ethics and politics (particularly representational politics) are different. Of course they are related. You cannot do politics without an ethical perspective. **But my point here is that the Right and neo-liberal ideologues will not simply go away if the Left adopt or raise awareness of alternative ethical lifestyles**. The Right are willing to capture state power, particularly at this time when the state is increasingly powerful. When we compare the concerted political programme of neo-liberalism, first developed by Reagan, Thatcher, the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, multi-national banks, and the G20, as just some of many examples, ethical individuals across the world offer some counter-resistance. But the 2008 crisis, and the response of protests like the Alternative G20, demonstrated how weak ethical resistance is in the face of the institutions of the neo-liberal economy. Another reason for this is because the ethical individual contributes so much to neo-liberal societies themselves. To explain how, we must briefly step back. The new social movements of previous decades have, in general, been effectively recuperated by the existing system of capital, by satisfying them in a way that neutralised their subversive potential. This is how capital has maintained its hegemonic position in post-Fordist societies. Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) explain how capitalists have worked with, rather than against, the characteristics of new social movements. They say the new social movements desire for autonomy, the ideal of self-management, the anti-hierarchical exigency, and the search for authenticity, were important in developing post-Fordism. These replaced the hierarchical framework of the Fordist period with new forms of networked control. And so, in this way, we see that the relationship between new social movements and capital has been productive. In turn, and this is the important point I want to make about the present moment, clearly the stakes of radical politics have now changed once more. As discussed earlier, it would now seem that post-Fordist society is actually more hierarchical and controllable than many previously thought. Without the neoliberal state, and the public's subordination to its actions, it would not now exist in anything like its present form. Our subordination to the state has stopped a post-crisis implosion of neo-liberalism. And this is of course where one of the central characteristics of the ethical individual has been so productive. Endemic individualism, so dominant in liberal societies, has been recuperated by the ethical individual who is unwilling to seize the state. **So the salient point here is that the ethical individual is reflective of the conservative forces in society today.**

Roleplay k Agency

The aff solves – Debate roleplaying specifically activates agency

Hanghoj 8

(Thorkild, University of Aarhus School of Education Assistant Professor, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming", http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin's dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider's (participant) perspective and to an outsider's (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider's perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as "ideological becoming", which represents "the process of selectively assimilating the words of others" (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

SS = Reflexivity

And, Switch-Side debate causes reflexivity and tolerance

Koehle 10

(Joe, Phd candidate in communications at Kansas, former West Georgia debater http://mccfblog.org/actr/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Koehle_Paper_ACTR-editedPDF.pdf.)

Much like criticism of the sophists has persisted throughout time; criticism of switch side debate has been a constant feature since the advent of tournament-style debating. Harrigan documents how numerous these criticisms have been in the last century, explaining that Page 15 Koehle 15 complaints about the mode of debate are as old as the activity itself (9). The most famous controversy over modern switch side debate occurred in 1954, when the U.S. military academies and the Nebraska teachers" colleges decided to boycott the resolution: "Resolved: That the United States should extend diplomatic relations to the communist government of China." The schools that boycotted the topic argued that it was ethically and educationally indefensible to defend a recognition of communists, and even went so far as to argue that "a pro-recognition stand by men wearing the country"s uniforms would lead to misunderstanding on the part of our friends and to distortion by our enemies" (English et al. 221). Switch side debate was on the defensive, and debate coaches of the time were engaged in virulent debate over the how to debate. The controversy made the national news when the journalist Edward Murrow became involved and opined on the issue in front of millions of TV viewers. English et al. even go so far as to credit the "debate about debate" with helping accelerate the implosion of the famous red- baiting Senator Joseph McCarthy (222). The debate about debate fell back out of the national spotlight after the high-profile incident over the China resolution, but it never ended in the debate community itself. The tenor of the debate reached a fever pitch when outright accusations of modern sophistry (the bad kind) were published in the Spring 1983 edition of the National Forensic Journal, when Bernard K. Duffy wrote, "The Ethics of Argumentation in Intercollegiate Debate: A Conservative Appraisal." Echoing the old Platonic argument against sophistic practice, Duffy argued that switch side debate has ignored ethical considerations in the pursuit of teaching cheap techniques for victory (66). The 1990"s saw a divergence of criticisms into two different camps. The first camp was comprised of traditional critics who argued that debate instruction and practice promoted form over substance. For example, a coach from Boston College lamented that absent a change, "Debate instructors and their students will become the sophists of our age, susceptible to the traditional indictments elucidated by Isocrates and others" (Herbeck). Dale Bertelstein published a response to the previously cited article by Muir about switch side debate that launched into an extended discussion of debate and sophistry. This article continued the practice of coaches and communications scholars developing and applying the Platonic critique of the sophists to contemporary debate practices. Alongside this traditional criticism a newer set of critiques of switch side debate emerged. Armed with the language of Foucauldian criticism, Critical Legal Studies, and critiques of normativity and statism, many people who were uncomfortable with the debate tradition of arguing in favor of government action began to question the reason why one should ever be obliged to advocate government action. They began to argue that switch side debate was a mode of debate that unnecessarily constrained people to the hegemony of debating the given topic. These newer criticisms of switch side debate gained even more traction after the year 2000, with several skilled teams using these arguments to avoid having to debate one side of the topic. William Spanos, a professor of English at SUNY Binghamton decided to link the ethos of switch side debate to that of neo-conservatism after observing a debate tournament, saying that "the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush...learned their „disinterested" argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed." (Spanos 467) Contemporary policy debate is now under attack from all sides, caught in its own dissoi logoi. Given the variety of assaults upon switch side debate by both sides of the political spectrum, how can switch side debate be justified? Supporters of switch side debate have made many arguments justifying the value of the practice that are not related to any defense of sophist Page 17 Koehle 17 techniques. I will only briefly describe them so as to not muddle the issue, but they are worthy of at least a cursory mention. The first defense is the most pragmatic reason of all: Mandating people debate both sides of a topic is most fair to participants because it helps mitigate the potential for a topic that is biased towards one side. More theoretical justifications are given, however. Supporters of switch side debate have argued that encouraging students to play the devil"s advocate creates a sense of self-reflexivity that is crucial to promoting tolerance and preventing dogmatism (Muir 287). Others have attempted to justify switch side debate in educational terms and advocacy terms, explaining that it is a path to diversifying a student"s knowledge by encouraging them to seek out paths they may have avoided otherwise, which in turn creates better public advocates (Dybvig and Iversen). In fact, contemporary policy debate and its reliance upon switching sides creates an oasis of argumentation free from the demands of advocacy, allowing students to test out ideas and become more well-rounded advocates as they leave the classroom and enter the polis (Coverstone). Finally, debate empowers individuals to become critical thinkers capable of making sound decisions (Mitchell, "Pedagogical Possibilities", 41).

Rez as Heuristic

Evaluate the desirability of the plan---using the resolution as a heuristic for deliberation is necessary to produce democratic citizens able to responding to manipulation and deception used by those in power---this does not necessitate excluding conjuring, but does necessitate having a common background for normative evaluation

Dahlberg 5

(Lincoln The University of Queensland, Center for Critical and Cultural Studies, Visiting Fellow, The Habermasian public sphere: Taking difference seriously?, Theory and Society (2005) 34:111-126)

I believe this critique of power, transparency, and the subject is largely based upon a poor characterization of Habermas' position. There are three main misunderstandings that need to be cleared up here, to do with power as negative, as able to be easily removed, and as able to be clearly identified. First, Habermas does not define power as simply negative and as therefore needing to be summarily removed from the public sphere. The public sphere norm calls for "coercion-free communication" and not power-free communication. Habermas emphasizes the positive power of communicative interaction within the public sphere through which participants use words to do things and make things happen.60 Communicative rationality draws on the "**force of better argument**" to produce more democratic citizens, culture, and societies. Subjects are indeed molded through this constituting power, but their transformation is towards freedom and autonomy rather than towards subjugation and normalization. As Jeffrey Alexander points out, **to act according to a norm is not the same as to be normalized**.61 The public sphere norm provides a **structure through which critical reflection** on constraining or dominating social relations and possibilities for freedom **can take place.** As Chambers argues, rational discourse here is about "the endless questioning of codes," the reasoned questioning of normalization.62 This is the very type of questioning critics like Lyotard, Mouffe, and Villa are engaged in despite claiming the normalizing and repressive power of communicative rationality. These critics have yet to explain adequately how they escape this performative contradiction, although they may not be too concerned to escape it.63 The form of power that is to be excluded from discourse in the public sphere is that which limits and disables democratic participation and leads to **communicative inequalities**. Coercion and domination are (ideally) excluded from the public sphere, which includes forms of domination resulting from the maldistribution of material and authoritative resources that lead to **discursive inequalities**. This emphasis on the ideal exclusion of coercion introduces the second point of clari- fication, that the domination free public sphere is an idealization for the purposes of critique. Habermas is more than aware of the fact that, as Nancy Fraser, Mouffe, and Young remind us, coercive forms of power, including those that result from social inequality, can never be completely separated from the public sphere.64 Claims that such power has been removed from any really-existing deliberative arena can only be made by ignoring or hiding the operation of power. However, **this does not mean that a reduction in coercion** and domination cannot be achieved. Indeed, this is precisely what a democratic politics must do. To aid this project, the public sphere conception **sets a critical standard for evaluation of everyday communication**. Chambers puts this nicely: **Criticism requires a normative backdrop against which we criticize.** Crit-icizing the ways power and domination play themselves out in discourse presupposes a conception of discourse in which there is no [coercive] power and domination. In other words, to defend the position that there is a mean- ingful difference between talking and fighting, persuasion and coercion, and by extension, reason and power involves beginning with idealizations. That is, it involves drawing a picture of undominated discourse.65 However, this discussion of the idealizing status of the norm does not answer claims that it invokes a transparency theory of knowledge. I would argue that such claims not only fall prey to another performa-tive contradiction – of presupposing that the use of rational discourse can establish the impossibility of

rational discourse revealing truth and power – but are also based on a poor reading of Habermas' theory of communicative rationality. This is the third point of clarification. In contrast to the metaphysics of presence, the differentiation of persuasion from coercion in the public sphere does not posit a naive theory of the transparency of power, and meaning more generally. The public sphere conception as based upon communicative rationality does not assume a Cartesian (autonomous, disembodied, decontextualized) subject who can clearly distinguish between persuasion and coercion, good and bad reasons, true and untrue claims, and then wholly re-move themselves and their communications from such influence. For Habermas, subjects are always situated within culture. The public sphere is posited upon intersubjective rather than subject-centered rationality. It is through the process of communicative rationality, and not via a Cartesian subject, that manipulation, deception, poor reasoning, and so on, are identified and removed, and by which meanings can be understood and communicated. In other words, it is through rational-critical communication that discourse moves away from coercion or non-public reason towards greater rational communication and a stronger public sphere. The circularity here is not a problem, as it may seem, but is in fact the very essence of democratization: throughthe practice of democracy, democratic practice is advanced. This democratizing process can be further illustrated in the important and challenging case of social inequalities. Democratic theorists (bothdeliberative and difference) generally agree that social inequalities al-ways lead to some degree of inequalities in discourse. Thus, the ide-alized public sphere of full discursive inclusion and equality requires that social inequalities be eliminated. Yet how is social inequality to befullyidentified,letaloneeliminated? The idealization seems wholly in-adequate given contemporary capitalist systems and associated social inequality. However, it is in the very process of argumentation, even if flawed, that the identification and critique of social inequality, and thus of communicative inequality, is able to develop. Indeed, public sphere deliberation often comes into existence when and where people become passionate about social injustice and publicly thematize problems of social inequality. Thus the "negative power" of social inequality – as with other forms of coercion – is brought to light and critique by the very discourse it is limiting. This is not to say that subjects are merely effects of discourse, that there are no critical social agents acting in the process. It is not to say that 125 subjects within discourse cannot themselves identify negative forms of power, cannot reflexively monitor their own arguments, cannot rationally criticize other positions, and so on. They can, and in practice do, despite the instability of meaning. The point is that this reasoning and understanding is (provisionally) achieved through the subject's situatedness in discourse rather than via a pre-discursive abstract subject. As Kenneth Baynes argues, it is through discourse that subjects achieve a degree of reflective distance (what we could call autonomy) from their situations, "enabling them to revise their conceptions of what is valuable or worthy of pursuit,[and]to assess various courses of action with respect to those ends." 66 Democratic discourse generates civic-oriented selves, inter-subjective meanings and understandings, and democratic agreements that can be seen as the basis of public sovereignty. How-ever, the idea of communicatively produced agreements, which in the public sphere are known as public opinions, has also come under ex-tensive criticism in terms of excluding difference, criticism that I wantto explore in the next section. The ends of discourse: Public opinion formation The starting point of discourse is disagreement over problematic validity claims. However, a certain amount of agreement, or at least mutual understanding, is presupposed when interlocutors engage in argumentation. All communication presupposes mutual understanding on the linguistic terms used – that interlocutors use the same terms in the same way.67 Furthermore, in undertaking rational-critical discourse, according to Habermas' formal pragmatic reconstruction, interlocutors also presuppose the same formal conditions of argumentation. These shared presuppositions enable rational-critical discourse to be undertaken. However, as seen above, meaning is never fixed and understanding is always partial. Understanding and agreement on the use of linguistic terms and of what it means to be reasonable, reflexive, sincere, inclusive, non-coercive, etc. takes place within discourse and is an ongoing political process.

Impact Defense

No Endless Warfare

No risk of endless warfare

GRAY 7

(Colin, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, [July 2007, "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration," http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy's military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention's critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.

No endless war

Rodwell 5

(Jonathan Rodwell is a PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy of the late 70's / rise of 'neo-cons' and Second Cold War, "Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson," http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through 'othering' it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn't produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the 'Evil Empire'. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive 'othering' of an 'alien' people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it's own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980's? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell's original work on which Jackson's approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that 'always results in an other being marginalized' or has the potential for 'demonisation'[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 "is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as 'evil', 'inhuman' and 'faceless enemies of freedom' creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated"[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940's and 50's even subjected to the language of the 'Red Scare' it's obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an 'other' of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of 'evil' and 'inhumanity' does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an 'other'. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model

Endless violence is not a thing

Chandler 9

(David, Westminster IR professor, "War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of `Global War'", Security Dialogue, 40.3, SAGE)

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to 'motorized partisans', in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states

have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of 'global war' have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with 'global war' thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. **This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines 'global' war today.** Very few studies of the 'war on terror' start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the 'war on terror' (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are 'scaled up' from the international to the global. Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire. The alternative reading of 'global war' rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the **lack of political stakes** and strategic structuring of the international sphere **rather than frameworks for asserting global domination.** We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the 'war on terror' campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. There would appear to be a **direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping** and structuring **interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome.** In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the **lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat** or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and **arbitrary interventions as** states and international institutions use the **lack of strategic imperatives** to **construct their own meaning through intervention.** As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains: war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz's classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. . . . War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most 'efficient' way of finding one. **The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to 'war'.** In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are **freed from strategic necessities** and **whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against 'real enemies'.** The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the

implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests.

No global war impact

Teschke 11

(Benno Gerhard, IR prof at the University of Sussex, "Fatal attraction: a critique of Carl Schmitt's international political and legal theory", International Theory (2011), 3 : pp 179-227)

For at the centre of the heterodox – partly post-structuralist, partly realist – neo-Schmittian analysis stands the conclusion of The Nomos: the thesis of a structural and continuous relation between liberalism and violence (Mouffe 2005, 2007; Odysseos 2007). It suggests that, in sharp contrast to the liberal-cosmopolitan programme of 'perpetual peace', the geographical expansion of liberal modernity was accompanied by the intensification and de-formalization of war in the international construction of liberal-constitutional states of law and the production of liberal subjectivities as rights-bearing individuals. Liberal world-ordering proceeds via the conduit of wars for humanity, leading to Schmitt's 'spaceless universalism'. In this perspective, a straight line is drawn from WWI to the War on Terror to verify Schmitt's long-term prognostic of the 20th century as the age of 'neutralizations and de-politicizations' (Schmitt 1993). But this attempt to read the history of 20th century international relations in terms of a succession of confrontations between the carrier-nations of liberal modernity and the criminalized foes at its outer margins seems unable to comprehend the complexities and specificities of 'liberal' world-ordering, then and now. For in the cases of Wilhelmine, Weimar and fascist Germany, the assumption that their conflicts with the Anglo-American liberal-capitalist heartland were grounded in an antagonism between liberal modernity and a recalcitrant Germany outside its geographical and conceptual lines runs counter to the historical evidence. For this reading presupposes that late-Wilhelmine Germany was not already substantially penetrated by capitalism and fully incorporated into the capitalist world economy, posing the question of whether the causes of WWI lay in the capitalist dynamics of inter-imperial rivalry (Blackbourn and Eley 1984), or in processes of belated and incomplete liberal-capitalist development, due to the survival of 're-feudalized' elites in the German state classes and the marriage between 'rye and iron' (Wehler 1997). It also assumes that the late-Weimar and early Nazi turn towards the construction of an autarchic German regionalism – Mitteleuropa or Großraum – was not deeply influenced by the international ramifications of the 1929 Great Depression, but premised on a purely political–existentialist assertion of German national identity. Against a reading of the early 20th century conflicts between 'the liberal West' and Germany as 'wars for humanity' between an expanding liberal modernity and its political exterior, there is more evidence to suggest that these confrontations were interstate conflicts within the crisis-ridden and nationally uneven capitalist project of modernity. Similar objections and caveats to the binary opposition between the Western discourse of liberal humanity against non-liberal foes apply to the more recent period. For how can this optic explain that the 'liberal West' coexisted (and keeps coexisting) with a large number of pliant authoritarian client-regimes (Mubarak's Egypt, Suharto's Indonesia, Pahlavi's Iran, Fahd's Saudi-Arabia, even Gaddafi's pre-intervention Libya, to name but a few), which were and are actively managed and supported by the West as anti-liberal Schmittian states of emergency, with concerns for liberal subjectivities and Human Rights secondary to the strategic interests of political and geopolitical stability and economic access? Even in the more obvious cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and, now, Libya, the idea that Western intervention has to be conceived as an encounter between the liberal project and a series of foes outside its sphere seems to rely on a denial of their antecedent histories as geopolitically and socially contested state-building projects in pro-Western fashion, deeply co-determined by long histories of Western anti-liberal colonial and post-colonial legacies. If these states (or social forces within them) turn against their imperial masters, the conventional policy expression is 'blowback'. And as the Schmittian analytical vocabulary does not include a conception of human agency and social forces – only friend/enemy groupings and collective political entities governed by executive decision – it also lacks the categories of analysis to comprehend the social dynamics that drive the struggles around sovereign power and the eventual overcoming, for example, of Tunisian and Egyptian states of emergency without US-led wars for humanity. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the generic idea of liberal world-ordering and the production of liberal subjectivities can actually explain why Western intervention seems improbable in some cases (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen or Syria) and more likely in others (e.g. Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya). Liberal world-ordering consists of differential strategies of building, coordinating, and drawing liberal and anti-liberal states into the Western orbit, and overtly or covertly intervening and refashioning them once they step out of line. These are conflicts within a world, which seem to push the term liberalism beyond its original meaning. The generic Schmittian idea of a liberal 'spaceless universalism' sits uncomfortably with the

realities of maintaining an America-supervised 'informal empire', which has to manage a persisting interstate system in diverse and case-specific ways. But it is this persistence of a worldwide system of states, which encase national particularities, which renders challenges to American supremacy possible in the first place.

AT: VTL

Life has intrinsic and objective value achieved through subjective pleasures---its preservation should be an a priori goal

Kacou 8

(Amien WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of "Life", Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184)

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without "life," as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of "pleasure," in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to "mediate" all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that "good" is absolutely synonymous with "pleasant"—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, "living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living," and saying, "I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living," whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, "life gives me pleasure," says little more than, "I like life." Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

Life is always valuable

Torchia 2, Professor of Philosophy, Providence College, Phd in Philosophy, Fordham College (Joseph, "Postmodernism and the Persistent Vegetative State," The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly Summer 2002, Vol. 2, No. 2, http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/torc/torc_01postmodernismandpvs1.html)

Ultimately, Aquinas' theory of personhood requires a metaphysical explanation that is rooted in an understanding of the primacy of the existence or esse of the human person. For humans beings, the upshot of this position is clear: while human personhood is intimately connected with a broad range of actions (including consciousness of oneself and others), the definition of personhood is not based upon any specific activity or capacity for action, but upon the primacy of esse. Indeed, human actions would have neither a cause nor any referent in the absence of a stable, abiding self that is rooted in the person's very being. A commitment to the primacy of esse, then, allows for an adequate recognition of the importance of actions in human life, while providing a principle for the unification and stabilizing of these behavioral features. In this respect, the human person is defined as a dynamic being which actualizes the potentiality for certain behavior or operations unique to his or her own existence. Esse thereby embraces all that the person is and is capable of doing. In the final analysis, **any attempt to define the person in terms of a single attribute, activity, or capability** (e.g., consciousness) flies in the face of the depth and multi-dimensionality which is part and parcel of personhood itself. To do so **would abdicate the ontological core of the person and the very center which renders human activities intelligible.** And Aquinas' anthropology, I submit, provides an effective philosophical lens through which the depth and profundity of the human reality comes into sharp focus. In this respect, Kenneth Schmitz draws an illuminating distinction between "person" (a term which conveys such hidden depth and profundity) and "personality" (a term which pertains to surface impressions and one's public image).40 The preoccupation with the latter term, he shows, is very much an outgrowth of the eighteenth century emphasis upon a human individuality that is understood in terms of autonomy and privacy. This notion of the isolated, atomistic individual was closely linked with a subjective focus whereby the "self" became the ultimate referent for judging reality. By extension, such a presupposition led to the conviction that only self-consciousness provides a means of validating any claims to personhood and membership in a community of free moral agents capable of responsibilities and worthy of rights. In contrast to such an isolated and enclosed conception (i.e., whereby one is a person by virtue of being "set apart" from others as a privatized entity), Schmitz focuses upon an intimacy which presupposes a certain relation between persons. From this standpoint, intimacy is only possible through genuine self-disclosure, and the sharing of self-disclosure that allows for an intimate knowledge of the other.41 For Schmitz, such a revelation of one's inner self transcends any specific attributes or any overt capacity the individual might possess.42 Ultimately, Schmitz argues, intimacy is rooted in the unique act of presencing, whereby the person reveals his or her personal existence. But such a mystery only admits of a metphysical explanation, rather than an epistemological theory of meaning which confines itself to what is observable on the basis of perception or sense experience. Intimacy, then, discloses a level of being that transcends any distinctive properties. Because intimacy has a unique capacity to disclose being, it places us in touch with the very core of personhood. Metaphysically speaking, intimacy is not grounded in the recognition of this or that characteristic a person has, but rather in the simple unqualified presence the person is.43

Preventing death is the first ethical priority – it's the only impact you can't recover from.

Bauman 95 Zygmunt Bauman, University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71

The being-for is like living towards-the-future: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other, as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The self stretches

towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching-toward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not-yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly an-other Other, that life can be lived - not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all-too-familiar unsure-of-itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' - both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of *being fu filled,* but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its *unfu filment.* One may say that the paradox *of hope* (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being-for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self-defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a *mystery.* And being-for-the-Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view - makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place - but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being-for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is *unspoken,* the responsibility undertaken is *unconditional;* it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery - noted Max Frisch - (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed - soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to the musical-chairs game of the real and the potential - it once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly open and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the *must* of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of being-for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition - an end to itself. Without knowing - without being capable of knowing - that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness (the being-for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre-empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place. The togetherness of being-for is always in the future, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The being-for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted. This is the tragedy of being-for - the reason why it cannot but be death-bound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love. The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end, and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. Morality, like the future itself, is forever not-yet. (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being-with) that we turn into moral selves. And it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally, and sometimes even of being good, in the present.

War = Structural Violence

We turn structural violence

Goldstein 1

(Joshua Goldstein, Int'l Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice." Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars' outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.[9] So, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to "reverse women's oppression." The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

No Prior Questions

No prior questions- scholarly orientations cause gridlock

Owen 2

(David, Southampton political theory reader, "Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning", Millennium 31.3, SAGE)

Commenting on the 'philosophical turn' in IR, Wæver remarks that '[a] frenzy for words like "epistemology" and "ontology" often signals this philosophical turn', although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, 'theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program' in that it 'dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory'.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since 'whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry'.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) 'the Highlander view'—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic

achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

Prior questions will never be fully settled---must take action even under conditions of uncertainty

Cochran '99

(Molly, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, "Normative Theory in International Relations", 1999, pg. 272)

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

Prereqs bad

Cochran 99

(Molly, GIT international affairs professor, Normative Theory in International Relations, 272)

institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

Ethics

Extinction First

Extinction impacts must be prioritized-any alternative frame fails in the context of public policy

Isaac 2

(Jeffrey, political science professor Indiana University, "Ends, Means, and Politics, Dissent Magazine, Spring 2002)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond moral- ity. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean con- science of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerless- ness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

AT: Extinction Inevitable

Extinction does not make our efforts worthless.

Trisel 4

Although our works will not last forever, this should not matter if we accomplished what we set out to do when we created these works. Wanting our [end page 390] creations to endure forever was not likely part of our goal when we created them. If we accomplish our goals and then later in life conclude that these accomplishments were of no significance, then this is a sign that a desire for long-lastingness has crept into the standards that we use to judge significance. Escalating desires can lead to escalating standards since the standards that we establish reflect our goals and desires. Including long-lastingness as a criterion for judging the significance of our efforts is unreasonable. If one includes long-lastingness as part of the standard, then one will feel that it is necessary for humanity to persist forever. There is no need for humanity to live forever for our lives and works to be significant. If the standard that we adopt for judging significance does not include long-lastingness as part of the standard, then it will not matter whether humanity will endure for a long time. Like Tolstoy, we may be unable to keep from wanting to have our achievements remembered forever. We may also be unable to keep from wanting our works to be appreciated forever. But we can refrain from turning these desires into standards for judging whether our efforts and accomplishments are significant. If we can keep from doing this, it will be to our advantage. Then, during those times when we look back on life from an imagined perspective that encompasses times after humanity has become extinct, we will not conclude that our efforts amounted to nothing. Rather, we will conclude that many people made remarkable accomplishments that made their lives, and possibly the lives of others, better than they would have been if these goals had never been pursued. And if we expand our evaluation, as we should, to take into account all experiences associated with living, not just goal-related experiences, we will conclude not that life was empty, but that living was worthwhile.

AT: Zizek Ethics

Their "don't compromise" style ethics are foolish—revolutionary consistency trades off with compassion and good judgment.

Nicholas BROWN English @ Illinois (Chicago) '4 {∅,S} ∈ {$}?: Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen *New Centennial Review* 4 (3) p. 315-319

Before at we arrive at the political thesis of Žižek's writings on Lenin, it is worth pointing out that Žižek's work is shot through with an ethical imperative which is not often explicitly thematized. Like Badiou, Žižek's ethics is one of subjective self-consistency, sustained, like Badiou's, by Lacan's "*ne pas céder.*" This ethical self-consistency is not to be confused with the substantial self-consistency of the subject—we know the Lacanian barred subject, written S, never fully coincides with itself—but rather refers to a kind of "going all the way," a refusal to compromise on one's desire, even if this desire is ultimately self-destructive. Žižek's contempt for an inconsistent ethical position—where the in-itself of a political position and its for-itself fail to coincide—is palpable. Nobody provokes Žižek's ire so much as pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt an attitude of utter disdain towards the Third Way, while their own radicalism ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obliges no one to do anything definite. (*Revolution,* 172) The great majority of today's "radical" academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model, with a secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play the stock market). (171) The basis of this contempt is its inconsistency: the "pseudo-radical academic Leftist" experiences his position as radical, while in fact it is nothing more than the empty quietism of Hegel's beautiful soul, benefiting from what it denounces while deriving disavowed pleasure from its presumed superiority to the same. There can be no doubt that the figure of the beautiful soul remains a potent figure for political critique. In fact, one could turn it against Žižek himself. But what is fundamentally wrong with the beautiful soul is not its inconsistency, but simply the quietism it masks. The consequence of Žižek's valorization of ethical consistency is a strange admiration for bad but consistent positions: With regard to this radical chic, our first gesture towards Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be one of praise: at least they play their game straight, and are honest in their acceptance of the global capitalist coordinates. (*Revolution,* 172) Žižek reproduces this gesture several times, with regard to, for example, the "refreshing" Francis Fukuyama ("In our intellectual space full of false protesters, here we finally have a fully pledged *apologist for the existing order*" [*Organs,* 132 n. 23), or, in the introduction to *On Belief,* his grudging preference for a reactionary fundamentalist preacher over the doctrinal equivocation of a liberal rabbi and priest. The problem with this ethics—as Brecht showed us, with ethics in general— is that, under capitalism, the only fully consistent ethical position is ruthless self-interest. There is no ethical position that is both minimally compassionate and fully ethically consistent. Mauler in *Saint Joan* is doomed to make money from all of his generous impulses; the good woman of Szechwan can only help her neighbors by taking advantage of them. In fact, this split constitutes part of capitalism's dynamism. The ideological force of capitalism is that so many people are given a subjective interest in maintaining the stability of capitalism, even if this interest involves competing with neighbors who share an "objective" interest in ending it. Any "opting out" is at present simply quixotic, and only possible on the basis of substantial privilege. Plainly, professors want tenured positions, for the same reason the unemployed want jobs: because they exist. (As for playing the stock market, this criticism buys neoliberal rhetoric hook, line, and sinker: most academics who "play the stock market" do so because universities, like many other U.S. employers, have shifted the burden of risk from their own retirement systems onto the individual employees.) For the wealthy—and this includes the famous tenured radical—self-interest only lines up with political interest in cynical defense of privilege. Our first gesture towards the pseudoradical academic should therefore be the exact opposite of Žižek's. True, academics by and large live their lives in accordance with their interest in the long-term stability of Capital; but at least they don't go all the way, contributing to its ideological legitimation in that small zone in which they timidly exercise their freedom. The only fully consistent leftist ethical position is revolutionary. Žižek has this right, but currently this position is easier to endorse than to occupy. (Of course, it would be easy to show that Žižek's own position, or mine, is just as compromised as that of our hypothetical tenured radical. But if we are not going to get upset at liberal hypocrisy, we can't get upset at Žižek's either. That would be hypocritical.) One of Žižek's hidden targets in *Revolution at the Gates* is Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire* (which appears here only in a footnote, while it gets fuller treatment in *Organs without Bodies*). Žižek's main critique (an adaptation of Lukács's critique of utopianism) is simple but damning: their political horizon is irredeemably abstract. Global citizenship, universal minimum wage, and so on: these are obviously wonderful ideas, but without any concrete proposals for getting there, they might as well be anything else or nothing at all. The more abstract the goal, the easier it is to achieve unanimity: pretty much everyone can agree that the world ought to be just, but as soon as concrete proposals for achieving justice are proposed, all unanimity disappears. The notion of the purely immanent, unorganized "desire of the multitude" is undeniably attractive; but, since this desire is an abstraction from concrete desires that may be incompatible, how could it form itself into a political subject without the imposition of an organization transcendent to it—a Party? Hardt and Negri know this: "The only event we are awaiting is the insurgence of a powerful organization. We do not have any models to offer for this event" (2000, 411). The similarity to the Pauline language of the Event as grace is striking, but is this not also a genuinely shocking admission, a virtual admission of defeat? The event they can only await in silence is the only event that would matter. But in the absence of any attempt to answer it, how does Žižek's question—" How do we invent the organizational structure which will confer on [contemporary social unrest] the form of universal political demand?" (*Revolution,* 296)—get us any farther than Hardt and Negri's empty expectation? While Žižek fully understands the theoretical need for a Party (and here I am not talking about any particular party or even any particular form of organization, but simply the fact that organization is primary), this exigency

remains completely formal. The closest Žižek comes to attempting an answer to this fundamental question is by invoking (weirdly, it seems to me) a kind of belated cyberspace Utopia, updating Lenin's famous slogan "Socialism = electrification + the power of the soviets" as "Socialism = free access to the internet + the power of the soviets" (294). Well, this is fine as far as it goes—internet technology has a liberatory edge that cannot be realized in a market economy—but where are the soviets, exactly? The question itself—what is to be done?—is urgent: the current global political and economic instability may loosen the death grip of neoliberalism, but it doesn't guarantee that what comes after will be better. Immanuel Wallerstein even thinks the capitalist world system will collapse of its own internal contradictions somewhere between 2025 and 2075. This assertion sounds less crazy now than it did a few years ago, but it isn't very helpful for trying to influence what comes next. Once again, the attitude is one of waiting until the right conditions emerge. When Heidegger famously claimed that "only a god can save us now," this was to be understood not theologically, but as a deus ex machina: as an unforeseeable Event. It is a symptom of the weakness of the Left that we effectively agree with Heidegger. Are we really condemned to await some unexpected turn, some unforeseen development that will emerge like a god from the machine of Capital? If, on the contrary, the question is how, without any quixotic *passage à l'acte,* one is to contribute to the organization of the "multitude against Empire," then waiting for a messiah will only waste time. The equation Lenin = Paul—already implicit in Badiou, made explicit by Žižek—is false. To say there was no certainty that the revolution of 1917 would succeed is true but banal: lots of things are hard to discern without belonging to an indiscernible register of being. Lenin's writings do reveal a kind of excessiveness to his conviction, yes. But they also show an extraordinarily detailed and insightful analysis of the concrete situation, and a remarkable theorization of the political opening offered by an immanent crisis in Capital (an effort which, if we were really to "repeat Lenin" today, would have to focus on the inability of Capital to absorb the propertyless masses on its periphery). What we are offered is not really the equation of Lenin and Paul, but a choice: Lenin or Paul? Do we wait for the Event, or do we organize to bring it about? Badiou, Hardt and Negri, and Žižek—along with Heidegger—all side with Paul. Do we?

Prevent Death Key

Preventing death is the first ethical priority – it's the only impact you can't recover from.

Bauman 95

(Zygmunt Bauman, University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71)

The ==being-for is== like ==living towards-the-future==: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other, as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The self stretches towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching-toward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not-yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly an-other Other, that life can be lived - not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all-too-familiar unsure-of-itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' - both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of *being fu filled,* but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its *unfu filment.* One may say that the paradox *of hope* (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being-for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self-defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a *mystery.* And being-for-the-Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view - makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place - but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being-for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is *unspoken,* the responsibility undertaken is *unconditional;* it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery - noted Max Frisch - (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed - soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. ==Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to== the musical-chairs game of ==the real and the potential== - it once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly ==open== and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the *must* of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of the being-for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition - an end to itself. Without knowing - without being capable of knowing - that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness (the being-for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre-empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place. The togetherness of being-for is always in the future, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The being-for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted. This is the tragedy of being-for - the reason why it cannot but be death-bound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. ==Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities==, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love. The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end, and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. Morality, like the future itself, is forever not-yet. (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being-with) that we turn into moral selves. And ==it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally==, and sometimes even of being good, ==in the present==.

Consequences Good

Their desire to ignore the consequences of their advocacy causes alt failure ---must evaluate consequences of proposals

Bracey 6

(Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318)

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." 281 For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

State/Law Key

2AC Reformism Good

Reformism is effective **and brings revolutionary change closer rather than pushing it away**

Delgado 9

(Richard Delgado 9, self-appointed Minority scholar, Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association's Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Professor Delgado's teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, "Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law", p. 588-590)

2. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure." To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to find rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. **The** CLS **critique of** piecemeal **reform is** familiar, **imperialistic and wrong**. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand**. The** critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, **or it may not**. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of **paternalism** to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some **incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer**, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants' union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars' critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we want.

2AC Law k for Oppressed

The law isn't perfect but the alt's illusory radicalism fails and neglects political openings to lessen violence

Roth 2k

(Brad R. Roth 2k, Assistant Professor or Legal Studies and Political Science and Adjunct Professor of Law at Wayne State University, "Governmental Illegitimacy and Neocolonialism: Response to Review by James Thuo Gathii", Michigan Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 6, May 2000, JSTOR)

"Critical" scholars frequently seem to imagine that, in struggling against the methodological norms of their disciplines, they are struggling against the very structure of the power relations that exploit and repress the poor and weak — the metaphor being, in their minds, somehow transubstantiated into reality. **The result is** all too often, **an illusory radicalism, rhetorically colorful but programmatically vacuous**. The danger is that a fantasized radicalism will lead scholars to abandon the defense of the very devices that give the poor and weak a modicum of leverage, when defense of those devices is perhaps the only thing of practical value that scholars are in a position to contribute.*1¶ My main problem with Gathii's critique, then, is not (as he might imagine) that it is political, but that it is politically dysfunctional. More specifically, for all of Gathii's anticolonial posturing, my book is, I insist, far more effectively anticolonial than is his critique of it.¶ I. The Law and Politics of Governmental Illegitimacy¶ Professor Gathii is fully justified in subjecting Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law to an essentially political critique, for the book, like all legal scholarship, has political implications — in this case, designedly so.* This is not to say, as "critical" scholars sometimes seem to imply, that law or legal scholarship is reducible to ordinary politics. Law is a purposive project, and thus not exclusively an empirical phenomenon; "law as it is" cannot be wholly separated from "law as it ought to be."5 The purposes that drive the project, however, must be demonstrably immanent in social reality, not merely superimposed according to the predilections of the jurist; the jurist's task, at once creative and bounded, is to render a persuasive account of how those immanent purposes bind powerful actors to worthy projects (such as the self-determination of Third-World peoples) that they would not otherwise be inclined to undertake." That legal scholarship impress those who are not natural political allies is the test, not only of its scholarly merit, but also of its political merit; that friends may be disappointed is of far lesser significance.¶ This task is not to everyone's taste, and some in the academy have devoted their considerable talents to discrediting the project of legal reasoning, as conventionally understood.7 But **their efforts, though often of great intellectual sophistication, are profoundly misguided.** In their zeal to "unmask" law's legitimation of exercises of power, they fail to appreciate that law can legitimate such exercises only insofar as it simultaneously constrains them. Power holders seeking the imprimatur of legality can benefit only to the extent that they accept its limits, for violation of the limits necessarily reverses the process of legitimation.8¶ To deny such a relationship between legitimation and constraint is to assert that putative legal limits are a remarkably effective ruse — that legal rhetoric, rather improbably, fools most of the people all of the time. (Presumably, the power holders are not thought to be fool- ing themselves, since if the constraints, though objectively illusory, seem real enough to them, the rule of law would be a reality in politi- cal terms even if a chimera in philosophical terms.) On **the other hand, if law does constrain as well as legitimate the exercise of power, to neglect that point is to miss an important political opportunity.**

2AC Law Good

They are right about the state of the law – but that is not a reason to reject it – that only causes nihilistic violence and conservative cooption – we should try to make it effective even if that's impossible

Ristroph '9

(Alice, Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, "Is Law? Constitutional Crisis and Existential Anxiety," *Constitutional Commentary* Vol. 25, 431-459. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1457&context=facpub)

One reason to care whether law is in "crisis" concerns our own expectations of the function of law. A possible achievement is to offer an alternative to violence—as we saw in Levinson and Balkin's account of the Constitution as enabling nonviolent dispute resolution.66 This might be called the anti-Thrasymachus view of law. Early in Plato's Republic (before Socrates has tamed him), a young man called Thrasymachus describes justice as "the advantage of the stronger."67 The claim is that might makes right, and Western political and legal thought has produced many efforts to prove Thrasymachus and his heirs wrong. If law distinguishes right from might, then it becomes important to say what law is, and to show that it exists. Hence, many ongoing jurisprudential debates about the criteria for a valid and functional system of law (including worries about legal indeterminacy) are motivated by worries about arbitrary power and violence.68 To show Thrasymachus to be mistaken, we want to show that the rule of law is really different from the rule of (the strongest) men. In legal theory, we could view John Austin's positivism— law as commands backed by threats of punishment—as a descendant of Thrasymachus's claim.69 Here, I want to examine briefly one of the most influential, and most plausible, efforts to show that law is something more and different from the commands of a gunman: H. L. A. Hart's response to Austin. Hart framed his discussion around the question, "What is law?".70 But perhaps, as the Stoppard passage that opened this essay suggests, beginning with this question led us to conjure an image of law with various predicates that do not, as it turns out, include existence. A second form of existential anxiety, one that I suspect shapes present talk of crisis, is the anxiety thast Thrasymachus and Austin were right and law, if it is anything more than command and force, does not exist. For my purposes here, the critical features of Hart's account are the rule of recognition and the internal point of view. Since, in most of The Concept of Law, Hart takes law's existence for granted, it is helpful to look at the passages where law's existence, or at least the existence of a particular form of law, is up for grabs. In his classic discussion of the question, "Is international law really law?", H. L. A. Hart deployed the concepts of a rule of recognition and the internal point of view to conclude that international law was at most in a state of transition toward fully legal law, moving toward law properly so called but certainly not yet there.71 At the time he wrote The Concept of Law, Hart believed that international law departed from domestic (or "municipal") law in that it lacked a widely accepted rule of recognition and in that states could not be said to take the internal point of view toward international obligations. (Hart's argument has been challenged by many contemporary scholars of international law, but that particular dispute need not occupy us here.72) For law qua law to exist, Hart argued, there must be a rule of recognition under which the authoritative status of other rules was accepted or denied, and the officials who would apply the rule of recognition must themselves take the internal point of view toward it. That is, the officials needed to view the rule of recognition as a binding, authoritative guide to their own decisions. Suppose Hart was right and the rule of recognition and the internal point of view are conditions for the existence of law. Two questions arise: what is the rule of recognition for constitutional law, and who must hold the internal standpoint toward that rule? The Constitution itself initially seems a candidate for the rule of recognition, though the fact that the Constitution must itself be interpreted leads some theorists to amend this account and say that the rule of recognition must include authoritative statements of the meaning of the Constitution, under prevailing interpretive standards.73 As for the internal point of view, we might hope that all state officials would take this point of view toward constitutional rules.74 In other words, we might hope that every state actor would comply with the U.S. Constitution because it is the Constitution, not simply to avoid injunctions, or judicial invalidation of legislative action, or liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But Hart's theory does not demand universal adherence to an internal point of view. Even if legislators and other public officials complied with First or Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment doctrine only to avoid invalidation or § 1983 liability —even if these public officials were the equivalent of Holmes's bad man—Hart might find that constitutional law still existed in a meaningful sense so long as the judges applying constitutional rules believed themselves to be bound by a constitutional rule of recognition.75 Here is a possibility, one I believe we must take seriously and one that prompts anxiety about the existence of constitutional law itself: there is no common rule of recognition toward which judges and other officials take an internal point of view.76 Individual judges may adhere to their particular understandings of the rule of recognition —the Constitution as interpreted by proper originalist methods, for example, or the Constitution as elucidated by popular understandings. But the fact that individual state actors follow their own rules of recognition in good faith does not satisfy Hart's account of law, and it does not provide a satisfying alternative to Thrasymachus. (There is no reason, on the might-makes-right account, that the mighty cannot hold the good faith belief that they are pursuing a common good or acting pursuant to rule-governed authority. What matters is that their power is in fact traceable to their superior strength.) There is reason for academic observers to doubt the existence of a single rule of recognition in American constitutional law. There are too many core interpretive disputes, as discussed in Part I, and it is now widely accepted that constitutional rules are at least underdeterminatc. Should there be doubt about this claim, consider this feature of constitutional law textbooks: they include majority and dissenting opinions, and questions after each case frequently ask the reader which opinion was more persuasive. Those questions are not posed as rhetorical. For most constitutional decisions, we can say, it could have been otherwise. With a few votes switched, with a different line-up of Justices, the same precedents (and in some cases, the same interpretive methodology) could have produced a different outcome. Moreover, these suspicions of indeterminancy or underdetermi-nancy are not the unique province of the academy. Think of the discussions of Supreme Court appointments in presidential elections. Many voters, law professors or not, understand their vote for president to be also a vote for a certain kind of Justice and for certain kinds of constitutional outcomes. Discussions of Supreme Court appointments are often framed in terms of judicial methodology —"I will appoint judges who are faithful to the text of the Constitution" —but that language may be more a matter of decorum than of real constitutional faith. Judges, of course, are not ignorant of the charges of indeterminancy or of the politicization of judicial appointments. And it seems possible that the erosion of constitutional faith has reached the judiciary itself.771 claim no special insight into judicial psychology, but it seems implausible that the reasons for constitutional skepticism—the discussions of underdetermined rules, the contingency of outcomes based on 5-4 votes, and the great attention to swing justices such as Sandra Day O'Connor or Anthony Kennedy—have not influenced judges themselves. Here again it seems worthwhile to consider dissenting opinions. Justice Scalia's polemics come to mind immediately; he has often accused his colleagues of acting lawlessly.78 Yet he keeps his post and continues to participate in a system that treats as law the determinations of five (potentially lawless) Justices. It is possible, I suppose, that Justice Scalia's dissents express earnest outrage, that he is shocked (shocked) by decisions like Lawrence v. Texas79 and Boumediene. It is possible that he believes himself to be the last best hope of constitutional law properly so called. But it seems more likely that he shares the skepticism of academic observers of the Court. Though one can't help but wonder whether judges are still constitutionally devout, I should emphasize here that my argument does not turn on a claim that judges are acting in good or bad faith. Individual judges may well take the internal point of view, in Hart's terms, and strive faithfully to apply the principles they recognize as law. But it seems clear that American judges do not all hold the internal point of view toward a single, shared rule of recognition, given the nature of disagreements

among judges themselves. If there are multiple rules of recognition, varying from judge to judge, then legal outcomes will depend on which judge is empowered to make the critical decision, and Thrasymachus is not so far off the mark. Contemporary judicial disagreement is profound, and it is not just a matter of Justice Scalia's flair for colorful rhetoric. Consider Scott v. Harris, the recent decision granting summary judgment (on the basis of qualified immunity) to a police officer who had rammed a passenger car during a high-speed chase, causing an accident that left the driver a quadriplegic.80 Like most use-of-force opinions, the decision applies a deferential Fourth Amendment standard that gives police officers wide leeway. What is unusual about Harris is that, because the case arose as a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the critical question (whether the driver, Victor Harris, posed a sufficient threat to others' bodily safety such that the use of deadly force was reasonable) was nominally a jury question, and at summary judgment, the court should have taken the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—the injured driver. Thus, in earlier use-of-force cases that reached the Court as § 1983 claims, the Court articulated the Fourth Amendment standard and then remanded the case to the trial court.81 But in Harris, the Court had access to videotapes of the chase recorded by cameras on the dashboards of the police vehicles involved.82 In the view of the eight-Justice majority, the videotape "spoke for itself": it made Harris's threat to the public so clear that no reasonable juror could conclude that the officer's use of force was unreasonable.83 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found the officer to be entitled to summary judgment.84 Doubtless there are many instances in which a court grants summary judgment to one party though non-judicial observers believe a reasonable juror could find for the other party. Harris is of particular interest, though, because the "reasonable juror" who might have found in favor of Victor Harris was clearly visible to the majority—in fact, this juror had a spokesman on the Court. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in Scott v. Harris, viewed the same videotape and found it to confirm the factual findings of the district court (which had denied the police offic-er's motion for summary judgment).85 Though Justice Stevens was careful not to base his argument on an actual determination of the substantive Fourth Amendment question (chiding his colleagues for doing just that and thereby acting as "jurors" rather than judges),86 he viewed the video evidence and explained how one might conclude, perfectly reasonably, that Scott had used excessive force.87 In order for the eight Justices in the Harris majority to believe their own opinion, they would have to conclude that Justice Stevens lived outside the realm of reason. Harris is nominally a dispute about what reasonable jurors could conclude, rather than a direct argument about the meaning of a particular constitutional provision. But the two reactions to the videotape should call to mind Larry Tribe's worry that American constitutional law is plagued by "deep and thus far intractable divisions between wholly different ways of assessing truth and experiencing reality."88 It is not just abortion and assisted suicide that reveal profound disagreement about what is true and real. A videotape that "speaks for itself" in the eyes of eight Justices says something entirely different to the ninth. Looking beyond the judiciary, consider the consequences of constitutional disagreement and constitutional indeterminacy for other government officials and for would-be critics of those officials. Earlier I noted that with sufficient constitutional indeterminacy, there's no such thing as an unconstitutional president. A more extreme version of this argument is that with sufficient legal indeterminancy, there's no such thing as illegality. When John Yoo wrote the Office of Legal Counsel memos that defend practices formerly known as torture, he was simply doing to bans on torture what critics had long argued it was possible to do for any law: he was trashing them.89 This was the spawn of CLS put to work in the OLC; **deconstructions on the left are now deconstructions on the right**.90 And that, of course, is cause for anxiety among those who would like to argue that George W. Bush or members of his administration acted illegally. As I suggested in the Introduction, this may be the Pyrrhic victory of critical legal studies: If the crits were correct, then there is no distinctively legal form of critique. About torture, indefinite detention, warrantless wiretapping, and so on, we can say I don't like it or it doesn't correspond to my vision of the good, but we cannot say it's illegal. To argue that the Bush administration violated the rule of law, we need to believe that the rule of law exists. But for 30 years or more, we have found reasons to doubt that it does.91 Perhaps it will seem that I am overstating the influence of legal realism and critical legal studies, or the doubts about law's existence. I'm willing to entertain those possibilities, but I do want to emphasize that the focus is on constitutional law. It's easy enough to believe in law when we see it applied and enforced by figures of authority in a recognized hierarchy. That is, the sentencing judge or the prison warden can believe in law—he has applied it himself. And the criminal should believe in law— he has felt its force. But these examples illustrate Austinian law: commands backed by force. What remains elusive, on my account, are laws that are truly laws given to oneself, and especially law given by a state to itself.92 That is why, in Part I of this essay, I suggested that brute force is a poor candidate to distinguish ordinary politics, or ordinary legal decisions, from extraordinary moments of crisis. What would be truly extraordinary is not the use of force, but its absence: a system of law truly based on consent and independent of sanction. The Constitution, in theory, is a law given unto oneself. By this I mean not simply that the Founders gave the Constitution to future generations, but that each successive generation must give the Constitution to itself: each generation must adopt the internal point of view toward the Constitution in order for it to be effective. Even once we have accepted the written text as authoritative, all but the strictest constructionists acknowledge that many meanings can plausibly be extracted from that text. (And even the strict constructionists must acknowledge that as a factual matter many meanings have been extracted; they deny only the plausibility of those varied readings.) Any law given unto oneself requires what Hart called the internal point of view, and what one more cynical might describe as self-delusion: it requires a belief that one is bound though one could at any minute walk away. It is possible, I think, that we have outwitted the Constitution: that we have become too clever, too quick to notice indeterminacy, even too post-modern to believe ourselves bound. A third possible explanation for contemporary references to crisis is professional malaise. It could be, as I suggested earlier, that after too many years of chewing what judges had for breakfast, professors have lost their appetites. It could be that the problems of originalists and historicists and popular constitutionalists don't amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world. And if these possibilities have not crossed the law professor's mind, they probably should. We might consider again Larry Tribe's explanation of his decision to stop work on his treatise of American constitutional law. There are two questions of meaning there, one of which Tribe confronts directly and the other which he brushes off quickly. Most obviously, there is the search for constitutional meaning, as Tribe acknowledges, a search that cannot be concluded within the Constitution's own text. "I see no escape from adopting some perspective... external to the constitution itself from which to decide questions not indisputably resolved one way or the other by the text and structure--------"9* Tribe goes on to wonder where these extra-constitutional criteria come from, and "who ratified the meta-constitution that such external criteria would comprise?".94 Supreme Court Justices (and other judges) must struggle with these questions, given "the public authority that they have the enormous responsibility and privilege to wield."95 But Tribe need not. He can simply decline to finish the treatise. If he declines to finish the treatise, though, we can't help asking ourselves what was at stake, and what remains at stake. If the law professor lacks the responsibility of a judge, is his constitutional theory just an amusing hobby? What was the point of the constitutional law treatise, or of other efforts to discern coherent principles of constitutional law? The significance of a treatise is the question of meaning that Tribe brushes off quickly: he says a treatise is an "attempt at a synthesis of some enduring value" and insists that his decision is not based on doubts about whether constitutional treatises arc ever worthwhile.96 But Tribe's letter leaves the "enduring value" of a treatise rather underspecified, and it is possible that current references to constitutional crisis in the academy stem from uncertainty about such questions of value. Is constitutional theory good for absolutely nothing? Only if we believe that the effort to resist Thrasymachus is futile or pointless. Constitutional theory is a species of legal and political theory, and the most intriguing forms of such theory are produced by worries that law and violence are too closely intertwined.97 Thus I suggested at the outset of this essay that existential anxiety is not always to be regretted, cured, or mocked. Such anxiety may be an important indication that we have noticed the ways in which Thrasymachus seems right, and we still care enough to try to prove him wrong.98 After so much talk of crisis and anxiety, consider an illustration from the dramatic genre. Tom Stoppard's play Jumpers features a troupe of philosophy professors who double as acrobats: "Logical positivists, mainly, with a linguistic analyst or two, a couple of Benthamite utilitarians ... lapsed Kantians and empiricists generally... and of course the usual Behaviorists... a mixture of the more philosophical members

of the university gymnastics team and the more gymnastic members of the Philosophy School."99 The Jumpers seem to practice what we would now identify as post-modern nihilism. One shoots and kills another, then conceals the murder with cheerful aplomb. Against these intellectually and physically adroit colleagues, the clumsy and old-fashioned Professor George Moore struggles to defend "the irreducible fact of goodness,"100 the possibility of a "moral conscience," and the claim that "there is more in me than meets the microscope."101 "Is God?" Moore wonders. He can neither shake nor defend his faith. Law schools, I think, are filled with moral sympathizers to Professor Moore who possess the skills of modern-day Jumpers.102 The current discourse of crisis is the latest manifestation of an old struggle between faith and doubt, and it is not one that we will resolve. On one hand, we have observed too much to believe (in law) unquestioningly. And on the other hand, we are determined to have law, even if we must make it ourselves. There was at least a smidgen of truth in John Finnis's claim that scholars of critical legal studies were "disappointed ... absolutists."103 But it is not just crits that are disappointed when they look for law and see nothing. Few scholars of any stripe want to vindicate Thrasymachus. All of this is just to reiterate the difficulty, and perhaps the necessity, of giving a law unto oneself. If constitutional law did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.

Negative State Action = N/L

We're NOT THE LAW OR STATE AFFIRMATION – demands that a state not exclude groups doesn't reaffirm the state

Newman 10

(Saul, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2)

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state – say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing – is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands **does not necessarily mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy**. On the contrary, demands are made from a **position outside the political order, and they** often **exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure.** They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.

Reform Possible

State Can be Reformed

The state can be reformed – We need to change our thinking

Austin 2014

(Lisa M. Austin Associate Professor Faculty of Law University of Toronto ; Lawful Illegality: What Snowden Has Taught us About the Legal Infrastructure of the Surveillance State; 2014 ; http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=506001013065022030094093080076001123025021068055070080202508609102607011509001600503105712211102200903610911800009300000108607301708401207606112600500606511509109500502907312200109507710706510402406709410206610307609409709100200400408910511909108%5&EXT=pdf&TYPE=2; B ; AWEY)

As Dyzenhaus has argued, some of the post 9/11 debate regarding emergencies and the rule of law concerns the different responses one might take to the existence of either legal black holes or legal grey holes. A black hole is where the legislature seeks to carve out a space of no-law; a grey hole is "one in which there is the facade or form of the rule of law rather than any substantive protections."4 The space created by such holes is a space for executive discretion and the need for such space derives from the perceived exceptional nature of national emergencies, where it is difficult to anticipate in advance what that emergency will be and how one should This framework of emergencies, with its themes of uncertainty and unforseeability, is both helpful and unhelpful when applied to state surveillance. It is helpful in that the exceptional nature of terrorism has deeply influenced contemporary methods of state surveillance. One aspect of the exceptional nature of terrorism is indeed its unpredictability. It is difficult to anticipate who will engage in acts of terrorism: agents of foreign powers, members of existing and known terrorist organizations, affiliates abroad, or homegrown extremists? It is difficult to anticipate where an attack will take place, whether many civilians will be at risk, the potential scale of an attack, and so on. Another aspect of the exceptional nature of terrorism is the type of risk it is seen to be — not just a risk of potentially catastrophic harm but a deep political threat to the state. For example, the US considers itself to be at "war" against al Queda. 6 The extraordinary nature of the threat of terrorism also underpins the US response of seeking to prevent future terrorist attacks, with a "never again" mentality.7 However, focusing on the exceptional nature of emergencies can detract us from the most salient features of the state surveillance methods Snowden has revealed to the world: they are in fact a rational, systematic, planned response to the perceived need to prevent terrorist attacks. In other words, the framework of emergencies concerns whether what is needed is a discretionary space for executive authority — either legal black holes or legal grey holes — to nimbly respond to exceptional circumstances that cannot be foreseen in advance. But state surveillance premised on the idea of collecting the "haystack" to find the "needle" is not about preserving discretion at all. It is about applying rational analytic methods to the problem of preventing certain kinds of threats that have been identified at least at some level of generality (e.g. terrorist threat).8 The proper frame of the rule of law challenge is not about the question of whether executive discretionary authority in relation to emergencies can and should be constrained by the reason of the law; instead, it is about whether mass surveillance as a mode of rational social ordering is in conflict with the deepest commitments of law as a mode of rational social ordering. When we talk about the legality of surveillance, therefore, we need to focus less on the spaces of discretion and more on the systematic features of surveillance that put strain on our traditional understandings of the rule of law. In particular, I want to flag three issues. The first is the issue of secrecy and the degree to which it is demanded by the national security context. My claim is that it creates pressure for unilateral, rather than objective and public, interpretations of the law. The second is the issue of legal complexity, especially as it relates to law reform initiatives. Where there is an increased blurring between regular law enforcement, border control, and terrorism investigations, as well as increasingly complex relationships between private sector communications intermediaries and the state, gaining a clear public understanding of proposed changes to lawful access laws or the full significance of legal cases before the courts, is extremely difficult. The third is the issue of jurisdiction and the extent to which national boundaries and questions of status (like citizenship) affect the lawfulness of surveillance. In particular, I argue that instead of providing us with the tools for accountability, status and jurisdiction allow for the leveraging of national boundaries to create an international surveillance regime with questionable accountability.

Reforms Work

Pure resistance entrenches the status quo---must be willing to propose imperfect reforms

Pyle 99

(Jefferey, Boston College Law School, J.D., magna cum laude Race, Equality and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory's Attack on the Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C.L. Rev. 787)

For all their talk of "realism,"'" race-crits are strangely unrealistic in their proposals for reform. 1 m7 Most probably realize that radical measures like racial or ethnic reparations are not likely to be granted, especially by a court. But even unrealistic proposals are rare, because race-crits generally prefer not to suggest solutions, but to "resist" the dominant legal thought, doctrine and policy, whatever that happens to be.'" As Derrick Bell has put it, "most critical race theorists are committed to a program of scholarly resistance, and most hope scholarly resistance will lay the groundwork for wide-scale resistance."'" How this ivory tower oppositionalism would foment grassroots revolt is unclear, because CRT professors rarely suggest anything practical. Rather, their exhortations are meant, as Bell says, to "harass white folks" and • thereby "make life bearable in a society where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class."'" One of the race-erns' few practical programs of "resistance" is Paul Butler's proposal that inner-city juries practice racially-based jury nullification.'91 jurors of color, Butler argues, have the "moral responsibility" not to apply the criminal law to blacks and whites equally, but to "etnancipate some guilty black outlaws" because "the black community" would be "better off" if there were fewer black men in prison.'" Butler rejects the ordinary democratic process of legal reform.' Democracy, he says, ensures a "permanent, homogenous majority" of whites that "dominat[es]" African Ainericans.w5 Butler is probably correct that occasional acts of jury nullification might well express the resentment that many African Americans justifiably feel towards discriminatory law enforcement.'"`' As Randall Kennedy has pointed out, however, black Americans are disproportionately the victims of crimes,'97 and therefore tend to favor more, not less, criminal prosecution and punishment. 1 "8 The race-crits' preference for "resistance"'99 over democratic participation seems to flow from a fear of losing their status as "oppositional scholars] "200 to the game of mainstream law and politics, which they regard as "an inevitably co-optive process?"' Better to be radically opposed to the "doniinant political discourse""2 and remain an out than to work within the current system and lose one's "authenticity?" In rejecting the realistic for the "authentic," however, race-crits begin to look like academic poseurs—ideological purists striking the correct radical stance, but doing little within the confines of the real world, so sure are they that nothing much can be done."

Change from Within k

Change must happen from within the state

Dussel| 2011

(Enrique Domingo Dussel Ambrosini (born December 24, 1934) is an Argentine-Mexican writer and philosopher; A note regarding political organization: strategic action ; 2011 ; From Critical Theory to the Philosophy of Liberation: Some Themes for Dialogue, page 33; AWEY)

In the same way, this lack of realism with respect to state institutions results in a lack of critical realism in political strategy. I am not speaking of a "politics of organization," but rather a "politics of events." Lacking a strategic institutional reference – like the state (which should nevertheless always be transformed) – strategic mediations become insignificant. In the end, for Negri, the global multitude faced with the specter of Empire (which for him lacks both an army and an exteriority) confronts the efforts of some organizations like the NGOs. This multitude will accumulate very little power (potentia) while under the control of and managed by the mediocracy (as Giorgio Agamben, who knows well the political power of media magnates like Berlusconi, refers to it), which inevitably fabricates the interpretation of all political actions and institutions. It is true that it is the interpretation of the event that creates the consciousness of the multitudes, as public opinion is manipulated through a sort of "fabricated meaning" that completely distorts those same events. In the end, what occurred in Seattle, Genoa, or Cancun is what the media presented through the distortion of information. The media outlets don not argue; they present video and images, they grind them up and repeat them, and they create an imaginary, fetishized unanimity with complete control over the meaning of the political. Is it possible in such a situation to passively await the maturation of a politics of events? It would seem that the reason and the political will of the oppressed masses, of the particular postcolonial states, of the marginalized, impoverished, of the original peoples of all the continents, of the excluded and the "wretched of the earth," also demands institutional mediation. Be they as they may, the unforeseeable, the already known, or the transformable, such institutions are necessary so that an empirical strategy might begin to clear the path. When the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre asserts that "Another world is possible!" – the practical postulate of all postulates – it slowly begins to invent from below, without firm presuppositions, humble in the face of the experiences of that globally-networks and united base. This base comprises political organizations on all levels, from the economic, household, neighborhood, sporting, artistic, cultural, and theoretical spheres, etc., new social movements whose participants know how to transform themselves into political actors in different institutions, not only in civil society but likewise in political society. Political parties, which need to transform themselves as reality demands, would need to play a new and more active role, not as a vanguard, but rather as a political school, as the rearguard of the popular masses, as a critical institution in the exercise of power, elaborating alternatives, as a site for the discussion of postulates, projects, models, ends, strategies, tactics, means... so that the reproduction and development of life in political community might be possible, so that its democratic, symmetrical, authorized participation might be possible, within a realism of that feasibility which is situated between anarchist impossibility (which is empirically impossible) and conservative impossibility (which is empirically possible, but open to criticism). Hope, beyond conservative pessimism, but more proximate than the extreme optimism of the anarchist, becomes mobilized when it exercises a feasible power which transforms the existing structures from the perspective of a postulate which needs only be filled with content: "A world in which all worlds fit!," as the Zapatistas proclaim.

Law Key to Natives

Legal reform is vital to provide meaningful redress for past violence to natives—can't fix the law outside of the law

Bradford 2

(William Bradford 2, Chiricahua Apache. LL.M., 2001, Harvard Law School; Ph.D., 1995, Northwestern University, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": 1 Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1)

[*17] Nevertheless, even if the non-Indian majority would reject the American Myth in the interest of mending national fences, the path to Indian redress winds through terrain unmapped heretofore. Compensation and apologies, gestures potentially part of an amicable settlement, are not germane to the resolution of Indian claims for injustices that cannot be remedied save by reinvestiture of lands and sovereignty in self-determining Indian tribes. 70 This requires not merely an abstract acknowledgment of the value of pluralism but a comprehensive program of legal reform that dispenses with doctrines and precedents perpetuating the denial of the human rights of Indian tribes and people. 71 As law, more than any other social variable, has reproduced the subordination of Indians in the United States, 72 legal reform occupies a central position in the claim for Indian redress. 73¶ [*18] In short, proponents of Indian redress must not only displace a flawed version of history: they must articulate a proposal for remediation that transports the American people far beyond the strictures of existing law to enable the peaceful restoration of Indian lands and powers of self-government. 74 Such a transformative mission cannot be accomplished by positing Indians and the non-Indian majority as adversaries, as would reparations; rather, redress of Indian claims and the healing of the American nation -- crucial foci of the drive toward perfection -- necessitate dialogue, reconciliation, and joint authorship of a future history of peace, harmony, and justice. 75¶ Part II of this Article offers a disquieting version of U.S-Indian history that accelerates erosion of the American Myth and acquaints the non-Indian majority with the necessary factual predicate to Indian redress. Parts III and IV contrast the assumptions, procedures, and remedies that distinguish reparations and reconciliation, 76 the dominant contending models of redress available to group victims of human injustice, and demonstrate that, because it offers the best hope for a peaceful American coexistence marked by mutual respect for sovereignty, reconciliation is a more appropriate avenue to Indian redress. Several preliminary proposals, including the introduction of traditional tribal peacemaking as perhaps the most appropriate form of [*19] reconciliation, will be offered to stimulate thinking.

Defense

AT: Quick Fix Solutions

Chocolate laxatives K is silly

Olson 9

(Dan T. Olson 9 - MA in theology from Fuller Theological Seminary and am in the process of completing another MA in philosophy at LMU, 8/1/9, Hauerwas, Zizek, Patagonia And Rob Bell: Capitalism's Chocolate Laxatives And The Church

http://dtomolson.wordpress.com/2009/08/01/hauerwas-zizek-patagonia-and-rob-bell-capitalisms-chocolate-laxatives-and-the-church/)

To get back to the point, Zizek suggests that the reason these liberal-communists and their chocolate laxatives must be rejected is that they are the quick fixes that allow the system to continue to grind on, grinding up the masses as it does. The chocolate laxative may momentarily loosen your stool, but it will not fix the main cause of the problem. In order to do that one must stop living off of chocolate and eat some roughage, which doesn't taste all that good to a palate used to sugar, cocoa and butter. One possible danger in Zizek's answer, for me, is that it is in danger of making the same mistake that every other purely human revolution, insurrection, or rescue mission has made. That is, in view of what must be achieved some sacrifices must be made—some heads of the aristocracy, some infidels, a couple of thousand Iraqi or Afghani civilians lives or the massive suffering and starvation of many of the wretched of the earth who depend on the charity of the liberal communists. For the Christian this is always unacceptable. People are not goods to be used no matter how lofty the purpose but persons to be loved. (Of course how this love works itself out is what is in question here.) Many theologians have told us, rightly, that the poor are the sight of the in breaking and redeeming work of Christ. This is different than being the subjective location of, or potential for, the revolution. One must be careful that in order to achieve one's end, the end of capitalist hegemony, an end that I believe is completely in line with the Gospel, one does not sacrifice those who cannot choose otherwise. This does not mean that on the other hand we shut our eyes and continue to rejoice in liberal communists and chocolate laxatives. We cannot be content to wear our Tom's Shoes and Gap Red T-shirts while drinking our fair trade coffee and going about our day pleased with the current social order. There has to be a third or middle way, a political option better than Elizabeth's ecclesial via media.

Law Inevitable

Law is inevitable – repressing the state increases its abusive activity

McCormick '99

(John P., Assistant Political Science Pf - Yale, American Political Science Review. v93, p. June 1999)//akim

Conventionalism is often considered to be a way of avoiding the naked prejudices of individual judges constituting the law. As a solution, whatever a community of judges in a particular culture could be expected to agree upon in a similar case ought to be adopted as a guideline for a judge's particular opinion in a given case. Indeed, in his early legal work, Schmitt ([1912] 1969, 71-9, 86) offers this as a solution to the problem of judicial subjectivism.8 Here Schmitt trusts in the [foot notes] [header] hegemony of the conservative interpretive methods of the late Kaiserreich to promote judicial consensus in much the manner that Fiss (1982, 1985), for instance, trusts in something approaching a postwar American liberal consensus in his own formulation of conventionalism. These examples, of course, potentially exacerbate rather than alleviate the problem of judicial arbitrariness: The cultural prejudice of a particular profession as a whole is no better solution to the problem of indeterminacy from a normative perspective than, on the one hand, a subjectively all-powerful lawgiver judge, or, on the other, a mechanically objective automaton judge. Collective prejudice is ultimately just as problematic as individual prejudice. It may temporarily reduce the threat of indeterminacy by guaranteeing more predictable results, but it does so in a way that is still, in the last instance, arbitrary. Schmitt abandons conventionalism in his mature writings of the 1920s and early 1930s; CLS has always rejected it, perhaps appropriately, as elitist. According to Schmitt, in their revulsion to arbitrary discretion, liberals sought to eliminate the state institutionally from jurisprudential concerns, just as they wished to eliminate, hermeneutically, the personal, subjective decision from such matters. But they were equally unsuccessful in each endeavor. Specifically, the adherence to legal formalism under conditions of an emerging welfare state allows more state intervention than was ever dreamed of by absolute monarchs. To Schmitt's mind, in the early twentieth century, the formalism of liberalism serves as an ideology that belies the so-called materialization of law that is brought about by state activity in the new era of welfare-state or Sozialstaat interventionism. Schmitt observes presciently that as state activity addresses complex and variegated social and economic situations, law is formulated in a more open-ended and less finely discernible manner. In the service of widescale state intervention into particular spheres of society, more discretion becomes exercised by bureaucratic administrators, including judicial officers, in implementing broadly defined social policy. Rather than a formal guideline for members of society, **law becomes a material part of social reality**.9 By **repressing the state,** the legal formalists not only do not prevent arbitrary state functioning but also **allow its activity to proliferate more extensively and undetected to an even greater degree**. Unlike CLS at a later date, however, Schmitt's concern with this situation is not that state officials and the powerful interests they represent potentially abuse their power through such functioning; rather, the state is actually, in the end, exhausted by it. The welfare state is a weakened state that overextends itself, not a dangerously strong coercive state.

State Inevitable

State is inevitable – only way to change is to work within it.

Dussel| 2011

(Enrique Domingo Dussel Ambrosini (born December 24, 1934) is an Argentine-Mexican writer and philosopher; The sphere of feasibility: Empire and the "dissolution of the particular state" ; 2011 ; From Critical Theory to the Philosophy of Liberation: Some Themes for Dialogue, page 29; AWEY)

All institutions, responding in their founding moment to demands for the permanence and extension of life, include a certain degree of discipline. Anti-institutional critics are quite right to show that this discipline becomes quickly (or even from its origin) repressive. This was Marcuse's subject in Eros and Civilization. The state is a political macro-institution. More recently, M. Foucault opposed the political binary of oppressor-oppressed as wielded by the only instance of the exercise of power (the state) and equally affirmed by standard Marxism.75 He tried to show that power was disseminated, through multipolar rather than bipolar structures, in micro-institutions that discipline the body on different epistemic levels and justify the exercise of power. The panoptical power of prisons, psychiatric clinics, schools etc., fragment power, and as such undermine the over-simplified view of power as based macro-institutionally in the state. The old tradition of which this sort of critique is a part – begun by Stirner and Bakunin, continued by Sorel and Pelloutier, and which runs deeply at present in Foucault himself, along with Negri and Holloway – expresses a need for the "dissolution of the state." This, however, brings in the entire institutional question within the philogenetic development of the human species that have progressively become "fixed" in systemic structures and institutions. Finally, it is on these latter that the entire problematic of diagnosing the nature of politics and economics is based, which provides the foundation for a properly contingent level of strategy. Political action that seeks to change or "transform" the world inevitably confronts institutions. In a situation of chaos or pure original dissidence (disidencia originaria), there can be no transformation or dissent. To chaos one can only "con-form," institutionalizing it toward the permanence of life by way of this "institutionalizing (instituyente) power."76 Original dissidence, on the other hand, is death and non-power, because when there is no consensus or agreement the "powers-to-posit" 77 of each member oppose and cancel out one another (and it is not possible to create any mediation to sustain life). The starting point should be some sort of consensus. The "form" of the institution or consensus is open to change, to be "trans-formed" through a moment of overcoming chaos with creative dissidence, into a higher form. To trans-form or change is not simply to destroy: it is to de-construct in order to innovate and move toward a better construction. Revolution is not only, or primarily, or principally destruction: it means having a principle that orients the deconstruction just as much as it orients the new construction (it is not the business of destroying everything, only that which is irretrievable). Those who lack criteria and principles for a new construction (note that I am not saying a "re-construction"), are not revolutionaries but simply destructive and barbaric. It would not be possible for millions of human beings to maintain and expand communal life without institutions. Should we irrationally return to the Paleolithic era? No. We are dealing with the "trans-formation" (what Marx called Veraenderung) of those institutions which began as lifeenhancing mediations, but which have since become instruments of death, impediments to life, instruments of an exclusion which can be observed empirically in the cry arising from the pain of the oppressed, the ones suffering under unjust institutions. Such entropically-repressive institutions exercise a power-over78 their victims, whose power-to-posit79 their own mediations is negated, and who are thereby repressed.

Alt Worse

Individual Ethics Fail

Individual ethical orientations aren't effective – it's more productive to rearticulate systems from the inside

Pugh 10

(Jonathan, Newcastle Postcolonial Geographer, "The Stakes of Radical Politics have Changed: Post-crisis, Relevance and the State", Globalizations, March-June, ebsco)

In this polemical piece I have just been talking about how, following an ethos of radicalism as withdrawal from the state, some from the radical Left were incapable of being able to respond to the new stakes of radical politics. In particular, they were not found at the state, where the passive public turned to resolve the crisis. I will now go on to examine how in recent years significant parts of the radical Left have also tended to prioritise raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities, over capturing state power. I am going to say that it is important to create this awareness. However, in an effort to draw attention to the stakes of politics as we find them now, post-2008, I will also point out that we should not place too much faith in this approach alone. Against the backdrop of what I have just been saying, it is important to remember that while much attention is focused upon President Obama, in many other parts of the world the Right and fundamentalism are gaining strength through capturing state power. The perception that the USA has changed is accompanied by a sense of relief among many radicals. However, the European Elections of 2009, the largest trans-national vote in history, heralded a continent-wide shift to the Right (and far Right) in many places—in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portgual, Slovenia, Spain, Romania, as just some examples (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Despite Obama's election and a near depression, neo-liberalism continues to be implemented through a world spanning apparatus of governmental and intergovernmental organisations, think tanks and trans-national corporations (Massey, 2009; Castree, 2009). The power of the Right in countries like Iran, while checked, remains unchallenged by the Left. Albertazzi et al. (2009) draw attention to how a disconnected Left is leaving power in the hands of the Right in many other countries nationally, like Italy for example. Reflecting upon contemporary radical politics, the British Labour politician Clare Short (2009, p. 67) concludes: In the fog of the future, I see a rise of fascistic movements . . . I am afraid it will all get nastier before we see a rise in generous, radical politics, but I suspect that history is about to speed up in front of our eyes and all who oppose the radicalisation of fear, ethnic hatred, racialism and division have to be ready to create a new movement that contains the solutions to the monumental historical problems we currently face. So, the stakes of politics are clear. The Right is on the rise. Neo-liberal ideology is still dominant. How is the Left responding to these stakes? I have already discussed how some from the radical Left are placing too much faith in civil society organisations that seek to withdraw from the state. I will now turn to how others have too much faith in the power of raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities. Post-crisis, the increasing popularity of David Chandler's (2004, 2007, 2009a, 2009b) work reflects the sense that radicals too often celebrate the ethical individual as a radical force, at the expense of wider representational programmes for change. His central argument is that this leaves radicals impotent. Chandler (2009a, p. 78–79) says that many radicals argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones— there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society. In one way, Chandler's reflective insight here is not particularly unique. Many others also seem to think that radicals today are too isolated and disengaged (Martin, 2009).5 Neither is it particularly original to say that there is too much emphasis upon creativity and spontaneity (what Richard Sennett, 2004, calls 'social jazz'), and not enough upon representational politics. Indeed, go to many radical blogs and you find radicals themselves constantly complaining about how it has become too easy to sign up to ethical web petitions, email complaints, join a variety of ethical causes, without actually developing the political programmes themselves that matter. So it is not Chandler's point about radicals being disengaged from instrumental politics that concerns me here. It is his related point—that there has been a flight into ethics, away from political accountability and responsibility that I find intriguing. Personal statements of ethical awareness have become particularly important within radical politics today. It is therefore interesting to note, as I will now discuss, that we have been here before. In his earlier writings Karl Marx (1982) criticised the German Idealists for retreating into ethics, instead of seizing the institutions of power that mattered for themselves. Unwilling to express their self-interests politically through capturing power, the Idealists would rather make statements about their ethical awareness. Such idealism, along with an unwillingness to be held accountable for political power, often goes hand in hand. For Marx, it is necessary to feel the weight, but also the responsibility of power. Chandler argues that, just as when the early Marx critiqued German Idealism, we should now be drawing attention to the pitfalls of the flights to ethics today. He says: In the case of the German bourgeoisie, Marx concludes that it is their weakness and fragmentation, squeezed between the remnants of the ancien re´gime and the developing industrial proletariat, which explains their ideological flight into values. Rather than take on political responsibility for overthrowing the old order, the German bourgeoisie denied their specific interests and idealised progress in the otherworldly terms of abstract philosophy, recoiling from the consequences of their liberal aspirations in practice. (Chandler, 2007, p. 717) Today we are witnessing a renewed interest in ethics (Lai¨di, 1998; Badiou, 2002). Fragmented, many radicals retreat into abstract ethical slogans like 'another world is possible', 'global human rights', or 'making poverty history'. As discussed above, we are also of course seeing the return of Kant's cosmopolitanism. While I think we should not attack the ethical turn for its values, as many of these around environmental issues and human rights are admirable, it is equally important to say that the turn to ethics

seems to reflect a certain lack of willingness to seize power and be held accountable to it. For the flight to ethics, as it often plays out in radical politics today, seems to be accompanied by scepticism toward representational politics. Continuing with this theme for a moment, Slavoj Zizek (2008) also sheds some more light upon why ethics (when compared to representational politics) has become so important to the Left in recent years. He says that many of us (he is of course writing for the Left) feel that we are unable to make a real difference through representational politics on a larger scale, when it comes to the big political problems of life. Zizek (2008, p. 453) talks of this feeling that 'we cannot ever predict the consequences of our acts'; that nothing we do will 'guarantee that the overall outcome of our interactions will be satisfactory'. And he is right to make this point. Today, our geographical imaginations are dominated by a broader sense of chaos and Global Complexity (Urry, 2003; Stengers, 2005). These ways of thinking, deep in the psyche of many radicals on the Left may be one other reason why so many have retreated into ethics. When we do not really believe that we can change the world through developing fine detailed instruments, capturing the state, or predictive models, we are naturally more hesitant. It is better to try and raise ethical awareness instead. Whereas in the past power was something to be won and treasured, something radicals could use to implement a collective ideology, today, with the risk posed by representation in fragmented societies, top-down power often becomes a hazard, even an embarrassment, for many on the Left (Laï¨di, 1998). This is, as I have already discussed, where the Right and neo-liberal ideologues are seizing the opportunity of the moment. Putting what I have just said another way, there is a need to be clear, perhaps more so in these interdisciplinary times—ethics and politics (particularly representational politics) are different. Of course they are related. You cannot do politics without an ethical perspective. **But my point here is that the Right and neo-liberal ideologues will not simply go away if the Left adopt or raise awareness of alternative ethical lifestyles**. The Right are willing to capture state power, particularly at this time when the state is increasingly powerful. When we compare the concerted political programme of neo-liberalism, first developed by Reagan, Thatcher, the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, multi-national banks, and the G20, as just some of many examples, ethical individuals across the world offer some counter-resistance. But the 2008 crisis, and the response of protests like the Alternative G20, demonstrated how weak ethical resistance is in the face of the institutions of the neo-liberal economy. Another reason for this is because the ethical individual contributes so much to neo-liberal societies themselves. To explain how, we must briefly step back. The new social movements of previous decades have, in general, been effectively recuperated by the existing system of capital, by satisfying them in a way that neutralised their subversive potential. This is how capital has maintained its hegemonic position in post-Fordist societies. Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) explain how capitalists have worked with, rather than against, the characteristics of new social movements. They say the new social movements desire for autonomy, the ideal of self-management, the anti-hierarchical exigency, and the search for authenticity, were important in developing post-Fordism. These replaced the hierarchical framework of the Fordist period with new forms of networked control. And so, in this way, we see that the relationship between new social movements and capital has been productive. In turn, and this is the important point I want to make about the present moment, clearly the stakes of radical politics have now changed once more. As discussed earlier, it would now seem that post-Fordist society is actually more hierarchical and controllable than many previously thought. Without the neoliberal state, and the public's subordination to its actions, it would not now exist in anything like its present form. Our subordination to the state has stopped a post-crisis implosion of neo-liberalism. And this is of course where one of the central characteristics of the ethical individual has been so productive. Endemic individualism, so dominant in liberal societies, has been recuperated by the ethical individual who is unwilling to seize the state. **So the salient point here is that the ethical individual is reflective of the conservative forces in society today.**

Micro-Resistance Fails – State Key

The alt doesn't adequately create counterhegemonies-micro resistance empirically relies on the myth they will spill up but never do-the AFF's vision of institutional change is more effective.

Lobel 7

(Orly, UCSD law professor, "The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics", http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf)

Both the practical failures and the fallacy of rigid boundaries generated by extralegal activism rhetoric permit us to broaden our inquiry to the underlying assumptions of current proposals regarding transformative politics — that is, attempts to produce meaningful changes in the political and socioeconomic landscapes. The suggested alternatives produce a new image of social and political action. This vision rejects a shared theory of social reform, rejects formal programmatic agendas, and embraces a multiplicity of forms and practices. Thus, it is described in such terms as a plan of no plan,211 "a project of projects,"212 "anti-theory theory,"213 politics rather than goals,214 presence rather than power,215 "practice over theory,"216 and chaos and openness over order and formality. As a result, the contemporary message rarely includes a comprehensive vision of common social claims, but rather engages in the description of fragmented efforts. As Professor Joel Handler argues, the commonality of struggle and social vision that existed during the civil rights movement has disappeared.217 There is no unifying discourse or set of values, but rather an aversion to any metanarrative and a resignation from theory. Professor Handler warns that this move away from grand narratives is self-defeating precisely because only certain parts of the political spectrum have accepted this new stance: "[T]he opposition is not playing that game . . . . [E]veryone else is operating as if there were Grand Narratives . . . ."218 Intertwined with the resignation from law and policy, the new bromide of "neither left nor right" has become axiomatic only for some.219 The contemporary critical legal consciousness informs the scholarship of those who are interested in progressive social activism, but less so that of those who are interested, for example, in a more competitive securities market. Indeed, an interesting recent development has been the rise of "conservative public interest lawyer[ing]."220 Although "public interest law" was originally associated exclusively with liberal projects, in the past three decades conservative advocacy groups have rapidly grown both in number and in their vigorous use of traditional legal strategies to promote their causes.221 This growth in conservative advocacy is particularly salient in juxtaposition to the decline of traditional progressive advocacy. Most recently, some thinkers have even suggested that there may be "something inherent in the left's conception of social change — focused as it is on participation and empowerment — that produces a unique distrust of legal expertise."222 Once again, this conclusion reveals flaws parallel to the original disenchantment with legal reform. Although the new extralegal frames present themselves as apt alternatives to legal reform models and as capable of producing significant changes to the social map, in practice they generate very limited improvement in existing social arrangements. Most strikingly, the cooptation effect here can be explained in terms of the most profound risk of the typology — that of legitimation. The common pattern of extralegal scholarship is to describe an inherent instability in dominant structures by pointing, for example, to grassroots strategies,223 and then to assume that specific instances of counterhegemonic activities translate into a more complete transformation. This celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems to rely on an aggregate approach — an idea that the multiplication of practices will evolve into something substantial In fact, the myth of engagement obscures the actual lack of change being produced, while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social reform produces a false belief in the potential of change. There are few instances of meaningful reordering of social and economic arrangements and macro-redistribution. Scholars write about decoding what is really happening, as though the scholarly narrative has the power to unpack more than the actual conventional experience will admit.224 Unrelated efforts become related and part of a whole through mere reframing. At the same time, the elephant in the room — the rising level of economic inequality — is left unaddressed and comes to be understood as natural and inevitable.225 This is precisely the problematic process that critical theorists decry as losers' self-mystification, through which marginalized groups come to see systemic losses as the product of their own actions and thereby begin to focus on minor achievements as representing the boundaries of their willed reality. The explorations of micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and the prescriptive. The manifestations of extralegal activism — the law and organizing model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate nongovernmental sphere of action — all produce a fantasy that change can be brought about through small-scale, decentralized transformation. The emphasis is local, but the locality is described as a microcosm of the whole and the audience is national and global. In the context of the humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies from the 1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter including works on American cities and neighborhoods in trouble.226 The aspiration of these genres was that each individual story could translate into a "time of the nation" body of knowledge and motivation.227 In contemporary legal thought, a corresponding gap opens between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality, although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-statenational federations have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline.228 There is, therefore, an absence of links between the local and the national, an absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed "the missing

middle" by Professor Theda Skocpol.229 New social movements have for the most part failed in sustaining coalitions or producing significant institutional change through grassroots activism. Professor Handler concludes that this failure is due in part to the ideas of contingency, pluralism, and localism that are so embedded in current activism.230 Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive debate? It is important for next-generation progressive legal scholars, while maintaining a critical legal consciousness, to recognize that not all extralegal associational life is transformative. We must differentiate, for example, between inward-looking groups, which tend to be self-regarding and depoliticized, and social movements that participate in political activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge and reform existing realities.231 We must differentiate between professional associations and more inclusive forms of institutions that act as trustees for larger segments of the community.232 As described above, extralegal activism tends to operate on a more divided and hence a smaller scale than earlier social movements, which had national reform agendas. Consequently, within critical discourse there is a need to recognize the limited capacity of small-scale action. We should question the narrative that imagines consciousness-raising as directly translating into action and action as directly translating into change. Certainly not every cultural description is political. Indeed, it is questionable whether forms of activism that are opposed to programmatic reconstruction of a social agenda should even be understood as social movements. In fact, when groups are situated in opposition to any form of institutionalized power, they may be simply mirroring what they are fighting against and merely producing moot activism that settles for what seems possible within the narrow space that is left in a rising convergence of ideologies. The original vision is consequently coopted, and contemporary discontent is legitimated through a process of self-mystification.

Alt Fails/State Good/Reformable

Either the alternative is ontologically incompatible and the alternative does nothing or it necessitates dissolution of the state which fails

Gay 12

(Paul, CBS department of organization professor, "Leviathan calling Some notes on sociological anti-statism and its consequences", Journal of Sociology, 48.4, SAGE)

Because the state is imperfect – indeed, in being born it had to renounce perfection, as Weber famously argued in The Profession and Vocation of Politics (1994), both its own and that of those it sought to rule, making do instead with its capacity to enforce peace and their capacity to act peaceably **– it is not necessarily wise to insist on benchmarking the state against moral ideals which are alien to its constitution**. In seeking to make the state conform to certain politically and morally expressivist ideals – whether liberal or communitarian, cosmopolitan or transnationalist, or any other such ideals – critics of the state can come dangerously close to endorsing its retheologization, or its dissolution. Michael Ignatieff (2001: 35) makes precisely this point when he argues that individual rights cannot and should not function as transcendental limits on state action because they are themselves the product of action by sovereign states. They are historical entitlements to legal action, contingent upon the state's capacity to establish and maintain security. Under conditions of peace the sovereign state, in its guise as security state, can almost seem to disappear, and the state becomes the addressee of a wide range of additional demands and expectations. As soon as the security envelope is threatened, however, whether internally (incitement to insurrection, domestic terrorism, economic crisis) or externally (foreign terrorism, invasion, economic crisis) then civil liberties and rights are retracted to the extent that is necessary to protect the space within which they were unfolded in the first place (Hunter, 1998, 2005). It should therefore come as no surprise – in fact it should be taken as evidence of its 'stateness' – that contemporary liberal-democratic states default to their 'foundational' security setting when under threat. It would be a worry if they did not, for this would be evidence of their transcendence or 'hollowing out'. What still seems so difficult for those seeking to moralize the state, and what conjoins them with earlier critics, is their distrust of the independence or autonomy of the state as an impersonal structure of rule. In particular, these modern critics seem unable, or unwilling, to accept that the state cannot possibly undertake its core functions of pacification and security unless it can decide for itself, 'without internal impediment', what can be publicly expressed or just who can own what, and why. It is the state, and the state alone, that can and must: judge the degree of jeopardy in every instance. The state carries, and must carry, the authority of its own subjects' will and choice to make that judgement on their behalf and to act, decisively, upon it. Indeed, each subject has a right against every other that it should do just this. (Dunn, 2000: 84) It is in this sense, as I indicated earlier, the authority of the state is both 'binding and content-independent': Part of the whole point of having such a free-standing coercive structure (the state) is that it be independent…. **As long as the basic fact remains, there is always going to be a gap between the political power of the state and the effective powers of the populace, and, on this argument, that is a good thing**… in a world populated by other states, many of them predatory, it is essential for the minimal self-defence of a certain population that it be organized as a state, or one might think that it was necessary [as recent events indicate all too clearly] to have an independent power that could intervene in the economy to prevent it from selfdestruction. (Geuss, 2001: 129, emphasis in original) The very rationale of the state as an 'independent coercive apparatus', one beyond the direct control of its subjects, means that it will always be antithetical to the moralizing ideal of popular sovereignty. From a statist point of view, this is a major factor in its favour. **Attempts by critics of various sorts to neuter the authoritarian or absolutist pedigree of the state through**, for instance, **abrogating its room for manoeuvre** by opposing its discretionary powers, **are**, from this statist viewpoint, **misguided, not least because they can** in certain circumstances **undermine the very conditions that made the state** and the liberal rights associated with it **possible** in the first place (Geuss, 2001; Hunter, 2005). The 'critique and expose' line of reasoning, which seeks to somehow evacuate, water down or occlude the continuing and crucial practical importance of sovereignty and an associated 'absolutist' capacity, also extends to contemporary sociological discussions of the state. Here, the effects of the ongoing 'moment of theory', in particular some of its 'constructionist' and 'constructivist' variants, are evident (for a detailed discussion see Hunter, 2006, 2007, 2009). Much important work in the latter vein has sought to puncture reifications of the state as a free-standing entity, indicating instead how 'state effects' are produced in, and as a result of, the relations established between a diverse range of materials, mundane practices and devices. However, while ostensibly signaling an adherence to empirical history and positive description, this body of work has tended to be highly theoretical and epochal in orientation. A

number of consequences have flowed from this, not least of which has been the effective disappearance of the state as an object of sociological analysis. Two pieces inspired by the work of Michel Foucault – Rose and Miller's (1992) 'Political Power beyond the State' (with its focus on 'governmentality') and Timothy Mitchell's (1999) 'Society, Economy, and the State Effect' (with its focus on 'disciplinary society') – serve as representative examples of this tendency. They do so precisely because they are more epochal theoretical positions than they are historical descriptions. In following a certain Foucauldian line, one which programmatically distinguishes between a 'before' and an 'after', instituting an epochal break between singular power exercised via absolutist sovereignty and plural powers exercised via normalizing disciplines and techniques of conduct, these and other such analyses are simply trading on an ahistorical theoretical distinction which supposedly contrasts perfectly antithetical ways of exercising power. As such, they have little to say about the historical emergence of the state and its instituted purposes, and thus equally little to say about how and why the manner of the state's historical existence makes it unamenable to being reduced to theoretical abstractions such as the 'juridico-discursive' or 'governmentality'. Their epochal theoretical orientation and concomitant lack of historical contextualization effectively render them incapable of comprehending how the absolutist security state was and remains the default setting for the contemporary liberal-democratic state (Hunter, 2005).

Institutions KT Solve Anti-Blackness

the law is obviously problematic, but that's a reason we should hold it accountable to live up to its ideals

Crenshaw 88

(Kimberle, Law @ UCLA, "RACE, REFORM, AND RETRENCHMENT: TRANSFORMATION AND LEGITIMATION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW", 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, lexis)

Questioning the Transformative View: Some Doubts About Trashing The Critics' product is of limited utility to Blacks in its present form. The implications for Blacks of trashing liberal legal ideology are troubling, even though it may be proper to assail belief structures that obscure liberating possibilities. Trashing legal ideology seems to tell us repeatedly what has already been established -- that legal discourse is unstable and relatively indeterminate. Furthermore, trashing offers **no idea of how to avoid the negative consequences of engaging in reformist discourse** or how to work around such consequences. Even if we imagine the wrong world when we think in terms of legal discourse, **we must nevertheless exist in a present world** where legal protection has at times been a blessing -- albeit a mixed one. The fundamental problem is that, although Critics criticize law because it functions to legitimate existing institutional arrangements, it is precisely this legitimating function that has made law **receptive to** certain demands in this area. The Critical emphasis on deconstruction as the vehicle for liberation leads to the conclusion that engaging in legal discourse should be avoided because it reinforces not only the discourse itself but also the society and the world that it embodies. Yet Critics offer little beyond this observation. Their focus on delegitimating rights rhetoric seems to suggest that, once rights rhetoric has been discarded, there exists a more productive strategy for change, one which does not reinforce existing patterns of domination. Unfortunately, **no such strategy has yet been articulated**, and it is difficult to imagine that racial minorities will ever be able to discover one. As Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward point out in their [*1367] excellent account of the civil rights movement, popular struggles are a reflection of institutionally determined logic and a challenge to that logic. 137 **People can only demand change in ways that reflect the logic of the institutions that they are challenging**. 138 Demands for change that do not reflect the institutional logic -- that is, demands that do not engage and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology -- will probably be **ineffective.** 139 The possibility for ideological change is created through the very process of legitimation, which is triggered by crisis. Powerless people can sometimes trigger such a crisis by challenging an institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it. 140 Such crisis occurs when powerless people force open and politicize a contradiction between the dominant ideology and their reality. The political consequences [*1368] of maintaining the contradictions may sometimes force an adjustment -- an attempt to close the gap or to make things appear fair. 141 Yet, because the adjustment is triggered by the political consequences of the contradiction, circumstances will be adjusted only to the extent necessary to close the apparent contradiction. This approach to understanding legitimation and change is applicable to the civil rights movement. Because Blacks were challenging their exclusion from political society, the only claims that were likely to achieve recognition were those that reflected American society's institutional logic: legal rights ideology. Articulating their formal demands through legal rights ideology, civil rights protestors exposed a series of contradictions -- the most important being the promised privileges of American citizenship and the practice of absolute racial subordination. Rather than using the contradictions to suggest that American citizenship was itself illegitimate or false, civil rights protestors proceeded as if American citizenship were real, and demanded to exercise the "rights" that citizenship entailed. By seeking to restructure reality to reflect American mythology, Blacks relied upon and ultimately benefited from politically inspired efforts to resolve the contradictions by granting formal rights. Although it is the need to maintain legitimacy that presents powerless groups with the opportunity to wrest concessions from the dominant order, it is the very accomplishment of legitimacy that forecloses greater possibilities. In sum, the potential for change is both created and limited by legitimation. 139 The possibility for ideological change is created through the very process of legitimation, which is triggered by crisis. 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Movements Fail

Have to transform systems from the inside out-otherwise rhetoric changes but not policies.

McCormack 10

(Tara, PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg 59-61)

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of 'emancipatory' security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and 'blindness' to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to 'protect' and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, 'if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed' (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a 'cosmopolitan' legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today's conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

Institutional Focus Key

Institutional focus is necessary --- alt fails

Myers 13,

(Ella Assistant Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at the University of Utah, 2013, Worldly Ethics: Democratic Politics and Care for the World, p. 44-45)

Unfortunately, Connolly is inconsistent in this regard, for he also positions Foucauldian self- artistry as an "essential preliminary to," and even the necessary "condition of," change at the macropolitical level.104 That is, although Connolly claims that micropolitics and political movements work "in tandem," each producing effects on the other,105 he sometimes privileges "action by the self on itself" as a starting point and necessary prelude to macropolitical change. This approach not only avoids the question of the genesis of such reflexive action and its possible harmful effects but also indicates that collective efforts to alter social conditions actually await proper techniques of the self. For example, in a rich discussion of criminal punishment in the United States, Connolly contends that "today the micropolitics of desire in the domain of criminal violence has become a condition for a macropolitics that reconfigures existing relations between class, race, crime and punishment."106 Here and elsewhere in Connolly's writing the sequencing renders these activities primary and secondary rather than mutually inspiring and reinforcing.107 It is a mistake to grant chronological primacy to ethical self-intervention, however. How, after all, is such intervention, credited with producing salient effects at the macropolitical level, going to get off the ground, so to speak, or assuredly move in the direction of democratic engagement (rather than withdrawal, for example) if it is not tethered, from the beginning, to public claims that direct attention to a specific problem, defined as publicly significant and changeable? How and why would an individual take up reflexive work on the desire to punish if she were not already attuned, at least partially, to problems afflicting current criminal punishment practices? And that attunement is fostered, crucially, by the macropolitical efforts of democratic actors who define a public matter of concern and elicit the attention of other citizens.108 For reflexive self- care to be democratically significant, it must be inspired by and continually connected to larger political mobilizations. Connolly sometimes acknowledges that the arts of the self he celebrates are not themselves the starting point of collaborative action but instead exist in a dynamic, reciprocal relation with cooperative and antagonistic efforts to shape collective arrangements. Yet the self's relation with itself is also treated as a privileged site, the very source of democratic spirit and action. This tendency to prioritize the self's reflexive relationship over other modes of relation defines the therapeutic ethics that ultimately emerges out of Foucault's and, to a lesser degree, Connolly's work. This ethics not only elides differences between caring for oneself and caring for conditions but also celebrates the former as primary or, as Foucault says, "ontologically prior." An ethics centered on the self's engagement with itself may have value, but it is not an ethics fit for democracy.

State k Change

Social movements end and resort to institutional bureaucratic agencies—empirics prove the only way for progressive change is through the state

Schneiberg and Lounsbury 07 (Marc Schneiberg, PhD University of Wisconsin, and Michael Lounsbury, Canada Research Chair in Entrepreneurship & Innovation Associate Dean of Research Univ. of Alberta, "Social Movements and Institutional Analysis", ph online @ http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.465.3710&rep=rep1&type=pdf)//akim

Schneiberg (2007; Schneiberg, King &¶ Smith 2008) takes this avenue of research a¶ step further in analyzing the development of¶ mutual, cooperative and publicly owned¶ enterprise in the US economy. For the most¶ part, populists and the radical anti-corporate¶ movements of the late nineteenth and early¶ twentieth centuries faced decisive defeats in¶ their efforts to forge alternatives to corporate¶ capitalism. But even though they collapsed,¶ these movements nevertheless left behind¶ organizational, cultural and institutional¶ legacies – bit and pieces of the paths they had¶ pursued, including theories of order, regulatory¶ fragments, local movement chapters, and¶ alternative systems of enterprise in key industries.¶ These legacies of previous mobilization,¶ in turn, served as legitimating structures, platforms¶ and infrastructures for subsequent collective¶ mobilization in the same or related¶ industries during the Progressive era, and¶ then in the early New Deal. Indeed, successive¶ waves of reformers and anti-corporate¶ forces built or transposed theories, moral sentiments¶ and cooperative forms out from insurance¶ and other early sites of alternative¶ enterprise into the dairy and grain industries,¶ the electrical utility industry and banking,¶ elaborating what amounts to a secondary path¶ of industrial order in the US economy.¶ Haveman, Rao and Paruchuri's (2007)¶ study of Progressivism and savings and loans¶ associations likewise highlights the distal¶ and often unintended effects of movements¶ on organizational fields. Progressive activists¶ quite deliberately and directly sought to¶ reform a variety of economic institutions,¶ from the railroads to savings and loan associations.¶ Yet they also fostered Progressive¶ models of rationality, **bureaucratization** and¶ **expert management within the thrift industry** indirectly, via two intermediary institutions.¶ Activists formed Progressive newspapers¶ that exposed corruption and promulgated¶ reform principles, and promoted city-manager¶ forms of municipal government that¶ exemplified those principles, providing tangible¶ analogies for reformers within the thrift¶ industry. Both institutions promoted the constitutive¶ legitimacy of bureaucracy, prompting¶ saving and loans associations to adopt¶ organizational forms more consistent with¶ 'modernist' moral sentiments.¶ Nor are these processes confined to economic¶ industries or organizational dynamics.¶ As Armstrong (2002, 2005) illustrates, the¶ legacy of initial movements may also include¶ the establishment of new identities, cultural¶ tools such as frames and logics, and 'creative¶ contexts' that enable subsequent groups to¶ continue struggles, mobilize and realize¶ new gains in their efforts. The rise of the¶ New Left in the 1960s enabled the creation¶ of new kinds of lesbian/gay organizational¶ identities in San Francisco in the early 1970s.¶ The development of gay identity politics, in¶ turn, proved crucial in structuring subsequent¶ lesbian/gay organizations as well as enabling¶ changes within mainstream organizations¶ such as the establishment of domestic partner¶ benefits (Creed & Scully 2000; Scully &¶ Creed 2005). While this work traces the¶ sequencing and layering from 'outsider' to¶ 'insider' movements, it would be interesting¶ to also understand how 'insider' movements¶ facilitate 'outsider' mobilizations.¶ Overall, the approach to movements and¶ **institutions** that we advocate **celebrates the¶ heterogeneity of actors, multiple logics and¶ practice variation**. A focus on such multiplicity¶ revises the isomorphic imagery of the¶ canonical two-stage diffusion and punctuated¶ equilibrium models (e.g., Tolbert & Zucker¶ 1983). Such a perspective concentrates less¶ on the contagion of unitary practices or a singular¶ rationality, but rather on multiple forms¶ of rationality that inform the decision making¶ of actors in fields (Bourdieu 1984), and provide¶ foundations for ongoing struggle and¶ contestation. This conceptualization of institutionalization¶ and fields as multiple, fragmented¶ and contested (Schneiberg & Soule¶ SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 665¶ 9781412931236-Ch27 11/22/07 7:09 PM Page 665¶ 2005; Washington & Ventresca 2004;¶ Lounsbury 2007) is a crucial ontological¶ starting point for a new wave and generation¶ of institutional scholars. And when combined¶ with a renewed attention to movements, it¶ directs analytical attention to how historical¶ legacies of prior social action

become embedded in existing fields, providing bases for sequences of mobilization, and the construction of new paths from the elements or ruins of old or forgotten orders. The early work in this direction has proven fruitful and promises to propel institutional analysis for many years to come.

The alt fails and locks in the status quo approach to surveillance ---the embrace of <contingency, radical democracy, alterity> discounts the role of political institutions in modern life and reduces politics to an individualistic project of ethical self-improvement and becoming

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(Chad, teaches political theory at Tulane University, Fear, Radical Democracy, and Ontological Methadone, Polity (2006) 38, 254-275

While liberalism exhorts us to take comfort in the promises and assurances of a fixed identity, radical democracy suggests revealing this identity for the reification that it is so that we can move beyond a tolerant modus vivendi and toward an ethical comportment of generosity and meaningful democracy. They prescribe, as a cure for postmodern agency panic, an enthusiastic embrace of the contingency of everyday life, a series of practices of the self that force an examination of the existential resentment felt by subjects of liberal capitalism: Don't adhere to a manufactured map! Learn to be at home in homelessness! The problem of fear, they suggest, resides in a dogmatic clinging to an untenable and disintegrating myth of subjectivity with an unrealizable promise of control. Their response to the fear of homelessness runs directly counter to the conspiracy theorist: with a model of contingency rather than conspiracy, there are no villains, thus no reservoir for depositing and segregating one's fear. Rather than depositing this fear at the feet of a scapegoat, face it; overcome it. ¶ While challenging the liberal fetish for reifying a historical production and thus closing the door on possibilities for alternative subjects to emerge, radical democrats also acknowledge the work done by liberalism to remove metaphysical obstacles to the expression of agency. As such, their claim is not antiliberal so much as it is postliberal, interrogating the limits of the liberal subject in pursuit of a more open approach to identity and difference. For the identities and attachments that have been forged through liberalism are anything but fetters to the unhindered exercise of democracy and production of difference. They are not only productive of many of the freedoms that we enjoy today in the liberal world (e.g., civil rights and liberties, relative government accountability), they also offer valuable solace from a hostile and increasingly unpredictable existence. But because the prescription for those suffering from agency panic tends to be found in the capitalist myths of merit, autonomy, and authenticity, we might look at liberalism as the opiate of the people, easing our pain, but preventing us from doing the work necessary to attend to the source of our ills. Perhaps liberalism, then, for all its value and appeal, is a habit we need to kick. **Radical democrats recommend sobering up and facing our fears head-on. But where's the Betty Ford Center for radical democracy?** ¶ If the fundamentalist drive to reify assumptions and the democratic drive to challenge them are two responses to the same panic that results from social pluralization (as Connolly convincingly claims), the question remains: why do some subjects flee from this fear (through fundamentalism), while others draw from it strength and forbearance (through radical democracy)? What resources allow some subjects to respond to revealed inadequacies of their foundational beliefs with a gracious humility while others respond by desperately clinging to and fundamentalizing the contested position? ¶ The short answer is that the democratic move is not an easy one to make. While liberal cognitive maps respond to the complexity of contemporary power networks with a promise of predictability and stability through the claims to fixed identity, rational control, and market efficiency, radical democracy promises precisely what subjects of liberalism fear: enduring instability. The ethos of forbearance asks subjects not only to accept social and political instability today, but ontological instability forever after (whereas the fundamentalizing moves promise order not only in the future, but now). By introducing contingency into the very substance of being, this approach leaves us in indeterminacy without even a promise of finding answers; it is "tentative, experimental," emphasizing the need for perpetual work of "cultivation" without the promise of attaining a stable system;41 it is "a risky and ambiguous enterprise" always threatening to destroy self-confidence as soon as it is built;42 it offers "no necessary political consequences," but only possible gains in freedom.43 ¶ Going back to Hobbes, radical democrats suggest that we should embrace rather than run from or even merely tolerate the very conditions we fear: unknowability, instability, and discord. Further, Connolly and Butler insinuate unmistakably that liberal authenticity has been thoroughly debunked, still adhered to only by potential or actual fascists who (at best) have been thoroughly colonized by the culture industry and the ideological apparatuses of the state or (at worst) have no sympathy for the contemporary movements interested in expanding the democratic web to include currently disenfranchised populations. They thus imply that it is the social critic who bears the mantle of democracy, and that it is not fear but a stubborn authoritarian desire that

obliges resistors to slap the table to illustrate its non-discursiveness and pound their chests to prove their individuated, corporeal, nonporous existence. (A spectre is haunting criticism—the spectre of Leninism.) We can almost hear radical democrats responding that liberal individualists have nothing to lose but their chains.¶ But if the reigning paradigms of identity and order offer solace from an increasingly indeterminate and unpredictable world (complete with massive layoffs, abandonment of traditional gender norms, declining national sovereignty, and other existential disintegrations), then by what standard can radical democrats call upon the subjects of liberal capitalism to reject the myths that make lives livable? These calls might be the ontological counterpart of ham-fisted approaches to drug abuse, exhorting addicts to take responsibility for themselves and quit cold turkey, with little attention to the social and psychological dynamics that lead millions of users to abuse narcotics, hallucinogens, opiates, and amphetamines—be they consumers of heroin, religious fervor, Xanax, or extreme corn chips and suburban assault vehicles.¶ The sales pitch for radical democracy rarely accounts for the degree to which citizens are interpellated as subjects of fear. Connolly is more than aware of the interpellations that subjects of capitalism receive; large sections of The Ethos of Pluralization are dedicated to the relationship between economic anxiety and the drive to fundamentalism, and Why I Am Not a Secularist is largely an indictment of secularism (and much of American liberalism) for failing to account for the habits inscribed on the body that rational argumentation cannot erase.44 His attention to what he calls "the visceral register," and his recommendation that the left take a lesson from William Bennett on how to appeal to this register is both compelling and timely.45 Unfortunately, Connolly's intellectual trajectory has shifted away from the social and political apparatuses which inculcate these habits and toward the level of neurology to explain the inward mechanisms of habits and ethics;46 while he never denies the relevance of social and political institutions (he merely argues that "too many cultural theorists" ignore the biological components of thinking and ethics), his trajectory has led him to speak more about what practices of the self might lead to more democracy and less about the institutional production of subjects who actually fear democracy.47 As White convincingly argued well before this latest turn toward biological studies, Connolly takes attitudes to have primacy over issues of justice, leading him to prematurely curtail pursuit of the obviously compatible institutional dimension of criticism.48¶ The common scoundrel in such critiques of liberalism, the prototypical antidemocratic citizen, is typified by Archie Bunker and his white working-class buddies. Resentful, socially and economically conservative, and easily seduced by reactionary propagandists, this was the face of fundamentalism before 9/11. Notably, this is a population whose economic viability and (therefore) ability to live up to conventional norms of masculinity have been taking it in the gut in recent decades. Identifying the threats that have constituted this subject, Connolly notes the familiar targets: civil rights, Vietnam, feminism, dismantling of the welfare state, environmentalism, and a decline in the availability of industrial jobs.49 Along with these transformations in established relations of power, we can also add to this list (which Connolly may or may not have intended to be exhaustive) the supposed death of grand narratives declared by critical intellectuals. Traditional cognitive maps are not only becoming obsolete in the wake of shifting terrain, but they are being criticized for being defective from the get-go. Given this, is the rise in public fear a surprise? As Jameson's, Melley's, and Furedi's attention to the paucity of concepts suggests, isn't the declining availability of cognitive maps to those threatened by shifting networks of power a prime candidate for Connolly's list?50¶ If fundamentalisms feed on the anxieties endemic to late capitalist (dis)order; if market ideology, conspiracy theories, and aggressive nostalgia are degraded attempts to construct cognitive maps that might provide threatened subjects with a sense of agency; what does radical democracy offer in their stead? Traditional fundamentalisms are popular precisely because they treat the agency panic and existential angst accelerated by global capitalism and postmodern culture. Again, Connolly recognizes the absence of viable democratic supplements to the decline of grand narratives, and he laments that the world's most zealous moralizers have effectively filled that void. But claims that rethinking liberalism's ontological commitments cannot be an afterthought of political emancipation (but must be coterminous with or preliminary to it), betray an inattention to how a postmodern ethos is intimately tied to the various psychological, economic, and political securities that cognitive maps often provide. While Connolly's diagnosis of fundamentalist epidemics clearly highlights their social and economic roots, he presents a postmodern sensibility as a treatment for the anxieties of identity without considering the role that this move may have played in actually producing those anxieties by threatening the cherished existence of those perhaps most in need of their help.51 My concern is not the diagnosis, but the prescription, as it is for a regimen that few have any interest in adopting.¶ Radical democracy is premised on the idea that its ontology and ethics are necessary to an enactment of the pluralism that liberalism purports to offer, transcending mere tolerance toward a generous fostering of otherness and a meaningfully democratic way of life. At the same time, however, it is insensitive to the profound threat that genealogy poses to those who receive their only respite from a

truly tenuous existence from their myths. While its pitch suggests that it is ontologically more defensible, ethically more admirable, and practically more conducive to a generous ethical-political comportment (contentions with which I agree, incidentally), it does not consider the sheer difficulty (and often terror) in adopting such a position. Certainly, it does not speak to the members of society who are the most economically, politically, and/or socially disadvantaged, whose daily survival is so tenuous as to not provide the luxury for the practices of self-cultivation which it advocates.¶ I am far from the first to call attention to the dangers of and aversions to genealogy. The aristocratic baggage of Nietzscheanism, from which radical democrats have vigorously sought to distance themselves, stems largely from Nietzsche's acknowledgement of the difficulties of abandoning foundations. No friend of pity, Nietzsche nevertheless prescribes revaluing our constitutive values only to a privileged class, maintaining that we cannot ask lambs to be birds of prey.52 Similarly, William James discusses the differential capacities of modern subjects to be at home in homelessness, expressing concern for those who might not be ready or able to make such a move. He argues (with unfortunate terminology) that the "healthy" has a responsibility to attend to the "sick" soul, and that some are not ready, willing, or able to abandon their most cherished myths: "Some constitutions need them too much."53 Returning to our liberal fundamentalist, Rorty emphasizes that "most people" are not interested in facing the contingency of their identities, and that "there is something very cruel about" revealing their contestability and groundlessness.54¶ While these arguably elitist arguments might sit uncomfortably with the radically democratic impulses of Connolly and Butler, which is more democratic: Throwing everybody into the same pool? Or realizing that not everybody knows how to swim? Or realizing that some citizens, having seen their parents devoured by sharks, might think the waters unsafe? Connolly reads Rorty's courteous capitulation to fear as an abandonment of irony precisely where it is most important. Whereas Rorty coddles subjects of fear, Connolly scolds them for their cowardice.55¶ I do not mean to suggest that consistency would oblige radical democrats to respect discourses hostile to pluralization (Connolly addresses this issue repeatedly). Nor do I want to imply that we should refrain from attacking the antidemocratic presumptions of various fundamentalisms. But I am concerned that the approach to fundamentalism in this literature is something much closer to hostility than sympathy (to say nothing of empathy). For all of its talk of generosity, radical democracy remains quite stingy with regard to this issue. Accepting that there remains a compatibility between foundational thought and undemocratic or authoritarian politics, the apparent expectation that the articulation of this compatibility might convince any lingering fundamentalists of their error **is distressing**. In fact, Connolly effectively labels those lacking in the material, philosophical, or psychological resources necessary for the move he recommends latent brownshirts, thus betraying not only a commitment to liberal voluntarism, but also a striking lack of generosity toward those still in need of comforting maps.56¶ Radical democrats clearly recognize the material conditions that may not provide the comfort necessary to develop an ethos of generosity. As diagnosticians, they are certainly attuned to the tactics applied by institutions (markets, ideologies, militaries) to subjects and the constant interpellation of subjects of fear. Nevertheless, the prescribed micropolitics of desire summons a heroic capacity to respond generously to the myriad threats we encounter. Recommending that subjects abandon the cognitive maps (Christianity, conspiracy theories, market fundamentalism) that allow them to find their bearings in increasingly complicated and vast networks of power, they ultimately reduce liberal fundamentalism to a problem of individual priorities and ethical failures rather than a medical condition requiring professional treatment or (better) a **public health issue** not easily or appropriately tied to any individual's preferences. **As in contemporary U.S. drug policy** rhetoric, **the addiction is all-too-easily reduced to an issue of personal responsibility, taking focus away from the institutions** responsible for the daily interpellation of subjects of fear.¶ Conclusion¶ Despite a relatively mature Constitution, Americans are no strangers to instability. In recent decades, the assurances of job security and the welfare state have fallen victim to a vicious market ideology; traditional codes of masculinity and femininity have become increasingly unrealizable with Martha Stewart and J. Lo doing their best to humiliate the ladies, Bill Gates and Vin Diesel the gentlemen; and illusions of effective agency have been ravaged by unprecedented technological and geopolitical transformations. In this condition, though radical democrats denounce the comforting liberal myth of the autonomous individual as a ruse of antidemocratic power, its ideology of identity, authenticity, and responsibility provides relief from the ontological homelessness endemic to a world with ever fewer uncontested narratives. Liberalism allows us to personalize and segregate various anonymous hostilities, facilitating displacements of general anxieties onto welfare moms, homosexual teachers, professional women, non-white street criminals, Zionist Occupied Governments, and Islamic fundamentalists.¶ While the reactionary grasp at liberal fundamentalism certainly constitutes an obstacle to a democratic politics of difference, it is also the case that subjects of late capitalism are interpellated as subjects of fear, reared to understand every component of society with suspicion. Navigating the breathtaking and impersonal forces of bureaucratic capitalism with categories which emphasize (indeed, almost exclusively mention) the powers of isolated individuals, we are led to an ever more hopeless situation. As history moves on and our cognitive maps seem less and less relevant for helping us chart networks of power, we feel an overwhelming sense of powerlessness. The ideology of autonomy, authenticity, and responsibility seems an entirely logical aid for coping with this agency panic. Indeed, liberalism both creates and then assuages the fears of late capitalism.¶ In this age of Panic, in which our surroundings appear at least comparably if not more alive and efficacious than our selves, radical democrats trenchantly reveal liberal ideology as an addictive and distorting source of relief. But in prescribing a micropolitics of desire to kickstart the stalled project of

democratization, they locate the work of politics in the contested site of the individual and discount the degree to which these individuals actually fear the unpredictable and radically democratic order being promised. Contesting the validity of the cognitive maps most commonly used to steer a course through institutions of social and political power, they ask subjects to abandon the anesthetizing components of liberal fundamentalism for a world composed of unstable identities and provisional reconciliations that are grounded in a set of ontological commitments that are weak at best. But as all but the most steadfast purveyors of simplification in the so-called war on drugs realize, addiction is inscribed on the body, and requires both desire and treatment to be overcome. Radical democrats realize why we are identity junkies. But where, oh where, are the ontological treatment centers and methadone clinics?

Psychoanalysis

2AC Psycho Bad

Psychoanalysis is not empirical and has no explanatory power --- prefer social science because it can explain events based on causal relationships

Sadovnikov 7

(Slava York University, "Escape from Reason: Labels as Arguments and Theories", Dialogue XLVI (2007), 781-796, philpapers.org/archive/SADEFR.pdf)

The way McLaughlin shows the rosy prospects of psychoanalytical social theory boils down to this: there are people who labour at it. He reports on Neil Smelser's lifelong elaborations of psychoanalytical sociology, which prescribed the use of Freudian theories. Then he presents a "powerful" psychoanalytical theory of creativity of Michael Farrell, commenting on how the theorist "usefully utilizes psychoanalytic insights," though McLaughlin does not specify them. He correctly expects that I might not view his examples as scientific. Their problems begin well before that. First, due to their **informative emptiness, or tautological character**, all they amount to is rewordings of everyday assumptions. Second, due to their vagueness these accounts are compatible with any outcomes; in other words, **they lack explanatory and predictive power**. The proposed ideas are too inarticulate to subject to intersubjective criticism, and **to call them empirical or scientific** theories **would be**, no **matter how comforting, a gross misuse of words.** ¶ On the constructive side, a psychoanalytic theorist may be challenged to unambiguously formulate her suppositions and specify conditions of their disproof, to leave out what we already well know and smooth out internal inconsistencies, and revise the theories in view of easily available counter-examples and competing accounts. Only after having done this can one present candidate theories to public criticism and thus make them part of science, and fruitfully discuss their further refinements. Another suggestion is not to label them "powerful theories," "classics," or anything else before their real scrutiny begins. ¶ That criticism and disagreement are indispensable for **science is not a "Popperian orthodoxy**," although Popper does champion this idea; it is the pivot of the tradition (which we owe to the Greeks) which identifies rationalism with criticism. 4 McLaughlin ostensibly bows to the critical tradition but does not put it to use. Instead of critical evaluation of the theories in question he writes of "compelling case," "powerful analytic model," and "useful conceptual tool." ¶ On the methodological side of the issue, we should inquire into the mode of thinking common to Fromm and all adherents of confirmation-ism. The trick consists in mere replacement of familiar words with new, more peculiar ones; customary expressions are substituted by "instrumental intimacy," "collaborative circles," and "idealization of a self-object." Since the new, funnier, and pseudo-theoretical tag does the job of naming just as well, it "shows how" things work. The new labels in the cases criticized here do not add anything to our knowledge; nor do they explain. We have seen Fromm routinely abuse this technique. The vacuity of Fromm's explanations by character type was the central point in my analysis of Escape , yet McLaughlin conveniently ignores it and, like Fromm, uses the method of labelling as somehow supporting his cause. ¶ The widely popular practice of mistaking new labels for explanations has been exposed by many methodologists in the history of philosophy, but probably the most famous example of such critique comes from Molière. In the now often-quoted passage, his character delivers a vacuous explanation of opium's property to induce sleep by renaming the property with an offhand Latinism, "virtus dormitiva." The satire acutely points not only at the impostor doctor's hiding his lack of knowledge behind foreign words, but also at the emptiness of his alleged explanation. (Pseudo-theoretical literature is boring precisely because of its "dormitive virtue," its shuffling of labels without rewarding inquiring minds.) ¶ Let me review notable criticisms of this approach in the twentieth century by Hempel, Homans, and Weber leaving aside their forerunners. This problem was discussed in the famous debate between William Dray and Carl Hempel. Dray argues, contra the nomological account of explanation, that historians and social scientists often try to answer the question, "What is this phenomenon?" by giving an "explanation-by-concept" (Dray 1959, p. 403). A series of events may be better understood if we call it "a social revolution"; or the appropriate tag may be found in the expressions "reform," "collaboration," "class struggle," "progress," etc.; or, to take Fromm's suggestions, we may call familiar motives and actions "sadomasochistic," and any political choice save the Marxist "escape from freedom."¶ Hempel agrees with Dray that such concepts may be explanatory, but they are so only if the chosen labels or classificatory tags refer to some uniformities, or are based on nomic analogies. In other words, our new label has explanatory force if it states or implies some established regularity (Hempel 1970, pp. 453-57). For example, you travel to a foreign country and, strolling along the street, see a boisterous crowd. Your guide may explain the crowd with one of several terms: that it is the local soccer team's fans celebrating its victory, or it is a local religious festival, or a teachers' strike, etc. The labels applied here—celebration, festival, strike— have explanatory value, because we know that things they refer to usually manifest themselves in noisy or unruly

mass gatherings.¶ If, on the other hand, by way of explaining the boisterous crowd the guide had invoked some hidden social or psychological forces, or used expressions such as embodiment, mode of production, de-centring, simulacra, otherness, etc., its causes would remain obscure. If she had referred to psychoanalytic "character types" (say, Fromm's authoritarian, anal, or necrophiliac types), the explanation would not make much sense either. Nothing prevents us nevertheless from unconditionally attaching all these labels to any event. The mistake McLaughlin and confirmationists persistently make is in thinking that labelling social phenomena alone does theoretical and explanatory work. 5 George Homans observed the prevalence of this trick some decades ago:¶ Much modern sociological theory seems to us to possess every virtue except that of explaining anything. … The theorist shoves various aspects of behavior into his pigeonholes, cries "Ah-ha!" and leaves it at that. Like magicians in all times and places, the theorist thinks he controls phenomena if he is able to give them names, particularly names of his own invention. (1974, pp. 10-11)

Non-Falsifiable

Do not let them shield their criticism with unfalsifiablity - sidelines truth and makes it impossible to debate - research proves

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(Justin P. Friesen [Ph.D in Psychology at The University of Winnipeg] Troy H. Campbell [Ph.D student at Duke University and in Fall 2015 a professor at the University of Oregon] Aaron C. Kay [Associate Professor of Management and Associate Professor of Psychology & Neuroscience at Duke University], 2015, "The Psychological Advantage of Unfalsifiability: The Appeal of Untestable Religious and Political Ideologies, " Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 108, No. 3, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000018, Pages 524-525, MX)

We conclude with a discussion of the macro social effects of unfalsifiability on belief, particularly how unfalsifiability may lead to polarization and intractability at a societal level and how people may actively wish to remove science from the discussion in an order to give their cherished beliefs an armor of unfalsifiability. Experiment 4 in particular may resonate with anyone who has watched cable news and seen a pundit tell a scientist that the data is just the scientist's "opinion" and immediately turn a conversation of objective metrics into a conversation of "beliefs." It seems as if people are motivated not only to deny isolated scientific findings but reduce the role of scientific inquiry in answering important social questions as doing so shields one's own beliefs in an armor of unfalsifiability. For example, 2012 Republican vicepresidential candidate Paul Ryan said: "Even if Washington could be good at picking winners and losers—which they're not—they shouldn't be in the business of picking winners and losers. That's not the role of government." (Stewart, 2012) Ryan believes the facts are on his side, but should he turn out to be wrong, he has already preemptively couched the issue of limited government as unfalsifiable moral principle instead of the more falsifiable question of government effectiveness. It seems increasingly difficult to have rational discussion in the polarized political climate (DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson, 1996). The current research suggests that this difficulty may be, at least in part, because people's beliefs are not based on falsifiable statements. Moreover, if including unfalsifiability is one defensive response to threat, popular beliefs systems may evolve to include more aspects of unfalsifiability over time, such as by marginalizing the relevance of science if they suspect that science does not support their beliefs. To the extent that scientific inquiry is the best method to test hypotheses and falsify beliefs, people who have salient psychological needs, other than needs for accuracy, may progressively distance their beliefs from science and the corresponding social discourse. Scientists must be aware of such tendencies and see that even flawless and clearly communicated science may not convince people because people often have a powerful trump card hidden up their sleeve: unfalsifiability. Our findings also have applied applications for the communication of science, and future research should take into account the defensive functions of unfalsifiability. For instance when unfalsifiability is most likely to be incorporated, under what mindsets people will permit themselves to hold falsifiable beliefs, how does temporary versus ultimate unfalsifiability influence beliefs, and how unfalsifiability might feel uncomfortable. These results and speculations suggest that unfalsifiability may be a dangerous force in society at large. Though it might benefit individuals psychologically or groups socially, unfalsifiability might also lead people and societies to continually make truthdefying decisions. To the extent that the success of a society largely depends on its ability to respect good data and change behavior accordingly (Sheikh, 2013), a devotion not just to ideas but to testing those ideas is necessary for the welfare and improvement of the society. Understanding the appeal of unfalsifiability is therefore an important question for a world that seems, on the one hand, actively interested in testable scientific data as evidenced by recent reforms in the United States to evidence-based policy (Baron, 2012; Borstein, 2012) but, on the other hand, at times seems to wish to remove the data from the discussion. This puzzle must be solved if evidence-based policy is to win out.

Robinson

Lacanianism relies on a prior assumptions and functions at the ontological rather than the political- it's use of universals obfuscates the fact that it's neither original nor applicable

Robinson 4

(Andrew Robinson [Postgraduate Student, School of Politics, University of Nottingham], 2004, "The Politics of Lack," British Journal of Politics & International Relations, Volume 6, Pages 260-262, MX)

For Lacanians, the return of the Real is always a disruptive, almost revolutionary event which shatters the entire social totality constructed around its exclusion. Every social order, therefore, has a single touchy 'nodal point' which it must maintain, or else it will collapse. Since the exclusion of a Real element is supposed to be necessary, Lacanians urge that one reconcile oneself to the inevitability of lack. Lacanian politics is therefore about coming to terms with violence, exclusion and antagonism, not about resolving or removing these. The acceptance of lack takes the form of an Act or Event, in which the myth of subjective completeness is rejected and the incompleteness of the self is embraced. The primary ethical imperative in Lacanian politics is to 'accept' the primacy of antagonism, i.e. the central ontological claim of the Lacanian edifice itself. Mouffe, for instance, demands that one accept 'an element of hostility among human beings' as something akin to a fact of human nature (2000, 130–132). She attacks deconstructive and dialogical approaches to ethics for being 'unable to come to terms with "the political" in its antagonistic dimension'. Such approaches lack 'a proper reflection on the moment of "decision" which characterises the field of politics' and which necessarily 'entail[s] an element of force and violence' (ibid., 129–130). Mouffe's alternative involves a politics which 'acknowledges the real nature of [the] frontiers [of the social] and the forms of exclusion that they entail instead of trying to disguise them under the veil of rationality or morality' (ibid., 105). She celebrates democracy, but her version of democracy depends on 'the possibility of drawing a frontier between "us" and "them" ' and 'always entails relations of inclusion–exclusion' (ibid., 43). The derivation of such views is unclear from the text, but seems to be that, since everyone needs a master-signifier as an element in their psyche, and since such a signifier arises through the machinations of 'the political', therefore the exclusionary and violent operations of coercive state apparatuses must be accepted as an absolute necessity for any kind of social life. This is Hobbesian statism updated for a post-modern era. As should by now be clear, the central claims of Lacanian theory are ontological rather than political. Indeed, since Lacan's work deals with politics only very occasionally, the entire project of using Lacan politically is fraught with hazards. With rare exceptions, Lacanian theorists put ontology in the driving seat, allowing it to guide their political theorising. Political discourse and events are subsumed into a prior theoretical framework in a manner more reminiscent of an attempt to confirm already-accepted assumptions than of an attempt to assess the theory itself. Among the authors discussed here, i ek takes this the furthest: the stuff of theory is 'notions', which have a reality above and beyond any referent, so that, if reality does not conform to the notions, it is 'so much the worse for reality' (in Butler, Laclau and i ek 2000, 244). The selection and interpretation of examples, whether in concrete analysis of political discourse or in theoretical exegesis, is often selective in a way which appears to confirm the general theory only because inconvenient counterexamples are ignored. The entire edifice often appears wholly a priori and non-falsifiable, and the case for its acceptance is extremely vague. Most often, the imperative to adopt a Lacanian as opposed to (say) a Rawlsian or an orthodox Marxist approach is couched in terms of dogmatically-posited demands that one accept the idea of constitutive lack. A failure to do so is simply denounced as 'shirking', 'blindness', 'inability to accept' and so on. In this way, Lacanian theory renders itself almost immune to analytical critique on terms it would find acceptable. Furthermore, a slippage frequently emerges between the external 'acceptance' of antagonism and its subjective encouragement. For instance, Ernesto Laclau calls for a 'symbolisation of impossibility as such as a positive value' (in Butler, Laclau and i ek 2000, 1999, original emphasis). The differences between the texts under review mainly arise around the issue of how to articulate Lacanian themes into a concrete political discourse. This becomes especially clear in the Butler, Laclau and i ek volume from which the above quotation is taken. Laclau and i ek share a theoretical vocabulary and agree on a number of issues of basic ontology. However, they both—and each in an equally dogmatic way—insist on a particular decontestation of this vocabulary in their analysis of contemporary events. For Laclau, Lacanian analysis dovetails with 'radical democracy', whereas for i ek, it entails a radical refusal of the status quo from a standpoint cross-fertilised with insights from Hegel, Kant and the Marxist tradition. This disagreement represents a broader split of Lacanian theorists into two camps: radical democrats' who follow Laclau's line that liberal democracy is a realisation of the Lacanian model through the acceptance of antagonism and its conversion into symbolically accepted electoral and interest-group competition, and more-or-less nihilistic Lacanians such as i ek and Badiou who maintain that a Lacanian politics requires a radical break with the present political system. Butler, for her part, is not sufficiently committed to an ontology of lack to accept the other protagonists' inability to provide substantial argumentation for their positions. She calls Lacanian theory a 'theoretical fetish', because the 'theory is applied to its examples', as if 'already true, prior to its exemplification'. Articulated on its own self-sufficiency, it shifts its basis to concrete matters only for pedagogical purposes (in Butler, Laclau and i ek 2000, 26–27). She suggests, quite accurately, that the Lacanian project is in a certain sense 'a theological project', and that its heavy reliance on a priori assumptions impedes its ability to engage with practical political issues, using simplification and a priori reasoning to 'avoid the rather messy psychic and social entanglement' involved in studying specific political cases (ibid., 155–156). She could perhaps have added that, in practice, the switch between ontology and politics is usually accomplished by the transmutation of single instances into universal facts by means of a liberal deployment of words such as 'always', 'all', 'never' and 'necessity'; it is by this specific discursive move that the short-circuit between 'theology' and politics is achieved. Butler questions the political motivations involved in such practices. 'Are we using the categories to understand the phenomena, or marshalling the phenomena to shore up the categories "in the name of the father" [i.e. the master-signifier]?' (ibid., 152). The problems raised by Butler are serious, and reflect a deeper malaise. Aside from the absence of any significant support for their basic ontological claims, the two Lacanian camps both face enormous problems once they attempt to specify their political agendas. For the Laclauians, the greatest difficulty is that of maintaining a 'critical' position even while endorsing assumptions

remarkably close to those of the analytical-liberal mainstream. The claim that liberal democracy is necessary to take the bite out of intractable conflicts arising from human nature, and the resultant condemnation of 'utopian' theories such as Marxism for ungrounded optimism and resultant totalitarian dangers, is hardly original. To take one example, it arises in Rawls' discussion of 'reasonable pluralism' and the 'burdens of difference' in Political Liberalism (1996, Lecture 2 and passim). Since much of the appeal of Lacanian theory depends on its claims to be offering a new, radical approach to politics, such similarities must be downplayed.

AT: Lack

Desire does not lack - their conception ignores the reality that need is a product of desire - turns the criticism because only desire can solve

Deluze and Guatarri 72

(Gilles Deleuze [French philosopher], Félix Guattari [French psychiatrist and political activist], 1972, Anti - Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Translated from the French by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane, Pages 26-28, MX)

If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the set of passive synthes s that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real is the end product, the result of the passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious. Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression. Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of a machine. Desire is a machine, and the object of desire is another machine connected to it. Hence the product is something removed or deducted from the process of producing: between the act of producing and the product, something becomes detached, thus giving the vagabond, nomad subject a residuum. The objective being of desire is the Real in and of itself.* There is no particular form of existence that can be labeled "psychic reality." As Marx notes, what exists in fact is not lack, but passion, as a "natural and sensuous object." Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: they are counterproducts within the real that desire produces. Lack is a countereffect of desire; it is deposited, distributed, vacuolized within a real that is natural and social. Desire always remains in close touch with the conditions of objective existence; it embraces them and follows them, shifts when they shift, and does not outlive them. For that reason it so often becomes the desire to die, whereas need is a measure of the withdrawal of a subject that has lost its desire at the same time that it loses the passive syntheses of these conditions. This is precisely the significance of need as a search in a void: hunting about, trying to capture or become a parasite of passive syntheses in whatever vague world they may happen to exist in. It is no use saying: We are not green plants; we have long since been unable to synthesize chlorophyll, so it's necessary to eat. . . . Desire then becomes this abject fear of lacking something. But it should be noted that this is not a phrase uttered by the poor or the dispossessed. On the contrary, such people know that they are close to grass, almost akin to it, and that desire "needs" very few things—not those leftovers that chance to come their way, but the very things that are continually taken from them—and that what is missing is not things a subject feels the lack of somewhere deep down inside himself, but rather the objectivity of man, the objective being of man, for whom to desire is to produce, to produce within the realm of the real. The real is not impossible; on the contrary, within the real everything is possible, everything becomes possible. Desire does not express a molar lack within the subject; rather, the molar organization deprives desire of its objective being. Revolutionaries, artists, and seers are content to be objective, merely objective: they know that desire clasps life in its powerfully productive embrace, and reproduces it in a way that is all the more intense because it has few needs. And never mind those who believe that this is very easy to say, or that it is the sort of idea to be found in books. "From the little reading I had done I had observed that the men who were most in life, who were moulding life, who were life itself, ate little, slept little, owned little or nothing. They had no illusions about duty, or the perpetuation of their kith and kin, or the preservation of the State. . . . The phantasmal world is the world which has never been fully conquered over. It is the world of the past, never of the future. To move forward clinging to the past is like dragging a ball and chain."30 The true visionary is a Spinoza in the garb of a Neapolitan revolutionary. We know very well where lack—and its subjective correlative—come from. Lack (manque)* is created, planned, and organized in and through social production. It is counterproduced as a result of the pressure of antiproduction;the latter falls back on (serab at sur) the forces of production and appropriates them. It is never primary; production is never organized on the basis of a pre-existing need or lack (manque). It is lack that infiltrates itself, creates empty spaces or vacuoles, and propagates itself in accordance with the organization of an already existing organization of production. The deliberate creation of lack as a function of market economy is the art of a dominant class. This involves deliberately organizing wants and needs (manque) amid an abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one's needs satisfied; and making the object dependent upon a real production that is supposedly exterior to desire (the demands of rationality), while at the same time the production of desire is categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy.

Perm/No Link Stuff

Permutation

Permutation do the Alternative - Severing the 1AC allows us to pass from attachment to detachment thus reclaiming our identities as Lacanian subjects and re-instituting desire

Scott 15

(Maria Scott [PhD in French at Trinity College Dublin], 2015, "Deciphering the Gaze in Lacan's "Of the gaze as objet petit a"'," DS Project, MX)

The always renewed re-institution of desire is at the core of Lacanian ethics. In order to renew one's desire, it is necessary first to fall sway to the drive. In Seminar XI, the satisfaction of the drive's requirements, as for example in the viewing of art, becomes the ethical goal of analysis. After the seminars on the gaze, the object a appears in Seminar XI as the libido or genital drive. This 'pure life instinct' is the 'organ' from which the subject separates in order to exist in society. Because this instinct is 'irrepressible,' however, the subject must renew continually her detachment from the libido, so as neither to revert to an undetermined 'hommelette,' nor to become frozen as a signifier. The subject is truly itself, according to Lacan, only in the passage from attachment to detachment: 'The subject is this emergence which, just before, as subject, was nothing, but which, having scarcely appeared, solidifies into a signifier.' The Lacanian subject has, therefore, 'no other being than as a breach in discourse' and 'manifests itself in daily life as a fleeting interruption of something foreign or extraneous,' 'a pulsation, an occasional impulse or interruption that immediately dies away or is extinguished.'

Perm Do Both

Permutation do both - Pragmatism and psychoanalysis are more similar than most realize

Hanlon 1

(Christopher Hanlon [PhD in Philosophy at University of Massachusetts Amherst], May 2001, "Pragmatism and the Unconscious: Language and Subject in Psychoanalytic Theory, Pragmatist Philosophy, and American Narrative," Scholarwork@UMassAmherst, http://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI3012135/, Page 19, MX)

This dissertation represents an attempt to seriously entertain the notion that pragmatism and psychoanalysis may already be on speaking terms, though in ways quite apart from those Rorty suggests in his essay on Freud. It explores this possibility by investigating the relations between classical American pragmatist philosophy and the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, relations sometimes secured through textual transmission and, at other moments, striking conceptual affinity. Through readings of a handful of signal texts—both "pragmatist" and "psychoanalytic"--which stand at the intersections of postmodern theory and American intellectual history, it enters into a network of problems: problems of language and consciousness, of body and mind, of gender and race, of power and know ledge, of fantasy and reality, of philosophy, of literature, of reading. Thus, while working to produce an acquaintance between some key issues of concern for Americanist intellectual historians and some of the key concepts of Lacan's theoretical corpus, it will continually pose questions which are normally thought of as "clinical" in their psychoanalytic context, but which may also serve to enliven what have become a series of ossified debates within American philosophical, literary, and cultural critical circles.

No Death Drive

No death drive - human destructiveness is a complex development process

De Masi 14

(Franco De Masi [Training and Supervising Analyst of the Italian Psychoanalytical Society and former President of Centro Milanese di Psicoanalisi and Secretary of the Training Milanese Institute. He is a medical doctor and a psychiatrist who worked for twenty years in psychiatric hospitals.], 10/29/14, "Is the concept of the death drive still useful in the clinical field?," The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 96:445–458, doi: 10.1111/1745-8315.12308, Pages 546-547, MX)

In this contribution I have attempted to distinguish aggression, which can assume the form of hate and violence, from destructiveness. The point of view suggested is that the concept of death instinct does not find a convincing explanation in the analytic clinical practice. By contrast, it is possible to consider destructiveness as a transformative potential inherent in the human mind, when life conditions become objectively and subjectively impossible to tolerate. In the sphere of mental phenomena, destructiveness underlies severe psychopathologies such as perversion, anorexic and borderline syndromes, drug addiction and psychoses. In the social and political field, destructiveness was responsible for the greatest tragedies of the last century, such as Nazism and the derivatives of ideological communism. In addressing the problems presented by the analytic treatment of some patients, we face considerable uncertainty when seeking to establish a link between infantile traumas and destructive pathologies. While acknowledging the role of infantile trauma in the generation of adult suffering, we find that in some cases it is not always easy to establish evidence of repeated violent trauma in infancy. The common element favouring such pathology is in fact the mental absence of the parents – their indifference to the child's emotional development. This emotional remoteness allows a child, already in early infancy, to stand aloof from reality and to take refuge in (megalomanic, phantasy-related or sexualized) psychic withdrawal involving incipient pathological identification with grandiose, destructive characters, who are felt to be providers of pleasure, so that the world of relationships is progressively abandoned. My idea is that human destructiveness does not derive from an original availability (the death instinct) but needs a long and complex development and is sometimes prompted by environmental destructiveness. In this regard, it seems essential to assume the existence of an internal pathological organization that forms gradually and tends to conquer the mind. The transformative process favouring the construction of an inhuman world takes place in a state of mind that is dissociated from the rest of the personality. In this psychic retreat destructiveness gives rise to a mental excitation that makes evil pleasurable and irresistible. Whereas aggression is exhausted once the aim of lowering tension has been accomplished, destructiveness, sustained as it is by pleasure, tends to be self-perpetuating. The power acquired by the pathological destructive organization over the rest of the personality depends on the role of the superego which coincides with a perverse psychopathological structure that has an intimidatory, seductive power. In my opinion (De Masi, 1999) the problem of pleasure is very complex: pleasure does not depend only on the defence of the self against the demands of external reality, or on drive discharge. In its production, the destructive mechanisms, directed against the subject's own self or others, seem as efficacious as those involved in the survival of the individual through self-affirmation and satisfaction of the drives. Thus, human destructiveness is very strongly linked to pleasure that gets satisfaction from evil. To achieve this goal, and for primal aggressiveness to be transformed into destructiveness, a long process is required in which the innate resources are combined with the environmental causes so as to get to a perverse constellation that enhances the destructive act as evidence of power, superiority and omnipotence.

No Scapegoating

No Scapegoating - empirical study proves

Gollwitzer 4

(Mario Gollwitzer [PhD in Psychology from University of Trier], 4/7/4, "Do Normative Transgressions Affect Punitive Judgments? An Empirical Test of the Psychoanalytic Scapegoat Hypothesis," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Pages 1657-1659, MX)

The psychoanalytic scapegoat hypothesis implies (a) that individuals who are guilty of violating a law or norm tend to impose harsher punitive judgments on comparable wrongdoers than nonguilty individuals and (b) that transgressors' punitiveness should be amplified by the subjectively perceived decision conflict. A new alter native hypothesis was derived from research on blame avoidance and empathy: If individuals were really funda mentally concerned with avoiding self-ascriptions of blame by applying "defensive" attributions (Shaver, 1970, 1985), then it follows that transgressors should impose more lenient punishment on comparable offenders, especially under circumstances of similarity. Although the blame-avoidance hypothesis directly contradicts the implications of the scapegoat hypothesis, both effects might be present depending on situation specific or person-specific factors. If these factors are not controlled for, the paradoxical situation could occur that the two effects cancel each other out (Schmitt et al., 2003). Among the most theoretically plausible of such person-specific factors is authoritarianism. This variable is expected to moderate the transgression-punitiveness relation. In other words: The scapegoat effect is expected to occur among high authoritarians, whereas the leniency effect should occur among low authoritarians. The data presented here largely support the blame avoidance motivation account: Punitive judgment scores were higher among nontransgressors, regarding both vignette transgressions in immoral temptation situations and actually committed transgressions reported by par ticipants. This effect was consistent across all six criminal cases in both vignette and actual transgressions. Further more compared with a "baseline measure" of punitive judgments, the present results suggest that it is not a harshness bias on the side of the nontransgressors that causes this effect but rather, a mildness bias on the side of the transgressors. Although this finding is a clear corroboration for the blame-avoidance hypothesis, one could argue (a) that transgressors simply do not care about the norm they transgress and (b) that transgression decision and punitiveness share a common cause, that is, the moral reprehensibility of the deed. The first explanation implies that conflict scores do not differ between trans gressors and nontransgressors. This is, however, not the case, because conflict scores were—except for the moonlighter scenario—consistently higher among transgressors than among nontransgressors. The suggestion that transgressors' mildness bias was simply due to their recklessness can therefore be ruled out. The sec ond explanation would result in the argument that the relation between transgression decision and punitive judgments is spurious, because they can both be traced back to the same cause, that is, the moral evaluation of the deed. The mediation effect of moral evaluation was not significant in the present analyses: The effect sizes of transgression decisions on punitive judgments remained largely unaffected by entering moral evaluation scores as a covariate. This finding contradicts the alternative hypothesis that moral evaluation was the common cause for transgression decisions as well as for punitive judgments. Besides investigating the main effect of transgression decision on punitiveness, we tested whether the subjectively experienced decision conflict in a dilemma situa tion affects punitive judgments among transgressors. Although the size of this correlation was consistently positive in sign across the six scenarios, it was not statistically deviate from 0. Thus, this particular finding cannot be used as an argument for or against the scapegoat hypothesis. Taking authoritarianism as a possible moderator variable into account was a further attempt to demonstrate scapegoating effects in a subpopulation where they appear to be most likely to occur. The negative sign of the three-way interaction regression coefficient shows that this was not the case. One might think of the possibility that this three-way interaction did not emerge because authoritarianism and transgression decisions were con founded. This would be a reasonable interpretation because authoritarianism implies conventionalism, which means refraining from committing something unlawful because it is unlawful (Adorno et al., 1950). Therefore, it could be that individuals high in authoritarianism principally do not give in to immoral temptations. Contrary to this speculation, however, transgression decisions in each of the six vignettes were correlated only weakly with authoritarianism (−.05 < r < .12, average r = .04). Thus, nontransgressors are not automatically high authoritarians. Taken together, the present study presents both weak and strong results. The major aim was to test the psycho analytic scapegoat hypothesis against an alternative hypothesis based on a blame-avoidance motivation. Concerning the main effect of transgression on punitive judgments, the results strongly support the blame avoidance hypothesis. Concerning the effect of transgressors' decision conflict on punitive judgments, however, the results support neither the scapegoat nor the blame-avoidance motivation hypothesis. One could think of other empirical accesses to the effect of decision conflicts. For example, the subjective quality of experienced decision conflicts in tempting situations might have trait-like qualities: Individuals might consistently differ in the way they perceive and solve moral decision conflicts and in the amount of unease connected to these decision conflicts. These inter individual differences could be assessed and tested as predictors for punitive judgments. Second, moral conflicts may be better captured by assessing them on a more idiosyncratic level. Participants could be interviewed about temptation situations in which they recall having experienced a strong decision conflict; subsequently, their punitive judgments could be assessed in an adaptively constructed criminal case vignette that resembles this particular temptation. Finally, a possible conflict-punitiveness relation might be moderated by other vari ables than authoritarianism. Because fear of an "Id breakthrough" is considered the crucial motor of scapegoating by Freud (1923/1990), trait anxiety appears to be a suitable moderator variable. It is remarkable that a prominent theoretical account such as the psychoanalytic scapegoat hypothesis, which is discussed among principal penological theories in stan dard textbooks on legal studies (e.g., Göppinger, 1997; Kaiser, 1996; Schwind, 2002), has never received the empirical attention that it might deserve. The present study was a first attempt to test specifically derived impli cations of the scapegoat hypothesis. It seems that although the process of scapegoating and its psycho dynamic roots,

as conceptualized in psychoanalytic writings, is not testable as such, its implications can be incorporated into contemporary accounts of punitiveness and retributive justice. If these implications repeatedly fail to receive empirical backup, the scapegoat hypothesis should be at least reformulated, or dismissed.

Vote Aff: Abandon Search

The gaze is resistant to understanding because Lacan wants it to be - vote affirmative to abandon the search

Scott 15

(Maria Scott [PhD in French at Trinity College Dublin], 2015, "Deciphering the Gaze in Lacan's "Of the gaze as objet petit a"'," DS Project, MX)

Each of my four readings of the gaze has been shown to correspond to a mode of the subject's relation to the object a (\$ ◊ a) as formulated by Lacan. The four-fold structure worked out here might be read as corresponding to Lacan's description of the subject's relation to the object a as one of 'envelopment-development-conjunction-disjunction.' The quartet is a recurrent figure in Seminar XI, in which the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, the four partial drives, the four elements composing the montage of the drive, and the four 'vicissitudes' of the drive are all invoked. Indeed, Lacan draws attention to the pattern by stating that 'it is curious that there are four vicissitudes as there are four elements of the drive.' Furthermore, while for Freud the drive combines active, passive, and reflexive modes, Lacan invents in Seminar XI a fourth mode, which contains the others, and which he claims involves a 'movement of appeal' toward the Other. Lacan's seminars on the gaze mix and match the various versions of the object a in a way that seems designed to confuse the auditor-reader. Their logic would seem to mimic the visual anamorphosis that they take to emblematize the workings of the gaze. It is possible that the concept of the gaze outlined in Seminar XI is resistant to understanding precisely because it obeys laws similar to those governing the gaze itself. In other words, Lacan's logic of the gaze may operate to captivate us by means of its elusiveness; an elusiveness that may ultimately be maddening enough to force us to renounce our search for it and symbolize our failure.

Alt Offense

Psycho Fails in IR

Psychoanalysis treats entire nations as single patient on a couch that can be treated like an individual psyche - this approach dooms alt solvency

Rosen-Carole 10

(Adam Rosen-Carole [a Visiting Professor in the Philosophy Department at Bard College.], 2010, "Menu Cards in Time of Famine: On Psychoanalysis and Politics," The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Volume LXXIX, Number 1, Pages 226-227, MX)

Also, we might think here of the innumerable discussions of "America's death drive" as propelling the recent invasions in the Middle East, or of the ways in which the motivation for the Persian Gulf Wars of the 1990s was a collective attempt "to kick the Vietnam War Syndrome"— that is, to solidify a national sense of power and prominence in the recognitive regard of the international community—or of the psychoanalytic speculations concerning the psychodynamics of various nations involved in the Cold War (here, of course, I have in mind Segal's [1997] work), or of the collective racist fantasies and paranoiac traits that organize various nation-states's domestic and foreign policies.7 Here are some further examples from Žižek, who, as a result of his popularity, might be said to function as a barometer of incipient trends: • What is therefore at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of the national Thing. We always impute to the "other" [ethnic group, race, nation, etc.] an excessive enjoyment: he wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our way of life) and/or he has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment. [1993, pp. 202-203] • Beneath the derision for the new Eastern European post- Communist states, it is easy to discern the contours of the wounded narcissism of the European "great nations." [2004, p. 27, italics added] • There is in fact something of a neurotic symptom in the Middle Eastern conflict—everyone recognizes the way to get rid of the obstacle, yet nonetheless, no one wants to remove it, as if there is some kind of pathological libidinal profit gained by persisting in the deadlock. [2004, p. 39, italics added] If there was ever a passionate attachment to the lost object, a refusal to come to terms with its loss, it is the Jewish attachment to their land and Jerusalem . . . . When the Jews lost their land and elevated it into the mythical lost object, "Jerusalem" became much more than a piece of land . . . . It becomes the stand-in for . . . all that we miss in our earthly lives. [2004, p. 41] Rather than explore collective subjects through analyses of their individual members, this type of psychoanalytically inclined engagement with politics treats a collective subject (a nation, a region, an ethnic group, etc.) as if it were simply amenable to explanation, and perhaps even to intervention, in a manner identical to an individual psyche in a therapeutic context.

Lacan is a pretentious charlatan whose writings are illiterate falsehoods - prefer Chomsky - he's actually alive and comprehensible

Wolters 13

(Eugene Wolter [the founder and editor of Critical-Theory.com; freelance writer; New School University graduate], 2/28/13, "Noam Chomsky Calls Jacques Lacan a 'Charlatan'," Critical Theory: Theory and Theorists, http://www.critical-theory.com/noam-chomsky-calls-jacques-lacan-a-charlatan/, MX)

Noam Chomsky appeared in a podcast on the site Veterans Unplugged back in December 2012 to give his thoughts about American militarism. When asked by the interviewer if he thought the work of Slavoj Zizek had any relevence, Chomsky started to rail against what he considers "fancy words" that mean nothing once they are "decoded". "Zizek is an extreme example, I don't see anything in what he's saying," said Chomsky. Chomsky then took a swipe at Jascques Lacan, the French psychoanalyst. Jacques Lacan I actually knew. I kind of liked him. We had

meetings everyone once in a while but quite frankly I thought he was a total charlatan, just posturing before the television cameras the way many Paris intellectuals do. Why this is influential I haven't the slightest idea I dont see anything that should be influential You can listen to the full interview at Veterans Unplugged, the convervation of Zizek and Lacan starts around 6:20. It's actually not the first time Chomsky has made this claim about Lacan and other postmodernists. An alleged text from Chomsky has been circulating on usenet and the web since 1995 where Chomsky calls Lacan "an amusing and perfectly self-conscious charlatan." The interview seems to bolster the evidence that the 1995 text in fact originated from Chomsky. In the text, Chomsky speaks of his discussions with Kristeva, Foucault, and others. Some of the people in these cults (which is what they look like to me) I've met: Foucault (we even have a several-hour discussion, which is in print, and spent quite a few hours in very pleasant conversation, on real issues, and using language that was perfectly comprehensible — he speaking French, me English); Lacan (who I met several times and considered an amusing and perfectly self-conscious charlatan, though his earlier work, pre-cult, was sensible and I've discussed it in print); Kristeva (who I met only briefly during the period when she was a fervent Maoist); and others. Many of them I haven't met, because I am very remote from from these circles, by choice, preferring quite different and far broader ones — the kinds where I give talks, have interviews, take part in activities, write dozens of long letters every week, etc. I've dipped into what they write out of curiosity, but not very far, for reasons already mentioned: what I find is extremely pretentious, but on examination, a lot of it is simply illiterate, based on extraordinary misreading of texts that I know well (sometimes, that I have written), argument that is appalling in its casual lack of elementary self-criticism, lots of statements that are trivial (though dressed up in complicated verbiage) or false; and a good deal of plain gibberish. When I proceed as I do in other areas where I do not understand, I run into the problems mentioned in connection with (1) and (2) above. So that's who I'm referring to, and why I don't proceed very far. I can list a lot more names if it's not obvious.

Psycho =/= Ptix

Lacanian theory pretends to be "radical" but falls silent on the question of politics, it's claims at revolution are undercut by a mythical explanation that justifies the status quo

Robinson 5

(Andrew Robinson [Ph.D. in Political Theory at the University of Nottingham], 2005, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," Theory & Event Volume 8, Issue 1, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1092-311X, MX)

There is more than an accidental relationship between the mythical operation of the concept of "constitutive lack" and Lacanians' conservative and pragmatist politics. Myth is a way of reducing thought to the present: the isolated signs which are included in the mythical gesture are thereby attached to extra-historical abstractions. On an analytical level, Lacanian theory can be very "radical", unscrupulously exposing the underlying relations and assumptions concealed beneath officially-sanctioned discourse. This radicalism, however, never translates into political conclusions: as shown above, a radical rejection of anti-"crime" rhetoric turns into an endorsement of punishment, and a radical critique of neo-liberalism turns into a pragmatist endorsement of structural adjustment. It is as if there is a magical barrier between theory and politics which insulates the latter from the former. One should recall a remark once made by Wilhelm Reich: 'You plead for happiness in life, but security means more to you' (1974, 27). Lacanians have a "radical" theory oriented towards happiness, but politically, their primary concern is security. As long as they are engaged in politically ineffectual critique, Lacanians will denounce and criticize the social system, but once it comes to practical problems, the "order not to think" becomes operative. This "magic" barrier is the alibi function of myth. The short-circuit between specific instances and high-level abstractions is politically consequential. A present evil can be denounced and overthrown if located in an analysis with a "middle level". The Lacanian gesture, however, is instead to present the evil and then add a word such as "always" to it. In this way, a present problem becomes eternal and social change becomes impossible. At the very most, such change cannot affect the basic matrix posited by Lacanian theory, because this is assumed to operate above history. In this way, Lacanian theory operates as an alibi: it offers a little bit of theoretical radicalism to inoculate the system against the threat posed by a lot of politicized radicalism (cf. Barthes, 2000, 41-2). In Laclau and Mouffe's version, this takes the classic Barthesian form: "yes, liberal democracy involves violent exclusions, but what is this compared to the desert of the real outside it?" The Žižekian version is more complex: "yes, there can be a revolution, but after the revolution, one must return to the pragmatic tasks of the present". A good example is provided in one of Žižek's texts. The author presents an excellent analysis of a Kafkaesque incident in the former Yugoslavia where the state gives a soldier a direct, compulsory order to take a voluntary oath - in other words, attempts to compel consent. He then ruins the impact of this example by insisting that there is always such a moment of "forced choice", and that one should not attempt to escape it lest one end up in psychosis or totalitarianism (1989, 165-6). The political function of Lacanian theory is to preclude critique by encoding the present as myth. There is a danger of a stultifying conservatism arising from within Lacanian political theory. Echoing the 'terrifying conservatism' Deleuze suggests is active in any reduction of history to negativity (1994, 53). The addition of an "always" to contemporary evils amounts to a "pessimism of the will", or a "repressive reduction of thought to the present". Stavrakakis, for instance, claims that attempts to find causes and thereby to solve problems are always fantasmatic (1999, 87), while Žižek states that an object which is perceived as blocking something does nothing but materialize the already-operative constitutive lack (1992c, 89). It is not clear whether such hostility applies to all instances of solution, or whether there is a difference between "constitutive lack" and some kind of surplus lack arising from contingent conditions. Certainly, Lacanians often revert to contingent, empirical explanations, even when these seem contrary to their own theoretical assumptions (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 131). In any case, a Lacanian approach to an instance of lack, such as environmental crisis, famine or political repression, carries a large danger that a contingent phenomenon will be labelled as constitutive and thereby placed beyond criticism. For instance, the argument that, since existing food production is sufficient for the world's population, the existence of famine is an intolerable indictment of the world trade system and global power relations would be severely damaged by a Lacanian claim that an inclusive distribution system is an impossible totalitarian fantasy. Contingent explanations - for instance, that the current famine in southern Africa is a result of IMF demands that governments sell food stocks - are in competition with the Lacanian mythical gesture of explaining shortages and conflicts by reference to a constitutive impossibility of completion. Even if Lacanians believe in surplus/contingent as well as constitutive lack, there are no standards for distinguishing the two. How does one tell an expression of "constitutive lack" from an effect of a particular regime of power, or for that matter from an imagined, nonexistent bogeyman? Perhaps all instances fall into the former category anyway: if it is not possible to know whether any specific impasse is an instance of constitutive lack or not, it is not possible to know that any of them are, and there is therefore no basis for claiming with any certainty that constitutive lack exists. (Žižek effectively admits that no element in the world is Real per se, reducing his affirmation of the idea to a suggestion that its rejection would lead to liberal conclusions [Žižek and Salecl, 1996, 41-2]. This suggests that he is prepared to affirm whatever he must affirm to avoid a conclusion he has decided in advance to view as unacceptable

- a far flight from his official image as a daredevil revealing repressed truths). Even if constitutive lack exists, Lacanian theory runs a risk of "misdiagnoses" which have a neophobe or even reactionary effect. To take an imagined example, a Lacanian living in France in 1788 would probably conclude that democracy is a utopian fantasmatic ideal and would settle for a pragmatic reinterpretation of the ancién regime. Laclau and Mouffe's hostility to workers' councils and Žižek's insistence on the need for a state and a Party (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 178; Žižek, 2002b, 296-7; 1997a, 157) exemplify this neophobe tendency. The construction of (for instance) the relation between colonizer and colonized in terms of "constitutive antagonism" (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 129) turns colonialism into an expression of an unchangeable ontology and impedes the possibility of anti-colonial rebellion. It is also interesting that Newman begins his book with an intention to destroy the place of power, but concludes with the view that this is impossible. Instead of 'the anarchic desire to destroy hierarchy', he demands that power merely be reinterpreted and displaced (2001, 37, 118-19). The pervasive negativity and cynicism of Lacanian theory offers little basis for constructive activity. Instead of radical transformation, one is left with a pragmatics of "containment" which involves a conservative de-problematization of the worst aspects of the status quo. The inactivity it counsels would make its claims a self-fulfilling prophecy by acting as a barrier to transformative activity. To conclude, the political theory of "constitutive lack" does not hold together as an analytical project and falls short of its radical claims as a theoretical and political one. It relies on central concepts which are constructed through the operation of a mythical discourse in the Barthesian sense, with the result that it is unable to offer sufficient openness to engage with complex issues. If political theory is to make use of poststructuralist conceptions of contingency, it would do better to look to the examples provided by Deleuze and Guattari, whose conception of contingency is active and affirmative. In contrast, the idea of "constitutive lack" turns Lacanian theory into something its most vocal proponent, Žižek, claims to attack: a "plague of fantasies".

Psycho Masquerades As Politics

Psychoanalysis masquerades as politics while turning the world into a couch - offering hyperactive apolitical solutions to a vicious world that needs marginal improvements just like the aff

Rosen-Carole 10

By way of conclusion, the worry about psychoanalytically inclined political theory goes something like this. At the level of form, the question is: can the diagnoses and proposals that proceed from psychoanalytically inclined political theory—or any other form of political theory, for that matter—be anything more than formal placeholders or standins for viable, vibrant political life? Aren't these diagnoses and proposals what becomes of the practice of political judgment under conditions of large-scale alienation from politics, that is, under conditions in which the diagnoses and demands articulated by psychoanalytically informed political theory are wanting for the public institutions through which they could be realized? And if the so-called interventions and proposals of psychoanalytically inclined political theory sidestep the question of the institutional transformations necessary for their realization, aren't they conspiring with our blindness to the enormous institutional impediments to a progressive political future? Doesn't psychoanalytic political theory—and I would say contemporary political theory in general—bear the burden of political alienation? And might this burden be evident in, and at least partially responsible for, (1) its reactive tendency to turn all the world into a couch, and (2) its hyperactive prescriptiveness? At the level of content, the question is: might not psychoanalytically inclined political theory, precisely in homing in on the unconscious dynamics of political investment, ideological captivation, and so forth, indicate precisely the apolitical dynamics of what passes for politics? If the value of psychoanalytic political theory is in its disclosure of motivations that are self-secluding, self-distorting, or otherwise constitutively opaque and so unshareable, then isn't the allure of a psychoanalytic interpretation of ostensibly political phenomena an indication that politics has fallen under eclipse; and so, in the name of politics, might there be reason to be wary about the whole enterprise of psychoanalytically inclined political theory? Finally, then, the worry is that frustrations with the limited viability of the habits and forms of life cultivated via psychoanalytic practice (discussed in the first part of this paper) may feed the temptation to interpretive "intervention" (discussed in the second), and so menu cards in time of famine provoke the offering of meals, i.e., political proposals, that can't be delivered. If so, again, what I want to insist on is that the value of psychoanalytic theory and practice, though not to be belittled, cannot be thought apart from the viciousness of the world in which its marginal contributions and interventions are necessary.

K = Repression

The negatives claim that we must accept posited conditions founded on transgression eliminates any possibility for incremental or revolutionary reform and creates conflict by promoting antagonism as inescapable

Robinson 5

(SCHOOL OF POLITICS – NOTTINGHAM, 2K5 [ANDREW, *THEORY & EVENT*, 8:1, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique")

The basic claim of Lacanian theory is that identity - whether individual or social - is founded on a lack. Therefore, social relations are always irreducibly concerned with antagonism, conflict, strife and exclusion. Chantal Mouffe, for instance, writes of 'the primary reality of strife in social life'4, while Slavoj Žižek seeks an 'ethics grounded in reference to the traumatic Real which resists symbolization'5. 'Lack ("castration") is original; enjoyment constitutes itself as "stolen"'6. According to Stavrakakis, the Real is 'inherent in human experience' and 'doesn't stop not being written'7. Hence, the primary element of social life is a negativity, which prevents the emergence of any social "whole". In Mouffe's words, 'society is the illusion... that hides the struggle and antagonism behind the scenes', putting the 'harsh reality' of antagonism behind a 'protective veil'. For Newman, 'war is the reality', whereas 'society is the illusion... that hides the struggle and antagonism behind the scenes'9. For Stavrakakis, 'personal trauma, social crisis and political rupture are constant characteristics of human experience'10. Such claims have political consequences, because they rule out the possibility of achieving substantial improvements (whether "reformist" or "revolutionary") in any area on which this fundamental negativity bears. The dimension of antagonism is, after all, 'ineradicable'. Instead of the imperative to overcome antagonism which one finds in forms as diverse as Marxian revolution and deliberative democracy, Lacanian political theory posits as the central political imperative a demand that one "accept" the underlying lack and the constitutive character of antagonism. While the various authors disagree about the means of achieving this, they agree on its desirability. Lacanian theory thus entails an ethical commitment to create conflict and antagonism. This ethics mostly expresses itself via a detour into ontology: the ethical imperative is to 'accept' or 'grasp' the truth of the primacy of lack, and the accusation against opponents is that they fall into some kind of fallacy (illusion, delusion, blindness, failure to accept, and so on). At other times, however, one finds a direct ethical advocacy of exclusion and conflict as almost goods in themselves.

Alt Offense

Turn: Imperialism of the analyst. Their psyschoanalytic reading of the social world is unethical. Their alternative and method presumes you can master the interpretation of any social system.

Dean 2

(Tim DEAN English and the Center for the Study of Psychoanalysis and Culture @ SUNY Buffalo '2 "Zizek and the Ethics of Psychoanalytic Criticism" diacritics 32.2 p. 21-41 MUSE)

This paper tackles **a problem** that is **exemplified by,** but not restricted to, Slavoj **Žižek's work: the tendency to treat** aesthetic **artifacts as symptoms of the culture in which they were produced**. Whether or not one employs the vocabulary and methods of psychoanalysis to do so, **this approach** to aesthetics has become so widespread in the humanities that it **qualifies as a contemporary critical norm**. As a norm, it may be subject to debate and even contestation. Today it is normative to read literature, film, and other cultural texts primarily as evidence about the societies that made them—evidence that necessarily requires our hermeneutic labor in order to yield its significance. This methodological protocol remains in place whether one inhabits critical perspectives as ostensibly disparate as historicist, materialist, or psychoanalytic modes of thinking; it is also a grounding assumption of cultural studies, irrespective of how one defines that critical practice. Indeed, the issue I want to address is quite as much a Marxist problem as it is a psychoanalytic one, and therefore the way in which Žižek articulates Lacan with Marx makes his work especially fertile terrain on which to engage this matter. As Žižek reminds us in The Sublime Object of Ideology, Lacan claimed that Marx invented the symptom [SO 11]—an observation that Žižek has been keen to exploit from the very beginning of his work. Žižek's combining psychoanalysis with Marxism in novel ways has helped make Lacan more palatable to contemporary critical sensibilities by politicizing psychoanalysis, demonstrating how it offers less an account of the individual than of society and culture. In Žižek's hands psychoanalytic theory appears less vulnerable to the standard criticisms that it is ahistorical and apolitical. While a number of critiques of Žižek have reiterated these common objections, nevertheless his politicizing of psychoanalysis has been particularly important during a period that witnessed the rise of new historicism, the institutionalization of cultural studies, and the escalating importance of "the political" as a sign—perhaps the sign—of humanities professors' seriousness.1 Žižek's work has gone a long way toward making Lacan seem indispensable to cultural studies, just as Juliet Mitchell's and Jacqueline Rose's work a decade earlier made Lacan seem indispensable to theoretically rigorous feminism. At a moment when the poststructuralist variant of Lacanian theory was being displaced by historicist modes of thought, Žižek emerged on the scene to revivify psychoanalysis and make it exciting again. Thus his work's appeal has an historical basis quite apart from Žižek's own personal charisma and his remarkable productivity. It is his politicizing of psychoanalysis, as much as his [End Page 21] rendering Lacan newly accessible, that has made Žižek popular. I want to argue, however, that **his style of politicizing psychoanalysis carries a significant ethical cost,** one that follows partly as a consequence of Žižek's failure to work through his theoretical relation to Althusser, from whom he derives the practice of symptomatic reading while claiming to displace the latter's version of psychoanalytic Marxism. Thus I shall be arguing for a significant distinction between a political and an ethical psychoanalysis, suggesting that we have been cultivating the former at the expense of the latter. Spaghetti Psychoanalysis The notion of the symptom is central to Žižek's thinking about politics and culture. Although in his work and in psychoanalytic theory more generally the term symptom carries a range of conceptual meanings, symptomatology remains the governing trope of Žižek's oeuvre. Following Lacan, who continued to modify the concept of the symptom throughout his career, Žižek argues that just about anything can be understood as symptomatic: [I]n the final years of Lacan's teaching we find a kind of universalization of the symptom: almost everything that is becomes in a way symptom, so that finally even woman is determined as the symptom of man. We can even say that "symptom" is Lacan's final answer to the eternal philosophical question "Why is there something instead of nothing?"—this "something" which "is" instead of nothing is indeed the symptom. [SO 71-72] **If**, for reasons to be elaborated, virtually **anything can be considered a symptom, then this conceptual move illuminates how Žižek can write about everything, how he seems** able to **render all cultural phenomena as grist to his theoretical mill. Having grasped the structural logic of the symptom, one may submit** practically **anything of interest to its explanatory grid.** And while Žižek expounds more than merely one logic of symptom formation, his structural logics—like his many books—tend to remain variations on a single theme. If, according to Lacan at the end of his career, the symptom has become a condition of subjective existence rather than a contingent problem, then there can be no possibility of curing symptoms in the manner that Freud envisioned when he invented psychoanalysis. Yet **while this universalizing of symptomatology sidelines the question of cure, it does nothing to diminish the psychoanalytic zeal for diagnosis** and interpretation. Instead, the opposite is true: **universalizing the symptom fuels the motive for diagnosis and interpretation, since symptoms are** no longer localized and self-evident but **lurking everywhere.** A hermeneutic operation becomes necessary before we can see how, for example, woman is the symptom of man.2 By shifting symptoms from the category of the exception to that of the rule, Žižek to some extent depathologizes the symptom, converting it into a subjective norm. But to the degree that **his method requires a diagnostic stance** (insofar as it encourages an intensified hermeneutic vigilance vis-à-vis the cultural field), **Žižek's symptomatology raises questions about the ethics of diagnosis.** While Lacan's universalizing of the symptom provokes fundamental [End Page 22] epistemological questions too, my primary concern lies with the ethical implications of a critical approach that regards the universe as perpetually in need of interpretation. **Reading one's world in terms of symptoms positions one** as a hermeneut **with a particular relation to the world—a relation of suspicion and** putative **mastery. Although Žižek repeatedly points out that one can never master one's "own" symptom (but only enjoy it), his method nonetheless situates the critic in a position of hermeneutic mastery over the social and cultural symptoms he or she diagnoses.** One cannot help noticing that in his dozen or so books **no cultural artifact poses** any **resistance** to Žižek's hermeneutic energy; **there is no social system** or movie or opera or novel that **he cannot interpret.** We might say that **there seems to be no cultural phenomenon that,** with his Lacanian schema**, Žižek cannot master.3 Žižek's** hermeneutic **voracity**—what Tom Cohen characterizes as his approaching "the vast samples of American popular culture with vampirelike urgency" [356]—**could be understood as** but one

more instance of ==psychoanalysis's imperialism, its tendency to find exemplifications of its principles everywhere it turns== [see Derrida; Meltzer]. I would suggest, however, that viewing cultural phenomena through the lens of symptomatology points to a larger problem, one that pertains to not only psychoanalytic criticism but also Marxism, historicism, and cultural studies. The problem lies in the way that treating aesthetic artifacts as cultural symptoms elides the specificity of art, making cultural forms too readily apprehensible as what Žižek, in one definition of the symptom, calls "the point of emergence of the truth about social relations" [SO 26]. Of course, the category of art—and, more broadly, that of aesthetic experience—does not appear in Žižek's work; speaking of "art" when discussing post-Lacanian ideology critique may appear as quaintly anachronistic. But that is exactly my point. Despite his interest in Kantian philosophy and his evocation of the sublime, Žižek's approach to culture and society leaves little conceptual space for any consideration of aesthetic effects or their significance.4

Alt Fails: Politics

Sweeping psychological generalizations have no explanatory power for politics. They represent the worst of non-falsifiable hindsight thinking.

Samuels 93

(Andrew, Training Analyst – Society of Analytical Psychology and Science Associate – American Academy of Psychoanalysis, Free Associtions, "The mirror and the hammer: depth psychology and political transformation", Vol. 3D, Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing)

The paper is about the depth psychology of political processes, focusing on processes of political change. It is a contribution to the longstanding ambition of depth psychology to develop a form of political and cultural analysis that will, in Freud's words, 'understand the riddles of the world'. It has to be admitted that there is an equally longstanding reluctance in the non-psychological community to accept the many and varied ideas and suggestions concerning political matters that have been offered by analysts of all persuasions. I do not believe this can all be put down to resistance. There is something offensive above reductive interpretations of complex socio-political problems in exclusively psychological terms. The tendency to panpsychism on the part of some depth psychologists has led me to wonder if an adequate methodology and ethos actually exists with which to make an engagement of depth psychology with the public sphere possible. By 'politics' I mean the arrangements within a culture for the organization and distribution of power, especially economic power, and the way in which power is deployed to maintain the survival and enhance the quality of human life. Economic and political power includes control of processes of information and representation as well as the use of physical force and possession of vital resources such as land, food and water. On a more personal level, political power reflects the ability to choose freely whether to act and what action to take in a given situation. 'Politics' refers to the interplay between the personal and public dimensions of power. That is, there is an articulation between public, economic power and power as expressed on the personal, private level. This articulation is demonstrated in family organization, gender and race relations, and in religious and artistic assumptions as they affect the life of individuals. (I have also tried to be consistent in my use of the terms 'culture', 'society' and 'collective'.)1 Here is an example of the difficulty with psychological reductionism to which I am referring. At a conference I attended in London in 1990, a distinguished psychoanalyst referred to the revolutionary students in Paris in 1968 as 'functioning as a regressive group'. Now, for a large group of students to be said to regress, there must be, in the speaker's mind, some sort of normative developmental starting point for them to regress to. The social group is supposed to have a babyhood, as it were. Similarly, the speaker must have had in mind the possibility of a healthier, progressive group process — what a more mature group of revolutionary students would have looked like. But complex social and political phenomena do not conform to the individualistic, chronological, moralistic, pathologizing framework that is often imported. The problem stems from treating the entire culture, or large chunks of it, as if it were an individual or, worse, as if it were a baby. Psychoanalysts project a version of personality development couched in judgemental terms onto a collective cultural and political process. If we look in this manner for pathology in the culture, we will surely find it. As we are looking with a psychological theory in mind, then, lo and behold, the theory will explain the pathology. But this is a retrospective prophecy (to use a phrase of Freud's), twenty—twenty hindsight. In this psychoanalytic tautologizing there is really nothing much to get excited about. Too much psychological writing on the culture, my own included, has suffered from this kind of smug 'correctness' when the 'material' proves the theoretical point. Of course it does! If we are interested in envy or greed, then we will find envy or greed in capitalistic organization. If we set out to demonstrate the presence of archetypal patterns, such as projection of the shadow, in geopolitical relations, then, without a doubt, they will seem to leap out at us. We influence what we analyse and so psychological reflection on culture and politics needs to be muted; there is not so much 'aha!' as one hoped.

Alt Fails/Threats Real

Threats aren't psychological projections and the alt fails

Hoffman 86

(Stanley Hoffman 86, Center for European Studies at Harvard, "On the Political Psychology of Peace and War: A Critique and an Agenda," Political Psychology 7.1 JSTOR)

The traditionalists, even when, in their own work, they try scrupulous-ly to transcend national prejudices and to seek scientific truth, believe that it is unrealistic to expect statesmen to stand above the fray: By definition, the statesmen are there to worry not only about planetary survival, but — first of all—about national survival and safety. To be sure, they ought to be able to see how certain policies, aimed at enhancing security, actually increase in-security all around. But there are sharp limits to how far they can go in their mutual empathy or in their acts (unlike intellectuals in their advice), as long as the states' antagonisms persist, as long as uncertainty about each other's intentions prevails, and as long as there is reason to fear that one side's wise restraint, or unilateral moves toward "sanity," will be met, not by the rival's similar restraint or moves, but either by swift or skillful political or military exploitation of the opportunity created for unilateral gain, or by a for-midable domestic backlash if national self-restraint appears to result in ex-ternal losses, humiliations or perceptions of weakness. There is little point in saying that the state of affairs which imposes such limits is "anachronistic" or "unrational." To traditionalists, the radicals' stance — condemnation from the top of Mount Olympus — can only impede understanding of the limits and possibilities of reform. To be sure, the fragmentation of mankind is a formidable obstacle to the solution of many problems that cannot be handled well in a national framework, and a deadly peril insofar as the use of force, the very distinctive feature of world politics, now entails the risk of nuclear war. But one can hardly call anachronistic a phenomenon—the assertion of national identity — that, to the bulk of [HU]mankind, appears not only as a necessity but also as a positive good, since humanity's fragmentation results from the very aspiration to self-determination. Many people have only recently emerged from foreign mastery, and have reason to fear that the alternative to national self-mastery is not a world government of assured fairness and efficiency, but alien domination. As for "unrationality," the drama lies in the contrast between the ra-tionality of the whole, which scholars are concerned about—the greatest good of the greatest number, in utilitarian terms — and the rationality or greatest good of the part, which is what statesmen worry about and are responsible for. What the radicals denounce as irrational and irresponsible from the viewpoint of mankind is what Weber called the statesman's ethic of responsibility. What keeps ordinary "competitive conflict processes" (Deutsch, 1983)— the very stuff of society — from becoming "unrational" or destructive, isprecisely what the nature of world politics excludes: the restraint of the partners either because of the ties of affection or responsibility that mitigate the conflict, or because of the existence of an outsider — marriage counselor, arbitrator, judge, policeman or legislator— capable of inducing or imposing restraints. Here we come to a third point of difference. The very absence of such safeguards of rationality, the obvious discrepancy between what each part intends, and what it (and the whole world) ends with, the crudeness of some of the psychological mechanisms at work in international affairs—as one can see from the statements of leaders, or from the media, or from inflamed publics—have led many radicals, especially among those whose training or profession is in psychoanalysis or mental health, to treat the age-old contests of states in terms, not of the psychology of politics, but of individual psychology and pathology. There are two manifestations of this. One is the tendency to look at nations or states as individuals writ large, stuck at an early stage of development (similarly, John Mack (1985) in a recent paper talks of political ideologies as carrying "forward the dichotomized structures of childhood"). One of my predecessors writes about "the correspondence between development of the individual self and that of the group or nation," and concludes "that intergroup or international conflict contains the basic elements of the conflict each individual experiences psychologically" (Volkan, 1985). Robert Holt, from the viewpoint of cognitive psychology, finds "the largest part of the American public" immature, in a "phase of development below the Conscientious" (Holt, 1984). The second related aspect is the tendency to look at the notions statesmen or publics have of "the enemy," not only as residues of childhood or adolescent phases of development, but as images that express "disavowed aspects of the self" (Stein, 1985), reveal truths about our own fears and hatreds, and amount to masks we put on the "enemy" because of our own psychological needs. Here is where the clash between traditionalists and radicals is strongest. Traditionalists do not accept a view of group life derived from the study of individual development or family relations, or a view of modern society derived from the simplistic Freudian model of regressed followers identifying with a leader. They don't see in ideologies just irra-tional constructs, but often rationally selected maps allowing individuals to cope with reality. They don't see national identification as pathological, as an appeal to the people's baser instincts, more aggressive impulses or un-sophisticated mental defenses; it is, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau so well understood, the competition of sovereign states that frequently pushes people from "sane" patriotism to "insane" nationalism (Rousseau's way of preventing the former from veering into the latter was, to say the least, im-practical: to remain poor in isolation). Nor do they see anything "primitive" in the nation's concern for survival: It is a moral and structural requirement. Traditionalists also believe that the "intra-psychic" approach distorts reality Enemies are not mere projections of negative identities; they are often quite real. To be sure, the Nazis' view of the Jews fits the metaphor of the mask put on the enemy for one's own needs. But were, in return, those Jews who understood what enemies they had in the Nazis, doing the same? Is the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, is the Soviet regime's treatment of dissidents, was the Gulag merely a convenient projection of our intrapsychic battles? Clichés such as the one about how our enemy "understands only force" may tell us a great deal about ourselves; but sometimes they contain half-truths about him, and not just revelations about us. Our fears flow not only from our private fantasies but also from concrete realities and from the fantasies which the international state of nature generates. In other words, the psychology of politics which traditionalists deem adequate is not derived from theories of psychic development and health; it is derived from the logic of the international milieu, which breeds the kind of vocabulary found in the historians and theorists of the state of nature: fear and power, pride and honor, survival and security, self-interest and reputation, distrust and misunderstanding,

commitment and credibility. It is also derived from the social psychology of small or large groups, which resorts to the standard psychological vocabulary that describes mental mechanisms or maneuvers and cognitive processes: denial, projection, guilt, repression, closure, rigidity, etc.... But using this vocabulary does not imply that a group whose style of politics is paranoid is therefore composed of people who, as private individuals, are paranoid. Nor does it relieve us of the duty to look at the objective reasons and functions of these mental moves, and of the duty to make explicit our assumptions about what constitutes a "healthy," wise, or proper social process. Altogether, traditionalists find the mental health approach to world affairs unhelpful. Decisions about war and peace are usually taken by small groups of people; the temptation of analyzing their behavior either, literal-ly, in terms of their personalities, or, metaphysically, in terms borrowed from the study of human development, rather than in those of group dynamics or principles of international politics is understandable. But it is misleading. What is pathological in couples, or in a well-ordered community, is, alas, frequent, indeed normal, among states, or in a troubled state. What is malignant or crazy is usually not the actors or the social process in which they are engaged: it is the possible results. The grammar of motives which the mental health approach brands as primitive or immature is actually rational for the actors. to the substitution of labels for explanations, to bad analysis and fanciful prescriptions. Bad analysis: the tendency to see in group coherence a regressive response to a threat, whereas it often is a rational response to the "existential" threats entailed by the very nature of the international milieu. Or the tendency to see in the effacement or minimization of individual differences in a group a release of unconscious instincts, rather than a phenomenon that can be perfectly adaptive—in response to stress or threats—or result from governmental manipulation or originate in the code of conduct inculcated by the educational system, etc.. . The habit of comparing the state, or modern society, with the Church or the army, and to analyze human relations in these institutions in ways that stress the libidinal more than the cognitive and superego factors, or equate libidinal bonds and the desire for a leader. The view that enemies are above all products of mental drives, rather than inevitable concomitants of social strife at every level. Or the view that the contest with the rival fulfills inter-nal needs, which may be true, but requires careful examination of the nature of these needs (psychological? bureaucratic? economic?), obscures the objective reasons of the contest, and risks confusing cause and function. Indeed, such analysis is particularly misleading in dealing with the pre-sent scene. The radicals are so (justifiably) concerned with the nuclear peril that the traditional ways in which statesmen and publics behave seem to vindicate the pathological approach. But this, in turn, incites radicals to overlook the fundamental ambiguity of contemporary world politics. On the one hand, there is a nuclear revolution—the capacity for total destruction. On the other hand, many states, without nuclear weapons, find that the use of force remains rational (in terms of a rationality of means) and beneficial at home or abroad—ask the Vietnamese, or the Egyptians after October 1973, or Mrs. Thatcher after the Falklands, or Ronald Reagan after Grenada. The superpowers themselves, whose contest has not been abolished by the nuclear revolution (it is the stakes, the costs of failure that have, of course, been transformed), find that much of their rivalry can be conducted in traditional ways — including limited uses of force —below the level of nuclear alarm. They also find that nuclear weapons, while—perhaps unusable rationally, can usefully strengthen the very process that has been so faulty in the prenuclear ages: deterrence (this is one of the reasons for nuclear proliferation). The pathological approach interprets deterrence as expressing the deterrer's belief that his country is good, the enemy's is bad. This is often the case, but it need not be; it can also reflect the conviction that one's country has interests that are not mere figments of the imagination, and need to be protected both because of the material costs of losing them, and because of the values embedded in them. As for war planning, it is not a case of "psychological denial of unwelcome reality" (Montville, 1985). but a — perhaps futile, perhaps dangerous—necessity in a world where deterrence may once more fail. The prescriptions that result from the radicals' psychological approach also run into traditionalist objections. Even if one accepts the metaphors of collective disease or pathology, one must understand that the "cure" can only be provided by politics. All too often, the radicals' cures consist of perfectly sensible recommendations for lowering tensions, but fail to tell us how to get them carried out —they only tell us how much better the world would be, if only "such rules could be established" (Deutsch, 1983). Sometimes, they express generous aspirations — for common or mutual security—without much awareness of the obstacles which conflict-ing interests, fears about allies or clients, and the nature of the weapons themselves, continue to erect. Sometimes, they too neglect the ambiguity of life in a nuclear world: The much lamented redundancy of weapons, a calamity if nuclear deterrence fails, can also be a cushion against failure. Finally, many of the remedies offered are based on an admirable liberal model of personality and politics: the ideal of the mature, well-adjusted, open-minded person (produced by liberal education and healthy family relations) transposed on the political level, and thus accompanied by the triumph of democracy in the community, by the elimination of militarism and the spread of functional cooperation abroad. But three obstacles remain unconquered: first, a major part of the world rejects this ideal and keeps itself closed to it (many of the radicals seem to deny it, or to ignore it, or to believe it doesn't matter). Second, the record shows that real democracies, in their behavior toward non-democratic or less "advanced" societies, do not conform to the happy model (think of the US in Central America). Third, the task of reform, both of the publics and of the statesmen, through consciousness raising and education is hopelessly huge, incapable of being pursued equally in all the important states, and — indeed — too slow if one accepts the idea of a mortal nuclear peril. These, then, are the dimensions of a split that should not be minimized or denied

Alt Fails: Cant Explain

One thing can explain all action – psychoanalysis fails

Mootz 2k

[Francis J, Visiting Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, Yale Journal of the Law & Humanities, 12 Yale J.L. & Human. 299, p. 319-320]

Freudian psychoanalysis increasingly is the target of blistering criticism from a wide variety of commentators. 54 In a recent review, Frederick Crews reports that independent studies have begun to converge toward a verdict... that there is literally nothing to be said, **scientifically** or **therapeutically**, to the advantage of the **entire Freudian system** or any of its component dogmas Analysis as a whole **remains powerless**... and understandably so, because a thoroughgoing epistemological critique, based on commonly acknowledged standards of evidence and logic decertifies every distinctively psychoanalytic proposition. 55 The most telling criticism of Freud's psychoanalytic theory is that it has proven no more effective in producing therapeutic benefits than have other forms of psychotherapy. 56 Critics draw the obvious conclusion that the benefits (if any) of psychotherapy are neither explained nor facilitated by psychoanalytic theories. Although Freudian psychoanalytic theory purports to provide a truthful account of the operations of the psyche and the causes for mental disturbances, critics argue that psychoanalytic theory may prove in the end to be nothing more than fancy verbiage that tends to obscure whatever healing effects psychotherapeutic dialogue may have. 57 Freudian psychoanalysis failed because it could not make good on its claim to be a rigorous and empirical science. Although Freud's mystique is premised on a widespread belief that psychoanalysis was a profound innovation made possible by his genius, Freud claimed only that he was extending the scientific research of his day within the organizing context of a biological model of the human mind. 58 [*320] Freud's adherents created the embarrassing cult of personality and the myth of a self-validating psychoanalytic method only after Freud's empirical claims could not withstand critical scrutiny in accordance with the scientific methodology demanded by his metapsychology. 59 The record is clear that Freud believed that psychoanalysis would take its place among the sciences and that his clinical work provided empirical confirmation of his theories. This belief now appears to be completely unfounded and indefensible.

Freud's quest for a scientifically grounded psychotherapy was not amateurish or naive. Although Freud viewed his "metapsychology as a set of directives for constructing a scientific psychology," n60 Patricia Kitcher makes a persuasive case that he was not a blind dogmatist who refused to adjust his metapsychology in the face of contradictory evidence. n61 Freud's commitment to the scientific method, coupled with his creative vision, led him to construct a comprehensive and integrative metapsychology that drew from a number of scientific disciplines in an impressive and persuasive manner. n62 However, the natural and social sciences upon which he built his derivative and interdisciplinary approach developed too rapidly and unpredictably for him to respond. n63 As developments in biology quickly undermined Freud's theory, he "began to look to linguistics and especially to anthropology as more hopeful sources of support," n64 but this strategy later in his career proved equally [*321] unsuccessful. n65 The scientific justification claimed by Freud literally eroded **when the knowledge base underlying his theory collapsed**, leaving his disciples with the impossible task of defending a theory whose presuppositions no longer were plausible according to their own criteria of validation. n66

Environment K Answers

Alt Fails

Advocacy for specific policy reform is key to environmental justice movements--- refusal of policy relevance ensures marginalization

Noonan 5

(Douglas S. Noonan 5, Assistant Professor, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005, "DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: POLICY DESIGN LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF EJ RESEARCH," http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~dn56/EJ.APPAM.pdf)

The negotiated nature of environmental policymaking holds some stark lessons for policymakers and analysts alike. Even if there were no uncertainty – and all of the useful scientific evidence was available – the heterogeneous interests of affected parties would persist. When policies ultimately seek to reconcile these competing interests, essentially answering questions of social choice (for which optimal solutions may not be available either in theory or due to practical limits to policy), only rarely or never would a policy process be such that selfish advocacy by interest groups yields both individually and socially optimal outcomes. In the environmental policy arena, the disconnect between the pursuit of individual interests and the pursuit of collective goals is paramount. In this sense, the acrimony surrounding many environmental policy debates is both undersandable and inevitable. ¶ Although this preface might apply equally well to discussions of "climate change policy" or "species/wilderness preservation policy," the application to environmental justice (EJ) provides an opportune arena in which to observe the interplay between environmental policymaking and the (allegedly) relevant research. Environmental justice is a major theme in environmental and social policy. Its researchers are legion. Their output is voluminous. A debate about the empirical evidence and about appropriate policies continues among academics. In more public forums, interest groups routinely cite environmental justice in advocating for policy reforms. As is typical in policy debates, advocates select evidence to cite in support of their position. **The influence of scholarly EJ research on policymakers**, however, **is less than straightforward**. If the mounting evidence provides only partial answers or, as is common, **answers to questions only marginally relevant to policymakers**, then **even hundreds of books** [1] on the subject may **do little to sway public policy**. Or, conversely, the evidence's influence may far outstrip its limited relevance. Regardless, like many other environmental policy topics, the role of scholarly research in policy design is inevitably contentious and complex. ¶ The purpose of this paper is to offer some insight about policy design from the scholarly literature on EJ. After scaling this mountain of literature, what are the important lessons to be learned for **making EJ policy?** From this vantage, this paper **critiques the field of EJ research**. It also offers some suggestions for a more policy-relevant research agenda. The conclusion returns to the broad assessment of EJ policy and suggests some future directions for designing policy and framing the discourse.

Environment impact is insulated from the alt

Minteer 5

(Ben, Arizona State biology professor, "Environmental Philosophy and the Public Interest: A Pragmatic Reconciliation," Environmental Values 14, ebsco)

This call for revisiting and rethinking the philosophical roots of Western culture, which for White were the techno-scientific worldview and its underlying religious and secular foundations in the medieval period, implied nothing less than an overhaul of the tradition, a foundation-razing process in which a new philosophy of science, technology, and nature – and perhaps a new, less arrogant relationship to the natural world – would be unearthed

and absorbed into the modern worldview. Early environmental philosophers such as Routley and Rolston, then, apparently following White in their call for a new ethic able to account for the independent value of the natural world, assumed that the anthropocentric worldview (and its destructive instrumentalisation of nature) had to be replaced with a new, nonanthropocentric outlook. Here, White's thesis about the anti-environmental implications of the Judeo-Christian religion, particularly his sweeping claim that the latter was 'the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen', offered a point of departure for environmental philosophers, who would respond in subsequent years with a series of influential criticisms of the moral humanism of the Western philosophical inheritance (e.g., Taylor 1986, Rolston 1988, Callicott 1989, Westra 1994, Katz 1996). As the field matured in the 1980s and 1990s, an exclusivist non-anthropocentric agenda established itself as the dominant approach in the field, with a few notable exceptions (of the latter, see Norton 1984, 1991; Weston 1985, and Stone 1987). The result of these developments is that the public interest never became part of the agenda of environmental philosophy in the same way, for example, that it appears to have made lasting impressions in other branches of applied philosophy such as business, engineering, and biomedical ethics. Concerned with what it perceived to be more pressing and fundamental questions of moral ontology – that is, with the nature of environmental values and the moral standing of nonhuman nature – environmental philosophers pursued questions selfconsciously cordoned off from parallel discussions in mainstream moral and political theory, which were apparently deemed too anthropocentric to inform a philosophical field preoccupied with the separate issue of the moral considerability and significance of nonhuman nature. As a consequence, instead of (for example) providing a conceptual or analytic framework for evaluating cases, practices, and policies from the perspective of ostensibly 'human-centred' concepts such as the public interest, many environmental philosophers preferred to focus exclusively on the independent status of natural values. I would argue that this original failure to link environmental values and claims to recognised moral and political concerns also helps to explain the relative inability of environmental philosophy to have a significant impact within public and private institutions over the years, again, especially when compared with other applied ethics counterparts. Environmental philosophy is and always has been concerned with 'nature's interest', not that of the public. This situation has also produced a number of unfortunate consequences for the contribution of environmental philosophy to policy discussion and debate, not to mention more concrete and on-the-ground forms of social action. One example here is the largely missed opportunity for philosophers to study and contribute to some of the more important environmental reform movements and institutional initiatives of the past three decades. Chief among these developments, perhaps, is the public interest movement that developed alongside environmental ethics in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which united consumer protection with environmental advocacy through organisations like Ralph Nader's Public Interest Research Groups (PIRGs). This list of emerging direct-action environmental movements would also have to include the growing number of grassroots organisations and groups, commonly lumped under the 'environmental justice' banner, which have sought to link the concerns of public health, safety, and community well-being to environmental protection through the language and tactics of social justice and civil rights (Gottlieb 1993, Shutkin 2000, Shrader-Frechette 2002). Had environmental philosophy worked a serious notion of the public interest into its agenda, it doubtless would have been (and would now be) much more engaged with these influential movements in citizen environmental action, not to mention a range of discussions in areas such as risk communication, pollution prevention and regulatory reform, public understanding of science, and so on.

AT: Movements

Movements/the alternative can't address immediate problems—they are multigenerational, educational ventures. Working within the system is necessary to solve particular instances of the climate problem—there's no guarantee their revolution will solve

-Working within existing political institutions is key

-It's too late to solve the whole environmental crisis, but can work to mitigate the damage

-No guarantee the alternative's regression to socialism wont' have same environmental problems

PARENTI 13

(Christian, professor of sustainable development at the School for International Training, Graduate Institute, "A Radical Approach to the Climate Crisis," *Dissent*, Summer 2013, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-radical-approach-to-the-climate-crisis)

Several strands of green thinking maintain that capitalism is incapable of a sustainable relationship with non-human nature because, as an economic system, capitalism has a growth imperative while the earth is finite. One finds versions of this argument in the literature of eco-socialism, deep ecology, eco-anarchism, and even among many mainstream greens who, though typically declining to actually name the economic system, are fixated on the dangers of "growth." All this may be true. Capitalism, a system in which privately owned firms must continuously out-produce and out-sell their competitors, may be incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world. However, that is not the same question as whether capitalism can solve the more immediate climate crisis. Because of its magnitude, the climate crisis can appear as the sum total of all environmental problems—deforestation, over-fishing, freshwater depletion, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, chemical contamination. But halting greenhouse gas emissions is a much more specific problem, the **most pressing subset** of the **larger apocalyptic panorama**. And the very bad news is, time has run out. As I write this, news arrives of an ice-free arctic summer by 2050. Scientists once assumed that would not happen for hundreds of years. Dealing with climate change by first achieving radical social transformation—be it a socialist or anarchist or deep-ecological/neo-primitive revolution, or a nostalgia-based localista conversion back to a mythical small-town capitalism—would be a very **long and drawn-out**, maybe even **multigenerational, struggle**. It would be marked by years of mass education and organizing of a scale and intensity not seen in most core capitalist states since the 1960s or even the 1930s. **Nor is there any guarantee** that the new system would not also degrade the soil, lay waste to the forests, despoil bodies of water, and find itself still addicted to coal and oil. Look at the history of "actually existing socialism" before its collapse in 1991. To put it mildly, the economy was not at peace with nature. Or consider the vexing complexities facing the left social democracies of Latin America. Bolivia, and Ecuador, states run by socialists who are beholden to very powerful, autonomous grassroots movements, are still very dependent on petroleum revenue. A more radical approach to the crisis of climate change begins **not with a long-term vision** of an alternate society but with an honest engagement with the very compressed timeframe that current climate science implies. In the age of climate change, **these are the real parameters of politics**.

State Good

Climate change mitigation and adaptation requires a revamped role of the state—their total insistence n overthrow of capitalism is a delusion

Christian **PARENTI**, professor of sustainable development at the School for International Training, Graduate Institute, **13** ["A Radical Approach to the Climate Crisis," *Dissent*, Summer 2013, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-radical-approach-to-the-climate-crisis]

Climate change is a problem of an entirely different order of magnitude, but these past solutions to smaller environmental crises offer lessons. Ultimately, solving the climate crisis—like the nineteenth-century victory over urban squalor and epidemic contagions— will **require a re-legitimation of the state's role** in the economy. The modern story of local air pollution offers another example of the "rebellion of nature." As Jim McNeil outlines in Something New Under The Sun, smog inundations in industrial cities of the United States and Europe used to kill many people. In 1879–1880 smog killed 3,000 Londoners, and in Glasgow a 1909 inversion—where cold air filled with smoke from burning coal was trapped near the ground—killed 1,063. As late as 1952, a pattern of cold and still air killed 4,000 people in London, according to McNeil, and even more according to others. By 1956, the Britons had passed a clean air act that drove coal out of the major cities. In the United States there was a similar process. In 1953, smog in New York killed between 170 and 260 people, and as late as 1966 a smog inversion killed 169 New Yorkers. All of this helped generate pressure for the Clean Air Act of 1970. Today, a similar process is underway in China. Local air quality is so bad that it is forcing changes to Chinese energy policy. A major World Bank study has estimated that "the combined health and non-health cost of outdoor air and water pollution for China's economy comes to around $US 100 billion a year (or about 5.8% of the country's GDP)." People across China are protesting pollution. Foreign executives are turning down positions in Beijing because of the toxic atmospheric stew that western visitors have taken to calling "airpocalypse." The film director Chen Kaige, who won the Palme d'Or for his 1993 film Farewell My Concubine, told the world he couldn't think or make films because of the Chinese capital's appallingly bad air. These local pressures are a large part of what is driving Chinese investment in renewable energy. Last year China added more energy capacity from wind than from the coal sector. Capitalism vs. Nature? Some of the first thinkers to note a conflict between capitalism and non-human nature were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. They came to their ecology through examining the local problem of relations between town and country—expressed simultaneously as urban pollution and rural soil depletion. In exploring this question they relied on the pioneering work of soil chemist Justus von Liebig. And from this small-scale problem, they developed the idea of capitalism creating a rift in the metabolism of natural processes. Here is how Marx explained the dilemma: Capitalist production collects the population together in great centers, and causes the urban population to achieve an ever-growing preponderance. This has two results. On the one hand it concentrates the historical motive force of society; on the other hand, it disturbs the metabolic interaction between man and the earth, i.e., it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; hence it hinders the operation of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil….All progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil. And as with "soil robbing," so too concentrations of atmospheric CO2: the natural systems are out of sync; their elements are being rearranged and redistributed, ending up as garbage and pollution. It may well be true that capitalism is incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world. But **that is not the same question** as whether or not capitalism can solve the climate crisis. Climate mitigation and adaptation are merely an effort to buy time to address the other larger set of problems that is the whole ecological crisis. This is both a pessimistic and an optimistic view. Although capitalism has not overcome the fundamental conflict between its infinite growth potential and the finite parameters of the planet's pollution sinks, **it has**, in the past, **addressed specific environmental crises**. Anyone who thinks the existing economic system must be totally transformed before we can deal with the impending climate crisis is **delusional** or in **willful denial** of the very clear findings of climate science. If the climate system unravels/// , all bets are off. The many progressive visions born of the Enlightenment will be **swallowed and forgotten by the rising seas** or smashed to pieces by the wrathful storms of climate chaos.

The political demands of climate change require reformist politics—the alternatives all or nothing attitude guarantees extinction. Perm is the best way out

Parenti 13

Hard Facts The scientific consensus, expressed in peer-reviewed and professionally vetted and published scientific literature, runs as follows: For the last 650,000 years atmospheric levels of CO_2—the primary heat-trapping gas—have hovered at around 280 parts per million (ppm). At no point in the preindustrial era did CO_2 concentrations go above 300 ppm. By 1959, they had reached 316 ppm and are now over 400 ppm. And the rate of emissions is accelerating. Since 2000, the world has pumped almost 100 billion tons of carbon into the atmosphere—about a quarter of all CO_2 emissions since 1750. At current rates, **CO_2 levels will double by mid-century**. Climate scientists believe that any increase in average global temperatures beyond 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels will lead to dangerous climate change, causing large-scale desertification, crop failure, inundation of coastal cities, mass migration to higher and cooler ground, widespread extinctions of flora and fauna, proliferating disease, and possible social collapse. Furthermore, scientists now understand that the earth's climate system has not evolved in a smooth linear fashion. Paleoclimatology has uncovered evidence of sudden shifts in the earth's climate regimes. Ice ages have stopped and started not in a matter of centuries, but decades. Sea levels (which are actually uneven across the globe) have risen and fallen more rapidly than was once believed. Throughout the climate system, there exist dangerous positive-feedback loops and tipping points. A positive-feedback loop is a dynamic in which effects compound, accelerate, or amplify the original cause. Tipping points in the climate system reflect the fact that causes can build up while effects lag. Then, when the effects kick in, they do so all at once, causing the relatively sudden shift from one climate regime to another. Thus, the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says rich countries like the United States must cut emissions 25 percent to 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020—only seven years away—and thereafter make precipitous cuts to 90 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. This would require global targets of 10 percent reductions in emissions per annum, starting now. Those sorts of emissions reductions **have only occurred during** economic **depressions**. Russia's near total economic collapse in the early 1990s saw a 37 percent decrease in CO_2 emissions from 1990 to 1995, under conditions that nobody wants to experience. The political implications of all this are mind-bending. As daunting as it may sound, it means that it is this society and these institutions that must cut emissions. That means, **in the short-term, realistic climate politics are reformist** politics, even if they are conceived of as **part of a longer-term anti-capitalist project** of totally economic re-organization.

Institutions Key

Their call to reject all existing institutions guarantees warming happens

Monbiot 8

(George, English Writer and Environmental and Political Activist, 9-4, "Identity Politics in Climate Change Hell," http://www.celsias.com/article/identity-politics-climate-change-hell/)

If you want a glimpse of how the movement against climate change could crumble faster than a summer snowflake, read Ewa Jasiewicz's article , published on the Guardian's Comment is Free site. It is a fine example of the identity politics that plagued direct action movements during the 1990s, and from which the new generation of activists has so far been mercifully free. Ewa rightly celebrates the leaderless, autonomous model of organising that has made this movement so effective. The two climate camps I have attended – this year and last – were among the most inspiring events I've ever witnessed. I am awed by the people who organised them, who managed to create, under extraordinary pressure, safe, functioning, delightful spaces in which we could debate the issues and plan the actions which thrust Heathrow and Kingsnorth into the public eye. Climate camp is a tribute to the anarchist politics that Jasiewicz supports. But in seeking to extrapolate from this experience to a wider social plan, she makes two grave errors. The first is to confuse ends and means. She claims to want to stop global warming, but she makes that task 100 times harder by rejecting all state and corporate solutions. It seems to me that what she really wants to do is to create an anarchist utopia, and use climate change as an excuse to engineer it. Stopping runaway climate change must take precedence over every other aim. Everyone in this movement knows that there is very little time: the window of opportunity in which we can prevent two degrees of warming is closing fast. We have to use all the resources we can lay hands on, and these must include both governments and corporations. Or perhaps she intends to build the installations required to turn the energy economy around - wind farms, wave machines, solar thermal plants in the Sahara, new grid connections and public transport systems - herself? Her article is a terryifying example of the ability some people have to put politics first and facts second when confronting the greatest challenge humanity now faces. The facts are as follows. Runaway climate change is bearing down on us fast. We require a massive political and economic response to prevent it. Governments and corporations, whether we like it or not, currently control both money and power. Unless we manage to mobilise them, we stand a snowball's chance in climate hell of stopping the collapse of the biosphere. Jasiewicz would ignore all these inconvenient truths because they conflict with her politics. "Changing our sources of energy without changing our sources of economic and political power", she asserts, "will not make a difference. Neither coal nor nuclear are the "solution", we need a revolution." So before we are allowed to begin cutting greenhouse gas emissions, we must first overthrow all political structures and replace them with autonomous communities of happy campers. All this must take place within a couple of months, as there is so little time in which we could prevent two degrees of warming. This is magical thinking of the most desperate kind. If I were an executive of E.On or Exxon, I would be delighted by this political posturing, as it provides a marvellous distraction from our real aims. To support her argument, Jasiewicz misrepresents what I said at climate camp. She claims that I "confessed not knowing where to turn next to solve the issues of how to generate the changes necessary to shift our sources of energy, production and consumption". I confessed nothing of the kind. In my book Heat I spell out what is required to bring about a 90% cut in emissions by 2030. Instead I confessed that I don't know how to solve the problem of capitalism without resorting to totalitarianism. The issue is that capitalism involves lending money at interest. If you lend at 5%, then one of two things must happen. Either the money supply must increase by 5% or the velocity of circulation must increase by 5%. In either case, if this growth is not met by a concomitant increase in the supply of goods and services, it becomes inflationary and the system collapses. But a perpetual increase in the supply of goods and services will eventually destroy the biosphere. So how do we stall this process? Even when usurers were put to death and condemned to perpetual damnation, the practice couldn't be stamped out. Only the communist states managed it, through the extreme use of the state control Ewa professes to hate. I don't yet have an answer to this conundrum. Does she? Yes, let us fight both corporate power and the undemocratic tendencies of the state. Yes, let us try to crack the problem of capitalism and then fight for a different system. But let us not confuse this task with the immediate need to stop two degrees of warming, or allow it to interfere with the carbon cuts that have to begin now. Ewa's second grave error is to imagine that society could be turned into a giant climate camp. Anarchism is a great means of organising a self-elected community of like-minded people. It is a disastrous means of organising a planet. Most anarchists envisage their system as the everyone is to be free from the coercive power of the state, this must apply to the oppressors as well as the oppressed. The richest and most powerful communities on earth - be they geographical communities or communities of interest - will be as unrestrained by external forces as the poorest and weakest. As a friend of mine put it, "when the means by which the oppressed can free themselves from persecution. But if anarchist utopia arrives, the first thing that will happen is that every Daily Mail reader in the country will pick up a gun and go and kill the nearest hippy." This is why, though both sides furiously deny it, the outcome of both market fundamentalism and anarchism, if applied universally, is identical. The anarchists associate with the oppressed, the market fundamentalists with the oppressors. But by eliminating the state, both remove such restraints as prevent the strong from crushing the weak. Ours is not a choice between government and no government. It is a choice between government and the mafia. Over the past year I have been working with groups of climate protesters who have changed my view of what could be achieved. Most of them are under 30, and they bring to this issue a clear-headedness and pragmatism that I have never encountered in direct action movements before. They are prepared to take extraordinary risks to try to defend the biosphere from the corporations, governments and social trends which threaten to make it uninhabitable. They do so for one reason only: that they love the world and fear for its future. It would be a tragedy if, through the efforts of people like Ewa, they were to be diverted from this urgent task into the identity politics that have wrecked so many movements.

Reps Good

Framework

Imagining possible changes is necessary to motivate action on the climate

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["CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management," *Environment and Planning C* 39 (4)]

For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of 'innovation studies', for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we've suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion. However, we are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an **'illusion of agency'** and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues '**illusions are productive** because they **motivate action** and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved' (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the **dynamics of change**: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are **necessary to processes within**. This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

AT: warming distancing

In the context of warming it is important to privilege scientific data. Personal experience is a flawed approach to climate change—creates systemic bias and inaction

-can't detect climate change locally b/c of temperature fluctuations

-people are misled by extreme events instead of long term trends

-more likely to underestimate the impacts of warming

Weber and Stern **11**

(professor @ Center for Research on Environmental Studies @ ColumbiaElke U. and Paul C. Stern, "Public Understanding of Climate Change in the United States" American Psychologist Vol. 66, No. 4, 315–328 May/June)

The power and limitations of personal experience. Personal experience is a powerful teacher, readily available to everyone from an early age. Decisions based on personal experience with the outcomes of actions (e.g., touching a hot stove or losing money in the stock market) involve associative and affective processes that are fast and automatic (Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004). However, learning from personal experience can lead to systematic bias in understanding climate change. First, there are serious problems detecting the signal. In most U.S. locales at this time, it is virtually impossible to detect the signal of climate change from personal experience, amid the noise of random fluctuations around the central trend (Hansen, Sato, Glascoe, & Ruedy, 1998). Second, people are likely to be misled by easily memorable extreme events. Such events have a disproportionate effect on judgment (Keller, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2006) even though they are poor indicators of trends. Extreme events by definition are highly infrequent, and it takes a long time to detect a change in the probability of an event that occurs, on average, once in 50 years or less frequently. The likelihood of an increase in the frequency or intensity of extreme climaterelated events large enough to be noticed by humans will be small for some time in many regions of the world. Even individuals whose economic livelihood depends on weather and climate events (e.g., farmers or fishers) might not receive sufficient feedback from their daily or yearly personal experience to reliably detect climate change, though recent surveys conducted in Alaska and Florida (two states in which the climate signal has been relatively strong) show that such personal exposure greatly increases the concern and willingness of citizens in these states to take action (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 2004; Leiserowitz & Broad, 2008).6 These studies are noteworthy for examining people's attempts to learn about climate change from personal experience, providing direct empirical evidence about the power as well as the shortcomings of this form of learning in this domain, rather than extrapolating from results of research in other domains. Third, experiential learning tends to bias the public's understanding because of a tendency to over-weight recent events (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). The evaluation of probabilistic outcomes follows classical reinforcement learning models, in which positive (negative) consequences increase (decrease) the likelihood of a behavior that gave rise to them. Such learning processes give recent events more weight than distant events, which is adaptive in dynamic environments where circumstances change with the seasons or other cycles or trends (Weber et al., 2004). Because extreme events have a small probability of having occurred recently, they usually have a smaller impact on the decision than their objective likelihood of occurrence would warrant. But when they do occur, recency weighting gives them a much larger impact on judgment and decision than their probability warrants, making decisions from experience more volatile across past outcome histories than decisions from description (Yechiam, Barron, & Erev, 2005). As a result, nonscientists can be expected to overreact to rare events like a hurricane or a heat wave (Li, Johnson, & Zaval, 2011) but most of the time to underestimate the future adverse consequences of climate change. Beliefs in climate change have been shown to be affected by local weather conditions (Li et al., 2011), and a relatively cool 2008 may have influenced the drop in American concern about climate change in 2008–2009 (Woods Institute for the Environment, 2010). Confusing weather with climate increases the potential for these sorts of error (Weber, 2010). Climate scientists can also overreact to single vivid events, but their greater reliance on analytic processing, accumulations of data, statistical descriptions and model outputs, and scientific deliberation and debate can be expected to dampen this tendency. Without such correctives, nonscientists are more likely than scientists to accept evidence that confirms preexisting beliefs and to fail to search out disconfirming evidence (Evans, 1989). The scientific method can be seen as a cultural adaptation designed to counteract the emotionally comforting desire for confirmation of one's beliefs, which is present in everyone (M. Gardner, 1957). Finally, nonscientists differ from scientists in the way they react to uncertainty. Rather than using probability theory to gauge and express the degree of belief in possible future events and to incorporate new evidence, nonscientists respond to uncertainty in ways that are more emotional than analytic (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) and in qualitatively different ways depending on whether

the uncertain events are perceived as favorable or adverse (Smithson, 2008). Nonscientists prefer concrete representations of uncertainty that relate to their experience (Marx et al., 2007). To satisfy this preference, some scientists translate probabilistic forecasts into a small set of scenarios (e.g., best- to worst-case) to facilitate strategic planning by professional groups such as military commanders, oil company managers, and policymakers (Schoemaker, 1995).

AT: Apoc Rhetoric Bad (Warming)

Disaster framing of warming overcomes fear and disbelief.

Joe **ROMM**, Fellow at American Progress, editor of Climate Progress, Ph.D. in physics from MIT, **12** [February 26, 2012, "Apocalypse Not: The Oscars, The Media And The Myth of 'Constant Repetition of Doomsday Messages' on Climate," http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2012/02/26/432546/apocalypse-not-oscars-media-myth-of-repetition-of-doomsday-messages-on-climate/#more-432546]

The two greatest myths about global warming communications are 1) constant repetition of doomsday messages has been a major, ongoing strategy and 2) that strategy doesn't work and indeed is actually counterproductive! These myths are so deeply ingrained in the environmental and progressive political community that when we finally had a serious shot at a climate bill, the powers that be decided not to focus on the threat posed by climate change in any serious fashion in their $200 million communications effort (see my 6/10 post "Can you solve global warming without talking about global warming?"). These myths are so deeply ingrained in the mainstream media that such messaging, when it is tried, is routinely attacked and denounced — and the flimsiest studies are interpreted exactly backwards to drive the erroneous message home (see "Dire straits: Media blows the story of UC Berkeley study on climate messaging") The only time anything approximating this kind of messaging — not "doomsday" but what I'd call blunt, science-based messaging that also makes clear the problem is solvable — was in 2006 and 2007 with the release of An Inconvenient Truth (and the 4 assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and media coverage like the April 2006 cover of Time). The data suggest that strategy measurably moved the public to become more concerned about the threat posed by global warming (see recent study here). You'd think it would be pretty obvious that the public is not going to be concerned about an issue unless one explains why they should be concerned about an issue. And the social science literature, including the vast literature on advertising and marketing, could not be clearer that only repeated messages have any chance of sinking in and moving the needle. Because I doubt any serious movement of public opinion or mobilization of political action could possibly occur until these myths are shattered, I'll do a multipart series on this subject, featuring public opinion analysis, quotes by leading experts, and the latest social science research. Since this is Oscar night, though, it seems appropriate to start by looking at what messages the public are exposed to in popular culture and the media. It ain't doomsday. Quite the reverse, climate change has been mostly an invisible issue for several years and the message of conspicuous consumption and business-as-usual reigns supreme. The motivation for this post actually came up because I received an e-mail from a journalist commenting that the "constant repetition of doomsday messages" doesn't work as a messaging strategy. I had to demur, for the reasons noted above. But it did get me thinking about what messages the public are exposed to, especially as I've been rushing to see the movies nominated for Best Picture this year. I am a huge movie buff, but as parents of 5-year-olds know, it isn't easy to stay up with the latest movies. That said, good luck finding a popular movie in recent years that even touches on climate change, let alone one a popular one that would pass for doomsday messaging. Best Picture nominee The Tree of Life has been billed as an environmental movie — and even shown at environmental film festivals — but while it is certainly depressing, climate-related it ain't. In fact, if that is truly someone's idea of environmental movie, count me out. The closest to a genuine popular climate movie was the dreadfully unscientific The Day After Tomorrow, which is from 2004 (and arguably set back the messaging effort by putting the absurd "global cooling" notion in people's heads! Even Avatar, the most successful movie of all time and "the most epic piece of environmental advocacy ever captured on celluloid," as one producer put it, omits the climate doomsday message. One of my favorite eco-movies, "Wall-E, is an eco-dystopian gem and an anti-consumption movie," but it isn't a climate movie. I will be interested to see The Hunger Games, but I've read all 3 of the bestselling post-apocalyptic young adult novels — hey, that's my job! — and they don't qualify as climate change doomsday messaging (more on that later). So, no, the movies certainly don't expose the public to constant doomsday messages on climate. Here are the key points about what repeated messages the American public is exposed to: The broad American public is exposed to virtually no doomsday messages let alone constant ones, on climate change in popular culture (TV and the movies and even online). There is not one single TV show on any network devoted to this subject, which is, arguably, more consequential than any other preventable issue we face. The same goes for the news media, whose coverage of climate change has collapsed (see "Network News Coverage of Climate Change Collapsed in 2011"). When the media do cover climate change in recent years, the overwhelming majority of coverage is devoid of any doomsday messages — and many outlets still feature hard-core deniers. Just imagine what the public's view of climate would be if it got the same coverage as, say, unemployment, the housing crisis or even the deficit? When was the last time you saw an "employment denier" quoted on TV or in a newspaper? The public is exposed to constant messages promoting business as usual and indeed idolizing conspicuous consumption. See, for instance, "Breaking: The earth is breaking ... but how about that Royal Wedding? Our political elite and intelligentsia, including MSM pundits and the supposedly "liberal media" like, say, MSNBC, hardly even talk about climate change and when they do, it isn't doomsday. Indeed, there isn't even a single national columnist for a major media outlet who writes primarily on climate. Most "liberal" columnists rarely mention it. At least a quarter of the public chooses media that devote a vast amount of time to the notion that global warming is a hoax and that environmentalists are extremists and that clean energy is a joke. In the MSM, conservative pundits routinely trash climate science and mock clean energy. Just listen to, say, Joe Scarborough on MSNBC's Morning Joe mock

clean energy sometime. The major energy companies bombard the airwaves with millions and millions of dollars of repetitious pro-fossil-fuel ads. The environmentalists spend far, far less money. As noted above, the one time they did run a major campaign to push a climate bill, they and their political allies including the president explicitly did NOT talk much about climate change, particularly doomsday messaging Environmentalists when they do appear in popular culture, especially TV, are routinely mocked. There is very little mass communication of doomsday messages online. Check out the most popular websites. General silence on the subject, and again, what coverage there is ain't doomsday messaging. Go to the front page of the (moderately trafficked) environmental websites. Where is the doomsday? If you want to find anything approximating even modest, blunt, science-based messaging built around the scientific literature, interviews with actual climate scientists and a clear statement that we can solve this problem — well, you've all found it, of course, but the only people who see it are those who go looking for it. Of course, this blog is not even aimed at the general public. Probably 99% of Americans haven't even seen one of my headlines and 99.7% haven't read one of my climate science posts. And Climate Progress is probably the most widely read, quoted, and reposted climate science blog in the world. Anyone dropping into America from another country or another planet who started following popular culture and the news the way the overwhelming majority of Americans do would get the distinct impression that nobody who matters is terribly worried about climate change. And, of course, they'd be right — see "The failed presidency of Barack Obama, Part 2." It is total BS that somehow the American public has been scared and overwhelmed by repeated doomsday messaging into some sort of climate fatigue. If the public's concern has dropped — and public opinion analysis suggests it has dropped several percent (though is bouncing back a tad) — that is primarily due to the conservative media's disinformation campaign impact on Tea Party conservatives and to the treatment of this as a nonissue by most of the rest of the media, intelligentsia and popular culture.

Apocalyptic Rhet Good

It's good and solves

Veldman 12

(Robin, Flordida religion PhD student, "Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists", Ethics and the Environment, 17.1, JSTOR)

As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several "interpretive communities," which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled "alarmists," described climate change ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 17(1) 2012 using apocalyptic language, such as "Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation," "Heat waves, it's gonna kill the world," and "Death of the planet" (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists "were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions" (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz's findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled "the Alarmed" (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) "are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, humancaused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response" (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that "[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)" (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.

Climate Reps Good

Our heuristic overcomes disbelief and mobilizes public responses

Romm 12 (Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, which New York Times columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 "Best Blogs of 2010." In 2009, Rolling Stone put Romm #88 on its list of 100 "people who are reinventing America." Time named him a "Hero of the Environment" and "The Web's most influential climate-change blogger." Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, where he oversaw $1 billion in R&D, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon technology. He is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT., 2/26/2012, "Apocalypse Not: The Oscars, The Media And The Myth of 'Constant Repetition of Doomsday Messages' on Climate", http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2012/02/26/432546/apocalypse-not-oscars-media-myth-of-repetition-of-doomsday-messages-on-climate/#more-432546)

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There is intrinsic value to the future-counterfactual simulation of the 1ac – representations of future climate change impacts leads to new solutions external to the aff and avoid traditional pedagogical dilemmas of role-playing

--sex edited

--attempts to project conceptions of the past into the future rely on an anchoring bias that is flawed – new scenarios must be injected to understand new futures

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(Timothy and Thomas Mahnken, "Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations," International Studies Review, 15)

As noted in our discussion of the counterfactuals literature, most scholars writing about the method focus on history. We argue that future counterfactuals may assist scholars in the same ways as historical ones and offer additional benefits. Scenarios may be useful for theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating "world views," setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. ¶ Theory Building and Development¶ The structured analysis of future counterfactuals offers a unique approach for the study of causal effects in social systems. The first category, and perhaps most significant, is the ability of researchers to use scenarios to identify variables of interest and consider ways to measure them. This is an approach

sometimes rec- ommended for qualitative research; it consists of writing a notional depiction of what a case study might look like. This exercise helps researchers to think through what variables are of greatest interest, what values those variables might take on, and how they interact to cause values of the dependent variable. Sce- nario analysis is one way in which researchers may conduct such a notional case study. Rather than introduce a timeless or historical vignette regarding fictional circumstances, the researcher may find it beneficial to place their case in the future. This helps orient the research project toward current and anticipated political issues—thus increasing the relevance of the work—even if the actual case studies are historical. Thinking through the causal process in this way helps the researcher to identify a wider range of explanatory variables, including those that have not yet occurred or may be of very low probability (but are still consis- tent with existing or proposed theoretical arguments). Scenario analysis also helps the researcher to consider the range of values that the identified indepen- dent variables may take on, as exploration of different "worlds" pushes the boundaries of the researcher's predispositions going into the research project. Robust scenario analysis thus helps the researcher to identify the upper and lower bounds of their theory.¶ Second, a commonly cited advantage of counterfactual reasoning that is useful for this process of theory building is a researcher's attempt to manipulate one variable in a causal process while holding others constant, thus isolating the effects of different values of the independent variable on the dependent vari- able. Manipulating one variable at a time to do a better job of analyzing causal processes is often very difficult to do, as, in the real world, interactions between variables often lead to unpredictable and nonlinear outcomes (Jervis 1997:34– 60). For instance, a scholar conducting an analysis of tax rates and other domes- tic legislation regarding oil may use a counterfactual of a different average oil price in the 1970s. Such a counterfactual would have some fairly obvious implica- tions for the domestic political question, but a world in which that one variable were manipulated would have a large number of equally plausible second- and third-order consequences for regional politics in the Middle East. Those conse- quences could conceivably feed back into domestic US politics, thus affecting the social system under analysis in a way the researcher may not have controlled for in the original scenario. ¶ Despite these acknowledged difficulties in using a "manipulate one variable" approach for the purpose of assaying real-world policy options, it is a useful input to the processes of building theory and research design. The best defense¶ of such an approach is that all forms of modeling involve abstractions from real- ity, and even highly unrealistic models— such as James Fearon's famous ideal condition in which war should never occur—are useful for studying real events (Fearon 1995). Furthermore, manipulating one variable at a time is more appro- priate to some kinds of counterfactual reasoning than others. Consider the three main categories of scenario use: political narratives, game theory and formal modeling, and experimentation. The "manipulate one variable" approach seems least useful to political narratives, which often try to tackle such tough questions as "What is the future of the international system?" Although scenarios offer advantages to developing and extending theory in regard to these sorts of ques- tions, particularly in assessing key drivers and articulating world views (discussed in the next subsections), a scientific approach of controlling for various social factors is unlikely to succeed. In these projects, manipulating one variable at a time serves only to develop one of many possible futures in the interest of extending the range of the theory's explanatory power.¶ On the other hand, the "manipulate one variable" approach offers more direct advantages for formal modeling and experimentation. The reasoning for each follows a comment made by Elinor Ostrom in her 1997 American Political Sci- ence Association presidential address. Ostrom suggested that "from...scenarios, one can proceed to formal models and empirical testing in field and laboratory settings" (Ostrom 1998). The experimental method with human subjects benefits strongly from the use of scenarios. In one study of how values factor into Ameri- cans' economic decision making, a team of researchers sought to "attribute sig- nificant differences in average responses between conditions to the independent variables manipulated in the hypothetical scenario; that is, to the factors intuitive neorealists should weigh heavily and intuitive economists should weigh lightly" (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001). That is to say, one variable related to individuals' world views could be manipulated at once in the experiment, and the researcher may test for the significance of variance between the test and con- trol groups.¶ After using scenarios to better identify variables of interest and the role of their specific values in a causal process, a third category of applications of scenario analysis to theory building is to develop new hypotheses and ways to test them. This follows from using scenarios to identify new independent variables and how their values may effect changes on the dependent variable; each new causal argu- ment may (and should) be expressed as a hypothesis to be tested in the broader research project for which the scenario analysis was developed. Additionally, "day- after" scenarios that seek to walk back the causal processes that may have led to a consequential event are particularly well suited to developing hypotheses (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008). By definition, this type of scenario analysis seeks to discover causal pathways. For instance, one might seek to chart various paths by which a particular type of social revolution may occur in a country of interest. Each narrative of how such a revolution could come to pass would result in at least one hypothesis regarding the links between the many variables of interest. These hypotheses may then be tested against historical data or used to develop new kinds of data collection methods (discussed further in the next section).¶ Finally, scenario analysis helps to explore completely new theoretical projects in a deductive way, whereas a great deal of qualitative work in political science tends to be inductive from the case study method. The use of scenario analysis may help scholars to pursue an "abductive," or hybrid, method of theory build- ing that draws on both deductive reasoning and insights from cases (Mayer and Pirri 1995). For example, a data-poor research subject, such as how states may respond to computer network attack, has few historical precedents (Mahnken 2011; Rid 2012). If a researcher were interested in identifying the circumstances under which states are more likely to resort to violence in response to cyber¶ attack, he would be confounded by the problem that never in history has a state responded with violence to such an attack. Scenario analysis beginning with the value of violent counter-attack on the dependent variable (the DV being a state's strategy choice) would help the researcher to deduce likely circumstances under which such an outcome may occur. Historical analysis, such as regarding other kinds of information threats, would be helpful for such a project, but the differ- ences between cyber and other kinds of information transmission would result in an incomplete causal narrative based on inductive reasoning alone.¶ Data-Poor Research Topics¶ Scenarios are a useful method for theory building and research design for topics that, despite being of high importance, lack an empirical base. The best example of this type of research is scholarship on nuclear warfare. An enormous literature evolved during the Cold War regarding how a nuclear war might be fought and how escalation dynamics might occur (Kahn 1962; Brown and Mahnken 2011). This literature was based almost exclusively on future counterfactuals, as there were no nuclear wars to study and a very low "n"—consisting of the Cuban Missile Crisis and very few other crises—for publicly acknowledged "close calls" (Sagan 1995). Indeed, in our survey of the use of scenarios in the discipline, more than 25% were about nuclear warfare. Other topics that are of high impor- tance but have a very low or zero "n" include great-power war, global epidemics, climate change, large-scale cyber attack, and weapon of mass destruction terrorism.¶ The points made earlier regarding the identification of new variables and hypotheses are relevant here. In addition to these advantages to new research topics, scenario analysis helps to identify new sources of data. This is partially because scenarios help to identify new independent variables, thus leading the researcher

to think about how to measure their values, but also by helping him to think of proxies for measurement when direct observation is not possible. For instance, a day-after analysis of a scenario of interest would cause the researcher to ask what [s]he would have needed to know to predict the occurrence of the future counterfactuals and in turn help the researcher to think about ways in which the discipline could identify that low-probability process if it begins to happen in the real world.¶ Articulation of "World Views"¶ In addition to the process of building theory, scenarios are useful in helping to link theories. This is known as the articulation of a "world view," which is a set of guiding logics for how an international system operates, such as realism, con- structivism, and neoliberal institutionalism (Doyle 1997). For any world view, one may use scenario analysis to narrate what the theory logically dictates ought to happen in the world. Similar to the benefit to theory building, but on a greater scale, this approach offers an opportunity for empirical validation of the world view over time. For instance, a scenario at a high level of abstraction, such as the structure of a political system, allows for the validation or invalidation of multiple theories and interactions of theories. Should behavior in the world fail to conform to the expectations of the world view, this of course offers scholars an opportunity to reconsider the guiding logics of their world view.¶ In the early 1990s, for example, a team of defense analysts had been tasked with developing a set of scenarios for the post–Cold War security environment (Project 2025 1994). They crafted a scenario of a future world dominated by conflict between radical Islam and the West that resembled in some key respects the current struggle against Al Qaeda and its Associated Movements. The sce- nario should not be seen as a prediction of current events, however. Rather, the¶ scenario was developed to test whether or not one could plausibly make the case for a global ideological conflict at a time when IR scholars such as Francis Fukuy- ama were arguing that ideological conflict had become a thing of the past (Fukuyama 1992). Islam appeared to be the most plausible universalist ideology that could trigger widespread conflict.¶ Another example is that a realist scholar may benefit from a scenario analysis of the likely futures of the European Union. Such an analysis would project dif- ferent possible outcomes—ranging from dissolution through more coherent for- eign policy and security integration—from basic premises consistent with the realist world view pitted against the premises of competing world views. The final section of this article offers an example of when John Mearsheimer conducted such an analysis more than 20 years ago; he developed scenarios regarding the future of Europe by comparing the expectations of offensive realism to other theoretical approaches.¶ Setting Research Agendas¶ The remainder of this section describes ways in which scenarios are useful to political scientists in ways other than developing theory. Scenarios are often used in the business and national security policy communities to have "smarter con- versations." This use of the scenario method differs from positivist social science and instead seeks to improve knowledge through participation in scenario exer- cises. Such exercises usually involve a facilitated discussion. One way in which scenario conversations may make researchers smarter is to identify new research questions. Thinking about critical drivers of the future may help scholars to understand areas that presently have no useful theories and to avoid the ten- dency of the political science discipline to consistently focus on a small number of questions. For instance, the New Era Foreign Policy Conference, initiated by the University of California, Berkeley, and currently cosponsored by the Ameri- can University, University of California, Berkeley, and Duke University, seeks to bring together graduate students of political science to engage in scenario analy- sis and identify future research topics.8¶ Avoiding Cognitive Biases¶ In a methods book on scenarios, James Ogilvy discussed the inability of extre- mely bright people to see ahead due to cognitive biases, that is, what people found "unthinkable," though those futures eventually came into being. In the context of discussing the future of US and USSR nuclear arsenals during a 1980s scenario exercise, Ogilvy wrote in hindsight that "two decades later we now take for granted what was then unthinkable to some very good thinkers" (Ogilvy 2002:191). This comment is very similar to an insight by Philip Tetlock that polit- ical scientists tend to view surprises as overdetermined in hindsight, but as incon- ceivable ahead of time (Weber 1996:281).¶ Scenarios, whether formally written or developed for purposes of conversation, offer a powerful way for researchers to compensate for cognitive biases endemic to any kind of human research. Scenarios do this by forcing researchers to con- front their most basic assumptions about how the world operates and by teasing out the logical implications of extreme values on the independent variables of interest. As Peter Schwartz put it,¶ "[Scenario building is] all part of a process of self-reflection: understanding your- self and your biases, identifying what matters to you, and perceiving where to put your attention. It takes persistent work and honesty to penetrate our internal mental defenses. To ensure the success of our efforts, we need a clear under- standing of the relationship between our own concerns and the wider world around us. To achieve that, it helps to have a constant stream of rich, diverse, and thought-provoking information" (Schwartz 1996:59).¶ One of the most common forms of bias that scenarios help to compensate for is an anchoring bias; that is, the tendency to interpret new information in ways that conform with our preexisting beliefs (Jervis 1976:143–202). One might also think about this as a "linear projection" bias; scholars who have a view of how the world is operating in the present (theoretically informed or not) may well project this view into the future. In addition to forcing scholars to explicitly confront these beliefs, the scenario process offers a way to think about sorting new information. A com- pleted scenario project allows a researcher to think about multiple futures (with differing plot lines for how the world arrived there) at once. Thus, new informa- tion is not automatically compared against a single linear projection into the future, but rather weighted relative to alternative futures. New information might be consistent with all hypothesized futures, in which case the new information may not lead to a new understanding. An example is the current debate regarding whether China is rising or declining relative to the United States. This literature, despite access to the same data, offers remarkably different projections regarding the future strength of each state and what this portends for the international sys- tem (Pape 2005; Layne 2009; Beckley 2011/2012; Subramanian 2011). In many cases, however, new information is likely to favor one trend line over another, thus changing how a researcher assigns probabilities to various futures.¶ Pedagogy¶ Scenarios offer many of the same benefits as simulations, recently a hot topic in the pedagogical literature, to teaching in political science (Newkirk and Hamil- ton 1979; Smith and Boyer 1996; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Simpson and Kauss- ler 2009; Sasley 2010). Indeed, scenarios are often a key part of simulation learning. For instance, in a decision-making simulation in which students are assigned the roles of heads of state, the students are often offered a scenario vignette to respond to with policy choices. The emphasis of scenarios and simu- lations in pedagogy, however, is different. The literature on simulations tends to focus on experiential learning, but recent scholarship has cast some doubt on whether or not this kind of learning improves students' knowledge of core course concepts (Raymond 2010).¶ Scenarios offer a way to make classroom exercises more explicitly oriented toward the incorporation of theories. For instance, rather than asking students to take on the roles of the President, National Security Advisor, etc., the students may be presented with a vignette and asked to analyze the strategic implications of the scenario for the United States. Both coauthors of this article have used scenarios in classroom exercises. Tom Mahnken has taught the use of scenarios for stategic planning at the Naval War College. Tim Junio used scenario exer- cises at the University of Pennsylvania. Students in the class "International Secu- rity," having been assigned Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence and other core readings on strategy, were asked to evaluate a scenario in which the United States had committed itself to military action, but was subsequently held hostage by a foreign power.¶ In Junio's scenario, a future US President was led to believe that due to an intel- ligence breakthrough, North Korean nuclear weapon targets were rendered¶ vulnerable to a US first strike with conventional weapons. The United States and close allies saw this as an opportunity for regime change and pre-positioned US forces in the region. The US President then issued an ultimatum to the North Korean regime to vacate the country within 48 hours, akin to the US threat to Sad- dam Hussein in 2003, or face a forceful regime change at the hands of the US-led coalition. To the surprise of US leaders, North Korea's Supreme Leader went on television to announce that an unspecified number of nuclear warheads had been smuggled into the United States as a contingency against such a situation. The Supreme Leader then declared that any act of aggression against the North Korean people would be met with retaliation against the US homeland. Students in the class were asked to first discuss the strategic situation for the United States. What mistakes had been made to get the United States into that situation? What issues were at stake? Then, the students were asked to apply strategic concepts to discuss how the United States might seek to extricate itself from the situation.¶ The North Korea's blackmail scenario is an example of an extremely low-prob- ability event that almost certainly would not justify much further analysis by the intelligence and defense policy communities, but is extremely useful for peda- gogy. This kind of scenario increases student interest in the material and

forces them to engage with the theories and concepts of the course. <u>Rather than focus on policy decisions alone</u>, as simulations are likely to do, <u>students are forced to bring deductive logic to bear to assess the boundaries of the scenario.</u>¶ Demonstrations of Robust Scenario Analysis¶ Mearsheimer 1990a,b¶ A widely read example of scenario analysis, though one not often considered methodologically interesting, is John Mearsheimer's "Back to the Future: Insta- bility in Europe After the Cold War" (published more accessibly in The Atlantic as "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War") (Mearsheimer 1990a,b). Mearshei- mer offered several scenarios of what post–Cold War Europe might look like; the one he deemed most probable suggested that Germany (and possibly others) would develop nuclear weapons and that European states would resume security competition. Mearsheimer contrasted this scenario, driven by the theoretical expectations of offensive realism, with outcomes predicted by the democratic peace and economic interdependence perspectives.¶ The dependent variable of interest in Mearsheimer's scenario analysis was the risk of war in Europe following the end of the Cold War. His primary research question was, "Would the end of the bipolar power structure result in a higher or lower risk of war?" He considered several independent variables, including the distribution of military power (possible values: a range along a spectrum from bipolar to multipolar [unipolar perhaps being logically possible, but he does not explicitly include it as a possibility]); the character of military power, defined in terms of the distribution of nuclear weapons (possible values: aboli- tion, sustenance of existing levels, unmitigated proliferation, or mitigated prolif- eration [current nuclear powers manage their spread]); and domestic politics (possible values: degree of nationalism, ranging from high to low). Mearsheimer was explicit regarding how he believed these independent variables should effect values on his dependent variable of war proneness. Bipolar power distributions were believed to be more stable than multipolar. Nuclear weapons were expected to increase the probability of war in the first three of his four categori- cal values. High values of nationalism were expected to increase the risk of war, while low values of nationalism would reduce or keep even the risk of war.¶ The shortest formulation of Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism is that states seek to maximize their relative power. A relevant aspect of the theory¶ that Mearsheimer articulated is states' perceptions of the costs and risks of going to war; he believed a competitive world under offensive realism might still be peaceful if the costs and risks of going to war were perceived to be high and the benefits of going to war low (Mearsheimer 1990a:12). Mearshei- mer also noted competing theoretical approaches regarding how European states were likely to behave during his analyzed time period: an international institutions perspective (IV: the strength of international institutions, ordinal), which Mearsheimer deemed irrelevant as power-seeking behavior should trump institutional concerns; democratic peace theory (IV: joint democracy, binary), which he found unpersuasive for a few reasons, including nationalism, defec- tion, and uneven spread of democracy among post-Soviet states; and pacifism (IV: binary, learned war is bad or did not), which Mearsheimer believed lacks an empirical basis.¶ Although Mearsheimer discussed these other theoretical perspectives superfi- cially, he developed a detailed account based on how he believed offensive real- ism would effect values on his three main independent variables of interest. He believed "it is certain that bipolarity will disappear, and multipolarity will emerge in the new European order" (Mearsheimer 1990a:31). He believed this because with the end of the US and Soviet spheres of influence, European states would be strongly incentivized by the anarchic character of the international system to provide for their own security. Thus, no two states were likely to emerge as clear poles in the European state system; rather, power would be diffused as many states competed with one other. Mearsheimer was highly confident in this out- come and treated it as more of a background condition than an important determinant of outcomes on his dependent variable.¶ The second two independent variables were nuclear proliferation and nation- alism. Mearsheimer viewed the most critical uncertainty regarding the future of security in Europe as the distribution and deployment patterns of nuclear weap- ons. He wrote that "the best new order would incorporate the limited, managed proliferation of nuclear weapons. This would be more dangerous than the cur- rent order, but considerably safer than 1900–1945. The worst order would be a non-nuclear Europe in which power inequalities emerge between the principal poles of power" (Mearsheimer 1990a:31). Mearsheimer offered scenarios of what it would look like if each of these outcomes resulted. Finally, Mearsheimer con- sidered the future that actually resulted, or the continuation of existing nuclear weapon ownership patterns. He argued that his theory predicted this future would not come to be, as Germany was expected to desire nuclear weapons so that they would not have to rely on Poland and Czechoslovakia to provide a bar- rier against a Soviet invasion, and because small East European states would simi- larly perceive nuclear weapons to be of the highest security interest. Nationalism was less important and factored into Mearsheimer's analysis as an interaction effect between nuclear proliferation and nationalism that may make war more likely under some conditions.¶ In summary, Mearsheimer's article provides an excellent example of scenario analysis being used to extend an existing theory and develop testable hypotheses that were subsequently falsified. His futures also constitute "plot lines" formed by the interaction of multiple variables of interest. Mearsheimer explained why he expected a particular outcome in Western Europe in the 1990s and why he did not expect other outcomes. The historical record clearly falsifies the hypoth- eses derived from his theory of offensive realism. Various reasons may explain why his theory was incorrect—such as normative claims, continued reliance on US security guarantees, and so on—but it is at least clear that his scenario-based approach framed a debate in a rigorous and clearly articulated way and has led to new areas of exploration for the discipline.¶ A second example of robust scenario analysis is a chapter from Keith Payne's book The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Payne 2001). In this chapter, Payne used a scenario to demonstrate how the assumptions underlying traditional deterrence analysis, which were developed during the Cold War, may not apply to a conflict between the United States and China. Payne also used this scenario to demonstrate why in the theoretical sections of his book he emphasized some variables that traditional deterrence theorists downplay. His self-proclaimed purpose was to use a scenario analysis to test whether a more empirical approach, drawing on cultural and domestic political contexts, is more applicable to future conflicts than the deductive reasoning applied to the Cold War.¶ The dependent variable in Payne's analysis was whether or not an adversary is deterred. He then took traditional independent variables from the existing deterrence literature and drew on extensive secondary sources to question what relaxing assumptions about the values of those variables would do to the depen- dent variable. For instance, in deductive reasoning, such factors as a state's cul- tures (organizational and in the usual sense of tradition) are assumed to be either constant on both sides or irrelevant because other variables matter more. Payne suggested that in a particular context, these variables are not only impor- tant, but also may dominate outcomes.¶ To explain how variation in these independent variables may yield an unde- terred adversary, Payne developed an excellent "full" qualitative scenario. His pri- mary interest was Chinese decision making. The context is whether or not the United States could deter China from escalating to violent conflict during a cri- sis over the status of Taiwan. Rather than assume constant values for China on the independent variables, Payne manipulated these variables (several at once, not a "one variable at a time" approach) to show how China: is more risk toler- ant than notional adversaries in the traditional deterrence literature; considers many political issues of lower importance than the status of Taiwan; perceives it has little freedom to back down; and has difficulty understanding US demands and viewing them as credible. Factors that cause them to have these different val- ues are related to the Chinese regime's culture and incentive structures. For instance, Payne focused on how the erosion of communist ideology has led the regime to emphasize national unity and stability as justifications for its continued hold on power, thus making the Taiwan issue of high importance. His points regarding risk tolerance come from Chinese strategic culture; Payne follows ana- lysts who place great meaning in the fact that the Chinese word for "crisis" has connotations of both danger and opportunity. Variation on all of these indepen- dent variables may, Payne argued, lead to an undeterred China, although tradi- tional deterrence theory would yield a deterred China.¶ Conclusion¶ The role of academics in policymaking is a cyclical debate in the IR subfield. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghani- stan, a vocal group has once again elevated the perspective that political science professors should be contributing to these pressing national security problems (Andres and Beecher 1989; George 1993; Putnam 2003; Monroe 2005; Nye 2009; Mead 2010). Nearly all of the discourse on "bridging the gap" between academia and the policy world emphasizes how academics may help policymak- ers, particularly with rigorous methods for testing social science hypotheses. The scenario method is one way in which political scientists may improve the policy relevance of their work. It also shows that ideas flowing in the other direction¶ are promising: the policy community and other disciplines have potential to improve the quality of political science research. The future counterfactual approach has been used by policymakers and wealth creators to improve deci- sions for decades, while our discipline has consistently relied to a great degree on the past. <u>Thinking and writing about the future in a robust way</u> offers politi- cal <u>scientists an exciting opportunity to push the boundaries of current debates and to generate new ones, while also improving the processes of teaching and theory building.</u>

We need apocalyptic framing to give us planning time for adaptive and mitigating strategies. Ongoing messages about the danger of inaction are key

-Impact is big—alarm is good because it gives us planning time and encourages adaptive measures

-We need an ongoing message about the dangers of inaction—this should be alarmist

Tom **FOWLER ET AL. 14**, Public Health, Epidemiology and Biostatistics @ University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, Sally C. Davies, Chief Medical Officer for England, and David Walker, Deputy Chief Medical Officer for England ["The risk/benefit of predicting a post-antibiotic era: Is the alarm working?" *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 1323, p. 1-10 (September 2014)]

Conclusions The impact of a post-antibiotic era would be **enormous**. We would see the re-emergence of many infectious diseases and the risks of many conventional medical treatments would rise, increasing the potential morbidity and mortality from many disease processes. Costs of medical care and the social impact of caring for the sick and those with disabilities would be great. The likelihood of a post-antibiotic era and the characteristics of such a scenario will depend very much on the action that we take collectively over the next few decades. Without further action, the probability of this eventuality is high owing to the inexorable rise of antimicrobial resistance and the declining rate of discovery of new antimicrobial agents. The benefit of raising the alarm about this issue is twofold. First, it enables us to explore adaptation strategies should such a scenario arise through research into potential problems and effective solutions. It is essential that this process begins early to allow for timely responses. A move to more isolation facilities, for example, would require planning, funding, and construction time. Second, it enables us to more accurately assess the true costs of antimicrobial resistance and to consider the prioritization of mitigation strategies, such as the development of global programs for antibiotic stewardship and the negotiation of new business models for the development of new antibiotics. We might also want to prioritize research and development activities into alternative diagnostic, prevention, and treatment strategies for infectious diseases, for example, genomic sequencing and innovative immunization technology. Of course, these processes also take time. Concerns have been raised about antimicrobial resistance for many decades but the real possibility of a post-antibiotic era has **only emerged recently**, as the antibiotic development pipeline has begun to dry up. This factor seems to have elevated concerns internationally to a level where international collaboration and government/private sector partnerships are real possibilities. Many individual countries, the WHO, and other international communities are now prioritizing this issue as a key threat, and work is underway to mitigate the risk and adapt to the consequences. The alarm has been raised and there is clear evidence of response within individual healthcare systems, nationally and globally. However, experience shows that to truly confront this issue requires the leadership of health professionals and a concerted, unified, and **ongoing message** that ensures that the public and politicians know the potential **dangers of inaction**.

CLS

Reform Effective

Reformism is effective **and brings revolutionary change closer rather than pushing it away**

Delgado 9

(Richard Delgado 9, self-appointed Minority scholar, Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association's Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Professor Delgado's teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, "Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law", p. 588-590)

2. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure." To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to find rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. **The** CLS **critique of** piecemeal **reform is** familiar, **imperialistic and wrong**. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand. The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, **or it may not**. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of **paternalism** to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some **incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer**, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants' union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars' critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we want. 3. CLS Idealism The CLS program is also idealistic. CLS scholars' idealism transforms social reality into mental construct." Facts become intelligible only through the categories of thought that we bring to experience. Crits argue that the principal impediments to achieving an ideal society are intellectual. People are imprisoned by a destructive system of mental categories that blocks any vision of a better world." Liberal capitalist ideology so shackles individuals that they willingly accept a truncated existence and believe it to be the best available. Changing the world requires primarily that we begin to think about it differently." To help break the mental chains and clear the way for the creation of a new and better world, Crits practice "trashing"—a process by which law and social structures are shown to be contingent, inconsistent and irrationally supportive of the status qua without good reason. CLS scholars' idealism has a familiar ring to minority ears. We cannot help but be

reminded of those fundamentalist preachers who have assured us that our lot will only improve once we "see the light" and are "saved."

Misconstrues Law

CLS can't distinguish between rules and principles – over generalizes laws as rules and constructs false situations solely for liberal resolution

McCormick '99
(John P., Assistant Political Science Pf - Yale, American Political Science Review. v93, p. June 1999)//akim

For Habermas, the de facto strategy of reducing all¶ cases to "exceptions" leads CLS to the conclusion that¶ since there is no coherence to liberal-democratic law,¶ there is no justice. Because each law is capable of¶ contradicting another, a fact exacerbated by subjective¶ [footnotes] 418¶ judging, the whole legal order is suspect. But <u>Habermas</u>¶ (1996, 216-7) <u>argues</u> that at base <u>CLS confuses</u>¶ <u>legal rules with legal principles. Rules are norms specified</u>¶ <u>for application in particular cases</u>, such as stipulations¶ for drawing up wills or traffic laws. <u>Rules are</u>¶ <u>often preceded by an "if" clause</u>, which clearly identifies¶ the application situation: If circumstance X obtains,¶ then procedure Y is in order (p. 208). <u>Principles</u>¶ <u>are general legal standards</u> with far fewer prespecified¶ application guidelines. <u>The meaning of procedural</u>¶ <u>rights, human rights, or equal protection is ultimately</u>¶ <u>made specific in interpretation and application</u> (pp.¶ 172, 208).¶ Rules may collide in irreconcilable ways, but they do¶ not constitute the broader workings of justice as such,¶ as do principles. In fact, rules are supposed to conflict¶ because they are so finely specified for particular¶ situations that the legal system depends on their conflict.¶ This kind of conflict can be interpreted as facilitating¶ the determinacy of the system, rather than as¶ thrusting it into indeterminacy jeopardy (Habermas¶ 1996, 217). Rules are highly determinate because they¶ set the conditions of their own application. They are¶ what Habermas calls "self-executing" laws, whereas¶ such principles as equality or mutual recognition are¶ "implemented along administrative paths," where their¶ meaning is fully fleshed out (p. 172). Principles are¶ necessarily indeterminate, to some extent, because they¶ do not apply themselves but, rather, require "additional¶ specification" (p. 217). Unlike rules that virtually¶ apply themselves in appropriate circumstances, in jurisprudential¶ practice, a principle must be carefully¶ examined to see whether another better conforms to a¶ particular case.¶ There is, for Habermas, an intimate relationship¶ between <u>rules and principles,</u> but they <u>ought not to be</u>¶ <u>collapsed in the way that CLS and Schmitt collapse</u>¶ <u>them</u>.21 <u>Because Schmitt and CLS perceive all law as</u>¶ <u>rules</u> and, more important, caricature liberalism as¶ ultimately doing the same, <u>they set up a false either/or</u>¶ <u>dilemma for liberal adjudication.</u> Thus viewed, all legal¶ materials are potentially in chaotic disagreement with¶ one another. The conflating of rules and principles is at¶ the root of Schmitt's and CLS's exaggerated characterization¶ of formalism. <u>Since Schmitt and CLS group all</u>¶ <u>liberal law under the blanket term "formal" and do not</u>¶ <u>acknowledge that formal and substantive modes of law</u>¶ <u>can coexist in the liberal rule of law, they encourage the</u>¶ <u>appearance of arbitrary and conflicting practices that</u>¶ <u>may not actually exist upon more differentiated analy</u>-¶ [footnotes] [header] ¶ <u>sis.</u> In fact, it is precisely because <u>Schmitt,</u> like the¶ positivism he criticizes, <u>views the</u> whole <u>liberal legal</u>¶ <u>system as</u> <u>merely a set of rules that he can move</u>¶ effortlessly <u>from statutes to constitutions</u>, gaps to exceptions,¶ generally with malicious political intent.¶ Habermas (1996, 208) remarks that a traditional way of¶ avoiding rule conflict in the law in cases in which it¶ might be confusing rather than instructive is the recourse¶ to exception clauses. <u>Schmitt exploits</u> this <u>by</u>¶ <u>reading a built-in exception clause into the entire</u>¶ <u>statutory legal system</u> (understood as a collection of¶ exceptionable rules) <u>with disastrous results. If all laws</u>¶ <u>have exception conditions, then so does the legal order</u>¶ <u>it</u>self, which <u>is</u> therefore <u>suspendable in the name of a</u>¶ <u>sovereign popular will.</u>

CLS Flawed

CLS is flawed – contradictions

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CLS also misrepresents the formal quality of liberal legalism. In its caricature of formalism, CLS very often assails a straw man: Even the most stringent legal formalists acknowledge a necessary but not devastating lack of total determinacy in the liberal rule of law.22 For Habermas, the formalism of the law has a very precise meaning. Formalism pertains primarily to the law's construction; that is, it is logically correct and established through prearranged procedures. The decisive aspect of the adjudication of principles, however, is not necessarily an air-tight formalism but, rather, appropriateness for a particular case (1996, 218). According to Habermas, in the application of principles all suitable normative reasons must be collected and then the situation itself interpreted. From a high level of abstraction, the formal modes of law associated, for instance, with such principles of criminal justice as retribution, appear irreconcilable with the more concrete, or material, modes of law that actualize the principle of substantive equality through social welfare provisions. But each is appropriate to a vastly different set of cases. To illustrate this point, Rosenfeld and Weinrib have each used the distinction between corrective and distributive justice to clear up misunderstandings stemming from conflations of the two. The primarily backward-looking quality of corrective justice-redressing a wrong already perpetrated by means of procedures previously established-makes its workings appear relatively transparent. The future-directed quality of distributive justice deals with quantities not always known in advance-how much of what, to whom, and by what means? This seems terribly vague by contrast with criminal justice codes (Rosenfeld 1992; Weinrib 1988). CLS lumps the two modes together in an attack on "the law." Just because the conditions of principle adjudication cannot, and should not, be fully laid out in advance does not render them hemorrhaging wounds in the body legal. It is largely their open-endedness that gives the process a public and democratic quality. According to Habermas (1996, 172), in legal discourses of application competing parties and state authorities present arguments over what norms are most relevant to the facts of a case. There are two interpretive steps for [foot notes] . judges that are not preordained: the description of facts and the description of norms (p. 218). According to Habermas, "once the situational features of the case have been described as exhaustively as possible from all normatively relevant points of view," the appropriate principle can be selected (p. 260). When one norm is selected over another for application, it does not invalidate, nullify, or render irrational those not chosen. "Recessive principles," according to Habermas, those that are decided to be less relevant, do not lose validity for a case as do rules, but only their "contextual relevance" (p. 209). CLS does not distinguish between principles that contradict one another per se and those that collide in a particular case (p. 216). Because a particular principle was not applied does not render it at war with other principles or with the system as a whole. "A plausible connection [is maintained] between the pertinent norm and the norms that … do not prevail such that the coherence of the rule system as a whole remains unaffected" (p. 260). This is not an ideological weighing or privileging of one over the other but, rather, a logical selection.

State Resilient

Critical legal theorists ignore state resiliency to civil and social principles

McCormick '99

(John P., Assistant Political Science Pf - Yale, American Political Science Review. v93, p. June 1999)//akim

In the previous section, I sympathetically presented¶ Habermas's distinction between rules and principles in¶ adjudication, particularly how they relate to earlier¶ historical paradigms of law in a liberal-democratic¶ framework. It is precisely this distinction, however, that¶ at this juncture is especially problematic at the supranational¶ level. It is presently either too easy or too¶ difficult to delineate juridical principles in supranational¶ configurations, even one as relatively homogeneous¶ as the EU.34 If the governing principles of a¶ [foot notes] [header] ¶ juridical unit like the EU pertain merely to the regulation¶ of an economic free-trade zone, for instance,¶ then those principles will clearly be too thin to preserve¶ the gains of liberal or social democracy associated with¶ two or three centuries of expanding civil and social¶ rights. According to skeptics (Garrett, Keleman, and¶ Schulz 1998), appeals by European citizens or associations¶ to the ECJ on the grounds of more substantive¶ principles of justice, and attempts by the ECJ to¶ address them, will be resisted by nation-states. While¶ the autonomy of the ECJ is a hotly contested issue in¶ European studies, the court's activities are no doubt¶ constrained to a significant degree by the preemptive¶ and reactive pressure of EU member states.¶ Habermas asserts supranational legal protection as¶ the necessary response to the expanding transnational¶ power of economic and hence political actors. But¶ evidence suggests that this development is presently¶ stymied by the still quasi-sovereign nation-states. EU¶ members may have suffered some loss of sovereignty to¶ the extent that they participate in the process of¶ integration as compensation for economic losses that¶ many attribute to international developments. These¶ states are, however, still sufficiently strong, and jealous¶ of what sovereignty they still hold, to be able to block¶ the extension of civil and social principles of justice to¶ the adjudication processes of the ECJ (Garrett, Keleman,¶ and Schulz 1998). Habermas takes note of this¶ retrenchist behavior on the part of the member states¶ (1998, 124), but he does not construe it as a particularly¶ significant obstacle to the development of his prospective¶ communicatively and constitutionally democratic¶ European continental regime (p. 127). On the contrary,¶ he urges state actors to undertake the "heroic¶ effort" to promote actively the development of supranational¶ institutions that could replace the actors¶ themselves, or at least replicate themselves on a continental¶ level (p. 124): institutions such as "a European-wide,¶ integrated public sphere . . ., a civil society¶ encompassing interest associations, nongovernmental¶ organizations, citizens' movements, etc., and naturally¶ a party system appropriate to a European arena" (p.¶ 160).¶ On Habermas's own terms, however, within the gap¶ between the nation-state's declining ability to secure¶ and advance principles of social justice (as a result of¶ evaporating tax bases, increased environmental threats,¶ antiimmigrant and minority-unfriendly policies, and so¶ on) and their reluctance to accede fully these responsibilities¶ to fora like the ECJ, lies the abyss of the¶ supranational democratic possibilities of Habermas's¶ theoretical framework.35 If the ECJ is to adjudicate¶ [foot notes] 424¶ exclusively on the basis of market-related rules, and¶ merely make hortatory appeals to principles associated¶ with civil, social, and human rights, then the subtle¶ distinction and interplay of rules and principles upon¶ which Habermas bases his rationally democratic theory¶ of adjudication would appear virtually ineffectual in the¶ EU context for the conceivable future. There is obviously¶ significant debate on the extent to which pessimism¶ is warranted concerning social welfare in contemporary¶ Europe.36 But it is precisely the existence¶ and importance of such debates that renders problematic¶ their absence from Habermas's discourse theory of¶ law and reflections on European integration, especially¶ given his stated concern with "empirically grounded¶ arguments" as much as a "normative perspective"¶ (1998, 158).¶ At one point in the discussion of the reflexive theory¶ of law in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas highlights¶ the historical limitations of understanding law in¶ terms of paradigms. But he has in mind the traditional¶ resistance of the bourgeois formal law to materialized¶ welfare-state law, not the resistance of his own understanding¶ of the two paradigms to new, perhaps supranational,¶ paradigms: Paradigms harden into ideologies insofar as they systematically¶ close themselves off from the perception of radically¶ new situations and resist different interpretations of rights¶ and principles, interpretations that press for acknowledgment¶ in the light of radically new historical experiences¶ .... [They]

stabilize themselves through professionally¶ and judicially institutionalized monopolies on interpretation¶ and permit only internal revision according to their own¶ standards (1996, 221, emphasis added).¶ This could, ironically, be said of Habermas's framework¶ itself. His discourse theory of law has to some¶ extent closed off, resisted, and insulated itself against¶ reflections on the law's radically new historical situation.¶ To that extent, Habermas falls somewhat short of¶ the standards set in his early work and his own adoption¶ of the strictures of critical theory. Obviously, the¶ simple assertion of "history" or the injunction toward¶ the more fine-grained analysis of "context" will not¶ automatically or satisfactorily address the deficiencies¶ of liberal normative theory or its concrete-fixated assailants¶ (Shapiro 1990, 207-13). But, as I conclude¶ below, the combination of the concretely historical and¶ categorically universal method practiced in Habermas's¶ [foot notes] [header] ¶ early efforts, and even still alluded to in his later ones,¶ offers a viable provisional guide for thinking critically¶ about the law in the coming years.

Feminisms

F/W & Tech Discourse Good

Using technical discourse strategically is key to solve the K

Caprioli 4

(Mary, Dept. of Political Science @ the University of Tennessee, PhD from the University of Connecticut, "Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis," International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Jun., 2004), pp. 253-269)

We should learn from the research of feminist scholars to engage in a dialogue **that can be understood**. Carol Cohn (1987), for example, found that one could not be understood or taken seriously within the national security arena without using a masculine-gendered language. In other words, a common language is necessary to understand and be understood. This insight could be applied to feminist research within international relations. Why not, as Charlotte Hooper (2001:10) suggests, **make "strategic use of [expert jargon]** to gain credibility for feminist arguments (or otherwise subvert it for feminist ends)." Little justification exists for abandoning the liberal empiricists who reason that "the problem of developing better knowledge lies not with the scientific method itself but with the biases in the ways in which our theories have been focused and developed" (Tickner 2001:13).

AT: excludes women in debate

The strength of feminist theory comes from the interface between theory and practical legal approaches. Their notion of law is that of a closed space—we must advance a model of informed engagement to turn law into a <u>site</u> of struggle rather than just a tool of struggle.

Bottomley and Conaghan 93

(ANNE BOTTOMLEY and JOANNE CONAGHAN, Kent Law School, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 2NY, England) "Feminist Theory and Legal Strategy" 20 J.L. & Soc'y 1 1993

We have entitled this collection feminist theory and legal strategy. At one level, <u>this could be read as</u> no more than <u>an attempt to bracket together themes and issues developed in theoretical debate with concrete, specific examples</u> by way of application. Indeed some of the papers may be read this way: such a project has a recognized academic history with which we have all engaged at some stage in our own work. <u>Equally, the move from particularities to more general principles has frequently been employed</u> in (feminist) academic work; locating strategies within a broader theoretical context is a common approach and one which allows us to continually remind ourselves of the potential ramifications of our immediate project. Again, there are aspects of this in some of the papers which follow.' <u>Feminist work within law has been characterized by both of these trajectories</u>; it is in the very mode of our operation as lawyers that we are continually faced with specific instances. It is also in our lives as women that our feminism is informed by the particular operations and instances of our engagement with law. This collection, however, is premised on a rather different base. It is a base which we would assert has been the particular strength of feminist work within and on law; it is that <u>our work is not</u> so much <u>concerned with</u> the <u>application of 'theory' to 'law' or vice versa, but rather</u> that it is the <u>interface between the two which is the **very site of our theoretical work**.</u> What we are posing here is twofold. On the one hand, it is a model of theory which sees theory as simply that - a model; one which offers us ideas which we return to and use as a series of tools to raise questions, test insights, and find a language to bring together and communicate our ideas. It does not exist in and for itself, but only in relation to the use to which it is put. For this reason, <u>the strength of feminist jurisprudence is tested **not by claims to internal coherence**</u> but <u>rather by an ability to deliver.</u> This may sound harshly pragmatic but we firmly believe that <u>those aspects of theoretical work which have proven of value to us over the years are those which have enabled us to develop and access concrete material gains</u> in our work. There are undoubtedly those who would read this as an anti-theoretical stance. Carol Smart might, for instance, identify us with what she terms as 'resistance to theory': based on the argument that, because law is a practice which has actual material consequences for women, what is needed in response is counterpractice not theory. This constituency demands 'practical engagement' and continually renders (mere?) theoretical practice inadequate. This argument comes from certain feminist constituencies which may define 'doing' theory as male. These... elements present a major obstacle to proponents of feminist legal theory as they (we) meet with the frustrations of being ignored or seen as outmoded in and by law and are simultaneously moved to renounce theory by the moral imperative of doing something through or in law.' In our view, <u>it is not a question of whether different forms of theoretical practice are seen as male or not.</u> Equally, <u>it is not a question of demanding practical engagement at the expense of theory</u>. It is rather that <u>the mode and strength of feminist theory in law has been the interface between the use of abstract models and ideas to **interrogate the practices of law**</u>.' It may not have been articulated in quite this way before - in that sense it has not yet been 'theorized' - but if we examine our feminist academic heritage, it is the one point which consistently characterizes the work, in all its rich plurality and diverse perspectives. Thus, <u>our stance is not anti-theory, neither is it concerned simply with the application of theory. It is theory, but it is not one which traditionalists would recognize in their limited use of the term</u>. If the counterpoint to our approach is the idea that theory stands for theory's sake, then certainly our notion of theory will be too radical. If we need (and we are not convinced that we do need) to find parallels in the work of 'theorists' who would exemplify a similar approach it would be with, for instance, Braidotti5 or Deleuze.6 They exemplify a theoretical stance based on engagement, on what used to be called 'praxis'. <u>It is not so much a question of application but rather of movement between 'theory' and 'practice'. This theoretical stance allows</u>, perhaps reflects, <u>a pluralism within which there can be no one analytical model deployed but rather a **series of engagements and incursions**</u>. In a legal context, <u>**this precludes seeing 'law' as a closed model but rather recognizes it as a series of ideas, practices, and**</u>

engagements, all of which are loosely held together under the rubric of the term 'law'. We would be the first to acknowledge the experience of any marginal or disadvantaged group within our society which has (rightly) felt, and continues to feel, in many ways and in many instances, the oppressive (or in terms of their own needs, unresponsive) operation of law.7 But to then characterize law simply in these terms is to fly in the face of our experience of law in other ways. One of the most important insights to emerge from the critical legal studies movement has been to highlight the internal inconsistencies in law, the paradoxes, silences, and contingencies. This matches our experiences as women and feminists engaged with law. It is not an internally coherent system which operates smoothly to oppress us at all times and in all ways. The 'power' of law is certainly present but not undifferentiated. It is uneven and it allows us space: space to argue, to engage, and (in the active sense of the word) to ,resist'.' We have only to listen to our sisters in practice to learn this lesson in a very pragmatic way. The operation of law involves a continual use of strategies, in which one is constantly balancing the -possibilities against the probabilities.' Again, let us be clear - in general, it is a more than uneven fight. As law is constituted in a society which still privileges sections of that society in terms of gender, race, class, and socially defined standards of ability, so it is by no means a 'free space' for equal engagement. **But neither is it closed space which we must continually struggle against rather than within.** When Smart states that 'the entry of feminists into law has turned law into a **site of struggle** rather than being taken only as a **tool of struggle**"' we would agree, but we would add that it is a site within which we find tools; it was never a tool because it is not a single entity or practice. Indeed, one of our problems has been that (ironically) the sense of this is far more available in the practice of law than in the academy. It is in the academy that law has been (partly under the influence of the social sciences) most frequently presented as an internally coherent, undifferentiated model which leaves one only with the choice of submission or resistance in the narrow sense of the word. **In practice we experience law as more complex and hence more open to incursions.** The problem is that this experience of law must not only be placed against a context of generally negative expectations and experiences (in other words, we must keep a perspective), but also that it is difficult to record. We mean this in two ways. First, there is still (properly) a tendency to focus on those areas of law which operate most to women's detriment. This necessarily reinforces our sense of neglect and exclusion. Secondly, the interstices of practice - not merely the operation of substantive law but the elements of process in bargaining and negotiation - are less visible than the record of judgments in the higher courts or the passing of legislation. **Small (but significant) developments which we could characterize as victories go unnoticed but radically improve the position of particular women in particular ways**. We might think here of developments requiring the sharp thinking of women solicitors and barristers in helping to devise means by which rape victims might receive representation in criminal cases or strategies to protect the claims to ownership made by women who do not hold legal title to property. This low-profile lawyering, reflected neither in case material nor academic texts, is a rich tapestry of strategies which often cross conventional legal categories." Of course this must be read against a generally negative background but, importantly, it leads us to **dismiss an entirely negative stance** towards the tools of lawyering, whether in practice or within the academy. **Our stance** then **is a politics of engagement**, informed and considered, moving continually between the abstract and the specific. 2 The overwhelming tone of this particular collection is with the problems we encounter when we engage in this way, problems which go beyond substantive law, to issues of procedure and process and beyond that to the very languages with which we engage. 3 They also reflect issues relating to the diversity of women's position and needs, 4 and to the general problems encountered by taking abstract stances, reliant upon concepts such as equality or rights. 5 In this sense, read as a whole, the collection reflects the modus operandi of our claim to a particular type of theoretical work - the interface between the particular, concrete circumstance, and the general, abstract model. It is that interface that we understand as 'strategy'.

AT: ontological power

Ontologizing sexual power and identity as a lens for worldly phenomena reproduces binary discourses end elides difference, reproducing heteronormativity.

Prasad '12

(Ajnesh, Australian School of Business, "Beyond analytical dichotomies," Human Relations May 2012 vol. 65 no. 5 567-595)

A poststructuralist critique At the most rudimentary level, poststructuralism may be typified by what Lyotard (1984) famously expressed as its **incredulity towards metanarratives** (also see Alvesson and Deetz, 1999; Kilduff and Mehra, 1997), or what Fraser and Nicholson (1997) describe as grand theorizing of social macrostructures. Akin to other critical traditions, it is 'explicitly historical, attuned to the cultural specificity of different societies and periods and . . . inflected by temporality, with historically specific institutional categories' (Fraser and Nicholson, 1997: 143–4). The aim of the poststructuralist mandate is to critique metanarratives and, from there, to define human consciousness and social existence through engagements with contextualized subjectivity (Agger, 1991).11 To appreciate this idea, it is important to understand how metanarratives are problematically situated within, and are informed by, socially constructed identity binaries, be they along the fault lines of gender (e.g. Butler, 1990; Hird, 2000), race (e.g. Gilroy, 2000; Miles and Torres, 2007), or sexuality (e.g. Zita, 1994). Indeed, poststructuralist critique, such as Derrida's conjecture of difference (Mumby and Putnam, 1992), illustrates how the preservation of the privileged identity ('white', 'man', 'heterosexual') is existentially dependent upon a corresponding relegated identity ('black', 'woman', 'homosexual') (see Tyler and Cohen, 2008); or, to posit it in Butlerian (1991) phrasing, heterosexuality presumes the being of homosexuality. Working from the same current, Harding (2003) extends this idea through consideration of the central dyadic relationship in management; she notes that every individual in the western workforce is identified as a worker or as a manager and that the identity of the latter is **wholly contingent upon the binary existence of the former**. Elsewhere, again assuming a poststructuralist position, Harding (2008: 44; emphasis in original) explains that identities '**cannot be resolved into an essence or into a coherent whole'**; rather, they are 'post hoc impositions of a seemingly unified [label] upon a disparate and disconnected population'. As such, the central aim of the poststructuralist is to repudiate deterministic and binary logic by drawing attention to the discursive processes that culturally (re)produce social realities and the dichotomous modes of thinking embedded within them (Butler, 1990; Calas, 1993). [T]he ways in which sex was put into Western discourse from the end of the 16th century onwards, the proliferation of sex during the 18th century and the modern incitement to discuss sex in endless detail have simultaneously established heterosexuality as the unassailable norm and constituted other sexualities as abnormal. Tangentially related to the Foucauldian reading of sexuality, Katz (2004) offers a genealogical investigation into how heterosexuality was invented and came to be ideologically defined from the late 19th-century onwards. Katz writes that because 'the concept of heterosexuality is **only one particular historical way** of perceiving, categorizing, and imagining the social relations of the sexes', it ought to be studied with the purposeful aim to **dislocate its socio-cultural privilege** as being the 'normal' and the 'natural' form of sexual expression (p. 69). Given its socially manifest 'nature', Butler (1991, 1993) contends that heterosexuality is perpetually at risk and must continually engage in a set of repetitive, or what she calls parodic, practices – such as, heterosexual sex – which functions to stringently affirm the hegemonic ideals of femininity (passive) and masculinity (active). Incidentally, the very redundancy of these parodic practices function to consolidate the discursive authority and cultural stability of heterosexuality (Butler, 1991; see also Butler's [1993] writing on 'performativity'). A related stream of poststructuralist-inflected scholarship reveals how **sexual identities that are predicated on ontological sexual difference produce heteronormativity,** which can be described as the 'the normative idealization of heterosexuality' (Hird, 2004: 27) or '**the centrality of heterosexual norms in social relations**' (Pringle, 2008: S111). While feminists have long critiqued the tacit and the explicit claims of ontological sexual difference, essentialist definitions of 'female' and 'male' continue to prevail in popular culture and in certain academic disciplines (Frye, 1996).12 On this point, Hird (2004) adopts a position in feminist science studies to develop a substantive critique into how the ontology of sexual difference is often rendered concrete in research propagated by the 'natural' – and particularly the 'biological' – sciences (also see Martin, 1991). The influence of ontological sexual difference within and outside of academia, lends credence to Broadbridge and Hearn's (2008: S39) recent observation that, '[s]ex and sex differences are still often naturalized as fixed, or almost fixed, in biology'. It is equally important to note, here, that **the alchemy of ontological sexual difference is wholly dependent upon the patriarchal conflation of 'biological' sex and 'cultural' gender (**Hird, 2004). As Pringle (2008: S112; also see Borgerson and Rehn, 2004) notes, '[g]ender **[does] not avoid the oppositional duality**

embodied in the concept of sex, but reflect[s] the interdependent relationship of masculinity and femininity'. This reflection pivots on genital determinism, which declares that males naturally embrace masculinity while females naturally embrace femininity (Bornstein, 1994; Hird, 2000). This initial conflation of sex and gender leads to the conventional model of heterosexuality, which dictates that a man will 'desire-to-be' a male and will 'desire-for' a female, while a woman will 'desire-to-be' a female and will 'desire-for' a male (Sinfield, 2002: 126). It is precisely these corresponding relationships whereby the 'heterosexual matrix' is constructed (Butler, 1990). According to Butler, this matrix serves as the '**grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, gender, and desires are naturalized**' (see Ringrose, 2008: 511).13

Gender is not the "root cause" of environmental degradation—such claims are simplistic and wrong

Fox 98 – Center for Environmental Studies

Fellow @ Cent. Env Studies, "The Deep-Ecology-Ecofem debate," in "Environmental Philosophy" ed. Zimmerman, p 232-3

To begin with, deep ecologists completely agree with ecofeminists that men have been far more implicated in the history of ecological destruction than women. However, deep ecologists also agree with similar charges derived from other social perspectives: for example, that capitalists, whites, and Westerners have been far more implicated in the history of ecological destruction than pre-capitalist peoples, blacks, and non-Westerners .21 If ecofeminists also agree with these points, then the question arises as to why they do not also criticize deep ecology for being neutral with respect to issues concerning such significant social variables as socioeconomic class, race, and Westernization. There appears to be two reasons for this. First, to do so would detract from the priority that econfeminists wish to give to their own concern with androcentrism. Second, and more significantly, these charges could also be applied with equal force to the ecofeminist focus on androcentrism itself.14 How does one defend the ecofeminist charge against deep ecology (i.e., that androcentrism is "the real root" of ecological destruction) in the face of these charges?" For deep ecologists, it is simplistic on both empirical and logical grounds to think that one particular perspective on human society identifies the real root of ecological destruction. Empirically, such thinking is simplistic (and thus descriptively poor) because it fails to give due consideration to the multitude of interacting factors at work in any given situation. (While on a practical level it can be perfectly reasonable to devote most of one's energy to one particular 'cause-if only for straightforward reasons to do with time and energy-that, of course, is no excuse for simplistic social theorizing.) Such thinking fails, in other words, to adopt an ecological perspective with respect to the workings of human society itself. Logically, such thinking is simplistic (and thus facile) because it implies that the solution to our ecological problems is close at hand-all we have to do is remove "the real root" of the problem-when it is actually perfectly possible to conceive of a society that is nonandrocentric, socioeconomically egalitarian, nonracist, and nonimperialistic with respect to other human societies, but whose members nevertheless remain aggressively anthropocentric in collectively agreeing to exploit their environment for their collective benefit in ways that nonanthropocentrists would find thoroughly objectionable. Indeed, the "green" critique of socialism proceeds from precisely this recognition that a socially egalitarian society does not necessarily imply an ecologically benign society.

Deliberation/Gender Consistent

Deliberation doesn't exclude gendered analysis

Dahlberg 5

(Lincoln, The University of Queensland, Center for Critical and Cultural Studies, Visiting Fellow, The Habermasian public sphere: Taking difference seriously?, Theory and Society (2005) 34:111-126)

I believe this critique of power, transparency, and the subject is largely based upon a poor characterization of Habermas' position. There are three main misunderstandings that need to be cleared up here, to do with power as negative, as able to be easily removed, and as able to be clearly identified. First, Habermas does not define power as simply negative and as therefore needing to be summarily removed from the public sphere. The public sphere norm calls for "coercion-free communication" and not power-free communication. Habermas emphasizes the positive power of communicative interaction within the public sphere through which participants use words to do things and make things happen.60 Communicative rationality draws on the "**force of better argument**" to produce more democratic citizens, culture, and societies. Subjects are indeed molded through this constituting power, but their transformation is towards freedom and autonomy rather than towards subjugation and normalization. As Jeffrey Alexander points out, **to act according to a norm is not the same as to be normalized**.61 The public sphere norm provides a **structure through which critical reflection** on constraining or dominating social relations and possibilities for freedom **can take place.** As Chambers argues, rational discourse here is about "the endless questioning of codes," the reasoned questioning of normalization.62 This is the very type of questioning critics like Lyotard, Mouffe, and Villa are engaged in despite claiming the normalizing and repressive power of communicative rationality. These critics have yet to explain adequately how they escape this performative contradiction, although they may not be too concerned to escape it.63 The form of power that is to be excluded from discourse in the public sphere is that which limits and disables democratic participation and leads to **communicative inequalities**. Coercion and domination are (ideally) excluded from the public sphere, which includes forms of domination resulting from the maldistribution of material and authoritative resources that lead to **discursive inequalities**. This emphasis on the ideal exclusion of coercion introduces the second point of clari- fication, that the domination free public sphere is an idealization for the purposes of critique. Habermas is more than aware of the fact that, as Nancy Fraser, Mouffe, and Young remind us, coercive forms of power, including those that result from social inequality, can never be completely separated from the public sphere.64 Claims that such power has been removed from any really-existing deliberative arena can only be made by ignoring or hiding the operation of power. However, this does not mean that a reduction in coercion and domination cannot be achieved. Indeed, this is precisely what a democratic politics must do. To aid this project, the public sphere conception **sets a critical standard for evaluation of everyday communication**. Chambers puts this nicely: **Criticism requires a normative backdrop** against which we criticize. Crit-icizing the ways power and domination play themselves out in discourse presupposes a conception of discourse in which there is no [coercive] power and domination. In other words, to defend the position that there is a mean- ingful difference between talking and fighting, persuasion and coercion, and by extension, reason and power involves beginning with idealizations. That is, it involves drawing a picture of undominated discourse.65 However, this discussion of the idealizing status of the norm does notanswer claims that it invokes a transparency theory of knowledge. Iwould argue that such claims not only fall prey to another performa-tive contradiction – of presupposing that the use of rational discourse can establish the impossibility of rational discourse revealing truth and power – but are also based on a poor reading of Habermas' theory of communicative rationality. This is the third point of clarification. In contrast to the metaphysics of presence, the differentiation of persusion from coercion in the public sphere does not posit a naive theory of the transparency of power, and meaning more generally. The public sphere conception as based upon **communicative rationality does not assume a Cartesian (autonomous, disembodied, decontextualized) subject** who can clearly distinguish between persuasion and coercion, good and bad reasons, true and untrue claims, and then wholly re-move themselves and their communications from such influence. For Habermas, subjects are always situated within culture. The public sphere is posited

upon **intersubjective** rather than subject-centered **rationality.** It is through the process of communicative rationality, and not via a Cartesian subject, that manipulation, deception, poor reasoning, and so on, are identified and removed, and by which meanings can be understood and communicated. In other words, it is through rational-critical communication that discourse moves away from coercion or non-public reason towards greater rational communication and a stronger public sphere. The circularity here is not a problem, as it may seem, but is in fact the very essence of democratization: through the practice of democracy, democratic practice is advanced. This democratizing process can be further illustrated in the important and challenging case of social inequalities. Democratic theorists (both deliberative and difference) generally agree that social inequalities al-ways lead to some degree of inequalities in discourse. Thus, the ide-alized public sphere of full discursive inclusion and equality requires that social inequalities be eliminated. Yet how is social inequality to befullyidentified,letaloneeliminated? The idealization seems wholly in-adequate given contemporary capitalist systems and associated social inequality. **However, it is in the very process of argumentation, even if flawed, that the identification** and critique **of social inequality, and thus of communicative inequality, is able to develop.** I ndeed, public sphere deliberation often comes into existence when and where people become passionate about social injustice and publicly thematize problems of social inequality. Thus the "negative power" of social inequality – as with other forms of coercion – is brought to light and critique by the very discourse it is limiting. This is not to say that subjects are merely effects of discourse, that there are no critical social agents acting in the process. It is not to say that 125 subjects within discourse cannot themselves identify negative forms of power, cannot reflexively monitor their own arguments, cannot rationally criticize other positions, and so on. They can, and in practice do, **despite the instability of meaning**. The point is that this reasoning and understanding is **(provisionally) achieved** through the subject's situatedness in discourse rather than via a pre-discursive abstract subject. As Kenneth Baynes argues, it is through discourse that subjects achieve a degree of **reflective distance** (what we could call autonomy) from their situations, "enabling them to revise their conceptions of what is valuable or worthy of pursuit,[and]to **assess various courses of action** with respect to those ends." 66 Democratic discourse generates civic-oriented selves, inter-subjective meanings and understandings, and democratic agreements that can be seen as the basis of public sovereignty. How-ever, the idea of communicatively produced agreements, which in the public sphere are known as public opinions, has also come under ex-tensive criticism in terms of excluding difference, criticism that I wantto explore in the next section. The ends of discourse: Public opinion formation The starting point of discourse is disagreement over problematic validity claims. However, **a certain amount of agreement, or at least mutual understanding, is presupposed** when interlocutors engage in argumentation. **All communication** presupposes mutual understanding on the linguistic terms used – that interlocutors use the same terms in the same way.67 Furthermore, in undertaking rational-critical discourse, according to Habermas' formal pragmatic reconstruction, interlocutors also **presuppose the same formal conditions of argumentation**. These **shared presuppositions enable** rational-critical discourse to be undertaken. However, as seen above, meaning is never fixed and understanding is always partial. Understanding and agreement on the use of linguistic terms and of what it means to be reasonable, reflexive, sincere, inclusive, non-coercive, etc. takes place within discourse and is an ongoing political process.

Public sphere not inevitably gendered---debates about public policy can include embodied experience

Lincoln **Dahlberg 5**, The University of Queensland, Center for Critical and Cultural Studies, Visiting Fellow, The Habermasian public sphere: Taking difference seriously?, Theory and Society (2005) 34:111-126

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through which participants use words to do things and make things happen.60 Communicative rationality draws on the "**force of better argument**" to produce more democratic citizens, culture, and societies. Subjects are indeed molded through this constituting power, but their transformation is towards freedom and autonomy rather than towards subjugation and normalization. As Jeffrey Alexander points out, **to act according to a norm is not the same as to be normalized**.61 The public sphere norm provides a **structure through which critical reflection** on constraining or dominating social relations and possibilities for freedom **can take place.** As Chambers argues, rational discourse here is about "the endless questioning of codes," the reasoned questioning of normalization.62 This is the very type of questioning critics like Lyotard, Mouffe, and Villa are engaged in despite claiming the normalizing and repressive power of communicative rationality. These critics have yet to explain adequately how they escape this performative contradiction, although they may not be too concerned to escape it.63 The form of power that is to be excluded from discourse in the public sphere is that which limits and disables democratic participation and leads to **communicative inequalities**. Coercion and domination are (ideally) excluded from the public sphere, which includes forms of domination resulting from the maldistribution of material and authoritative resources that lead to **discursive inequalities.** This emphasis on the ideal exclusion of coercion introduces the second point of clari- fication, that the domination free public sphere is an idealization for the purposes of critique. Habermas is more than aware of the fact that, as Nancy Fraser, Mouffe, and Young remind us, coercive forms of power, including those that result from social inequality, can never be completely separated from the public sphere.64 Claims that such power has been removed from any really-existing deliberative arena can only be made by ignoring or hiding the operation of power. However, this does not mean that a reduction in coercion and domination cannot be achieved. Indeed, this is precisely what a democratic politics must do. To aid this project, the public sphere conception sets a critical standard for evaluation of everyday communication. Chambers puts this nicely: **Criticism requires a normative backdrop** against which we criticize. Crit-icizing the ways power and domination play themselves out in discourse presupposes a conception of discourse in which there is no [coercive] power and domination. In other words, to defend the position that there is a mean- ingful difference between talking and fighting, persuasion and coercion, and by extension, reason and power involves beginning with idealizations. That is, it involves drawing a picture of undominated discourse.65 However, this discussion of the idealizing status of the norm does not answer claims that it invokes a transparency theory of knowledge. I would argue that such claims not only fall prey to another performa-tive contradiction – of presupposing that the use of rational discourse can establish the impossibility of rational discourse revealing truth and power – but are also based on a poor reading of Habermas' theory of communicative rationality. This is the third point of clarification. In contrast to the metaphysics of presence, the differentiation of persusion from coercion in the public sphere does not posit a naive theory of the transparency of power, and meaning more generally. The public sphere conception as based upon **communicative rationality does not assume a Cartesian** (autonomous, disembodied, decontextualized) **subject** who can clearly distinguish between persuasion and coercion, good and bad reasons, true and untrue claims, and then wholly re-move themselves and their communications from such influence. For Habermas, subjects are always situated within culture. The public sphere is posited upon **intersubjective rather than subject-centered rationality.** It is through the process of communicative rationality, and not via a Cartesian subject, that manipulation, deception, poor reasoning, and so on, are identified and removed, and by which meanings can be understood and communicated. In other words, it is through rational-critical communication that discourse moves away from coercion or non-public reason towards greater rational communication and a stronger public sphere. The circularity here is not a problem, as it may seem, but is in fact the very essence of democratization: through the practice of democracy, democratic practice is advanced. This democratizing process can be further illustrated in the important and challenging case of social inequalities. Democratic theorists (both deliberative and difference) generally agree that social inequalities al-ways lead to some degree of inequalities in discourse. Thus, the ide-alized public sphere of full discursive inclusion and equality requires that social inequalities be eliminated. Yet how is social inequality to be fully identified, let alone eliminated? The idealization seems wholly in-adequate given contemporary capitalist systems and associated social inequality. **However, it is in the very process of argumentation, even if flawed, that the identification and critique of social inequality, and thus of communicative inequality, is able to develop.** Indeed, public sphere deliberation often comes into existence when and where people become passionate about social injustice and publicly thematize problems of social inequality. Thus the "negative power" of social inequality – as with other forms of coercion – is brought to light and critique by the very discourse it is limiting. This is not to say that subjects are merely effects of discourse, that there are no critical social agents acting in the process. It is not to say that 125 subjects within discourse cannot themselves identify negative forms of power, cannot reflexively monitor their own arguments, cannot rationally criticize other positions, and so on. They can, and in practice do, **despite the instability of meaning.** The point is that this reasoning and understanding is

(provisionally) achieved through the subject's situatedness in discourse rather than via a pre-discursive abstract subject. As Kenneth Baynes argues, it is through discourse that subjects achieve a degree of **reflective distance** (what we could call autonomy) from their situations, "enabling them to revise their conceptions of what is valuable or worthy of pursuit,[and]to **assess various courses of action** with respect to those ends." 66 Democratic discourse generates civic-oriented selves, inter-subjective meanings and understandings, and democratic agreements that can be seen as the basis of public sovereignty. How-ever, the idea of communicatively produced agreements, which in the public sphere are known as public opinions, has also come under ex-tensive criticism in terms of excluding difference, criticism that I want to explore in the next section. The ends of discourse: Public opinion formation **The starting point of discourse is disagreement over problematic validity claims.** However, **a certain amount of agreement, or at least mutual understanding, is presupposed** when interlocutors engage in argumentation. **All communication** presupposes mutual understanding on the linguistic terms used – that interlocutors use the same terms in the same way.67 Furthermore, in undertaking rational-critical discourse, according to Habermas' formal pragmatic reconstruction, interlocutors also **presuppose the same formal conditions of argumentation**. These **shared presuppositions enable** rational-critical discourse to be undertaken. However, as seen above, meaning is never fixed and understanding is always partial. Understanding and agreement on the use of linguistic terms and of what it means to be reasonable, reflexive, sincere, inclusive, non-coercive, etc. takes place within discourse and is an ongoing political process.

AT: Patriarchy R/C

Patriarchy's not the root cause

Bell '6

(Duncan, senior lecturer – Department of Politics and International Studies @ Cambridge University, "Beware of false prophets: biology, human nature and the future of International Relations theory," *International Affairs* 82, 3 p. 493–510)

Writing in *Foreign Aff airs* in 1998, Francis Fukuyama, tireless promulgator of the 'end of history' and now a member of the President's Council on Bioethics, employed EP reasoning to argue for the central role in world politics of 'masculine values', which are 'rooted in biology'. His argument starts with the claim that male and female chimps display asymmetric behaviour, with the males far more prone to violence and domination. 'Female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik.' Moreover, the 'line from chimp to modern man is continuous' and this has signifi cant consequences for international politics.46 He argues that the world can be divided into two spheres, an increasingly peaceful and cooperative 'feminized' zone, centred on the advanced democracies, and the brutal world outside this insulated space, where the stark realities of power politics remain largely masculine. This bifurcation heralds dangers, as 'masculine policies' are essential in dealing with a masculine world: 'In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability.' Fukuyama concludes the essay with the assertion that the form of politics best suited to human nature is—surprise, surprise—free-market capitalist democracy, and that other political forms, especially those promoted by feminists and socialists, do not correspond with our biological inheritance.47 Once again the authority of science is invoked in order to naturalize a particular political objective. This is a pattern that has been repeated across the history of modern biology and remains potent to this day.48 It is worth noting in brief that Fukuyama's argument is badly flawed even in its own terms. As anthropologist R. Brian Ferguson states, Fukuyama's claims about the animal world display 'a breathtaking leap over a mountain of contrary evidence'.49 Furthermore, Joshua Goldstein concludes in **the most detailed analysis of the data on war and gender** that although biological differences do play a **minor role,** focusing so heavily on them is **profoundly misleading.**50 The simplistic claims, crude stereotyping and casual use of evidence that characterize Fukuyama's essay unfortunately recur throughout the growing literature on the biology of international politics.

Relationships are complex and multiple types of feminism disproves their argument

Crenshaw2

(Carrie, PhD, Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from CAD, Scholar)

Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. **Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors** to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that **such arguments** only **exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning** in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that **debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize** the **voices** of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He argued that **causal arguments are desirable** for four reasons. First, causal analysis increases the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding of them. Second, the use of causal reasoning increases rigor of analysis and fairness in the decision-making process. Third, causal arguments promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil. Finally, causal reasoning supplies good reasons for "commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive "claims of immediacy**" (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions

that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions "to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists" (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of "good reasons" to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, "[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(rjesolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both topics, desiring "big impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. **Such arguments** seem to **have two assumptions** in common. First, **there is a single feminism**. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as **a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmatic entity** and feminists as women with identical m otivations, methods, and goals. Second, **these arguments assume that patriarchy is the** single or **root cause of** all forms of **oppression**. Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. **These** reductionist **arguments reflect an** unwillingness to debate about the **complexities of human motivation and explanation**. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists to feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. **Debaters practice the convention of poor causal** reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional. **Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts** in order to conform to audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leads the judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However, **when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students' understanding of causal reasoning. The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating.** For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the **identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression**. The result **is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author,** for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact **Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated**. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). **The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism**. As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status. This position becomes clearer **when we examine** the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate **– patriarchy is the sole cause** of oppression. **Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows the** subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression **like racism and classism to the**

struggle against **sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance**. "Within feminist movement in the West, **this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination**" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, **identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination**, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. **If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality** or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, **then women cooperate in suppressing** and promoting **false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility** for **transforming ourselves and society** (hooks. Talking Back 20). **Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege**. It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional for**m**, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships. **The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices**. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. **Privileging the act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle"** (hooks, Talking Back 14). **Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself**. The content of the speech of feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14). At this point, arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate seem to be overdetermined by the expectation of common practice, the "game" that we play in assuming there is such a thing as a direct and sole causal link to a monolithic impact To play that game, we have gone along with the idea that there is a single feminism and the idea that patriarchal impacts can account for all oppression. In making this critique, I am by no means discounting the importance of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate. In fact, feminists contain the possibility of a transformational politic for two reasons. First, feminist concerns affect each individual intimately. We are most likely to encounter patriarchal domination "in an ongoing way in everyday life. Unlike other forms of domination, sexism directly shapes and determines relations of power in our private lives, in familiar social spaces..." (hooks. Talking Back 21). Second, the methodology of feminism, consciousness-raising, contains within it the possibility of real societal transformation. "[E]ducation for critical consciousness can be extended to include politicization of the self that focuses on creating understanding the ways sex, race, and class together determine our individual lot and our collective experience" (hooks, Talking Back 24). Observing the incongruity between advocacy of single-cause relationships and feminism does not discount the importance of feminists to individual or societal consciousness raising.

Perm

Their advocacy is not exclusive with the 1AC. The judge can endorse the affirmative and the negative's methods of resistance to oppression as two separate, worthwhile methods.

Kathleen **Higgins**, University of Texas-Austin, Philosophy Professor, Winter 20**13**, Post-Truth Pluralism: The Unlikely Political Wisdom of Friedrich Nietzche, Kindle

Progressives are right that we live increasingly in a post-truth era, but rather than rejecting it and pining nostalgically for a return to a more truthful time, we should learn to better navigate it. Where the New York Times and Walter Cronkite were once viewed as arbiters of public truths, today the Times competes with the Wall Street Journal, and CBS News with FOX News and MSNBC, in describing reality. The Internet multiplies the perspectives and truths available for public consumption. The diversity of viewpoints opened up by new media is not going away and is likely to intensify. This diversity of interpretations of reality is part of a longstanding trend. Democracy and modernization have brought a proliferation of worldviews and declining authority of traditional institutions to meanings. Citizens have more freedom to create new interpretations of facts. This proliferation of viewpoints makes the challenge of democratically addressing contemporary problems more complex. One consequence of all this is that our problems become more wicked and more subject to conflicting meanings and agendas. We can't agree on the nature of problems or their solutions because of **fundamentally unbridgeable values and worldviews**. In attempting to reduce political disagreement to black and white categories of fact and fiction, progressives themselves uniquely ill-equipped to address our current difficulties, or to advance liberal values in the culture. A new progressive politics should have a different understanding of the truth than the one suggested by the critics of conservative dishonesty. We should understand that human beings make meaning and apprehend truth from radically different standpoints and worldviews, and that our great wealth and freedom will likely lead to more, not fewer, disagreements about the world. Nietzsche was no democrat, but the pluralism he offers can be encouragement to today's political class, as well as the rest of us, to become more self-aware of, and honest about, how our standpoint, values, and power affect our determinations of what is true and what is false. In the post-truth era, **we should be able to articulate not one but many different perspectives.** Progressives seeking to govern and change society cannot be free of bias, interests, and passions, but they should strive to be aware of them so that they can adopt different eyes to see the world from the standpoint of their fiercest opponents. **Taking multiple perspectives into account** might alert us to more sites of possible intervention and prime us for **creative formulations** of **alternative possibilities for concerted responses** to our problems. Our era, in short, need not be an obstacle to taking common action. We might see today's divided expert class and fractions public not as temporary problems to be solved by more reason, science, and truth, but rather as permanent features of our developed democracy. We might even see this proliferation of belief systems and worldviews as an opportunity for human development. **We can agree to disagree and still engage in pragmatic action** in the World.

AT: Gender Monolithic

While gender has a large impact – it isn't monolithic, nor unified

Hooper 1

(Charlotte, University of Bristol research associate in politics, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics pp 45-46.)

Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan (1993), in their discussion of gendered dichotomies, appear to drop Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse as an explanation for gendered dichotomies in favor of a more straightforward- ly political account.14Gendered dichotomies, rather than uniformly con- structing gendered social relations through universal psychoanalytic mecha- nisms, are seen more ambiguously, as playing a dual role. Where gendered dichotomies are used as an organizing principle of social life (such as in the gendered division of labor) they help to construct gender differences and in- equalities and thus are constitutive of social reality, but in positing a grid of polar opposites, they also serve to obscure more complex relationships, commonalties, overlaps, and intermediate positions (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 24–25). Elaborating on this view, it can be argued that gendered dichotomies are in part ideological tools that mystify, masking more complex social realities and reinforcing stereotypes. On one level, they do help to produce real gen- der differences and inequalities, when they are used as organizing principles that have practical effects commensurate with the extent that they become embedded in institutional practices, and through these, human bodies. They constitute one dimension in the triangular nexus out of which gender identities and the gender order are produced. But at the same time, institutional practices are not always completely or unambiguously informed by such dichotomies, which may then **operate to obscure more complex relationships**. It is a mistake to see the language of gendered dichotomies as a unified and totalizing discourse that dictates every aspect of social practice to the extent that we are coherently produced as subjects in its dualistic image. As well as the disruptions and discontinuities engendered by the intersections and interjections of other discourses (race, class, sexuality, and so on) **there is always room for evasion, reversal, resistance, and dissonance** between rhetoric, practice, and embodiment, as well as reproduction of the symbolic order, as identities are negotiated in relation to all three dimensions, in a variety of **complex and changing circumstances**. On the other hand, the symbolic gender order does inform practice, and our subjectivities are produced in relation to it, so to dismiss it as performing only an ideological or propagandistic role is also too simplistic.

State/Reform Good

Legal/State Key

Abdication of legal reformism makes concrete challenges to material barriers to feminism impossible

Crawford 7

(1-1-2007 Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure Bridget J. Crawford Pace University School of Law, bcrawford@law.pace.edu)

CONCLUSION In spite of third-wave feminism's appeal, at this point in its development, third-wave feminism lacks an **overall theoretical view** of how the law functions Third-wave feminism is largely a **reactive critique** that fails to advance its own **positivistic view** of how certain **goals should be accomplished**. Third-wave feminists respond to incomplete and distorted images of second-wave feminism. Their indictment of second-wave feminism has led to a significant tension between older and younger feminists. Gloria Steinem, for one, has said that when reading third-wave feminist writings, she feels "like a sitting dog being told to sit."384 Women on the younger cusp of second-wave feminism, who demographically are not part of the third wave, report that they feel adrift between the competing "waves."385 And even some younger women, perhaps articulating the most decidedly third-wave stance of all, state that they do not want selfidentity as part of a "third-wave" of feminism, because that identification implies a group affiliation or branding that should be rejected in favor of a third-wave embrace of individualism. So one is left with the sense that third-wave feminism is a **helpful** elaboration of some of the issues first raised by earlier feminists, but that it is not so decidedly different from what has come before. Third-wave feminism's emphasis on personal pleasure, the fluidity of gender roles, the internet and coalition-building contribute to the feminist conversation, but third-wave feminists have not yet **altered the terms** and conditions **of that conversation.** It remains for lawyers and legal theorists **to take up the challenge** from this generation of young women to **develop laws that enhance women's** autonomy and **well-being.**

Feminist critiques of the state get coopted to justify neoliberal deregulation--- engagement is key

Gupta 12

(Rahila, freelance journalist and writer, Has neoliberalism knocked feminism sideways?, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rahila-gupta/has-neoliberalism-knocked-feminism-sideways)

Feminism needs to recapture the state from the neoliberal project to which it is in hock in order to make it deliver for women. It must guard against atomisation and recover its transformative aspirations to shape the new social order that is hovering on the horizon, says Rahila Gupta¶ How should feminists read our current times? A major economic crisis rocks the developed world. While austerity measures don't appear to be working across Europe, the mildly Keynesian efforts of Obama to kick-start the US economy have had only a marginal effect. The Occupy movement has gone global and the public disorder in the summer, with more disorder being predicted by the police, are an indication of deep discontent with the system. Yet we have seen an enthusiastic and vibrant third wave of youthful feminism emerge in the past decade. At the rate at which these waves arise, it will be some time before the rock of patriarchy will be worn smooth.¶ The current phase of capitalism – neo-liberalism – which began with Thatcher and Reagan in the 1970s, promotes privatisation and deregulation in order to safeguard the freedom of the individual to compete and consume without interference from a bloated state. According to David Harvey, a Marxist academic, the world stumbled towards neo-liberalism in response to the last major recession in the 70s when 'the uneasy compact between capital and labour brokered by an interventionist state' broke down. The UK government, for example, was obliged by the International Monetary Fund to cut expenditure on the welfare state in order to balance the books. The post-war settlement had given labour more than its due, and it was time for the upper classes to claw these gains back. ¶

The fact that second wave feminism and neoliberalism flourished from the 1970s onwards has led some to argue, notably Nancy Fraser, that feminism 'served to legitimate a structural transformation of capitalist society'. I am with Nancy Fraser in so far as she says that there is a convergence, a coinciding of second wave feminism and neo-liberalism, even that feminism thrived in these conditions. It is well known that in an attempt to renew and survive, capitalism co-opts the opposition to its own ends. If part of the project of neoliberalism is to shrink the size of the state, it serves its purpose to co-opt the feminist critique that the state is both paternalistic and patriarchal. Critiques of the nanny state from the right may chime with feminist concerns. However, the right has little to say about patriarchy. What is left out of the co-option process is equally significant. The critique of the state mounted by feminists such as Elizabeth Wilson when state capitalism was at the height of its powers suited neoliberal capitalists seeking deregulation and a reduced role for the state. ¶ Fraser's analysis does not explain the current resurgence of feminism at a time when the shine of neoliberalism has faded. It is not so much that feminism legitimised

neoliberalism, but that neoliberal values created a space for a bright, brassy and ultimately fake feminism - the 'I really, really want' girl-power ushered in by the Spice Girls. This transitional period between second wave and the current wave of feminism (which some commentators characterised as post-feminist) represented the archetypal appropriation of the feminist agenda, shorn of its political context, by neoliberalism. Incidentally, many of us rejected the label post-feminist because it felt like an attempt to chuck feminism into the dustbin of history and to deny the continuing need for it. In hindsight, there was something different going on in that lull between the two waves in the 70s and 80s and today; the voice of feminism was being drowned out by its loud, brassy sisters.¶ If the culture of neoliberalism had something to offer women, it was the idea of agency, of choice freely exercised, free even of patriarchal restraints. It emphasised self-sufficiency of the individual while at the same time undermining those collective struggles or institutions which make self-sufficiency possible. The world was your oyster – all you needed to do was compete successfully in the marketplace. The flexible worker, in order to make herself acceptable to the world of work, may even go so far as to remodel herself through cosmetic surgery, all the while under the illusion that she was in control of her life. In her essay on 'Feminism' in a forthcoming book, Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Clare Chambers argues that liberal capitalism is committed to what she calls the 'fetishism of choice'. If women choose things that disadvantage them and entrench differences, it legitimates inequality because the inequality arises from the choices they make. The few women who do well out of the sex industry do not believe that their work entrenches inequality because it is freely chosen, because prostitution is seen as a liberation from the drudgery of cleaning jobs. Choice is their weapon against feminist objections. In their so-called free expression of their sexuality, they are challenging nothing in the neoliberal schema because the work reduces women to the status of meat and commodity.

State Inevitable

State influence inevitable---only mobilizing focus on reforms can effectively challenge patriarchy

Connell 90

Because of its power to regulate and its power to create, the state is a major stake in gender politics; and the exercise of that power is a con- stant incitement to **claim the stake**. Thus the state becomes the **focus** of interest-group formation and mobilization in sexual politics. It is worth recalling just how wide the liberal state's activity in relation to gender is. This activity includes family policy, population policy, labor force and labor market management, housing policy, regulation of sexual behavior and expression, provision of child care, mass educa- tion, taxation and income redistribution, the creation and use of mili- tary forces - and that is not the whole of it. This is not a sideline; it is a major realm of state policy. Control of the machinery that conducts these activities is a **massive asset in gender politics**. In **many situations** it will be **tactically decisive**. The state is therefore a focus for the mobilization of interests that is **central to gender politics on the large scale**. Feminism's historical con- cern with the state, and attempts to capture a share of state power, appear in this light as a **necessary response to a historical reality** They are **not an error brought on by an overdose of liberalism or a capitula- tion to patriarchy**. As Franzway puts it, the state is **unavoidable** for feminism. The question is not whether feminism will deal with the state, but how: on what terms, with what tactics, toward what goals.[5] The same is true of the politics of homosexuality among men. The ear- liest attempts to agitate for toleration produced a half-illegal, half-aca- demic mode of organizing that reached its peak in Weimar Germany, and was smashed by the Nazis. (The Institute of Sexual Science was vandalized and its library burnt in 1933; later, gay men were sent to concentration camps or shot.) A long period of lobbying for legal reform followed, punctuated by bouts of state repression. (Homosexual men were, for instance, targeted in the McCarthyite period in the United States.) The gay liberation movement changed the methods and expanded the goals to include social revolution, but still dealt with the state over policing, de-criminalization, and anti-discrimination. Since the early 1970s gay politics has evolved a complex mixture of confron- tation, cooperation, and representation. In some cities, including San Francisco and Sydney, gay men as such have successfully run for public office. Around the AIDS crisis of the 1980s, in countries such as the United States and Australia, gay community based organizations and state health services have entered a close - if often tense - long-term relationship.' In a longer historical perspective, all these forms of politics are fairly new. Fantasies like Aristophanes's Lysistrata aside, the open mobiliza- tion of groups around demands or programs in sexual politics dates only from the mid-nineteenth century. The politics that characterized other patriarchal gender orders in history were constructed along other lines, for instance as a politics of kinship, or faction formation in agri- cultural villages. It can plausibly be argued that modern patterns re- sulted from a reconfiguration of gender politics around the growth of the liberal state. In particular its structure of legitimation through plebiscite or electoral democracy invited the response of popular mobilization

State influence is inevitable but depth of oppression matters---reform is effective and only way to solve---they exaggerate state's internal coherence

Connell 90

Appraisals Is the state patriarchal? Yes, beyond any argument, on the evidence dis- cussed above. It is **not "essentially patriarchal"** or "male"; even if one could speak of the "essence" of a social institution, this would **exaggerate the internal coherence of the state**. Rather the state is historically patriarchal, patriarchal as a matter of **concrete social practices**. State structures in recent history institutionalize the European equation be- tween authority and a dominating masculinity; they are effectively con- trolled by men; and they operate with a massive bias towards hetero- sexual men's interests. At the same time the pattern of state patriarchy changes. In terms of the depth of oppression and the historical possibilities of resistance and transformation, a fascist regime is **crucially different** from a liberal one, and a liberal one from a revolutionary one. The most favorable histori- cal circumstance for progressive sexual politics seems to be the early days of social-revolutionary regimes; but the later bureaucratization of these regimes is devastating. **Next best is a liberal state with a reformist government;** though reforms introduced under its aegis are vulnerable in periods of reaction. Though the state is patriarchal, progressive gender politics **cannot avoid it** The character of the state as the **central institutionalization of power**, and its historical trajectory in the regulation and constitution of gender relations, make it **unavoidably a major arena for challenges to patriarchy**. Here liberal feminism is on **strong ground** Becoming engaged in practical struggles for a share of state power requires tactical judgments about what developments within the state provide opportunities. In the 1980s certain **strategies of reform have had a higher relative pay- off** than they did before. In Australia, for instance, the creation of a network of "women's services" was a feature of the 1970s, and the momentum of this kind of action has died away. Reforms that have few budgetary implications but fit in with other state strategies, such as modernizing the bureaucracy, become more promi- nent. Equal employment opportunity and anti- discrimination legisla- tion have been highlighted; decriminalizing homosexuality is consistent with this.

Reform Better

State influence is inevitable but depth of oppression matters---reform is effective and only way to solve---they exaggerate state's internal coherence

Connell 90

(R. W. Connell 90, "The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal", Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544, http://www.jstor.org/stable/657562)

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Our Strat Best

That's the best starting point – struggles for political power in the name of narrow goals <u>sanitizes the desire for dominance</u> and <u>arrest</u> radical potential. The thought experiment of recognizing the <u>interconnectedness</u> of political violence is key

Wang 14

(Hongyu, Ph.d., Professor, STCL - Curriculum Studies, 20, "A Nonviolent Perspective on Internationalizing Curriculum Studies," International Handbook of Curriculum Research, Ch. 5 Routledge)

In the first edition of this Handbook. William K Pinar (2003) discusses the importance of focusing on education and curriculum, rather than international political tensions, for the internationalization of curriculum studies. If we have scholars acting as if diplomatic representatives of their own countries, the intellectual and educational possibility will be lost in power struggles. Actually, <u>in political and social movements, the **egocentric pursuit of political authority** and control, either for an **individual or for a group,** can **hardly lead to any success**</u>, (Ihandi (1942/2007) specifically <u>points out that</u> the <u>nonviolence</u> movement <u>is "**not a program of seizure of power**" but "a program of **transformation of relationships**</u>" (p. 40). In the Liberian women's peace movement in 2003, they adopted the strategy of not criticizing the political policies of the dictatorship—even though there were more than plenty to criticize—but demanding of peace unyieldingly and wholeheartedly (Disney & Ritickcr, 2(108; Cibowce, 2011). <u>Paradoxically, the **key to winning social and political victories**</u> in nonviolence movements is to **abandon the politics of power struggle** and **instead to mobilize every participant in the powerful process of transforming the nature of relationships from dominating/being dominated to organic interconnectedness.** <u>If we cannot go beyond the confinement of national, group, or individual self-interest, there is **no possibility of achieving**</u> "heart <u>unity" with others who arc distant or/and different from us.</u> Here it is essential not only to dwell in international space, but also to move towards transnational space. <u>The inter-space and trans-space are both important</u> for creating nonviolent dynamics of the local, the national. and the global through transforming relationships<u>. The term "international" acknowledges the "in between" fluid spaces where multiplicity and differences are neither excluded nor self-contained</u>. Moreover, <u>internationalization</u> as a concept <u>supports the **decentering of both the national and the global**</u> through a <u>focus on interaction and relationship that lead to the **transformation of both locality and globalness**</u>. To borrow the language of chaos and complexity theory (Doll. 20121, the newness of the global comes from a dynamic interaction of local parts. Also as Peter Hershock (2009) argues, it is a fallacy lo assume that "whatever is good for each and every one of us (individually) will be good for all of us (communally or ecologically)" (p. 156) since what is good for the local may become detrimental to the ecological or the global. Therefore, the global us the whole is more than the addition of (he national or the local, but emerges from interactive dynamics and is marked by organic relationality. Noel Gough (2003) suggests that "<u>internationalizing</u> curriculum <u>inquiry might best be understood as a process of creating</u> transnational spaces <u>in which scholars from different localities collaborate in **reframing**</u> and decentering <u>their own knowledge traditions and negotiate trust in each other's contributions to their collective work"</u> (p. 6S). The very usage of "trans-"' indicates both an intense experiencing of (the boundary and an effort to go beyond that boundary. <u>Such transnational spaces</u> not only <u>sustain hybrid movements but **also support embodied work** to negotiate collaborative trust</u>. Nonviolence education must be an embodied process. Sherry B. Shapiro (2002) asserts that it is the joy and suffering of the human body that extends "beyond the boundaries of nationality, rice, ethnicity, gender, social class, or sexual or religious preference—all the ways of marking ourselves off from others" (p. I4U). <u>Peace and nonviolence education need to **sensitize us to the collective body**, and pedagogically we need to begin with the body as the connector between the public and the private, and between social identity and a wider shared experience</u>. <u>In such dynamics of international</u> and transnational <u>movements, identity is destabilized</u>, power <u>struggles are displaced into fluid modes of relationships,</u> <u>and nonviolent relationality across differences become multidimensional</u>— both horizontal (among the local) and vertical (between the local and the global l. and both top-down (from the global to the individual body) and bottom-up (from the local to the international)—to form a network of nonviolence. <u>Instead of **intensifying the fragmentation**</u> (due to dualism) that marks the fragility of the modern life we share, <u>the nonviolent modes of relationalily we choose to establish can contribute to the **integrative potential of the network**</u>. For the dynamics of intergroup relationships within the national, I reference the American field of curriculum studies as an example due to my familiarity with it. Pinar (2013) identifies "power, identity, and discourse" as the key concepts of the reconceptualized curriculum field in the United States, hut he suggests that these concepts

have become assumptions—due to their success—and that these newly taken-for-granted concepts have tendencies toward totalization and reductionism. Now the assumption that "power predominates, that identity is central, and that discourse is determinative (e.g. our research provides only narratives, never truth)—are widely shared" (p. 8). Accepted as given, they have become "abstractions split off from the concrete complexity of the historical moment" <p. S) and exhausted in self-referentiality. Ironically, the central emphasis of identity leads to the casually of individual agency and subjective specificity. As both an observer and participant of the American field of curriculum studies who came from China in 1996, I also would like to add another causality: organic relationality. The complexity and richness in the singularity of each individual or group coexists with the complicated and organic relationality of humanity and life, and when one side of the coin is undermined, ihe other side deteriorates as well. While Pinar (2013) discusses the proliferation of "uncertainty" and "dispersion" in post •structural dis-courses and their elicits. I also think ihe distance between self and other stretched by the post-structural discourses of otherness and the unknown Other may lead to the difficulty of nm being able to bring self and other back into the fabric of relationality (Wang, in press). In addressing "difference-centered politics of recognition and respect." drawing upon the Buddhist philosophy. Peter Hershock I20O9) argues for "a concerted shift from considerations of how much we are the same or different from each |sic | another to how we might best differ for one another" (p. 1611: emphasis in original). In a nondualistic. nonviolent view, subject and object, body and mind, and self and other exist interdependent!). Hershock's perception of differences as essential for mutual contribution and shared welfare, as something positive that should not be erased or elevated, but as a part of a relationship network, is a challenge not only to the liberal notion of the individual as autonomous, but also to the identity politics of static diversity or the postmodern radicalization of singularity. The nonviolent relational dynamics of "differing for" rather than "differing from" are particularly imperative under the context of a profoundly shared sense of crisis in American public education. While particular differences such as racial or gendered differences must he discussed, the discussions need to orient towards changing our ways of relating to others and addressing the root course of social violence, rather than fixing on any particular social identity. Nonviolence cannot exist without social justice, but social justice for one group at the expense of the welfare of others docs not do justice to the shared human struggle for the common good of all. Confronting the crisis in American public education, I suggest that challenging the violence of the conservative forces and working through the depressive position of educators in relation to the external attack from non-education sectors, we are called to form nonviolent relationships among different social groups and their affiliated scholarly camps. Identity-based struggles, when contextualized in the interconnected web of life, have played a progressive role in the field. However, without contextualizing and complicating one's own investment in a broader project of education for all, without taking a step back from one's own particular subjective positioning to see a bigger picture, any fixation upon one group's struggle—along or within the lines of cither nice, gender, class, sexuality, nation, or other social factors—at the expense of the collective good arrests democracy as an unfulfilled dream, If we can initiate and participate in nonviolent dynamics of "differing for" an educationally informed, compassion-ale community across local and national borders, we are also challenging the international domination of American politics, along with its domestically repressive educational "reform" demand for raising test scores and maintaining global control. This suggestion is certainly not about subsuming diversity into uniformity, as any network has room for breaks and fragmentations. The organic relationalty of nonviolence welcomes differences and does not avoid conflicts because it has the ability to stretch, transform, and rebuild. Moving from the national to the international level, the dualism of "us" versus "them" has played a violent role in global relationships, and the possibility of moving beyond such a fixed boundary depends upon our capacity for refusing to dehumanize the other, both the friendly other and the hostile other. Through the psychoanalytic notion of "the stranger to ourselves." Julia Kristeva (1993) invites us "to recognize ourselves as strange in order better to appreciate the foreigners outside us instead of striving to bend them to the norms of our own repression" (p. 29). If we are aware of our subconscious rather than repressing it. aliens are no longer a threat to us. Kristeva believes that a transnational or international position is situated at the crossing of boundaries, which simultaneously affirms and transcends national borders. The idea of nation "at the same time affirmed as a space of freedom and dissolved in its own identity" (p. 32) affirms both the protective function of identification and the necessity of border-crossing. Situated at the fluid border, "nations without nationalism" support nonviolent relationality.

AT Specific Strategies

Alt no solve

The alternative can't solve access but a focus on legalism does

Schwartz9

(Joseph, Poli Sci Prof @ Temple, "The Future of Democratic Equality," Routledge, pg 64-5)

'Discursive' performance is not the sole manner by which individuals deal with (and express) the material and cultural structural realities that both empower and constrain individuals. For example. **individuals cannot readily "discursively perform" themselves out of their socio-economic or class position.** There is a certain materiality to poverty or to being "bossed" that can't simply be "ironically" and "performatively" transformed. Class relations are structural, as well as discursive. The greater difficulty in forming unions in the United States- as compared to other advanced industrial democracies- has much to do with American legal, ideological, and political constraints and not simply with the rel- ative inefficacy of the "performative," "counter-hegemonic" behavior of (frag- mented) individuals. Even the "parodic" possibilities of "gender" reversal are constrained by the communities in which one resides. **Is the "reversal" of "drag" a viable public possibility in a violently homophobic community?** Were not the "performative" options of a Matthew Sheperd (extremely) more limited than those of a gay or lesbian student at a "progressive" residential liberal arts college (and unsafe-and even degrading and violent-social spaces confront gay and lesbian people and women and students of color in the most allegedly "cosmopolitan" of social spaces). Simply put, **distinct "social spaces" set differ- ential constraints on "performative" choices.** Of course, how individuals express class, race, gender, and sexuality does, in part, involve how we "perform" (or "racist") cultural and discursive "norms." Hence, the inevitable controversies over "authenticity" within racial, sexual, and ethnic communities, as well as criticism of people taking on the mores of a class different from those who share their "place" in the labor process, neighborhood, or income strata. But there are material constraints to **performative "choice": one can't "perform" one's way out of an under-funded inner city school** or out of being a **laid-off auto worker with dim prospects of finding a new job with comparable wages and benefits.** Traditional sociological theories of **"structuration"** provide **greater insight into how these individuals would deal with these social dilemmas** than do **micro-level theories of the discursive construction of subjectivity.** To her credit, Wendy Brown is more concerned with issues of class and political economy than are many post-structuralist political theorists. She expressly claims to bring class back into her political analysis and condemns identity poli- tics as a "phantasmagorical reflection of the 'middle-class' American dream." But there is little attention in her work to developing a political strategy that could promise a structural and material redistribution of power, rather than an alter- ation of how we think of epistemology, discourse, and politics." While ideology and culture play a relatively autonomous role in constituting subjectivity, both have a material structure that must be altered if society is to be democratized. Brown implies that radical social change does not as much involve democratiz- ing social structural relations as it does popularizing a radical epistemological approach to discourse. Brown argues that if we will ourselves to "surrender epis- temological foundations" and give up "specifically moral claims" we will all be able to engage in "the sheerly political: 'wars of position' and amoral contests about the just and good in which truth is always grasped as coterminous with power, as always already power, as the voice of power."""' Even if one resists asking whether democracy can rest on "amoral" principles, one can still ask whether Brown's Foucauldian assertation that power and truth are co-terminous can distinguish between more or less democratic forms of power? The post-structuralist hyper- emphasis on "discourse" and the agonal construction of the self also **overly devalues the state as an arena for political reform.** Brown's work makes a positive political contribution by warning social movements about fetishizing the struggle for group rights within the law as potential minefields of "reversed" power/knowledge formations. State regulation and technocratic control which claim to defend the interests of newly, legally- recognized identities may yield the perverse consequence of "domesticating" the identity of the insurgent social group (e.g. state micro-management of the work place in "comparable worth legislation," or enforcement of patriarchal values in regard to punitive workfare or "child support" regulation)?" Sometimes, as Brown contends, new-found rights may enhance separation and alienation between and within individuals and groups, as well as constitute new forms of state regulation in the name of the impersonal subject. But Brown rejects the possibility (and historical reality) that new "rights" can, in other contexts, con- tribute to human emancipation by enhancing individual choice and freedom. To deny this is to ignore the elective affinity between the struggle for "rights" and struggles to achieve political equality for formerly subordinate peoples. Not all new-found rights are "co-optative" and a "reinscribing of domination.""7 Nor will the conflict within the American polity over how we should interpret and defend

"rights" ever cease. One only has to witness contemporary political con- conflict over "abortion rights," "voting rights," "gun rights," etc. Rights are both politically contested and protective of certain forms of human choice and agency. Rights do not "fix" identities as intransigently as Brown and other post-structuralists claim. Do rights only serve, as Brown contends, to promote "the discursive denial of historically layered and institutionally secured bounds, by denying with words the effects of relatively wordless, politically invisible, yet material constraints"?"" Patri- cia Williams and other critical race theorists have argued that being included under the state's equal protection law helped limit violence against people of color." Despite legitimate fears about excessive state regulation of sexuality, would Brown reject the use of state force to limit domestic violence? How does her philosophical fear of the bureaucratic-regulatory powers of the state speak to the experience of hundreds of thousands of women who have been spared the "privatization" of domestic violence by the extension of the rights of state author- ity (e.g. the police) to act against violence within the household? Are such prac- tices solely evidence of the "reconstruction of domination by the regulation of the technocratic-bureaucratic state"? Of course, state regulation of domestic violence may, in Brown's language, produce a female subject "dependent upon the pater- nal state" for protection. But is this not preferable to the prior form of paternal state that let a man be the violent definer of "rights" in his home?

Alt Fails – Strategy Key

Alternative alone <u>can't solve</u> – focus on tactics and strategy key

Saloom 6

(Rachel, JD Univ of Georgia School of Law and M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from U of Chicago, Fall 2006, A Feminist Inquiry into International Law and International Relations, 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 159, Lexis)

Because patriarchy is embedded within society, it is no surprise that the theory and practice of both international law and international relations is also patriarchal. 98 <mark>Total critique</mark>, however, <mark>presents no method by which to challenge current hegemonic practices. Feminist scholars have yet to provide a coherent way in which total critique can be applied to change the nature of international law and international relations.</mark> Some [*178] feminist scholars are optimistic for the possibility of changing the way the current system is structured. For example, Whitworth believes that "sites of resistance are always available to those who oppose the status quo." 99 Enloe suggests that since the world of international politics has been made it can also be remade. 100 She posits that every time a woman speaks out about how the government controls her, new theories are being made. 101 <mark>All of these theorists highlight the manner in which gender criticisms can destabilize traditional theories. They provide **no mechanism**</mark>, however, <mark>for the actual implementation of their theories into practice.</mark> While in the abstract, resistance to hegemonic paradigms seems like a promising concept, gender theorists have made no attempt to make their resistance culminate in meaningful change. <mark>The notion of rethinking traditional approaches to</mark> international law and <mark>international relations does not go far enough in prescribing an alternative theoretical basis for understanding the international arena. Enloe's plea for women to speak out about international politics does not go nearly far enough in explaining how those acts could have the potential to **actually change the practice** of international relations. Either women are already speaking out now, and their voices alone are not an effective mechanism to challenge the system</mark>, or women are not even speaking out about world politics currently. Obviously it is absurd to assume that women remain silent about world politics. If that is the case, then one must question women's ability to speak up, challenge, and change the system.

AT: Negativity Alt

Optimism and solidarity are our only hope---their pessimism accepts the foundational premises of patriarchy/racism as its starting point for politics

Hooks 96

(bell hooks 96, Killing Rage: Ending Racism, Google Books, 269-272)

269More than ever before in our history, black Americans are succumbing to and internalizing the racist assumption that there can be no meaningful bonds of intimacy between blacks and whites. It is fascinating to explore why it is that black people trapped in the worst situation of racial oppres sion—enslavement—had the foresight to see that it would be disempowering for them to lose sight of the capacity of white people to transform themselves and divest of white supremacy, even as many black folks today who in no way suffer such extreme racist oppression and exploitation are convinced that white people will not repudiate racism. Con temporary black folks, like their white counterparts, have passively accepted the internalization of white supremacist assumptions. Organized white supremacists have always taught that there can never be trust and intimacy between the superior white race and the inferior black race. **When black people internalize these sentiments, no resistance to white supremacy is taking place; rather we become complicit in spreading racist notions.** It does not matter that so many black people feel white people will never repudiate racism because of being daily assaulted by white denial and refusal of accountability. We must not allow the actions of white folks who blindly endorse racism to determine the direction of our resistance. Like our white allies in struggle we must consistently keep the faith, by always sharing the truth that 270white people can be anti-racist, that racism is not some immutable character flaw. **Of course** many white people are comfortable with a rhetoric of race that suggests racism cannot be changed, that all white people are "inherently racist" simply because they are born and raised in this society. Such misguided thinking socializes white people both to remain ignorant of the way in which white supremacist attitudes are learned and to assume a posture of learned helplessness as though they have no agency—no capacity to resist this thinking. Luckily we have many autobiographies by white folks committed to anti-racist struggle that provide documentary testimony that many of these individuals repudiated racism when they were children. Far from passively accepting It as inherent, they instinctively felt it was wrong. Many of them witnessed bizarre acts of white racist aggression towards black folks in everyday life and responded to the injustice of the situation. Sadly, in our times so many white folks are easily convinced by racist whites and bLack folks who have internalized racism that they can never be really free of racism. These feelings aíso then obsc]re the reality of white privi lege. As long as white folks are taught to accept racism as 'natura]" then they do not have to see themselves as con sciously creating a racist society by their actions, by their political choices. This means as well that they do not have to face the way in which acting in a racist manner ensures the maintenance of white privilege. Indeed, denying their agency allows them to believe white privilege does not exist even as they daily exercise it. If the young white woman who had been raped had chosen to hold all black males account able for what happened, she would have been exercising white privilege and reinforcing the structure of racist thought which teaches that all black people are alike. Unfortunately, 271so many white people are eager to believe racism cannot be changed because internalizing that assumption downplays the issue of accountability. No responsibility need be taken for not changing something ¡fit is perceived as immutable. To accept racism as a system of domination that can be changed would demand that everyone who sees him- or herself as embracing a vision of radai social equality would be required to assert anti-racist habits of being. We know from histories both present and past that white people (and everyone else) who commit themselves to living in anti-racist ways need to make sacrifices, to courageously endure the uncomfortable to challenge and change. Whites, people of color, and black folks are reluctant to commit themselves fully and deeply to an anti-racist struggle that is ongoing because there is such a **pervasive feeling of hopelessness—a conviction that nothing will ever change.** How any of us can continue to hold those feelings when we study the history of racism in this society and see how much has changed makes no logical sense. Clearly we have not gone far enough. In the late sixties, Martin Luther King posed the question "Where do we go from here." To live in anti-racist society we must **collectively** renew our commitment to a democratic vision of racial justice and equality. Pursuing that vision we create a culture where beloved community flourishes and is sustained. Those of us who know the joy of being with folks from all walks of life, all races, who are fundamentalls' anti-racist in their habits of being. need to give public testimony. Ve need to share not only what we have experienced but the conditions of change that make such an experience possible. The interracial circle of love that I know can happen because each individual present in it has made his or her own commitment to living an anti- racist life and to furthering the struggle to end white supremacy 272 will become a reality for everyone only if those of us who have created these communities share how they emerge in our lives and the strategies we use to sustain them. Our devout commitment to building diverse communities is cen tral. These commitments to anti-racist living are just one expression of who we are and what we share with one an other but they form the foundation of that sharing. Like all beloved communities we affirm our differences. It is this generous spirit of affirmation that gives us the courage to challenge one another, to work through misunderstandings, especially those that have to do with race and racism. In a beloved community solidarity and trust are grounded in profound

==commitment to a shared vision==. Those of us who are always anti-racist long for a world in which evezyone can form a beloved community where borders can be crossed and cultural hybridity celebrated. Anyone can begin to make such a community by truly seeking to live in an anti-racist world. <u>If that longing guides our vision and our actions, the new culture will be born and anti-racist communities of resis tance will emerge everywhere. That is where we must go from here.</u>

AT: Individual Experience Method

They presume the purity of their experience in place of facts---we must examine multiple perspectives

Conway 97

(philosophy, Penn State, Daniel, *Nietzsche and the political*, 135-6)

This preference is clearly political in nature, and Haraway makes no pretense of aspiring to epistemic purity or foundational innocence. For Haraway, **any epistemic privilege** necessarily **implies a political (i.e., situated) preference** Her postmodern orientation elides the boundaries traditionally drawn between politics and epistemology, and thus renders otiose the ideal of epistemic purity. All perspectives are partial, all standpoints situated— including those of feminist theorists. It is absolutely crucial to Haraway's postmodern feminist project that we acknowledge her claims about situated knowledge as themselves situated within the political agenda she sets for postmodern feminism; feminist theorists must therefore accept and accommodate the self-referential implications of their own epistemic claims. ¶ The political agenda of postmodern feminism thus assigns to (some) subjugated standpoints a political preference or priority. Haraway, for example, believes that some subjugated standpoints may be more immediately revealing, especially since they have been discounted and excluded for so long. They may prove especially useful in coming to understand the political and psychological mechanisms whereby the patriarchy discounts the radically situated knowledges of others while claiming for its own (situated) knowledge an illicit epistemic privilege: ¶ The standpoints of the subjugated … are savvy to modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and disappearing acts— ways of being nowhere while claiming to sec comprehensively. The subjugated have a decent chance to be on to the god-trick and all its dazzling—and, therefore, blinding—illuminations.34 ¶ **But these subjugated standpoints do not afford** feminist theorists **an epistemically privileged view of the world,** independent of the political agendas they have established. Reprising elements of Nietzsche's psychological profile of the "slave" type, Haraway warns against the ¶ serious danger of romanticizing and/or **appropriating the vision of the less powerful** while claiming to see from their positions. To see from below is **neither easily learned nor unproblematic,** even if "we" "naturally" inhabit the great underground terrain of subjugated knowledges **The positionings of the subjugated are not exempt from critical re-examination**, decoding, deconstruction, and interpretation; that is, from both semiological and hermeneutic modes of critical enquiry. The standpoints of the subjugated are not "innocent" positions.35 ¶ A subjugated standpoint may shed new light on the ways of an oppressor, but it in no way renders superfluous or redundant the standpoint of the oppressor. Because **neither** standpoint fully **comprises the other** the **aggregation** of the two would move both **parties** (or a third party) **closer to a more objective understanding of the world** If some feminists have political reasons for disavowing this project of aggregation, or for adopting it selectively, **then they must pursue their** political **agenda at the expense of** the greater **objectivity that they might otherwise have gained**

Micro focus fails

Cuomo '11

(Chris Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and an affiliate faculty member of the Environmental Ethics Certificate Program and the Institute for African-American Studies. The author and editor of many articles and several books in feminist, postcolonial, and environmental philosophy, Cuomo served as Director of the Institute for Women's Studies from 2006-2009. Her book, The Philosopher Queen, a reflection on post-9/11 anti-war feminist politics, was nominated for a Lambda Award and an APA book award, and her work in ecofeminist philosophy and creative interdiciplinary practice has been influential among those seeking to bring together social justice and environmental concerns, as well as theory and practice. She has been a recipient of research grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Ms. Foundation, the National Council for Research on Women, and the Institute for Sustainability and Technology Policy, and she has been a visiting faculty member at Cornell University, Amherst College, and Murdoch University in Perth, Australia, "Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Responsibility," Hypatia 26 no4 Fall 2011 p. 690-714, AM)

Due to the scale of change that is needed, individual and household reductions in greenhouse-gas pollution will be effective **only if** they are deep and widespread, and only if they are accompanied by meta-level efforts, but meta-level policies and corporate practices seem unlikely to emerge without significant support from "below." Addressing climate change through mitigation and transnational funding for adaptation requires administrative action in the form of binding treaties, laws and regulations, taxes, incentives for technological development, and increased international aid, but such policies and practices require mass popular support. An unfair and possibly unmanageable degree of practical responsibility therefore falls on citizens and consumers, who may turn out to be ineffective as political actors because of the problems of insufficiency and disempowerment, among other things. Nonetheless, if national and corporate policies will not go in a more sustainable direction without a great swell of public support in places like the United States, then it is ethically and practically necessary that the significant minority who hopes to effectively address the problem of climate change find ways to build that support. It would be tragic if increasing disempowerment fueled by well-intentioned green messaging were to magnify **political ineffectiveness** among environmentalists and global human rights advocates by making it more attractive to focus on personal or private-sphere changes, rather than investing time or energy in work for change at higher levels. Perhaps money and energy otherwise spent on highpriced home retrofitting or demanding lifestyle changes should be aimed directly toward growing movements that increase "green" consciousness and political influence and that effectively demand full corporate responsibility for pollution. If such efforts were to result in a few very significant policy changes, such as a global moratorium on gas flaring or a greening of the military, the payoff in terms of long-term mitigation could be great. Such successes could in turn energize cultural shifts toward more effective alternative technologies. What can a well-organized collection of people who care accomplish through democratic politics and cultural transformation? Can advocates for environmental integrity and human rights better help us all to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions in due time? The problem of climate change provides opportunities to foster regenerating movements toward more sustainable and humane futures, and so inevitably some will step up and take responsibility for addressing the problem. Could they possibly succeed? Given the urgency created by the industrial greenhouse effect, an ethically motivated minority must effectively act on their caring while also making it contagious through the creation of a more effective political will. The insufficiency problem might be reduced if those who care about climate change and climate justice channel their mitigation efforts more effectively to influence decision-makers and policies at higher levels, where actions can be carried out with significant and immediate effects on emission levels and matters of social justice. If more corporate and governmental actors are pressured (or inspired) to take responsibility for the causes of climate change, their decisions and innovations can in turn create more options for carbon-free lifestyles, which will also help reduce the insufficiency and disempowerment problems for average consumers. The knowledge we need to avert a more extreme climate disaster already exists, in many places and in multiple forms. Those who care about humanity and Earth's green growing mantle of life need the power to turn dominant practices and policies toward better futures. Grand successes along those lines are needed very soon.

AT: Affirmation of Self

We have to extend politics beyond the realm of our immediate experience and the confines of the debate space---structural analysis key

Rob 14

(Carleton College, Robtheidealist, My Skinfolk Ain't All Kinfolk, www.orchestratedpulse.com/2014/03/problem-identity-politics/)

Some people look at these flaws and call for an end to "identity politics", but I think that's a mistake. At its most basic level, identity politics merely means political activity that caters to the interests of a particular social group. In a certain sense, all politics are identity politics. However, it's one thing to intentionally form a group around articulated interests; it's another matter entirely when group membership is socially imposed. Personal identities are socially defined through a combination of systemic rewards/marginalization plus actual and/or potential violence. We can't build politics from that foundation because these socially imposed identities don't necessarily tell us anything about someone's political interests. Successful identity politics requires shared interests, not shared personal identities I'm not here to tell you that personal identity doesn't matter; we rightfully point out that systemic power shapes people's lives. Simply put, my message is that personal identity is not the only thing that matters. We spend so much energy labeling people—privileged/marginalized, oppressor/oppressed—that we often **neglect to build spaces that antagonize the systems that cause our collective trauma** All You Blacks Want All the Same Things We assume that if a person is systemically marginalized, then they must have a vested interest in dismantling that system. Yet, that's not always the case. Take Orville Lloyd Douglas, who last summer wrote an article in the Guardian in which he admitted that he hates being Black. I can honestly say I hate being a black male… I just don't fit into a neat category of the stereotypical views people have of black men. I hate rap music, I hate most sports, and I like listening to rock music… I have nothing in common with the archetypes about the black male… I resent being compared to young black males (or young people of any race) who are lazy, not disciplined, or delinquent. Orville Lloyd Douglas, Why I Hate Being a Black Man As we can see from Douglas' cry for help, membership in a marginalized group is no guarantee that a person can understand and effectively combat systemic oppression Yet, we seem to treat all marginalized voices as equal, as if they are all insightful, as if there is no diversity of thought, as if—in the case of race– "All you Blacks want all the same things". Shared identity does not equal shared interests. John Ridley, the Oscar-winning screenplay writer of 12 Years a Slave, is a good example. He's written screenplays based on Jimi Hendrix, the L.A. riots, and other poignant moments and icons within Black history. He wants to see more Black people in Hollywood and he has a long history of successfully incorporating Black and Brown characters into comic book stories and franchises. However, in 2006, Ridley made waves with an essay in which he castigated Black people who did not live up to his standards; saying, "It's time for ascended blacks to wish niggers good luck." So I say this: It's time for ascended blacks to wish niggers good luck. Just as whites may be concerned with the good of all citizens but don't travel their days worrying specifically about the well-being of hillbillies from Appalachia, we need to send niggers on their way. We need to start extolling the most virtuous of ourselves. It is time to celebrate the New Black Americans—those who have sealed the Deal, who aren't beholden to liberal indulgence any more than they are to the disdain of the hard Right. It is time to praise blacks who are merely undeniable in their individuality and exemplary in their levels of achievement. The Manifesto of Ascendancy for the Modern American Nigger While Ridley and I share cultural affinity, and we both want to see Black people doing well, shared cultural affinity and common identity are not enough– which recent history makes abundantly clear. Barack Obama continues to deport record numbers of Brown immigrants here at home, while mercilessly bombing Brown folks abroad. Don Lemon, speaking in support of Bill O'Reilly, said that racism would be lessened if Black people pulled up their pants and stopped littering. Last fall, 40% of Black U.S. Americans supported airstrikes against Syria. My skinfolk ain't all kinfolk, and the Left needs to catch up. NO MORE ALLIES John Ridley, Barack Obama, myself, and Don Lemon are all Black males. We also have conflicting political positions and interests, but how can we decide which paths are valid if we only pay attention to personal identity? Instead of learning to recognize how the overarching systems maintain their power and then attacking those tools, we spend our energy finding an "other" to embody the systemic marginalization and legitimize our spaces and ideals. In some interracial spaces I feel like nothing more than an interchangeable token whose only purpose is to legitimize the politics of my White peers. If not me, then some other Black person would fill the slot. We use these "others" as authorities on various issues, and we use concepts like "privilege" to ensure that people stay in their lanes. People of color are the authorities on race, while LGBTQ people are the authorities on gender and sexuality, and so forth and so on. Yet, **experience is not** the same as **expertise, and privilege doesn't automatically make you clueless**. As I've discussed, these groups are not oriented around a singular set of political ideals and practices. Furthermore, as we see in Andrea Smith's work, there are often competing interests within these groups. **We mistake essentialism for intersectionality** as we look for the ideal subjects to embody the various forms of oppression; true intersectionality is a

description of systemic power, not a call for diversity. If we don't develop any **substantive analysis of systemic power** then it's impossible to know what our interests are, and aligning with one another according to shared interests is out of the question. In this climate all that remains is the ally, which requires no real knowledge or political effort, only the willingness to appear supportive of an "other". We can't build power that way. After having gathered to oppose organized White supremacy at the University of North Carolina, a group of organizers in Durham, North Carolina found that the Left's emphasis on personal identity and allyship was a major reason why their efforts collapsed. They proposed that we **adopt the practice of forming alliances rather than identifying allies** (h/t NinjaBikeSlut) Much of the discourse around being an ally seems to presume a relationship of one-sided support, with one person or group following another's leadership. While there are certainly times where this makes sense, it is misleading to use the term ally to describe this relationship. In an alliance, the two parties support each other while maintaining their own self-determination and autonomy, and are bound together not by the relationship of leader and follower but by a shared goal. In other words, one cannot actually be the ally of a group or individual with whom one has no political affinity – and this means that one cannot be an ally to an entire demographic group, like people of color, who do not share a singular cohesive political or personal desire. The Divorce of Thought From Deed While it's vital for me to learn the politics and history of marginalized experiences that differ from my own, listen to their voices, and respect their spaces and contributions – it's also important for me to understand the ways in which these same systems have shaped my own identity/history as well. Since we know that **oppression is systemic** and multidimensional, then **I'm going to have to step outside of personal experience and begin to develop political ideals and practices that actually antagonize those systems** I have to understand and articulate my interests, which will allow me to operate from a position of strength and form political alliances that advance those interests– **interests which speak to issues beyond just my own immediate experience**.

AT: Lesbian Separatism

The alt essentializes identity – reproduces heteronormativity – that implicates every level of their argument

Prasad 12

(Ajnesh, York University's Schulich School of Business PhD candidate, "Beyond analytical dichotomies", Human Relations, 65.5, Sage)

A poststructuralist critique At the most rudimentary level, poststructuralism may be typified by what Lyotard (1984) famously expressed as its **incredulity towards metanarratives** (also see Alvesson and Deetz, 1999; Kilduff and Mehra, 1997), or what Fraser and Nicholson (1997) describe as grand theorizing of social macrostructures. Akin to other critical traditions, it is 'explicitly historical, attuned to the cultural specificity of different societies and periods and . . . inflected by temporality, with historically specific institutional categories' (Fraser and Nicholson, 1997: 143–4). The aim of the poststructuralist mandate is to critique metanarratives and, from there, to define human consciousness and social existence through engagements with contextualized subjectivity (Agger, 1991).11 To appreciate this idea, it is important to understand how metanarratives are problematically situated within, and are informed by, socially constructed identity binaries, be they along the fault lines of gender (e.g. Butler, 1990; Hird, 2000), race (e.g. Gilroy, 2000; Miles and Torres, 2007), or sexuality (e.g. Zita, 1994). Indeed, poststructuralist critique, such as Derrida's conjecture of difference (Mumby and Putnam, 1992), illustrates how the preservation of the privileged identity ('white', 'man', 'heterosexual') is existentially dependent upon a corresponding relegated identity ('black', 'woman', 'homosexual') (see Tyler and Cohen, 2008); or, to posit it in Butlerian (1991) phrasing, heterosexuality presumes the being of homosexuality. Working from the same current, Harding (2003) extends this idea through consideration of the central dyadic relationship in management; she notes that every individual in the western workforce is identified as a worker or as a manager and that the identity of the latter is **wholly contingent upon the binary existence of the former**. Elsewhere, again assuming a poststructuralist position, Harding (2008: 44; emphasis in original) explains that identities '**cannot be resolved into an essence or into a coherent whole'**; rather, they are 'post hoc impositions of a seemingly unified [label] upon a disparate and disconnected population'. As such, the central aim of the poststructuralist is to repudiate deterministic and binary logic by drawing attention to the discursive processes that culturally (re)produce social realities and the dichotomous modes of thinking embedded within them (Butler, 1990; Calas, 1993). [T]he ways in which sex was put into Western discourse from the end of the 16th century onwards, the proliferation of sex during the 18th century and the modern incitement to discuss sex in endless detail have simultaneously established heterosexuality as the unassailable norm and constituted other sexualities as abnormal. Tangentially related to the Foucauldian reading of sexuality, Katz (2004) offers a genealogical investigation into how heterosexuality was invented and came to be ideologically defined from the late 19th-century onwards. Katz writes that because 'the concept of heterosexuality is **only one particular historical way** of perceiving, categorizing, and imagining the social relations of the sexes', it ought to be studied with the purposeful aim to **dislocate its socio-cultural privilege** as being the 'normal' and the 'natural' form of sexual expression (p. 69). Given its socially manifest 'nature', Butler (1991, 1993) contends that heterosexuality is perpetually at risk and must continually engage in a set of repetitive, or what she calls parodic, practices – such as, heterosexual sex – which functions to stringently affirm the hegemonic ideals of femininity (passive) and masculinity (active). Incidentally, the very redundancy of these parodic practices function to consolidate the discursive authority and cultural stability of heterosexuality (Butler, 1991; see also Butler's [1993] writing on 'performativity'). A related stream of poststructuralist-inflected scholarship reveals how **sexual identities that are predicated on ontological sexual difference produce heteronormativity**, which can be described as the 'the normative idealization of heterosexuality' (Hird, 2004: 27) or '**the centrality of heterosexual norms in social relations**' (Pringle, 2008: S111). While feminists have long critiqued the tacit and the explicit claims of ontological sexual difference, essentialist definitions of 'female' and 'male' continue to prevail in popular culture and in certain academic disciplines (Frye, 1996).12 On this point, Hird (2004) adopts a position in feminist science studies to develop a substantive critique into how the ontology of sexual difference is often rendered concrete in research propagated by the 'natural' – and particularly, the 'biological' – sciences (also see Martin, 1991). The influence of ontological sexual difference within and outside of academia, lends credence to Broadbridge and Hearn's (2008: S39) recent observation that, '[s]ex and sex differences are still often **naturalized as fixed, or almost fixed, in biology'** It is equally important to note, here, that **the alchemy of ontological sexual difference** is **wholly dependent upon the patriarchal conflation of 'biological' sex and 'cultural' gender (**Hird, 2004). As Pringle (2008: S112; also see Borgerson and Rehn, 2004) notes, '[g]ender **[does] not avoid the oppositional duality embodied in the concept of sex**, but reflect[s] the interdependent relationship of masculinity and femininity. This reflection pivots on genital determinism, which declares that males naturally embrace masculinity while females naturally embrace femininity (Bornstein, 1994; Hird, 2000). This initial conflation of sex and gender leads to the conventional model of heterosexuality, which dictates that a man will 'desire-to-be' a male and will 'desire-for' a female, while a woman will 'desire-to-be' a female and will 'desire-for' a male (Sinfield, 2002: 126). It is precisely these corresponding relationships

whereby the 'heterosexual matrix' is constructed (Butler, 1990). According to Butler, this matrix serves as the 'grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, gender, and desires are naturalized' (see Ringrose, 2008: 511).13

AT: rage alt

The valorization of rage as a political leads to a vicious cycle of repetitive violence

Wenning '09

(Mario, Phd., Assistant professor of philosophy @ the University of Macau, "The Return of Rage," Parrhesia No. 8 pg. 89-99)

The valorization of erotic emotions and virtues over thymotic ones is as old as philosophy itself. Aristotle already insists that the virtuous person cultivates mildness of temper "the even tempered person confesses to be calm and not carried away by his feelings, but to be cross only in the way, at the things, and for the length of time that reason dictates." 15 <u>Compassion is introduced as an antidote to revenge. The virtuous character does not lose the control that is necessary to provide for a self-sufficient emotional economy,</u> which is the precondition for achieving a life that is marked by wisdom, even-temperedness, and justice. Seneca's influential work on rage, <u>De ira, which was immensely influential for Christian and humanist ethics, calls for a Stoic control of the dangerous affect</u>. The general suspicion against the destructive consequences of this aggressive emotion is not limited to the European tradition. <u>Confucius already warns his students "to let a sudden fit of anger make you forget the safety of your own person or even that of your parents, is that not misguided judgment?"</u> 16 Daoism and ZenBuddhism promote meditative practices and compassion to overcome our fixation on the need of being angry with ourselves and the world surrounding us. <u>More recently, Martha Nussbaum argued that we should aim to understand "how to channel emotional development in the direction of a more mature and inclusive and less ambivalent type of love."</u> 17 According to Nussbaum, anger should at best operate as a tool of compassion. <u>Acts of punishment are then seen as merciful rather than vindictive because they aim at the good of the victim</u>. These representative examples illustrate that <u>the erotization of the psyche replaced what is regarded as **archaic forms of militancy** that</u>, it is contended, <u>mistakenly suggest that honor, pride and craving for recognition (and the rage that results from the violation of these) has been considered to be more important than a concern for justice, equality and compassion</u>. We might think that the dislike of negative emotions in general and potentially aggressive ones in particular results from an insight into the misfortunes these emotions bring about. <u>Revenge, then, is undesirable because it tends to be too costly in producing long term damages</u>. <u>Hegel</u>, for example, <u>reminds us in the Philosophy of Right of the **infinite chain of violence**, the ec**onomy of pay-back that results from blind vengeance and selfadministered acts of justic**e</u>. 18 <u>The **excesses of rage** can easily lead to **tragic repetitions** of an **original act of violence** that might be **impossible to get out of**</u>. Honor killings often lead to new honor killings rather than the reestablishment of justice and the fight against terror breed more terrorists.

Utilize rage as a means to mobilize ati-surveillance movements---targeted rage is key

Lesage 85

(Julia, in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Nelson and Grossberg, http://pages.uoregon.edu/jlesage/Juliafolder/womensRage.html)

Feminism by itself is not the motor of change. Class, anti-imperialist, and antiracist struggles demand our participation. Yet how, specifically, does women's consciousness change? How do women move into action? How does change occur? What political strategies should feminists pursue? How, in our political work, can we constantly challenge sexual inequality when the very social construction of gender oppresses women? In 1981 I visited Nicaragua with the goal of finding out how and why change occurred there so quickly in women's lives. "The revolution has given us everything," I was told. "Before the revolution we were totally devalued. We weren't supposed to have a vision beyond home and children." In fact, many Nicaraguan women first achieved a fully human identity within the revolution. Now they are its most enthusiastic supporters. For example, they form over 50 percent of the popular militias, the mainstay of Nicaragua's defense against United States-sponsored invasions from Honduras and Costa Rica. In the block committees, they have virtually eliminated wife and child abuse. Yet in Nicaragua we still see maids, the double standard sexually, dissatisfaction in marriage, and inadequate childcare. Furthermore, all the women I talked to defined their participation in the revolution in terms of an extremely idealized notion of motherhood and could not understand the choice not to reproduce. I bring up this example of Nicaragua because Nicaraguan women are very conscious of the power of their own revolutionary example. They know they have been influenced by the Vietnamese and Cuban revolutions and are very much shaping how Salvadoran women militants are looking at women's role in the Salvadoran revolution. Because of the urgency and violence of the situation, unity between men and women was and is necessary for their survival, but the women also want to combat, in an organized and self-conscious way, specific aspects of male supremacy in the workplace, politics, and daily life. Both here and in Nicaragua, women's daily conversation is about the politics of daily life. They talk to each other often, complaining about men and about managing the domestic sphere. Women's talk also encompasses complaints about poor and unstable work conditions, and about the onerous double day. However, here in the United States that conversation usually circulates pessimistically, if supportively, around the same themes and may even serve to reconfirm women's stasis within these unpleasant situations. Here such conversation offers little sense of social change; yet in our recent political history, feminists have used this preexisting social form--women's conversation in the domestic sphere--to create consciousness-raising groups. But to what degree is consciousness raising sufficient to change women's behavior, including our self-conception and our own colonized minds? We do not live in a revolutionary situation in the United States. There is no leftist political organization here providing leadership and a cohesive strategy, and in particular the struggle against women's oppression is not genuinely integrated into leftist activity and theory. Within such a context, women need to work on another, intermediate level, both to shape our revolutionary consciousness and to empower us to act on our own strategic demands. That is, we need to promote self-conscious, collectively supported, and politically clear articulations of our anger and rage. Furthermore, we must understand the different structures behind different women's rage. Black women rage against poverty and racism at the same time that they rage against sexism. Lesbians rage against heterosexual privilege, including their denial of civil rights. Nicaraguan women rage against invasions and the aggressive intentions of the United States. If, in our political work, we know this anger and the structures that generate it, we can more genuinely encounter each other and more extensively acknowledge each other's needs, class position, and specific form of oppression. If we do not understand the unique social conditions shaping our sisters' rage, we run the risk of divisiveness, of fragmenting our potential solidarity. Such mutual understanding of the different structures behind different women's anger is the precondition of our finding a way to work together toward common goals. I think a lot about the phenomenon of the colonized mind. Everything that I am and want has been shaped within a social process marked by male dominance and female submission. How can women come to understand and collectively attack this sexist social order? We all face, and in various ways incorporate into ourselves, sexist representations, sexist modes of thought. Institutionally, such representations are propagated throughout culture, law, medicine, education, and so on. All families come up against and are socially measured by sexist concepts of what is "natural"--that is, the "natural" roles of mother, children, or the family as a whole. Of particular concern to me is the fact that I have lived with a man for fifteen years while I acutely understand the degree to which heterosexuality itself is socially constructed as sexist. That is, I love someone who has more social privilege than me, and he has that privilege because he is male. As an institution, heterosexuality projects relations of dominance and submission, and it leads to the consequent devaluation of women because of their sex. The institution of heterosexuality is the central shaping factor of many different social practices at many different levels--which range, for example, from the dependence of the mass media on manipulating sexuality to the division of labor, the split between the public and private spheres, and the relations of production under capitalism. Most painfully for women, heterosexuality is a major, a social and psychological mode of organizing, generating, focusing, and institutionalizing desire, both men's and women's. Literally, I am wedded to my own oppression. Furthermore, the very body of woman is not her own--it has been constructed by medicine, the law, visual culture, fashion, her mother, her household tasks, her reproductive capacity, and what Ti-Grace Atkinson has called "the institution of sexual intercourse." When I look in the mirror, I see my flaws; I evaluate the show I put on to others. How do I break through representations of the female body and gain a more just representation of my body for and of myself? My social interactions are shaped by nonverbal conventions which we all have learned unconsciously and which are, as it were, the glue of social life. As Nancy Henley describes it in Body Politics, women's nonverbal language is characterized by shrinking, by taking up as little space as possible. Woman is accessible to be touched. When she speaks in a mixed group, she is likely to be interrupted or not really listened to seriously, or she may be thought of as merely emotional. And it is clear that not only does the voyeuristic male look shape most film practice, but this male gaze, with all its power, has a social analog in the way eye contact functions to control and threaten women in public space, where women's freedom is constrained by the threat of rape. We need to articulate these levels of oppression so as to arrive at a collective, shared awareness of these aspects of women's lives. We also need to understand how we can and already do break through barriers between us. In our personal relations, we often overcome inequalities between us and establish intimacy. Originally, within the women's movement we approached the task of coming together both personally and politically through the strategy of the consciousness-raising group, where to articulate our experience as women itself became a collective, transformative experience. But these groups were often composed mostly of middle-class women, sometimes predominantly young, straight, single, and white. Now we need to think more clearly and theoretically about strategies for negotiating the very real power differences between us. It is not so impossible. Parents do this with children, and vice versa; lovers deal with inequalities all the time. The aged want to be in communion with the young, and third-world women have constantly extended themselves to their white sisters. However, when women come together in spite of power differences among them, they feel anxiety and perhaps openly express previously suppressed hostility. Most likely, such a coming together happens when women work together intensively on a mutual project so that there is time for trust to be established. Yet as we seek mutually to articulate the oppression that constrains us, we have found few conceptual or social structures through which we might authentically express our rage. Women's anger is pervasive, as pervasive as our oppression, but it frequently lurks underground. If we added up all of women's depression--all our compulsive smiling, ego-tending, and sacrifice; all our psychosomatic illness, and all our passivity--we could gauge our rage's unarticulated, negative force. In the sphere of cultural production there are few dominant ideological forms that allow us even to think "women's rage." As ideological constructs, these forms end up containing women. Women's rage is most often seen in the narratives that surround us. For example: Classically, Medea killed her children because she was betrayed by their father. Now, reverse-slasher movies let the raped woman pick up the gun and kill the male attacker. It is a similar posture of dead end vengeance. The news showed Patty Hearst standing in a bank with a gun embodying that manufactured concept "terrorist," and then we saw her marrying her FBI bodyguard long after her comrades went up in flames. In melodrama and film noir, as well as in pornography, women's anger is most commonly depicted through displacement onto images of female insanity or perversity, often onto a grotesque, fearful parody of lesbianism. These displacements allow reference to and masking of individual women's rage, and that masked rage is rarely collectively expressed by women or even fully felt. We have relatively few expressions of women's authentic rage even in women's art. Often on the news we will see a pained expression of injustice or the exploitative use of an image of a third- world woman's grief. Such images are manipulated purely for emotional effect without giving analysis or context. Some great feminist writers and speakers such as Mary Wollstonecraft, Virginia Woolf, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Harriet Tubman have provided models by which we can understand ourselves, but too often the very concept of "heroine" means that we hold up these women and their capacity for angry self-expression as the exception rather than the rule. In Illinois, women chained themselves together in the state house when it was clear that the ERA would not pass; the women sought to express our collective anger at our legislators' cowardice and to do so in a conspicuous, public way. But actions such as these often have little effect beyond their own time span. We need to think beyond such forms to more socially effective ones. It is a task open to all our creativity and skill--to tap our anger as a source of

energy and to focus it aesthetically and politically. We may have to combine images of anger with something else--say, images of how women can construct the collectivity as a whole. It is here that, by their example, our third-world sisters have often taken the lead. Rosa Parks refusing to sit in the back of the bus, Harriet Tubman leading slaves to the North, an Angolan mother in uniform carrying a baby and a rifle, a Vietnamese farmer tilling and defending her land, Nicaraguan women in their block committees turning in wife abusers to the police--these images let us see that women can gain more for themselves than merely negating the bad that exists. And it is in their constant need to attack both sexism and racism, as well as poverty and imperialist aggression, that third-world feminists now make us all see much more clearly both the urgent need for and the possibility of reconstructing the whole world on new terms. Artistically, emotionally, and politically women seem to need to glimpse dialectically the transcendence of our struggle against sexism before we can fully express sexism's total negation, that is, our own just rage. Sometimes our suppressed rage feels so immense that the open expression of it threatens to destroy us. So we often do not experience anger directly and consciously, nor do we accurately aim our rage at its appropriate target. To transcend negation and to build on it means that we have to see what is beyond our rage. An example of such transcendence was demonstrated by Nicaraguan mothers of "martyred" soldiers (those killed by U.S.-paid counterrevolutionaries) to Pope John Paul II when he visited Managua in April 1983. They stood in the rows closest to the podium where the Pope spoke and they all bore large photos of their dead children. As the events of the day unfolded, the women created an image that stirred the whole people, one that the Pope could not go beyond or even adequately respond to. Here is what happened: The Pope spoke on and on to the gathered crowd about obeying the hierarchy and not getting involved with the things of this world. In frustration and anger, the women began to shout, "We want peace," and their chant was taken up by the 400,000 others there. The women's rage at personal loss was valorized by the Nicaraguan people as a whole, as the grieving mother became a collective symbol of the demand for peace. The chant, "We want peace," referred simultaneously to national sovereignty, anti-imperialism, religion, and family life. The women spoke for the whole. This brings me back to my original question about women's political action in the United States today. One of the major areas of investigation and struggle in the women's movement has been the sphere of daily life. This struggle, represented by an early women's movement phrase--"the personal is the political"--derives from women's real material labor in the domestic sphere and in the sphere of social relations as a whole. Women have traditionally done the psychological labor that keeps social relations going. In offices, in neighborhoods, at home, they often seek to make the social environment safe and "better," or more pleasant. That such labor is invisible, particularly that it is ignored within leftist theory and practice, is one of the more precise indices of women's oppression. And it is feminists' sensitivity to and analysis of social process that clarifies for them the sexism on the Left. Often at a leftist conference or political meeting, many men continue to see women and women's concerns as "other," and they do not look at what the Left could gain from feminist theory or from women's subcultural experience or from an analysis of women's labor. Women who come to such an event have already made a commitment to learn and to contribute, so they make an effort to continue along with the group as a whole but are impeded by sexist speakers' intellectual poverty (e.g., use of the generic "he"), macho debating style, and distance from political activism. Furthermore, not only women feel this political invisibility at leftist events. When black labor and black subcultural experience in the United States is not dealt with, nor is imperialism, or when racism is theoretically subsumed under the rubric of "class oppression" and not accorded its specificity, then third-world participants face the same alienation. To demonstrate this process and analyze what divides us, I will describe an incident that occurred at the Teaching Institute on Marxist Cultural Theory in June 1983. It is worth discussing because it is the kind of incident that happens all too often among us on the Left. Early in that summer session, a coalition of students and the two women faculty members, Gayatri Spivak and me, formed to present a protest statement to the faculty. It was read in every class. Here is what it said: The Marxist-Feminist Caucus met on Friday June 17th and concluded that the "limits, frontiers and boundaries" of Marxist cultural theory as articulated by the Teaching Institute excluded and silenced crucial issues of sexism, racism and other forms of domination. We find ourselves reproducing in the classrooms of the Teaching Institute the very structures which are the object of our critique. The Marxist-Feminist Caucus therefore proposes that each class set aside an hour weekly to discuss strategic silences and structural exclusions. A Marxism that does not problematize issues of gender and race, or of class consciousness in its own ranks, cannot hope to be an adequate tool for either social criticism or social transformation. The institute had a format of having famous Marxist intellectuals lecture, specifically males with job security who have never incorporated a feminist analysis into their theoretical work. Both the format and the content of their lectures enraged some of us, but not others. In a sense, writing a protest statement divided the school's participants between the political ones and the consumers of Marxist theory. This is because critical theory itself has become a pathway for elitist advancement in the humanities and social sciences in universities where these areas are facing huge cutbacks. And the canon of that critical theory is based on Marx and Freud and their contemporary interpretants, Althusser and Lacan. Both at the Teaching Institute and at prestigious universities, young academics could get their quick fix of Marxism, the knowledge of which could help greatly in their academic career. This is a capitalist mode of consuming knowledge. Too many students, especially career-pressured graduate students, want only a well conceived lecture, a digest of Marxist theory and social analysis, something that can be written in a notebook, taken home, and quoted from in a future paper or journal article. Furthermore, we intellectuals fall into this capitalist competitive mode. We feel pressured inside ourselves to be the best. Students are told to buy the best. All the faculty at the Teaching Institute felt that they could not make a mistake, that they had to read and show they had read everything, that they had been challenged on their political practice, accused of being racist or sexist or undemocratic. Our control over the classroom and studied theoretical polish became a kind of professional hysteria and worked against the collective building of Marxist knowledge and theory that we have needed for more effective social change. Since the early 1970s women have come together in meetings like these, in feminist seminars, caucuses, and workshops, partly in resistance to a certain macho leftist or academic style and partly to build a new body of knowledge and feminist political practice. And we have been successful at doing this but it has meant double or triple work for us. Feminist scholarship does not usually lead to academic promotion for a woman. The knowledge women produce is easily marginalized, as was made painfully obvious at that summer school. Feminists and third-world students came to the Teaching Institute knowing how much they needed Marxist theory. They understood that abolishing capitalism and imperialism was the precondition for liberation. They came as political participants expecting to learn theoretical tools to use in fighting oppression. But sex and race were too often ignored--I would say stupidly ignored--as social determinants in the theories presented about social change. (Beyond that, students felt intimidated by name-dropping and teachers' and other students' failure to explain terms. They felt they had to give a polished rebuttal or a cohesive "strategic intervention" before they could speak to refute a lecturer's point.) And when students raised issues of sexism or racism, deflection became the all too frequent tactic used by teachers or some of the white male students in response. No wonder that women, with their sex-role socialization, were often too intimidated to speak. This is a sad analysis, but not an infrequent one in academia. It speaks about political theory and academic sexism and racism, and elitism and class privilege. The incident reveals much of what divides politically progressive people in the United States. These differences must be acknowledged in depth if we are to work together politically in a coalition form. In particular, I understand the texture of women's silence in a forum that demanded a highly rational and developed intervention. Many of the women students at the Teaching Institute already produced feminist theory, but the intimidating nature of this kind of aggressive public speaking made them seem like nonparticipants. And it often happens to me, too. I know that we watch and despair of our own colonized psyches which hold us back in silence precisely when we would choose to be political actors, especially in a Marxist forum. What we have seen in the 1970s and 1980s in North America and Europe is a supercession of political forms related to developments in radical consciousness. Conditions have evolved in the United States that make it impossible to conceive of a revolutionary organizing strategy that does not embrace a black and minority revolution and a feminist revolution. The lesson of the civil rights/black power movement was that blacks will organize autonomously. Now it is the offspring of that movement, Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, that has taken the lead in building an anti-imperialist coalition that addresses the specific struggles and organizing forms of blacks, Latinos, women, and gays. Such a coalition relates to the existence of the women's movement, the gay and lesbian movement, the anti-imperialist movement, by supporting these groups' autonomous organizing and granting new respect, not by subsuming or controlling them. Furthermore, at this point in U.S. history, issues of mass culture and mass communication have to be dealt with, so that minority figures such as Jesse Jackson or Harold Washington, Chicago's black major, have developed an ongoing analysis about racism in the press. As a feminist who has worked both in the cultural sphere and in anti-imperialist work, I have experienced this supercession of forms. In the early 1970s a politically active woman was either "on the Left" or "in the independent women's movement." Some socialist feminists within leftist organizations formed caucuses to try to influence their organizations. In the 1970s I chose to work mostly within the independent women's movement, especially in creating a women's studies program at an urban university. In developing feminist media now within the women's movement, I find many of my sisters addressing broader issues of imperialism, racism, class oppression, and the nuclear threat. Many of us are joining progressive coalitions around these issues. Within these coalitions we must be able openly to declare, "I am a feminist and our feminist position represents the most advanced stand. You men have to join us." Indeed, many men, often younger men, have. As feminists, we are the ones who are building a whole theoretical critique of mass culture and mass communication; we are the ones who are learning how to appropriate all of culture in an oppositional way. And because of our historical position in advanced capitalism, we are one of the first social movements to address cultural issues in such a thorough and complex way. Many feminists are eager to participate in coalitions, the major political strategy for us in the 1 980s. In Chicago, we saw the women's movement and the Left work to elect Harold Washington. In the San Francisco area, gays and lesbians have formed a Central America support group. Both in the United States and abroad, the antinuclear movement contains within it all-women's affinity groups. Latinos in various areas identify and organize as Puerto Rican or Mexican-American according to their ethnic origins and concentration, and also unite in Central American solidarity work. This great diversity of sectoral organizing enriches all of us who are working for social change. Some of the best aspects of current progressive organizing have, in fact, derived specifically from the development of the contemporary women's movement. I mentioned the consciousness-raising groups earlier. I think the women's movement has introduced into political discourse an open and direct critique of the macho style and political posturing of many male leaders. As feminist activists, we have created among ourselves new forms of discussion and a creative, collective pursuit of knowledge--in contrast to an older, more aggressive, male debating style. Particularly important for me, the women's movement has pursued and validated as politically important cultural and artistic work. In Chicago, where I live, I experience a strong continuum and network among community-based artists and women in the art world. We have built up intellectual ties between academic women and feminist film- and videomakers who have created an analysis of how sexuality is manipulated in the visual culture that surrounds us. As a consequence, feminist film criticism has developed a new theoretical framework for

analyzing ideology and the mass media. In fact, I think that our building of a feminist cultural theory has made a key contribution to the Left and to revolutionary movements throughout the world. When I want to consider how unleashing our anger might capacitate us to act for change, I reconsider Frantz Fanon's essay "Concerning Violence" in The Wretched of the Earth. In that essay he describes decolonization, particularly the process by which the native sheds the colonizer's values and the colonizer's ways. I understand that my black and Latina sisters in the United States experience a rage against the economic and racial violence perpetrated every day against them; in a way that is similar to what Fanon describes: this rage knows its resolution lies in a complete change of the economic order in which we live. At the same time, I must ask what kind of rage it would be that would effectively contest women's oppression--given all the levels at which gender inequality and women's oppression is articulated in social and personal life. What Fanon describes to us is a specific historical moment at which mental colonization can be and is surpassed. As I look at women's mental colonization, I see our internalized sense of powerlessness, our articulation into masochistic structures of desire, and our playing out of personae that on the surface seem "passive," "self-defeating," "irrational," "hesitant," "receptively feminine," or even "crazy." Much of this behavior stems from internalized and suppressed rage. Fanon describes such behavior in the colonized and posits active rage, the violent response to violence, as its cure. What would the overturning of male supremacy and women's colonization mean to women? How would it be accomplished? Fanon understands that a whole social structure and a new kind of person must come into being, and that those with privilege know, fear, and resist this. His call to armed struggle, based on the very clear demarcations and abuses of power that the native always sees, signals a survival struggle that does not characterize the war between the sexes. As I read Fanon for what he can teach me about women's resistance to oppression in nonrevolutionary society, I read him as a communist psychiatrist talking about how social movements can change the mentality of the oppressed. When I ask about revolution for women now, minimally I see that our contestation cannot be conducted in the mode of nice girls, of managing the egos of and patiently teaching those who oppress, which is a skill and duty we learned from our mothers in the domestic sphere. If we do so, once again we will be placed in that very role of "helpmate" that we are trying to overcome. Angry contestation may take us the extra step needed to overcome our own colonized behavior and tardy response. Let me now rewrite for you parts of Fanon's essay to show its power when discussing the relation between psychological and social change. The distance between the violence of colonization and its necessary response in armed struggle, and the emotional rage I am referring to here in combating sexism, marks the distance between the periphery and the center of international capitalism. By using Fanon in this way, I do not wish to co-opt him for the women's movement but to learn from him, just as I learned from the Nicaraguan women's courage and tenacity. If women must learn to be openly angry, we must learn to draw links between ourselves and those who are more oppressed, to learn new methods of struggle and courageous response. Combating women's oppression as we know it is a historical process: that is to say, it cannot become intelligible or clear to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements that give it historical form and content. Combating women's oppression is the meeting of two intrinsically opposed forces, which in fact owe this originality to that sort of substantification that results from and is nourished by the social construction of gender. The husband is right when he speaks of knowing "them" well--for it is men who perpetuate the function of wife. Men owe the reproduction of their bodies and psyches to the family. Feminist revolution never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally. It transforms passive femininity crushed with inessentiality into privileged agency under the floodlights of history. A new kind of woman brings a new rhythm into existence with a new language and a new humanity; combating women's oppression means the veritable creation of new women who become fully human by the same process by which they freed themselves. Feminists who decide to put their program into practice and become its moving force are ready to be constantly enraged. They have collectively learned that this narrow world, strewn with prohibitions, can only be called into question by absolute contestation. The sex-gender system is a world divided into compartments. And if we examine closely this system of compartments, we will at last be able to reveal the lines of force it implies and to mark out the lines on which a nonoppressive society will be reorganized. At the level of individuals, anger is a cleansing force. It frees the woman from her inferiority complex and from despair and inaction; it makes her fearless and restores her self-respect. At this point I will stop citing from and reworking Fanon, deliberately at the point of individual rage. Now is a time when we need to work in coalitions, but we must be very honest about what divides us and what are the preconditions we need before we can work together. I have made the decision to work in leftist and feminist cultural work and in Latin American solidarity work. I think in all our strategies we must analyze the relation of that strategy to feminist, antiracist, and anti-imperialist demands. Women comprise over half the population; any class issues in the United States are intimately tied to the question of racism; we all live off the labor of workers, often underpaid women, in the Third World; and socialist revolution is being waged very near us. Personally, I know that it is by my contact with Nicaraguan women, who insist that men and women must struggle together for our mutual liberation, that I have been politically and emotionally renewed. The problems grow more acute. We know that the Right is racist, homophobic, and sexist. We in the women's movement must stop turning our anger against each other and learn the most effective ways to work together for social change. We can focus our anger and harness it, but to do that we must clearly analyze cause and effect. If theory accompanies anger, it will lead to effective solutions to the problems at hand. We have great emotional and social power to unleash when we set loose our all too often suppressed rage, but we may only feel free to do so when we know that we can use our anger in an astute and responsible way.

Their deployment of essentialism fails – it's rejected as a descriptive theory and can't achieve political ends

Stone '04 (Alison, Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy Lancaster University, "Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy," Journal of Moral Philosophy 1.2, 2004)

An objection immediately arises to this strategic essentialist position. Any political strategy is effective only inasmuch as it allows agents to recognize and intervene into the real social events, processes and forces which make up the social field. But it seems reasonable to think that a strategy can be effective, in this sense, only insofar as it embodies an accurate understanding of the character of social processes. This implies that a strategy of affirming fictitious commonalities among women will fail to facilitate effective action given a world where women do not really have any common social characteristics or locations. Rather, such a strategy appears

destined to mislead women into fighting against difficulties which are either non-existent or— more likely—really affect only some privileged subgroup of women. This objection can be resisted, however, as it (implicitly) is by Denise Riley in ' Am I That Name? '. Riley claims that **'it is compatible to suggest that "women" don't exist—while maintaining a politics of "as if they existed"** — since the world behaves as if they unambiguously did'. 15 In other words, for Riley, the fiction that women share a common social experience is politically effective because the social world actually does treat women as if they comprise a unitary group. Riley accepts that women are not a unitary group and that the socially prevalent idea that they are unified is false. Nevertheless, this false idea informs and organizes the practices and institutions that shape women's experiences, so that those—very different—experiences become structured by essentialist assumptions. A strategy of affirming fictitious commonalities therefore will be effective given this world in which (false) descriptive essentialist assumptions undergird women's social existence. Riley's argument has a problem, though: she **cannot consistently maintain** both that women's social experience is fully diverse and that this experience is uniformly structured by essentialist assumptions. If essentialism informs and organizes the structures that shape women's social experience, then this experience will be organized according to certain shared models and will acquire certain common patterns and features. More concretely, the idea that women are a homogeneous group will structure social institutions so that they position all women homogeneously, leading to (at least considerable areas of) shared experience. Thus, Riley (and other strategic essentialists)may be right that essentialist constructions are socially influential, but they cannot, consistently with this, also maintain that descriptive essentialism is false. Furthermore, it is not obviously true that any uniform set of essentialist constructions informs all social experience. These constructions may all identify women as a homogeneous group, but they vary widely in their account of the context of women's homogenous features. Consequently, these constructions will influence social structures in correspondingly varying directions, against which no counter-affirmation of common experience can be expected to be effective Strategic essentialists, then, have attempted to resuscitate essentialism by arguing that it can take a merely political and non-descriptive form. But this **attempt proves unsuccessful**, because one cannot defend essentialism on strategic grounds without first showing that there is a homogeneous set of essentialist assumptions that exerts a coherent influence on women's social experience—which amounts to defending essentialism on descriptive grounds(as well). Advocates of essentialism therefore need to show that it accurately describes social reality. Here, though, critics can retort that essentialism is descriptively false, since women do not even share any common mode of construction by essentialist discourses. Yet this retort reinstates the problem of anti-essentialism: its paralysing effect on social criticism and political activism. Strategic essentialism has not resolved this problem, for it has not stably demarcated any merely political form of essentialism from the descriptive essentialism which critics have plausibly condemned as false and oppressive.

Foucault Answers

General Foucault

Aff = Consistent

Their reading of Foucauldian philosophy is all wrong - the affirmative supports Foucault's idea to deconstruct power systems instead of their radical critique.

Ferguson '11

Professor of Anthropology at Stanford Univeristy (James, "Toward a left art of government: from 'Foucauldian critique' to Foucauldian politics," History of the Human Sciences 24(4), http://hhs.sagepub.com/content/24/4/61.full.pdf)//DWB

One of the founding premises of this special issue and the conference with which it began¶ is that Foucault has been read, and used, in different ways in different academic¶ disciplines. In this article I will discuss one common way of using Foucault's thought in my own discipline of anthropology. I will suggest that the strategy of using Foucauldian¶ modes of analysis to 'critique power' (as it is often put) has frequently led to a rather sterile¶ form of political engagement. Attention to some of Foucault's own remarks about politics¶ hints at a different political sensibility, in which empirical experimentation rather than¶ moralistic denunciation takes center place. I will reference some examples of such¶ experimentation that come out of my current research on the politics of social assistance¶ in southern Africa (though I do not have space here to give a full exposition of these).¶ The sort of use of Foucault that I have in mind is well represented in the anthropology¶ of development (and the related field of what is sometimes called critical development¶ studies). Here, the characteristic strategy is to use Foucauldian analysis to reveal the way¶ that interventions, projects, etc., which claim to be merely technical or benevolent, really¶ involve relations of power. This is a perfectly reasonable thing to do, but too often, in this¶ field, such a simple demonstration is apparently seen as the end of the exercise. Power¶ has been 'critiqued', an oppressive system has been exposed as such, and that seems to¶ be taken as a satisfactory end to the matter.¶ This impasse in development studies and anthropology is related, I think, to a wider¶ predicament that progressive or left politics seems to find itself in today. The predicament¶ is that the left seems increasingly to be defined by a series of gestures of refusal¶ – what I call 'the antis' (anti-globalization, anti-neo-liberalism, anti-privatization,¶ anti-Bush, sometimes even anti-capitalism – but always 'anti', never 'pro'). The current¶ world system, the politics of the 'anti-' points out, rests on inequality and exploitation.¶ The global poor are being screwed, while the rich are benefiting. The powerless are getting¶ the short end of the stick. This is all perfectly true, of course, if not terribly¶ illuminating. But such lines of argument typically have very little to propose by way of¶ an alternative 'art of government'. Governing is exercising power over others, which is¶ what the powerful do to the downtrodden. It appears as something to be resisted or¶ denounced, not improved or experimented with.¶ My first observation about this sort of analysis is that it rests on what seems to me a very¶ un-Foucauldian idea of the political. Foucault did, certainly, valorize certain forms of resistance,¶ and worked tirelessly to undermine and denaturalize taken-for-granted arrangements¶ of power. But he never suggested that power ought not be exercised, or that it was illegitimate¶ for some to seek to govern the conduct of others. On the contrary, he repeatedly insisted¶ that it made no sense (in his scheme of things) to wish for a world without power.1¶ Naive readings of Foucault turned his skeptical analytics of power into a simple¶ denunciation. Thus the question (once posed to him by an interviewer) of whether it¶ would be an intolerable use of power for a parent to prevent a child from scribbling¶ on the walls of a house. Foucault's instructive answer was:¶ If I accepted the picture of power that is frequently adopted – namely, that it's something¶ horrible and repressive for the individual – it's clear that preventing a child from scribbling¶ would be an unbearable tyranny. But that's not it. I say that power is a relation. A relation in¶ which one guides the behavior of others. And there's no reason why this manner of guiding¶ the behavior of others should not ultimately have results which are positive, valuable, interesting,¶ and so on. If I had a kid, I assure you he would not write on the walls – or if he did, it¶ would be against my will. The very idea! (Foucault, 1988a: 11–13) In the same interview, he complained of those who¶ ... think I'm a sort of radical anarchist who has an absolute hatred of power. No! What I'm¶ trying to do is to approach this extremely important and tangled phenomenon

in our society,¶the exercise of power, with the most reflective, and I would say prudent, attitude. … To¶ question the relations of power in the most scrupulous and attentive manner possible, looking¶ into all the domains of its exercise, that's not the same thing as constructing a mythology¶of power as the beast of the apocalypse. (ibid.: 11–13)

Alt = Inconsistent

Their static position of critique is exactly what Foucault opposed.

Ferguson '11 – Professor of Anthropology at Stanford Univeristy (James, "Toward a left art of government: from 'Foucauldian critique' to Foucauldian politics," History of the Human Sciences 24(4), http://hhs.sagepub.com/content/24/4/61.full.pdf)//DWB

Such a stance, I suggest, brings us much closer toward a truly Foucauldian politics. For¶ politics, for Foucault, was always more about experimentation than denunciation. In an¶ interview on social security, Foucault insisted that what was required for a progressive¶ rethinking of social policy was not a theoretically derived 'line', but, as he put it, 'a certain¶ empiricism'.¶ We have to transform the field of social institutions into a vast experimental field, in such a¶ way as to decide which taps need turning, which bolts need to be loosened here or there, to get¶ the desired change. ... What we have to do ... is to increase the experiments wherever possible¶ in this particularly interesting and important area of social life. (Foucault, 1988b: 165)¶ What this implies is a form of politics that has less to do with critique and denunciation¶ than with experimentation and assessment. It is a matter not of refusing power, but rather¶ exercising it in a way that would be provisional, reversible, and open to surprise. If we¶ are indeed to arrive at viable left 'arts of government', we will need to be open to the¶ unexpected, ready to 'increase the experiments wherever possible', and attentive to¶ the ways that governmental techniques originally deployed for nefarious purposes can¶ be appropriated toward other ends. To do this, we will need to forgo the pleasures of the easy, dismissive critique, and instead turn a keen and sympathetic eye toward the rich world¶ of **actual** social and **political** practice, the world of tap-turning and experimentation. That is¶ a world still full of invention and surprise, where the landscape of political possibility and¶ constraint that we have come to take for granted is being redrawn, even as we speak.

Liberalism Good

Lib k HR/Env

International Relations and Liberalism is key to solve human rights, environment, and poverty – constitutents provide a legitimate check.

Devitt '11 – Masters in International Relations (Sept. 1, Rebecca, "Liberal Institutionalism: An Alternative IR Theory or Just Maintaining the Status Quo?", E-International Relations Students, http://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/01/liberal-institutionalism-an-alternative-ir-theory-or-just-maintaining-the-status-quo/)//DWB

Domestic interests have had a major impact on cooperation in International Relations, public reactions to the deaths of US soldiers in Somalia led to the Clinton administration pulling out of a peacekeeping mission to the war torn country whilst public demand for action on Climate Change has led to member states such as Australia to sign up to the Kyoto Protocol. [15]¶ This reflects the fact that domestic issues and policies have a major influence on how states cooperate with other states on an international stage. If a state was to go into agreement with another on trade relations, but that state had a bad record on human rights, the government might reconsider doing a deal if its constituents elected them on the basis of a strong human rights stance. This reflects the need for greater development of the liberal institutionalists argument in terms of domestic influences on decision making at an international level.¶ Furthermore whilst Liberal institutionalists have acknowledged the influence non-state actors in world affairs such as transnational organizations and non-governmental organizations play, they have failed to recognize the role that global political advocacy networks have had in international relations. Advocacy work on human rights, the environment and poverty has had major effects on the way states are viewed and global movements have challenged the notion that sovereignty is sacrosanct. Technological advances and telecommunication networks have allowed for swifter mobilization and organization of groups that can lobby governments and organizations about issues such as human rights and questioned the liberal institutionalists argument that states remain the key actors in world affairs. As R.B.J Walker has stated:

Lib k Peace/Democ

Liberalism is key to democracy – that spills over to more peaceful societies.

Burchill '05 – Researcher of International Relations at Deakin University (Scott, Theories of International Relations Third edition, Chapter 3 "Liberalism", pp. 55-83)//DWB

At the beginning of this chapter, it was argued that liberalism was an¶ 'inside-out' approach to international relations, because liberals favour¶ a world in which the endogenous determines the exogenous. Their challenge¶ is to extend the legitimacy of domestic political arrangements¶ found within democratic states to the relationships between all nationstates.¶ To put it another way, liberals believe that democratic society, in¶ which civil liberties are protected and market relations prevail, can have¶ an international analogue in the form of a peaceful global order. The¶ domestic free market has its counterpart in the open, globalized world¶ economy. Parliamentary debate and accountability is reproduced in¶ international fora such as the United Nations. And the legal protection¶ of civil rights within liberal democracies is extended to the promotion of¶ human rights across the world. With the collapse of Communism as an¶ alternative political and economic order, the potential for continuity¶ between the domestic and the international became greater than in any¶ previous period.¶ Fukuyama had reason to be optimistic. The spread of liberal democracies¶ and the zone of peace was an encouraging development, as is the¶ realization by states that trade and commerce is more closely correlated¶ with economic success than territorial conquest. The number of governments¶ enjoying civilian rather than military rule is increasing, and there¶ are signs that ethical considerations and ideas of human justice have a¶ permanent place on the diplomatic agenda. The collapse of Marxism as¶ a legitimate alternative political order removes a substantial barrier to¶ the spread of liberal democracies, and there can be little doubt that the¶ great powers are now much less inclined to use force to resolve their¶ political differences with each other. It appears that **liberal democracies¶ are in the process of constructing a separate peace**.¶ The globalization of the world economy means that there are few¶ obstacles to international trade. Liberals want to remove the influence of¶ the state in commercial relations between businesses and individuals,¶ and the decline of national economic sovereignty is an indication that¶ the corrupting influence of the state is rapidly diminishing. TNCs and¶ capital markets wield significant influence over the shape of the world¶ economy, in the process homogenizing the political economies of every¶ member state of the international community.¶

Free Trade Solves War

Liberal free trade prevents war and fosters international dialogue.

Burchill '05 – Researcher of International Relations at Deakin University (Scott, Theories of International Relations Third edition, Chapter 3 "Liberalism", pp. 55-83)//DWB

Free trade, however, was a more peaceful means of achieving national¶ wealth because, according to the theory of comparative advantage, each¶ economy would be materially better off than if it had been pursuing¶ nationalism and self-sufficiency (autarky). Free trade would also break¶ down the divisions between states and unite individuals everywhere in one¶ community. Artificial barriers to commerce distorted perceptions and¶ relations between individuals, thereby causing international tension. Free¶ trade would expand the range of contacts and levels of understanding¶ between the peoples of the world and encourage international friendship¶ and understanding. According to Kant, unhindered commerce between¶ the peoples of the world would unite them in a common, peaceful enterprise.¶ ·Trade … would increase the wealth and power of the peaceloving,¶ productive sections of the population at the expense of the¶ war-orientated aristocracy, and … would bring men of different nations¶ into constant contact with one another; contact which would make clear¶ to all of them their fundamental community of interests' (Howard 1978:¶ 20; Walter 1996). Similarly Ricardo believed that free trade 'binds¶ together, by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the universal¶ society of nations throughout the civilised world' (Ricardo 1911: 114).¶ Conflicts were often caused by states erecting barriers which distorted¶ and concealed the natural harmony of interests commonly shared by¶ individuals across the world. The solution to the problem, argued Adam¶ Smith and Tom Paine, was the free movement of commodities, capital¶ and labour. 'If commerce were permitted to act to the universal extent it¶ is capable, it would extirpate the system of war and produce a revolution¶ in the uncivilised state of governments' (Howard 1978: 29). Writing¶ in 1848, John Stuart Mill also claimed that free trade was the means to¶ bring about the end of war: 'it is commerce which is rapidly rendering¶ war obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests¶ which act in natural opposition to it' (Howard 1978: 37). The spread of¶ markets would place societies on an entirely new foundation. Instead of¶ conflicts over limited resources such as land, the industrial revolution¶ raised the prospect of unlimited and unprecedented prosperity for all:¶ material production, so long as it was freely exchanged, would bring¶ human progress. Trade would create relations of mutual dependence¶ which would foster understanding between peoples and reduce conflict.¶ Economic self-interest would then be a powerful disincentive for war. Liberals have always felt that unfettered commercial exchanges would¶ encourage links across frontiers and shift loyalties away from the nationstate.¶ Leaders would eventually come to recognize that the benefits of¶ free trade outweighed the costs of territorial conquest and colonial¶ expansion. The attraction of going to war to promote mercantilist interests¶ would be weakened as societies learn that war can only disrupt trade and therefore the prospects for economic prosperity. Interdependence¶ would replace national competition and defuse unilateral acts of aggression¶ and reciprocal retaliation.

Lib Solves War

Liberalism is key to solve war. All other solutions lead to chaos.

Burchill '05 – Researcher of International Relations at Deakin University (Scott, Theories of International Relations Third edition, Chapter 3 "Liberalism", pp. 55-83)//DWB

For liberals, peace is the normal state of affairs: in Kant's words, peace¶ can be perpetual. The laws of nature dictated harmony and cooperation¶ between peoples. War is therefore both unnatural and irrational, an artificial¶ contrivance and not a product of some peculiarity of human¶ nature. Liberals have a belief in progress and the perfectibility of the¶ human condition. Through their faith in the power of human reason and¶ the capacity of human beings to realize their inner potential, they remain¶ confident that the stain of war can be removed from human experience¶ (Gardner 1990: 23–39; Hoffmann 1995: 159–77; Zacher and Matthew¶ 1995: 107–50).¶ A common thread, from Rousseau, Kant and Cobden, to Schumpeter¶ and Doyle, is that **wars were created by militaristic and undemocratic¶ governments** for their own vested interests. Wars were engineered by¶ a 'warrior class' bent on extending their power and wealth through territorial conquest. According to Paine in The Rights of Man, the 'war¶ system' was contrived to preserve the power and the employment of¶ princes, statesmen, soldiers, diplomats and armaments manufacturers,¶ and to bind their tyranny ever more firmly upon the necks of the people'¶ (Howard 1978: 31). Wars provide governments with excuses to raise¶ taxes, expand their bureaucratic apparatus and increase their control over¶ their citizens. The people, on the other hand, were peace-loving by nature,¶ and plunged into conflict only by the whims of their unrepresentative¶ rulers.¶ War was a cancer on the body politic. But it was an ailment that¶ human beings, themselves, had the capacity to cure. The treatment which¶ liberals began prescribing in the eighteenth century had not changed: the¶ 'disease' of war could be successfully treated with the twin medicines of¶ democracy and free trade. Democratic processes and institutions would¶ break the power of the ruling elites and curb their propensity for violence.¶ Free trade and commerce would overcome the artificial barriers between¶ individuals and unite them everywhere into one community.¶ For liberals such as Schumpeter, war was the product of the aggressive¶ instincts of unrepresentative elites. The warlike disposition of these rulers¶ drove the reluctant masses into violent conflicts which, while profitable¶ for the arms industries and the military aristocrats, were disastrous for¶ those who did the fighting. For Kant, the establishment of republican¶ forms of government in which rulers were accountable and individual¶ rights were respected would lead to peaceful international relations¶ because the ultimate consent for war would rest with the citizens of the¶ state (Kant 1970: 100). For both Kant and Schumpeter, war was the¶ outcome of minority rule, though Kant was no champion of democratic¶ government (MacMillan 1995). Liberal states, founded on individual¶ rights such as equality before the law, free speech and civil liberty,¶ respect for private property and representative government, would not¶ have the same appetite for conflict and war. Peace was fundamentally a¶ question of establishing legitimate domestic orders throughout the world.¶ 'When the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments,¶ wars become impossible' (Doyle 1986: 1151).¶

I/R = Global Stability

International relations guarantee global stability – even tense relations won't escalate

Shuja '01 - Adjunct Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bond University, Australia (January 1, Sharif, "The Historical Myopia of International Relations," Contemporary Review, Vol. 278, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/THE+HISTORICAL+MYOPIA+OF+INTERNATIONAL+RELATIONS.-a070396453)//DWB

ALL nations are members of the community of nations and part of the international political system; each needs to deal in some measure with the other members. No one can stop the world and get off. We have to share the planet with each other, and the way in which we share it is what foreign policy is all about. Some nations depend a great deal on the international community for their security, their economic development and their way of life. Others may flourish in a more self-reliant or autarchic way. ¶ The international system has been described by some writers as representing a billiard table, on which the 191 or so sovereign independent countries behave like balls which bounce off each other in an unpredictable fashion, seeking only their own national interests; much of the energy generated by these collisions gives rise to conflict and war. It is argued that there is no guiding hand, no predictable behaviour, no pattern or order; the key principle is survival of the fittest; violence and war are integral to the system. ¶ At one extreme is thus pure conflict. It occurs when the interests of actors, such as states, or non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, are diametrically opposed: if one actor realises its goal, the other cannot achieve its objective. For example, in a conflict over territory, one state will gain the territory and the other will lose it. ¶ At the other extreme, the system is painted as a cobweb of relationships in which states, in spite of their formal claims to sovereignty and to complete control over their own affairs, are in fact closely linked together in an interdependence they cannot escape. It is an interdependence based on common global needs of economic development, environmental protection, ideological convergence and the need to avoid war. In such a situation, actors have a common interest, and all benefit from the pursuit of this shared interest. Allies, for example, have a common interest in ensuring their common defence, or colonies often have a common interest in achieving independence, or trading partners have a common interest in maintaining beneficial trading relations.¶ For large and small states alike, survival and welfare depend on close cooperation. Violence and war are seen as aberrations, rather than the norm, since they destroy the fabric of the cobweb and everyone loses. Because of this, most states recognise that violence is more or less becoming counter-productive and that more and more of their sovereignty must be surrendered for the common goal. The cobweb represents an ordered framework of behaviour which the great majority of states adhere to for most of the time. ¶ Most international interaction contains elements of both conflict and cooperation. Even in situations of extreme conflict, there is often an element of co-operation. For example, despite the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over placing missiles in Cuba in 1962, both superpowers' interest in preventing the escalation of these conflicts into nuclear war and holocaust led to co-operation as their resolution. ¶ Conversely, in situations involving high levels of co-operation, there is often an element of conflict; and even when actors share interests, there is usually conflict over specific interests and specific solutions. For example, all states may want to establish and maintain a stable international monetary system; but some of these states may prefer a particular type of monetary system, such as a fixed exchange rate or a floating exchange rate regime, which satisfies their more specific national interests. Thus, within a framework of common goals, as argued in 1992, in The Politics of International Economic Relations, by Joan Edelman Spero, states disagree over the best means to achieve their common end.

Institutions k Peace

International institutions are key to ensure a safe global political environment

Irrespective of the view we have of the international system, there are a number of major global issues with which policy makers of all nations grapple. These are the imminence of violence; the containing and resolving of international conflict; the development gap between the wealthy few and the underdeveloped many; the protection of the environment, and the protection of human rights. Greater levels of co-operation between nation states are needed in meeting these challenges. ¶ In domestic politics, goal-seeking behaviour is regulated by government, which has the authority to make decisions for a society and the power to enforce those decisions. The characteristic that distinguishes international politics from internal politics is the absence of government. In the international system, no legitimate body has the authority to manage conflict or achieve common goals by making and enforcing decisions for the system; instead, the decision-making authority is dispersed among many governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental groups. ¶ Because there is no international government, the central problems of international politics are the adjustment or management of conflict and the achievement of co-operation. Over the years, actors have devised rules, institutions and procedures to manage international conflict and co-operation. These forms of managing international order have varied over time and issues. They range from balances of power to alliances and to international organisations, from hegemony to colonialism and to international law. Even during the Cold War period, efforts were made to contain and reduce armed conflict through several 'layers of management'. ¶ Firstly, the two superpowers - the USA and the USSR - established a loose duopoly, and between them they managed global strategy, more or less effectively, at the nuclear level and they controlled, to a considerable degree, the behaviour of their allies and clients at other levels, all according to a set of mostly tacit rules and understandings. ¶ Secondly, this superpower 'management' was codified and elaborated by a range of explicit bilateral and multilateral regional alliances between each superpower and its respective allies. This network of military arrangements, though sometimes brittle and unstable, has brought about a reasonably 'safe' distribution of military power.¶ At the third level, the international community has put in place the apparatus of global collective security in the United Nations. Many of the key provisions of the UN Charter, such as, the role of the Security Council, the establishment of peace-keeping forces, the process of the peaceful resolution of conflict, the International Court of Justice and so on, are all designed to prevent or limit the use of violence between nations. These different layers of management in practice merge into each other. Together they give us the relative degree of safety from violence that we currently enjoy.

N/L: Lib =/= Conflict Focus

Liberalism focuses on more than just political power – it recognizes the importance of "everyday" interactions instead of just conflicts

A leading exponent of realism is Hans Morgenthau. Realists focus on power and conflict as the dynamic elements of international politics and pay particular attention to the military dimensions of power. States are seen to be motivated by the pursuit of their national interests; in pursuing those interests, states are influenced by the prevailing 'balance of power'. Although the concept of 'balance of power' can be interpreted in various ways, it may be defined as the way in which power is distributed within international politics, particular among the major states. ¶ A more recent version of realism is 'neorealism'. Kenneth Waltz is often considered its leading exponent. Neorealism is not so much concerned with the alleged metaphysical dimensions of power as with the logical character of state behaviour in an anarchical world. This theory contends that a major influence on a state's behaviour is the fact that it has to look to its survival in a state of anarchy. Neorealists believe that the structure of the system enables them to predict the likelihood of a state's actions given that particular state's location in this anarchical world. ¶ On the other hand, one can consider liberalism or liberal institutionalism as an alternative to realism and neorealism. This approach puts more emphasis on the economic dimensions of power. The state remains important but less so than in the realist paradigm, and more attention is given to the ways in which states cooperate as well as compete. Interdependence is suggested as an alternative. The latter term points to the way in which the various actors in the world are linked in a variety of ways. Because liberalism emphasises the role of 'low politics', liberal theorists pay more attention to the 'everyday' character of these interactions and distinguish them from the more dramatic developments in the 'high politics' of realism.

Lib/Govt k Stability

Sovereign governments are key to ensure political stability – worth it even at a small violation of rights

These perspectives are helpful in understanding the dynamics of international politics. But the peculiarities of the international system insist that each nation state has a compulsion to strengthen its economy, to deepen its defence capability and to maximise its economic welfare, if necessary at the expense of other states. To achieve these objectives, each nation state maintains sovereign control over its resources and its people, and uses and disposes of both as it thinks fit. The system expects that each nation state play a self-interested game in order to survive. Where then is there a place for principles of humanity, compassion and morality in efforts to reduce the development gap? To what extent can Great Powers in the post-Cold War period participate in attempts to introduce more equity, peace and order into the international community? Despite hopes to the contrary, the post-Cold War world has not witnessed the end of international conflict. In Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, issues of war and peace continue to present challenges to the international community. More than ever, world problems require careful thinking, creative research, fresh ideas, and practical approaches, if they are to be solved. ¶ These questions are relevant since the world now is becoming a global village. And we are all enmeshed in a 'cobweb of interdependence', and we all have to deal with these difficult global issues. These, along with other issues including globalisation and an expansion of information technology that have given rise to a new wave of changes in international relations, will be the focus of my next article.

Lib Fails

Liberalism fails through a litany of reasons – inconsistent theorists, unregulated political judging, no brightline to objective-subjective politics

McCormick '99

(John P., Assistant Political Science Pf - Yale, American Political Science Review. v93, p. June 1999)//akim

In the 1920s Schmitt criticized liberal legal theory for avoiding the reality of jurisprudence by denying the existence of gaps within the law: the fact that the formal rules of statutory law cannot possibly cover all instances of concrete reality. Liberalism (1) demotes judges to the status of mere vending machines that mechanically dispense the law upon cases, without intellectual reflection or active contribution, and (2) leaves the legal theorist inadequately equipped to analyze exactly how the law is applied. According to Schmitt's "decisionist" alternative to liberalism, only a person, not a rule within a larger system, can determine how to enforce or realize the law. Purely formal jurisprudence endangers the "personality" of judges, their ability to engage in the concrete particularity of a given case, by confining them to the mechanical application of a pre-given statute. For Schmitt, between the law and concrete reality there will always be a gap that must be mediated by a judge. This is the "humanity" or "life" of the law. According to Schmitt's account, liberal jurists refuse to acknowledge anything but formal imperatives in adjudication.6 Moreover, they pretend that the law is applied consistently and appropriately most or all of the time. CLS ultimately indicts postwar North American liberal adjudication on the same grounds. Less concerned with metaphysical assertions about juridical "reality" or "life" than Schmitt-indeed, questioning the very existence of such phenomena- CLS points primarily to the uncertain nature of meaning in language as the source of the indeterminacy of deciding cases. Legal rules are so far from clear regarding where and how they should be applied that there is no possibility of their being applied consistently or objectively. According to CLS, this shakes the very foundations of liberal formalist notions of efficiency and justice. As a result of this lack of determinacy, both Schmitt and CLS conclude that, to some extent, judges make the law. The difference is that CLS wishes to expose the subjective decision making that goes on behind the supposedly objective formal rule of law in order to undermine the generally conservative rulings of judges. Schmitt wants to emphasize the personal quality of decisions so that conservative rulings may be rendered with less liberal constraint. But the theories may converge in more fundamentally disconcerting ways, as will be seen below. The subjective-judging criticism also allows both [foot notes] 414 Schmitt and CLS to criticize legal liberalism for falsely separating politics from the law. For both there is no sharp distinction between objective law and subjectively biased politics. Such scholars as Tushnet (1984, 1986, 1988), Boyle (1985), Unger (1975), -and most recently and elaborately Kennedy (1997) argue that political value judgments infiltrate the law at every turn. The law embodies specific political and, especially, economic values, such as self-interest, individualism, and advantage, and it reflects the personal prejudices of particular judges. There is no consensus in the CLS literature on the exact nature of these judicial prejudices (see Tushnet 1981). Kennedy (1997, 1-5, 115) is perhaps most cynical in his assertion that judges generally pursue "ideological projects" of varying stripes but mostly decide cases so as to curry favor with, and secure the interests of, what he calls the "intelligentsia"- New York intellectuals and Beltway insiders. Moreover, judges deny such strategic political behavior, according to Kennedy (1997, 5), in deliberate "bad faith."7 CLS acknowledges the presence of more progressive countervalues in legal discourse, such as solidarity and altruism, which also constitute the human psyche, but these seem overwhelmed by the more conservative ones mentioned above (Tushnet 1985). Worse still for CLS, the very pervasiveness of contradictory values embedded in different laws and precedents makes manifest the incoherence of the whole system, a system in perpetual war with itself. For Schmitt as well, legal formalism is compromised politically, despite claims of being insulated from politics. The fact that the "personality" of judges interacts with the law makes for unacknowledged state action. The emphasis on "abstractly valid" principles, in particular, betrays liberalism's prejudice against Schmitt's preferred model; namely, the more subjective, personalist theories of judging associated with European absolutism. Yet, as a result of this denial and bias, liberalism allows such political judging to proliferate undetected, unmonitored, and unregulated.

Institutions K Solve Warm

Their call to reject all existing institutions guarantees warming happens

Monbiot 8

(George, English Writer and Environmental and Political Activist, 9-4, "Identity Politics in Climate Change Hell," http://www.celsias.com/article/identity-politics-climate-change-hell/)

If you want a glimpse of how the movement against climate change could crumble faster than a summer snowflake, read Ewa Jasiewicz's article , published on the Guardian's Comment is Free site. It is a fine example of the identity politics that plagued direct action movements during the 1990s, and from which the new generation of activists has so far been mercifully free. Ewa rightly celebrates the leaderless, autonomous model of organising that has made this movement so effective. The two climate camps I have attended – this year and last – were among the most inspiring events I've ever witnessed. I am awed by the people who organised them, who managed to create, under extraordinary pressure, safe, functioning, delightful spaces in which we could debate the issues and plan the actions which thrust Heathrow and Kingsnorth into the public eye. Climate camp is a tribute to the anarchist politics that Jasiewicz supports. But in seeking to extrapolate from this experience to a wider social plan, she makes two grave errors. The first is to confuse ends and means. She claims to want to stop global warming, but she makes that task 100 times harder by rejecting all state and corporate solutions. It seems to me that what she really wants to do is to create an anarchist utopia, and use climate change as an excuse to engineer it. Stopping runaway climate change must take precedence over every other aim. Everyone in this movement knows that there is very little time: the window of opportunity in which we can prevent two degrees of warming is closing fast. We have to use all the resources we can lay hands on, and these must include both governments and corporations. Or perhaps she intends to build the installations required to turn the energy economy around - wind farms, wave machines, solar thermal plants in the Sahara, new grid connections and public transport systems - herself? Her article is a terryifying example of the ability some people have to put politics first and facts second when confronting the greatest challenge humanity now faces. The facts are as follows. Runaway climate change is bearing down on us fast. We require a massive political and economic response to prevent it. Governments and corporations, whether we like it or not, currently control both money and power. Unless we manage to mobilise them, we stand a snowball's chance in climate hell of stopping the collapse of the biosphere. Jasiewicz would ignore all these inconvenient truths because they conflict with her politics. "Changing our sources of energy without changing our sources of economic and political power", she asserts, "will not make a difference. Neither coal nor nuclear are the "solution", we need a revolution." So before we are allowed to begin cutting greenhouse gas emissions, we must first overthrow all political structures and replace them with autonomous communities of happy campers. All this must take place within a couple of months, as there is so little time in which we could prevent two degrees of warming. This is magical thinking of the most desperate kind. If I were an executive of E.On or Exxon, I would be delighted by this political posturing, as it provides a marvellous distraction from our real aims. To support her argument, Jasiewicz misrepresents what I said at climate camp. She claims that I "confessed not knowing where to turn next to solve the issues of how to generate the changes necessary to shift our sources of energy, production and consumption". I confessed nothing of the kind. In my book Heat I spell out what is required to bring about a 90% cut in emissions by 2030. Instead I confessed that I don't know how to solve the problem of capitalism without resorting to totalitarianism. The issue is that capitalism involves lending money at interest. If you lend at 5%, then one of two things must happen. Either the money supply must increase by 5% or the velocity of circulation must increase by 5%. In either case, if this growth is not met by a concomitant increase in the supply of goods and services, it becomes inflationary and the system collapses. But a perpetual increase in the supply of goods and services will eventually destroy the biosphere. So how do we stall this process? Even when usurers were put to death and condemned to perpetual damnation, the practice couldn't be stamped out. Only the communist states managed it, through the extreme use of the state control Ewa professes to hate. I don't yet have an answer to this conundrum. Does she? Yes, let us fight both corporate power and the undemocratic tendencies of the state. Yes, let us try to crack the problem of capitalism and then fight for a different system. But let us not confuse this task with the immediate need to stop two degrees of warming, or allow it to interfere with the carbon cuts that have to begin now. Ewa's second grave error is to imagine that society could be turned into a giant climate camp. Anarchism is a great means of organising a self-elected community of like-minded people. It is a disastrous means of organising a planet. Most anarchists envisage their system as the everyone is to be free from the coercive power of the state, this must apply to the oppressors as well as the oppressed. The richest and most powerful communities on earth - be they geographical communities or communities of interest - will be as unrestrained by external forces as the poorest and weakest. As a friend of mine put it, "when the means by which the oppressed can free themselves from persecution. But if anarchist utopia arrives, the first thing that will happen is that every Daily Mail reader in the country will pick up a gun and go and kill the nearest hippy." This is why, though both sides furiously deny it, the outcome of both market fundamentalism and anarchism, if applied universally, is identical. The anarchists associate with the oppressed, the market fundamentalists with the oppressors. But by eliminating the state, both remove such restraints as prevent the strong from crushing the weak. Ours is not a choice between government and no government. It is a choice between government and the mafia. Over the past year I have been working with groups of climate protesters who have changed my view of what could be achieved. Most of them are under 30, and they bring to this issue a clear-headedness and pragmatism that I have never encountered in direct action movements before. They are prepared to take extraordinary risks to try to defend the biosphere from the corporations, governments and social trends which threaten to make it uninhabitable. They do so for one reason only: that they love the world and fear for its future. It would be a tragedy if, through the efforts of people like Ewa, they were to be diverted from this urgent task into the identity politics that have wrecked so many movements.

Institutions Inevitable

You can't just wish away institutions

McCormack 10

(Tara, Leicester international politics lecturer, Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches, pg 58)

Contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches reject the possibility of reaching an objective evaluation of the world or social reality because they reject the possibility of differentiating between facts and values. For the contemporary critical theorists, theory can only ever be for someone and for some purpose. As this is so then quite logically critical theorists elevate their own values to be the most important aspect of critical theory. As a result of the rejection of the fact/value distinction we see within the work of contemporary critical theorists a highly unreflective certainty about the power of their moral position. Critical theorists argue that all theory is normative, they offer in its place better norms: ones, as we have seen, that will lead to emancipation and will help the marginalised. The claims made for the central role of the values of the theorist reveal the theoretical limits of critical and emancipatory theory today. Yet even good or critical theory has no agency, and only political action can lead to change. Theory does of course play an important role in political change. This must be the first step towards a critical engagement with contemporary power structures and discourses. In this sense, we can see that it is critical theory that really has the potential to solve problems, unlike problem-solving theory which seeks only to ensure the smooth functioning of the existing order. Through substantive analysis the critical theorist can transcend the narrow and conservative boundaries of problem-solving theory by explaining how the problematic arises. Unlike problem-solving theory, critical theory makes claims to be able to explain why and how the social world functions as it does, it can go beyond the 'given framework for action'. The critical theorist must therefore be able to differentiate between facts (or social reality) and values, this ability is what marks the critical theorist apart from the traditional or problem-solving theorists, who cannot, because of their values and commitment to the existing social world, go beyond the 'given framework for action'. If we cannot differentiate between our desires or values or norms (or our perspective, to put it in Cox's terms) and actually occurring social and political and historical processes and relationships, it is hard to see how we can have a critical perspective (Jahn, 1998: 614). Rather, through abolishing this division we can no longer draw the line between what we would like and everything else, and thereby contemporary critical theories are as much of a dogma as problem-solving theories. Contemporary critical theorists are like modern-day alchemists, believing that they can transform the base metal of the unjust international order into a golden realm of equality and justice through their own words. For contemporary critical theorists, all that seems that the crucial step towards progress to a better world order is for the theorist to state that their theory is for the purposes of emancipation and a just world order.

Wilderson/Anti-Blackness

AT: structural antagonism

Antiblackness is not the foundational structure of violence – their analysis is overdetermined by discrete historical events that do not make sense together – their reading of black social life is ontological fatalism, this is based on social factors that are subject to change

Hudson 13

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Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn't excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered "ontological"), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is **not determined** once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is **nowhere engraved in ontological stone** but is political and never terminally settled. Put differently, the "curvature of intersubjective space" (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific modes of the "othering" of "otherness" are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see **Wilderson** 2008). **The social does not have to be divided into white and black**, and the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side of the **ontic** – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn't exist, the black man doesn't exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. "Whiteness" may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the "ontological difference" (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not follow that the "void" of "black being" functions as the ultimate substance the transcendental signified **on which all possible forms of sociality** are said to rest. What gets lost here, then, is the **specificity** of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its "ontological" differential. A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and the imaginary give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the "lived experience" (vécu) of the colonised subject. The colonised is "traversing the fantasy" (Zizek 2006a, 40–60) all the time; the void of the verb "to be" is the very content of his interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work, who is left stranded by his very interpellation.4 "Fixed" into "non-fixity," he is eternally suspended between "element" and "moment"5 – he is where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism. Be this

as it may, whiteness and blackness are (sustained by) determinate and **contingent practices** of signification; the "structuring relation" of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how tight, can always be undone. **Anti-colonial** – i.e., anti-"white" –modes of struggle are not (just) "psychic" 6 but involve the "**reactivation**" (or "de-sedimentation")7 of colonial objectivity itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it can't totalise or make sense of, where its production of meaning falters. This is its internal limit point, its real:9 an errant "object" that has no place of its own, isn't recognised in the categories of the system but is produced by it – its "part of no part" or "object small a."10 Correlative to this object "a" is the subject "stricto sensu" – i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an identity that pins it down.11 That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from "subject" position based on a determinate identity.

Afro-pessimism's dogmatism reifies the failures of defining static identities—blackness is reduced to incapacity which recreates violence of universality by actively refusing to understand contingency

David **Marriott 12**, "Black Cultural Studies", Years Work Crit Cult Theory (2012) 20 (1): 37-66

However, this is also not the entire story of Red, White, and Black, as I hope to show. For example, in Chapter One ('The Structure of Antagonisms'), written as a theoretical introduction, and which opens explicitly on the Fanonian question of why ontology cannot understand the being of the Black, Wilderson is prepared to say that black suffering is not only beyond analogy, it also refigures the whole of being: 'the essence of being for the White and non-Black position' is non-niggerness, consequently, '[b]eing can thus be thought of, in the first ontological instance, as non-niggerness, and slavery then as niggerness' (p. 37). It is not hard when reading such sentences to suspect a kind of absolutism at work here, and one that manages to be **peculiarly and dispiritingly dogmatic**: throughout Red, White, and Black, despite variations in tone and emphasis, there is always the desire to have black lived experience **named as the worst** and the politics of such a desire inevitably collapses into a kind of **sentimental moralism**: for the claim that 'Blackness is incapacity in its most pure and unadulterated form' means merely that **the black has to embody this abjection** without reserve (p. 38). This logic—and the denial of any kind of 'ontological integrity' to the Black/Slave due to its endless traversal by force does seem **to reduce ontology to logic**, namely, a logic **of non-recuperability**—moves through the following points: (1) Black non-being is not capable of symbolic resistance and, as such, falls outside of any language of authenticity or reparation; (2) for such a subject, which Wilderson persists in calling 'death', the symbolic remains foreclosed (p. 43); (3) as such, Blackness is the record of an occlusion which remains ever present: 'White (Human) capacity, in advance of the event of discrimination or oppression, is parasitic on Black incapacity' (p. 45); (4) and, as an example of the institutions or discourses involving 'violence', 'antagonisms' and 'parasitism', Wilderson describes White (or non-Black) film theory and cultural studies as incapable of understanding the 'suffering of the Black—the Slave' (they cannot do so because they are erroneously wedded to humanism and to the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, which Wilderson takes as two examples of what the Afro-pessimist should avoid) (p. 56); as a corrective, Wilderson calls for a new language of abstraction, and one centrally concerned with exposing 'the structure of antagonisms between Blacks and Humans' (p. 68). Reading seems to stop here, at a critique of Lacanian full speech: Wilderson wants to say that Lacan's notion of the originary (imaginary) alienation of the subject is still wedded to relationality as implied by the contrast between 'empty' and 'full' speech, and so apparently cannot grasp the trauma of 'absolute Otherness' that is the Black's relation to Whites, because psychoanalysis cannot fathom the 'structural, or absolute, violence' of Black life (pp. 74; 75). 'Whereas Lacan was aware of how language ''precedes and exceeds us'', he did not have Fanon's awareness of how violence also precedes and exceeds Blacks' (p. 76). The violence of such abjection—or incapacity—is therefore that it cannot be communicated or avowed, and is always already delimited by desubjectification and dereliction (p. 77). Whence the suspicion of an ontology reduced to a logic (of abjection). Leaving aside the fact that it is quite mistaken to limit Lacan's notion of full speech to the search for communication (the unconscious cannot be confined to parole), it is clear that, according to Wilderson's own 'logic', his description of the Black is working, via analogy, to Lacan's notion of the real but, in his insistence on the Black as an absolute outside Wilderson can only duly **reify this void at the heart of universality**. The Black is 'beyond the limit of contingency'—but it is worth saying immediately that this 'beyond' is indeed a foreclosure that defines a violence whose traces can only be thought violently (that is, analogically), and whose nonbeing returns as the theme for Wilderson's political thinking of a non-recuperable abjection. The Black is

nonbeing and, as such, is more real and primary than being per se: given how much is at stake, this insistence on a racial metaphysics of injury implies a fundamental irreconcilability between Blacks and Humans (there is really no debate to be had here: irreconcilability is the condition and possibility of what it means to be Black).

Sequencing question – immunity is the nexus of antagonism and gratuitous violence – recognizing the political bases of violence is key

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("Between Interpellation and Immunization: Althusser, Balibar, Esposito," Postmodern Culture Volume 22, Number 3, May 2012)

The work of Roberto Esposito on immunity may well appear to be inscribed in a different register than that of Althusser and Balibar. As a response to some of the theoretical problems engendered by Foucault's work on biopower, particularly that "interval of meaning which remains open in Foucault's text between the constitutive poles of the concept of biopolitics, namely biology and politics," it would seem to address the question of the appropriation of life by politics that in a certain way would allow us to **sidestep or circumvent** the question of the subject altogether. Reading Esposito in the light of the foregoing discussion, however, we cannot escape the sense that the opposition between communitas and immunitas is another way to think the constitutive aporia of the subject and the **irreducible conflict** at the heart of the notion of citizen. As Esposito demonstrates, **the concept of immunity is political before it is biological.** Communitas or community is not only not "a property belonging to subjects that joins them together," the totality to which they would pertain before their separation into individuals; it is not even a thing (the res publica) that could be substantified as that which individuals "share" or possess (Communitas 8). If we can speak of a sharing, it would be the sharing of a munus, an obligation, a debt, a tax, even the paradox of an obligatory gift, the sharing of which Esposito describes as a **lack or void.** Communitas is thus not more than the individual, but less; it does not add but subtracts and is finally the experience of destitution and expropriation (depropriazione) (6-7). Such a subject is subject of and to debt and despoliation: an outside that marks its own limit is rediscovered within, as that which **separates each subject from itself**. It is here, in a gesture whose timing in relation to the argument concerning the subject's relation to communitas as well as whose content can only remind us of Althusser, that Esposito turns to Scripture and the example not of Moses but of Paul. Even fellowship, κοινότης, in the community of the faithful, the κοινωνία, is a "taking part in" that entails a loss and a diminution, a participation in a loss of freedom that is δούλεια or slavery in Christ, in whose death one must participate (11). These, of course, are the images of subjection so total that the subjected subject is threatened with extinction, a destitution that leaves no remainder. It is in relation to the "unacceptable" as well as "unbearable" munus, in which the subject is lost to itself at the heart of the Christian communitas, that the countermovement of immunization takes place. Immunity emerges as the demand for exemption from debt, obligation, service, and above all from the shared debt of communitas, which is now experienced at the extreme as a claim on one's life and therefore as the threat of death. Every social tie becomes a threat against which the subject must be immunized by as complete a separation as possible from others whose **claims on him can be ignored with impunity** (a term closely related to immunity). Immunity evacuates the void of the munus by **emptying the common: there is nothing in common**. But the subject thus free from obligation and from the **movement of alienation and exteriorization** represented by the munus, a subject therefore restored to the self-sovereignty and self-proprietorship that community had denied it--the subject, that is, in the modern sense—can only become and remain a subject in this sense **by virtue of its subjection** to **that which will protect or immunize it against the threats to its autonomy**. The subject thus can exercise sovereignty over itself (over its life, property, and liberty) only to the extent that it is subjected or **subjects itself to the sovereign power capable of assuring its immunity**. To translate this into Althusser's idiom, there is no subject except by and through subjection. It is, at least in part, on the terrain of Hobbes's philosophy that the **link between interpellation and immunization becomes intelligible**: "the Leviathan-state coincides with the breaking [la dissociazione] of every communitarian bond, with the squelching [l'abolizione] of every social relation that is foreign to the vertical exchange of protection-obedience" (14). As Esposito argues, this state is the denial of the very possibility of relation, not only of the cum, as if human beings are originally separated and unite only secondarily, but even of the entire transindividual dimension from which the juridical individual cannot be disentangled and extricated without violence and loss and without **being deprived of that part of himself** that is in common **with others and nevertheless proper to him.** In fact, taken to its logical conclusion, which is, as Esposito notes, paradoxically a remnant of irrationality, individuals are "preserved" and "protected" **only at the cost of the very sociality** that makes their existence in a material as well as cultural sense possible: "they live in and of their refusal to live together [convivere]" (14). Every possible combination, coagulation, and

confusion in which the juridical individual might become **lost or dispersed** - or, on the contrary, might become part of a composite singularity ranging from couples, in particular (the INSERT DESCRIPTION - inline graphic or "one flesh" of the first couple--a phrase establishing that their separation could only be a tearing or laceration of the composite but irreducible body they had become), to collectivities of all kinds, whether "natural" or "artificial"-is abolished and replaced by the relation between subject and Subject. In fact, politics itself becomes prevention, not only the prevention of war, but just as importantly a prophylaxis against any exposure to others that would automatically carry the danger of transindividual contagion and a weakening of the **vertical relation of subjection**. Hence the immunitary practice that both precedes and accompanies interpellation as its simultaneous condition and result.

AT: Affirmation of Self

Their deployment of identity/social location/privilege arguments shuts down effective collective action – this reifies racism and leads to endless squabbling about authenticity

Rob 13

(the Idealist, Carleton College, JD candidate, 10/1, Tim Wise & The Failure of Privilege Discourse, www.orchestratedpulse.com/2013/10/tim-wise-failure-privilege-discourse/)

I don't find it meaningful to criticize Tim Wise the person and judge whether he's living up to some anti-racist bona fides. Instead, I choose to focus on the paradigm of "White privilege" upon which his work is based, and its conceptual and practical limitations. Although the personal is political, not all politics is personal; we have to attack **systems**. To paraphrase the urban poet and philosopher Meek Mill: there are levels to this shit. How I Define Privilege There are power structures that shape individuals' lived experiences. Those structures provide and withhold resources to people based on factors like class, disability status, gender, and race. It's not a "benefit" to receive resources from an unjust order because ultimately, injustice is cannibalistic. Slavery binds the slave, but destroys the master. So, the point then becomes not to assimilate the "underprivileged", but to instead eradicate the power structures that create the privileges in the first place. The conventional wisdom on privilege often says that it's "benefits" are "unearned". However, this belief ignores the reality and history that privilege is earned and maintained through violence. Systemic advantages are allocated and secured as a class, and simply because an individual hasn't personally committed the acts, it does not render their class dominance unearned. The history and modern reality of violence is why Tim Wise' comparison between whiteness and tallness fails. White supremacy is not some natural evolution, nor did it occur by happenstance. White folks *murdered* people for this thing that we often call "White privilege"; it was bought and paid for by blood and terror. White supremacy is not some benign invisible knapsack. The same interplay between violence and advantage is true of any systemic hierarchy (class, gender, disability, etc). Being tall, irrespective of its advantages, does not follow that pattern of violence. Privilege is Failing Us Unfortunately, I think our use of the term "privilege" is no longer a productive way for us to gain a thorough understanding of systemic injustice, nor is it helping us to develop collective strategies to dismantle those systems. Basically, **I never want to hear the word "privilege" again** because **the term is so thoroughly misused at this point that it does more harm than good.** Andrea Smith, in the essay "The Problem with Privilege", outlines the pitfalls of misapplied privilege theory. Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered... Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Dr. Tommy Curry says it more bluntly, "It's not genius to say that in an oppressive society there are benefits to being in the superior class instead of the inferior one. That's true in any hierarchy, that's not an 'aha' moment." Conceptually, privilege is best used when narrowly focused on explaining how structures generally shape experiences. However, when we overly personalize the problem, then privilege becomes a tit-for-tat exercise in blame, shame, and guilt. In its worst manifestations, this dynamic becomes "oppression Olympics" and people tally perceived life advantages and identities in order to invalidate one another. At best, we treat structural injustice as a personal problem, and moralizing exercises like "privilege confessions" inadequately address the nexus between systemic power and individual behavior. The undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural forms of oppression. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Bigger than Tim Wise However, the problem with White privilege isn't simply that Tim Wise, a white man, can build a career off of Black struggles. As I've already said, White people need to talk to White people about the historical and social construction of their racial identities and power, and the foundation for that conversation often comes from past Black theory and political projects. The problem for me is that privilege work has become a cottage industry of self-help

moralizing that **in no way attacks** the systemic ills that create the personal injustices in the first place. A **substantive critique of privilege requires us to get beyond identity politics**. It's not about good people and bad people; it's a bad system. It's not just White people that participate in the White privilege industry, although not everyone equally benefits/profits (see: Tim Wise). Dr. Tommy Curry takes elite Black academics to task for their role in profiting from the White privilege industry while offering no challenge to White supremacy. These conversations about White privilege are not conversations about race, and certainly not about racism; it's a business where Blacks market themselves as racial therapists for White people… The White privilege discourse became a bourgeois distraction. It's a tool that we use to morally condemn whites for not supporting the political goals of elite black academics that take the vantages of white notions of virtue and reformism and persuade departments, journals, and presses into making concessions for the benefit of a select species of Black intellectuals in the Ivory Tower, without seeing that the white racial vantages that these Black intellectuals claim they're really interested in need to be dissolved, need to be attacked all the way to the very bottom of American society. Dr. Tommy Curry, Radio Interview The truth is that a lot of people, marginalized groups included, simply want more access to existing systems of power. They don't want to challenge and push beyond these systems; they just want to participate. So if we continue to play identity politics and persist with a personal privilege view of power, then **we will lose the struggle**. Barack Obama is president, yet White supremacy marches on, and often with his help (record deportations, expanded a drone war based on profiling, fought on behalf of US corporations to repeal a Haitian law that raised the minimum wage). Adolph Reed, writing in 1996, predicted the quagmire of identity politics in the Age of Obama. In Chicago, for instance, we've gotten a foretaste of the new breed of foundation-hatched black communitarian voices; one of them, a smooth Harvard lawyer with impeccable do-good credentials and vacuous-to-repressive neoliberal politics, has won a state senate seat on a base mainly in the liberal foundation and development worlds. His fundamentally bootstrap line was softened by a patina of the rhetoric of authentic community, talk about meeting in kitchens, small-scale solutions to social problems, and the predictable elevation of process over program — the point where identity politics converges with old-fashioned middle-class reform in favoring form over substance. I suspect that his ilk is the wave of the future in U.S. black politics. Adolph Reed Jr., Class Notes: Posing As Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene Although it has always been the case, Obama's election and subsequent presidency has made it starkly clear that it's not just White people that can perpetuate White supremacy. Systems of oppression condition all members of society to accept systemic injustice, and there are (unequal) incentives for both marginalized and dominant groups to perpetuate these structures. Our approaches to injustice must reflect this reality. This isn't a naïve plea for "unity", nor am I saying that talking about identities/experiences is inherently "divisive". Many of these privilege discussions use empathy to build personal and collective character, and there certainly should be space for us to work together to improve/heal ourselves and one another. People will always make mistakes and our spaces have to be flexible enough to allow for reconciliation. Though we don't have to work with persistently abusive people who refuse to redirect their behavior, there's a difference between establishing boundaries and puritanism. Fighting systemic marginalization and exploitation requires more than good character, and **we cannot fetishize personal morals over collective action**.

Ethics B4 Ontology

Ethics/language precedes ontology---black body doesn't have any fixed meaning until it's constructed in a discursive community---we aren't <u>speaking from nowhere</u>---the body can reject the ontological fixity of the white gaze

Yancy 5

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body. Hence, I write from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to "expose" is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone's "inferior" reasoning power. The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of "us" without the slightest mention of his or her "raced" identity. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes: Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "whiteness" of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; <u>to speak</u> (apparently) <u>from nowhere</u>, for everyone, <u>is empowering,</u> though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But <u>such an authorship</u> and authority <u>is also pleasurable</u>: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or [End Page 215] apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials. (1998, 6) <u>To theorize the Black body one must "turn to the [Black] body as the radix for interpreting racial experience</u>" (Johnson [1993, 600]).1 It is important to note that this particular strategy also functions as a lens through which to theorize and critique whiteness; for the Black body's "racial" experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the "raced" white body. **However, there is no denying that my own "racial" experiences or the social performances of whiteness can become objects of critical reflection.** In this paper, <u>my objective is to describe and theorize situations where the Black body's subjectivity, its lived reality, is reduced to instantiations of the white imaginary, resulting in what I refer to as "the phenomenological return of the Black body.</u>"2 These instantiations are embedded within and evolve out of the complex social and historical interstices of whites' efforts at self-construction through complex acts of erasure vis-à-vis Black people. These acts of self-construction, however, are myths/ideological constructions predicated upon maintaining white power. As James Snead has noted, "Mythification is the replacement of history with a surrogate ideology of [white] elevation or [Black] demotion along a scale of human value" (Snead 1994, 4). <u>How I understand and theorize the body relates to the fact that the body</u>—in this case, the Black body—is **capable of undergoing a sociohistorical process of "phenomenological return" vis-à-vis white embodiment.** <u>The body's meaning</u>—whether phenotypically white or black— <u>its ontology,</u> its modalities of aesthetic performance, its comportment, <u>its "raciated" reproduction,</u> **is in constant contestation. The hermeneutics of the body, how it is understood,** how it is "seen," **its "truth,"** is partly <u>the result of a</u> profound historical, ideological <u>construction</u>. "<u>The body" is positioned by historical practices and discourses.</u> The body is codified as this or that in terms of meanings that are sanctioned, scripted, and constituted through processes of negotiation that are embedded within and serve various ideological interests that are grounded within further power-laden social processes. <u>The</u> **historical** <u>plasticity of the body,</u> <u>the fact that it is a site of contested meanings, speaks</u> to the <u>historicity</u> of its "being" <u>as lived</u> and meant within the interstices of social semiotics. Hence: a) **the body is less of a** thing/**being than a** shifting/**changing historical meaning that is subject to** cultural configuration/**reconfiguration. The point** here **is to** interrogate the "Black body" as a "**fixed** and material **truth" that preexists** "**its** relations with **the world and with** others"3 ; b) <u>the body's meaning is</u> fundamentally **symbolic** (McDowell 2001, 301), <u>and its meaning is</u> **congealed** through **symbolic repetition** and iteration that emits certain signs and presupposes <u>certain n</u>orms; and, c) <u>the body is a battlefield,</u> one **that is fought over again and again** across particular historical moments and within particular social spaces. "In other words, **the concept of the body provides only** <u>the illusion of</u> **self-evidence**, facticity, 'thereness' for something [End Page 216] <u>fundamentally</u> ephemeral, imaginary, something made in the image of particular social groups" (301). On this score, <u>it is not only</u> the "Black body" that **defies the ontic fixity projected upon it** through the white gaze, and, hence, <u>through the episteme of</u> whiteness, but <u>the white body is also fundamentally symbolic, requiring demystification of its status as norm,</u> the paragon of

beauty, order, innocence, purity, restraint, and nobility. In other words, given the three suppositions above, both the "Black body" and the "white body" lend themselves to processes of interpretive fracture and to strategies of interrogating and removing the veneer of their alleged objectivity.

Wilderson = Reductive

Wilderson is overly reductive---he has no way to explain historical resistance to anti-blackness because his theory pigeon holes all oppression into the non-falsifiable register of psychoanalysis

Bâ 11

(Saër Maty, prof of film at Portsmouth University, The US Decentred, http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/article/view/2304/2474)

As we shall see below, blacks in the US cannot and do not have ontology, or so Wilderson argues, denying with the same breath the workability of analogy as a method, because analogy can only be a ruse. Thus, what he calls 'the ruse of analogy' grants those who fall for it, for example, 'Black film theorists' or Black academics, an opportunity to reflect on (black) cinema only after some form of structural alteration. (38) Analogy does seem tricky if one follows Wilderson's line of thought, that is, the Holocaust/Jews and slavery/Africans. Jews entered and came out of Auschwitz as Jews whereas Africans emerged from the slave ships as Blacks.2 Two types of holocaust: the first

'Human', the second 'Human and metaphysical', something which leads to Wilderson saying that 'the Jews have the Dead ... among them; the Dead have the Black among them'. (38) It bears reiterating that for Wilderson, blacks are socially and ontologically dead in the sense that the black body has been violently turned into flesh, 'ripped apart literally and imaginatively', that

it is a body vulnerably open, 'an object made available (fungible) for any subject' and 'not in the world' or civil society the way white bodies are. (38)¶ Furthermore, Wilderson argues that differences between black and white ethical dilemmas separate them dialectically into incompatible zones. As illustration Wilderson reflects on black women suffering in US prisons in the 1970s and then juxtaposes the suffering with white women's concurrent public preoccupations in civil society. For example, the violence and neglect underwent by Safya Bukhari- Alston3 in solitary confinement at the Virginia Correctional Center for Women is linked to the similar plight of another black woman, Dorothy, in Haile Gerima's Bush Mama (1977) before Wilderson questions what both situations mean in relation to images of '[w]hite women burning bras in Harvard Square ... marching in ... Manhattan campaigning for equal rights'. (135) Wilderson's answer is that the images of female black pain and white

activism are irreconcilable precisely because they cannot be read against one another without such an exercise appearing intellectually sloppy. However, he does not develop this point preferring instead to examine suffering through 'a libidinal economy' (131) leading, predictably, to the conclusion that white radicalism, white political cinema and white supremacy are one and the same thing. Most unfortunate though inevitable is the reason Wilderson gives to justify this: a so-called 'anti-Blackness' that, ¶ [wilderson quote begins]¶ as opposed to white apathy, is necessary to White political radicalism and to White political cinema because it sutures affective, emotional, and even ethical solidarity between the ideological polar extremes of Whiteness. This necessary anti-Blackness erects a structural prohibition that one sees in White political discourse and in White political cinema. (131) [wilderson quote ends]¶ undamentally, the first three chapters of Red, White and Black are concerned with what it takes to think blackness and agency together ethically, or to permit ourselves intellectual mindful reflections upon the homicidal ontology of chattel slavery. Wilderson posits ways through which 'the dead' (blacks) reflect on how the living can be put 'out of the picture'. (143) There seems to be no let off or way out for blacks ('The Slave') in Wilderson's logic, an energetic and rigorous, if unforgiving and sustained, treadmill of damning analysis to which 'Indians'

('The "Savage"'/'The Red') will also be subjected, first through '"Savage" film' analysis.¶ <cont>¶ And yet Wilderson's highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the 'Diaspora' or 'African Diaspora', a key component in Yearwood's thesis that, crucially, neither navel-gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter-connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott's mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood's idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott's 1990s' theory of black

film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson's corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the US-centricity or 'social and political specificity of [his] filmography', (95) I am talking about Wilderson's choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge 'a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black "body", the Black "home", and the Black "community"' (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes's Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act(STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson's dubious and questionable conclusions on black film.¶ Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by

Wilderson's propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, '"Savage" Negrophobia', he writes ¶ [wilderson quote begins]¶ The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black 'style' ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say 'nigger' because anyone can be a 'nigger'. (235)7¶ [wilderson quote ends] ¶ Similarly, in chapter ten, 'A Crisis in the Commons', Wilderson

addresses the issue of 'Black time'. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are 'the ship hold of the Middle Passage': 'the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time' but also 'the "moment" of no time at all on the map of no place at all'. (279)¶ Not only does Pinho's more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians' and sociologists' works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz-studies books on cross-cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as 'belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking', (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti- Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film's badly planned sequel: 'How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.' (340)

AT: Libidinal Economy

Their insidious targeting arg relies on the libidinal economy which is wrong and cannot be the foundation for ethics or the political

Gordon 1

(Paul, psychotherapist living and working in London **Psychoanalysis and Racism**: The politics of defeat Race & Class v. 42, n. 4)

The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with disappointment. All the tragedies of the political project of emancipation ± the evils of Stalinism in particular ± are seen as the inevitable product of men and women trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into discourse and deconstruction and representation ± as though to interpret the world is more important than to change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'.58 To justify their flight from a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals and abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case, psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers `a world-historical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human-kind to be free. At every turn for such theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners: there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; however, once we grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax.59 Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory power of his new faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always `imagined', which, in his view, means based on fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are dismissed as `fantasies of self-sufficient combination'.60 In this scenario, the idea that people might come together, think together, analyse together and act together as rational beings is impossible. The idea of a genuine community of equals becomes a pure fantasy, a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the first place: `Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented traditions.'61 Now, this is not only non- sense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history `always false'? Did the Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always `imagined'? Or, as Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle? Furthermore, all attempts to legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other firrm action against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded `understand- ing' or even help through psychotherapy. It is indeed a strange kind of `anti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up. In their move from politics to the academy and the world of `discourse', the postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical materialism, for another, psychoanalysis.62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed radicalism of psycho- analysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret it, need to look elsewhere.

Impact Defense

AT: social death

Their politics is the wrong way to deal with social exclusion – resurrection from social death within soviereign spaces gets coopted and fails

Christopher **Peterson**, 20**07**, *Kindred Specters, Death, Mourning, and American Affinity*, University of Minnesota Press 2007

That Americanist literary criticism on the subject of mortality remains **implicated in the larger cultural disavowal** of dying suggests that we ought to reassess our critical energies, particularly as these powers are enlisted to address how American political ideology produces the "death" of racial and sexual others. Indeed, I would argue that such criticism **remains invested** - despite all claims to the contrary - **in an American exceptionalist project.** American exceptionalism names, in part, a **fetishization of novelty and futurity** that initially defined America against an ostensibly decaying and moribund Europe. As David Noble has argued, the doctrine of exceptionalism excluded America from "the human experience of birth, death, and rebirth" by figuring Europe in terms of time and America in terms of timeless space." If, as George Berkeley put it, America is "time's noblest offspring," history gives birth to its final progeny in order that the latter might escape time altogether. America thus becomes **eternally present** while "Europe breeds in her decay." If the "new world" qua new must deny mortality, then reanimating the excluded from within the terms of a dialectical reversal renews rather than dismantles the American exceptionalist project. Challenging the ideology of American exceptionalism is particularly crucial for a post-9/11 politics that aims to resist the transformation of American exposure to injury and death into a newly reconsolidated sense of innocence and immortality. As Donald Pease has argued, 9/11 transformed "virgin land" into "ground zero," effecting an ideological shift from a "secured innocent nation to a wounded, insecure emergency state."16 Drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben. Pease describes the emergency state as a nation that - by exempting itself from its own democratic rules of free speech, due process, and above all, the rules of war - marks a division between those whom the state protects from injury and those whom the state is free to injure and kill with impunity (13). The reduction of the Arab other to that which cannot be killed because it is already dead works to cover over the wound that ground zero opens up under the surface of virgin land. The emergency state (or what Agamben calls the "state of exception") thus also names a nation that attempts to except itself from the universal condition of mortality. As Bauman notes, "if mortality and transience are the norm among humans, durability may be attained only as an exception" (67, his emphasis).

Their historical reading is wrong

Vincent **Brown**, Prof. of History and African and African-American Studies @ Harvard Univ., December 20**09**, "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery," American Historical Review, p. 1231-1249

THE PREMISE OF ORLANDO PATTERSON'S MAJOR WORK, that enslaved Africans were natally alienated and culturally isolated, was challenged even before he published his influential thesis, primarily by scholars concerned with "survivals" or "retentions" of African culture and by historians of slave resistance. In the early to mid-twentieth century, when Robert Park's view of "the Negro" predominated among scholars, it was generally assumed that the slave trade and slavery had denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa. The historians Carter G. Woodson and W. E. B. Du Bois and the anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits argued the opposite. Their research supported the conclusion that while enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions with them to the Americas, they did maintain significant aspects of their cultural backgrounds.32 Herskovits ex- amined "Africanisms"—any practices that seemed to be identifiably African—as useful symbols of cultural survival that would help him to analyze change and continuity in African American culture.33 He engaged in one of his most heated scholarly disputes with the sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, a student of Park's, who empha- sized the damage wrought by slavery on black families and folkways.34 More recently, a number of scholars have built on Herskovits's line of thought, enhancing our understanding of African history during the era of the slave trade. Their studies have evolved productively from assertions about general cultural heritage into more precise demonstrations

of the continuity of worldviews, categories of belonging, and social practices from Africa to America. For these scholars, the preservation of distinctive cultural forms has served as an index both of a resilient social personhood, or identity, and of resistance to slavery itself. 35 Scholars of slave resistance have never had much use for the concept of social death. The early efforts of writers such as Herbert Aptheker aimed to derail the popular notion that American slavery had been a civilizing institution threatened by "slave crime."36 Soon after, studies of slave revolts and conspiracies advocated the idea that resistance demonstrated the basic humanity and intractable will of the enslaved—indeed, they often equated acts of will with humanity itself. As these writ- ers turned toward more detailed analyses of the causes, strategies, and tactics of slave revolts in the context of the social relations of slavery, they had trouble squaring abstract characterizations of "the slave" with what they were learning about the en- slaved.37 Michael Craton, who authored Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies, was an early critic of Slavery and Social Death, protesting that what was known about chattel bondage in the Americas did not confirm Patterson's definition of slavery. "If slaves were in fact 'generally dishonored,' " Craton asked, "how does he explain the degrees of rank found among all groups of slaves—that is, the scale of 'reputation' and authority accorded, or at least acknowledged, by slave and master alike?" How could they have formed the fragile families documented by social historians if they had been "natally alienated" by definition? Finally, and per- haps most tellingly, if slaves had been uniformly subjected to "permanent violent domination," they could not have revolted as often as they did or shown the "varied manifestations of their resistance" that so frustrated masters and compromised their power, sometimes "fatally."38 The dynamics of social control and slave resistance falsified Patterson's description of slavery even as the tenacity of African culture showed that enslaved men, women, and children had arrived in the Americas bearing much more than their "tropical temperament." The cultural continuity and resistance schools of thought come together pow- erfully in an important book by Walter C. Rucker, The River Flows On: Black Re- sistance, Culture, and Identity Formation in Early America. In Rucker's analysis of slave revolts, conspiracies, and daily recalcitrance, African concepts, values, and cul- tural metaphors play the central role. Unlike Smallwood and Hartman, for whom "the rupture was the story" of slavery, Rucker aims to reveal the "perseverance of African culture even among second, third, and fourth generation creoles."39 He looks again at some familiar events in North America—New York City's 1712 Coromantee revolt and 1741 conspiracy, the 1739 Stono rebellion in South Carolina, as well as the plots, schemes, and insurgencies of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner—deftly teasing out the African origins of many of the attitudes and actions of the black rebels. Rucker outlines how the transformation of a "shared cultural heritage" that shaped collective action against slavery corresponded to the "various steps Africans made in the process of becoming 'African American' in culture, orientation, and identity."40

Social death is an incorrect homogenization of the past AND reifies colonial power relations by placing European whiteness at the center of symbolic examination

Walker 12

(Tracey, Birkbeck University Masters in Psychosocial Studies, "The Future of Slavery: From Cultural Trauma to Ethical Remembrance", Graduate Journal of Social Science, 9.2, July, JSTOR)

To argue that there is more to the popular conception of slaves as victims who experienced social death within the abusive regime of transatlantic slavery is not to say that these subjectivities did not exist. When considering the institution of slavery we can quite confidently rely on the assumption that it did indeed destroy the self-hood and the lives of millions of Africans. Scholar Vincent Brown (2009) however, has criticised Orlando Patterson's (1982) seminal book Slavery and Social Death for positioning the slave as a subject without agency and maintains that those who managed to dislocate from the nightmare of plantation life 'were not in fact the living dead', but 'the mothers of gasping new societies' (Brown 2009, 1241). The Jamaican Maroons were one such disparate group of Africans who managed to band together and flee the Jamaican plantations in order to create a new mode of living under their own rule. These 'runaways' were in fact 'ferocious fighters and master strategists', building towns and military bases which enabled them to fight and successfully win the war against the British army after 200 years of battle (Gotlieb 2000,16). In addition, the story of the Windward Jamaican Maroons disrupts the phallocentricism inherent within the story of the slave 'hero' by the very revelation that their leader, 'Queen Nanny' was a woman (Gotlieb 2000). As a leader, she was often ignored by early white historians who dismissed her as an 'old hagg' or 'obeah' woman (possessor of evil magic powers) (Gotlieb 2000, xvi). Yet, despite these negative descriptors, Nanny presents an interesting image of an African woman in the time of slavery who cultivated an exceptional army and used psychological as well as military force against the English despite not owning sophisticated weapons (Gotlieb 2000). As an oral tale, her story speaks to post-slavery generations through its representation of a figure whose gender defying acts challenged the patriarchal fantasies of the Eurocentric imaginary and as such 'the study of her experiences might change the lives of people living under paternalistic, racist, classist and gender based oppression' (Gotlieb 2000, 84). The label of 'social death' is rejected here on the grounds that it is a narrative which is positioned from the vantage point of a European hegemonic ideology. Against the social symbolic and its gaze, black slaves were indeed regarded as non-humans since their lives were stunted, diminished and deemed less valuable in comparison to the Europeans.

However, Fanon's (1967) assertion that 'not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man' (Fanon 1967, 110) helps us to understand that this classification can only have meaning relative to the symbolic which represents the aliveness of whiteness against the backdrop of the dead black slave (Dyer 1997). Butler (2005) makes it clear that the 'death' one suffers relative to the social symbolic is imbued with the fantasy that having constructed the Other and interpellated her into 'life', one now holds the sovereignty of determining the subject's right to live or die: this death, if it is a death, is only the death of a certain kind of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of the fantasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had, in other words it is a necessary grief (Butler 2005, 65). The point to make here is that although the concept of social death has proved useful for theorists to describe the metaphysical experience of those who live antagonistically in relation to the social symbolic, it is nevertheless a colonial narrative within which the slaves are confined to a one dimensional story of terror. In keeping with Gilroy's (1993b) argument that the memory of slavery must be constructed from the slaves' point of view, we might instead concentrate, not on the way in which the slaves are figured within the European social imaginary, but on how they negotiated their own ideas about self and identity. We might therefore find some value in studying a group like the Maroons who not only managed to create an autonomous world outside of the hegemonic discourse which negated them, but also, due to their unique circumstances, were forced to create new modes of communication which would include a myriad of African cultures, languages and creeds (Gottlieb 2000). This creative and resistive energy of slave subjectivity not only disrupts the colonial paradigm of socially dead slaves, but also implies the ethical tropes of creation, renewal and mutual recognition. In contrast, the passive slave proved to feature heavily in the 2007 bicentenary commemorations causing journalist Toyin Agbetu to interrupt the official speeches and exclaim that it had turned into a discourse of freedom engineered mostly by whites with stories of black agency excluded8.

Young's argument that 'one of the damaging side effects of the focus on white people's role in abolition is that Africans are represented as being passive in the face of oppression', appears to echo the behaviour in the UK today given that a recent research poll reveals that the black vote turnout is significantly lower than for the white majority electorate and that forty percent of second generation 'immigrants' believe that voting 'doesn't matter'.9 Yet, Gilroy (1993a) argues that this political passivity may not simply be a self fulfilling prophecy, but might allude to the 'lived contradiction' of being black and English which affects one's confidence about whether opinions will be validated in a society that, at its core, still holds on to the fantasy of European superiority (Gilroy 1993a). Without considering the slaves' capacity for survival and their fundamental role in overthrowing the European regime of slavery, we limit the use–value of the memory and risk becoming overly attached to singular slave subjectivities seeped in death and passivity. The Maroons story how-ever, enables slave consciousness to rise above the mire of slavery's abject victims and establishes an ethical relation with our ancestors who lived and survived in the time of slavery.

AT: Wilderson Humanism – Tuch

Blackness is not the experience of social death---their very articulation of their critique proves that the concept of humanity is malleable and not subject to closure

Steven A. **Tuch 7**, professor of sociology, GWU and * Yoku Shaw-Taylor. The Other African Americans: Contemporary African and Caribbean Immigrants in the United States

Accompanying the expansion of counmes whose consolidation became known as Europe were emerging differences in the order of knowledge through which human beings were classified. As scholars such as V. Y. Mudimbe (1988). Oyèrónké Oyewùmí (1997). and Cor nd West (2002) have shown, drawing upon the resources of archaeo logical and genealogical poststructuralism, the emergence of systematic forms of inquiry premised upon white supremacy as the basis of human normality resulted in notions of deviation that structured black people in a derivative relationship with whites. In other words, a link between the formation of knowledge and processes of inquiry, on the one hand, and mechanisms of power and the effecting of new and differentiating forms of life/identities, on the other, emerged with their correlative subjectivities. From aesthetic criteria for human beauty to measurements of intelligence, blacks became the comparison model of deviation instead of ever serving as the standard. Even worse, the very production of their classification—as blacks at the least. "niggers" at worst — was a function of a logic that was not their own: blacks are, in other words, as Franiz Fanon (1967) declared, white constructions.¶ The account suffers, however, in that it **simply declares the** conditions for the **emergence of certain** forms of **phenomena: it does not articulate the lived reality** of such phenomena, especially in terms of the consciousness that experiences them. For even such a consciousness would be subjected to discursive determinations of its emergence: it would, in other words, be accepted if, and only if, theorized from its outside, that is, in terms of what constitutes it as such. So meaning, form, definition, and determination cannot make sense inside of things. **Given the conceptual work brought to bear in making things meaningful, there is always an outside, public, hence social, dimension to the constitution of meaning. We should thus study not the essence of the thing but how such an essence is formed**. A problem is raised, however. by a thing that is capable of raising such questions, a thing that can raise the question of its own meaning and subjectivity. In effect, it subjects itself, or is able to raise the problem of its existence to itself. This means that it faces a paradox: in the face of the rejection of an inner logic of the self, it poses the question of itself as an external matter from inside of itself This rather complex development amounts to saying that the thing in question is not fully a thing. It is a human being.¶ **The human being poses a challenge to mechanisms of** discursive **closure**. This means that there is always a world of relations of subjectiv ities and intersubjectivities. of a shared experience of meanings that are both given and being made. This dialectical relationship of subjection and intersubjectivity is a manifestation of what is often called agency. That human beings are aware of. or have to interpret and even appre hend. their situations means that the archaeological and genealogical accounts of the constitution of racialized forms of life tell only a part of the story. Missing. as well, are the varieties of ways subjects of racism live in their historical and everyday social situations. That they live a constant struggle for the assertion of their humanity means that social lines are constantly challenged. expanded. and retracted, and in their course, a more dialectical story unfolds.¶ The DuBoisian concept of double consciousness is a case in point. In one instance. It is simply an effect of the system— blacks seeing them selves as seen by the dominating perspectives and resources of mean ing in an antiblack racist society. On the other hand. as Paget Henry (2005) points out, there is palentiated double consciousness, where there is realization of the false, universalistic claims of the system of oppression, where blacks realize that the reality of injustice posed as justice in a racist system hides the racism as racism by (as DuBois [1898. 19031 also observed) making black people into problems instead of engaging black people as people facing problems. The latter expec tation requires an admission of a social relationship between blacks and nonbiacks. in short, the reality of intersubjective or shared participation in the constitution of meaning in the world.¶ That black people have posed much difficulty for the modern world is a sign of a healthy consciousness. **It means a refusal to submit to at tempts of human erasure**. It is not that all black individuals subscribe to such resistance. It is simply sufficient that enough resistance has existed from the start of racialized slavery in the sixteenth century to **make the** anthropological **question of what it is to be a human being a constantly unfolding discourse and material praxis** of the modern age. For black people, the concrete formulation is the reduction of blacks to forms of inert labor, as labor without a point of view, as property. Even for many freed

blacks, the institutional imposition of labor with black ness mearn a constant struggle for the assertion of claimed freedom in a world that had no room for blacks to have leisure time: to be black and not laboring amounted to an illicit laziness. But even more, the plethora of lines drawn against human assertion meant a constant struggle against illegitimate being. Any category of social life becomes stained with indiscretion in black form; how does one "live" when one lacks a right to exist?

AT: Social Death/Contemporary Slavery Impact

Their ontological account of social death is wrong—the focus on gratuitous violence is ahistorical and equates all conditions

Nadine **Ehlers**, Professor, School of Social Sciences, Media, and Communication Faculty of Law, Humanities, and Arts University of Wollongong, **12** ["Racial Imperatives: Discipline, Performativity, and Struggles against Subjection," p. 9-12, footnote from p. 145]

While I deploy these terms for analytic convenience, the study pivots on the desire to make dear tbe false homogeneity of subjects that are denoted by these terms and the arbitrariness of race per se. In the same moment that I employ these terms as critical tools of analysis, then, I hope to expose the mechanisms of their production and mark possibilities for their rearticulation. The final portion of this study is concerned with examining what forms of agency and resistance are possible within the context of this binary construction of black and white identities. Guiding this analysis is the question of how individuals struggle against subjection and how racial norms might be recited in new directions, given that the coercive demands of discipline and performative constraints make it seem like race is an insurmountable limit or closed system. **That race operates as a limit appears particularly so for black subjects.** For despite the fact that all subjects are produced and positioned within and by the discursive formations of race, the impact of that positioning and what it means for experience is markedly different. Black subjects are situated within an antiblack context where the black body/self continues to be torn asunder within the relations of civil society. This means that, as Yancy (2008, 134 n. n) insists, " the capacity to imagine otherwise is seriously truncated by ideological and material forces that are systematically linked to the history of white racism!' A number of scholars have examined these realities and advanced critical accounts of what they identify as the resulting condition of black existence. David Marriot, for instance, argues that "the occult presence of racial slavery" continues to haunt our political and social imagination: "nowhere, but nevertheless everywhere, a dead time which never arrives and does not stop arriving" (2007, xxi). Saidiya Hartman, in her provocative Lose Your Mother: A journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route (2007) refers to this haunting as slavery's afterlife. She insists that we do not live with the residue or legacy of slavery but, rather, that slavery lives on. It 'survives' (Sexton 2010, 15), through what Loic Wacquant (2002, 41) has identified as slavery's fu nctional surrogates: Jim Crow, the ghetto, and the prison. For Hartman, as echoed by other scholars, slavery has yet to be undone: Black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the afterlife of slavery- skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment. I, too, am the afterlife of slavery. (2007, 6) Frank B. **Wilderson** III, in his Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structures of U.S. Antagonisms (2009), powerfully frames slavery's afterlife as resulting in a form of **social death** for black subjects and, more than this, he argues that black subjectivity is constituted as **ontological death**. For Wilderson, " the Black [is] a subject who is always already positioned as Slave" (2009, 7) in the United States, while everyone else exists as "Masters" (2009, 10).8 Studies of slavery's afterlife and the concept of social death have inarguably made essential contributions to understandings of race.9 The strengths of such analyses lie in the salient ways they have theorized broad social systems of racism and how they have demanded the foregrounding of suffering, pain, violence, and death. Much of this scholarship can be put or is productively in conversation with Foucault's account ofbiopolitics that, as I noted earlier, regulates at the level of the population. Where sovereignty 'took life and let live,' in the contemporary sphere biopolitics works to 'make live.' However, certain bodies are not in the zone of protected life, are indeed expendable and subjected to strategic deployments of sovereign power that 'make die.' It is here that Foucault positions the function of racism. It is, he argues, "primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die" (2003b, 254). Thus, certain bodies/subjects are killed - or subjected to sovereign power and social death- so that others might prosper. 10 In Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America (1997), Hartman examines the 'must die' imperative of social death understood broadly as a lack of social being-but she also illuminates how, within such a context, slave "performance and other modes of practice . .. exploit[ed), and exceed[ed] the constraints of domination" (1997, 54, my emphasis). Hartman analyzes quotidian enactments of slave agency to highlight practices of "(counter)investment" (1997, 73) that produced "a reconstructed self that negates the dominant terms of identity and existence" (1997, 72). 11 She thus argues that a form of agency is possible and that, while "the conditions of domination and subjugation determine what kinds of actions are possible or effective" (1997, 54), **agency is not reducible to these conditions** (1997, 55).'2 The questions that I ask in this analysis travel in this direction, and aim to build on this aspect of Hartman's work. In doing so I make two key claims: first, that despite undeniable historical continuities and structural d)'namics, race is also marked by discontinuity; and second, race is constantly reworked and transformed within relations of power **by subjects**. 13 **For Vincent**

Brown, a historian of slavery, "violence, dislocation, and death actually generate politics, and consequential action by the enslaved" (2009, 1239) . He warns that focusing on an overarching condition or state potentially **obscures seeing these politics**. More than this, however, **it risks positioning relations of power as totalizing and transhistorical**, and it risks essentializing experience or the lived realities of individuals. **14** I scale down to the level of the subject to analyze both (a) how subjects are formed, and (b) how subjects – black and white alike – have struggled against conditions in ways that refuse totalizing, immutable understandings of race. This book does not seek to mark a condition or situa tion then, but instead takes up Brown's challenge (made within the context of studies of slavery) to pay attention to efforts to remake condition. Looking to those efforts to remake condition and identity grapples with the microphysics of power and the practices of daily life, enacted by individuals and i11 collective politics, to consider what people do with situations: those dynamic, innovative contestations of (a never totalizing) power. Echoing the call raised by Brown (2009, 1239), my work focuses then on "examining ... social and political lives **rather than assuming** … **lack of social being**" in order to think about how subjects can and have "made a social world out of death itself" (Brown 2009, 1233) or how, more generally, race can be reconfigured within the broader workings of what I am calling racial discipline and performative imperatives. But in addressing the quotidian and those efforts to remake condition and identity, this study insists on a shift in perspective in terms of how power is thought about. As I have remarked, I am not focused on biopolitics or what can be seen as solely sovereign forms of power that are deployed to condition who will live and who will die. Instead, I am concerned with disciplinary power, which is articulated simultaneously but at a different level to biopolitics (and despi te the exercise of sovereign forms of power} (Foucault 2003a, 250). For Foucault, this form of **power is not absolute**, nor does it exist in opposition to resistance. Rather, power is seen as always fragmentary and incoherent, and power and resistance are seen as mutually constitutive. Disciplinary power is productive, in that it generates particular capacities and forms of subjectivity (and, necessarily, agency). And finally, **though subjects are formed in power, they are not reducible to it, not determined by power**. [BEGIN ENDNOTE] 14. Historian Vincent Brown, in his "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery" (2009), has examined a number of scholars who seemingly take up such a viewpoint, in that they broadly position blackness as a totalizing state that, historically and in the present, renders slavery synonymous with social death and blackness/// as always already synonymous with slavery. Brown focuses specifically on the academic uptake and what he sees as the problematic distillation and extension of Orlando Patterson's (1981) concept of"slavery as social death;' where social death indicates a lack of social being. As a scholar of slavery, Brown is most concerned with examining the limitations of this idea in relation to the enslaved, but he is also interested in how the idea is used in relation to the present. For Brown, **Patterson's "slavery as social death," and contemporary usages of this concept to account for the present, advance a troubling transhistorical characterization of slavery** He argues in line with I-Ierman Bennett (quoted in Brown 1009, 1133), who has observed: As the narrative of the slave experience, soclardeath assumes a uniform African, slave, and ultimately black subject rooted in a static New World history whose logic originated in being property and remains confined to slavery. It absorbs and renders exceptional evidence that underscores the contingent nature of experience and consciousness. Thus, normative assumptions about the experiences of peoples of African descent assert a timeless, ahistorical, epiphenomenal "black" cultural experience.

[END ENDNOTE]

Sexual Power/ID = Heteronorm

Ontologizing sexual power and identity as a lens for worldly phenomena reproduces binary discourses end elides difference, reproducing heteronormativity.

Prasad '12

(Ajnesh, Australian School of Business, "Beyond analytical dichotomies," Human Relations May 2012 vol. 65 no. 5 567-595)

A poststructuralist critique At the most rudimentary level, poststructuralism may be typified by what Lyotard (1984) famously expressed as its **incredulity towards metanarratives** (also see Alvesson and Deetz, 1999; Kilduff and Mehra, 1997), or what Fraser and Nicholson (1997) describe as grand theorizing of social macrostructures. Akin to other critical traditions, it is 'explicitly historical, attuned to the cultural specificity of different societies and periods and . . . inflected by temporality, with historically specific institutional categories' (Fraser and Nicholson, 1997: 143–4). The aim of the poststructuralist mandate is to critique metanarratives and, from there, to define human consciousness and social existence through engagements with contextualized subjectivity (Agger, 1991).11 To appreciate this idea, it is important to understand how metanarratives are problematically situated within, and are informed by, socially constructed identity binaries, be they along the fault lines of gender (e.g. Butler, 1990; Hird, 2000), race (e.g. Gilroy, 2000; Miles and Torres, 2007), or sexuality (e.g. Zita, 1994). Indeed, poststructuralist critique, such as Derrida's conjecture of difference (Mumby and Putnam, 1992), illustrates how the preservation of the privileged identity ('white', 'man', 'heterosexual') is existentially dependent upon a corresponding relegated identity ('black', 'woman', 'homosexual') (see Tyler and Cohen, 2008); or, to posit it in Butlerian (1991) phrasing, heterosexuality presumes the being of homosexuality. Working from the same current, Harding (2003) extends this idea through consideration of the central dyadic relationship in management; she notes that every individual in the western workforce is identified as a worker or as a manager and that the identity of the latter is **wholly contingent upon the binary existence of the former**. Elsewhere, again assuming a poststructuralist position, Harding (2008: 44; emphasis in original) explains that identities '**cannot be resolved into an essence or into a coherent whole'**; rather, they are 'post hoc impositions of a seemingly unified [label] upon a disparate and disconnected popul-ation'. As such, the central aim of the poststructuralist is to repudiate deterministic and binary logic by drawing attention to the discursive processes that culturally (re)produce social realities and the dichotomous modes of thinking embedded within them (Butler, 1990; Calas, 1993). [T]he ways in which sex was put into Western discourse from the end of the 16th century onwards, the proliferation of sex during the 18th century and the modern incitement to discuss sex in endless detail have simultaneously established heterosexuality as the unassailable norm and constituted other sexualities as abnormal. Tangentially related to the Foucauldian reading of sexuality, Katz (2004) offers a genealogical investigation into how heterosexuality was invented and came to be ideologically defined from the late 19th-century onwards. Katz writes that because 'the concept of heterosexuality is **only one particular historical way** of perceiving, categorizing, and imagining the social relations of the sexes', it ought to be studied with the purposeful aim to **dislocate its socio-cultural privilege** as being the 'normal' and the 'natural' form of sexual expression (p. 69). Given its socially manifest 'nature', Butler (1991, 1993) contends that heterosexuality is perpetually at risk and must continually engage in a set of repetitive, or what she calls parodic, practices – such as, heterosexual sex – which functions to stringently affirm the hegemonic ideals of femininity (passive) and masculinity (active). Incidentally, the very redundancy of these parodic practices function to consolidate the discursive authority and cultural stability of heterosexuality (Butler, 1991; see also Butler's [1993] writing on 'performativity'). A related stream of poststructuralist-inflected scholarship reveals how **sexual identities that are predicated on ontological sexual difference produce heteronormativity**, which can be described as the 'the normative idealization of heterosexuality' (Hird, 2004: 27) or '**the centrality of heterosexual norms in social relations**' (Pringle, 2008: S111). While feminists have long critiqued the tacit and the explicit claims of ontological sexual difference, essentialist definitions of 'female' and 'male' continue to prevail in popular culture and in certain academic disciplines (Frye, 1996).12 On this point, Hird (2004) adopts a position in feminist science studies to develop a substantive critique into how the ontology of sexual difference is often rendered concrete in research propagated by the 'natural' – and particularly, the 'biological' – sciences (also see Martin, 1991). The influence of ontological sexual difference within and outside of academia, lends credence to Broadbridge and Hearn's (2008: S39) recent observation that, '[s]ex and sex differences are still often **naturalized as fixed, or almost**

fixed, in biology'. It is equally important to note, here, that **the alchemy of ontological sexual difference is wholly dependent upon the patriarchal conflation of 'biological' sex and 'cultural' gender (**Hird, 2004). As Pringle (2008: S112; also see Borgerson and Rehn, 2004) notes, '[g]ender **[does] not avoid the oppositional duality embodied in the concept of sex**, but reflect[s] the interdependent relationship of masculinity and femininity'. This reflection pivots on genital determinism, which declares that males naturally embrace masculinity while females naturally embrace femininity (Bornstein, 1994; Hird, 2000). This initial conflation of sex and gender leads to the conventional model of heterosexuality, which dictates that a man will 'desire-to-be' a male and will 'desire-for' a female, while a woman will 'desire-to-be' a female and will 'desire-for' a male (Sinfield, 2002: 126). It is precisely these corresponding relationships whereby the 'heterosexual matrix' is constructed (Butler, 1990). According to Butler, this matrix serves as the '**grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, gender, and desires are naturalized**' (see Ringrose, 2008: 511).13

Their politics – which produces nostalgia for non-engagement – casting movement as stasis makes theorizing for the future impossible

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(*Can the Subaltern Speak?: Reflections on the History of an Idea*, pg. 8)

Subalternity is not that which could, if given a ventriloquist, speak the truth of its oppression or disclose the plenitude of its being. The hundreds of shelves of well-intentioned books claiming to speak for or give voice to the subaltern **cannot ultimately escape the problem of translation** in ii> full sense. **Subalternity is less an identity than what we might call a predicament**, but this is true in very odd sense. For, in Spivak's definition, it is the structured place from which the capacity to access power is radically obstructed. To the extent that anyone escapes the muting of subalternity, she ceases being a subaltern. Spivak says this is to be desired. And who could disagree? There is neither authenticity nor virtue in the position of the oppressed. There is simply (or not so simply) oppression. Even so, we are moved to wonder, in this context, what burden this places on memory work in the aftermath of education. What kind of representation becomes available to the one who, having partially escaped the silence of subalternity, is nonetheless possessed by the consciousness of having been obstructed, contained, or simply misread for so much of her life? Is there any alternative to either the positivist euphoria that would claim to have recovered the truth of her past or the conflation of historiography with therapeutic adaptation by which ideology finally makes the silence of subalternity seem normal?

Today in the halls of the academy it is possible to discern a certain displacement of the critique of power and class, and hence of history, by the cultural analysis of memory. If the latter offers itself as an alternative to the positivism of empiricist historiography, and as a critique of the teleologies implicit in so much Marxist theory, it nonetheless tends to **surrender uto-pianism only to embrace nostalgia**. Nostalgia, in this sense, is but the inverse of utopianism, a **utopianism without futurity**. Ironically, this nostalgia often bears a secret valorization and **hypostatization of subalternity** as an identity—**to be recalled, renarrated, reclaimed, and revalidated. We need to resist the narcissism implicit in this gesture**—which ultimately demands a whole image as the mirror of ourselves, not merely as the basis for misrecognition (and hence our own subject formation) but also **as the alibi for a politics that imagines the project of emancipation to be over**. A quick survey of the contemporary social landscape demands the recognition that it is not.

Affirming difference as the starting point for revolution is a failed strategy that ends in ambivalence – maroonage collapses into aescthetic boundary drawing – makes the skill building necessary for radical politics inevitable

Thomas **Nail**, Post-doctoral Lecturer in European Philosophy at the University of Denver, 20**13**, Deleuze, Occupy, and the Actuality of Revolution, Theory & Event Volume 16, Issue 1

(1) Political Ambivalence

"Affirming Difference in the state of permanent revolution [affirmer la Différence dans l'état de révolution permanente]," as Deleuze says in Difference and Repetition (75/53),8 may escape the previous problems of vanguardism and the party-state, **but it also poses a new danger: that the "pure affirmation of Difference" will be ultimately ambivalent**. Revolution may provide a new non-representational space of liberty, or it may provide a ruptured "open" domain for a new discourse of rights and military occupation by the state, or it may merely reproduce a complicity with the processes of capitalist deterritorialization necessary for new capitalist reterritorializations. Slavoj Žižek, in particular, frequently attributes this capitalist ambivalence to Deleuze and Guattari's politics (2004, 184). But to say, with Alain Badiou, that **affirming the potentiality for transformation as such is to affirm a "purely ideological radicality" that "inevitably changes over into its opposite**: **once the mass festivals of democracy and discourse are over, things make place for the modernist restoration of order** among workers and bosses," would be to overstate the problem (Badiou and Balmès 1976, 83).

Rather, it would be much more appropriate to say, with Paolo Virno, that "[t]he multitude is a form of being that can give birth to one thing but also to the other: ambivalence" (Virno 2003, 131). Accordingly, the affirmation of this ambivalence as a political commitment, and the "politico-ontological optimism and unapologetic vitalism" it assumes in Hardt, Negri, and Deleuze's work, according to Bruno Bosteels, **remains radically insufficient** (2004, 95). While the purely creative power of the multitude may be the condition for global liberation from Empire, it is also the productive condition for Empire as well. With no clear political consistency to organize or motivate any particular political transformation "vitalist optimism" is politically ambivalent, speculative, and spontaneous. Showing the non-foundational or ungrounded nature of politics provides no more of a contribution for organized politics than does the creative potentiality of desire. "A subject's intervention," Bosteels suggests, "cannot consist merely in showing or recognizing the traumatic impossibility, void, or antagonism around which the situation as a whole is structured" (2004, 104). Rather, following Badiou, a "political organization is necessary in order for the intervention, as wager, to make a process out of the trajectory that goes from an interruption to a fidelity. In this sense, organization is nothing but the consistency of politics" (Badiou 1985, 12). And in so far as Deleuze and Guattari, and those inspired by their work, do not offer developed concepts of political consistency and organization that would bring differential multiplicities into specific political interventions and distributions, they remain, at most, ambivalent toward revolutionary politics.

 (2) Virtual Hierarchy

In addition to this first danger of revolutionary ambivalence, Deleuze's concept of revolution, according to Badiou and Hallward, risks a second danger; namely, that of creating a political hierarchy of virtual potential. Badiou argues at length in The Clamor of Being that,

… contrary to all egalitarian or "communitarian" norms, Deleuze's conception of thought is profoundly aristocratic. Thought only exists in a hierarchized space. This is because, for individuals to attain the point where they are seized by their preindividual determination and, thus, by the power of the One-All—of which they are, at the start, only meager local configurations—they have to go beyond their limits and endure the transfixion and disintegration of their actuality by infinite virtuality, which is actuality's veritable being. And individuals are not equally capable of this. Admittedly, Being is itself neutral, equal, outside all evaluation … But 'things reside unequally in this equal being' (Deleuze 1994, 60/37). And, as a result, it is essential to think according to 'a hierarchy which considers things and beings from the point of view of power'

(Deleuze 1994, 60/37; Badiou 1999, 12–13).

The political thrust of this argument is that, if we understand revolutionary change as the pure potential for change as such, and not actual change for or against certain forms, **then, contrary to any kind of egalitarianism, there will instead be a hierarchy** of actual political beings that more or less participate in this degree of pure potential transformation. The more actual political beings renounce their specific and local determinations and affirm their participation in the larger processes of difference-in-itself, the more powerful they become. Thus, if the point of examining any local political intervention is in every case to show to what degree it renounces its concrete determinations and might "become other than it is" (as a virtuality or potentiality), there is, according to Badiou, a risk of "**asceticism" and hierarchy** in such a relationship of potential (Badiou 1999, 13).

Similarly, Peter Hallward has argued that Deleuze's political philosophy is "indifferent to the politics of this world" (2006, 162). Hallward claims that "once a social field is defined less by its conflicts and contradictions than by the lines of flight running through it" any distinctive space for political action can only be subsumed within the more general dynamics of creation, life, and potential transformation (2006, 62n16). And since these dynamics are "themselves anti-dialectical if not anti-relational, there can be little room in Deleuze's philosophy for relations of conflict and solidarity" (2006, 162). If each concrete, localized, actual political being is important only in so far as it realizes a degree of pure potentiality of a virtual event, "and every mortal event in a single Event" (Deleuze 1990, 178/152), then the processional "telos" of absolute political deterritorialization is completely indifferent to the actual politics of this world (2006, 97). By valorizing this pure potentiality for transformation as such against all actual political determinations, Hallward argues, Deleuze is guilty of **affirming an impossible utopianism**. "By posing the question of politics in the starkly dualistic terms of war machine or state," Hallward argues, "by posing it, in the end, in the apocalyptic terms of a new people and a new earth or else no people and no earth—the political aspect of Deleuze's philosophy amounts to little more than **utopian distraction**" (2006, 162).

(3) Subjective Paralysis

The differential reading of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of revolution may be able to avoid the problem of representational subjectivity—that it can reject or affirm particular desires but never change the nature of the "self that desires"—but it does so only at the risk of diffusing the self into an endless

multiplicity of impersonal drives: a self in perpetual transformation. This leads to the third danger, that of subjective paralysis. Firstly, to read Deleuze and Guattari's theory of revolutionary subjectivity as the "simple fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentiality" (Agamben 1993, 43), or as Paul Patton calls it, one's "critical freedom" ("the freedom to transgress the limits of what one is presently capable of being or doing, rather than just the freedom to be or do those things" (2000, 85) suggests an ambivalence of action. What are the conditions and factors by which one might decide to take an action or not? Emancipation and enslavement in this sense are merely just different things to be done.

Secondly, without a pre-given unity of subjectivity, how do agents qua multiplicities deliberate between and distinguish (in themselves) different political decisions? Without the representational screen of reason, or the state-guaranteed grounds of political discourse, what might something like a dispute or agreement look like? If "becoming other is not a capacity liberated individuals possess to constitute themselves as autonomous singularities," but "what defines 'autonomy' itself" (2006, 146), as Simon Tormey argues, then the political danger, according to Hallward, is that the subject is simply replaced by the larger impersonal process of transformation as such: "pure autonomy." **The radical affirmation of the ambivalent** and unlocalizable processes of subjective potentiality (qua pure multiplicities) **seems then to have nothing to contribute to an analysis of the basic function of participatory democracy and collective decision-making, which remains at the core of** many of **today's radical political struggles** (See Starr, Martinez-Torres, and Rosset 2011). Insofar as a theory of subjectivity is defined only by its potential for transformation, it is stuck in a kind of paralysis of endless potential change no less disempowering than subjective stasis. Or, as Hallward frames this criticism, Deleuze "abandons the decisive subject in favor of our more immediate subjection to the imperative of creative life or thought" (2006, 163).

AT: Ballot/Strategy

AT: white suicide

Instead of focusing politics on the personal, we should take collectivize action against social ills—a personality litmus test dooms political projects

Rob the Idealist, Carleton College, 10/1/**13**, Tim Wise & The Failure of Privilege Discourse, www.orchestratedpulse.com/2013/10/tim-wise-failure-privilege-discourse/

I don't find it meaningful to criticize Tim Wise the person and judge whether he's living up to some anti-racist bona fides. Instead, I choose to focus on the paradigm of "White privilege" upon which his work is based, and its conceptual and practical limitations. Although the personal is political, not all politics is personal; we have to attack systems. To paraphrase the urban poet and philosopher Meek Mill: there are levels to this shit. How I Define Privilege There are power structures that shape individuals' lived experiences. Those structures provide and withhold resources to people based on factors like class, disability status, gender, and race. It's not a "benefit" to receive resources from an unjust order because ultimately, injustice is cannibalistic. Slavery binds the slave, but destroys the master. So, the point then becomes not to assimilate the "underprivileged", but to instead eradicate the power structures that create the privileges in the first place. The conventional wisdom on privilege often says that it's "benefits" are "unearned". However, this belief ignores the reality and history that privilege is earned and maintained through violence. Systemic advantages are allocated and secured as a class, and simply because an individual hasn't personally committed the acts, it does not render their class dominance unearned. The history and modern reality of violence is why Tim Wise' comparison between whiteness and tallness fails. White supremacy is not some natural evolution, nor did it occur by happenstance. White folks *murdered* people for this thing that we often call "White privilege"; it was bought and paid for by blood and terror. White supremacy is not some benign invisible knapsack. The same interplay between violence and advantage is true of any systemic hierarchy (class, gender, disability, etc). Being tall, irrespective of its advantages, does not follow that pattern of violence. Privilege is Failing Us Unfortunately, I think our use of the term "privilege" is no longer a productive way for us to gain a thorough understanding of systemic injustice, nor is it helping us to develop collective strategies to dismantle those systems. Basically**, I never want to hear the word "privilege" again** because **the term is so thoroughly misused at this point that it does more harm than goo**d. Andrea Smith, in the essay "The Problem with Privilege", outlines the pitfalls of misapplied privilege theory. Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered… Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Dr. Tommy Curry says it more bluntly, "It's not genius to say that in an oppressive society there are benefits to being in the superior class instead of the inferior one. That's true in any hierarchy, that's not an 'aha' moment." Conceptually, privilege is best used when narrowly focused on explaining how structures generally shape experiences. However, when we overly personalize the problem, then privilege becomes a tit-for-tat exercise in blame, shame, and guilt. In its worst manifestations, this dynamic becomes "oppression Olympics" and people tally perceived life advantages and identities in order to invalidate one another. At best, we treat structural injustice as a personal problem, and moralizing exercises like "privilege confessions" inadequately address the nexus between systemic power and individual behavior. The undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural forms of oppression. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Bigger than Tim Wise However, the problem with White privilege isn't simply that Tim Wise, a white man, can build a career off of Black struggles. As I've already said, White people need to talk to White people about the historical and social construction of their racial identities and power, and the foundation for that conversation often comes from past Black theory and political projects. The problem for me is that privilege work has become a cottage industry of self-help moralizing that in no way attacks the systemic ills that create the personal injustices in the first place. A **substantive critique of**

privilege requires us to get beyond identity politics. It's not about good people and bad people; it's a bad system. It's not just White people that participate in the White privilege industry, although not everyone equally benefits/profits (see: Tim Wise). Dr. Tommy Curry takes elite Black academics to task for their role in profiting from the White privilege industry while offering no challenge to White supremacy. These conversations about White privilege are not conversations about race, and certainly not about racism; it's a business where Blacks market themselves as racial therapists for White people… The White privilege discourse became a bourgeois distraction. It's a tool that we use to morally condemn whites for not supporting the political goals of elite black academics that take the vantages of white notions of virtue and reformism and persuade departments, journals, and presses into making concessions for the benefit of a select species of Black intellectuals in the Ivory Tower, without seeing that the white racial vantages that these Black intellectuals claim they're really interested in need to be dissolved, need to be attacked all the way to the very bottom of American society. Dr. Tommy Curry, Radio Interview The truth is that a lot of people, marginalized groups included, simply want more access to existing systems of power. They don't want to challenge and push beyond these systems; they just want to participate. So if we continue to play identity politics and persist with a personal privilege view of power, then we will lose the struggle. Barack Obama is president, yet White supremacy marches on, and often with his help (record deportations, expanded a drone war based on profiling, fought on behalf of US corporations to repeal a Haitian law that raised the minimum wage). Adolph Reed, writing in 1996, predicted the quagmire of identity politics in the Age of Obama. In Chicago, for instance, we've gotten a foretaste of the new breed of foundation-hatched black communitarian voices; one of them, a smooth Harvard lawyer with impeccable do-good credentials and vacuous-to-repressive neoliberal politics, has won a state senate seat on a base mainly in the liberal foundation and development worlds. His fundamentally bootstrap line was softened by a patina of the rhetoric of authentic community, talk about meeting in kitchens, small-scale solutions to social problems, and the predictable elevation of process over program — the point where identity politics converges with old-fashioned middle-class reform in favoring form over substance. I suspect that his ilk is the wave of the future in U.S. black politics. Adolph Reed Jr., Class Notes: Posing As Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene Although it has always been the case, Obama's election and subsequent presidency has made it starkly clear that it's not just White people that can perpetuate White supremacy. Systems of oppression condition all members of society to accept systemic injustice, and there are (unequal) incentives for both marginalized and dominant groups to perpetuate these structures. Our approaches to injustice must reflect this reality. This isn't a naïve plea for "unity", nor am I saying that talking about identities/experiences is inherently "divisive". Many of these privilege discussions use empathy to build personal and collective character, and there certainly should be space for us to work together to improve/heal ourselves and one another. People will always make mistakes and our spaces have to be flexible enough to allow for reconciliation. Though we don't have to work with persistently abusive people who refuse to redirect their behavior, there's a difference between establishing boundaries and puritanism. Fighting systemic marginalization and exploitation requires more than good character, and **we cannot fetishize personal morals over collective action**.

The alt aestheticizes violence – the position of the master is not produced by violent interactions – stubborn endorsement of violence leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy of opposition rather than focusing on the factors that produce the need for radical politics

Simon **Swift**, Ph.d., Senior Lecturer in Critical and Cultural Theory, University of Leeds, 20**13** "Hannah Arendt, violence and vitality," European Journal of Social Theory 16(3) 357–376

A key aspect of Arendt's critique of modern political life as it increasingly embodies violence that has emerged throughout this article has been the ways in which political ideologies and philosophical ideas **fail to keep pace with the flux of events that they try to understand and control.** This insight, and the important role played by violence within it, are taken further in Arendt's account of the 'global phenomenon' of the student protest movement in 1968 in her late essay On Violence (Arendt, 1972: 117). Arendt claims that the **students misrecognize the sources for their own turn to violence**, which she repeatedly associates with the rise of technology, and which she frames especially in the context of

the nuclear standoff or what she calls the 'weird suicidal development of modern weapons' (Arendt, 1972: 116). The general context that Arendt defines for the growing commitment to violence on the New Left is **uncertainty about the future.** In the context of nuclear armament, **the means of violence overwhelm the ends of politics** in a particularly dramatic way, as society's technological development is continually geared towards preparation for a thermonuclear war that never happens. The students' aesthetic critique of society, which takes the form of a growing commitment to violence as a furthering and enhancement of the life force, **misrecognizes its continuity with this wider political abandonment of the instrumentality of violence.** Both the Cold War powers and the students, in other words, pass beyond an instrumental model of violence, to a view of violence as an end in itself. But Arendt also asks why it is that the students '**cling with such stubborn tenacity to concepts and doctrines that have not only been refuted by factual developments** but are **clearly inconsistent with their own politics'** (Arendt, 1972: 124). The disconnect with reality and what she thinks of as the outmodedness of their ideas are in fact part and **parcel of the same phenomenon.** The students cling tenaciously to an ideology of creativity in the face of the fact that an increasingly consumerist, technology-driven society has done away with any notion of work. Behind their critique of consumerism, she argues, 'stands the illusion of Marx's society of free producers, the liberation of the productive forces of society'; a revolution which has in fact been accomplished, Arendt thinks, by science and technology (Arendt, 1972: 117). Like the life philosophy that, in Arendt's account, inspires it, the student protest movement's **aestheticization of violence** blocks out the technological **context that determines it and that it reproduces in its radical abandonment of an instrumental view of violenc**e. As Benjamin remarked in his essay 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', Bergson's philosophy, in his earlier Matter and Memory, manages above all to stay clear of that experience from which his own philosophy evolved or, rather, in reaction to which it arose. It was the inhospitable, blinding age of big-scale industrialism. In shutting out this experience the eye perceives an experience of a complementary nature in the form of its spontaneous afterimage, as it were. (Benjamin, 1992: 154) But while the students are guilty of misapprehending, like Marx before them, **the real process-character of modern life** and labour because they cling to an **outmoded, humanistic idea of man as a creator-producer,** a figure who, **in the work of Sartre and Fanon**, is seen to **produce himself through violence**, their expression of this doctrine of creativity is also, for Arendt, **internally inconsistent**. Unlike Marx, who proposes that man reproduces himself through labour, the students turn to the Nietzschean thesis that 'the joy of destruction is a creative joy' (Arendt, 1972: 117). They at once inhabit and depart from a Marxist humanism, and in doing so they make contact, **in their 'seemingly so novel biological justification of violence' with 'the most pernicious elements in our oldest traditions of political thought**' (Arendt, 1972: 171). **These elements enable a thinking of power in biological terms as violence**. Specifically, violence is understood as creative in its expressing of what Bertrand de Jouvenel calls 'an inner urge to grow' (Arendt, 1972: 171). 'Just as in the realm of organic life everything either grows or declines or dies,' this theory runs as Arendt rehearses it, 'so in the realm of human affairs power supposedly can sustain itself only through expansion; otherwise it shrinks and dies.' The endpoint of this biological theory of power is found in the view that kings are killed 'not because of their tyranny but because of their weakness' and that the people erect scaffolds as a 'biological penalty for weakness' (p. 171). In fact, Arendt had herself employed such an organicist theory of power in her effort to understand the agency of anti-Semitism in The Origins of Totalitarianism, where she had compared the Jews to aristocrats in pre-Revolutionary France. When the aristocrats lost their privileges, 'among others the privilege to exploit and oppress, the people felt them to be parasites, without any function in the rule of the country'. Comparably, '[a]ntisemitism reached its climax when Jews had similarly lost

their public functions and their influence, and finally were left with nothing but their wealth' (Arendt, 1968: 4).

The alt amounts to an arbitrary targeting mechanism based on the presumed knowledge and charictarization of others bodies which is a double turn with their first strategy, but also creates infinite culpability for action – they can't solve until everyone who is not them is symbolically dead

<u>**Butler 2**</u> Paul Butler, Professor of Law, George Washington University BA Yale JD Harvard By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law UCLA Law Review 50 2002-2003 761-762

<u>**Just war doctrine**</u>, applied to insurgents, <u>**would limit violence more than it would authorize it**</u>. <u>**Jus in bello requires that there be no injury to civilians.**</u> If the usual definitions of "terrorism" and "civilians" are invoked, this requirement seems to rule out virtually all terrorism, for terrorism is commonly thought of as politically motivated violence against civilians. <u>**Sometimes terrorists argue**</u> that, in their particular conflict, <u>**there are no "noncomba-tants."**</u> An example of this argument is the claim that even nonmilitary citizens of Israel arc permissible targets for Palestinian protestors because all Israelis benefit from and help maintain the subordination of Palestinians.101 <u>**The problem with this argument is**</u> the same as the problem with most terrorism: <u>**It is indiscriminate**</u>. <u>**It grants insufficient weight to the value of human life when it does not acknowledge that there are degrees of culpability.**</u> Surely, for example, <u>**children are not as responsible as adults, and surely a poor laborer is not as responsible as a high government official.**</u> On the other hand, it is possible to defend a construct of "combatants," that is, permissible targets of violence, that includes nonmilitary actors. <u>The objective of just war is to change the regime, or the way that it operates. To attack the foot soldiers, but to ignore the authorities responsible for creating and implementing the oppressive policies, seems inefficient.</u> The suggestion that <u>**insurgents should distinguish among civilians and limit their targets**</u> to "well-known officials, notorious collaborators, and bo on," seems reasonable,"" Thus, just war applied to insurgents would not eliminate the "combatant" restriction but would broaden the concept, in the manner described by Professor Walzer. "Combatant" could be defined as any person directly responsible for creating, administering, or defending the human rights violations, including genocide or race discrimination, that are the subject of the conflict. As discussed below, <u>**in the context of the "war" against race-based capital punishment, combatants would include those directly responsible for creating and implementing it. These people are culpable in a way that the ordinary civilian is not.**</u> Even then, <u>**violence against them is not necessarily moral**</u>: The other conditions of just war must also be satisfied. I want to emphasize the purpose of applying just war doctrine to insurgents, because I understand that any moral construct that tolerates political violence by nongovernmental entities is controversial. Just war doctrine accepts that violence—killing people—can be morally justified, if certain conditions are satisfied. One of the necessary conditions is that the targets must be military. This condition seems inconsistent with other common constructs of morality, including those found in criminal and international law, and in popular culture. The heroic status that many now accord those who led slave revolts is evidence of that view of morality. Yet <u>**definitions of combatants proffered by**</u>

terrorists are overly broad when they include those who are not directly responsible for the oppression of others (even if they benefit from that oppression). **This view of combarants discounts the sanity of human life that must underlie any construct of morality** (even if that construct allows for the taking of life in certain cases). The proposed application of just war doctrine to "terrorists" assumes that they, like nation-states, are open to persuasion about their methods. Their embrace of violence does not mean they have abandoned their claim to morality. If just war doctrine is to remain relevant in the twenty-first century, it should be applied to every actor—not just governments—that uses violence to accomplish political objectives.

AT: give us the ballot

"Confessing" ballot just reinstates domination

Andrea **Smith**, Ph.D., co-founder of Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, UC Riverside Associate Professor, 20**13**, Geographies of Privilege, Unsettling the Privilege of Self-Reflexivity, Kindle

In my experience working with a multitude of anti-racist organizing projects over the years, I frequently found myself participating in various workshops in which participants were asked to reflect on their gender/race/sexuality/class/etc. privilege. These workshops had a bit of a self-help orientation to them: "I am so and so, and I have x privilege." It was never quite clear what the point of these confessions were. It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in question had her/his proclaimed privilege. It did not appear that these individual confessions actually led to any political projects to dismantle the structures of domination that enabled their privilege. Rather, the confessions became the political project themselves. The benefits of these confessions seemed to be ephemeral. For the instant the confession took place, those who do not have that privilege in daily life would have a temporary position of power as the hearer of the confession who could grant absolution and forgiveness. The sayer of the confession could then be granted temporary forgiveness for her/his abuses of power and relief from white/male/heterosexual/etc guilt. Because of the perceived benefits of this ritual, there was generally little critique of the fact that in the end, it primarily served to reinstantiate the structures of domination it was supposed to resist. One of the reasons there was little critique of this practice is that it bestowed cultural capital to those who seemed to be the "most oppressed." Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered. "I may be white, but my best friend was a person of color, which caused me to be oppressed when we played together." Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. And despite the cultural capital that was, at least temporarily, bestowed to those who seemed to be the most oppressed, these rituals ultimately reinstantiated the white majority subject as the subject capable of self-reflexivity and the colonREized/racialized subject as the occasion for self-reflexivity. These rituals around self-reflexivity in the academy and in activist circles are not without merit. They are informed by key insights into how the logics of domination that structure the world also constitute who we are as subjects. Political projects of transformation necessarily involve a fundamental reconstitution of ourselves as well. However, for this process to work, individual transformation must occur concurrently with social and political transformation. That is, the undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural forms of oppression. However, the response to structural racism became an individual one – individual confession at the expense of collective action. Thus the question becomes, how would one collectivize individual transformation? Many organizing projects attempt and have attempted to do precisely this, such Sisters in Action for Power, Sista II Sista, Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, and Communities Against Rape and Abuse, among many others. Rather than focus simply on one's individual privilege, they address privilege on an organizational level. For instance, they might assess – is everyone who is invited to speak a college graduate? Are certain peoples always in the limelight? Based on this assessment, they develop structures to address how privilege is exercised collectively. For instance, anytime a person with a college degree is invited to speak, they bring with them a co-speaker who does not have that education level. They might develop mentoring and skills-sharing programs within the group. To quote one of my activist mentors, Judy Vaughn, "You don't think your way into a different way of acting; you act your way into a different way of thinking." Essentially, the current social structure conditions us to exercise what privileges we may have. If we want to undermine those privileges, we must change the structures within which we live so that we become different peoples in the process.

Don't take self-understanding as an incontrovertible truth – we don't perfectly know ourselves and have a lot to gain by making our beliefs subject to external criticism

McBride 3 –Professor of Government @ London School of Economics

(Cillian, "Self-transparency and the possibility of deliberative politics," Journal of Political Ideologies, 8.3)

ABSTRACT I argue against the notion of self-transparency which underwrites the politics of presence. This connects situation, identity, and perspective in such a way as to be **incompatible** with deliberative politics and treats self-understand- ing as authoritative, rendering it **insensitive** to the possibility that our self-under- standings may be **distorted**. I propose a hermeneutic, narrative, conception of selfhood on which we **relate** to our lives as authors, constructing our identities by employing the linguistic and narrative resources which our respective situations make available to us. This admits the possibility that **others may provide us with superior interpretations of our lives**, which is a **precondition** of deliberative politics. Given the possibility that our self-understandings may be distorted, deliberative citizens have a **duty** to challenge **problematic self-under- standings**. Anchoring criticism to public deliberation, together with the her- meneutic premise that a measure of self-opacity is universal, secures such challenges against the charge of authoritarianism levelled at traditional ideol- ogy-critique.¶ I want to focus here on the challenge posed to dialogue-centred politics by a particular discourse connecting situation, identity and politics, which Anne Phillips has termed the 'politics of presence'.1 While apparently providing a particularly firm basis for arguments for the inclusion of hitherto marginalized groups within the democratic process, this discourse embodies highly problem- atic views about political dialogue and the nature of the self. I hope to build on an analysis of these flaws to clarify the ontological preconditions of deliberative politics and, furthermore, to draw some conclusions about the nature of the obligations of parties to deliberation.¶ The politics of presence rests on a model of the self as transparent to itself, but not to others, with the consequence that a person's self-understanding, at the very least, must be acknowledged to be authoritative, or incorrigible. This model of the self cannot, however, be made to cohere with a plausible account of communication, and consequently it **must be discarded** in favour of a broadly hermeneutic model of selfhood as situated in and constituted through a network of language and interpretative traditions. While this self is inevitably opaque to itself in certain respects, reflection on this opacity lends a point to dialogue which it cannot have on the assumption of self-transparency. A dialogic politics, which is sensitive to the possibility of distorted self-understanding and aims at facilitating the transformation of perspectives and self-interpretations, must acknowledge as a fundamental premise the **provisional character** of self-under- standing. This, in turn, provides a basis for viewing deliberative citizens as having obligations, in certain circumstances, to **challenge rather than defer to the self-understandings of others**.

ROB

Our permutation frees us from the demand of immediacy in "the debate space." Imperfect, aspirational performatives are crucial for democratic agency means you should prioritize our impacts

Leela **GANDHI** English @ Chicago **'14** *The Common Cause: Postcolonial Ethics and the Practice of Democracy* p. 164-166

4. To speak an ordinary language, that is, to be ordinary in the sense of being-in-common or being-with-others (in a word, democratic), is an art of the possible.

"Our investigation," Wittgenstein famously notes in Philosophical Investigations, "is directed not toward phenomena, but, as one might say, toward the "possibilities" of phenomena."48 The clearest tenets for the potentiality of shared meanings, thus conceived, occur in Austin's oeuvre. The performative utterances that he distinguishes as bringing something about rather than referring to something already in place do not themselves need to be sui generis and original. 49 Thus the words that launch a marriage or a ship, or cause an arrest to be made are, indeed, coded, iterable, and therefore citational. 50 So too, their powers of conjuration have a great deal to do with the institutional and modular nature of the things they bring about (marriage, prison, journeys). Nonetheless, performative meanings are always subject to creative deviation, deferral, and/or variation. A behabitive commendation may fail to make the person being commended feel commended. An apology may take years to have effect, or it may communicate way more or less regret than intended. Likewise, an expositive utterance plainly announcing or explaining what we are about to do may falter mid-route. Famously (and very likely apocryphally), when training as a barrister in London, the young M.K. Gandhi once failed entirely to give birth to the speech he was signaling repeatedly with the words "I conceive-," "I conceive-". It is this type of synapse or interval between utterance and signification-or, indeed, between utterance, signification, and resignification –that Judith Butler so eloquently describes as the "open temporality of the speech act."51 Performativity, she helps us understand, is not then, the certainty of effect so much as a "possibility of agency," which need not conform to spatial and temporal specificities, and which, we might add, may also remain unrealized. 52 To summarize, at the admittedly minor scene (though one embedded in the first half of the twentieth century) of an academic spat between Cambridge English and Oxford ordinary-language philosophy, we find another variant on the binary of perfectionism/imperfectionism. Where Leavisite English studies took up the cause of humanistic elevation against the threat of egalitarianism, OLP committed to disciplinary dethronement in its name. Both forms proclaimed their own wider application in the world beyond academe, in different ways. But the special-case, ahimsaic path not taken by Cambridge English, and, perhaps, not fully appreciated in the descent of Western philosophy, either, is as yet available for recuperation. Very clearly, if aphoristically, it reformulates ordinariness as the basis for a democratic exegetics, which consists in cultivating our most unremarkable faculties, being suspicious of the facts, and taking something like mere possibility very seriously as a form of politics and of knowledge. This sometimes entails giving free play to the fictionality of any given text situation, by which, in turn, we must mean its socially critical or reparative-because-unfinished impulse. There is apt transcription of OLP principles into an ethico-political hermeneutic by William Empson, the antiprovincial critic-poet admired by Wittgenstein, who spent many years between and after the first two world wars teaching in China. 53 In terms especially resonant with the "possibility" thematic in OLP, Empson draws attention to the principle of ambiguity encoded within all literary experience. A poem may be fully steeped in its context-a social work, as it were-yet there will come a point when its language begins to venture beyond the grammar of its own graspable world. Add to this the muddy business of reading, and what you often get besides the inaugural "faint and separate judgments of probability," is the random surprise of a wildly autonomous final meaning. 54 These ambiguities are a measure of the plurality of likely assumptions secreted within the work and up for grabs to anybody. In context, the democratic critic's proper terrain is to exacerbate ambiguity. She must prevent the foreclosure of collective sense that comes from dealing conclusively or expertly with the material, or from forcing people to attend to "what is really there" in a text or situation. 55 Much better, Empson advises, to leave the understanding ultimately unsatisfied and the text or literary experience ongoingly sociable. Complex permutations obtain from such recommendations. For instance, we have all encountered textual situations the meanings of which simply cannot be brought into view no matter how hard we try because they seem too insignificant or unintelligible in relation to the grammar and moment of their prevailing circumstances. Yet, a la M. K. Gandhi, such textual situations can be hypothesized, precisely in their semantic failure, as aspirational-as bearing the strictly groundless character of a hoping and wishing that is either at odds with its ambient circumstance or that seeks to be circumstance-altering: as in, "I wish x could be otherwise," or, "I hope against hope that y."56 Guessing at this aspirational content or, rather, gleaning insignificance, failure, and unintelligibility as aspirational modes is, thus, an exigent critical task. Similarly, we can also simply refuse to disclose the meanings of a textual situation by pointing to what it actually achieves or references in the world to which it

belongs. In other words, we can enforce its failure. When meanings are thus actively retracted from realization, that is, with the disappearance of a fixed or sole referent/object/ objective, a galactic if inchoate relational field often comes into view. This comprises the textual situation's "implication threads," "contiguous fields" and "neighboring worlds" (to borrow some themes from Gilbert Ryle); or, ala Wittgenstein, its sympathetic resemblance and kinship to other not even necessarily coeval textual situations .57 It goes without saying that such close-up readings will be indistinct and blurry. 58 But they may well be proportionally more inclusive, cosmopolitan, and global. This is but another low-key wager in the spirit of imperfection. In all such cases the risks of self-reduction are finally negligible. If democracy is already here, we win. If it is yet to come, it is still well worth the price. We can gamble thus from a range of venues and in the midst of miscellaneous activities: in Makkali Gosala's cowshed; in Diogenes' bathtub; during a peace protest; as we chat with a friend; in a naval mess hall; during wartime; in the rituals of Kant's complicated couture; even in a library.

AT: pedagogy k/subjectivity

Pedagogy is not a new-found mode of educational inculturation, but rather a means for achieving consciousness by foregrounding teaching moments AGAINST power, and not just OUTSIDE power – that distinction is crucial and proves the alt can never solve

Henry **Giroux 13**, Chair of Secondary education at Pennsylvania State University, Henry Giroux on the Militarization of Public Pedagogy, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/27/teaching-and-learning-with-henry-giroux/

HG: This is an important issue and symptomatic of a much larger problem. Public schools are not simply being corporatized, they are also subjected increasingly to a militarizing logic that disciplines the bodies of young people, especially low income and poor minorities, and shapes their desires and identities in the service of military values and social relations. For a lot of these young people, there are only a few choices here: you can be unemployed and hopefully be able to participate in some way in the social safety net, you can take a low-income job, you can end up in prison or you can go into the military. And it seems to me that increasingly the military is becoming the best option of all of those. So you have a whole generation which – by virtue of this massive inequality – really has very limited choices. But also you have these institutions that are basically there to socialize kids, telling them the only way to succeed is to join the military-industrial complex, and that there really are no other options, at least for them. Moreover, as these young people are subject to the warring logics of a militarized society, a society in which life itself is increasingly absorbed into a war machine, it becomes difficult for them to imagine a social order that can be otherwise, one that is organized around democratic values. SK: Like this program I've been following: it's called STARBASE. This is a Defense Department program that every year reaches around 70,000 students in over one-thousand schools – the majority of them in fifth grade. Pitched as a way to supplement school curriculum in the STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) fields, there's an insidious element of military marketing at work: soldiers "mentor" students enrolled in this program and most of the instruction takes place at military installations. As part of the program students are given plenty of time to horse around on "cool" military hardware. HG: It's mind-blowing. I think what we often forget – and this is something that you and others like yourself are trying to make clear – is that when you talk about the militarization of American society you're not just talking about increasing the military budget or arming the police with military-style weapons and so forth. You're also talking about the militarization of a culture in which military values and relationships permeate every aspect of what C. Wright Mills called the cultural apparatus – schools, fashion, movies and screen culture. Violence becomes the only shared relationship that we have to each other, the only mediating form through which people can now solve problems. More insidiously, it defines our sense of identity and personal liberation through violence both as a mediating force and as a source of pleasure and entertainment. It's one of the reasons why the majority of people in the U.S. support state-sanctioned torture. How do you explain that? It's really a culture that's become so saturated in this military/violent mindset that it has lost any sense of critical thought and ethical responsibility and has little understanding of what a democratic society might look like. SK: Militarism in the schools is of course just one aspect of a larger culture of militarism in the U.S. And this gets at your notion of public pedagogy, doesn't it? HG: I may be terribly wrong but I think the central issue here is that first of all you have to realize that the educational force of the culture represents the most important pedagogical force at work in the United States, Canada, and in many other countries. This is not to suggest that schools are not involved in the process of teaching and learning. But I think we commit a grave mistake when we assume that schools are the only place where learning goes on. I would be willing to argue – and I have argued – that the most powerful educational force in the US is not the schools, it's outside the schools. Young people are awash in a public pedagogy that is

distributed across numerous sites that extend from movies and the Internet, readily amplified through a range of digital apparatuses that include cell phones, computers and other electronic registers of the new and expanded cultural flows. When schools fail to make a connection between knowledge and everyday life – between knowledge and these ever expanding cultural apparatuses – they fail to understand, interrogate, and question the educational forces that are having an enormous influence on children. The ongoing commercial carpet-bombing of kids through a range of ever expanding technologies–that make possible new social networks and information flows–is aggressively commodifying every aspect of their lives. Not to address this and make it pedagogically problematic, not to interrogate the massive violence kids are exposed to through screen culture and the new digital technologies is to do an enormous disservice to the way in which young people are being educated by the wider culture. SK: But young people are resisting, in various ways. You were obviously inspired to write your latest book because you believe youth have a role to play in fighting and changing the system. HG: As someone from the generation of the '60s, I'm enormously inspired by what they're doing. Right now they may be the only chance that we have. Consider their courage: the bravery of these young kids in Occupy Wall Street fighting against state-sanctioned violence in the form of police pepper spray, police dragging them off to jail and arresting them en masse. They've become a model for what it is to stand up to this one percent that has turned the US into an authoritarian society. I think that what these kids are doing is not only producing a new language to talk about inequality and power relations in the US but they're actually trying to create public spaces where new forms of social relationships inspired by democratic and cooperative values are really becoming meaningful. These young people are rethinking the very nature of politics and asking serious questions about what democracy is and why it no longer exists in many capitalist countries across the globe. They have been written out of the discourses of justice, equality, and democracy and are not only resisting how neoliberalism has made them expendable, but they are also arguing for a collective future very different from the one that is on display in the current political and economic systems in which they feel trapped. That's important. But they face enormous challenges. They don't have access to the dominant media. They're trying to use new media to create new modes of communication. They're trying to understand what democratic processes might mean in terms of sustaining collective struggles, and all of this takes time. I think that rather than saying that Occupy Wall Street has died, we can say that they're in the process of understanding what the long march through alternative institutions might mean. As conditions get worse in the U.S. this movement will grow and take on an international significance. Hopefully they'll join with young people in other countries to figure out how to address the biggest problem that the global community faces – politics is local and power is global. Nation-states can't control the flow of capital; it's outside the boundaries of nation-states. So, we need a politics that's global to be able to deal with that. SK: In reflecting on my own research I've seen examples of school administrators treating student activists in two distinctly different ways. In my area, Western Massachusetts, for example, there are high school students who are very heavily involved in organizing around issues of ecology and sustainability. They lobby for locally grown foods to be served in the cafeteria, install small garden plots for community members, school officials give them land on school property to grow vegetables, and so on. But then you have the students in San Diego that I mentioned before. Because they were fighting against the military presence in their schools they were seen as agitators. School administrators and police would conduct video surveillance of the students' marches, and one of their leaders was prevented from taking part in the graduation ceremony with the rest of his class. What might explain the differential response here? HG: As long as these modes of resistance don't challenge relations of power, that's fine with school officials and others in a position of authority. As long as they're focused on students finding a happy spot in themselves, positive thinking, that's fine. But as soon as they start talking about power, militarization, inequality, racism – all those things that point to deep structural problems—student resistance and dissent is viewed as exceeding its possibilities and limits. Just look at what happened in places like Arizona, where these racist educators and politicians succeeded in banning ethnic studies. When young people protested against their history, culture, and forms of witnessing being excluded from the curriculum, they were labeled as criminals, communists, and agitators. What is most important in terms of these youth movements is that you have a lot of young people making connections, saying "Look you can't talk about the rise in tuition unless you talk about the attack on the social state and social protections. You can't talk about what's happening in education unless you talk about the rise of the punishing state." In a place like California where more is spent on prisons than on education clearly those connections are what give force to a generation of students who are simply refusing to isolate these issues. It no longer makes sense to say that these are spoiled kids who don't want to spend much for their education. These young people are developing a conversation about society at large, calling into question its most fundamentally oppressive economic, political, and educational structures. Also, young people are recognizing that they're not going to find their voice in the Democratic Party or in the existing labor unions. What they really need to fight for are new mass and collective organizations that can call the entirety of society into question and mobilize so as to develop the policies and institutions that make a new and radically democratic society possible. SK: Here's a paradox for you: How do you teach social change or resistance to authority within public schools – institutions that many have criticized for being authoritarian and resistant to change? HG: You can't do it if you believe these institutions are so authoritarian that there's simply no room for resistance. That's a mistake. Power is never so overwhelming that there's no room for resistance. Power and the forms it takes are always contradictory in different ways and there is always

some room for resistance. What needs to be understood is the intensity of dominant power in different contexts and how it can be named, understood, and fought. The issue here is to seize upon the contradictions at work in these institutions and to develop them in ways that make a difference. During the sixties, the term for this was the long march through institutions and the reference had little to do with reform but with massive restructuring of the instruments of democracy. And we also need to impose a certain kind of responsibility upon adults in the schools – whether they be social workers, university professors, or high school teachers. Clearly it's not enough to say they operate under terrible burdens that make them voiceless. I understand those structural conditions but it doesn't mean they shouldn't resist either. That means they not only have to promote particular kinds of pedagogies in their classrooms but they also have to join social movements that give them the force of a collective voice that can bear down on these problems and create change. The greatest battle that we're facing in the U.S. today is around the question of consciousness. If people don't have an understanding of the nature of the problems they face they're going to succumb to the right-wing educational populist machine. This is a challenge that the Left has never taken seriously because it really doesn't understand that at the center of politics is the question of pedagogy. Pedagogy is not marginal, it is not something that can be reduced to a method, limited to what happens in high schools, or to what college professors say in their classes. Pedagogy is fundamental not only to the struggle over culture but also, if not more importantly, the struggle over meaning and identity. It's a struggle for consciousness, a struggle over the gist of agency, if not the future itself – a struggle to convince people that society is more than what it is, that the future doesn't simply have to mimic the present. SK: What would this look like in practice? One encouraging experiment I had the privilege of observing up close is taking place at the Emiliano Zapata Street Academy in Oakland. There, in an "alternative high school" within the Oakland Unified School District, student interns working with a group called BAY-Peace lead youth in interactive workshops on topics relevant to their lives: street violence, the school-to-prison pipeline, military recruiters in their schools, and so on. HG: I think two things have to go on here, and you just mentioned one of them. We've got to talk about alternative institutions. There has to be some way to build institutions that provide a different model of education. On the Left, we had this in the '20s and '30s: socialists had Sunday schools, they had camps; they found alternative ways to educate a generation of young people to give them a different understanding of history, of struggle. We need to reclaim that legacy, update it for the twenty-first century, and join the fight over the creation of new modes of thinking, acting, and engaging ourselves and our relations to others. On the second level is what Rudi Dutschke called what I referred to earlier as the "long march through the institutions." It's a model that makes a tactical claim to having one foot in and one foot out. You can't turn these established institutions over to the Right. You can't simply dismiss them by saying they're nothing more than hegemonic institutions that oppress people. That's a retreat from politics. You have to fight within these institutions. Not only that, you have to create new public spheres. SK: Henry, we've covered a lot of territory. Is there anything we haven't addressed that you would like to bring up before closing? HG: We need both a language of critique and a language of hope. Critique is essential to what we do but it can never become so overwhelming that all we become are critics and nothing else. It is counterproductive for the left to engage in declarations of powerlessness, without creating as Jacques Rancière argues "new objects, forms, and spaces that thwart official expectations." What we need to do is theorize, understand and fight for a society that is very different from the one in which we now live. That means taking seriously the question of pedagogy as central to any notion of viable progressive politics; it means working collectively with others to build social movements that address a broader language of our society – questions of inequality and power (basically the two most important issues we can talk about now.) And I think that we need to find ways to support young people because the most damage that's going to be done is going to be heaped upon the next generations. So what we're really fighting for is not just democracy; we're fighting for the future. And so critique is not enough; we need a language of critique and we need a language of possibility to be able to go forward with this.

Alt Answers

AT: Negativity Alt

Optimism and solidarity are our only hope---their strategy of negativity accepts the foundational premises of racism as its starting point for politics

Hooks '96

(Bell hooks 96, Killing Rage: Ending Racism, Google Books, 269-272)

269More than ever before in our history, black Americans are succumbing to and internalizing the racist assumption that there can be no meaningful bonds of intimacy between blacks and whites. It is fascinating to explore why it is that black people trapped in the worst situation of racial oppres sion—enslavement—had the foresight to see that it would be disempowering for them to lose sight of the capacity of white people to transform themselves and divest of white supremacy, even as many black folks today who in no way suffer such extreme racist oppression and exploitation are convinced that white people will not repudiate racism. Con temporary black folks, like their white counterparts, have passively accepted the internalization of white supremacist assumptions. Organized white supremacists have always taught that there can never be trust and intimacy between the superior white race and the inferior black race. **When black people internalize these sentiments, no resistance to white supremacy is taking place; rather we become complicit in spreading racist notions.** It does not matter that so many black people feel white people will never repudiate racism because of being daily assaulted by white denial and refusal of accountability. We must not allow the actions of white folks who blindly endorse racism to determine the direction of our resistance. Like our white allies in struggle we must consistently keep the faith, by always sharing the truth that 270white people can be anti-racist, that racism is not some immutable character flaw. **Of course** many white people are comfortable with a rhetoric of race that suggests racism cannot be changed, that all white people are "inherently racist" simply because they are born and raised in this society. Such misguided thinking socializes white people both to remain ignorant of the way in which white supremacist attitudes are learned and to assume a posture of learned helplessness as though they have no agency—no capacity to resist this thinking. Luckily we have many autobiographies by white folks committed to anti-racist struggle that provide documentary testimony that many of these individuals repudiated racism when they were children. Far from passively accepting It as inherent, they instinctively felt it was wrong. Many of them witnessed bizarre acts of white racist aggression towards black folks in everyday life and responded to the injustice of the situation. Sadly, in our times so many white folks are easily convinced by racist whites and bLack folks who have internalized racism that they can never be really free of racism. These feelings aíso then obsc]re the reality of white privi lege. As long as white folks are taught to accept racism as 'natura]" then they do not have to see themselves as con sciously creating a racist society by their actions, by their political choices. This means as well that they do not have to face the way in which acting in a racist manner ensures the maintenance of white privilege. Indeed, denying their agency allows them to believe white privilege does not exist even as they daily exercise it. If the young white woman who had been raped had chosen to hold all black males account able for what happened, she would have been exercising white privilege and reinforcing the structure of racist thought which teaches that all black people are alike. Unfortunately, 271so many white people are eager to believe racism cannot be changed because internalizing that assumption downplays the issue of accountability. No responsibility need be taken for not changing something ¡fit is perceived as immutable. To accept racism as a system of domination that can be changed would demand that everyone who sees him- or herself as embracing a vision of radai social equality would be required to assert anti-racist habits of being. We know from histories both present and past that white people (and everyone else) who commit themselves to living in anti-racist ways need to make sacrifices, to courageously endure the uncomfortable to challenge and change. Whites, people of color, and black folks are reluctant to commit themselves fully and deeply to an anti-racist struggle that is ongoing because there is such a **pervasive feeling of hopelessness—a conviction that nothing will ever change. How any of us can continue to hold those feelings when we study the history of racism in this society and see how much has changed makes no logical sense.** Clearly we have not gone far enough. In the late sixties, Martin Luther King posed the question "Where do we go from here." To live in anti-racist society we must **collectively** renew our commitment to a democratic vision of racial justice and equality. Pursuing that vision we create a culture where beloved community flourishes and is sustained. Those of us who know the joy of being with folks from all walks of life, all races, who are fundamentalls' anti-racist in their habits of being. need to give public testimony. Ve need to share not only what we have experienced but the conditions of change that make such an experience possible. The interracial circle of love that I know can happen because each individual present in it has made his or her own commitment to living an anti- racist life and to furthering the struggle to end white supremacy 272 will become a reality for everyone only if those of us who have created these communities share how they emerge in our lives and the strategies we use to sustain them. Our devout commitment to building diverse communities is cen tral. These commitments to anti-racist living are just one expression of who we are and what we share with one an other but they form the foundation of that sharing. Like all beloved communities we affirm our differences. It is this generous spirit of affirmation that gives us the courage to challenge one another, to work through misunderstandings, especially those that have to do with race and racism. In a beloved community solidarity and trust are grounded in profound commitment to a shared vision. Those of us who are always anti-racist long for a world in which evezyone can form a beloved community where borders can be crossed and cultural hybridity celebrated. Anyone can begin to make such a community by truly seeking to live in an anti-racist world. If that longing guides our vision and our actions, the new culture will be born and anti-racist communities of resis tance will emerge everywhere. That is where we must go from here.

AT: Alt – Impossible Demands Bad

impossible demands bad

Žižek 7

(Slavoj, 11/15, Resistance Is Surrender, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n22/print/zize01_.html)

The response of some critics on the postmodern Left to this predicament is to call for a new politics of resistance. Those who still insist on fighting state power, let alone seizing it, are accused of remaining stuck within the 'old paradigm': the task today, their critics say, is to resist state power by withdrawing from its terrain and creating new spaces outside its control. **This is, of course, the obverse of accepting the triumph of capitalism**. The politics of resistance is nothing but the moralising supplement to a Third Way Left. Simon Critchley's recent book, Infinitely Demanding, is an almost perfect embodiment of this position.[*] For Critchley, the liberal-democratic state is here to stay. Attempts to abolish the state failed miserably; consequently, the new politics has to be located at a distance from it: anti-war movements, ecological organisations, groups protesting against racist or sexist abuses, and other forms of local self-organisation. It must be a politics of resistance to the state, of bombarding the state with impossible demands, of denouncing the limitations of state mechanisms. The main argument for conducting the politics of resistance at a distance from the state hinges on the ethical dimension of the 'infinitely demanding' call for justice: no state can heed this call, since its ultimate goal is the 'real-political' one of ensuring its own reproduction (its economic growth, public safety, etc). 'Of course,' Critchley writes, history is habitually written by the people with the guns and sticks and one cannot expect to defeat them with mocking satire and feather dusters. Yet, as the history of ultra-leftist active nihilism eloquently shows, one is lost the moment one picks up the guns and sticks. Anarchic political resistance should not seek to mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty it opposes. So what should, say, the US Democrats do? Stop competing for state power and withdraw to the interstices of the state, leaving state power to the Republicans and start a campaign of anarchic resistance to it? And what would Critchley do if he were facing an adversary like Hitler? Surely in such a case one should 'mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty' one opposes? Shouldn't the Left draw a distinction between the circumstances in which one would resort to violence in confronting the state, and those in which all one can and should do is use 'mocking satire and feather dusters'? The ambiguity of Critchley's position resides in a strange non sequitur: if the state is here to stay, if it is impossible to abolish it (or capitalism), why retreat from it? Why not act with(in) the state? Why not accept the basic premise of the Third Way? Why limit oneself to a politics which, as Critchley puts it, 'calls the state into question and calls the established order to account, not in order to do away with the state, desirable though that might well be in some utopian sense, but in order to better it or attenuate its malicious effect'? These words simply demonstrate that today's liberal-democratic state and the dream of an 'infinitely demanding' anarchic politics exist in a relationship of mutual parasitism: **anarchic agents do the ethical thinking, and the state does the work of running and regulating society**. Critchley's anarchic ethico-political agent acts like a superego, comfortably bombarding the state with demands; and the more the state tries to satisfy these demands, the more guilty it is seen to be. In compliance with this logic, the anarchic agents focus their protest not on open dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles. The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don't agree with the government's policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush's reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: 'You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!' It is striking that the course on which Hugo Chávez has embarked since 2006 is the exact opposite of the one chosen by the postmodern Left: far from resisting state power, he grabbed it (first by an attempted coup, then democratically), ruthlessly using the Venezuelan state apparatuses to promote his goals. Furthermore, he is militarising the barrios, and organising the training of armed units there. And, the ultimate scare: now that he is feeling the economic effects of capital's 'resistance' to his rule (temporary shortages of some goods in the state-subsidised supermarkets), he has announced plans to consolidate the 24 parties that support him into a single party. Even some of his allies are sceptical about this move: will it come at the expense of the popular movements that have given the Venezuelan revolution its élan? However, this choice, though risky, should be fully endorsed: the task is to make the new party function not as a typical state socialist (or Peronist) party, but as a vehicle for the mobilisation of new forms of politics (like the grass roots slum committees). What should we say to someone like Chávez? 'No, do not grab state power, just withdraw, leave the state and the current situation in place'? Chávez is often dismissed as a clown – but wouldn't such a withdrawal just reduce him to a version of Subcomandante Marcos, whom many Mexican leftists now refer to as 'Subcomediante Marcos'? Today, it is the great capitalists – Bill Gates, corporate polluters, fox hunters – who 'resist' the state. The lesson here is that the truly subversive thing is not to insist on 'infinite' demands we know those in power cannot fulfil. Since they know that we know it, such an 'infinitely demanding' attitude presents no problem for those in power 'So wonderful that, with your critical demands, you remind us what kind of world we would all like to live in. Unfortunately, we live in the real world, where we have to make do with what is possible.' The thing to do is, on the contrary, to bombard those in power with strategically well-selected, precise, finite demands, which can't be met with the same excuse.

Gilbert

No one method can achieve social change – cultural and representational experiments should be supplemented by collaboration with existing institutions.

Jeremy **GILBERT** Cultural and Political Theory @ East London **'14** *Common Ground: Democracy and Collectivity in an Age of Individualism* p. 200-206

Having said this, it would be problematic simply to dismiss projects such as Burning Man or even the Boom festival for their failure to exhibit these qualities: to some extent their lack of self-doubt and political ambition are conditions of possibility for their success as sites of relatively safe affective and symbolic experimentation. If they lack effective connections with wider political movements then the fault lies as much with those movements, or with all of us who might have built new ones but haven't yet. Although it is right to try to catalyse processes of democratic self-questioning and the interrogation of internal hierarchies in all social situations, it remains the case that in the face of neoliberalism's attempt to privatise every aspect of existence, it becomes politically crucial to defend every such possible site of' collective joy' (Ehrenreich 2007). It is also important to note, of course, that raves and festivals are very far indeed from exhausting the possible forms of such sites. I have referred to them consistently here because they constitute an easy illustration of what such a site can look like, and they have been through interesting processes of radicalisation and reterritorialisation over recent decades. There are many other such sites which are arguably much more important, however. Given its importance to the cultural life of millions, for example, the commercialisation and celebritisation of sport in recent years is arguably a far greater cause for concern. 16 And instances in which physical crowds gather are not of course the only significant potential sites of shared joyous affect. Social networking protocols are just the latest manifestation of the inherent capacity of advanced communications technologies to manifest this potential, at an extraordinary level of distribution and complexity, enabling all kinds of empowering connections to occur between disparate elements of human experience; and it is clearly a potential which companies such as Facebook wish to contain, delimit, and exploit carefully: ensuring, for example, that users maintain a single .individual profile, identifying themselves as easily trackableconsumers, and do not engage in any kind of activity which cannot be profitably data-mined. But I want to take this complexification of the idea of a 'site of collective joy' even further. I would suggest, in fact, that this kind of joy need not have anything to do with the physical proximity of bodies or the noise of the electronic crowd. Even an activity as superficially solitary as reading in a library can be understood as an experience of such a site, to the extent that it involves a creative and productive interaction between singularities: those elements of the reader's conscious and unconscious attention which are engaged in reading; the multiple ideas and possible uses thereof which are partially expressed in the books they read; the elements of the physical, architectural, economic, social, cultural and political assemblage which make the very existence of a library possible; and so on. A library can only exist - can only be individuated - as the consequence of a complex process of social interactions, and can only function well to the extent to which it works as a commons to increase the capacities of its users, while remaining sufficiently flexible and open in form and function to accommodate the invention of multiple and changing uses. Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, a library is not simply a public space or a private space, but must be at the same time both and neither, enabling a diverse population to share resources while also enabling each person, if necessary, to do so relatively undisturbed. This, just as much as the raving crowd (Gilbert 1997), incarnates the ideal of the multitude as a collectivity which empowers but does not suppress the singularity of its constituent elements; and it is possible to experience the democratic sublime in a moment of exemplary clarity or exhilarating confusion (or to experience the disempowerment of bored frustration} at least as much in the one place as the other. What such spaces have in common is that they are all, in a certain sense, spaces of decision, within and from which new individuations and new becomings can emerge. This is not to say they are necessarily spaces within which actual conscious choices are made (although they might be). In fact they are spaces within which we can only experience the ultimate impossibility of making a 'decision' or 'choice' according to the classical liberal model of the rational, intentional, autonomous and autochthonous subject: a decision which is final, which is ours alone, and which is an expression of only our rational interests. But it is by virtue of this fact that they are spaces conducive to the expansion of a field of potentiality and possibility, without which no new decisions, no new individuations, no collective joy, and hence no democracy are ever possible. Problems of Strategy and Government The arguments presented in this chapter so far invite some obvious reactions: How far is it possible to construct systems and institutions which facilitate the emergence of the kind of hetero-affective collective decisions described earlier in the chapter, not just at the level of political organisation, but also at the level of government? At the same time, at the level of political organisation itself: what happens when waiting for such events of collective individuation to emerge simply will not do, when circumstances demand that determinate, conscious choices have to be made here and now? One answer to this question is to observe that social change is of course not ultimately possible without determined efforts by broad-based aggregations of political forces co-ordinated by a viable political strategy: without, in other words, hegemonic projects. The democratic potential of the Latin

American multitude would not have reached any kind of realisation without the strategic co-ordination enabled by the political parties led by Chavez, Morales and Lula. The women's movement only secured significant results by successfully transforming the common sense of a majority of the public in many countries in the world and implementing consequent legislative change. The inability of, for example, the rave and festival movements in the United Kingdom to defend themselves from criminalisation and commercialisation is testament to how far being 'an affective process without a subject' gets you in the long term, if your enemies are stronger and better organised than you are (McKay 1996, Gilbert and Pearson 1999). One of the characteristics that all of the most successful political and cultural projects for democratisation share including but not limited to those already discussed in this chapter- is what I have called a 'strategic orientation' (Gilbert 2008b). By this I mean not a determinate strategy, but merely an awareness of the complexity and specificity of their strategic situation: their strengths, limitations, threats, opportunities and opponents in the broader field of political forces. However, if this sounds like a rather minimal concept, then so it should, because it is important not to have unreasonable expectations of those types of political and cultural intervention which necessarily operate on a 'molecular' scale. No single project, organisation, tendency or process can be expected to deliver radical social change; such change can only ever come about as the result of a complex distribution and aggregation of forces. The gains (and failures) of the women's movement, for example, have always been a product of relationships between interventions in the domains of affective relations, symbolic culture (for example, involving questions of the representation of women in print and broadcast media), political organisation (for example, involving questions of women's representation within political and governmental institutions), and institutional management (Fraser 2013). To put it crudely: the upshot of this observation is that the necessary task of hard political strategising should not be understood as falling on every group who wants to make social change happen: under conditions of advanced neoliberal post-democracy, it may well have to fall to established and well-resourced mainstream political organisations: the unions and the social-democratic parties, in particular, or those intermediary organisations which seek to mediate between them and a range of other social actorsY Conversely, professional political organisers and leaders may have to accept that they cannot bring about the cultural change which would make their political projects viable, and instead be on the lookout for sympathetic and potentially important tendencies as they emerge within wider culture. The complex interdependence between the 'molar' and 'molecular' dimensions of politics is not, of course, a new phenomenon and does not work in only one direction. For example, the efflorescence of radical democratic demands in the 1960s was itself partly a product of the successes of the social-democratic governmental projects from the 1930s onwards, which freed large populations from the immediate fear of poverty for the first time since the industrial revolution, so enabling a profounder imaginative challenge amongst many of them to existing social relations than would otherwise have been possible;18 this social-democratic success was itself made possible in part by the 'molecular' cultural changes of the inter-war period: in particular the diffusion of' modernism', in both its avant-garde and popular variants (Williams 1989). It is therefore obviously a mistake to imagine that either the strategic, molar and hegemonic or the molecular, affective and experimental dimensions of political struggle can ever be ignored. Nor can any one of them be expected to bear the full weight of hopes and demands for social change. In most contemporary contexts, it is to be expected that the multiple tasks required to make change possible are likely to be borne by quite different kinds of agent: from art movements to think tanks to university departments to civil society organisations to political parties. Such tasks include generating new modes of thought and perception which might contribute to cultural change; crystallising those affective changes into meaningful political demands; strategically co-ordinating a range of demands and constituencies into a viable political coalition; delivering a coherent programme for government which instantiates some of those changes; recruiting and mobilising a cadre of professional politicians who can implement this programme; sustaining the affective and semiotic potency of those demands to the point that such realisation becomes likely; and many others. Because such tasks require quite different dispositions and competences, it is not surprising that their agents often dislike each other and find mutual comprehension difficult; but it is probably necessary for any kind of democratic progress that there should exist a degree of what we might call 'molecular sympathy' between them. Arguably one of the most debilitating features of the political Left - mainstream and radical - in recent decades has been its inability to connect or even resonate at all with sites of radical cultural experimentation. 19 This raises once again the issue of what kinds of political organisation and institutional innovation might make radical democratic hopes concretely realisable. This is an issue addressed by Erik Olin Wright and Archon Fung in their co-edited book Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innm,ations in Empowered Participat01y Gwernance (Wright and Fung 2003). This work is largely a collection of studies of localised experiments in participatory and deliberative democracy, such as the famous Porto Alegre participatory budgeting process, or the decentralised planning process deployed by the leftist government of Kerala.20 In itself the collection stands as evidence for the viabilityof participatory democratic forms in wildly varying contexts; but what is particularly interesting for us here is the conclusion reached by the editors in their epilogue. Wright and Fung argue that such experiments in participatory democracy, at least under present socio-political conditions, are always in danger of degeneration into democratic inefficacy, or co-option, or neutralisation by more powerful political and commercial forces. They argue that these outcomes are only avoidable where there exists sufficient 'countervailing power' - in other words, sufficiently well-organised and mobilised political

constituencies- to defend their democratic status. Going further, they suggest that this countervailing power must be deployed by forces which are strong and well-organised, but whose relationship to government is **not habitually adversarial**, but instead **collaborative**: engaging in complex tactical problem-solving, and constructive institutional engagement, but from a position of strategic strength. Wright and Fung underscore, with a justified degree of pessimism, the difficulty of mobilising on such terms movements and organisations whose identities and practices are grounded in adversarial relationships to existing power structures. A number of the conceptual distinctions we have encountered in this study are relevant to understanding this argument. In Laclau's terms, Wright and Fung can be read as suggesting that such radical democratic innovation requires an 'institutionalist' (or perhaps we might coin the term 'counter-institutionalist'21) practice on the part of movements formed on a populist basis. Following Deleuze and Guattari, we could say that the difficulty they highlight is that of enacting a molecular deterritorialisation of existing institutions from the position of a molar collectivity. And yet the great value of the schizoanalytic perspective is that it demonstrates the extent to which every such molarity is already an assemblage, constituted by its lines of flight and its molecular processes, and so would suggest that such a transition need not be understood simply as the reversal of a group's constituted nature, but as an activation and intensification of its most dynamic constituent tendencies. This last phrase of mine deliberately echoes a key distinction made by Antonio Negri between 'constituent power' (the creative power of the multitude of which all true democracy is an expression) and 'constituted power' (actually existing institutions of government) (Negri 1999). In fact what seems to be at stake here is a generalised extension of Gramsci's concept of political struggle as a 'war of position', a sort of ongoing trench or siege warfare which is distinguished from the full-frontal revolutionary assault of the classic 'war of manoeuvre' or 'war of movement'. The same thing happens in the art of politics as happens in military art: war of movement increasingly becomes war of position, and it can be said that a State will win a war in so far as it prepares for it minutely and technically in peacetime. The massive structures of the modem democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the 'trenches' and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position. (Gramsci 1971: 243) Wright and Fung's formulation develops an element which is already implicit in Gramsci's: even while it is strategising against its opponents and inventing institutions of its own, a radical force must have a constructive, creative dimension. The implication of the foregoing argument is that this creative dimension cannot be expressed only through the positive, ex nihilo construction of new institutions it also requires processes of molecular, transformative engagement with existing systems.

Permutation Stuff

Perm – Negativity Combined with Positivity

Their insistence on negativity as the starting point and generating competition is problematic—only our inclusive approach can create movements and tangible change

Brand-Jacobsen 5

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Peace by Peaceful Means Dear Friends, The discussions which have taken place over e-mail over the past few days have been extremely interesting. I have just returned from Oslo where the 100th anniversary of the Nobel Peace Prize was being celebrated. The obvious contrast between the rather elite 'suit' dominated celebrations in Oslo and the realities of what is occurring in the world today was stark. Questions of strategy, tactics and visions for how we work to bring about change, to transform all forms of violent conflict -- direct, structural, and cultural -- and to empower, mobilise, and involve people in a mass, broad-based movement for peace and to build the alternatives we are looking for, are vital. In Norway alone, to take one example, perhaps 80% of people think what is happening now in and over Afghanistan is wrong, either completely or at least in part, and yet all they hear from the media, academics and politicians is constant support and acclaim for the 'justness' of this war (or indeed, any war in which it is 'we' against 'them'). Small groups of people and 'NGOs', in Norway as in every single country, are trying to bring forward alternatives, to raise their voices, and to protest/oppose what they think is wrong. While these organisations are in every case much smaller than our governments and militaries going to war, they often represent the social majority. A major challenge they face, however, is how to reach out to people, how to involve people, and how to develop alternatives which make sense to people tired of war and violence (whether of the kind we are seeing in Afghanistan, or of a global economic system killing 100,000 a day). Negative slogans and opposition to what is wrong is not enough however. It is not enough, but it is necessary. 'Basta!', 'Enough!' was perhaps the most 'revolutionary' cry of the last decade, and still is in many parts of the world. The simple, courageous act, of standing up when we see that something is wrong, and stating that it is wrong, not cooperating with it, can be a powerful and evocative symbol. When we are having our conferences, discussions and meetings in whichever city, town or village of the world we may be found, we should always remember that the vast majority of people in our own city, town or village, as well as the entire rest of the world, have no idea that we are there, meeting. The vision, hope and ideas which bring people to these conferences are, in the vast majority of cases, kept marginalised, on the periphery Yet that is also part of our own responsibility, technique and methods. Basta! became a cry to inspire millions, because those who said it lived it, refusing to cooperate any longer with what they know to be wrong. While Basta! may be the most revolutionary cry or word today, transforming all forms of direct, structural, and cultural violence is the greatest challenge The two are inclusive and complementary, not exclusive. We need to state clearly our opposition to violence, war, injustice and exploitation (the 'peace movement' has often been willing to do the first two, not always as willing on the last two), and we need also to build a constructive, positive programme It is not only a question of what we are against, but what we are for. When we criticize what we think is wrong, people will also want to know what we think could be done instead. In these cases, our answers must seem real and viable to people. The 'anti-globalisation' movement is therefore also a social justice movement; 'non-governmental organisations' should also be people's organisations or people's movements; and one of our challenges today will be to build upon the growing 'anti-war' movement, transforming it also into a peace movement. A step further, as many social and peace activists have recognised, will be to link the peace and social justice movements. Slogans and messages are important, as are practice and vision. It will not be possible today to unite broad numbers of people around issues which they feel are too abstract and divorced from them. The 'abolish the debt' campaign/movement was successful because people were able to see the clear linkages between debt and the effective colonisation and enslavement of countries and

people across the south, as well as the incredible suffering and destruction it brought. The Jubilee 2000 'campaign' however, unlike the Jubilee South movement which continues today, did not reach its objective of having the debt cancelled. Instead, while many people around the world believe the problem has been solved, the debt-system and the burden it places upon countries has become even more extreme. Going from 'campaigns' to movements will also be important, though even here it is not a question of 'either/or' but 'both/and' with individual campaigns extremely useful and effective at times for involving people, raising awareness and mobilising around specific issues, strengthening further the broader movements of which they may be a part. Today, a movement for demos kratos is necessary and vital for any movement or work towards peace. To speak about the United States or any government in the world today as a 'democracy' is a ridiculous farce. They are highly elite dominated systems built upon massive structures and cultures of violence, and willing to use overwhelming (Powel Doctrine) violence when necessary to enforce their needs and/or interests. At best they may be demagogia's, where elites maintain power by promising the people what they will do for them (we call this 'elections'), but they are not system's or societies built upon people's power, demos kratos. Decisions to go to war are made by tiny numbers of people. Our economic and political policies are constructed for us, often to the detriment of the social majorities who are told to 'leave well enough alone' and trust in the experts. This is sometimes as true of politicians as it is of non-governmental organisations who themselves frequently prefer the conference halls and well-funded projects to actually working democratically with people as part of the people themselves. An alternative today, what Johan Galtung has called for, with 10,000 dialogues, meetings, discussions at every level, focussing not only on what is wrong, but also on what we want therapy, ideas, alternatives. In one form or another many of these dialogues are taking place. In a way they are therapy for the massive amounts of violence we are all being exposed to today, in our cultures, in our world, on our television sets or in the speeches of our 'democratically elected' rulers (the question, for those who do not support their policies, should not be 'who put them in power' -- though this is also important -- but why haven't we removed them from power yet_). They are also empowering, if we take the step beyond saying what is wrong to what **could be done** , what should be done_, and then go further to discussing what I/we can do about it. Mobilising people for peace today is not simply about a slogan (though coming up with clearly expressed messages in a few words will of course help us to link people together and raise awareness). What is necessary, beyond any single issue or top-level strategy for how to change the world, is the **process**. The way is the goal. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the social justice/anti-globalisation movement is that it has mobilised, involved, and empowered millions of people around the world in discussing, thinking about, and acting upon the realities around them. On the streets of Seattle, Praha, Okinawa, Melbourne, Gotheburg, Washington, Quebec, Genoa, Ottawa, people, many of whom refuse to vote, have been discussing foreign policy, domestic politics, people to people movements, and all the issues which politicians and well-established NGOs are not able and often not willing to discuss with people. We have our 'manifestos', our policies and plans which we wish to put forward in the name of people, often addressing them to 'politicians' and 'elites' believing, in a fundamentally undemocratic way, that they will be the ones to bring about and implement change for us. This is not to say that that is not an important level which we also need to work at. The broader vision here is both/and, not either or, in terms of strategy as well often of vision. We also need, however, to be willing to take part in the much slower, more timely, and more empowering process of tens of thousands of dialogues together with people, communities, and organisations at every level. Solidarity today is **being built** upon and carried further into alliances not just supporting people in their struggles for social justice, peace and freedom, but carrying forward those struggles ourselves in our own communities, our own towns, cities and villages. If we wish to change the injustices taking place in the world today we must of course work on a global level, but we must also work, just as importantly, within our communities. Again, **both/and** rather than either or **We should also be wary when we say 'we must begin here', or 'this must be done first**!', even when the message is very positive and constructive. 'We must begin with the individual!'. 'We must begin by changing society!'. 'We must begin with a culture of peace!'. 'We must begin by ending the debt!'. **All of these**, and the **many others** put forward, are extremely important issues. **They are also all linked together**. Again, both/and. Exclusive and elitist visions will only serve to **further fragment** our efforts, creating division and separation where what is needed is dialogue, solidarity, cooperation and alliances between movements/organisations which often take diverse strategies and approaches to addressing deeply interlinking injustices and structures and cultures of violence. Conscientisation (raising awareness, often political awareness -- but also social, cultural, economic), organisation (we can do more together than we can apart, and it is necessary to organise -- though in many different ways -- to be able to bring about changes, both against what we think is wrong and for what we think is right), mobilisation (bringing in more and more people, involving people in dialogues, discussion, action, and work for change/transformation), and empowerment (I/we can, rather than 'I/we can't'; also important recognising the power we have to bring about change, rather than simply accepting existing, often extremely violent, power structures and believing that change can/should/must be implemented by those 'in power', whether slave owners, men, politicians, or fuhrers) are **all necessary**.

Institutions KT Solve Anti-Blackness

the law is obviously problematic, but that's a reason we should hold it accountable to live up to its ideals

Crenshaw 88

(Kimberle, Law @ UCLA, "RACE, REFORM, AND RETRENCHMENT: TRANSFORMATION AND LEGITIMATION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW", 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, lexis)

Questioning the Transformative View: Some Doubts About Trashing The Critics' product is of limited utility to Blacks in its present form. The implications for Blacks of trashing liberal legal ideology are troubling, even though it may be proper to assail belief structures that obscure liberating possibilities. Trashing legal ideology seems to tell us repeatedly what has already been established -- that legal discourse is unstable and relatively indeterminate. Furthermore, trashing offers **no idea of how to avoid the negative consequences of engaging in reformist discourse** or how to work around such consequences. Even if we imagine the wrong world when we think in terms of legal discourse, **we must nevertheless exist in a present world** where legal protection has at times been a blessing -- albeit a mixed one. The fundamental problem is that, although Critics criticize law because it functions to legitimate existing institutional arrangements, it is precisely this legitimating function that has made law **receptive to** certain demands in this area. The Critical emphasis on deconstruction as the vehicle for liberation leads to the conclusion that engaging in legal discourse should be avoided because it reinforces not only the discourse itself but also the society and the world that it embodies. Yet Critics offer little beyond this observation. Their focus on delegitimating rights rhetoric seems to suggest that, once rights rhetoric has been discarded, there exists a more productive strategy for change, one which does not reinforce existing patterns of domination. Unfortunately, **no such strategy has yet been articulated**, and it is difficult to imagine that racial minorities will ever be able to discover one. As Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward point out in their [*1367] excellent account of the civil rights movement, popular struggles are a reflection of institutionally determined logic and a challenge to that logic. 137 **People can only demand change in ways that reflect the logic of the institutions that they are challenging**. 138 Demands for change that do not reflect the institutional logic -- that is, demands that do not engage and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology -- will probably be **ineffective.** 139 The possibility for ideological change is created through the very process of legitimation, which is triggered by crisis. Powerless people can sometimes trigger such a crisis by challenging an institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it. 140 Such crisis occurs when powerless people force open and politicize a contradiction between the dominant ideology and their reality. The political consequences [*1368] of maintaining the contradictions may sometimes force an adjustment -- an attempt to close the gap or to make things appear fair. 141 Yet, because the adjustment is triggered by the political consequences of the contradiction, circumstances will be adjusted only to the extent necessary to close the apparent contradiction. This approach to understanding legitimation and change is applicable to the civil rights movement. Because Blacks were challenging their exclusion from political society, the only claims that were likely to achieve recognition were those that reflected American society's institutional logic: legal rights ideology. Articulating their formal demands through legal rights ideology, civil rights protestors exposed a series of contradictions -- the most important being the promised privileges of American citizenship and the practice of absolute racial subordination. Rather than using the contradictions to suggest that American citizenship was itself illegitimate or false, civil rights protestors proceeded as if American citizenship were real, and demanded to exercise the "rights" that citizenship entailed. By seeking to restructure reality to reflect American mythology, Blacks relied upon and ultimately benefited from politically inspired efforts to resolve the contradictions by granting formal rights. Although it is the need to maintain legitimacy that presents powerless groups with the opportunity to wrest concessions from the dominant order, it is the very accomplishment of legitimacy that forecloses greater possibilities. In sum, the potential for change is both created and limited by legitimation. 139 The possibility for ideological change is created through the very process of legitimation, which is triggered by crisis. Powerless people can sometimes trigger such a crisis by challenging an institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it. 140 Such crisis occurs when powerless people force open and politicize a contradiction between the dominant ideology and their reality. The political consequences [*1368] of maintaining the contradictions may sometimes force an adjustment -- an attempt to close the gap or to make things appear fair. 141 Yet, because the adjustment is triggered by the political consequences of the contradiction, circumstances will be adjusted only to the extent necessary to close the apparent contradiction. This approach to understanding legitimation and change is applicable to the civil rights movement. Because Blacks were challenging their exclusion from political society, the only claims that were likely to achieve recognition were those that reflected American society's institutional logic: legal rights ideology. Articulating their formal demands through legal

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Non-Mutually Exclusive

Must take action---pessimism doesn't necessitate passivity

Seidman 11

(Louis Michael Seidman 11, Professor of Constitutional Law at Georgetown, Hyper-Incarceration and Strategies of Disruption: Is There a Way Out?, moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/Articles/Volume9_1/Seidman.pdf)

<u>My worry</u> about myself <u>is not that I would make a wrong choice</u> between these alternatives, <u>but that I would **avoid the necessity of choice by adopting a stance of world-weary passivity or complacent indifference**</u>. <u>There is no good way to deal with overwhelming evil, but there is surely a way not to deal with it</u>. <u>Willful blindness</u>, craven apologetics, <u>and</u> flaccid <u>acquiescence are not options when millions of our fellow inhabitants are behind bars</u>. Like the people of good will trapped in Nazi Europe, <u>we</u> opponents of hyper-incarceration <u>need to</u> confront the truth of our situation and <u>be honest about how bleak the prospects are</u>. **But pessimism should not be confused with passivity.** <u>Even if our efforts accomplish nothing at all, and whatever form our politics take, we must do what we can to stop the horror.</u> ¶ Our personal dignity demands no less.

Reforms Work – Pyle

Pure resistance entrenches the status quo---must be willing to propose imperfect reforms

Pyle 99

(Jefferey, Boston College Law School, J.D., magna cum laude Race, Equality and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory's Attack on the Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C.L. Rev. 787)

For all their talk of "realism,"'" race-crits are strangely unrealistic in their proposals for reform. 1 m7 Most probably realize that radical measures like racial or ethnic reparations are not likely to be granted, especially by a court. But even unrealistic proposals are rare, because race-crits generally prefer not to suggest solutions, but to "resist" the dominant legal thought, doctrine and policy, whatever that happens to be.'" As Derrick Bell has put it, "most critical race theorists are committed to a program of scholarly resistance, and most hope scholarly resistance will lay the groundwork for wide-scale resistance."'" How this ivory tower oppositionalism would foment grassroots revolt is unclear, because CRT professors rarely suggest anything practical. Rather, their exhortations are meant, as Bell says, to "harass white folks" and • thereby "make life bearable in a society where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class."'" One of the race-erns' few practical programs of "resistance" is Paul Butler's proposal that inner-city juries practice racially-based jury nullification.'91 jurors of color, Butler argues, have the "moral responsibility" not to apply the criminal law to blacks and whites equally, but to "etnancipate some guilty black outlaws" because "the black community" would be "better off" if there were fewer black men in prison.'" If enough juries were hung or not-guilty verdicts rendered, he imagines, the white-dominated government would change its excessive reliance on incarceration.'" Butler rejects the ordinary democratic process of legal reform.' Democracy, he says, ensures a "permanent, homogenous majority" of whites that "dominat[es]" African Ainericans.w5 Butler is probably correct that occasional acts of jury nullification might well express the resentment that many African Americans justifiably feel towards discriminatory law enforcement.'"`' As Randall Kennedy has pointed out, however, black Americans are disproportionately the victims of crimes,'97 and therefore tend to favor more, not less, criminal prosecution and punishment. 1 "8 The race-crits' preference for "resistance"''99 over democratic participation seems to flow from a fear of losing their status as "oppositional scholars] "200 to the game of mainstream law and politics, which they regard as "an inevitably co-optive process?"' Better to be radically opposed to the "doniinant political discourse""2 and remain an out than to work within the current system and lose one's "authenticity?" In rejecting the realistic for the "authentic," however, race-crits begin to look like academic poseurs—ideological purists striking the correct radical stance, but doing little within the confines of the real world, so sure are they that nothing much can be done."

Coalitions Key

Perm's best---the alt alone causes imperialistic domination

Churchill 3

(Ward, former professor of ethnic studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder Acts of Rebellion: The Ward Churchill Reader pg 106)

It is in this last connection that the greatest current potential may be found, not only for the Newes in their struggle to retain (or regain) their homeland, but for (re)assertion of indigenous land rights more generally, and for the struggles of nonindians who seek genuinely positive alternatives to the North American status quo. In the combination of forces presently coalescing in the Nevada desert lie the seeds of a new sort of communication, understanding, respect, and the growing promise of mutually beneficial joint action between native and nonnative peoples in this hemisphere.294 For the Shoshones, the attraction of a broad—and broadening—base of popular support for their rights offers far and away the best possibility of bringing to bear the kind and degree of pressure necessary to compel the federal government to restore all, or at least some sizable portion, of their territory. For the nonindian individuals and organizations involved, the incipient unity they have achieved with the Newes represents both a conceptual breakthrough and a seminal practical experience of the fact that active support of native land rights can tangibly further their own interests and agendas.295 For many American Indians, particularly those of traditionalist persuasion, the emerging collaboration of nonindian groups in the defense of Western Shoshone lands has come to symbolize the possibility that there are elements of the dominant population that have finally arrived at a position in which native rights are not automatically discounted as irrelevancies or presumed to be subordinate to their own.296 On such bases, bona fide alliances can be built. Herein lies what may be the most important lesson to be learned by those attempting to forge a truly American radical vision, and what may ultimately translate that vision into concrete reality: Native Americans cannot hope to achieve restoration of the lands and liberty which are legitimately theirs without the support and assistance of nonindians, while nonindian activists cannot hope to effect any transformation of the existing social order which is not fundamentally imperialistic, and thus doomed to replicate some of the most negative aspects of the present system, unless they accept the necessity of liberating indigenous land and lives as a matter of first priority.297 Both sides of the equation are at this point bound together in all but symbiotic fashion by virtue of a shared continental habitat, a common oppressor, and an increasingly interactive history. There is thus no viable option but to go forward together, figuratively joining hands to ensure our collective well-being, and that of our children, and our children's children.

AT: Coalition Link

Critique of the racial state shouldn't preclude appeals to state-based politics.

Lipsitz 4 George Black Studies @ UC SB "Abolition democracy and global justice" *Comparative American Studies* 2 (3) p. 271-276

Abstract As new social relations produce new kinds of social subjects, scholars in American Studies and Area Studies experience anxieties about disciplinary as well as geographic borders. The Civil Rights tradition of the 14th Amendment plays an important role within progressive American Studies scholarship, but in the course of seeking equality and exclusion within the USA, this tradition runs the risk of occluding the role of the nation in the world and its central role in creating and preserving inequality and injustice in other nations. An emerging emphasis on struggles for social justice without seeking state power encapsulates many of the most progressive impulses within Area Studies and transnational studies, yet this perspective runs the risk of occluding the enduring importance of the nation-state in inflecting global developments with local histories and concerns. The present moment challenges us to draw on both traditions, and to use each to critique the shortcomings of the other, while at the same time promoting an inclusionary, nonsectarian, and mutually supportive dialogue about our differences. Keywords American Studies ● Area Studies ● inequality ● transnationalism In Jack Conroy's 1935 short story 'The Weed King', a stubborn Missouri farmer wages a one person war against the weeds that spring up in his fields. Believing that farming would be an easy job if it were not for the weeds, he dedicates himself to their eradication with a zeal that astounds his fellow workers. The 'weed king' embraces his war against weeds as his reason for being. 'His only vanity,' Conroy tells us, is his belief that he has 'put the quietus to more weeds than any man, woman, child or beast west of the Mississippi' (Conroy, 1985: 101). Even in the winter time when snow covers the ground, the zealot worries night and day about the tiny seeds waiting to bloom in the spring. One of his neighbors points out that weeds have their uses too, that many of them have greatly-needed medicinal powers. However, the weed king is not deterred. He soon succeeds in suppressing most of the weeds on his property. His singleminded zealotry has its costs, however. The measures he takes to kill the weeds prove fatal to his crops as well. At the present moment of tumultuous transformation and change, scholars in American Studies and Area Studies might be tempted to emulate the weed king, to keep a keen eye on our fields to protect what we have been cultivating for so many years, to view each other's work with trepidation and counter-insurgent zeal. American Studies scholars worry that the growing enthusiasm for transnational studies threatens to focus too much on exchanges across national boundaries, in the process occluding the unique, particular, and specific inflections given to those processes by distinct national histories, cultures, and politics. Area Studies specialists, many of whom have been part of a decades-long tradition dedicated to constructing epistemologies and ontologies that resist the hegemony of the monolingual, monocultural, and nationalist scholarship of the US academy, rightly fear that a transnational or postnational American Studies might simply project American Exceptionalism onto a broader geographic terrain. Outside the USA, specialists in both American Studies and Area Studies have reason to fear that (wittingly or unwittingly) scholars from the USA will use the power of US capital, communications media, and commerce to substitute a US-centric monologue masquerading as a dialogue for the greatly needed polylateral communication and collaboration that a transnational world requires. At a time when substantive changes in social structures, technology, and politics are radically reconfiguring the relations linking culture, time, and place, policing the boundaries of disciplines speaks to deep desires for continuity and certainty. It is possible to look at the current ferment in our fields and see only what is being lost, to become subsumed with melancholy about lost conversations and conventions. Yet scholarly research should be conducted out of conviction, rather than out of habit. If we are not careful, our work can come to resemble Swedish anthropologist Ulf Hannerz's definition of Scandinavian cooking – something passed down from generation to generation for no apparent reason (Hannerz, 1992: 42). Like the weed king, we can worry night and day about the purity of our fields. As new social relations throw forth fundamentally new social subjects with new epistemologies, ontologies, archives, and imaginaries, new patterns of scholarly inquiry will inevitably emerge. Will shallow forms of cultural and ideological critique eclipse the grounded insights produced by ethnography or social history? Will the fetishes of archival and ethnographic research methods produce empiricist and myopic work lacking in self-reflexivity? Will comparative work lack the cultural and linguistic depth traditionally produced by primarily national studies? Will national studies ignore the ways in which nationalism itself is a transnational project? Will the proliferation of new social subjects and new objects of study come at the expense of marginalizing aggrieved social groups or will it teach us how social identities become conflated with power in richly generative and productive ways? It is understandable that these kinds of questions arise when we try to do our work. Anything worth doing can nonetheless be done badly, and principled questions from colleagues protect our interests as well as theirs. Yet counter-insurgency is a poor model for scholarly work, and too much attention to pulling out weeds can kill the crops. Even more important, weeds can have

curative powers if we learn to use them correctly. The author of 'The Weed King' confided to his biographer that his mother believed that 'weeds' were simply plants for which no use had yet been found (Wixon, 1994: 32). The 'weeds' that invade a field can also inform it in crucially important ways if we learn to recognize their curative powers. Within American Studies, the tradition of 14th Amendment Americanism may seem like the quintessential expression of American exceptionalism. Forged from the freedom dreams and collective struggles of an enslaved people, the 14th Amendment stands as an enduring symbol of the accomplishments of the abolition democracy that ended slavery in the wake of the Civil War. More than a specific Constitutional provision promising equal treatment under law, the 14th Amendment has functioned as a widely shared social warrant authoring and authorizing new ways of knowing and new ways of being. In his indispensable work, Black Reconstruction in America, W.E.B. Du Bois demonstrated how slaves fighting for their freedom soon realized that it would not be enough to be merely 'free' in a society premised on their exclusion. In the course of staging a general strike in the fields, running away from slavery to swell the ranks of the Union army, and joining together to work land liberated by military force, they formulated a political perspective that Du Bois named 'abolition democracy' (Du Bois, 1995). They fought for the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution. At the Charleston Black Convention in 1865 they called for more than nominal freedom, for the development of their full being as humans. Between 1865 and 1877 they fashioned alliances with poor whites to elect progressive majorities to office, and their successes led to the first universal public education systems in the South, to governments that subsidized the general economic infrastructure rather than just the privileges and property of the elite. Although betrayed by the Compromise of 1877, by the removal of federal troops from the South, by the legal consolidation of the combination of sharecropping and Jim Crow Segregation, and by Supreme Court decisions that took protections away from black people and extended them to corporations, abolition democracy and the 14th Amendment successfully challenged the hegemony of white male Protestant propertied power. It opened the door for subsequent claims for social justice by immigrants and their children, religious minorities, women, workers and people with disabilities. From voting rights to affirmative action, from fair housing to fair hiring, the 14th Amendment is an enduring and abiding force for social justice in US society. Yet American Studies scholarship that subsumes social justice under the rubric of the 14th Amendment runs the risk of ignoring the position of the USA in the world. Celebrating struggles for citizenship inside the USA can work to strengthen the distinctions between citizens and aliens, providing legitimation for nationalist and nativist policies that impose enormous suffering on humans precisely because they are not US citizens. The legacy of the 14th Amendment has not prevented women and blacks in contemporary California from supporting anti-immigrant nativism through Proposition 187, aimed at denying immigrants and their children needed state services, or through Proposition 227, banning bilingual education in the state's classrooms. Post-1965 immigrants from Asia, who owe their entry into to the USA to the civil rights movement and its exposure of previous national origin quotas as racist, have not been immune to pursuing the privileges of whiteness for themselves by opposing affirmative action and school desegregation policies vital to the well-being of blacks and Latinos. At the same time, the power inequalities that separate even the most aggrieved US citizens from the masses of poor and working people around the world can render struggles for full 14th Amendment rights by US citizens to be little more than what Martin Luther King, Jr used to describe as 'an equal right to do wrong'. Certainly the prominence of Colin Powell and Condoleeza Rice in forging the rationale for the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq demonstrates the limits of this form of inclusion. If abolition democracy emblematizes the emancipatory tradition within American Studies, the idea of collective and linked struggles for change without aiming for control over any one state expresses the uniquely generative stance within transnational social movements and transnational scholarship. Articulated in the form of a manifesto in John Holloway's Change the World Without Taking Power, this sensibility has taken on activist form in the work of the EZLN in Mexico, the Gabriela Network in the Philippines, and the Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence in that Japanese prefecture (Holloway, 2002). These movements make demands on the state and recognize the specificity of national histories, cultures and politics, but their aspirations and activities cannot be contained with any single national context. The activities of the Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV) demonstrate the importance of a transnational perspective that goes beyond the history, culture, and politics of any single nation state (Fukumura and Matsuoka, 2002). Coming from a country that has been serially colonized since the 17th century and occupied militarily by both the USA and Japan, OWAAMV activists cannot solve their problems within a single national context. Disadvantaged by colonial status, race, and gender, they cannot turn to national liberation, anti-racism or feminism as their sole context for struggle. Coming from a small island with a limited population in a corner of the world far removed from metropolitan centers of power, they must forge alliances with outsiders based on political affinities and identifications, rather than counting on the solidarities of sameness that sustain most social movements. As eyewitnesses to brutal combat on the island in 1945 that killed more than 130,000 Okinawan civilians (one-third of the local population) and tens of thousands of Japanese and US military personnel, they find it impossible to celebrate organized violence and masculinist militarism (Hein and Selden, 2003: 13). As women confronted with the pervasive presence of commercial sex establishments, sex tourism and rapes of civilian women and girls by military personnel, they see gender as a central axis of power and struggle. The complicated history that brought the OWAAMV into existence, and which vexes them in so many ways, has produced new ways of being and new ways of knowing that contain enormous generative power for scholars in Ethnic Studies and American Studies. They do not seek to make their nation militarily superior to others. Instead, they argue that massive preparation for war increases rather than decreases the likelihood of violence. Moreover, they argue that military spending creates security for states and financial institutions but not for people. They charge that expenditures on war serve to contain and control people like themselves who oppose the global economic system, who challenge neoliberal policies designed to privatize state assets, lower barriers to trade and limit the power of local entities to regulate the environment. Perhaps most important, they call for a new definition of 'security', one that places the security of women, children and ordinary people before the security of the state and financial institutions. They 'queer' the nation – not because they take an explicit position on the rights of gays and lesbians, but because they interrupt and contest the narrative of patriarchal protection upon which the nation-state so often rests. By necessity, the OWAAMV go beyond the categories and cognitive mappings of area studies. They are citizens of Japan, but also victims of Japanese and US colonialism. On most issues, they feel more in solidarity with the indigenous Sovereignty Movement in Hawai'i or the Gabriela network mobilizing against sex tourism and sex work near military bases than they do with their fellow citizens of Japan. The nature of US imperialism forces them to seek alliances with pacifists and feminists in the USA, with Puerto Rican activists fighting against US military exercises on the island of Vieques, and with the Okinawans transported to

Bolivia during the Cold War era when the Japanese and US governments relocated them in that South American nation so their land could be appropriated for military uses. They feel solidarity with witnesses to war and empire everywhere, recognizing that the things that have happened in their part of the Pacific cannot be contained within any one 'area' of study. Transnational organizing of mobilizations for change, without directly seeking to take state power, speak directly to the new circuits and networks of power emerging from new forms of production, consumption, communication and repression. They often display brilliant ingenuity in fashioning seemingly unlikely short-term alliances, affinities and identifications with people across class, gender, race and national lines. Yet this very tactical dexterity makes it difficult to turn temporary victories into long-term institutional changes. Strategies that manifest the mobility and dynamism required for challenging transnational corporations and financial institutions often lack the concentrated power needed to challenge the enduring power of the state and its control over the prisons, armies and police agencies deployed in support of private power everywhere. Even more important, flexible, fluid and dynamic coalitions often lack both the organic solidarity and the connecting ideology that make movements successful. Groups engaged in this kind of struggle can become unexpected allies in each other's struggles, but they can also easily be manipulated into fighting against each other if they do not develop a systemic analysis of global power. Scholars can be pitted against each other as easily as aggrieved communities can. In an era of carefully orchestrated challenges to public education, scholarly independence and critical thinking, it is likely in the near future that every department, discipline and field will be encouraged to defend its own worth by belittling others, to compete for scarce and declining resources by inflating its own achievements at the expense of others. A losing proposition in politics, this 'race to the bottom' would be even more disastrous for scholarship because it encourages parochialism and defensive localism at precisely the moment when we most need dialogue, generosity and cosmopolitanism. It is important in this context to identify and learn from scholarly works that offer models of principled and productive synthesis between American Studies and Area Studies. Fortunately, both well established classics and promising new work in both American Studies and Area Studies contain this generative potential. The scholarly works of W.E.B. Du Bois and Walter Rodney provide especially useful and generative models from the past, while recent studies by Melani McAlister, Lise Waxer, Roderick Ferguson and Clyde Woods pose bold and exciting challenges in the present (Ferguson, 2004; McAlister, 2001; Waxer, 2002; Woods, 1998).

AT: Anti-blackness link

Their use of the black-white binary accords no power to other non-white groups to contest the racial landscape. This undermines their analysis of race

Michael **OMI**, Associate Professor at UC Berkeley, **AND** Howard **WINANT**, Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, **13** ["Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias," Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 6, 2013]

In the USA today it is important not to frame race in a bipolar manner. The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now changed dramatically. Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, the USA has become more 'coloured'. A 'majority–minority' national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted to arrive by the mid-twenty-first century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally and regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the state's population. While the decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial dominance, the dawning and deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit black/white racial framework that is evident in Feagin and Elias's essay. Shifting racial demographics and identities also raise general questions of race and racism in new ways that the 'systemic racism' approach is not prepared to explain.3 Class questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example, call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and race consciousness. No racially defined group is even remotely uniform; groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some have achieved or exceeded socio-economic parity with whites, while others are subject to what we might call 'engineered poverty' in sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or prisons. Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present, and conflicts between racially defined groups ('black/brown' conflict, for example) are evident in both urban and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are the 'new white ethnics', able to 'work toward whiteness'4 at least in part, and that the black/white bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007). We question that argument in light of the massive demographic shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism on a global scale, all drive migration. The country's economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, low-wage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant class) without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, may be more limited than it was when the 'whitening' of Europeans took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words this argument's key precedent, the absorption of white immigrants 'of a different color' (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we might think of the assimilationist model itself as a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a historically specific case study – one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration. Feagin and Elias's systemic racism model, while offering numerous important insights, does not inform concrete analysis of these issues. It is important going forward to understand how groups are differentially racialized and relatively positioned in the US racial hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial project. This has **important consequences**, not only with respect to emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to the **degree of power available** to different racial actors to define, shape or **contest the existing racial landscape** Attention to such matters is largely absent in Feagin and Elias's account. In their view racially identified groups are located in strict reference to the dominant 'white racial frame', hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially subordinate groups interact and influence each others' boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they offer so little specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds her/himself once again in the land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial

dynamics, in which whites and blacks play the leading roles, and other racially identified groups – as well as those ambiguously identified, such as Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans (MEASA) – play at best supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the picture entirely.

AT: Contingency Link

The 1ac combines radical critique and reform, holding them in productive tension to remake common understandings surrounding incarceration – this creates medium-term steps towards complete abolition

Sudbury 8, Professor of Ethnic Studies

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Chronic overcrowding has led to worsening conditions for prisoners. As a result of the unprecedented growth in sentenced populations, prison authorities have packed three or four prisoners into cells designed for two, and have taken over recreation rooms, gyms, and rooms designed for programming and turned them into cells, housing prisoners on bunk beds or on the floor. These new conditions have created challenges for activists, who have found themselves expending time and resources in pressuring prison authorities to provide every prisoner a bed, or to provide access to basic education programs. As prison populations continue to swell, anti-prison activists are faced with the limitations of reformist strategies. Gains temporarily won are swiftly undermined, new "women-centered" prison regimes are replaced with a focus on cost-efficiency and minimal programming and even changes enforced by legal cases like Shumate vs. Wilson are subject to backlash and resistance. 19 Of even greater concern is the well-documented tendency of prison regimes to co-opt reforms and respond to demands for changes in conditions by further expanding prison budgets. The vulnerability of prison reform efforts to cooption has led Angela Y. Davis to **call for "non-reformist reforms," reforms that do not lead to bigger and "better" prisons**. 20 Despite the limited long-term impact of human rights advocacy and reforms, building bridges between prisoners, activists, and family members is **an important step toward challenging the racialized dehumanization that undergirds the logic of incarceration**. In this way, human rights advocacy carried out in solidarity with prisoner activists is **an important component of a radical anti-prison agenda**. Ultimately, however, anti-prison activists aim not to create more humane, culturally sensitive, women-centered prisons, but **to dismantle prisons** and enable formerly criminalized people to access services and resources outside the penal system. After three decades of prison expansion, more and more people are living with criminal convictions and histories of incarceration. In the U.S., nearly 650,000 people are released from state and federal prisons to the community each year. 21 Organizations of formerly incarcerated people focus on creating opportunities for former prisoners to survive after release, and on eliminating barriers to reentry, including extensive discrimination against former felons. The wide array of "post-incarceration sentences" that felons are subjected to has led activists to declare a "new civil rights movement." 22 As a class, former prisoners can legally be disenfranchised and denied rights available to other citizens. While reentry has garnered official attention, with President Bush proposing a $300 million reentry initiative in his 2004 State of the Union address, anti-prison activists have critiqued this initiative for focusing on faith-based mentoring, job training, and housing without addressing the endemic discrimination against former prisoners or addressing the conditions in the communities which receive former prisoners, including racism, poverty, and gender violence. Organizations of ex-prisoners working to oppose discrimination against former prisoners and felons include All of Us Or None, the Nu Policy Leadership Group, Sister Outsider and the National Network for Women Prisoners in the U.S., and Justice 4 Women in Canada. All of Us Or None is described by members as "a national organizing initiative of prisoners, former prisoners and felons, to combat the many forms of discrimination that we face as the result of felony convictions." 23 Founded by anti-imperialist and former political prisoner Linda Evans, and former prisoner and anti-prison activist Dorsey Nunn, and sponsored by the Northern California–based Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, All of Us Or None works to mobilize former prisoners nationwide and in Toronto, Canada. The organization's name, from a poem by Marxist playwright Bertold Brecht, invokes the need for solidarity across racial, class, and gender lines in creating a unified movement of former prisoners. Black women play a leading role in the organization, alongside other people of color. All of Us Or None focuses its lobbying and campaign work at city, county, and state levels, calling on local authorities to end discrimination based on felony convictions in public housing, benefits, and employment, to opt out of lifetime welfare and food stamp bans for felons, and to "ban the box" requiring disclosure of past convictions on applications for public employment. In addition, the organization calls for guaranteed housing, job training, drug and alcohol treatment, and public assistance for all newly released prisoners. 24 In the context of the war on drugs, many people with

felony convictions also struggle with addictions. The recovery movement, which is made up of 12-step programs, treatment programs, community recovery centers, and indigenous healing programs run by and for people in recovery from addiction, offers an alternative response to problem drug use through programs focusing on spirituality, healing, and fellowship. However, the recovery movement's focus on individual transformation and accountability for past acts diverges from many anti-prison activists' focus on the harms done to criminalized communities by interlocking systems of dominance. As a result, anti-prison spaces seldom engage with the recovery movement, or tap the radical potential of its membership. Breaking with this trend, All of Us Or None has initiated a grassroots organizing effort to reach out to people in 12-step programs with felony convictions. This work is part of their wider organizing efforts that aim to mobilize former prisoners as agents of social change. Building on the strengths of identity politics, these organizations suggest that those who have experienced the prison-industrial complex first-hand may be best placed to provide leadership in dismantling it. As former prisoners have taken on a wide range of leadership positions across the movement, there has been a shift away from leadership by white middle-class progressives, and a move to promote the voices of those directly affected by the prison-industrial complex. Politicians who promote punitive "tough-on-crime" policies rely on racialized controlling images of "the criminal" to inspire fear and induce compliance among voters. Once dehumanized and depicted as dangerous and beyond rehabilitation, removing people from communities appears the only logical means of creating safety. Activists who pursue decarceration challenge stereotypical images of the "criminal" by making visible the human stories of prisoners, with the goal of demonstrating **the inadequacy of incarceration as a response to the complex interaction of factors** that produce harmful acts. Decarceration usually involves targeting a specific prison population that the public sees as low-risk and **arguing for an end to** the use of imprisonment **for this population.** Decarcerative strategies often involve the promotion of alternatives to incarceration that are less expensive and more effective than prison and jail. For example, Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, which passed in California in 2000 and allowed first- and second-time non-violent drug offenders charged with possession to receive substance abuse treatment instead of prison, channels approximately 35,000 people into treatment annually. 25 **Drug law reform is a key area of decarcerative work**. Organizations and campaigns that promote drug law reform include Drop the Rock, a coalition of youth, former prisoners, criminal justice reformers, artists, civil and labor leaders working to repeal New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws. The campaign **combines racial justice, economic, and public safety arguments by demonstrating that the laws have created a pipeline of prisoners of color** from New York City to newly built prisons in rural, mainly white areas represented Republican senators, resulting in a transfer of funding and electoral influence from communities of color to upstate rural communities. 26 Ultimately, the campaign calls for an end to mandatory minimum sentencing and the reinstatement of judges' sentencing discretion, a reduction in sentence lengths for drug-related offenses and the expansion of alternatives, including drug treatment, job training, and education. Former drug war prisoners play a leadership role in decarcerative efforts in the field of drug policy reform. Kemba Smith, an African–American woman who was sentenced to serve 24.5 years as a result of her relationship with an abusive partner who was involved in the drug industry, is one potent voice in opposition to the war on drugs. While she was incarcerated, Smith became an active advocate for herself and other victims of the war on drugs, securing interviews and feature articles in national media. Ultimately, Smith's case came to represent the failure of mandatory minimums, and in 2000, following a nation-wide campaign, she and fellow drug war prisoner Dorothy Gaines were granted clemency by outgoing President Clinton. After her release, Smith founded the Justice for People of Color Project (JPCP), which aims to empower young people of color to participate in drug policy reform and to promote a reallocation of public expenditures from incarceration to education. While women like Kemba Smith and Dorothy Gaines have become the human face of the drug war, prison invisibilizes and renders anonymous hundreds of thousands of drug war prisoners. The organization Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) challenges this process of erasure and dehumanization through its "Faces of FAMM" project. The project invites people in federal and state prisons serving mandatory minimum sentences to submit their cases to a database and provides online access to their stories and photographs. 27 The "Faces of FAMM" project highlights cases where sentencing injustices are particularly visible in order to galvanize public support for sentencing reform. At the same time, it dismantles popular representations of the war on drugs as a necessary protection against dangerous drug dealers and traffickers, demonstrating that most drug war prisoners are serving long sentences for low-level, non-violent drug-related activities or for being intimately connected to someone involved in these activities. Decarcerative work is not limited to drug law reform. Free Battered Women's (FBW) campaign for the release of incarcerated survivors is another example of decarcerative work. The organization supports women and transgender prisoners incarcerated for killing or assaulting an abuser in challenging their convictions by demonstrating that they acted in self-defense. Most recently, FBW secured the release of Flozelle Woodmore, an African–American woman serving a life sentence at CCWF for shooting her violent partner as an 18 year old. Released in August 2007, after five parole board recommendations for her release were rejected by Governors Davis and then Schwarzenegger, Woodmore's determined pursuit of justice made visible and ultimately challenged the racialized politics of gubernatorial parole releases. 28 While the number of women imprisoned for killing or assaulting an abuser is small—FBW submitted 34 petitions for clemency at its inception in 1991, and continues to fight 23 cases—FBW's campaign for the release of all incarcerated survivors challenges the mass incarceration of gender-oppressed prisoners on a far larger scale. FBW argues that experiences of intimate partner violence and abuse contribute to the criminalized activities that lead many women and transgender people into conflict with the law, including those imprisoned on drug or property charges, and calls for the release of all incarcerated survivors. Starting with a population generally viewed with sympathy—survivors of intimate partner violence—FBW generates a

radical critique of both state and interpersonal violence, arguing that "the violence and control used by the state against people in prison mirrors the dynamics of battering that many incarcerated survivors have experienced in their intimate relationships and/or as children." 29 In theorizing the intersections of racialized state violence and gendered interpersonal violence, FBW lays the groundwork for a broader abolitionist agenda that refutes the legitimacy of incarceration as a response to deep-rooted social inequalities based on interlocking systems of oppression. By gradually shrinking the prison system, Black women activists involved in decarcerative work hope to erode the public's reliance on the idea of imprisonment as a commonsense response to a wide range of social ills. At the other end of anti-expansionist work are activists who take a more confrontational approach. By starving correctional budgets of funds to continue building more prisons and jails, they hope to force politicians to embrace less expensive and more effective alternatives to incarceration. Prison moratorium organizing aims to stop construction of new prisons and jails. Unlike campaigns against prison privatization, which oppose prison-profiteering by private corporations, and seek to return imprisonment to the public sector, prison moratorium work opposes all new prison construction, public or private. In New York, the Brooklyn-based Prison Moratorium Project (PMP), co-founded by former prisoner Eddie Ellis and led by young women and gender non-conforming people of color, does this work through popular education and mass campaigns against prison expansion. Focusing on youth as a force for social change, New York's PMP uses compilations of progressive hip hop and rap artists to spread a critical analysis of the prison-industrial complex and its impact on people of color. PMP's strategies have been effective; for example, in 2002 the organization, as part of the Justice 4 Youth Coalition, succeeded in lobbying the New York Department of Juvenile Justice to redirect $53 million designated for expansion in Brooklyn and the Bronx. 30 PMP has also worked to make visible the connections between underfunding, policing of schools, and youth incarceration through their campaign "Stop the School-to-Prison Pipeline." By demonstrating how zero tolerance policies and increased policing and use of surveillance technology in schools, combined with underfunded classrooms and overstretched teachers, has led to the criminalization of young people of color and the production of adult prisoners, PMP argues for a reprioritization of public spending from the criminal justice system to schools and alternatives to incarceration. 31 Moratorium work often involves campaigns to prevent the construction of a specific prison or jail. In Toronto, for example, the Prisoner Justice Action Committee formed the "81 Reasons" campaign, a multiracial collaboration of experienced anti-prison activists, youth and student organizers, in response to proposals to build a youth "superjail" in Brampton, a suburb of Toronto. 32 The campaign combined popular education on injustices in the juvenile system, including the disproportionate incarceration of Black and Aboriginal youth, with an exercise in popular democracy that invited young people to decide themselves how they would spend the $81 million slated for the jail. Campaigners mobilized public concerns about spending cuts in other areas, including health care and education, to create pressure on the provincial government to look into less expensive and less punitive alternatives to incarceration for youth. While this campaign did not ultimately prevent the construction of the youth jail, the size of the proposed facility was reduced. More importantly, the campaign built a grassroots multiracial antiprison youth movement and raised public awareness of the social and economic costs of incarceration. Moratorium campaigns face tough opposition from advocates who believe that building prisons stimulates economic development for struggling rural towns. Prisons are "sold" to rural towns that have suffered economic decline in the face of global competition, closures of local factories, and decline of small farms. In the context of economic stagnation, prisons are touted as providing stable, well-paying, unionized jobs, providing property and sales taxes and boosting real estate markets. The California Prison Moratorium Project has worked to challenge these assertions by documenting the actual economic, environmental, and social impact of prison construction in California's Central Valley prison towns. According to California PMP: We consider prisons to be a form of environmental injustice. They are normally built in economically depressed communities that eagerly anticipate economic prosperity. Like any toxic industry, prisons affect the quality of local schools, roads, water, air, land, and natural habitats. 33 California PMP opposes prison construction at a local level by building multiracial coalitions of local residents, farm workers, labor organizers, anti-prison activists, and former prisoners and their families to reject the visions of prison as a panacea for economic decline. 34 In the Californian context, where most new prisons are built in predominantly Latino/a communities and absorb land and water previously used for agriculture, PMP facilitates communication and solidarity between Latino/a farm worker communities, and urban Black and Latino/a prisoners in promoting alternative forms of economic development that do not rely on mass incarceration. Scholar-activist Ruth Wilson Gilmore's research on the political economy of prisons in California has been critical in providing evidence of the detrimental impact of prisons on local residents and the environment. 35 As an active member of CPMP, Gilmore's work is deeply rooted in anti-prison activism and in turn informs the work of other activists, demonstrating the important relationship between Black women's activist scholarship and the anti-prison movement. 36 Many anti-prison activists view campaigns for decarceration or moratorium as building blocks toward the ultimate goal of abolition. These practical actions promise short and medium-term successes that are essential markers on the road to long-term transformation. However, abolitionists believe that like slavery, the prison-industrial complex is a system of racialized state violence that cannot be "fixed." The contemporary prison abolitionist movement in the U.S. and Canada dates to the 1970s, when political

prisoners like Angela Y. Davis and Assata Shakur, in conjunction with other radical activists and scholars in the U.S., Canada, and Europe, began to call for the dismantling of prisons. 38 The explosion in political prisoners, fuelled by the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and targeting of Black liberation, American Indian and Puerto Rican independence movements in the U.S. and First Nations resistance in Canada as "threats" to national security, fed into an understanding of the role of the prison in perpetuating state repression against insurgent communities. 39 The new anti-prison politics were also shaped by a decade of prisoner litigation and radical prison uprisings, including the brutally crushed Attica Rebellion. These "common" prisoners, predominantly working-class people of color imprisoned for everyday acts of survival, challenged the state's legitimacy by declaring imprisonment a form of cruel and unusual punishment and confronting the brute force of state power. 40 By adopting the term "abolition" activists drew deliberate links between the dismantling of prisons and the abolition of slavery. Through historical excavations, the "new abolitionists" identified the abolition of prisons as the logical completion of the unfinished liberation marked by the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which regulated, rather than ended, slavery. 41 Organizations that actively promote dialogue about what abolition means and how it can translate into concrete action include Critical Resistance (CR), New York's Prison Moratorium Project, Justice Now, California Coalition for Women Prisoners, Free Battered Women, and the Prison Activist Resource Center in the U.S. and the Prisoner Justice Action Committee (Toronto), the Prisoners' Justice Day Committee (Vancouver) and Joint Action in Canada. CR was founded in 1998 by a group of Bay Area activists including former political prisoner and scholar-activist Angela Y. Davis. Initially, CR focused on popular education and movement building, coordinating large conferences where diverse organizations could generate collective alternatives to the prison-industrial complex. Later work has included campaigns against prison construction in California's Central Valley and solidarity work with imprisoned Katrina survivors. CR describes abolition as: [A] political vision that seeks to eliminate the need for prisons, policing, and surveillance by creating sustainable alternatives to punishment and imprisonment … . An abolitionist vision means that we must build models today that can represent how we want to live in the future. It means developing practical strategies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real and that lead the average person to believe that things really could be different. It means living this vision in our daily lives. 42 In this sense, prison abolitionists are tasked with a dual burden: first, transforming people's consciousness so that they can believe that a world without prisons is possible, and second, taking practical steps to oppose the prison-industrial complex. Making abolition more than a utopian vision requires practical steps toward this long-term goal. CR describes four steps that activists can get involved in: shrinking the system, creating alternatives, shifting public opinion and public policy, and building leadership among those directly impacted by the prison-industrial complex. 43 Since its inception in the San Francisco Bay Area, Critical Resistance has become a national organization with chapters in Baltimore, Chicago, Gainesville, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, Tampa/St. Petersburg, and Washington, D.C. As such, CR has played a critical role in re-invigorating abolitionist politics in the U.S. This work is rooted in the radical praxis of Black women and transgender activists.

Neolib

War Turns Structural Violence

War turns structural violence

<u>**Bulloch 8**</u>

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But <u>the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are</u> – in and of themselves – <u>unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate</u> the injustice that inspires conflict, namely <u>poverty.</u> However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that **it rarely suffers any examination**. To suggest <u>that war causes poverty is</u> to utter **an obvious truth,** but to suggest <u>the opposite is</u> – on reflection – <u>quite **hard to believe.** War is</u> an <u>expensive</u> business in the twenty-first century, <u>even asymmetrically.</u> And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving <u>the problem of peace and war</u> in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which <u>the Peace Prize itself has simply become</u> an award that reflects a degree of <u>Western liberal wish-fulfilment</u>. <u>It is</u> perhaps <u>comforting to believe that **poverty causes violence,**</u> as it serves <u>to endorse</u> a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards <u>all problems as</u> fundamentally <u>economic rather than</u> deeply – and potentially radically – <u>political</u>.

Neolib Sustainable

Neolib is sustainable and the alt is a useless political abstraction

Arvidsson 13

(Adam, teaches sociology at the University of Milano"Thinking beyond neo-liberalism: A response to Detlev Zwick", ephemera: theory & politics in organization 13(2): 407-412)

This makes it trickier to do critical theory. We can of course still criticize the actual state of things. We can point to the precarious relations that prevail among creative knowledge workers; show how exploitative and unjust conditions are intensified by the very forces that drive the globalization of communicative capitalism, like the outsourcing of design work; or lament the fact that a triumphant neoliberal regime subsumes and appropriates aspects of subjectivity and social life that we think should have been left alone. To produce such critiques remains useful intellectual work – I have done it in other contexts (Arvidsson et al., 2010; Arvidsson, 2007), as has Detlev Zwick (2008), and many others. To the extent that such critiques reach a mass audience, they can become a progressive impulse to action and reflection – as in the case of Naomi Klein's work inspiring the 'no global' movement (to use an inadequate name coined by the mainstream press). But such a critique without an alternative remains unsatisfactory for at least three reasons. First, and most superficially, since everyone else is doing it, the marginal utility of yet another piece of critical theory rapidly diminishes, as does the intellectual satisfaction that can be derived form producing it. Second, and more seriously, the absence of a realistic alternative, or even of a historical subject in the name of which such a critique can be pronounced, risks rendering critical theory moralistic and rather toothless. We might agree with Zwick when he suggests that the outsourcing of design work from Toronto to the Philippines is somehow wrong, but it is difficult to understand exactly why this would be the case. (Why shouldn't Philippine designers be allowed to compete with Canadian designers? Can the 'creative class' claim an exemption from the global economy? Perhaps the answer is 'yes', but I do not know of any viable alternative vision of society that is able to substantiate that 'yes'.) Third, and most importantly, in the absence of an alternative vision, critical theory remains rather unconvincing to the people in the name of whom it proposes to speak. I can assure you – and I've tried! – that you won't become an organic intellectual among social entrepreneurs or precarious creative workers by telling them that they are exploited, that they sell out their subjectivity, or that the system in which they operate is unjust. Pure critique is simply not attractive enough to make the multitude of new productive subjects, fragmented by neoliberalism, cohere into a historical subject. To do that you need at least the myth of an alternative, as agitators from Sorel via Lenin to Subcomandante Marcos could tell you. Don't get me wrong. I am not proposing that it is wrong to point to the precarious conditions of knowledge work, or that we should not do this as academics and researchers. This is still an important task. But it is not enough. Critical theory must do this, but it must also do more. It must also engage with the question of what a realistic alternative to neoliberalism could be, and it must elaborate a realistic political vision in the name of which a critique that is productive and progressive, and not simply moralistic, can be articulated. By realistic, I mean that such an alternative must be sought in the actual relations of production that characterize the contemporary information economy. Zwick's suggestion that we imagine a commonism of productive consumption as collaborative sharing in the absence of private property and combined with an inclusive model of political determination, collective sovereignty, belonging and justice – and so on – is simply unproductive to my mind. We might all agree that an economy of commons that has done away with capitalism might be more desirable, but the reality is that hybrid forms, like the game modders that Zwick cites, where a an economy of commons co-exists with a capitalist value logic, in some form, are indeed becoming the norm. At that point the interesting thing to do is not so much to criticize the enduring capitalist nature of these hybrid forms, but rather to investigate the new forms of politics that they might give rise to. This in no way implies that one does away with conflict and politics. Rather, it implies investigating and understanding the new spaces and discourses through which such a new type of politics can be articulated. In order to do this we must start with what the actors involved in these processes actually think themselves. It is quite useless to simply deploy existing philosophical perspectives, or to compare the reality of communicative capitalism to utopian projections of the political visions of last century. Instead we must start with the 'empirical metaphysics', to use Bruno Latour's term, that actually prevail among people engaged in such hybrid

practices. We might all want to do away with neoliberalism and the forms of life that it has promoted. But at the same time, we all recognize that the neoliberal project has been one of **the most successful projects** of governmentality since, perhaps, the very project of disciplinary power that Foucault himself described. Rebus sic stantibus **we cannot simply wish it away**. We need to recognize that people have changed, that competitive individualism, self-branding and an entrepreneurial mentality **are,** by now, normal features of life. The same thing goes for the popular political myths that prevail among advanced knowledge workers, what Zwick calls 'cyber-utopianism'. We need to recognize that notions like peer-to-peer production, high-tech gift economies and the like have the power to mobilize the energies of the subjects that are most likely to become the pioneers of a new political vision – today's version of the skilled workers that have taken the lead in most modern political movements. Even though the social theory that they produce might be shallow and imperfect, and even though they might not have read Marx and Foucault as well as we have, we cannot simply dismiss this vision as a mere ideology to be replaced by our theoretically more refined ideology. Like the relations of production that are emerging in communicative capitalism and the subjectivity of knowledge workers, these myths are part of the raw material with which the Gramscian intellectual must engage in order to articulate new understandings of common sense that are both politically progressive and intuitively attractive to the people that they are supposed to mobilize. In other words, in order to articulate an alternative, we cannot simply dismiss the reality of communicative capitalism and fall back on what remains of the political utopias of last century. We need to **engage with the reality** of neoliberal communicative capitalism and try to push its dialectic beyond its apolitical present state. We must investigate what the real conditions of production and imagination are and ask ourselves where they might lead. Critical theory needs to become an **empirical**, and not simply a philosophical, enterprise.

Permutation Stuff

Reform Perm

Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt --- policy analysis key

James **Ferguson 11**, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, "The Uses of Neoliberalism", Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184

If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded political struggle—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—then there is much to be said for focusing, as I have here, on mundane, real- world debates around policy and politics, even if doing so inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims.¶ My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the "informal", help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor,¶ in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats' dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming).¶ My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a very particular (and conservative) political agenda ("neoliberalism") may be in the process of being peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest.¶ As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic "neoliberal" political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific "neoliberal" techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier's case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic "is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work", and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact "deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms" (2005:2).¶ As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do.¶ Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left's governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. "[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented". But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Lévi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. If we can go beyond seeing in "neoliberalism" an evil essence or an automatic unity, and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a

bit <mark>less bare than first appeared</mark>, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

2AC Perm (Barry)

Only the perm solves—proposing alternative non-capitalist economics out of nowhere is of *zero value*. Environmental reform of capitalism is key.

John **BARRY** Reader in Politics @ Belfast **'7** ["Towards a model of green political economy: from ecological modernisation to economic security" *Int. J. Green Economics*, Vol. 1, Nos. 3/4, 2007 p. 447-448]

Economic analysis has been one of the weakest and least developed areas of broadly green/sustainable development thinking. For example, whatever analysis there is within the green political canon is largely utopian – usually based on an argument for the complete transformation of modern society and economy as the only way to deal with ecological catastrophe, an often linked to a critique of the socioeconomic failings of capitalism that echoed a broadly radical Marxist/socialist or anarchist analysis; or underdeveloped – due, in part, to the need to outline and develop other aspects of green political theory. However, this gap within green thinking has recently been filled by a number of scholars, activists, think tanks, and environmental NGOs who have outlined various models of green political economy to underpin sustainable development political aims, principles and objectives. The aim of this article is to offer a draft of a realistic, but critical, version of green political economy to underpin the economic dimensions of radical views about sustainable development. It is written explicitly with a view to encouraging others to think through this aspect of sustainable development in a collaborative manner. Combined realism and radicalism marks this article, which starts with the point that we cannot build or seek to create a sustainable economy ab nihlo, but must begin from where we are, with the structures, institutions, modes of production, laws and regulations that we already have. Of course, this does not mean simply accepting these as immutable or set in stone; after all, some of the current institutions, principles and structures underpinning the dominant economic model are the very causes of unsustainable development. We do need to recognise, however, that we must work with (and 'through' – in the terms of the original German Green Party's slogan of 'marching through the institutions') these existing structures, as well as change and reform and in some cases, abandon them as either unnecessary or positively harmful to the creation and maintenance of a sustainable economy and society. Equally, this article also recognises that an alternative economy and society must be based in the reality that most people (in the West) will not democratically vote for a completely different type of society and economy. That reality must also accept that a 'green economy' is one that is recognisable to most people and that indeed safeguards and guarantees not just their basic needs but also aspirations (within limits). The realistic character of the thinking behind this article accepts that consumption and materialistic lifestyles are here to stay (so long as they do not transgress any of the critical thresholds of the triple bottom line) and indeed there is little to be gained by proposing alternative economic systems, which start from a complete rejection of consumption and materialism. The appeal to realism is in part an attempt to correct the common misperception (and self-perception) of green politics and economics requiring an excessive degree of self-denial and a puritanical asceticism (Goodin, 1992, p.18; Allison, 1991, p.170–178). While rejecting the claim that green political theory calls for the complete disavowal of materialistic lifestyles, it is true that green politics does require the collective reassessment of such lifestyles, and does require a degree of shared sacrifice. It does not mean, however, that we necessarily require the complete and across-the-board rejection of materialistic lifestyles. There must be room and tolerance in a green economy for people to live 'ungreen lives' so long as they do not 'harm' others, threaten long-term ecological sustainability or create unjust levels of socioeconomic inequalities. Thus, realism in this context is in part another name for the acceptance of a broadly 'liberal' or 'post-liberal' (but certainly not anti-liberal) green perspective.[1]

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AT: Growth Link

Case is a pre-requisite to changes in the direction of consumption. Without growth and minimizing conflict resources get devoted to competition.

Rasmus **KARLSSON** Poli Sci @ Lund **'9** "A global Fordian compromise?—And what it would mean for the transition to sustainability" *Envt'l Science and Policy* 12 p. 190-191

Though these caricatures may still hold true to a certain extent, I would argue that the last years have challenged this impasse. On one hand, the general public has grown increasingly aware of how serious our current predicament has become. On the other hand, a string of promising academic work, both in the sciences (Hoffert et al., 2002) and in green political theory (Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 2007), has finally taken up what otherwise has been a dormant position ever since the 1970s. I am referring to those who accept the gravity of the present environmental crisis yet believe that the solution can never be found in the traditional green mantra of **reduction**, conservation and **self-denial**. Instead these authors have attempted to **reconcile** the politics of **scarcity** with **technological optimism**, to tap into the spirit that once made grand projects like the Apollo program possible and, on this basis, move towards a politics of radical engagement. Nowhere does the need for such new politics appear more urgent than on the global level. With parts of the world (mostly in Asia) rapidly industrializing while others remaining trapped in the direst poverty, the planetary perspective goes to the heart of the sustainable transition. Not only does it show the terrible human cost of the present status-quo but also the irreversibility in the move towards modernization. Billions are now impatiently aspiring for the material living standard of the West, and given the limited ecological space of the planet (Andreasson, 2005; Rist, 1997, pp. 44–45), it is hard to see how these needs can be met without radical technological innovation. However, there are reasons to doubt the feasibility of any advanced technological paths to sustainability. Only in a climate of high and **sustained economic growth** would it be possible for states to set aside the vast resources necessary to bring success to long-term projects on nuclear fusion, nanotechnology and other converging technologies (Malsch, 2008). Such benign economic conditions are, just as the prospects of sustainable development more generally (Blinc et al., 2007), unlikely to come about in times of international tension, unplanned mass-migration and growing resource scarcity. This should warrant a new kind of sobering realism, an acceptance that the future of modernity is now a planetary enterprise and that we are all into this as one common human civilization.

Perm: Movements Reinforcing

Top-down and bottom-up movements are <u>mutually reinforcing</u> but the alt alone causes <u>worse forms of trade</u> and <u>global wars</u>

Brecher 2k

Jeremy Brecher is a historian and the author of numerous books on labor and social movements, co-founded Global Labor Strategies, Tim Costello is one of Australia's most recognised voices on social justice, leadership and ethics, Brendan Smith, social activist, co-founder of Global Labor Strategies, Globalization from Below, 2000, google books

The apparent <u>opposition among strengthening</u> local, national, and <u>global institutions is</u> <u>based on a false premise: that more power at one level</u> of governance <u>is</u> necessarily <u>disempowering to people at others.</u> But today **the exact opposite is the case**. The <u>empowerment of local</u> and national <u>communities</u> and polities today <u>requires a degree of global</u> regulation and <u>governance.</u> Far from being dichotomous, **they are interdependent.** Globalization from below requires a framework that recognizes that interdependence. <u>Global capital has usurped powers that rightfully belong to people</u> and to their representatives in government. <u>The challenge is for people to establish greater control over their economic lives by</u> establishing greater control over global capital. To do so requires a stronger governmental role and increased <u>organization</u> in civil society at every level from local to global. <u>These various levels of action</u> far from being in competition, <u>can actually be **mutually supportive**.</u> Indeed, the <u>programs needed at each level are **unlikely to work for long**</u> unless complemented by supportive policies and <u>structures at the other levels</u>. Consider for example the issue of local empowerment. In the United States, ironically, <u>local empowerment has been major theme of that part of the right</u> that is <u>most favorable to global capitalism</u>. Newt <u>Gingrich</u>, as conservative Republican speaker of the US House of Representatives, <u>campaigned to eliminate</u> federal <u>regulations that "interfered" with</u> states and <u>municipalities</u>. Of course, <u>the real purpose of this</u> faux localism <u>was to break down regulations that</u> establish minimum wages and labor standards, <u>preserve the environment</u>, reduce poverty, and protect the rights of women, oppressed minorities, the disabled, and trade unions. <u>"Empowering local communities" meant</u> <u>putting them at the mercy of powerful corporations</u> and financiers. It also meant <u>pitting them against each other in a race to the bottom.</u> Clearly, national <u>regulation</u> that protects minimum standards and <u>limits the race to the bottom</u> actually <u>strengthens, rather than undermines</u>, the ability of people in <u>local communities</u> to control their own lives. <u>The same can be true **globally**</u>. While the rules and policies currently imposed by the IMF, World Bank, and WTO empower corporations and disempowers people at every level, that doesn't mean that different global institutions and policies couldn't have the opposite effect. For example, international agreements that reduce gases that destroy the ozone layer and produce global warming can protect local communities and countries against environmental destruction. Global economic institutions that regulate global demand and international currency flows would strengthen the ability of national governments to regulate their own economies. Environmental and labor conditions in international trade agreements could put limits on the race to the bottom. So could trade union agreements with corporations specifying minimum conditions worldwide. Enforceable international code of conduct for corporations could reduce their ability to dictate

conditions to countries and communities. In fact, such higher-level regulation is essential if the forces of globalization are to be tamed. This point is missed by those who see globalization simply as a matter of greater power for international economic institutions. **Globalization was not caused** (even though it was accelerated) **by the WTO** or NAFTA. And globalization will continue even if such institutions are abolished. Indeed, the likely result of completely eliminating supranational economic regulation is not genuine national self-determination but an **economic war of all-against-all**. As each nation pursues policies of economic nationalism, others will follow suit in **escalating trade wars**. And without means for regulating demand, global depression is more than likely to follow.

Impact Turns

Trade good

Top-down and bottom-up movements are <u>mutually reinforcing</u> but the alt alone causes <u>worse forms of trade</u> and <u>global wars</u>
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Enforceable international code of conduct for corporations could reduce their ability to dictate conditions to countries and communities. In fact, such higher-level regulation is essential if the forces of globalization are to be tamed. This point is missed by those who see globalization simply as a matter of greater power for international economic institutions. **Globalization was not caused** (even though it was accelerated) **by the WTO** or NAFTA. And globalization will continue even if such institutions are abolished. Indeed, the likely result of completely eliminating supranational economic regulation is not genuine national self-determination but an **economic war of all-against-all**. As each nation pursues policies of economic nationalism, others will follow suit in **escalating trade wars**. And without means for regulating demand, global depression is more than likely to follow.

Liberal Norms Good

Shocks to the system are the ONLY propensity for conflict—liberal norms have eradicated warfare and structural violence—every field study proves

Horgan 09

JOHN HORGAN is Director of the Center for Science at Stevens Institute of Technology, former senior writer at Scientific American, B.A. from Columbia and an M.S. from Columbia, Newsweek, "The End of the Age of War," Dec 7, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/225616/page/1

The economic crisis was supposed to increase violence around the world. The truth is that we are now living in one of the **most peaceful periods** since war first arose 10 or 12 millennia ago. The relative calm of our era, say scientists who study warfare in history and even prehistory, belies the popular, pessimistic notion that war is so deeply rooted in our nature that we can never abolish it. In fact, war seems to be a largely cultural phenomenon, which culture is now helping us eradicate. Some scholars now even cautiously speculate that the era of traditional war—fought by two uniformed, state-sponsored armies—might be drawing to a close. "War could be on the verge of ceasing to exist as a substantial phenomenon," says John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio State University.¶ That might sound crazy, but consider: if war is defined as a conflict between two or more nations resulting in at least 1,000 deaths in a year, there have been no wars since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and no wars between major industrialized powers since World War II. Civil wars have also declined from their peak in the early 1990s, when fighting tore apart Rwanda, the Balkans, and other regions. Most armed conflicts now consist of low-level guerrilla campaigns, insurgencies, and terrorism—what Mueller calls the "remnants of war."¶ These facts would provide little comfort if war's remnants were nonetheless killing millions of people—but they're not. Recent studies reveal a clear downward trend. In 2008, 25,600 combatants and civilians were killed as a direct result of armed conflicts, according to the University of Uppsala Conflict Data Program in Sweden. Two thirds of these deaths took place in just three trouble spots: Sri Lanka (8,400), Afghanistan (4,600), and Iraq (4,000).¶ Uppsala's figures exclude deaths from "one-sided conflict," in which combatants deliberately kill unarmed civilians, and "indirect" deaths from war-related disease and famine, but even when these casualties are included, annual war-related deaths from 2004 to 2007 are still low by historical standards. Acts of terrorism, like the 9/11 attacks or the 2004 bombing of Spanish trains, account for less than 1 percent of fatalities. In contrast, car accidents kill more than 1 million people a year.¶ The contrast between our century and the previous one is striking. In the second half of the 20th century, war killed as many as 40 million people, both directly and indirectly, or 800,000 people a year, according to Milton Leitenberg of the University of Maryland. He estimates that 190 million people, or 3.8 million a year, died as a result of wars and state--sponsored genocides during the cataclysmic first half of the century. Considered as a percentage of population, the body count of the 20th century is comparable to that of blood-soaked earlier cultures, such as the Aztecs, the Romans, and the Greeks.¶ By far the most warlike societies are those that preceded civilization. War killed as many as 25 percent of all pre-state people, a rate 10 times higher than that of the 20th century, estimates anthropologist Lawrence Keeley of the University of Illinois. Our ancestors were not always so bellicose, however: there is virtually no clear-cut evidence of lethal group aggression by humans prior to 12,000 years ago. Then, "warfare appeared in the evolutionary trajectory of an increasing number of societies around the world," says anthropologist Jonathan Haas of Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. He attributes the emergence of warfare to several factors: growing population density, environmental stresses that diminished food sources, and the separation of people into culturally distinct groups. "It is only after the cultural foundations have been laid for distinguishing 'us' from 'them,' " he says, "that raiding, killing, and burning appear as a complex response to the external stress of environmental problems."¶ Early civilizations, such as those founded in Mesopotamia and Egypt 6,000 years ago, were extremely warlike. They assembled large armies and began inventing new techniques and technologies for killing, from horse-drawn chariots and catapults to bombs. But nation-states also developed laws and institutions for resolving disputes nonviolently, at least within their borders. These cultural innovations helped reduce the endless, tit-for-tat feuding that plagued pre-state societies.¶ A host of other cultural factors may explain the more recent drop-off in international war and other forms of social violence. One is a surge in democratic rather than totalitarian governance. Over the past two centuries democracies such as the U.S. have rarely if ever fought each other. Democracy is also associated with

low levels of violence within nations. Only 20 democratic nations existed at the end of World War II; the number has since more than quadrupled. Yale historian Bruce Russett contends that international institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union also contribute to this "democratic peace" phenomenon by fostering economic interdependence. Advances in civil rights for women may also be making us more peaceful. As women's education and economic opportunities rise, birthrates fall, decreasing demands on governmental and medical services and depletion of natural resources, which can otherwise lead to social unrest.¶ Better public health is another contributing factor. Over the past century, average life spans have almost doubled, which could make us less willing to risk our lives by engaging in war and other forms of violence, proposes Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker. At the same time, he points out, globalization and communications have made us increasingly interdependent on, and empathetic toward, others outside of our immediate "tribes."¶ Of course, the world remains a dangerous place, vulnerable to disruptive, unpredictable events like terrorist attacks. Other looming threats to peace include climate change, which could produce droughts and endanger our food supplies; overpopulation; and the spread of violent religious extremism, as embodied by Al Qaeda. A global financial meltdown or ecological catastrophe could plunge us back into the kind of violent, Hobbesian chaos that plagued many pre--state societies thousands of years ago. "War is not intrinsic to human nature, but neither is peace," warns the political scientist Nils Petter Gleditsch of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo.¶ So far the trends are positive. If they continue, who knows? World peace—the dream of countless visionaries and -beauty--pageant -contestants—or something like it may finally come to pass.

Devp/Globalization Good

Anything else leads to system degradation a system of trade that results in inevitable conflict

Thompson 02

[Grahame, Professor of Political Economy at the Open University of Britain, "Wither the 'Washington Consensus,' the 'Developmental State,' and the 'Seattle Protests,' can Managed Free Trade and Investment' become an Alternative Development Model," Vol. 33, no. 131, x-xii, 2002 Problemas del Desarrollo]

Thus <u>although the anti-globalization movement could mount a critique of both these models, its main weakness in the development debate is its</u> <u>failure to construct a more sensible, attractive and realistic alternative vision for development</u> than provided by the two models outlined so far. <u>The anti-globalization movement remains **essentially negative**</u>. It provides a worthy and sometimes telling critique of many of the excesses of the international economy but that is about it (Thompson 2003b). <u>It does not have a positive alternative model of development. In fact the anti-globalization movement is a **disparate amalgam of many mutually contradictory elements** and positions.</u> It can 'unite' the extreme Marxist left with the far Right, along with disaffected environmentalist, human rights campaigners and debt-forgivers in between. <u>This is not a recipe for a **coherent** alternative position.</u> In fact, <u>as far as any consistent position from this quarter can be discerned it amounts to little more than the **call for a 'new protectionism'**. The desire to break up the international agencies of economic management like the IMF, The World Bank and the WTO, would **inevitably lead to this result**</u>. Whilst <u>these agencies have their pernicious aspects and</u> are not to be simply endorsed in their present form, they at <u>least have the virtue of preventing a devastating destruction of international trade and investment, and the likely formation of antagonistically poised trade blocks as arose in the inter-War period.</u>

Impact Defense

Env Up

Environment improving globally

Bailey 14

Ronald Bailey is a science correspondent at Reason magazine and author of Liberation Biology, Reason Magazine, August 1, 2014, "Predictions of a Man-Made Sixth Mass Extinction May Be Exaggerated", http://reason.com/archives/2014/08/01/predictions-of-a-man-made-sixth-mass-ext

Meanwhile, some countervailing trends suggest the future of animal species may not be so grim. These trends include urbanization, slowing deforestation, the global increase in protected areas, and the advent of peak farmland. Transforming hundreds of millions of hardscrabble subsistence farmers scattered across the landscape into urban dwellers would greatly reduce the pressure on wildlife and their habitats. The good news is that that process is happening. According to the United Nations Population Division's World Urbanization Prospects 2014 report, 54 percent of people live in cities—up from 30 percent in 1950. The U.N. demographers forecast that proportion will rise to 66 percent by 2050. If world population follows the medium fertility trend, rising to 9.5 billion by 2050, that means that 3.2 billion people will still live in rural areas, down slightly from 3.4 billion today. In that scenario, population pressure will not be pushing the expansion of the human frontier into more wildlands. And if population growth traverses along the U.N.'s low fertility trend, the year 2050 will see human numbers peaking at 8.3 billion people. If 66 percent live in cities, only 2.8 billion people will be living on the landscape. Looking further into the future, the U.N. expects that 80 percent of people will be urbanites by 2100. Medium and low fertility population projections suggest that would mean that only 2.2 to 1.3 billion rural dwellers. Since most species live in forests, chiefly tropical forests, we should take a look at global forest cover trends. Happily, the deforestation rate is slowing. The Food and Agriculture Organization's State of the World's Forests 2012 report notes that the global rate of deforestation slowed from 0.2 percent per year between 1990 and 2000 to 0.14 percent between 2005 and 2010. Between 2000 and 2010, a total of 130 million hectares were cut, but 78 million hectares returned to forests. So globally, forests declined on average by 5.2 million hectares per year—at which rate, the report notes, "It will take 775 years to lose all of the world's forests." It adds, "This would seem to provide enough time for actions to slow or stop global deforestation." And indeed, researchers in 2006 found that more and more countries are passing through a "forest transition" in which their forest area starts expanding. Roger Sedjo, a forest ecologist at Resources for the Future, predicts that by 2050 most of the world's industrial wood will be grown on forest plantations covering only 5 to 10 percent of the extent of today's global forests. One dark blot on forest restoration trends is biofuel mandates in rich countries, which have spurred tropical countries to chop down forests to grow palm oil to produce biodiesel. By one estimate, 87 percent of the deforestation in Malaysia and 118 percent in Indonesia occurred as result of expanding palm oil plantations. Another beneficial trend is that protected areas such as parks and marine preserves are expanding at a remarkably fast pace. The World Bank notes that protected areas have nearly doubled from 8.5 percent of the world's total land area in 1990 to 14.3 percent in 2012. That's an area twice the size of the entire United States. Marine protected areas have increased from 4.7 percent of territorial waters in 1990 to 10 percent in 2012. Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, governments of the world have committed to protecting 17 percent of terrestrial and inland water areas and 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas by 2020. Considering that agriculture is the most expansive and intensive way in which people transform natural landscapes, the really good news is that the amount of land globally devoted to food production may be falling as population growth slows and agricultural productivity increases. "We believe that projecting conservative values for population, affluence, consumers, and technology shows humanity peaking in the use of farmland," concludes Jesse Ausubel, the director of the Human Environment Program at the Rockefeller University. In a 2013 article titled "Peak Farmland and the Prospect for Land Sparing," Ausubel and his colleagues write: "Global arable land and permanent crops spanned 1,371 million hectares in 1961 and 1,533 million hectares in 2009, and we project a return to 1,385 million hectares in 2060." As a result of these trends, humanity will likely restore at least 146 million hectares of land, an area two and a half times that of France, or ten Iowas—and possibly much more. Relaxing those biofuel mandates would spare an additional 256 million hectares from the plow, the researchers estimate. That mean nearly 400 million hectares—an area nearly double the size of the United

States east of the Mississippi River—could be restored to nature by 2060. The late 20th century's predictions of imminent mass extinction happily proved wrong. The positive trends cited above provide good grounds to believe that the new ones will also turn out to be exaggerated.

AT: Sustainability Impacts

Sustainability impacts are bad science – no basis for running into tech barriers

Matt **Ridley**, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, **'14**

("The World's Resources Aren't Running Out," April 25, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579517862612287156?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702304279904579517862612287156.html)

"We are using 50% more resources than the Earth can sustainably produce, and unless we change course, that number will grow fast—by 2030, even two planets will not be enough," says Jim Leape, director general of the World Wide Fund for Nature International (formerly the World Wildlife Fund). But here's a peculiar feature of human history: **We burst through such limits again and again**. After all, as a Saudi oil minister once said, **the Stone Age didn't end for lack of stone.** Ecologists call **this "niche construction"**—that people (and indeed some other animals) can create new opportunities for themselves by making their habitats more productive in some way. Agriculture is the classic example of niche construction: We stopped relying on nature's bounty and substituted an artificial and much larger bounty. Economists call the same phenomenon innovation. What frustrates them about ecologists is the latter's tendency to think in terms of static limits. Ecologists can't seem to see that when whale oil starts to run out, petroleum is discovered, or that when farm yields flatten, **fertilizer comes along,** or that when glass fiber is invented, demand for copper falls. **That frustration is heartily reciprocated**. Ecologists think that economists espouse a sort of **superstitious magic** called "markets" or "prices" to avoid confronting the reality of limits to growth. The easiest way to raise a cheer in a conference of ecologists is to make a rude joke about economists. **I have lived among both tribes**. I studied various forms of ecology in an academic setting for seven years and then worked at the Economist magazine for eight years. When I was an ecologist (in the academic sense of the word, not the political one, though I also had antinuclear stickers on my car), I very much espoused the carrying-capacity viewpoint—that there were limits to growth. I nowadays lean to the view that there are no limits because we can invent new ways of doing more with less. This disagreement goes to the heart of many current political issues and explains much about why people disagree about environmental policy. In the climate debate, for example, pessimists see a limit to the atmosphere's capacity to cope with extra carbon dioxide without rapid warming. So a continuing increase in emissions if economic growth continues will eventually accelerate warming to dangerous rates. But optimists see economic growth leading to **technological change that would result in the use of lower-carbon energy**. That would allow warming to level off **long before it does much harm.** It is striking, for example, that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's recent forecast that temperatures would rise by 3.7 to 4.8 degrees Celsius compared with preindustrial levels by 2100 was based on several assumptions: little technological change, an end to the 50-year fall in population growth rates, a tripling (only) of per capita income and not much improvement in the energy efficiency of the economy. Basically, that would mean a world much like today's but with lots more people burning lots more coal and oil, leading to an increase in emissions. Most economists expect a five- or tenfold increase in income, huge changes in technology and an end to population growth by 2100: not so many more people needing much less carbon. In 1679, Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, the great Dutch microscopist, estimated that the planet could hold **13.4 billion people**, a number that most demographers think we may never reach. Since then, estimates have bounced around between 1 billion and 100 billion, with no sign of converging on an agreed figure. Economists point out that **we keep improving the productivity of each acre of land by applying fertilizer, mechanization, pesticides and irrigation.** Further innovation is bound to shift the ceiling upward. Jesse Ausubel at Rockefeller University calculates that the amount of land required to grow a given quantity of food has fallen by 65% over the past 50 years, world-wide. Ecologists object that these innovations rely on nonrenewable resources, such as oil and gas, or renewable ones that are being used up **faster than they are replenished**, such as aquifers. So current yields cannot be maintained, let alone improved. In his recent book "The View

from Lazy Point," the ecologist Carl Safina estimates that if everybody had the living standards of Americans, we would need 2.5 Earths because the world's agricultural land just couldn't grow enough food for more than 2.5 billion people at that level of consumption. Harvard emeritus professor E.O. Wilson, one of ecology's patriarchs, reckoned that only if we all turned vegetarian could the world's farms grow enough food to support 10 billion people. Economists respond by saying that since large parts of the world, especially in Africa, have yet to gain access to fertilizer and modern farming techniques, there is no reason to think that the global land requirements for a given amount of food will cease shrinking any time soon. Indeed, Mr. Ausubel, together with his colleagues Iddo Wernick and Paul Waggoner, came to the startling conclusion that, even with generous assumptions about population growth and growing affluence leading to greater demand for meat and other luxuries, and with ungenerous assumptions about future global yield improvements, we will need less farmland in 2050 than we needed in 2000.

(So long, that is, as we don't grow more biofuels on land that could be growing food.) But surely intensification of yields depends on inputs that may run out? Take water, a commodity that limits the production of food in many places. Estimates made in the 1960s and 1970s of water demand by the year 2000 proved grossly overestimated: The world used half as much water as experts had projected 30 years before. The reason was greater economy in the use of water by **new irrigation techniques**. Some countries, such as Israel and Cyprus, have cut water use for irrigation through the use of drip irrigation. Combine these improvements with solar-driven desalination of seawater world-wide, and it is **highly unlikely that fresh water will limit human population.** The best-selling book "Limits to Growth," published in 1972 by the Club of Rome (an influential global think tank), argued that we would have **bumped our heads against all sorts of ceilings by now, running short of various metals, fuels, minerals and space. Why did it not happen? In a word, technology: better mining techniques, more frugal use of materials**, and if scarcity causes price increases, substitution by cheaper material. We use 100 times thinner gold plating on computer connectors than we did 40 years ago. The steel content of cars and buildings keeps on falling. Until about 10 years ago, it was reasonable to expect that natural gas might run out in a few short decades and oil soon thereafter. If that were to happen, agricultural yields would plummet, and the world would be faced with a stark dilemma: Plow up all the remaining rain forest to grow food, or starve. But thanks to fracking and the shale revolution, **peak oil and gas have been postponed**. They will run out one day, **but only in the sense that you will run out of Atlantic Ocean one day if you take a rowboat west out of a harbor in Ireland**. Just as you are likely to stop rowing long **before you bump into Newfoundland**, so **we may well find cheap substitutes for fossil fuels long before they run out**.

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("The World's Resources Aren't Running Out," April 25, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579517862612287156?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702304279904579517862612287156.html)

"We are using 50% more resources than the Earth can sustainably produce, and unless we change course, that number will grow fast—by 2030, even two planets will not be enough," says Jim Leape, director general of the World Wide Fund for Nature International (formerly the World Wildlife Fund). But here's a peculiar feature of human history: <u>**We burst through such limits again and again**</u>. After all, as a Saudi oil minister once said, <u>**the Stone Age didn't end for lack of stone.**</u> Ecologists <u>call **this "niche construction"**</u>—that <u>people</u> (and indeed some other animals) <u>can create new opportunities</u> for themselves <u>by making their habitats more productive</u> in some way. Agriculture is the classic example of niche construction: We stopped relying on nature's bounty and substituted an artificial and much larger bounty. <u>Economists call the same phenomenon</u> <u>innovation</u>. What frustrates them about <u>ecologists</u> is the latter's <u>tend</u>ency <u>to think in terms of **static limits**</u>. Ecologists can't seem to see that <u>when whale oil starts to run out, petroleum is discovered,</u> or that <u>when farm yields flatten, **fertilizer comes along,**</u> or that when glass fiber is invented, demand for copper falls. <u>**That frustration is heartily reciprocated**</u>. Ecologists think that economists espouse a sort of **superstitious magic** called "markets" or "prices" to avoid confronting the reality of limits to growth. The easiest way to raise a cheer in a conference of ecologists is to make a rude joke about economists. <u>**I have lived among both tribes**</u>. I <u>studied various forms of ecology</u> in an academic setting for seven years and then <u>worked at the Economist magazine for eight years</u>. When I was an ecologist (in the academic sense of the word, not the political one, though I also had antinuclear stickers on my car), I very much espoused the carrying-capacity viewpoint—that there were limits to growth. I nowadays lean to the view that there are no limits because we can invent new ways of doing more with less. <u>This disagreement goes to the heart of many current political issues</u> and explains much about why people disagree about environmental policy. <u>In the climate debate, for example, pessimists see a limit to the atmosphere's capacity</u> to cope with extra carbon dioxide without rapid warming. So a continuing increase in emissions if economic growth continues will eventually accelerate warming to dangerous rates. <u>But optimists see economic growth leading to</u> **technological change that would result in the use of lower-carbon energy**<u>. That would allow warming to level off</u> **long before it does much harm.** <u>It is striking</u>, for example, <u>that the Intergovernmental Panel</u> on Climate Change's recent forecast that temperatures would rise by 3.7 to 4.8 degrees Celsius compared with preindustrial levels by 2100 was based on several assumptions: little technological change, <u>an end to the 50-year fall in population growth rates, a tripling (only) of per capita income and not much improvement in the energy efficiency of the economy.</u> Basically, that would mean a world much like today's but with lots more people burning lots more coal and oil, leading to an increase in emissions. <u>Most economists expect a five- or tenfold increase in income</u>, huge changes in technology and an end to population growth by 2100: not so many more people needing much less carbon. In 1679, Antonie van <u>Leeuwenhoek, the great Dutch microscopist, estimated that the planet could hold **13.4 billion people**</u>, a number that most demographers think we may never reach. Since then, estimates have bounced around between 1 billion and 100 billion, with no sign of converging on an agreed figure. Economists point out that <u>**we keep improving the productivity of each acre of land by applying fertilizer, mechanization, pesticides and irrigation.**</u> Further innovation is bound to shift the ceiling upward.

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Alt's orientation away from WTO is impacted in the 1ac with trade wars and GATS collapse their politics leads to apathy – can't transition from theory to political change

John **Gibson**, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Kent, **'08**

("The Myth of the Multitude: The Endogenous Demise of Alter-globalist Politics," Global Society, Vol. 22, No. 2, April, 2008)

Crucially, such assessments view the rhizomatic structures and reflexive capacities of alter-globalist agents as also negating the internal antagonism and factionalism often associated with social movements. Hardt understands the World Social Forum as fulfilling the promise of anti-hierarchical politics—an infinitesimally open-ended collection of struggles converging around a basic commitment to resist neoliberalism, in which ideological differences cease to produce significant schisms.16 Stephen Gill has argued that alter-globalist practices counter long-standing differences between "new" and "old" social movements, creating a radically fluid "postmodern Prince" in the process.17 Similarly, Jackie Smith has argued that the demand for "democracy", functioning as an open signifier for the desire for greater personal control over biopolitics, is the sole commonality in otherwise plural alter-globalist spaces.18 Such claims resemble Laclau and Mouffe's model of a Logic of Equivalence, in which a vast collection of particular social movements and political demands resonate in accordance with one another through the use of a central empty signifier (in this case, "democracy") as an open point for infinite re-inscriptions, and whose ontological closure is permanently resisted.19 In such interpretations, the pronoun "we" in alterglobalist contexts is devoid of any fixed subjective content and is radically democratic. The political moment is defined within such discourses by Kingsnorth's "one no". Unity is structured around a shared rejection of transnational neoliberal capitalism, facilitating cross-cultural forms of identification and epistemic exchange, resisting any fixed meaning of the collective subject that undertakes activism. The central dilemma for activist life becomes whether the "many yeses" arising in its wake can exert counter-hegemonic power in a long-term war of position.20 However, although such accounts appear to present sources of optimism that dominant technocratic and individualist frames of global politics can be countered successfully, there are reasons to doubt their claims. After reaching an early apogee of 250,000 protesters at the Genoa G8 meeting in 2001, in the wake of 11 September 2001 summit protests have declined significantly, both in terms of frequency and attendees. The protest in Miami against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement in November 2003, advertised within movement circles as an event that would exceed the importance of Seattle, drew a crowd of below 10,000, and failed to generate any significant media coverage.21 The 2004 G8 summit in Georgia was met by hundreds, rather than thousands of protesters, and planned

solidarity actions elsewhere failed to materialise.22 Likewise, the 2004 London May Day gathering was cancelled after poorly attended planning meetings, and in 2005 fewer than two dozen self-declared anti-capitalists played cricket on the lawn south of the House of Commons.23 The direct action protests conducted around the Gleneagles G8 summit were undertaken by only a few thousand, and controversial protest tactics, including acts of vandalism in Auchterarder, generated considerable internal schisms.24 Social Forums have also become beset by difficulties. Intra-movement concerns reflect a growing atrophy; the absence of a venue for the prospective fifth European Social Forum reflects a scenario in which "there is no more cooperation between our forces than there was before Florence [in 2002]".25 To compound matters, some activists have complained that such events are becoming dominated by resource-heavy NGOs.26 The World Social Forum has become frequented by political elites. Gerhard Schro¨der and Jacques Chirac both attended the 2003 event, transgressing its Charter of Principles, in which the WSF exists in "opposition to a process of globalisation commanded by the large multinational corporations and by the governments and international institutions at the service of those corporations' interests, with the complicity of national governments".27 Activists often assert that the current impasse is temporary, that as new ways of pushing forward are imagined there will be a corresponding resurgence of antineoliberal politics. However, rather than the current lull representing a temporary period of torpor for alter-globalist politics, a number of entrenched weaknesses within the dominant myths of alter-globalist networks stymie its capacity to embody radical democracy. Caution is required against the hubris evident in the prevailing accounts of a fluid subject, conscious of its counter-hegemonic potential as a source of the dissolution of the neoliberal world order. Such mythology is ridden with inherent deficiencies that are rarely addressed by participants. Rather than a global multitude taking shape, in many respects we see only the phantasm of such a polis, and one that depends upon the active repression of contradictions and flaws in order to maintain the idealised image of the multitude presented by such prominent movement commentators as Klein and Kingsnorth.

Corporate influence is exaggerated

Jones 04

(Kent Jones is Professor of Economics at Babson College, Who's Afraid of the WTO?, 2004, pg. 174-5)

For their most severe critics, such measures will hardly be enough.6 Yet domestic political channels in the MNC's home country are still the best way to raise the issues and exert influence. In contrast, trying to attack MNCs by attacking the WTO misses the target. For one thing, MNC influence on the WTO has often been exaggerated. The largest of the MNCs certainly wield a great deal of political influence, but mainly through domestic channels. The first is through lobbying efforts in their home countries, where they play a large role in setting national agendas for trade negotiations and also have access to unilateral trade protection through antidumping and countervailing duty laws.7 The second channel lies in their relationships with the governments of the countries hosting MNC foreign operations. It is important to keep in mind that many countries, and indeed localities even within the developed countries, have been courting FDI for the economic benefits it brings. Most governments have come to view FDI as an overwhelmingly positive contribution to the recipient country's economic development and growth. This view is based on the underlying economics of international capital mobility and related activities. Such bilateral relationships always carry the danger of abuse, as special deals may be struck to bypass taxes or regulations, for example. In addition, many governments, especially in developing countries, want to retain as much control as possible over the terms of FDI, which is why they also have a strong interest in TRIMs. Yet this issue is being sorted out in the WTO as a matter of negotiation among sovereign states, not as the result of MNCs dictating the rules to helpless governments. Within the WTO, the MNCs can indeed exert strong influence, but it is typically tempered through the mediating factor of governmental representation. In the years before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, U.S. multinationals (and other U.S. firms), for example, could—and did—lobby their home government directly for unilateral action under various forms of section 301 of U.S. trade law. Together, these provisions allowed unilateral actions by the United States to "pry" open foreign markets and to retaliate against any foreign trade practices deemed "unreasonable."8 By bringing investment and intellectual property issues into the WTO through the TRIMs and TRIPs agreements, and by strengthening the dispute settlement system, trade policy issues of concern to MNCs were channeled into a multilateral forum. Under the WTO system, only governments have standing, and a government must therefore decide whether to bring a case before the Dispute Settlement Body, based on national interests and an associated

assessment of trade-offs in commercial diplomacy. This does not eliminate the influence of MNCs on the trading system; active lobbying; aggressive, unfair trade-law enforcement; and accommodating domestic trade officials still give them considerable clout. Yet the elimination of unilateral measures tends to moderate the influence of the MNCs and of domestic business in general on trade policy. One sign of the restraint on political influence is that many MNCs advocate WTO reform that would allow them to file dispute cases directly, without governmental intermediaries (see Julius 1994). Such proposals cast serious doubt on claims that MNCs somehow control the WTO or dictate trade rules or dispute settlement decisions. In addition, MNC activities are subject to increased public scrutiny, providing another channel of influence for NGOs. In general, stakeholders in trade issues, whether they are NGOs, MNCs, or other interest groups, have their most direct influence on trade policy through their national political institutions. For those concerned abut MNC political power, the best institutional arrangement is one in which governments can negotiate agreements and represent the broader interests of their domestic constituents in the WTO, keeping all interest groups involved at the domestic level of the policy debate. Other channels of influence for nontrade issues can also be developed in new international institutions.

Impact causality is backwards---violence is significantly declining---be skeptical of their doomsaying

Steven **Pinker**, Johnstone Family professor of psychology at Harvard and the author of The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, **and** Andrew **Mack**, fellow at the One Earth Future Foundation and director of the Human Security Report Project at Simon Fraser University, "The World Is Not Falling Apart," **12/22**/'14, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/12/the_world_is_not_falling_apart_the_trend_lines_reveal_an_increasingly_peaceful.single.html

The world is not falling apart. The kinds of violence to which most people are vulnerable—homicide, rape, battering, child abuse—have been in **steady decline** in most of the world. Autocracy is giving way to democracy. **Wars between states**—**by far** **the most destructive** of all conflicts—**are** all but **obsolete**. The increase in the number and deadliness of civil wars since 2010 is **circumscribed**, **puny in comparison with** **the decline** **that preceded it,** and **unlikely to escalate.** We have been told of impending doom before: a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, a line of dominoes in Southeast Asia, revanchism in a reunified Germany, a rising sun in Japan, cities overrun by teenage superpredators, a coming anarchy that would fracture the major nation-states, and weekly 9/11-scale attacks that would pose an existential threat to civilization. Why is the world **always "more dangerous than** it has **ever** been"— **even as a greater and greater majority** of humanity **lives in peace and dies of old age**? Too much of our impression of the world comes from a **misleading** formula of **journalistic narration.** Reporters give lavish coverage to gun bursts, explosions, and viral videos, oblivious to how representative they are and apparently innocent of the fact that many were contrived as journalist bait. Then come sound bites from "**experts" with vested interests** in maximizing **the impression of mayhem:** generals, politicians, security officials, moral activists. The talking heads on cable news filibuster about the event, desperately hoping to avoid dead air. Newspaper columnists instruct their readers on what emotions to feel. **There is a better way to understand the world.** Commentators can brush up their history—not by rummaging through Bartlett's for a quote from Clausewitz, but by recounting the events of the recent past that put the events of the present in an intelligible context. And they could consult the analyses of quantitative datasets on violence that are now just a few clicks away. An evidence-based mindset on the state of the

world would bring many benefits. It would calibrate our national and international responses to the magnitude of the dangers that face us. It would limit the influence of terrorists, school shooters, decapitation cinematographers, and other violence impresarios. It might even dispel foreboding and embody, again, the hope of the world.

AT: Neoliberalism/Cap Impact

Reject their lens of neoliberalism. Starting with "neoliberalism" encourages fake radicalism, oversimplification, and greater levels of cooptation than positive and pragmatic politics.

-Ad hoc policies of neoliberalism also originate from Leftist movements for greater autonomy

-Sustainability politics also emerged during this time, but the neolib K ignores those and lumps them all together

-Ignores positive action that doesn't conform to a romantic view of rebellion (i.e. the plan)

Clive **BARNETT** Faculty of the Social Sciences @ Open University (UK) **'5** ["The Consolations of 'Neoliberalism'" *Geoforum* 36 (1) p. Science Direct]

3. There is no such thing as neoliberalism! The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives 'take' in everyday situations. So perhaps **the best thing to do is to stop thinking of "neoliberalism" as a coherent "hegemonic" project** altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of "neoliberalism" and "neoliberalization" in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors "out there", who are **always framed as engaging in resistance** or contestation. The conceptualization of "neoliberalism" as a "hegemonic" project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of "neoliberalism" altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about "neoliberalism" manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about "neoliberalism" pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a "hegemonic" project of "neoliberalization", and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, referring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, women's health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b J. Clark, Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neo-liberalism, Journal of Social Policy 33 (2004), pp. 27–48.Clarke, 2004b). None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular "hegemonic" project of "neoliberalization".

They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as "hegemonic neoliberalism" is a muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of **privatization, market liberalization**, and de-regulation have often followed an **ironic pattern** in so far as they have **been triggered by citizens' movements arguing from the left** of the political spectrum **against the rigidities of statist** forms of **social policy** and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four

decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to "hegemonic neoliberalism". And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of "democracy" (see Barnett and Low, 2004). Recent theories of "neoliberalism" have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of "neoliberalism" have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of "individualized collective-action" (Marchetti, 2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of "neoliberal hegemony": **environmental politics and the politics of sustainability**; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris, 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, pp. 281–284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault's ideas into the Marxist narrative of "neoliberalism" sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 11–12). And **clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action** that does not conform to a **romanticized picture of rebellion**,//

contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine, 2001). Theories of "neoliberalism" are unable to recognize the emergence of new and innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public. The radical academic discourse of "neoliberalism" frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism—understood as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable conflicts of value, interest, and faith—the discourse of "neoliberalism" reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of "neoliberalism" invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure. The recurrent problem for theories of "neoliberalism" and "neoliberalization" is their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. They can only account for the relationship between top-down initiatives and bottom-up developments by recourse to the language of centres, peripheries, diffusion, and contingent realizations; and by displacing the conceptualization of social relations with a flurry of implied subject-effects. The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of "neoliberalism". The task for social theory today remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify "the recurrent causal processes that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale" (Tilly, 2003, p. 345). Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of "getting-at" ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how "hegemonic" projects of "neoliberalism" win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucault's ideas on governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what Ivison (1997) calls the "freedom to be formed and normed". Over time, Foucault's own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.

Alt/Strategy Answers

Specify Alt Key

Failure to specify how the alternative, or event, can solve existing problems of economic decision-making—empirically resulted in tyranny and economic catastrophe

Andrew **SAYER** Reader in Political Economy @ Lancaster **'95** *Radical Political Economy: A Critique* p. 13-14

Yet while the 'velvet' character of the revolutions was remarkable enough, there was little else that the Left could celebrate about them. As Habermas points out, they were also singularly depressing in that they were devoid of 'ideas that are either innovative or orientated to the future' (1991, p. 27). Whether Habermas meant it or not, I would add that it was Western Marxists as well as people in the former socialist states who lacked ideas about alternatives. In this context, market triumphalism could divert attention from the continued failings of capitalism, as if the 'victory' of capitalism meant that no one had any right to criticize it. Again, as Habermas put it, 'it is not as though the collapse of the Berlin Wall solved a single one of the problems specific to our system' (Habermas, 1991, p. xii). While the latter statement is surely correct it could be read as implying that it was 'business-as-usual' for the Left. It is my view that this kind of interpretation, together with those of Jameson and Callinicos, are complacent and hopelessly inad- equate. One can agree with Jameson that Marxism is primarily a theory of capitalism, but this position is nevertheless all too smug, for it begs the question of whether its account of capitalism is at all adequate.' Similarly, Callinicos implies that there are no lessons to be learned from the demise of state socialism, save that it wasn't real socialism, and there are certainly no lessons for the critique of capitalism.

This book is motivated by the view that such complacency is **entirely unwarranted**. The **totalitarian** character of state socialism and its problems of economic motivation and coordination are not historical aber- rations but are presaged by Marxism's lack of a sufficiently materialist understanding of the social division of labour and its associated division and dispersion of knowledge in advanced economies. This failing not only explains the inadequacies of state socialism's attempt to plan such an economy centrally, but is the **major unresolved flaw** in Marxist theory of capitalism. The reluctance of the Left to think through alternatives (for fear of producing 'blueprints' which might pre-empt future struggles) meant not only that radical political movements had little idea of **feasible and desirable objectives**, but that the standpoints from which capitalism and its problems were explained and criticized were unexamined and often **incoherent** or undesirable. There is no way the Left can reply to market triumphalism and the lack of alternatives without giving some consideration to the old problems of political economy.

AT: pedagogy

Their insistence on pedagogy being 'first' reifies extremism and fragmentation in the academy – only the perm avoids scholarship shutdown

David **Lake 11**, political science prof at UC-San Diego, Why "isms" Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress, International Studies Quarterly (2011) 55, 465-480

My critique of our profession is a common one, but one worth repeating. Most generally, we organize ourselves into academic "sects" that engage in self-affirming research and then wage theological debates between academic religions. This occurs at both the level of theory and epistemology. In turn, we reward those who stake out extreme positions within each sect. Unfortunately, this academic sectarianism, a product of our own internal political struggles, produces less understanding rather than more. Some reasonably fear intellectual "monocultures," as McNamara (2009) has called the possible hegemony of rationalism. But the current cacophony is not a sign of productive intellectual ferment in the pursuit of meaningful knowledge." Rather, we have produced a clash of competing theologies each claiming its own explanatory "miracles" and asserting its universal truth and virtue. Instead, a large measure of intellectual humility Is in order. Theoretically, we are far from the holy grail of a universal theory of international politics—if indeed such a grail even exists. We should focus instead on developing contingent, mid-level theories of specific phenomena. This analytical eclecticism is likely to be more productive (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). But we aLso need a lexicon for translating otherwise incommensurable theories and making them mutually intelligible. In the following section, I outline the problems with theoretical sects and affirm the case for analytic eclecticism. I then end with one possible "Rosetta stone" that aims to facilitate conversation across research traditions by suggesting that all theories of international studies can be disaggregated into the basic and common concepts of interests, interactions, and institutions. Epistemologically, there is perhaps an even deeper divide that is, unfortunately, not so easily bridged. The nomothetic vs narrative divide cuts through all of the social sciences and possibly beyond. This divide endures because scholars—either innately or through socialization—find one form of explanation more intellectually satisfying than the other. Yet, in international studies, we have reified this divide and, as with our theories, have formed mutually exclusive churches. Rather than claiming one or the other epistemology Is always and everywhere superior, we should recognize that both are valid and perhaps even complementary paths to understanding. The question is not which approach is inherently superior, but which yieIds greater insights under what circumstances. The second major section below takes up epistemology and its consequences for professional practice and knowledge.

AT: Silly Alt

Failure to specify how the alternative can solve existing problems of economic decision-making that create subsidies and overproduction will produce either tyranny or ineffectiveness.

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Neolib Alt

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Clive **BARNETT** Faculty of the Social Sciences @ Open University (UK) **'5**

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polyvalent discourse of "democracy" (see Barnett and Low, 2004). Recent theories of "neoliberalism" have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of "neoliberalism" have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of "individualized collective-action" (Marchetti, 2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of "neoliberal hegemony": environmental politics and the politics of sustainability; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris, 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, pp. 281–284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault's ideas into the Marxist narrative of "neoliberalism" sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 11–12). And clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action that does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion, contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine, 2001). Theories of "neoliberalism" are unable to recognize the emergence of new and innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public. The radical academic discourse of "neoliberalism" frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism—understood as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable conflicts of value, interest, and faith—the discourse of "neoliberalism" reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of "neoliberalism" invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure. The recurrent problem for theories of "neoliberalism" and "neoliberalization" is their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. 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Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of "getting-at" ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how "hegemonic" projects of "neoliberalism" win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucault's ideas on governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what Ivison (1997) calls the "freedom to be formed and normed". Over time, Foucault's own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.

AT: Bifo

Bifo Alt Fails

Bifo's alternative <u>fails</u> at disrupting capital---a simple withdrawal from the system <u>evacuates politics</u> and <u>cedes it to the Right</u>---turns the K.

Lear 12

(Ben is an underemployed researcher living in Manchester, UK. He recently co-authored an article in Occupy Everything! Reflections on Why it's Kicking off Everywhere, and is a member of Plan C., "Lifeboat Communism – A Review of Franco "Bifo" Berardi's After the Future," 5-18-2012, Viewpoint Magazine, http://viewpointmag.com/2012/05/18/lifeboat-communism-a-review-of-franco-bifo-berardis-after-the-future/)

What does the end of the future mean for **radical politics**? It is at this point that **Bifo's argument becomes problematic**. In an argument that intersects with groups such as Tiqqun, Bifo argues that we must see "Communism as a necessity in **the collapse of capital**." Distant from the voluntarism of previous forms of Communist politics, this "post-growth Communism" will be best understood as a necessary response to capital's refusal of labour. Cut adrift from the "opportunity" to work, with welfare systems dismantled, Bifo argues that we will witness the proliferation of zones of autonomy responding to the needs of an increasingly precarious and superfluous social body. Communist politics will emerge from an exodus, both voluntary and compulsory, from a stagnating and increasingly predatory state-capital nexus. This exodus is both social, in the development of an alternative infrastructure, and personal, in the withdrawal from the hyper-stimulation of the semiotic economy. Bifo abandons hope in collective contestation at the level of the political. **Bifo's politics could be described as a** kind of "**lifeboat communism**." As the crisis ripples, mutates, and deepens, Bifo sees the role of communism as the creation of spaces of solidarity to blunt the worst effects of the crisis of social reproduction. **Gone is the demand for a better world for all**, the liberation of our **collective social wealth,** or the unlocking of the **social potentials of technology**. Rather, Bifo's politics are based around **insulating** a necessarily small portion of society from the dictates of capital. By **withdrawing** from the **political sphere**, we accept the likelihood of losing the final scraps of the welfare state and **concede the terrain of the political to zombie politics** and **predatory capital**. Rather than seeking **new forms of organization** to re-enter the political stage, Bifo seems to suggest that we seek **shelter** beneath it as best we can. This **shying away** from the political stage is the weakness at the heart of the book. Recent eruptions of **political struggle** have captured the collective-imagination because they demonstrate that **political contestation is** still **possible** today, in spite of the obstacles Bifo has described. The Occupy movement and the uprisings in the **M**iddle **E**ast and **N**orth **A**frica have resonated with all those who still have hope in collective struggle. Although these movements have encountered varying problems, to which we must **develop solutions**, they dispel the idea of an unchangeable present. The current blockages to successful organising have been shown to be **strategic** and **tactical**, not terminal. Misdiagnosing the current **inertia of post-political public life** as a terminal condition leads the left towards **an evacuation of the political**, while we should instead reassert its primacy. If we abandon any hope of fighting in, against, and beyond the existing architecture of the state and capital, **and** instead seek refuge in **small communes**, and go-slow practices, we abandon all real hope of a generalized, or generalizable, **emancipatory politics**. Although Bifo's analysis of the difficulties of collective action resonates with all of us who have attempted to organize struggles in the past few decades, the proposal for a simple withdrawal from capitalism is **a bleak politics** indeed – which, at its most optimistic, calls for an orderly default by portions of the proletariat. The horizons of communist politics appear much narrower when capitalism is no longer seen as the repository of a vast store of social wealth awaiting collective redistribution, but rather redefined as an unassailable site of universal and permanent austerity combined with widening social redundancy. It is hard to imagine a network of self-organized projects and systems supporting the majority of the population in the context of an increasingly predatory capitalism. Emerging from the and isolated leftist scenes, this lifeboat communism will by its very nature have **a limited carrying capacity,** as the anarchist experience in post-Katrina New Orleans attests. The lifeboats that Bifo

calls for will undoubtedly be too small and makeshift to harbor us all. The crisis is twofold. It is a crisis of capitalist profitability, and of an increasingly precarious and surplus global proletariat whose reproduction (as both labour and body) is under threat. It is unlikely that the proliferation of communes, squats, food co-ops, file sharers, urban gardeners, and voluntary health services will bring forth a new, better world. But while the current seemingly post-political situation throws up massive obstacles to organizing, there is still a potential for collective contestation. The capitalist state, racked by its own legitimacy crisis and weekly political scandals, is more vulnerable than it appears. We need only recall the period of unexpected hope built by students in Britain, occupiers in Oakland, and vast swathes of North Africa and the Middle East during the past two years. These movements were mobilised through the betrayal of a vision of the future – but alongside their rage, they put forth a hope which can guide our politics. The task at hand is to unlearn old behaviour and to forge new tactical and organisational weapons for struggle. Bifo's contribution is a timely and challenging one, but it ultimately leads us back towards a DIY culture and "outreach" politics. As our movements come to terms with these limits, we must also hold onto the belief that luxury for all is possible. The social potential of unfilled blocks of flats, emerging technologies like 3D-printing, and the desires of the millions of underemployed, should remind us of this. This will not be possible without a collective struggle against the state and the demands of capital, one which simultaneously defends what we have and attempts to move beyond it. A retreat to lifeboat politics is both **premature** and **a self-fulfilling prophecy**. While Bifo correctly analyses the current conjuncture – clearly identifying the post-political state, the weakness of the Left, the crisis of profitability and new forms of labour, and their impact on the subject – his political prescriptions lead us in the wrong direction. Just as Bifo does, we place the struggle against work at the center; but we can also seek to liberate social wealth, rather than insulate a lucky few from the ravages of capital. Rather than "No Future," we must raise a different banner: "The future's here, it just needs reorganizing."

Cap K

Specific Adv k Env

Advocacy for specific policy reform is key to environmental justice movements--- refusal of policy relevance ensures marginalization

Noonan 5

(Douglas S., Assistant Professor, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005, "DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: POLICY DESIGN LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF EJ RESEARCH," http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~dn56/EJ.APPAM.pdf)

The negotiated nature of environmental policymaking holds some stark lessons for policymakers and analysts alike. Even if there were no uncertainty – and all of the useful scientific evidence was available – the heterogeneous interests of affected parties would persist. When policies ultimately seek to reconcile these competing interests, essentially answering questions of social choice (for which optimal solutions may not be available either in theory or due to practical limits to policy), only rarely or never would a policy process be such that selfish advocacy by interest groups yields both individually and socially optimal outcomes. In the environmental policy arena, the disconnect between the pursuit of individual interests and the pursuit of collective goals is paramount. In this sense, the acrimony surrounding many environmental policy debates is both undersandable and inevitable. ¶ Although this preface might apply equally well to discussions of "climate change policy" or "species/wilderness preservation policy," the application to environmental justice (EJ) provides an opportune arena in which to observe the interplay between environmental policymaking and the (allegedly) relevant research. Environmental justice is a major theme in environmental and social policy. Its researchers are legion. Their output is voluminous. A debate about the empirical evidence and about appropriate policies continues among academics. In more public forums, interest groups routinely cite environmental justice in advocating for policy reforms. As is typical in policy debates, advocates select evidence to cite in support of their position. **The influence of scholarly EJ research on policymakers**, however, **is less than straightforward**. If the mounting evidence provides only partial answers or, as is common, **answers to questions only marginally relevant to policymakers**, then **even hundreds of books** 1 on the subject may **do little to sway public policy**. Or, conversely, the evidence's influence may far outstrip its limited relevance. Regardless, like many other environmental policy topics, the role of scholarly research in policy design is inevitably contentious and complex. ¶ The purpose of this paper is to offer some insight about policy design from the scholarly literature on EJ. After scaling this mountain of literature, what are the important lessons to be learned for **making EJ policy?** From this vantage, this paper **critiques the field of EJ research**. It also offers some suggestions for a more policy-relevant research agenda. The conclusion returns to the broad assessment of EJ policy and suggests some future directions for designing policy and framing the discourse.

AT: Epistemology Flawed

Pragmatic, limited correction of our epistemology by testing *environmental* solutions is better than trying fullscale

epistemological or ontological shift. They stop us from developing *better* forms of management.

Norton 2

(Bryan, Philosophy @ Georgia Tech '2 in Pragmatist Ethics for a Technological Culture ed. Keulartz p. 179-182)

The positivist sociologist, Otto Neurath, provided a useful simile - one that has become very popular with pragmatists today - that illustrates the pragmatist search for truth (discussed in Quine, 1960). Improving our knowledge and understanding, Ncnnth said, is most like repairing a ship while on the high seas. Imagine a ship that is kept in service indefinitely, with no opportunity to be pulled into dry dock for repairs, As particular planks weaken from weather and heavy use, we replace them, standing on the strongest remaining planks while replacing the weakest ones. In principle, it would be possible to replace every plank, resulting in a "new" ship in the physical sense that every plank is new, but the -ship" remains itself, with no need to be re-christened. The analogy captures perfectly the pragmatists' approach to epistemology. First, the pursuit of epistemological renewal - for the pragmatists, unlike Descartes – does not start by tearing down every plank of knowledge, necessitating a completely new construction. Rather the task of renewal begins for pragmatists by identifying the most problematic "planks" of knowledge. Since we must keep the boat afloat as we do our repairs identifying the problematic planks is not just a matter of identifying what beliefs we have the least evidence for. In the ship analogy, this might mean that we fix a moderately rotted plank below the water level before replacing a badly rotted one in a little-used area of the deck; in pragmatist epistemology, this kind of decision involves identifying uncertainties that am particularly relevant to community survival and to other chosen social goals The assessment is furthermore relative to appropriate values, not simply to a mechanical application of a test of physical strength of the particular "planks" of knowledge. The analogy also illustrates the idea of piecemeal improvement of a belief system in which no belief is ultimately privileged, even though some beliefs am accepted, in context, as unquestioned for very long periods of time. So the analogy, by noting that the entire ship is subject to the ravages of time and wear, and will eventually be replaced with new wood. illustrates also the pragmatists idea that every belief is up for re- evaluation as necessary. If we am imagine our sailors continuing their back and forth passages indefinitely, each and every belief will eventually be submitted to the test of experience and experiment. Its time will come when it is relevant to an important disagreement regarding what needs to be done and how it must be done. Each plank of knowledge will thus eventually be vt-evaluated and its strength at any given point will be the extent to which it has held up to observation and experiential tests in past cases in which it was called into question. ¶ The ship analogy also illustrates in simple tams a way out of the quandaries of subjectivism, anti-realism, and relativism. Some readers, reasoning as follows, might think that Neurath's analogy pushes us closer to relativism. Since the decision which 'plank to stand on and which to fix is a matter of judgment. surely affected by the - and values of the am (survival, at least), it might be argued that different people, including different scientists, will lake different things to be "given" and unquestioned at any particular time. Accepting that our society is made up of people with different values and different assumptions - paradigms and worldviews - it could be argued that we must expect different people with different perspectives to "Mm different goals, values, and to put different scientific hypotheses up for t. Not only will people cite very different beliefs in support of policy choices, communication across perspectives may become impossible, because the choice of linguistic categories and meanings depends also on individual's values and This undermines appeals to any particular linguistic vocabulary as privileged. as valid pre-experientially (Quint, l%l) we must give up, as Dewey saw, appeals to fixed and eternal categories and to fixed and eternal maths The ways in which we identify, characterize, individuate, and aggregate objects of the senses are deeply affected by our goals and values as well as our perspective and worldview. Through language, we construct reality; and different languages reflect, it would seem, different wont inhabited by different tens from different perspectives. If we apply Neurath's analogy to language, we find that a kind of linguistic relativity - perhaps better called, linguistic conventionalism- is unavoidable. Despite this form of conventionalism, which plays havoc with our ability to match specific sentences with particular bits of reality, there is still an element of realism in Neurath's AM. The - analogy avoids a skeptical and relativist conclusion about beliefs and knowledge, because the decisions made do not escape the test of experience. Over time, staying afloat depends on realistic assessments of damage to the ship and realistic models of what will happen if a particular plank fails. If the repair crew constantly repairs the easiest planks to access. ignoring the ones under deep water, a disaster will eventually occur. Similarly, if the crew replica the bar in the Officers' galley every time it is scratched, while ignoring severe rot below the water line. the whole crew will be selected out of the pool of sailors and a new ship will have to be launched. Further, while languages may suggest different and relative ontologies for individuals who speak different languages, language is not an individual matter. Just as the repair crew on the ship must communicate if they arc to collectively decide what to do next, a seeker alter the truth will be a member of an intellectual community, Some form of shared language or linguistic communication is presupposed in the designation of a group sa a 'community. Similarly, - as the repair crew's decisions will affect the whole crew, giving crew members an incentive to oversee the repairmen's decisions and work, the progression of the scientific endeavor will bring larger and larger communities - and their collective and individual experiences - into discourse about what to do to protect the environment. The key point here is that Neurath's analogy shows clearly how we can adopt a position of limited realism by pushing the level at which we judge truth and falsity from the sentential level to the action level at which we act on our total belief system in particular situations. We can recognize. in the face of unexpected experiences and surprising outcomes of experiments, that our set of beliefs is inadequate; we cannot, however, on the basis of one or a few such experiences, unambiguously identify where the problem in our belief system lies, and there is no algorithm for deciding the best way to repair problems as they arise. Because, in any given situation, what we expect is determined not simply by one or a few beliefs our expectations arc supported by our entire system of beliefs, including background knowledge, that is (temporarily) not doubted in the given situation. If expectations are not born out by experience, y solution requires a creative reconstruction (Quine. 1960). Direct experience, to extend Neurath's analogy, can

tell us that we have a leak" in our system of knowledge. Determining how best to fix the leak may require that we reconsider some of out background beliefs. Limited realism accepts the fact that no substantive knowledge of the external world is knowable a priori; we must correct our system of beliefs without benefit of prior principles to guide us. It also accepts the apparently unavoidable conclusion that our varied linguistic forms, designed to function in many different situations, yield no common underlying structure for all experience. If categories we find in the world are of our own making; they we not given in reality independent of us For these reasons realism must be limited. But 11 remains realism in the one important sense. It retains a method of selection and is thus self-correcting on the basis of broader experience and open deliberation. One cannot believe anything one wishes and still survive -this is a necessity imposed upon us by our environment; it is not volitional, it is imposed upon us. The crew on Neurath's ship either stays afloat or they die. For the pragmatist. it is not so important to separate the hypotheses acted upon from the attitudes and values that bring them to the fore in real situations requiring inquiry; what is important is that we observe and experiment, that there be an external check on claims and counterclaims There is, after all, an experience that will tell the repair crew they made a mistake, given their shared goals. The experience begins with the sensation of sinking into wetness.

The action contexts, and certain unavoidable experiences, correct us when we have wrong beliefs and inappropriate goals. Adaptive Managers can thus adopt limited realism as a working epistemology. Since environmental management is clearly a cultural and social endeavor. it can be hoped that (a) many belief systems, perspectives , and viewpoints will be proposed and tried out, but that (b) this initial relativity will be gradually reduced as proposals, the belief systems that =MM them, and even the perspectives taken, we subjected to the ultimate teet do they work in real situations? Hopefully, as time goes on, we an learn new methods and techniques whereby proposals and beliefs can be tested through pilot projects, experiments, and so forth, avoiding the necessity of having a cultural collapse to disprove every errant hypothesis. This hope is represented, in pragmatist thought, in the emphasis pragmatists place on devising techniques and methods that help to winnow truth from falsehood without catastrophic cultural failure. If indeed such methods an be devised and gradually improved, it would appear that the optimism of Adoptive Managers - who, we admitted at the outset, must have some reason to believe that observation and experiment will provide some advantage in an open-ended pros of eavironinental management - are provided intellectual support by a pragmatist epistemology. Our cxcursion So limited new and pragmatist epistemology suggests tint, given many diverse voices engaged in dialogue triut what we ought to do to protect the environment a general method cmcrg from our accvunL The method an, at its best, help us to pick winning from losing strategies by use of s studies, observations, and experiments, and a diligent recording of what works and what doesn't work in particular situations. There is thus reason to believe that Adeptive Management an provide a self-corrective method for pursuing environmental protection.

Envt O/W's Ontology

Prioritize environmental existence over framing and ontology.

Wapner 3

(Paul Prf. And Director of the Global Environmental Policy Program @ American '3 "Leftist Criticism of 'Nature'," *Dissent*, Winter, p. 74-75)

The third response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" *does* deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions—except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world—in all its diverse embodiments—must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean- François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment. Now, what does this mean for politics and policy, and the future of the environmental movement? Society is constantly being asked to address questions of environmental quality for which there are no easy answers. As we wrestle with challenges of global climate change, ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity, and so forth, we need to consider the economic, political, cultural, and aesthetic values at stake. These considerations have traditionally marked the politics of environmental protection. A sensitivity to eco-criticism requires that we go further and include an ethic of otherness in our deliberations. That is, we need to be moved by our concern to make room for the "other" and hence fold a commitment to the nonhuman world into our policy discussions. I don't mean that this argument should drive all our actions or that respect for the "other" should always carry the day. But it must be a central part of our reflections and calculations. For example, as we estimate the number of people that a certain area can sustain, consider what to do about climate change, debate restrictions on ocean fishing, or otherwise assess the effects of a particular course of action, we must think about the lives of other creatures on the earth—and also the continued existence of the nonliving physical world. We must do so not because we wish to maintain what is "natural" but because we wish to act in a morally respectable manner. I have been using postmodern cultural criticism against itself. Yes, the postmodernists are right: we can do what we want with the nonhuman world. There is nothing essential about the realm of rocks, trees, fish, and climate that calls for a certain type of action. But postmodernists are also right that the only ethical way to act in a world that is socially constructed is to respect the voices of the others— of those with whom we share the planet but with whom we may not share a common language or outlook. There is, in other words, a limit or guiding principle to our actions. As political theorist Leslie Thiele puts it, "One can't argue for the diversity of views of 'nature' without taking a stand for the diversity of nature."

Timeframe Key

Timeframe of solvency is the key issue: Administrative environmental discourse is key to the effectiveness of short-term policy.

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In this way the social action represented by 'Green Romanticism' is of a more semiotic nature than is the social action represented by 'Administrative rationalism which has more immediate concrete outcomes in terms of policies and material practices. 'these discourses may actually be complementary when seen from the perspective of a diverse and wide- ranging movement, which seeks to raise issues and effect social change in a variety of different ways, One key consideration is the time-frame in which discourses seek to operate. If you seek to gain short-term results, you will need a discourse that is clearly related to dominant discourses; less so for medium-term results; and long-term results may require the subversion of the dominant discourse itself in conjunction with changing certain key social structures and material practices. I would argue that effective movements typically work with all these time-scales in addition to working at different scales from micro to macro politics.

AT: Ethics O/W

Preventing death is the first ethical priority – it's the only impact you can't recover from.

Bauman 95 Zygmunt Bauman, University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71

The being-for is like living towards-the-future: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other,as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The self stretches towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching-toward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not-yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly an-other Other, that life can be lived - not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all-too-familiar unsure-of-itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' - both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of *being fu filled,* but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its *unfu filment.* One may say that the paradox *of hope* (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being-for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self-defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a *mystery.* And being-for-the-Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view - makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place - but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being-for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is *unspoken,* the responsibility undertaken is *unconditional;* it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery - noted Max Frisch - (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed - soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to the musical-chairs game of the real and the potential - it once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly open and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the *must* of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of being-for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition - an end to itself. Without knowing - without being capable of knowing - that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness (the being-for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre-empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place. The togetherness of being-for is always in the future, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The being-for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted. This is the tragedy of being-for - the reason why it cannot but be death-bound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love. The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end, and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. Morality, like the future itself, is forever not-yet. (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being-with) that we turn into moral selves. And it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally, and sometimes even of being good, in the present.

Alt Answers

Alt Specificity k

Failure to specify how the alternative, or event, can solve existing problems of economic decision-making—empirically resulted in tyranny and economic catastrophe

Andrew **SAYER** Reader in Political Economy @ Lancaster **'95** *Radical Political Economy: A Critique* p. 13-14

Yet while the 'velvet' character of the revolutions was remarkable enough, there was little else that the Left could celebrate about them. As Habermas points out, they were also singularly depressing in that they were devoid of 'ideas that are either innovative or orientated to the future' (1991, p. 27). Whether Habermas meant it or not, I would add that it was Western Marxists as well as people in the former socialist states who lacked ideas about alternatives. In this context, market triumphalism could divert attention from the continued failings of capitalism, as if the 'victory' of capitalism meant that no one had any right to criticize it. Again, as Habermas put it, 'it is not as though the collapse of the Berlin Wall solved a single one of the problems specific to our system' (Habermas, 1991, p. xii). While the latter statement is surely correct it could be read as implying that it was 'business-as-usual' for the Left. It is my view that this kind of interpretation, together with those of Jameson and Callinicos, are complacent and hopelessly inad- equate. One can agree with Jameson that Marxism is primarily a theory of capitalism, but this position is nevertheless all too smug, for it begs the question of whether its account of capitalism is at all adequate.' Similarly, Callinicos implies that there are no lessons to be learned from the demise of state socialism, save that it wasn't real socialism, and there are certainly no lessons for the critique of capitalism. This book is motivated by the view that such complacency is **entirely unwarranted**. The **totalitarian** character of state socialism and its problems of economic motivation and coordination are not historical aber- rations but are presaged by Marxism's lack of a sufficiently materialist understanding of the social division of labour and its associated division and dispersion of knowledge in advanced economies. This failing not only explains the inadequacies of state socialism's attempt to plan such an economy centrally, but is the **major unresolved flaw** in Marxist theory of capitalism. The reluctance of the Left to think through alternatives (for fear of producing 'blueprints' which might pre-empt future struggles) meant not only that radical political movements had little idea of **feasible and desirable objectives**, but that the standpoints from which capitalism and its problems were explained and criticized were unexamined and often **incoherent** or undesirable. There is no way the Left can reply to market triumphalism and the lack of alternatives without giving some consideration to the old problems of political economy.

Movements Fail/Perm Key

Movements/the alternative can't address immediate problems—they are multigenerational, educational ventures. Working within the system is necessary to solve particular instances of the climate problem—there's no guarantee their revolution will solve

-Working within existing political institutions is key

-It's too late to solve the whole environmental crisis, but can work to mitigate the damage

-No guarantee the alternative's regression to socialism wont' have same environmental problems

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Several strands of green thinking maintain that capitalism is incapable of a sustainable relationship with non-human nature because, as an economic system, capitalism has a growth imperative while the earth is finite. One finds versions of this argument in the literature of eco-socialism, deep ecology, eco-anarchism, and even among many mainstream greens who, though typically declining to actually name the economic system, are fixated on the dangers of "growth."

All this may be true. Capitalism, a system in which privately owned firms must continuously out-produce and out-sell their competitors, may be incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world. However, that is not the same question as whether capitalism can solve the more immediate climate crisis.

Because of its magnitude, the climate crisis can appear as the sum total of all environmental problems—deforestation, over-fishing, freshwater depletion, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, chemical contamination. But halting greenhouse gas emissions is a much more specific problem, the **most pressing subset** of the **larger apocalyptic panorama**.

And the very bad news is, time has run out. As I write this, news arrives of an ice-free arctic summer by 2050. Scientists once assumed that would not happen for hundreds of years.

Dealing with climate change by first achieving radical social transformation—be it a socialist or anarchist or deep-ecological/neo-primitive revolution, or a nostalgia-based localista conversion back to a mythical small-town capitalism—would be a very **long and drawn-out**, maybe even **multigenerational, struggle**. It would be marked by years of mass education and organizing of a scale and intensity not seen in most core capitalist states since the 1960s or even the 1930s.

Nor is there any guarantee that the new system would not also degrade the soil, lay waste to the forests, despoil bodies of water, and find itself still addicted to coal and oil. Look at the history of "actually existing socialism" before its collapse in 1991. To put it mildly, the economy was not at peace with nature. Or consider the vexing complexities facing the left social democracies of Latin America. Bolivia, and Ecuador, states run by socialists who are beholden to very powerful, autonomous grassroots movements, are still very dependent on petroleum revenue.

A more radical approach to the crisis of climate change begins **not with a long-term vision** of an alternate society but with an honest engagement with the very compressed timeframe that current climate science implies. In the age of climate change, **these are the real parameters of politics**.

AT: Rejection (Warming)

Advocacy for specific policy reform is key to environmental justice movements---refusal of policy relevance ensures marginalization

Douglas S. **Noonan 5**, Assistant Professor, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005, "DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: POLICY DESIGN LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF EJ RESEARCH," http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~dn56/EJ.APPAM.pdf

The negotiated nature of environmental policymaking holds some stark lessons for policymakers and analysts alike. Even if there were no uncertainty – and all of the useful scientific evidence was available – the heterogeneous interests of affected parties would persist. When policies ultimately seek to reconcile these competing interests, essentially answering questions of social choice (for which optimal solutions may not be available either in theory or due to practical limits to policy), only rarely or never would a policy process be such that selfish advocacy by interest groups yields both individually and socially optimal outcomes. In the environmental policy arena, the disconnect between the pursuit of individual interests and the pursuit of collective goals is paramount. In this sense, the acrimony surrounding many environmental policy debates is both undersandable and inevitable. ¶ Although this preface might apply equally well to discussions of "climate change policy" or "species/wilderness preservation policy," the application to environmental justice (EJ) provides an opportune arena in which to observe the interplay between environmental policymaking and the (allegedly) relevant research. Environmental justice is a major theme in environmental and social policy. Its researchers are legion. Their output is voluminous. A debate about the empirical evidence and about appropriate policies continues among academics. In more public forums interest groups routinely cite environmental justice in advocating for policy reforms. As is typical in policy debates, advocates select evidence to cite in support of their position. **The influence of scholarly EJ research on policymakers**, however, **is less than straightforward**. If the mounting evidence provides only partial answers or, as is common, **answers to questions only marginally relevant to policymakers**, then **even hundreds of books** 1 on the subject may **do little to sway public policy**. Or, conversely, the evidence's influence may far outstrip its limited relevance. Regardless, like many other environmental policy topics, the role of scholarly research in policy design is inevitably contentious and complex. ¶ The purpose of this paper is to offer some insight about policy design from the scholarly literature on EJ. After scaling this mountain of literature, what are the important lessons to be learned for **making EJ policy?** From this vantage, this paper **critiques the field of EJ research**. It also offers some suggestions for a more policy-relevant research agenda. The conclusion returns to the broad assessment of EJ policy and suggests some future directions for designing policy and framing the discourse.

AT: Zizek (rev/act)

Their proposal is just empty radicalism. Risking everything for revolution creates Stalinist totalitarianism.

Julia **HELL** German Studies @ Michigan **'6** "Remnants of Totalitarianism" *Telos* Fall Vol. 136 p. 96-103

This brings us to the present and the form of political actions that are thinkable, or unthinkable, in a condition allegedly dominated by the opposition between totalitarianism and democracy. What is needed is a "freedom fighter with an inhuman face." In Zizek's Revolution at the Gates, Antigone is such a model, her defiance an example of ==an act that "intervenes in the very rational order of the Real, changing-restructuring its co-ordinates==-an act is not irrational; rather, it creates its own (new) rationality.""' This event "cannot be planned in advance-we have to take a risk, a step into the open, with no Big Other to return our true message to us"-and ==its consequences might well be **Stalinist terror**==, that is one of the risks."' A freedom fighter with an inhuman face-the phrase resonates with Benjamin's early thoughts on the Angel of History as a figure that embod- ies the creativity of destruction. iek discusses Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in the context of "revolutionary violence" as "the transformation of the oppressed victim into an active agent. "6 To make the argument for the ethical nature of the revolutionary act, 2iiek turns to Eric Santner's reading of Benjamin. "[A] present revolutionary interven- tion repeats/redeems past failed attempts," Zizek writes."' He uses Eric Santner's notion of "symptoms" as "past traces which are retroactively redeemed through the 'miracle' of the revolutionary intervention": they are, Santner writes, "not so much forgotten deeds, but rather forgotten failures to act, failures to suspend the force of the social bond inhibiting acts of solidarity with society's 'others.'"" Santner's political claims are more modest: these symptoms register not only past failed revolutionary attempts, but past "failures to respond to calls for action, or even for empa- thy" on behalf of the suffering."" Santner uses Christa Wolf's reflections on the Nazi pogroms of 1938, not on the events of 1917. But Zizek is not concerned with modest ethical acts; for him, the excessive violence of the 1938 pogroms is a symptom that testifies to the "possibility of the authen- tic proletarian revolution.""'

This was an outburst of violence that covered "the void of the failure to intervene effectively in the social crisis."" ==As the Stalinist purges contained a redemptive kernel, so does==, apparently, ==right-wing violence==. At stake is a contemporary politics of authentic acts that redeems these voids and creates a revolutionary future from a revolu- tionary past. IV "A Crazy Wager on the Impossible": Eaek 's New (Post)Democratic Post-Politics If we read Zizek and Muffler with reference to Arendt's Origins of Totali- tarianism, we discover two different, but complementary stories that express a familiar dilemma of the left. **In Zizek's writings, the** entire ==mur- derous history of Stalinism is erased in favor of a== still ==unrealized future==: the realization of the redemptive dimension----one that we find even at the heart of Stalinism. In MUller's texts, the GULAG is reified into a concept of history as catastrophe, the history of an eternal cycle of violence. The future only exists as the repetition of that violence. Both iek and Muller draw on Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History," which were written at the moment of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. The opposition between Muller's melancholic paralysis and iek's revolutionary decisionism raises again a problematic that Yves de Maes- seneer discusses apropos of Benjamin's angel. Maesseneer argues that the figure of the angel represents a "terrifying amalgam of redemption and destruction," because it implies the "end of politics," either leading to res- ignation, or (state) terror .... If we appeal to Benjamin's angel, Maesseneer submits, ==we either risk "an endorsement of the posture of a powerless witnessing of catastrophe==," because the angel is "too immaterial to make a difference," ==or else we are endorsing radical destruction.==" Whether this assessment is valid for Benjamin's angel might be debatable; as a warning, it certainly applies to 2iek's and MUller's readings of it."' I am not arguing that .iek revived Benjamin's angel with a bomb in one hand and a copy of the Koran in the other. I do however agree with Geoff Boucher's analysis that iek's recent theorizing of the act as an "exit from the symbolic network, a dissolution of social bonds" indicates a tension between democratic politics (as the formation of a hegeinonic project) and "quasi-religious militarism,"" ==Boucher criticizes Zizek's notion of a foundational act as a leftover from "Cultural-Revolution-period Maoism" and ultimately a retreat from politics, because it seems to privi- lege individual over collective action and reduces politics and economics to ideological struggles==."' I have traced this new politics of "repeating Lenin" and the Bolsheviks' refusal of evolutionary history to two different contexts. The first is the Eastern European context, i.e., the de-politicizing connection between petrified (post)totalitarian conditions and the volun- tarist fantasies of Eastern Europe's dissident Marxists. The second is the context discussed by Boucher, i.e., the politics of the 1970s. However, I propose to comprehend iek's re-invention of radical politics as a return not to Maoism, but to the abstract radicalism of the RAE. In 1972, Ulrike Meinhof wrote a manifesto about Black September's role in the anti-imperialist struggle. Meinhof argued that Germany was imperialism's fascist center, that Israel's conflict with the Palestinians had turned that country into "Nazi-Faschismus," and that the bloody kidnappings in Munich constituted an "anti-imperialist, anti-fascist" intervention."' Again, I am not arguing that iek is re-inventing the Angel of History as Islamic fundamentalist, Palestinian freedom fighter, or the reincarnation of Ulrike Meinhof. But Meinhof's ghost does haunt his "freedom fighter with an inhuman face." Anti-imperialist struggle, she wrote, aims at the "[m]aterial destruction of imperialist domination" and the "myth" of its omnipotence."" This sounds familiar: we could be reading a Maoist pamphlet. Meinhof's reflections on the symbolic core of militant actions are more intriguing: "Propagandistic action as part of the

material attack: the act of liberation in the act of annihilation. "`9 Libera- tion through destruction: in this statement we find remnants of Hegel's master-slave dialectic and its echoes in Fanon and Sartre--and we find a crude foreshadowing of Zizek's conception of the authentic revolutionary act as one that changes the symbolic itself. This raises again the question of which kinds of acts Ziek has in mind. Reading Zizek unfortunately does not help to clarify this issue. What we do learn is that Zizek attempts to theorize politics beyond "democracy." Discussing the challenge that Carl Schmitt's theory of the political poses to the left, Chantal Mouffe insists that radical democracy be understood as a critique of parliamentary democracy, not as its dismissal. Radical democracy politicizes liberal democracy by introducing Schmitt's agonistic definition of politics, which deliberative models of democracy exclude; and it introduces agonistic pluralism into Schmitt's ineradicable 2onfiictuality by transforming antagonistic confrontations into agonistic Dries, "enemies" into legitimate "adversaries" with whom "there exists a common ground.""' That parliamentary democracy provides the space for the elaboration of this common symbolic ground has been the cornerstone of the post-Stalinist left and its reinvention of democratic politics. In his essay on Schmitt's "decisionist formalism," Zizek argues that Schmitt asserts "the independence of the abyssal act of free decision from its positive content "3' Like Mouffe, Zizek welcomes Schmitt's definition of the political as antagonistic, but criticizes him for not properly articu- lating "the logic of political antagonism.""' Schmitt's move to limit the friend/enemy distinction to external politics disavows the internal struggle that traverses society, while "a leftist position," hek writes, insists on "the unconditional primacy of the inherent antagonism as constitutive of the political.""' Zizek then provides "positive content" to Schmitt's formalism by defining the political as a struggle for democracy: "The political struggle proper is. never simply a rational debate between mul- tiple interests, but simultaneously the struggle for one's voice to be heard and recognized as the voice of a legitimate partner.""' The "protests of the 'excluded" always involve their right to be recognized."' Yet is Zizek's new radical act really more than just another kind of empty, formalist decisionism? Granted, he gives it a more material con- tent by insisting on the continuing relevance of class antagonism, i.e., the "notion of a radical antagonistic gap that affects the entire social body.""' In Welcome to the Desert of the Real, this gap is exposed by the attacks on the World Trade Center, because, iek argues, these attacks represented the eruption of the real into our symbolic order: they signaled the gap between the First and the Third Worlds, iek unequivocally distances himself from these attacks. Nevertheless, this militant gesture does pose a problem. I see Zizek's recent involvement with theology as an attempt to differentiate his messianic-militant politics from this kind of terrorism. And the hermeneutic pirouettes performed in the service of the "redemptive kernel" of Stalinism serve the same function: to delineate the boundaries of what this act is and is not. The "freedom fighter with the inhuman face" is no terrorist, Islamic or Stalinist-but is she anything more than a rev- enant from another desperate age? To answer this question, we need to return to Ulrike Meinhof, In Welcome to the Desert of the Real, iiek compares the attacks on the World Trade Center to those of the RAF. Meinhof's concept of the revolution- ary act, Zizek writes, is driven by the twentieth-century "passion for the Real," a belief that violent transgression bombs people out of their numbed state."' However, this kind of act, 2iek argues, paradoxically produces only the "pure semblance of the effect of the Real.""' But does this analysis (which I read as a kind of anticipatory rebuttal) really exhaust Meinhof's theory of the authentic act? What the RAF aimed for were three things: the existential effect, the shock effect, and, finally, a kind of "rev- elation": the act's power to lay bare the (fascist) essence of the (German) state. As 1 mentioned above, we find traces of Fanon's existentialism, but point two and three also hint at the legacy of surrealism, of Debord and the Situatjonjst International, And it is here that we can locate Ziek's debt to the RAF. For we can read the RAF's desire to "unveil" the true nature of the state in two ways: as the production of mere spectacle, a "thrill of the Real," or as a desire to radically intervene on the level of the symbolic. '39 Like iek's authentic revolutionary act, Meinhof's theory of revolutionary acts contained a symbolic dimension; they were aimed at a rearrangement of the very pre-conditions of politics. Zizek is thus in the process of rethinking radical democracy through Meinhof, substituting the work of hegemonic articulation with a new strat- egy, the authentic revolutionary act. And Zizek takes Mouffe's Gramscian rearticulation of the symbolic outside the space of liberal parliamentary democracy. For, as Zizek points out in his response to Boucher, the time of optimism is over: "we effectively live in dark times for democratic politics."40 Far from advocating a "crazy messianic politics of a radical violent Act," Zizek writes, in this age of global capitalism he is concerned with finding ways to re-think radical change (which, he argues, Mouffe and Laclau abandoned by limiting their anti-globalization strategy to "multiple local practices of resistance"). 141 Ultimately, Zizek writes, "we cannot formulate a clear project of global change."" Zizek's angel is thus really not much more than an intriguing, but ultimately empty, cipher-a remnant from a bygone era. Where does this leave us? Curiously, in a position similar to that of Arendt in 1945: the conditions of both political analysis and politics itself have fundamentally changed, Zizek argues, and therefore need to be radi- cally re-thought. While Arendt takes recourse to the miracle of birth, Zizek conjures the miracle of the authentic act. What distinguishes Zizek from Arendt is his willingness to take the ultimate risk: to sever the connection to liberal parliamentary democracy. In his recent writings, Zizek comes "perilously close to an ultra-left refusal of the difference between capital- ist democracy and military dictatorship." 143 Like Arendt, Zizek situates his recent work in the shadow of catastrophe ("dark times" is a transparent allusion to Brecht and National Socialism). Unlike Arendt, Ziek does not escape this catastrophic imaginary but repeats its antinomies." Zizek's new politics thus constitutes a curious double repetition: first, of Arendt's attempt to liberate politics from the catastrophic imagi- nary; and second, of the RAF. iek himself analyzes 1970s terrorism as a response to the New Left's realization that the revolution will not happen-neither in Berlin, nor Prague, nor Belgrade. '45 As the New Left disintegrated, groups like the RAP and Red Brigades slowly slid into their suicidal politics. Muller fell for this messianic politics at a moment when the petrified conditions of the GDR appeared to be its eternal future. Ziek seems to fall for it now, his empty repetition of the RAP nothing but a symptom-albeit apparently not a very enjoyable one. Zizek is certainly not the only one conceiving of a new politics in rather empty tenns. Giorgio Agamben argues that modernity's murderous biopolitics has been accompanied by the state of exception as a norm leading to the United States as its ultimate totalitarian instantiation. While Againben's view of (contemporary) modernity is best described by Arendt's "law of ruin," his new politics comes down to nothing but a metaphysical desire to experience genuine Being, a kind of Heideg- gerian great leap forward-or rather, a leap into the beyond."'

Radical democracy worked through the "shock of experience" that its theorists shared--however belatedly-with Arendt, and they heeded her advice to think the unprecedented. Its strategies might need re-inventing (and Zizek's materialist re-centering of the social around its basic antagonism is a productive first step). But its basic tenets-that politics takes place within the framework of parliamentary democracy and that it transforms the friend/enemy antagonism into a friend/adversary agonism-still seems the adequate answer to U.S. Republican politics and their own brand of catastrophic scenarios.

Neolib Alt Fails

Starting with "neoliberalism" encourages fake radicalism, oversimplification, and greater levels of cooptation than positive and pragmatic politics.

-Ad hoc policies of neoliberalism also originate from Leftist movements for greater autonomy

-Sustainability politics also emerged during this time, but the neolib K ignores those and lumps them all together

-Ignores positive action that doesn't conform to a romantic view of rebellion (i.e. the plan)

BARNETT '5

(CliveFaculty of the Social Sciences @ Open University (UK) "The Consolations of 'Neoliberalism'" *Geoforum* 36 (1) p. Science Direct)

3. There is no such thing as neoliberalism! The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives 'take' in everyday situations. So perhaps **the best thing to do is to stop thinking of "neoliberalism" as a coherent "hegemonic" project** altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of "neoliberalism" and "neoliberalization" in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors "out there", who are **always framed as engaging in resistance** or contestation. The conceptualization of "neoliberalism" as a "hegemonic" project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of "neoliberalism" altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about "neoliberalism" manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about "neoliberalism" pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a "hegemonic" project of "neoliberalization", and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, referring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, women's health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b J. Clark, Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neo-liberalism, Journal of Social Policy 33 (2004), pp. 27–48.Clarke, 2004b). None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular "hegemonic" project of "neoliberalization".

They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as "hegemonic neoliberalism" is a muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of privatization, market liberalization, and de-regulation have often followed an **ironic pattern** in so far as they have **been triggered by citizens' movements arguing from the left** of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of

this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to "hegemonic neoliberalism". And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of "democracy" (see Barnett and Low, 2004). Recent theories of "neoliberalism" have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of "neoliberalism" have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of "individualized collective-action" (Marchetti, 2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of "neoliberal hegemony": environmental politics and the politics of sustainability; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris, 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, pp. 281–284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault's ideas into the Marxist narrative of "neoliberalism" sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 11–12). And clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action that does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion, contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine, 2001). Theories of "neoliberalism" are unable to recognize the emergence of new and innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public. The radical academic discourse of "neoliberalism" frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism—understood as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable conflicts of value, interest, and faith—the discourse of "neoliberalism" reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of "neoliberalism" invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure. The recurrent problem for theories of "neoliberalism" and "neoliberalization" is their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. They can only account for the relationship between top-down initiatives and bottom-up developments by recourse to the language of centres, peripheries, diffusion, and contingent realizations; and by displacing the conceptualization of social relations with a flurry of implied subject-effects. The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of "neoliberalism". The task for social theory today remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify "the recurrent causal processes that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale" (Tilly, 2003, p. 345). Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of "getting-at" ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how "hegemonic" projects of "neoliberalism" win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucault's ideas on governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what Ivison (1997) calls the "freedom to be formed and normed". Over time, Foucault's own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.

Perm/Link Stuff

Envt Reform Cap k

Only the perm solves—proposing alternative non-capitalist economics out of nowhere is of *zero value*. Environmental reform of capitalism is key.

Barry '7

(John BARRY Reader in Politics @ Belfast '7 ["Towards a model of green political economy: from ecological modernisation to economic security" Int. J. Green Economics, Vol. 1, Nos. 3/4, 2007 p. 447-448)

Economic analysis has been one of the weakest and least developed areas of broadly green/sustainable development thinking. For example, whatever analysis there is within the green political canon is largely utopian – usually based on an argument for the complete transformation of modern society and economy as the only way to deal with ecological catastrophe, an often linked to a critique of the socioeconomic failings of capitalism that echoed a broadly radical Marxist/socialist or anarchist analysis; or underdeveloped – due, in part, to the need to outline and develop other aspects of green political theory. However, this gap within green thinking has recently been filled by a number of scholars, activists, think tanks, and environmental NGOs who have outlined various models of green political economy to underpin sustainable development political aims, principles and objectives. The aim of this article is to offer a draft of a realistic, but critical, version of green political economy to underpin the economic dimensions of radical views about sustainable development. It is written explicitly with a view to encouraging others to think through this aspect of sustainable development in a collaborative manner. Combined realism and radicalism marks this article, which starts with the point that we cannot build or seek to create a sustainable economy ab nihlo, but must begin from where we are, with the structures, institutions, modes of production, laws and regulations that we already have Of course, this does not mean simply accepting these as immutable or set in stone; after all, some of the current institutions, principles and structures underpinning the dominant economic model are the very causes of unsustainable development. We do need to recognise, however, that we must work with (and 'through' – in the terms of the original German Green Party's slogan of 'marching through the institutions') these existing structures, as well as change and reform and in some cases, abandon them as either unnecessary or positively harmful to the creation and maintenance of a sustainable economy and society. Equally, this article also recognises that an alternative economy and society must be based in the reality that most people (in the West) will not democratically vote for a completely different type of society and economy. That reality must also accept that a 'green economy' is one that is recognisable to most people and that indeed safeguards and guarantees not just their basic needs but also aspirations (within limits). The realistic character of the thinking behind this article accepts that consumption and materialistic lifestyles are here to stay (so long as they do not transgress any of the critical thresholds of the triple bottom line) and indeed there is little to be gained by proposing alternative economic systems, which start from a complete rejection of consumption and materialism. The appeal to realism is in part an attempt to correct the common misperception (and self-perception) of green politics and economics requiring an excessive degree of self-denial and a puritanical asceticism (Goodin, 1992, p.18; Allison, 1991, p.170–178). While rejecting the claim that green political theory calls for the complete disavowal of materialistic lifestyles, it is true that green politics does require the collective reassessment of such lifestyles, and does require a degree of shared sacrifice. It does not mean, however, that we necessarily require the complete and across-the-board rejection of materialistic lifestyles. There must be room and tolerance in a green economy for people to live 'ungreen lives' so long as they do not 'harm' others, threaten long-term ecological sustainability or create unjust levels of socioeconomic inequalities. Thus, realism in this context is in part another name for the acceptance of a broadly 'liberal' or 'post-liberal' (but certainly not anti-liberal) green perspective.[1]

Perm/ideology 1st Fails

Their insistence on ideology being 'first' reifies extremism and fragmentation in the academy – only the perm avoids scholarship shutdown

David **Lake 11**, political science prof at UC-San Diego, Why "isms" Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress, International Studies Quarterly (2011) 55, 465-480

My critique of our profession is a common one, but one worth repeating. Most generally, we organize ourselves into academic "sects" that engage in self-affirming research and then wage theological debates between academic religions. This occurs at both the level of theory and epistemology. In turn, we reward those who stake out extreme positions within each sect. Unfortunately, this academic sectarianism, a product of our own internal political struggles, produces less understanding rather than more. Some reasonably fear intellectual "monocultures," as McNamara (2009) has called the possible hegemony of rationalism. But the current cacophony is not a sign of productive intellectual ferment in the pursuit of meaningful knowledge." Rather, we have produced a clash of competing theologies each claiming its own explanatory "miracles" and asserting its universal truth and virtue. Instead, a large measure of intellectual humility Is in order. Theoretically, we are far from the holy grail of a universal theory of international politics—if indeed such a grail even exists. We should focus instead on developing contingent, mid-level theories of specific phenomena. This analytical eclecticism is likely to be more productive (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). But we aLso need a lexicon for translating otherwise incommensurable theories and making them mutually intelligible. In the following section, I outline the problems with theoretical sects and affirm the case for analytic eclecticism. I then end with one possible "Rosetta stone" that aims to facilitate conversation across research traditions by suggesting that all theories of international studies can be disaggregated into the basic and common concepts of interests, interactions, and institutions. Epistemologically, there is perhaps an even deeper divide that is, unfortunately, not so easily bridged. The nomothetic vs narrative divide cuts through all of the social sciences and possibly beyond. This divide endures because scholars—either innately or through socialization—find one form of explanation more intellectually satisfying than the other. Yet, in international studies, we have reified this divide and, as with our theories, have formed mutually exclusive churches. Rather than claiming one or the other epistemology Is always and everywhere superior, we should recognize that both are valid and perhaps even complementary paths to understanding. The question is not which approach is inherently superior, but which yields greater insights under what circumstances. The second major section below takes up epistemology and its consequences for professional practice and knowledge.

AT: Vampiristic Consumption

Not vampiristic consumption

Braidotti 6

(Rosi, contemporary philosopher and feminist theoretician, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, 76)

I beg to differ from Spivak's assessment. The charge of **vampiristic** or consumerist **consumption** of others is an ill-informed way of approaching the issue, in that it ignores the rigorous anti-humanistic, cartographic and materialistic roots of poststructuralism. It specifically rests on a misreading of what is involved in the poststructuralist critique of representation and on what is at stake in the task of redefining alternative subject positions. Spivak attempts to rescue Derrida, whom she credits with far more self-reflexivity and political integrity than she is prepared to grant to Foucault and Deleuze. The grounds for this preferential treatment are highly debatable. Nomadic thinking challenges the semiotic approach that is crucial to the 'linguistic turn' and also to deconstruction. Both Deleuze and Foucault engage in a critical dialogue with it and work towards an alternative model of political and ethical practice. It seems paradoxical that thinkers who are committed to an analytics of contemporary subject-positions get accused of actually having caused the events which they account for; as if they were single-handedly responsible for, or even profiting from, the accounts they offer as cartographies. **Naming the networks of power-relations** in late postmodernity, however, **is not as simple as metaphorizing and therefore consuming them**. In my view **there is no vampiristic approach towards 'otherness'** on the part of the poststructuralists. Moreover, I find that approach compatible with the emerging subjectivities of the former 'others' of Western reason. Late postmodernity has seen the proliferation of many and potentially contradictory discourses and practices of difference, which have dislocated the classical axis of distinction between Self or Same/Other or Different. The point of coalition between different critical voices and the poststructuralists is the process of elaborating the spaces in-between self and other, which means the **practice of the Relation**. They stress the need to elaborate forms of **social and political implementation** of non-pejorative and nondualistic notions of 'others'.

Disease

AT: Apoc Disease

Presenting the impact as the worst-case scenario is best to motivate action—these messages are unique because new antibiotics aren't being developed

-Past warnings were during a time when new antibiotics were coming out

Tom **FOWLER ET AL. 14**, Public Health, Epidemiology and Biostatistics @ University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, Sally C. Davies, Chief Medical Officer for England, and David Walker, Deputy Chief Medical Officer for England ["The risk/benefit of predicting a post-antibiotic era: Is the alarm working?" *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 1323, p. 1-10 (September 2014)]

Is the alarm working? It can therefore be argued that the main potential criticism of predicting a post-antibiotic era can be answered thus: 1. there is a need for such predictions to help inform the response to the issue, particularly if we are going to require societal as well as healthcare responses; 2. there is a need for such predictions to provide an appropriate evidence base for the need for resources to address the issue; 3. it is reasonable to make such predictions **as a worst-case scenario** if action is not taken. This still leaves the question of whether this is the most effective way to lever action. Given that Mary Barber was warning as early as 1958 of the growth of antimicrobial resistance, particularly in staphylococci, and introduced a hospital-wide antibiotics reduction policy in Hammersmith Hospital (London),[31] why are we in the current situation? It must be remembered that when these historical warnings were made (arguably correct as they were) it was against a backdrop of discovery of new antibiotics. Many believed that the introduction of methicillin in 1960 marked the end of penicillin-resistant staphylococci. Ernst Chain (who shared the Noble Prize in Physiology or Medicine for penicillin with Alexander Flemming and Howard Florey) is reported to have said "no more resistance problems, methicillin is the answer."[6] It is therefore **unsurprising** that these warnings did not elicit political action. At the turn of the millennium, there was a flurry of activity around antimicrobial resistance,[4, 32-34] including a World Health Organization Resolution, which led to the UK Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy and Action Plan.[35] Even this was at a time where new classes of antibiotics had been discovered in the recent past. Perhaps reflecting this in the first UK action plan, research on new antibiotics was the 16th and last objective, though more detail was then given later in the document. This compares to the recent UK Five-Year Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy 2013–2018,[36] where one of the three strategic aims is to simulate the development of new antibiotics, diagnostics, and novel therapies. This suggests that previous warnings around the potential for a post-antibiotic era have been ineffective. Yet, if we look at **recent activity** we see a **change in** the high-level policy focus on the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). The recent Chief Medical Officer for England's Annual Report,[2] the CDC report,[13] the World Economic Forum's Global Risks 2013 report,[7] and the Chennai Declaration[37] in India are all examples of this. In a keynote address at the conference "Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: Time for Action" held in Copenhagen, Denmark on March 14, 2012, Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization stated, "If current trends continue unabated, the future is easy to predict. Some experts say we are moving back to the pre-antibiotic era. No. This will be a post-antibiotic era. In terms of new replacement antibiotics, the pipeline is virtually dry, especially for Gram-negative bacteria. The cupboard is nearly bare. A post-antibiotic era means, in effect, an end to modern medicine as we know it. Things as common as strep throat or a child's scratched knee could once again kill."[38] Importantly, **these calls to action are being responded to**. In the United Kingdom, through the UK government scheme Biomedical Catayst UK,[39] two small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), Cantab Anti-infectives and Discuva, are pioneering ways to tackle drug resistance in Gram-negative bacteria. The National Institute for Health Research in the United Kingdom has recently announced a research funding call in this area. In Europe, the Innovative Medicines Initiative, a program specifically aimed at promoting public and private partnerships between academia and SMEs, has had a specific topic call around the discovery and development of new drugs that combat Gram-negative infections. This call has the specific aim to create a European Drug Discovery Centre of Excellence for antibiotic resistance.[40] The Joint Programming Initiative on Antimicrobial Resistance consists of 18 EU member states that have joined forces to address the issue of fragmented research in this area.[41] Their strategic research agenda is currently being consulted, but the first area topic in the consultation document is the development of novel antibiotics and novel alternatives to antibiotics. In the United States, there is active lobbying to

seek legislation based on the concept of a new regulatory approval pathway for limited population antibacterial drugs, which would encourage the development of antibiotics that address the greatest unmet needs of patients by making the approval pathway more feasible.[42] The U.S. BARDA,[43] within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, develops and procures medical countermeasures against a broad array of public health threats (natural and intentional in origin), including vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, and nonpharmaceutical countermeasures. BARDA has recently funded a collaboration with GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) to develop several antibiotics, taking a novel approach that allows for funding to move around GSK's antibacterial portfolio and for medicines to be studied for the potential treatment of both conventional and biothreat pathogens, that is, to develop a response to the potential threats from both antimicrobial resistance and bioterrorism.[44] While it remains to be seen if these initiatives do address the issue of market failure, (which will be the true test of whether the alarm is working), it can certainly be said that ==the alarm has led to unprecedented action==.

Baudrillard

AT: Baudrillard/Info Overload

Politics is possible---debate solves info overload

Bleiker 2

(Roland, professor of international relations at the University of Queensland, Politics After Seattle: Dilemmas of the Anti-Globalisation Movement, conflits.revues.org/1057)

Any protest action that draws sufficient media attention has the potential to engender a political process that transcends its immediate spatial environment. It competes for the attention of global television audiences and thus interferes with the struggle over values that ultimately shapes the world we live in. "A world united by Benetton slogans, Nike sweatshops and McDonald's jobs might not be anyone's utopian global village," says Naomi Klein, "but its fibre-optic cables and shared cultural references are nonetheless laying the foundations for the first truly international people's movement.31 But the recent wave of global protests is hardly the first international movement of its kind. Nor is it as unproblematic as Klein suggests. For some the revolution of speed is too random to allow for critical interference and, indeed, for human agency. Jean Baudrillard, for instance, believes that the distinctions between reality and virtuality, political practice and simulation are blurred to the extent that they are no longer recognisable.32 Our media culture, he says, has annihilated reality in stages, such that in the end its simulating image « bears no relation to any reality whatever : it is its own pure simulacrum. » Television, the unproblematic transmission of the hyperreal, has conditioned our mind such that we have lost the ability to penetrate beneath the manifest levels of surface.33¶ ¶ 24 **Patterns of global protest do not confirm the pessimistic views that Baudrillard and others espouse. The blurring of reality and virtuality has not annihilated dissent**. The fact that televised images are hyperreal does not necessarily diminish their influence. Independently of how instantaneous, distorted and simulated images of a protest action may be, they still influence our perceptions of issues, and thus also our political responses to them. To accept the logic of speed, then, is not to render political influence obsolete, but to acknowledge multiple and overlapping spatial and temporal spheres within which **political practices are constantly being shaped and reshaped.**

2ac ballot

The plan's method a <u>particular</u> response is a useful template for solving transnational problems, without prescribing a formula for all action – outweighs co-option risks

Daniel **Bray**, The University of Melbourne International Politics and Political Theory Lecturer, Ph.D., 20**09**, Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism: A Deweyan Approach to Democracy beyond the Nation-State, Millennium, 37.3

<u>In keeping with pragmatist tenets, my approach to the problem</u> of practical institutionalisation <u>is a **context-sensitive** one that does not impose an a priori 'direct</u>' or 'representative' <u>template for the political institutionalisation of democracy</u>, <u>which may require more or less degrees of mediation</u> and delegation depending <u>on the particular problematic situation</u>. As Saward points out, <u>different</u> democratic <u>mechanisms may be called for depending on whether they require permanent</u> structures <u>or temporary measures</u> and on <u>whether they are undertaken by governments or by non-governmental actors</u>.103 Thus, <u>one may have a normative preference for minimising</u> the degree of mediation and delegation in <u>any democratic regime</u>, <u>but</u> these <u>features</u> of democratic practice <u>should not be viewed as inherent bads</u>. Indeed, <u>given the scale and complexity of modern politics, transnational democratic publics are likely to require significant levels of mediation</u> and delegation <u>if they are to be effective actors in global politics</u>. <u>The key response</u> of pragmatic cosmopolitanism here <u>is to see</u> transnational <u>publics as institutions of critical inquiry that are formed when</u> associated <u>individuals work collectively to address problems presented by transnational consequences</u>. As Molly Cochran points out, in Deweyan terms these publics exist on a continuum from 'weak' publics that are understood to involve associated activity that is only informally organised (like a neighbourhood group) or narrowly focused on a single issue (like the control and prevention of AIDS104), to stronger publics that have political agencies invested with public authority that are capable of issuing binding decisions for a societal group (an international regime, say, or a more densely articulated public we commonly regard as a political 'state').105 <u>Today, in the absence of adequately responsive global institutions, most transnational associations take contestation</u> rather than popular control as <u>their fundamental political purpose</u>.106 <u>When they seek to provide alternative sites for deliberation where dominators are not present they form</u> what Nancy Fraser calls '<u>subaltern counterpublics</u>' that attempt to indirectly influence formal organisations by mobilising broader public opinion.107 <u>These oppositional networks and movements can only be conceived</u> as transnational public institutions, however, <u>when their efforts are directed at shifting authority away from states</u> and their agents <u>by making their own concerns authoritative in the decisionmaking that takes place where</u> international <u>public authority exists in global politics</u> – international law, regimes, the United Nations and in the broader bilateral and multilateral relations between states.108 <u>In the view of pragmatic cosmopolitanism, this process constitutes the core dynamic of democratic reconstruction in international institutions</u>. It is this perspective that highlights the key difference between the pragmatist and deliberative approaches to the institutionalisation of transnational democracy. <u>Instead of seeing publics as constituted by responsible citizens who reason</u> publicly on the basis of a distinctive form of communication, <u>pragmatists see responsible action as emerging from publics constituted by persons who recognise a need for social cooperation in resolving common problematic situations</u>. In the pragmatist view, publics are developing 'the traits of a state' when they develop strong organisational and decision-making capabilities and seek to make their concerns authoritative in global politics. <u>Pragmatism therefore does not hold to the strict state–civil society separation</u> that fundamentally shapes the deliberative approach. Beyond nation-states with sharply defined constitutional structures, the <u>desire to maintain a strict separation between **opinion-formation in the public sphere** and will-formation in formal representative institutions seems to neglect the requirement for some kind of **connective tissue between them**</u>, or at least <u>assumes that the translation of opinions into decision-making will occur through an underlying</u> discursive <u>shift that changes the context in which formal decisions are reached</u>. Deliberative <u>democrats</u> thus <u>privilege informal procedures of truth-seeking</u> (that are never power-free or completely non-

strategic) over political voice in formal institutions. Dryzek is obviously concerned about the co-option of oppositional civil society – which is certainly an ever-present threat and one to be taken seriously – but in many global and transnational contexts this threat tends to be overstated and fails to acknowledge the strategic character of 'publics' themselves. As Cochran points out, despite the blurring of the state–society divide, co-option is unlikely to be ever fixed or complete.109 Additionally, not all weak publics seek permanent or even minimal levels of inclusion in existing formal institutions, preferring to focus on contestation or developing alternative forums. Ultimately, pragmatic cosmopolitanism argues that in many contexts of contemporary global politics the need to realise change through **access to formal decision-making outweighs the risk of co-option**. One such context I discussed earlier centres on the contemporary climate change negotiations, where a wide variety of nongovernmental actors attempt to influence states in formal institutions by 'channelling up' the concerns of excluded publics, while at the same time monitoring the negotiations and 'channelling down' information to broader transnational and domestic constituencies.110

at: info saturation

Fawver, 8

[Kurt, Master of Arts Engilsh – Cleveland State University, " DESTRUCTION IN SEARCH OF HOPE: BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATION, AND CHUCK PALAHNIUK'S CHOKE," August 2008, http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Fawver%20Kurt%20D.pdf?csu1219269969]

If Palahniuk's Choke was merely an excellent resource for understanding Baudrillardian theory, it would still be a valuable text. As it stands, however, Choke expands on the ideas of simulation and mediation and struggles to free itself from the snares of Baudrillard's ultimate unreality. Through a regime of breakdown and disorder, the text fights to emerge from "the end or disappearance of… the real, the social, history, and other key features of modernity" (Best 133). It attempts to create a meaningful correspondence between signifiers and signifieds, between images and meanings. **While Baudrillard posits that "everything can and has been done, and all we can do is to assemble the… pieces of our culture and proceed to its extremitie**s," **Choke resists such reasoning and,** in fact, runs **through stages of assembly and extremism to demonstrate how utterly futile and pointless they are** (Best 137). Choke seeks to blow apart those very reproductions that Baudrillard claims cause the implosion of meaning. Essentially, **the text advocates a clean sweep of communication, a discarding of all mediated reality**. In Choke, as in many other Palahniuk novels, **the flow of true meaning can only return to society and individuals once all mediated, simulated, reproduced "meanings" are razed.** Thus, the text does glorify destruction, but it is destruction in search of hope, destruction that will, presumably, lead to creation. Victor's eventual identity collapse, and his subsequent rebuilding, is paradigmatic of Choke's anti-Baudrillardian philosophy. Victor begins by compiling the persona of a dysfunctional, perpetually orphaned child-cum-adult from mediated symbols of "dysfunction." His sex addiction and his compulsion to simulate choking in restaurants are symptoms of this poor attempt at constructing a workable identity. When the "traumatized child-now-in-adulthood" simulation fails, Victor turns to new mediated identities: Christ and Antichrist. These personas also lack any depth or connection to Victor's core being and are, subsequently, discarded. As the text progresses, Victor drops all attempts at creating his identity from the palette of society's mass-produced conceptions. He pleads for someone to "just show me one thing in this world that is what you'd think" (Choke 205). But, as no inherent realness exists in contemporary society, no one can show Victor a thing or an individual with inherent meaning. Therefore, his only option is to extricate himself from the culture of simulation by cutting himself off from his own history and other individuals' mediated perceptions of his past. In a moment of clarity, Victor realizes **that he must reduce his identity to its simplest, most immediate terms because "There's no way you can get the past right**. You can pretend. You can delude yourself, but you can't re-create what's over" (Choke 273). Thus, by the end of the novel, Victor is more a blank page than a fully fleshed character. Rather than continuing to allow his identity to be an ever-evolving reactive simulation that forms in reference to external mediation, he becomes a clean slate on which he can write his own self-generated identity. He slakes off most of the factors that traditionally 26 inform self; familial expectation, personal history, and even conventional emotion are all missing from his identity at the text's close. As Victor explains, "For the first time in longer than I can remember, I feel peaceful. Not happy. Not sad. Not anxious. Not horny. Just all the higher parts of my brain closing up shop…. I'm simplifying myself" (Choke 282). The implication is that, in order to escape simulation, Victor must revert to a more primitive state. **His thoughts are of an essentially basic order; he no longer seeks out "deeper" meanings or alternate referential**s. Instead, **events, feelings, people, and things simply are what they appear to be, without connection to external mediation**. For Victor, **the universe of multiple signified meanings for any given signifier is no longer relevant**. **He has destroyed his perception** of alternate reference **and**, therefore, has **limited his field of meaning to exclusively intrinsic values**. Such perception comes at a price, however. Victor has to sacrifice a world of possibility, of variable signification, for concrete meaning. He can no longer ponder whether an image means one thing or another; rather, an image will, to Victor, always be fixed to one referent. In a sense, then, he has given up the parts of his "higher brain," namely a rigorous intellect and boundless creativity, in order to gain a foothold into solid reality and flee Baudrillard's infinite simulatory spiral. Whereas Baudrillard "critiques… representational thought which is confident that it is describing reality as it is," Victor embraces such thoughts with open arms (Best 140). Victor is intelligent enough to understand that **choosing a path of selfimposed communicative primitivism is the only measure of prevention against accruing a new body of simulacra. The polar opposite** of Victor **is Tracy**, the woman to whom he loses his virginity. She is **the prime example of an individual forever lost in Baudrillardian pos**t27 **structuralism,** representing everything that Victor, or any person, may become when nihilistic acceptance of simulation has infiltrated every aspect of self. Victor meets her on an airplane, in an unlocked bathroom. She takes flights, enters the restroom, leaves the door unlocked, then waits until someone walks in on her and attempts to engage them in a sexual encounter. When Victor questions her aberrant behavior, she replies that "the answer is there is no answer… when you think about it, there's no good reason to do anything. There is no point… people… don't want an orgasm as much as they just want to forget. Everything." (Choke 256-7). Clearly, life in the Baudrillardian void has taken its toll on this woman. Tracy ponders "Why do I do anything? …I'm educated enough to talk myself out of any plan. To deconstruct any fantasy. Explain away any goal. I'm so smart I can negate any dream." (Choke 257). She is the essence of Baudrillard's postconstructionist theory; in her, the text introduces an embodiment of hyper-intellectualism that has cut away all the joy, fulfillment, and meaning from life and reality and, subsequently, sees only a vacuum underlying all existence. Her nihilism leads into a quest for extrication from the ultimate emptiness and, thus, works as the catalyst for her sexual addiction. **She wants to find meaning and absolute reality but will always be forced, due to her intelligence and her deconstructive ability, to undermine the very goal she is trying to achieve**. For Tracy, **meaning is impossible not because it has objectively disappeared, but because she cannot accept simple truths or non-multiplicitous signifiers**. She thrives on the complexity of reality and, therefore, will never be satisfied by a simplistic interpretation, even if the simplistic interpretation is that for which she yearns. Through Tracy's unsatisfied, perpetually-wandering nature, the text puts forth the implication that 28 **maintaining such an unflinching post-constructionist mindset has no future other than disappointment, dysfunction, and existential despair**. Indeed, Choke implicitly attacks Baudrillard's

blasé acceptance of simulation and attempts to show the ramifications of such acceptance. Hence, **while the critical perspective from which Baudrillard's theory stems is akin to a scalpel, cutting deeper and deeper into the body of reality to reveal unending layers of nothingness, Choke advocates a return to a bandaged surface**; **it strives toward the revitalization of easily accessible signifieds,** and, thus, shuns Tracy's (see also Baudrillard's) system of thought that only seeks to forever prove the disappearance of meaning. Therefore, **the text is ultimately moving beyond Baudrillard by "emphasizing creation over destruction" and promoting the deemphasization of post-constructionist critical inquiry as a means of understanding reality** (Kavadlo 12). To further illustrate the resurrection of meaningful signifiers and images, the text introduces Denny, Victor's best friend. Denny is a recovering sex addict who, throughout the text, earnestly seeks rehabilitation. **As sex addictions in Choke seem to be symptomatic of a fatalistic surrender to the simulatory world, Denny is the one character who consistently seeks out a means of resistance**. Strangely enough, **this resistance takes the form of thousands of rocks**. As the novel progresses, Denny builds an enormous rock collection and, with those rocks, embarks on the construction of a mystery structure in an empty field. He enlists Victor's help and, when a local reporter comes to interview Victor and Denny about the construction project, Victor's responses are veiled in a haze of ignorance. Victor recalls the dialogue between himself and the reporter, saying that she asked: "'This structure you're building, is it a house?' And I say we don't know. 29 'Is it a church of some kind?' We don't know. …'What are you building, then?' We won't know until the very last rock is set. 'But when will that be?' We don't know." (Choke 263-4). Victor's reticence with the reporter is not due to any particular stigma or grudge against the media. Rather, his unforthcoming answers are a result of a new (or perhaps ancient) mode of perception and, thus, communication. Instead of focusing on the possibilities of the stone structure or its eventual outcome, Denny instructs Victor to focus on the process of building, alone. He says that "the longer we can keep building, the longer we can keep creating, the more will be possible. The longer we can tolerate being incomplete," the better (Choke 264). Initially, this statement appears to echo Baudrillard's sentiments, with a perpetual process of building that leads nowhere and creation that actually creates nothing. Yet, precisely the opposite is true. **By compelling the rock structure to remain a work-in-progress without a definitive end, Denny has squashed any simulatory nature the building may possess. He and Victor are not putting stones atop one another to create any of the long-mediated structures of society. The stone building is not a house or a church or any other structure of convention and, therefore, is not founded upon any previous referent.** Denny's rock building is not trying to simulate any other structure; **it is simply allowed to rise and become whatever it eventually becomes. With the stone structure, Denny is attempting to introduce a product that holds inherent, unmediated meaning**. **As soon as Denny or Victor would conclude that the building is a house or a church, then it would, necessarily, begin to take on aspects of those structures. It would begin to simulate a house or a church. But, by allowing the structure to grow almost organically, Denny has set the 30 groundwork for a signifier that may finally be connected with an inherent meaning, with a concrete undeniable reality**. The price for cultivating an unmediated, unsimulatory reality is high, however. Both Denny and Victor must discard the realm of speculation and conjecture. In order to maintain a sense of the real, all possibility outside a thing's readily apparent meaning must vanish. Denny and Victor do not know what the stone building will be because they don't want to know until it is finished. They choose a path of ignorance so that realness may reassert itself within the structure without being crushed by external mediated "reality." Basically, **Denny and Victor must become simple, single-minded individuals who have no need for multiplicitous signs and no desire for a constant outgrowth of discourse. Theirs is a reality that requires no mediation, no simulation, and, hence, no emptiness**. Such a lifestyle choice flies in the face of our contemporary world, where formulating variable meanings for signifiers and expanding the possible field of referentials for images is second-nature. **The very fiber of critical theory**, or of practically any academic discipline**, hinges on increased speculation, on infinitely sprawling discourses,** and on the complication of texts, signifiers, and reality itself. **Choke's solution for escaping Baudrillard's simulation is to escape that same incisively critical manner of thinking.** In doing so, Denny and Victor become primitive postpostmodern men. The duo simultaneously evolve and devolve communication; they usher reality back into a signifier but cause the collapse of complexity. Indeed, "many of the seemingly random transgressive acts perpetrated by the characters in Palahniuk's fiction," such as Denny and Victor's intentional ignorance, "fall within an understanding of entropy as a force for renewal and meaning" (Sartain 32). Thus, while Denny may 31 have set society on a course for a neo-stone age, his rock structure may actually be something that simply "is what it is." Victor's mother, Ida, is an individual who also manages to cut ties with simulation, but in a much different, and arguably more destructive, manner. Her perspective on reality, like the neo-primitivism of Victor and Denny, strives to attain communion with a long-lost realness. However, Ida takes a much more direct and assertive approach. She uses drugs to "simplify" her state of mind. As Ida explains, "Trichloroethane… All my extensive testing has shown this to be the best treatment for a dangerous excess of human knowledge" (Choke 148). She is attempting to clear away the debris of contemporary society's all-consuming media (and with it mediation and simulation) by chemically altering her consciousness, thus allowing her to ignore its multiplicity of disembodied voices and images that would, otherwise, crush her unmediated, individual perception of reality. Ida claims that she can see things as they truly are when she is on drugs. She says that the trichloroethane makes the world appear "without the framework of language. Without the cage of associations… without looking through the lens of everything she knew was true…" (Choke 149). Through her druginduced highs, Ida is stripping away mediation and, therefore, making simulation impossible. Without a vast body of mediated meanings to draw upon, Ida is forced to view the world as it actually is, in its simplest terms. She has rid herself of simulation and allowed realness to seep back into images. However, the reality is fleeting and dissipates back into the cacophony of Baudrillard's simulatory universe as soon as Ida is clean once more. Even worse, the constant drug use takes its toll on Ida; over the course of the text, she ends up with a perpetual bloody nose and, ultimately, is reduced to a 32 feeble, emaciated skeleton. Idea proves that, while escaping Baudrillard's simulation may be possible in a number of ways, the return to reality can come at an indescribably steep price. Ida is also critical to understanding Choke's postulation on the manner in which society may be galvanized into forsaking simulation. It is "Ida's ideology of adventure, her belief in the restorative power of chaos [that] serves to unbalance comfortable homogeneity. She… seeks to create meaning and potential for change through random chaotic acts" (Sartain 33). Ida vandalizes merchandise in stores, kidnaps children, and causes public disturbances all in the service of disrupting complacent adherence to mediated reality. She knows that "a fire alarm is never about a fire, anymore" and tries to disseminate this knowledge across society, albeit obliquely and illegally (Choke 161). **Ida challenges simulation by creating real panic and real**

excitement. **Her acts of destruction are aimed squarely at bringing a sense of reality back into a populace that, normally, experiences events and emotions in a heavily mediated environment**. Ida causes people to feel true fear, to experience events that are precisely what they appear to be: actual, unsimulated danger. However, there is no proof that Ida's regime of philosophy-based crime alters the perception or behavior of anyone but Victor over the long term. **For a brief moment, the victims of Ida's crimes may experience a true, unmediated, unsimulated event, but as soon as the danger has been resolved, the contemporary culture of mass media creeps back in and continues to suffocate with its hollow signifiers**. Therefore, **Ida's attempts to empower society may be entirely pointless**. **While her personal freedom from Baudrillard's simulatory world is assured, she cannot force others to choose the same path of informed, intelligible ignorance**. 33 Indeed, Ida's failure to enact social change exhibits the textual implication that **release from simulation must begin in the most intensely personal and introspective realms and radiate outward**. Perhaps meaning can be reconnected with images, but, as Choke demonstrates, **such reconnection must be instituted at the individual level long before it can solidify into an absolute reality upon which everyone agrees**. If Choke's resolution to the Baudrillardian dilemma seems somewhat perfunctory or abrupt, it would be in keeping with the theoretical concerns of the text. **In a simulatory reality, where all information is produced and mediated to individuals at a hyperkinetic speed, it would be logical for a solution or paradigmatic rebellion to arise just as quickly, given that this solution would still, necessarily, have a point of emergence within a system that is unable to slow the production of information, images, and signifiers**. Thus, the text's resolution – an idea that works as a competing perception of reality – appears as quickly and as suddenly as any other random image or information structure; the system of mindless, endless generation has unwittingly generated its own demise. That Choke ends without much exploration of its resolution to simulatory reality is also reasonable, given that such an open-ended future is antithetical to the very principle of Baudrillardian nihilism. **The text fights despair and a defeated acceptance of missing reality with unabashed romanticism.** With the novel ending shortly after the characters have lain in place their newfound adherence to knowing ignorance, the future is uncertain. Anything could happen to reality following the close of the text; **a reunion of images and meaning is as possible as the continuation of hollow simulation**. Victor and Denny's plan for identity-formation and reality-perception may lead to the eventual destruction of all simulacra or it may be entirely useless. The reader is left in a state of 34 unknowing, of hope for meaning-filled future. **Such a conclusion is impossible in a Baudrillardian scheme of reality. Under Baudrillard's critical eye, the world has reached a point where struggle against the forces of simulation is impossible. In Baudrillardian theory, there is no hope for the retrieval of meaning; rather, the process of simulacra will continue**, unabated. In answer to this bleak nihilistic view, Choke presents an open space, an ending that is more the beginning of a competing discourse than a summation of all that has come before it. **There is no definite success at the end of the text, nor is there assured defeat. The text's concluding indeterminacy, its allowance for hope, separates it from Baudrillard's nihilism and reinforces the supposition that escape from simulation is, in fact, possible**.

AT: plan = fear

Attributing causality to self-loathing is the worst 19th century biologism

Michael **Ure 12** – date inferred, political and social theory prof at Monash University, Resentment/Ressentiment, http://www.academia.edu/2434176/Resentment_Ressentiment

On the other hand, Nietzsche conceives **ressentiment** as symptomatic of **evolutionary degeneration, a widespread physiological disease**. For the sake of the species' health, he argues, we should eliminate the physiological disorders that underpin and explain the emergence of ressentiment If ressentiment is not eliminated, he claims, the species will continue its evolutionary degeneration. From our vantage-point Smith's Enlightenment faith in the ultimate compatibility between humanity's natural constitution and its moral and political progress may seem to carry too many traces of a now discredited faith in nature's purposiveness or teleology.24 Nietzsche famously identified himself as the first European thinker to properly de-deify nature, eliminating from his account of nature all teleological assumptions or explanations as metaphysical hangovers. He aimed to conceive humanity in strictly naturalistic terms. However, his alternative **naturalism is bound to an idiosyncratic version of nineteenth century Social Darwinism**. In the past decade there has been a renaissance of scholarly interest in Nietzsche's relationship to Darwinism and other contemporary evolutionary theories.25 This research has successfully challenged Heidegger's attempt to purge Nietzsche's philosophy of its "alleged biologism".26 In the recent debate most scholars agree that Nietzsche is a naturalist of one stripe or another, and the main interest lies in identifying his particular shading of nineteenth century naturalism.27 In this context Nietzsche's concept of the will to power has been conceived as neo Darwinian or as anti-Darwinian.2* I share the latter view that **Nietzsche** explicitly **targeted Darwin with his own purely speculative, if not blatantly fanciful biology**. Against Darwin **Nietzsche held** first that **healthy biological types seek to maximize** or expand **their power even at the cost of self-preservation** and that only sick biological types seek to preserve themselves; and secondly that the weak and sick preserve themselves far more effectively than the powerful largely because they emasculate or moralise the latter and in doing so prevent them from threatening their existence. Through the morality of ressentiment the weak become parasites sapping the vitality of the strong. If Nietzsche's view is true, then Darwin's notion of nature as a struggle for existence is merely a symptom of distressed life rather than a scientific account of nature.29 The point I wish to draw attention to here is that **this anti-Darwinian conception of nature only reinforced Nietzsche's idiosyncratic and extreme version of the social** Darwinist political view **we should exploit the weak, sick and dying so that higher types have the opportunity to** squander themselves or eliminate the weak if they threaten to impinge on these higher types' capacity for maximal self-expression. Arguably, Nietzsche's physiological theories and explanations do not de-deify nature, but demonise it with the "born misfit[s]", "cellar-rats" and "maggot' men of ressentiment. These two philosophical traditions confront us with the problem of how to distinguish between resentment and ressentiment Are they different shadings and evaluations of the same basic "unsocial passion" or are they concepts deriving from incommensurable conceptual orders? The primary aim of this paper is to clarify the nature of a now widely deployed distinction between resentment and ressentiment Since most defenders of resentment find Nietzsche's physiologically-based aristocratic radicalism disturbing and/or untenable they usually attempt to short-circuit any possible association between resentment and its Nietzschean incarnation, ressentiment? Often with the aid of moral sentiment theory they applaud resentment as a 'moral' emotion and condemn ressentiment as morally pernicious. By the same token, however, even its defenders concede that the 'virtue' of resentment may have the potential to become a pathological vice that undermines justice. The shadow of Nietzschean ressentiment still hovers over moral defences of resentment. "Resentment" as Margaret Walker acknowledges "embodies a sense of iault that can be difficult to dislodge, and one gripped by resentment may be far too disposed to find fault in others than to question whether his or her own resentment might be misplaced".31 Its defenders often reach for 'diabolical' metaphors to express resentment's tendency to exceed the agent's volition and remain impervious to apologies and other symbolic reparations.33 Once in resentment's grip we are sorely tempted to groundlessly blame others for our suffering and unjustly make them the objects of resentment. Resentment also carries the danger that agents see themselves as victims and identify the good with powerlessness, weakness and incapacity. The resentful are in danger of entrapping themselves in a victim-identity and enviously spoiling all forms of good fortune and human flourishing.34 If we can no longer rest content with Smith's natural theology to justify our confidence that ultimately resentment is a gift of providence that naturally tends towards justice and moral order, we need to carefully examine the social and psychological basis of these socalled 'pathological' expressions of resentment. How can we explain, for example, the compelling desire to unjustly and irrationally blame others for one's suffering? Why does such ressentiment continue to haunt resentment? **We require an account of reactive emotions that does not** hinge on Smith's natural theological faith in the moral sentiments or **fall into** Nietzsche's idiosyncratic and insupportable theory of **evolutionary degeneration**. **We do not want** our defence of resentment to rest on a hidden or implicit teleological assumptions or **our rejection of ressentiment to be based on insupportable physiological theories of moral judgement and action**. This paper addresses these issues by examining Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment It suggests that **under the rubric of ressentiment Nietzsche identifies** two distinct phenomena: **a physiological disease that finds alleviation through the mechanism of blaming others** and a form of

radical envy or envious hatred that deploys moral concepts and judgments in order to spoil others' good fortune and happiness.[35] Nietzsche's physiology of **ressentiment rests on untenable speculations and assumptions** he draws **from** his interpretation of contemporary theories of **evolution**. For the purposes of this essay Nietzsche's second concept of envious hatred is more promising for understanding of how resentment can become politically toxic.

AT: Speed K

Reject their theory of acceleration – we should pursue politics <u>in spite of speed</u> affirming the power of the citizen to reclaim the political

McIvor,**'11**

(David, Kettering Foundation, "The Politics of Speed: Connolly, Wolin, and the Prospects for Democratic Citizenship in an Accelerated Polity," Polity Vol. 43 No. 1)

In order to develop these habits, Wolin wants to direct attention away from the state and towards localities with their particularities, peculiarities, and irregularities. <u>On Wolin's reading, national politics is little more than a spectacle, and the citizen's role within **that spectacle is often only as "a rooter limited to choosing sides."88**</u> Localities, <u>on the other hand, remain venues that promise robust participation.</u> As individuals slowly develop the habits related to participation— interpreting and coming to know one's environment and its other inhabitants, its multiple histories and overlapping concerns—their very being changes. "<u>Politicalness" marks our capacity "to develop . . . into beings who know and value what it means to participate in and be responsible for the care and improvement of our common and collective life."89 By nurturing this politicalness we begin to feel a tug of loyalty towards a common reality that had</u> not heretofore existed. Wolin, in describing the early stages of the Free Speech Movement, referred to this experience as the "revival of a sense of shared destiny, of some common fate which can bind us into a people we have never been."90 Of course, these assemblages are subject to the same "thousand natural shocks" to which all flesh is heir. <u>Publics rise and fall; democratic moments remain momentary. Yet those who are honed by these experiences and who are dedicated to their recovery become what Wolin calls a "multiple civic self . . . **one who is required to act the citizen in diverse settings: national, state, city or town, neighborhood, and voluntary association."**</u>91 This is "perhaps the most complex conception of citizenship ever devised" yet "we have no coherent conception of it."91 The multiple civic self is not modeled along republican or representative lines, which reduce participation to occasional ratification or refusal, and which filter popular power through elite-managed institutions. Nor, however, is it based on the radical democratic conception of citizenship as direct sharing in power. <u>The complexities of what Wolin calls "the megastate" and the sheer size of the United States exceed what an Athens-styled radical democracy could manage. The multiple civic self is one capable of participating not simply in his/her locality but "intellectually and passionately in the controversies surrounding the megastate" in order to **"reclaim" public space and insist upon "widened debate."**</u>92 Wolin is not (only) a localist. Rather, <u>he thinks that the **skills** and habits best acquired by consistent participation in our particular localities lay the groundwork for a form of citizenship attuned to the plural layers of political action and struggle in late-modern America</u>. Moreover, the multiple civic self promotes the dispersal of power between local, state, and national bodies.93 Such diffusion re-establishes a separation of powers that forces slow-time negotiations upon the impatient megastate.94 <u>The slowly developed habits of participation make possible a more robust form of democratic citizenship and, perhaps, fugitive democratic moments</u>. These moments, in turn, can help to slow the world down. <u>Political theorists and social actors inspired by Wolin's example and worried about the inegalitarian consequences of social acceleration</u> should look to start from his (so far underdeveloped) idea of the multiple civic self. <u>Instead of refurbishing federal institutions or romanticizing the consequences of speed, we ought to attend primarily to what Wolin calls the "recurrent aspiration"</u> of democracy**: "to find room in which people can join freely with others to take responsibility for solving their common problems** and **thereby sharing the modest fate that is the lot of all mortals."**95 By **pursuing solutions to mutual problems through concerted action, we as citizens can hone the craft of democratic participation—broadening our notions of self and learning to honor the differences we encounter within a shared space.**96

at: politics is dead / depressing uq claim

Politics is still possible, they are just too stubborn to see it

Feit '12

(Mario, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, "Wolin, Time, and the Democratic Temperament," Theory & Event Volume 15, Issue 4, 2012)

But what if we reframed Wolin's problematic?4 Wolin asks an important question, namely, he invites us to think about the temporality of democracy and political theory. However, his question emerges in response—if not in reaction—to changing social facts, namely the faster pace of contemporary culture, economy, and perhaps even theory. Thus, Wolin proceeds from a negation, and is, as shall become clearer, delimited by this origin. Instead, I propose that the temporal orientations of democratic politics and political theory are better understood if we pursue the following questions: Why and how is democracy patient or impatient? Can and should political theory replicate democratic impatience? These questions are, I think, implicit in Wolin's essay on social acceleration. Wolin himself does not raise them, due to his focus on repudiating social acceleration and because his approach to political time does not distinguish between the world's pace—which may be expressed with the language of slowness or speed—and our temporal expectations about this world. This essay's conceptual language of patience and impatience is better suited to describing temporal expectations about the possibilities for political action. Indeed, to make patience and impatience front and center provides an opportunity to theorize democratic temporality in a positive fashion. Furthermore, this conceptual shift opens up Wolin's overall approach to democracy to considerations of democratic temporality. In fact, I argue that Wolin's conception of the demotic offers a democratic temporality that is fundamentally in tension with the one Wolin contemplates in his rejection of social acceleration. For patience emerges as an implicit temporal virtue in "What Time Is It?" and impatience as the corresponding vice, nurtured in part by social acceleration.5 I show that the demotic, on the other hand, would recommend impatience as a democratic virtue, that is, the demotic entails speeding up, not slowing down, politics. Returning to Wolin's problematic, social acceleration may in fact reshape contemporary politics in part because it is alluring to democratic citizens. Social acceleration may partially bring democracy in temporal sync with itself, even as it may complicate democratic politics in some of the ways sketched by Wolin.6 In recuperating democratic impatience, my argument disentangles the close temporal fit that Wolin posits between political theory and democracy. Patience may very well be critical for political theory—and philosophy, overall, as Wittgenstein might add. Wolin calls for such patience. That said, I show that his thinking about political temporality initially does not approach its subject matter with sufficient patience. He only develops the necessary patience as a result of interlocutors, who put critical pressure on his ideas. In other words, in part my argument illustrates that deliberative patience is still possible for political theory in the present, and that Wolin eventually displays such patience in his thinking about political temporality. Still, I also detect an impatience in parts of Wolin's argument, which is quite distinct from his rashness in his critique of social acceleration. I argue that Wolin's frustration with the Iraq war reflects a bubbling up of valuable demotic impatience. In other words, I distinguish more closely than Wolin between necessary theoretical patience, troubling theoretical impatience and beneficial demotic impatience that manifests itself within his political thinking.

Everything is awesome

Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, **2010**

(Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet **average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times**. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. **But even if you break down the world into bits**, **it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955**. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa's rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, **the outcome for the world is** remarkably, astonishingly, **dramatically positive**. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. **Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951**. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. **The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000**. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. **Despite a doubling of the world population**, even **the raw number of people living in absolute poverty** (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) **has fallen since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won't. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

Death & Suffering K's

AT: Relation to Death

they can't just wish this away modernity or how we relate to death --- multiplying the ways to relate to death makes people freak out more.

Mellor, 1992

(Phillip, Leeds Professor of Religion and Social Theory Head of School, "Death in high modernity: the contemporary presence and absence of death", The Sociological Review, May, ebsco)

The fundamentally discontinuist impulse of modernity is expressed in high modernity in the pervasiveness of 'reflexivity', the systematic and critical examination, monitoring and revision of all beliefs and practices in the light of changing circumstances (Giddens, 1990, 1991). Helmuth Schelsky created the term Dauerreflexion, meaning 'permanent reflection', to characterise the continuous examination of meaning and values which he observed in the modern consciousness (Schelsky 1965). Giddens's usage of the term 'reflexivity' is consistent with Schelsky's earlier conceptualisation of the systematically-questioning character of modernity. Dauerreflexion, or reflexivity, is chronic: it is a never-ending process of systematic and potentially radical reappraisals and reassessments of all aspects of modem life, calling everything into question, and undermining any certainty of knowledge so that it can be said that a major feature of high modernity is the pervasiveness of 'radical doubt' (Giddens, 1991:21). **Giddens argues that 'We are abroad in a world which is thoroughly constituted through reflexively applied knowledge, but where at the same time we can never be sure that any given element of that knowledge will not be revised** . (Giddens, 1990:39). Gehlen has also written of the constant scrutiny of, and reflection on, motives for action which are no longer located in transpersonal traditions, but in the isolated individual consciousness (Gehlen, 1956, 1957), signaling the same tendency towards insecurity which is at the heart of modernity. Despite Gehlen's generally pessimistic interpretation of the implications of modem reflexivity for the continuance of the social order as a whole, and for the psychological stability of the individual, a more positive interpretation is possible. A person's experience of this pervasive reflexivity, and its attendant risks, can be profoundly liberating and empowering, since there are considerable areas of opportunity available to her/him which would not have been so in the past. Lasch, for example, discusses the ways in which self-development programmes in the United States have encouraged older people to cut their ties with the past and embark upon new marriages, new careers and new hobbies (Lasch, 1991:214). Lasch offers a characteristically bleak interpretation of these activities, which he relates to the 'narcissistic' personality type (Mellor and Shilling, 1993), but it must be acknowledged that the people experiencing such changes in their lives may often find them profoundly empowering, and are often no doubt prepared to accept the so-called 'loss of community' which Lasch, and others such as Sennett (1974), envisage as the price for such empowenment of the individual. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how this reflexivity can ultimately help individuals deal with the phenomenon of death, since this is a universal parameter within which reflexivity occurs, rather than an object to which reflexivity can be convincingly applied. Although it could be argued that modem societies are culturally diverse, and exhibit a degree of flexibility which allows people to draw upon a variety of cultural resources in order to deal with death**, it could also be argued that this diversity compounds the difficulties individuals experience when death is encountered: reflexivity may be increasingly applied to death in a multitude of ways, but this multiplicity of particular approaches to death accentuates the reality-threatening potential of death in general**, i.e. as an unavoidable biological constraint upon various attempts at its cultural containment. **The more diverse are the approaches to death in modern societies, the more difficult it becomes to contain it within a communally-accepted framework, and thus limit the existential anxiety it potentially offers to the individual**. The apparent cultural diversity and flexibility in modern approaches to death can therefore be explained as being consistent with the sequestration of death from public space into the realm of the personal.4 This difficulty of reconciling the dominant reflexivity of high modernity with the brute fact of human finitude is particularly apparent if we relate them both to issues centred on questions of self-identity. These issues are of central significance in contemporary society because modernity has purchased increased control over life at the expense of communally constructed values (Weber, 1948), values being sequestrated from public space into the fragile sphere of the private (Gehlen, 1956, 1957; Bauman, 1989; Giddens, 1991). The concern for issues of self-identity apparent in high modernity is

the result of individuals, left alone to construct meaning in their lives, searching for meaning through the creation of a viable and stable sense of self (Sennett, 1974; Rose, 1989). Nevertheless, self-identity is also subject to the pervasive reflexivity of high modernity, so that it is created and maintained through the continual reflexive reordering of self-narratives (Giddens, 1991). Berger argues that 'the individual's own biography is objectively real only insofar as it may be comprehended within the structures of the social world' (Berger, 1967: 13), but he prioritises the idea that society assigns an identity to the individual. As Abercrombie notes, those critics who accuse Berger of neglecting social structure are wrong, since the conversation between the individual and social structure is entirely one-sided (Abercrombie, 1986:30). In high modernity, individuals must create their own identities, drawing upon the reflexive mechanisms and socio-cultural resources available to them, but ultimately having to take individual responsibility for the construction of meaning as well as the construction of identity. **In this context, death is particularly disturbing because it signals a threatened 'irreality' of the self-projects which modernity encourages individuals to embark upon, an ultimate absence of meaning, the presence of death bringing home to them the existential isolation of the individual in high modernity.** This idea of the privatisation of meaning, and the difficulties it creates for modem individuals attempting to deal with death, is borne out by a consideration of what are generally acknowledged to be the considerable changes in how people in Europe and North America have approached the phenomenon of death (Aries, 1974, 1981; Vouvelle, 1980; Turner, 1991). Death has gradually been removed from public space, where it was contained in communal, religious beliefs and practices (Aries, 1981), into the seclusion of the hospital (Illich, 1976; Huntington and Metcalf, 1979; Elias, 1985), where it has become a technical matter for medical professionals (Glaser and Strauss, 1968; Giddens, 1991). Funeral rites have similarly ceased to be a concern for the community as a whole, becoming a private matter for the family and friends of the dead person, again organised by a professional group of funeral specialists (Huntington and Metcalf, 1979). The reflexive deconstruction of communal frameworks for the containment of death has been so extensive that even when persons find themselves at funerals they are often unsure how to act or speak, because prescribed rites of mourning are often no longer available to them (Turner, 1991). As Elias expresses it, 'The task of finding the right word or the right gesture therefore falls back on the individual' (Elias, 1985:26). This point demonstrates how the sequestration of death from public space makes its presence in the personal sphere potentially commanding and threatening. Individuals are likely to experience the tension between the public absence and private presence particularly strongly when they find themselves alone with the task of not merely constructing meaning, but of even knowing how to act, when they are faced with the deaths of those they care about. Gehlen has coined the term Hand/ungsver/ust, the decline of the capacity to act, which he associates with the retreat into subjectivism attendent upon the deconstruction of tradition. Together with this deconstruction there is an increase in behavioural insecurity, psychological confusion, and a loss of the capacity to construct socially meaningful human reality (Gehlen, 1957; Zijderweld, 1986). The difficulties modem persons face when confronted with death otTer particularly strong supports for this aspect of Gehlen's conceptualisation of modernity. Nevertheless, the aloneness individuals experience when having to cope with the death of others, is perhaps even more intense when they themselves begin to die. As a result of the reality threatening power of death, and the increased vulnerability to this threat because of the reflexively-induced disorientations of high modernity, modem persons are increasingly reluctant to come into close contact with those who are dying (Elias, 1985). Since the maintenance of their self-identities is potentially undermined by the presence of death in others, this means that there is a tendency for all persons now to die in situations of unparalleled isolation. Death finds no easy, or generally accepted, place in the conceptions of reality generated by high modernity, and which individuals appropriate in their reflexive constructions of self-identity. Consequently, when death becomes startlingly real in the people around them, their desires for self-preservation encourage them to shut themselves off from those people who are dying; both spatially, sequestrating them in hospitals away from the public gaze, and emotionally, shunning physical contact and denying people the emotional interaction and support just when they are likely to need these things most. Thus, Elias's conception of the loneliness of the dying, the way modem social conditions foster feelings of solitude in those who are dying (Elias, 1985:85), can be extended to include a more general existential isolation encouraged by the reflexivity of modernity. The absence of death from public space makes its presence in private space an intense and potentially threatening one. **Because meaning has been so privatised, any attempts to construct meaning around death are now inherently fragile**. Even in the case of the hospice movement, whose development has clearly been part of an attempt to counter certain aspects of these trends, many of the features noted above are still evident. The hospice, like the hospital, remains an institutional expression of the modem desire to sequestrate death away from the public gaze, and individuals in them are still subject to the technical expertise of the medical profession in much the same way, despite the religious patronage of many hospices. Similarly, the location of the dying in a hospice rather than a hospital is unlikely to alter the discomfort of family and friends in the face of the reality of death which the dying temporarily embody. Death may be present in the hospice in a way that it is not in the hospital, but its presence remains a predominantly personally-located one. It is notable that the strategies for dying associated with the hospice movement, such as Kubler-Ross's (1970) various 'stages' in the psychological preparation for death, are directed towards individuals, encouraging them to construct some sort of individual awareness of the meaningfulness of their lives and deaths. They therefore offer nothing to counteract the widespread privatisation of meaning in high modernity which is the major source of many persons' contemporary difficulties in dealing with death.

Suffering kills Reflection

The aff turns the critiques impact and alternative – our impacts create intense suffering that kills reflective interpretations of death

White 12

(Richard White is associate professor of philosophy Creighton University "Levinas, the Philosophy of Suffering, and the Ethics of Compassion" The Heythrop Journal Volume 53, Issue 1, pages 111–123, Published online esept 27 2011, official publication date: January 2012, Wiley)

What is suffering? Suffering includes the extremity of physical pain, as well as the emotional anguish and spiritual despair which **every individual is bound to experience** at some point in her life. It has been suggested that **there is a significant difference between 'pain' and 'suffering'**, since the first is primarily 'physical' while the latter is basically 'mental'. As Eliot Deutsch comments: 'One has a pain or "that is painful", but "I am suffering". Where there is no ego there is no suffering – although there might be pain'.[9] Against this, however, the language of physical experience is often used to describe what Deutsch would regard as purely 'mental' aspects of suffering: This is why we express emotional suffering in physical terms; when we say that we are tortured by guilt, or burning with shame; or our heart aches because of something that happened. Indeed, it would not be surprising if every form of suffering, including those which are primarily 'spiritual' or 'emotional' had a physical correlate in the body itself – fear is both physical and mental, for example, and depression always has a somatic aspect. The upshot of all this is that it may be possible to understand the nature of suffering by **focusing on physical pain** as its most direct and unmediated form. – In suffering, we experience the **limits of self-assertion**, and the most extreme form of this is physical anguish, in which **the self is rendered passive and impotent** by the torment that ruins it as a subject. Herbert Fingarette puts this point succinctly when he notes that: '**To suffer is to be compelled to endure**, undergo, and experience the humbled will, rather than to be able to impose one's will'.[10] This means that the experience of suffering is the opposite of self-assertion and is **shot through with the will's experience** of impotence and limitation. Something like this is also the starting-point for Levinas's own account of what it is to suffer. In the course of several books and numerous articles, Emmanuel Levinas sketches the outlines of a phenomenology of suffering. Suffering is not always a central concern of his philosophy, but it is possible to reconstruct his basic view of suffering by examining comments drawn from several different texts. In Time and the Other, for example, Levinas announces that he will focus his remarks on 'the pain lightly called physical', for 'in it engagement in existence is without any equivocation'.[11] Once again, the point here is that physical suffering is the purest form of suffering since it completely overwhelms the sovereignty of the self and as such it is an experience without mediation. As Steven Tudor notes in his account of compassion and remorse: 'Many physical pains intrude so forcefully into one's consciousness that they impose their own significance which **no stoic attitude can alter** – that significance possibly being a pure sense of raging chaos that **obliterates all other matters of significance, so rupturing, so consuming is the pain'**.[12] Levinas also notes that in spiritual suffering it is still possible to preserve an attitude of dignity and distance from whatever affects one, and in this respect one remains independent and 'free'. Indeed, it can be argued that spiritual suffering is itself a kind of luxury that can only exist for as long as we are not disturbed by physical pain. As Levinas comments, from one perspective (which he refers to as 'socialism'), 'solitude and its anxieties are an ostrichlike position in a world that solicits solidarity and lucidity; they are epiphenomena – phenomena of luxury or waste – of a period of social transformation, the senseless dream of an eccentric individual, a luxation in the collective body'.[13] By contrast, physical suffering in its most extreme form **effaces subjectivity and all subjective attitudes**. For Levinas, physical suffering involves the 'irremissibility' of being and the absence of all refuge; in such pain we are backed up against being with no possibility of escape, and for this reason it provides the clearest, most unambiguous model for suffering in general. As Levinas notes, **significant suffering corrodes all the structures of meaning** that we project into the world; **it overwhelms all 'virility' – or the effort to be masters of our own fate** – until finally one is reduced to a state resembling helpless infancy: 'Where suffering attains its purity, where there is no longer anything between us and it, the supreme responsibility of this extreme assumption turns into supreme irresponsibility, into infancy. Sobbing is this, and precisely through this it announces death. To die is to return to this state of irresponsibility, to be the infantile shaking of sobbing'.[14] In her own account of torture in The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry confirms this point, when she argues that more than resisting language, suffering and pain actively destroy language and all other meaningful projects, so that the subject reverts to 'a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned'.[15] In this way, suffering is world-destroying. Indeed, to suffer greatly is to have one's world reduced to the content of one's pain. In the passage cited above, Levinas notes a connection between suffering and death. According to Levinas, the one announces the other: There is

not only the feeling and the knowledge that suffering can end in death. Pain of itself includes it like a paroxysm, as if there were something about to be produced even more rending than suffering, as if despite the entire absence of a dimension of withdrawal that constitutes suffering, it still had some free space for an event, as if it must still get uneasy about something, as if we were on the verge of an event beyond what is revealed to the end in suffering.[16] Extreme suffering involves complete passivity. In suffering we are subject to something which does not come from ourselves and which tends to undermine all meaningful structures of subjectivity. In this respect, suffering is the anticipation of death as the encounter with something that cannot be avoided or held at arm's length. Both suffering and death involve the end of mastery, and with each, the contents of consciousness are destroyed. In his collection of essays, At the Mind's Limits, Jean Amery, who was tortured by the Nazis, also seeks to articulate the strong sense of a connection between acute physical suffering and death. Speculating on the meaning of his own experience, he comments that Pain … is the most extreme intensification imaginable of our bodily being. But maybe it is even more, that is: death. No road that can be travelled by logic leads us to death, but perhaps the thought is permissible that through pain a path of feeling and premonition can be paved to it for us. In the end, we would be faced with the equation: Body = Pain = Death, and in our case this could be reduced to the hypothesis that torture, through which we are turned into body by the

other, blots out the contradiction of death and allows us to experience it personally.[17] In extreme physical suffering, such as the torment that Amery describes, the individual becomes purely a body, 'and nothing else besides that'. For as long as it continues there is no space for reflection; and this violent reduction to physical being is the most intense form of negation which seems to parallel the negation of death. Elaine Scarry agrees: death and suffering are 'the purest expressions of the anti-human, of annihilation, of total aversiveness, though one is an absence and the other a felt presence, one occurring in the cessation of sentience, the other expressing itself in grotesque overload'.[18]

Death = Social Meaning

Death has social meaning now—they over generalize-prefer this evidence because she actually talked to people for 10 years unlike Baudrillard and Bataille who never spoke to another person.

Bradbury, 1999

(Mary, London School of Economics social psychology PhD, Representations of Death : A Social Psychological Perspective, 189-197)

It is commonly accepted that contemporary death practices are perfunctory, empty and without old-style customary and ritual power. **I disagree. It is simply that we fail to see where our customs and death rituals are flourishing**. It appears that we are blind to our own cultural ingenuity, while **remaining locked into a collective nostalgia**. The following acts are significant social customs in contemporary Loudon: certifying and registering the cause of death, the viewing and embalming of the corpse, placing notices in papers, the funeral cortege, the cremation ceremony (when non-religious), the use of cards and letters of condolence and the sending of flowers. The following would appear to fit the description of ritual acts, although what makes a ritual authentic relies on the meaning extracted by the participants, not on the objects which are used as props: the funeral service, certain burial and cremation rites, some wakes and memorial services and personal rites centring on memorial objects. For many people in Britain today, death rituals do have an existential dimension. Indeed, for a lucky few the participation in ritual can afford the opportunity to transcend death altogether. The structure and lay-out of the funeral parlour and the crematorium, the black hearse, the show-room full of coffins and the touching epithets to be found in the book of remembrance all could be viewed as objectifications. expressed as part of the ritual process, of our representations of death as rebirth. However, as Moscovici (1984a) most certainly did not have custom and ritual in mind when he described the processes of objectification and anchoring it is possible that another process is at work, such as symbolization. Indeed, Joffe (1999) has noted that there is a great deal of overlap between objectification and symbohzation. Douglas (1966) states that, the modem Western world does not utilize or display neat patterns of pollution fears as the fabric of our society is too complex. However, it is possible to identify strange systems of belief that cluster around areas of ambiguity. These unfamiliar terrains are a source of ritual power. We have some less-than- fully rational feelings about the dead body, which is subject to strong pollution taboos. Precisely because of its decomposing and inert condition it is a singularly rich source for symbols. The things that we do to the body, such as dressing it, embalming it, en-coffining it, viewing it, cremating and/or burying it cannot be explained in purely rationalist terms. Harnessing our fears of pollution we make the corpse express our representations of life and death. So, **contemporary mortuary practices cannot be dismissed as some kind of ritual shadows**. We all race questions of mortality, whatever our culture. British representations of death are not only to be found in medical practice (science) or films, documentaries and newspapers (media), they also exist in our death customs and rituals. These customary and ritual acts are replete with meaning. They express our representations of death, serving as both vehicles of traditional representations and the means of effecting change. Like those of other cultures, the customs and rituals of our society are almost invisible and. for many, taking part in them can be a comfortable, almost mundane, experience. The purpose of all representations is to make something unfamiliar. or unfamiliarity itself familiar. (Moscovici 1984a: 25) The study of death would appear to provide an excellent opportunity for observing the processes whereby people make the unfamiliar familiar. What is unfamiliar about death is relatively obvious: the inert state of the body of a relative or patient: the body's remorseless change from human corpse to rotting carcass; the strange and unpredictable behavior of the grieving relative; the loss of family or friend or work roles. The list goes on. Almost everything about death seems unfamiliar. Probably this is true for all cultures. However, in the industrialized West, unfamiliarity is increased by two further factors. First, as I mentioned in Chapter 6, large numbers of the urban population are alienated from the natural world and do not often, if ever, see dying or dead animals. Second, the social organization of death is in the hands of a small group of professionals who guard their activities as jealously as the members of a medieval guild ever did. The representations we fabricate - of a scientific theory, a nation, an artefact, etc. - are always the result of a constant effort to make usual and actual something which is unfamiliar or which gives us a feeling of unfamilianty. And through them we overcome it and integrate it into our mental and physical world which is thus enriched and transformed. (Moscovici 1984a: 27) Moscovici also considered those things that are 'like us, and yet not like us*, such as the mentally ill and those from another culture. Moscovici suggested that those things that fail to become familiar are pushed aside and are likely to be endowed with imaginary, often negative- characteristics. This is typical of the 'unfamiliar'. Thus, the corpse and those who deal with it are marginalized and subject to negative and quite erroneous characterizations. Both the death work professionals and the next of kin are contaminated by their contact with the polluting corpse. Moscovici (1984a) dismissed three other 'traditional* explanations of why we create representations, one of which is that groups create representations to filter information from the environment and thus control individual behavior. While he acknowledges that mere may be a certain amount of truth in this, his dismissal of this extremely significant explanation may have been over-hasty. After all, it would appear to be one of the implicit working hypotheses of many anthropological texts. For example, Bloch and Parry (1982) argue that

the ritual celebration of death may be used to further those in power. This is doing more than just make the unfamiliar familiar. This theme of control can be seen to operate in modern society too. It is possible, for example, that the representation of the good medical death as painless was first created by doctors involved in a power struggle with the clergy at death beds during the nineteenth century. Medical practitioners continue to be involved in the promotion of the good medical death. This is to do with control, rather than with familiarization. As we would expect the dominant system into which the unfamiliar corpse and the recently bereaved are both integrated is that of the medical model. The unfamiliar corpse is anchored in medical knowledge. The dead body is treated much like a patient, the bereaved like the mentally ill. The classification and naming which is a sign mat anchoring has taken place is centred on medical descriptions of the cause of death. This in turn feeds into a discourse about whether the death was good or bad. There are other systems of classification. We also make use of age-old concepts of the sacred good death and the rebirth of the dying. When Moscovici first formulated the processes of anchoring and objectification he still had in mind the split between the reified world of science and the consensual world of common sense. Objectification, in particular, was envisaged as the process whereby intellectual ideas are made more concrete and physically accessible. Fortunately, the process of objectification still seems to make sense if we consensualize science. Once we have anchored a death into the context of medical science then we can objectify the death by delaying decomposition. To give another example: if we wish to construct the image of the medically controlled death it is possible to make this a physical reality by the application of fatal doses of opiates. Thus embalming and euthanasia become objectifications of our representations of the medical good death. Moscovici noted how we also objectify by means of language. The use of euphemisms and various labels peculiar to the funeral trade appear to fit this description. Embalming, for example, becomes 'hygienic treatment*. While I set out to discover our current social representations of death, at the outset I was not sure what form these representations would assume. However, the anthropological and historical literature had provided me with some ideas, namely, that societies tend to shape deaths into those that are good. bad. natural and unnatural. It appears that Bloch and Parry's (1982) prediction that ideas of regeneration and rebirth are more weakly stressed in an industrialized, individualistic society is correct. However, we still need to anchor unfamiliar death and in this book I have tried to show how age-old representations of the good. bad. natural and unnatural death continue to be utilized by professionals and bereaved alike. During the eighteenth and nineteenth century representations of dying changed along with medical innovations. Dying was increasingly viewed as a process that could be made painless through the application of powerful painkillers. Willi the development of a secular climate of opinion, however, not only did the manner of the good death change but also its meaning. In brief for many people it became profane. The good death was no longer concerned with the fate of the soul; it was concerned only with the character of the physical event. The medical notion of good death continues to be the dominant representation of good deaths and the hospital environment appears to provide the optimal degree of control. We can manipulate the lime, location and expression of death. So, with the exception of self-sacrifice or murder, medical science provides the best conditions for the human control and manipulation of the process of dying. Bloch and Parry (1982) suggest that the key to a good death is a sense of control. As it happens, the illusion of human control over life and death can be enjoyed from within the medical model and deaths that require some kind of medical intervention and/or hospitalization seem good candidates for becoming good deaths, as I found to be the case. The cause of death is of crucial importance to any type of good death because the type of disease has an impact on such factors as awareness, preparation and consciousness of the dying person. Managing to orchestrate a medical good death has become the concern of medical practitioners. However, as I mentioned earlier, this does not just influence the behaviour of medical personnel in the hospital, home or hospice. It has also influenced the behaviour of those deathwork professionals who deal with the corpse. The coroner, registrar and funeral director are all involved in a medical discourse about death that is partly concerned with presenting the image of the painless, sleep-like death. Deaths that do not conform to this stereotype - the bad medical deaths and particularly those that do not produce a reposeful corpse (Prior 1989: 160) - galvanize the death-work professional into hiding or disguising the facts of the death (Bradbury 1996). This professional good practice is justified as being a way of protecting the bereaved. The professional's image of the bereaved, whose grief is potentially 'pathological", is engendered by the application of a medical model to grief as well as to the medical good and bad deaths. In a reaction against a perceived excess of medical intervention in the process of dying, the term 'natural death" has recently enjoyed a comeback. While coroners" courts have been using the expression for some time, talk about dying 'naturally* was unfashionable during the modem era. With increasing longevity and changing death trajectories our conceptions of a good way of dying are being revolutionized. Rejecting scenarios that seem depersonalizing and over-medicalized. people are now exploring 'new* ways of dying. From the start the natural death movement cannily anchored itself in people's consciousness by affiliating itself with a very successful representation (and movement): the natural birth movement. There are many differences between giving birth and dying and the affinity between the two does not stand close scrutiny. Yet the use of the title worked and everyone, particularly the media, knew exactly what the movement's leaders were saying. Moscovici described two roles of representations. The first is that they 'conventualise the objects, persons and events we encounter" (1984a: 7). The grouping of these objects, persons and events into models helps to structure an otherwise chaotic universe. So death is conventualized by the representations we have formed about the dead body and the grieving relative. The second is that they are prescriptive, 'that is, they impose themselves upon us with an irresistible force" (1984a: 9). Examples of the prescriptive nature of our representations of death abound. In our moment of deepest grief we warmly thank the doctor and are meticulously careful to be compliant, polite and composed. We find ourselves describing the deaths of our loved ones as good, although we are hard put to find a reason. Thus calling a death good or bad may not be about believing it is either good or bad, but simply gives the survivors a socially acceptable handle on tins most taboo of topics. As Moscovici notes: By setting a conventional sign of reality on the one hand, and, on the other, by prescribing through tradition and age-old structures, what we perceive and imagine, these creatures of thought, which are representations, end up by constituting an actual environment. (Moscovici 1984a: 12, original italics) Thus the anchoring of death as good or bad in sacred, medical or natural terms confines the participants to a pattern of behaviour and rules. Clearly the representation of the good or bad death is the concern of the living, yet it constrains those same people when it is their turn to die. I do not wish to suggest that this representation of death is used cynically by the professionals. They genuinely believe they are making life easier for the bereaved. Discussions by death-workers of their own experiences of bereavement suggest that they use the same representations of the good death when they lose someone they love. Significantly. I found that they appear just as vulnerable to conflict with those in control as the non-professional bereaved (Goffinan 1959). We also compete and argue. I agree with Billig (1986) in his call for the merging of the theatre and game metaphors. As I hope will have become apparent in Chapter 6. The discourse about the good and bad death is 'argumentative'. As Moscovici (1984a) notes, when one person's classification of an object or an event is imposed on another's they convey a bundle of expectations as to how the other person should respond. There is no guarantee that the other person will agree. I found that the bereaved kin were not at all passive about classifying their partner's death as good or bad and they certainly do not always share the same representation as the deathwork professional. We can observe a tussle for power in those instances where the bereaved's representations of death are not in accordance with those of the professionals". We might imagine that the outcome of such negotiations or arguments would be predictable, given that the professional is usually in a position of power over their bereaved client. Yet I found that despite their distress, families stubbornly resist the constraints imposed by the professionals and the professionals" personal representation of the death, and still manage to win the day by reinstating their own personal representations after the disposal of the body. We should be wary of constructing 'definitions" of the good death. Given the popularity of the good death in literature of the social sciences (Aries 1974,1933; Beier 1989; Bradbury 1993a. 1996; Kellehear 1990; Sanierel 1995; Small 1993; Walter 1994) it ts possible that the lay population will appropriate, and in the process distort, mis 'scientific knowledge" about the good and bad ways of doing a death. Re-presenting the healthy grief Just as the medical model dominates our representations of the good and bad death, I have argued that grief has been similarly medicalized. For decades psychologists have viewed grief as the archetypal individual experience. Counsellors, therapists, journalists and the bereaved themselves have been looking for symptoms, stages and outcomes which they believe to be concrete phenomena, like a tumour or a fracture, rather than a social representation of loss. The anchoring of bereavement in the grief reaction simultaneously constrains the sorrowful person and reassures the observer about all those chaotic and unknown becomes the known, belonging to a category and with a familiar set of characteristics. The psychiatric and psychological research into grief lias failed to appreciate the social nature of grief as mourning individuals battle to rebuild their damaged selves. I found mat my respondents had a notion of grief as something mat might turn into a life-tlireatenmg disease. These women did not have to be apprenticed into knowing about this representation, for it permeates our popular culture. So just as I tapped into the representations of good and bad deaths as salient features in the interviews themselves, the psychiatric and psychological research into the grief reaction, discussed in the last chapter, tapped not the reality of grief as a disease but social representations of grief as a disease. Representations, however, have a habit of becoming realities. These studies remain fascinating and important, even though the psychiatrists and psychologists conducting them did not discover what they thought they had. The use of quantitative research tools, in which the researcher sets the agenda, may have obscured the process of re-presentation. It has been argued that the postmodern era, which has been developing at some pace over the last few decades, represents a chance for the re-enchantment of society, a welcome return of the 'subject* (Bauman 1992b). However, there are problems associated with this. As Bauman notes 'the post-modem mind seems to condemn everything, propose nothing'

(1992b: 9). The wholescale demolition and deconstruction of our modem and objective view of the world can engender fear of the void. Thus we attack the medical model and dismantle the safe, reassuring descriptions of the stages of dying, the good medical death and healthy grief and in their place seem **to leave nothing but variety and choice**. Incoherence seems to be postmodernism s distinctive feature. **Bauman would argue that we are tearing down the power- supported structure of the modem era, the false truths that were constructed out of a desperate search for structure and order that followed on the heels of the Renaissance**. **But this does not lessen those private fears which are expressed in the contemporary mania for the DIY solutions** poignantly illustrated by the natural death movement, in which dying individuals are encouraged to 'take on' their own deaths and to draw comfort from the imagined community of fellow natural death supporters. Death is a physical event that turns the subjective self into an objective other and for this reason represents something of a challenge to our conception of this brave new world. My exploration of contemporary deathways revealed them to be both traditional and innovative. With apparent ease we seem to be able to accept both continuity and change, that fine balance which enables us to draw an embalmed corpse on a horse-drawn hearse to the local crematorium for a service with a priest. Despite the rapid rate of change over the past couple of centuries there seems little sign that our belief in immortality has been genuinely deconstructed, thus causing an over-emphasis of the here and now which is so often described as a sign of postmodernisni's holdover us (Bauman 1992b). There is little that is either 'ephemeral* or 'evanescent* about planting a tree or erecting a headstone (Bauman 1992b). Many of the social representations of death and the customs and rituals which express them do act as a balm to the survivors. These funerals are rites of passage which send our loved ones to the other world. There is symbolism to gather by the arrnful if we only know where to look: the floral tribute that shouts' FOREVER"; the kitsch condolence card bedecked with doves; the visit to the funeral director's chapel to see a corpse pumped full of formaldehyde; the poem recited on a favourite hilltop as the wind catches the ashes as they are poured from their urn; the dedicated bench in the park**. The British way of death cannot be explained away in terms of mindless tradition, the dominance of the medical profession or the seductive force of consumerism. These acts are full of the meanings of love, life and the hereafter.**

AT: Symbolic Value

No link---death's symbolic value <u>does not deny the value of life</u>---the option to continue living should always be available

Kacou 8

I. What we mean (in more detail) Regardless of whether or not we find that it is the "fundamental question" of philosophy,[8] we can see that judging whether life is or is not worth living is, in one sense at least, when understood with a general character, a fundamentally philosophical question. The question calls on the living individual to make a value judgment (which seems of the most serious extent) about the condition it most basically, most generally, and in a sense most intimately, "finds itself" in—and in this sense, the question must be seen as a "personal" one.[9] But the judgment called for only becomes especially interesting for philosophical exercise once we attempt to make it "objective," so to speak. On the one hand, from a "subjective" point of view, the question whether life is or is not worth living reduces simply to the question whether or not—or how—we the living already in fact, in our variable situations, desire or not to live. Its answer is a function of descriptions of motivational dispositions as they may vary from individual to individual and circumstance to circumstance. (For instance, some may find certain cases of euthanasia justified, or find certain forms of suicide honorable.) In other words, from a subjective point of view, the answer would simply be that life is worth living to the extent that, while we could have a different attitude, we just happen to want it (to be disposed towards it), perhaps in light of circumstantial considerations. And, thus, the question could be quickly addressed in some cases, without much need for philosophical inquiry—except perhaps on collateral issues. Similarly, typical answers referring simply to how "fun" or "beautiful" life is, or (perhaps the contemporary scientist's favorite) how "fascinating" or "mysterious"—these answers are, as stated, inadequate for our purposes, to the extent that they are primitive (uncritical) generalizations expressing our preexisting desire for (or infatuation with) life. On the other hand, from a point of view that purports to be "objective," we must have a more complex approach. We must "problematize" the value of life in general. The question is not simply whether (or how, or even why in the broad sense of an explanation) we happen to desire or not to live, but rather whether (or why in the narrow sense of a justification) we should or should not ever desire to live in the first place. a. The objective approach In seeking a justification, we must look, beyond the mere "freedom" (or given-ness) of any primitive desire, for something like a final "authority" that we could show through some fact or logical inference[10] to make us "right" (i.e., as a matter of reasoning) to have such a desire. In other words, we must try to present life as being instrumental or not to some uncontested value (or purpose)—and, thus, as either "useful" or "futile." In this sense, the word "meaningful" (pertaining to life) would be basically synonymous with the word "useful"—a relation between objects and moments, on the one hand, and how what we value can be served, on the other hand. In addition, we do not look for conditions that would sustain or increase the value of a proposed venture; we look for a demonstration that the venture can have any value. Accordingly, in order to find the objective position, we must avoid in our picture of life or death any variable circumstance that could be taken to make either one of them arbitrarily more or less attractive or pursuable. Furthermore, any description of how we desire to live

may well entail conditions under which we would not prefer to live. But **even if such conditions exist**, it does not necessarily follow that life is without value when those conditions prevail. Indeed, by analogy, that we would prefer ten dollars to five dollars if we could choose does not mean at all that the five dollars would then have no value. Other example: that we would happily accept an ice cream cone if it were free but refuse it if we had to pay for it does not mean at all that ice cream has no value to us. The distinction can be expressed as follows: the value of ice cream in light of its cost, we call its a posteriori value; the value of ice cream irrespective of its cost, we call its a priori value. What we seek in this inquiry is the **a priori value of life-as-such**—the value that subsists in, or is essential to, or is the initial value in, **any life**, **irrespective of its circumstances**, including, to any extent possible, any explanation for its existence.[11] (The objective question calls for an a priori answer.) In contrast, we are not interested in questions such as whether seppuku is honorable or how end-of-life decisions should be made. (The subjective question, the question of circumstances and the a posteriori answer coincide.)

Life = Pre-requisite

Life is a pre-requisite to death's symbolic value---fearing death doesn't preclude recognizing life's finitude and its inevitability---we can still create provisional value in life---individuals should have the option to live

Kalnow 9

(Cara Kalnow 9 A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil at the University of St. Andrews "WHY DEATH CAN BE BAD AND IMMORTALITY IS WORSE" https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/724/3/Cara%20Kalnow%20MPhil%20thesis.PDF)

(PA) also provided us with good reason to reject the Epicurean claim that the finitude of life cannot be bad for us. With (PA), we saw that our lives could accumulate value through the satisfaction of our desires beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But Chapter Four determined that the finitude of life is a necessary condition for the value of life as such and that many of our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life. I therefore argued that an indefinite life cannot present a desirable alternative to our finite life, because life as such would not be recognized as valuable. In this chapter, I have argued that the finitude of life is instrumentally good as it provides the recognition that life itself is valuable. Although I ultimately agree with the Epicureans that the finitude of life cannot be an evil, this conclusion was not reached from the Epicurean arguments against the badness of death, and I maintain that (HA) and (EA) are insufficient to justify changing our attitudes towards our future deaths and the finitude of life. Nonetheless, the instrumental good of the finitude of life that we arrived at through the consideration of immortality should make us realize that the finitude of life cannot be an evil; it is a necessary condition for the recognition that life as such is valuable. Although my arguments pertaining to the nature of death and its moral implications have yielded several of the Epicurean conclusions, my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams, as (PA) accounts for the intuition that it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided. I have therefore reached three of the Epicurean conclusions pertaining to the moral worth of the nature of death: (1) that the state of being dead is nothing to us, (2) death simpliciter is nothing to us, and (3) the finitude of life is a matter for contentment. But against the Epicureans, I have argued that we can rationally fear our future deaths, as categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect of death is rationally held as an evil to be avoided. Finally, I also claimed against the Epicureans, that the prospect of death can rationally be regarded as morally good for one if one no longer desires to continue living. 5.3 Conclusion I began this thesis with the suggestion that in part, the Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us. I went on to defend the Epicurean position against the objections raised by the deprivation theorists and Williams. I argued that the state of being dead, and death simpliciter, cannot be an evil of deprivation or prevention for the person who dies because (once dead), the person—and the grounds for any misfortune—cease to exist. I accounted for the anti-Epicurean intuition 115 that it is rational to fear death and to regard death as an evil to be avoided, not because death simpliciter is bad, but rather because the prospect of our deaths may be presented to us as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable. In this chapter, I concluded that even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, we can attach two distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect of our own individual deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. How to decide on the balance of those values is a matter for psychological judgment.

Maintaining the conditions of possibility for life is a prerequisite to ongoing experiences with death

Lawtoo 5

(Nidesh Lawtoo 5, Dept of Comparative Lit, U Washington, Bataille and the Suspension of Being, linguaromana.byu.edu/Lawtoo4.html)

Bataille's notion of communication involves a dialectic with two positives (hence a non-dialectic) where two sovereigns confront death not in view of an end but as an end in itself: "confronting death," in fact, "puts the subjects at stake-"l'être en eux-mêmes [est] mis en jeu" (Sur Nietzsche 61). Further, Bataille affirms that "[p]ersonne n'est-un instant-souverain qui ne se perde" (OC VIII 429). It is the Nietzschean self-forgetfulness that is here evoked; a self-forgetfulness which implies a transgression of the limits of both communicating subjects. Again, for Bataille "[l]a 'communication' n'a lieu qu'entre deux êtres mis en jeu-déchirés, suspendus, l'un et l'autre penchés au-dessus de leur néant" (Sur Nietzsche 62). However, if according to Nietzsche, self-forgetfulness takes place in solitude, for Bataille it **necessitates the presence of an "other."**(5) Communication in fact, asks for "deux êtres mis en jeu" who participate in what he defines as "une fête immotivée" (Sur Nietzsche 31). There the sovereign loses himself (se perde) with the other, through the other, in the other, in a process of "mutual laceration" (Essential 105) which is simultaneously tragic and ludic. The emphasis on the other is Hegelian, but unlike dialectics, communication does not confront the subject with an object (Gegen-stand, something that stands against the subject). As Bataille puts it (apparently echoing Baudelaire), communication takes place with "un semblable," "mon frère" (OC VIII 289). And he adds: "Cela suppose la communication de sujet à sujet" (OC VIII 288). Bataille's notion of communication is not based upon a "violent hierarchy" (Derrida's term) but rather upon egalitarianism. Moreover, transgressing the limits of the subject implies that the two subjects already possess (in potential) the characteristics of sovereignty. Hence, **the status of sovereign is not achieved as a result of a fight to the death, but requires the subject to be open to an other** who is outside the limits of the self.

Derrida speaks of the "trembling" to which Bataille submits Hegelian concepts (253). This trembling, I would argue, has its source in Nietzsche (6): "The figs fall from the trees" says Zarathustra, "they are good and sweet, and when they fall, their red skins are rent. A north wind am I unto ripe figs" (qtd. in Philosophy 135). If we apply this passage to Bataille's philosophy, we could say that inherent in this "fall" is an explosion of Hegelian concepts, and in particular, as we have seen, the notion of Herrshaft. Further, communication, for Bataille, involves a similar "fall" which rents (déchire) the skin of the subjects (their limits) exposing the red flesh which lies beneath the skin. According to the French philosopher, Nietzsche's critique of the subject is more radical than Hegel's, since, as he puts it in "Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice," Hegel's philosophy, and I would add Kojève's interpretation of it, is "une théologie, où l'homme aurait pris la place de Dieu" (OC XII 329). Hegel's "theology" preserves the identity of the subject. Now, Bataille makes his position to this "theology" clear as he writes: "I don't believe in God-from the inability to believe in self" (Essential 10). By establishing a direct link between the death of the subject and the death of God, Bataille extends his critique of "beings" into the larger, ontological, critique of "Being." Implicit in this theoretical move is the articulation of the ontology of sovereignty. Bataille's philosophy is Nietzschean insofar as it is grounded in experience and in the immanence of the body. Communication, for Bataille is first and foremost a bodily affair. Hence the interrogation of the limits of the subject starts from an interrogation of what we could call the "gates," or openings of the body: the mouth, the vagina, the anus and the eyes are for Bataille central places for philosophical investigation because at these gates, the integrity of the subject is questioned; its limits can be transgressed. They are spaces of transition where a "glissement hors de soi" (OC VIII 246) can take place. These bodily openings, which Bataille also defines as "blessures," (Sur Nietzsche 64) found his conception of the sovereign subject. In fact, each "blessure" can be linked to a specific dimension of communication which obsesses Bataille. His central themes match different bodily openings: the mouth connects to laughter; the vagina to eroticism; the eyes to tears; the anus to the excrements which he links to death. Through these openings the subject is traversed by different fluxes and its integrity, totality and stability is challenged. They allow for the possibility of a glissement of the subject's being. The same could be said of Bataille's corpus: it is a unitary entity, which, like a body, escapes the totalizing temptation of closure. Despite the fact that Bataille defines sovereignty in terms of the Kojèvian/Hegelian "nothingness" (Bataille's Rien), his conception of communication is built upon the Nietzschean ontological distinction between the Dionysian and the Apollonian. In fact, the ontological movement that takes place in communication "exige que l'on glisse" (OC VI 158) from an "insufficient" and "discontinuous" being to a reality of "continuity" that transcends binary oppositions (Erotism 13-14). To put it more simply, communication introduces a movement from the "many" to the "One"; from a "discontinuity of being" to a "continuity of being;" from separate "beings" to a common ontological ground ("Being"). The source of Bataille's ontology is clear: it stems from Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy which in turn, is construed upon Schopenhauer's distinction between will and representation. "As a sailor sits in a small boat in a boundless raging sea," writes Schopenhauer," surrounded on all sides by heaving mountainous waves, trusting to his frail vessel; so does the individual man sit calmly in the middle of a world of torment, trusting to the principium individuationis" (Birth 21) .(7) Communication, for Bataille, as the Dionysian for Nietzsche, involves the shattering of the principium individuationis, a tearing down of the veil of Maya which constitutes, what Bataille calls, with a blink of the eye to Schopenhauer, the "illusion of a being which is isolated" (Essential 10; my emphasis). Communication, thus, involves an opening of the subject to the larger ground of Being. The sovereign's boat is constantly leaking. Yet, in order for communication to take place, the boat needs to keep floating. That is to say that **for transgression to take place, the limits of the subject need to be preserved** (Erotism 63; Foucault 34). The being of the sovereign subject is suspended upon the abîme-what Bataille also calls "une réalité plus vaste" (OC II 246)-which means that the subject neither dwells safely within the limits of the "small, insufficient boat" of individuation, nor within the depth of the undifferentiated "raging sea," but in the space of contact in-between the two spheres. This precision is key in order to delineate the originality of Bataille's ontology of sovereignty. Bataille's conception of the communicating subject (i.e., of sovereignty) walks a thin line between its self-dissolution and its self-preservation. **Hence the idea that he is above all a thinker of limits** or borders. The sovereign's being, in fact, is "suspended" on the "bord de l'abîme" (Coupable V 355) **but never actually falls**, except, of course, in death. Hence, for Bataille, "[i]l s'agit d'approcher la mort" [it is approaching death] that is to say, the abîme, or the continuity of being, "d'aussi près qu'on peut l'endurer" [as close as one can endure] (337-338). The sovereign subject **confronts death while preserving his life.** His being is placed at the border between life and death. Hence, if Bataille defines philosophy as "existence striving to reach its limits" (Essential 146), it should

be specified that the being of the subject is not found beyond its limits, as his use of "existence" seems to suggest (Ek-sistenz) since that would imply a total dissolution of the subject. Bataille's philosophy of **transgression implies the preservation of the limits of the subject so that the sovereign can experience and endure death in life** The tension between self-expenditure (Nietzsche's Verschwendung) and self-preservation (linked to Hegel's Anerkennung) is analogous to the movement of a moth that is first attracted by the fire of a candle and subsequently distances itself from the fire in order to preserve its life.(8) This repeated back and forth movement recapitulates the movement of communication and is responsible for the underlying tension which traverses Bataille's philosophy. It is an inner (bodily) drive that attracts the moth to death and not, as it is the case for Hegel's master, a reasoned project in view of an end (recognition). The moth's self-sacrifice, in fact, is perfectly useless (it serves no purpose) and hence is truly sovereign. Bataille would call it "une négativité sans emploi." Or, as he says with respect to eroticism in his first and last interview before he died, "it is purely squandering, an expenditure of energy for itself" (in Essential 220). This movement forwards, towards the flame of self-dissolution (which takes place in death, eroticism, laughter...) and its retreat backwards, towards life and the limits it involves, epitomizes Bataille's notion of communication. A practice which for Bataille seems to have the characteristic of a fort-da game in which the subject is not in control of the movement. This movement, Bataille writes in the Preface to Madame Edwarda, happens "malgré nous" (III 11). Thus conceived the sovereign accepts the place of a toy in the hands of a child playing-a definition similar to Heraclitus' vision of life, which he defines as "a child at play, moving pieces in a game (Fragment 52, in GM 149). This view of communication is both tragic and joyful; violent and useless. A joyful tragedy, which challenges the limits of the subject; that puts the subject's being en jeu. If Bataille is deeply fascinated by death, decay and the dissolution of the subject in a continuity of being, **he escapes the temptation to embrace death at the expense of life**. His definition of eroticism sums up this fundamental tension: "Eroticism," he writes, "is assenting to life up to the point of death" (Erotism11). This applies not only to eroticism but also to all communicating activities such as laughter, play, tears, and ultimately to the ethos that sustains the totality of Bataille's philosophy. If Kojève defines dialectics as a "negating-negativity" (5), Bataille's communication can be read as an affirmative negativity. In fact, death is confronted and even invoked**, but what is found in death is the ultimate affirmation of life.** Negation of the integrity (the limits) of the subject leads to a **radical affirmation of life.** And if in the Preface to Madame Edwarda, Bataille can affirme "l'identité de l'être et de la mort" (OC III 10), let us also note that **the identity of being and death is realized in life.** Faithful to Nietzsche, Bataille does not become a negator of the will; a negator of life; a pessimist, a Buddhist or worse, a nihilist (some of the derogatory terms used by Nietzsche to retrospectively define his first and last master). **Bataille remains truthful to life**. While the ontological premises grounding sovereignty are taken from Schopenhauer (via Nietzsche), Bataille's conclusions are diametrically opposed to Nietzsche's first master. In fact, Bataille's philosophy can be seen as an affirmation of the will (he operates an inversion of values) through Dionysian practices (included sexuality which Schopenhauer condemned) that put the subject in touch with the ultimate ground of being, **without dissolving him/her in it**

Alt = Obsession

Trying to find the truth in death causes eternal obsession – it's not productive criticism

Dollimore, Sussex sociology professor, 1998

(Jonathan, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, pg. 221)

Occasionally one wonders if the advocates of the denial-of-death argument are not themselves in denial. They speak about death endlessly yet indirectly, analyzing not death so much as our culture's attitude towards it. To that extent it is not the truth of death but the truth of our culture that they seek. But, **even as** they make death signify in this indirect way, it is still death that is compelling them to speak. And those like Baudrillard and Bauman speak urgently, performing intellectually a desperate mimicry of the omniscience which death denies. One sense that the entire modern enterprise of relativizing death, of understanding it culturally and socially, may be an attempt to disavow it in the very act of analyzing and demystifying it. Ironically then, for all its rejection of the Enlightenment's arrogant belief in the power of rationality, this analysis of death remains indebred to a fundamental Enlightenment aspiration to mastery through knowledge. Nothing could be more 'Enlightenment', in the pejorative sense that Baudrillard describes, than his own almost megalomaniac wish to penetrate the truth of death, and the masterful controlling intellectual subject, which that attempt presupposes. And this may be true to an extent for all of us, more or less involved in the anthropological or quasi-anthropological accounts of death which assume that, by looking at how a culture handles death, we disclose things bout a culture which it does not know about itself. So what has been said of sex in the nineteenth century may also be true of death in the twentieth: it has not been repressed so much as resignified in new, complex, and productive ways which then legitimate a never-ending analysis of it.

Survivalism First

Survivalism must be unconditional—it's a prerequisite to all ethics and values

Hägglund 8

(Martin, Fellow in Comparative Literature at Cornell University, "Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life" google books)

In the preceding chapters I have demonstrated how Derrida's work offers powerful resources to think life as survival and the desire for life as a desire for survival. I have argued that every moment of life is a matter of survival because it depends on what Derrida calls the structure of the trace. The structure of the trace follows from the constitutive division of time. Given that every moment of life passes away as soon as it comes to be, it must be inscribed as a trace in order to be at all. The tracing of time enables the past to be retained and thus to resist death in a movement of survival. However, the survival of the trace that makes life possible must be left for a future that may erase it. The movement of survival protects life, but it also exposes life to death, since every trace is absolutely destructible. I have argued that such radical finitude is not a lack of being that it is desirable to overcome. Rather, the finitude of survival **opens the possibility** of everything we desire and the peril of everything we fear. The affirmation of survival is thus not a value in itself; it is rather the **unconditional condition** for **all values.** Whatever one may posit as a value, one has to affirm the time of survival, since without the time of survival the value could never live on and be posited as a value in the first place.

In this final chapter I want to elaborate how **the unconditional affirmation of survival** allows us to rethink the condition of political responsibility and especially the desire that drives political struggle. I will argue that **the radical finitude of survival** is not something that inhibits responsibility and political struggle; **it is rather what gives rise to the**m. If we were not exposed to the coming of a future that could violate and erase us there would be nothing to take responsibility for, since nothing could happen to us. It is thus the finitude of survival—**and the affirmation of such survival**—that raises the demand of responsibility. If I did not desire the survival of someone or something, there would be nothing that precipitated me to take action. Even if I sacrifice my own life for another, this act is still motivated by the desire for survival, since I would not do anything for the other if 1 did not desire the survival of him or her or it.

AT: Ressentiment

Ressentiment not First

Ressentiment doesn't come first – extinction and material impacts do

Torbjörn **Tännsjö 11**, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, "Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing," online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one's genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide "survivors" confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

Ressentiment Productive

Ressentiment is productive—inseparable for some freedom and their crusade against it links just as much

Stefan P. **Dolger 10**, Brock University, "In Praise of Ressentiment: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Glenn Beck", APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642232&download=yes

After Ressentiment ¶ In closing I would suggest that my praise of ressentiment is also in line with the more deliberatively conceived multiculturalism of the Left than is the current puritanical disdain. As Monique Deveaux argues, it is a failure of political imagination when we fixate on liberal principles as preconditions lo multicultural dialogue, and in particular it is necessary to move toward a deeper level of intercultural respect rather than mere toleration (Deveaux 2000).10 But if it is appropriate to go beyond simply tolerating non- liberal peoples abroad and in immigrant communities, if we must go beyond toleration to do justice to the rich tradition of cultural pluralism, then perhaps we can also open our hearts and minds to the possibility that the ressentiment-suffused need to be heard out as well. Perhaps rather than demonizing ressentiment as a toxin to politics, as the worst of the worst for subjects whom we purport to free, we must accept that ressentiment is for many inseparable from their conception of their own freedom. Perhaps rather than pitying these poor fools, in ways that we would never pity a plural wife in the global South, we should ponder whether ressentiment as a precondition of subjectivity is as much a gift as a curse.¶ And are we so sure, after all, we late Nietzscheans, that our crusade against ressentiment is not itself suffused with ressentiment? Is not itself fully in the grips of it? How would we know if it were or weren't? Perhaps we are, in our own way, as spiteful, vain, petty, weak, subjected, enraged against the past, capitalized, consumerized, unfree, as those we purport to want to free from the chains of slave morality. Perhaps it is ourselves that we need to give a break to, that we need to get over, when we first look to purge the other of ressentiment. Perhaps we all swim in this current, perhaps we are all Ressentiment's children, and perhaps that is OK – even to the extreme of the using ressentiment unconsciously in the effort to rid the world of ressentiment. Though just in saying so I wouldn't expect that to do much to overturn Ressentiment's reign. No, she is far too puissant for that. But we do not need to rage against the weakness in others because we fear the dependence and weakness in ourselves. ¶ As Vetlesen puts it, defending Amery: "Against Nietzsche, who despised victims because he saw them as weak, as losers in life's struggles, Amery upholds the dignity of having been forced by circumstances beyond one's control into that position, thus reminding Nietzsche that as humans we are essentially relational beings, dependent, not self-sufficient. In hailing the strong and despising the weak, in denying that vulnerability is a basic ineluctably given human condition, a condition from which not only the role of victim springs but that of the morally responsible agent too, Nietzsche fails to be the provocateur he loves to believe he is: He sides with the complacent majority and so helps reinforce the existential and moral loneliness felt by Amery, the individual victim who speaks up precisely in that capacity" (Vetlesen 2006, 43). Perhaps we can begin to see how we have been using the weak, the viewers of Glenn Beck and others, as the targets for our need to find blameworthy agents. And that too is fine. The trouble comes when we think we've gone beyond Ressentiment when in fact we're just listening to her whisperings without realizing it. We think that we can well and truly look down on the Rush Limbaughs, these destroyers of civilization, because they are possessed by something that we are above. And far be it from me to suggest that we should not resent, should not blame; I merely suggest we direct our blame toward more useful ends than where it is currently located.

AT: Ressentiment = Extinction

Ressentiment doesn't cause extinction

Bernard N. **Meltzer 2**, and Gil Richard Musolf, profs of sociology at Central Michigan University, "Resentment and Ressentiment," Sociological Inquiry, V72 N2, Spring, 240-55

Given this negative characterization—a prevailing evaluation—of ressentiment, it is not surprising to learn that Sartre (1965, p. 14) describes those who experience the emotion as individuals who ''establish their human personality as a perpetual negation.'' Augmenting the negative view of this emotion is a widely held view among scholars that both resentment and ressentiment tend to be base, dastardly emotions resorted to by thin-skinned individuals and seekers after excuses for failure, that these emotions are often felt irrationally, on occasions in which one has not been morally wronged. Thus, Solomon (1995) refers to a ''vindictive'' emotion, frequently a personal, petty, disproportionate reaction to a slight; Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) write of a ''distasteful'' emotion; and Adam Smith [1759] (1969) designates a ''disagreeable'' passion.7 On the other hand, Solomon (1994), elsewhere, takes a more positive view of ressentiment, pointing out that it often entails compassion for others in the same situation, and its implicit sense of injustice may lead to corrective action; thus, ressentiment can be seen as an expression of ''the socially responsible insistence of the community on justice and justification'' (p. 124). Similarly, Haber (1991) argues that resentment can be a form of personal protest that expresses regard for oneself, for others, and for the normative order (p. 48). Moreover, Haber (1991, p. 82) holds that a display of resentment may serve as an instrument of individual or social change. In fact, the historian Hippolyte Taine (cited in Jameson 1976, p. 131) sought to explain revolutions in terms of underlying ressentiment, and Jameson (1976) contends that this emotion is the very content of revolutions. In the same vein, various scholars have asserted that ''the individual of ressentiment is a potential revolutionary'' (Vaneigem 1979, p. 9) and that ''our revolutionaries are men and women of resentment''(Solomon 1995, p. 266).8 Thus, Merton (1957, p. 155) maintains that **''organized rebellion may draw upon a vast reservoir of the resentful and discontented as institutional dislocations become acute**.'' In the light of such characterizations, the role of the political agitator is readily recognized as that of raising consciousness of unjust treatment (where such consciousness is absent), inducing ressentiment (where the emotion is absent), and organizing resistance to the recurrence or continuation of unjust treatment. Moreover, Folger (1987) claims that revolutionary ideologies can help to create ressentiment. **That ressentiment can be used to initiate** (and sustain) **revolution argues against the more passive—and contemptuous—conceptions held by Nietzsche,** Scheler, and their many followers.

AT: Ressentiment – Productive/K Links

Ressentiment is productive—inseparable for some freedom and their crusade against it links just as much

Dolger 10

After Ressentiment ¶ In closing I would suggest that my praise of ressentiment is also in line with the more deliberatively conceived multiculturalism of the Left than is the current puritanical disdain. As Monique Deveaux argues, it is a failure of political imagination when we fixate on liberal principles as preconditions lo multicultural dialogue, and in particular it is necessary to move toward a deeper level of intercultural respect rather than mere toleration (Deveaux 2000).10 But if it is appropriate to go beyond simply tolerating non- liberal peoples abroad and in immigrant communities, if we must go beyond toleration to do justice to the rich tradition of cultural pluralism, then perhaps we can also open our hearts and minds to the possibility that the ressentiment-suffused need to be heard out as well. Perhaps rather than demonizing ressentiment as a toxin to politics, as the worst of the worst for subjects whom we purport to free, we must accept that ressentiment is for many inseparable from their conception of their own freedom. Perhaps rather than pitying these poor fools, in ways that we would never pity a plural wife in the global South, we should ponder whether ressentiment as a precondition of subjectivity is as much a gift as a curse.¶ And are we so sure, after all, we late Nietzscheans, that our crusade against ressentiment is not itself suffused with ressentiment? Is not itself fully in the grips of it? How would we know if it were or weren't? Perhaps we are, in our own way, as spiteful, vain, petty, weak, subjected, enraged against the past, capitalized, consumerized, unfree, as those we purport to want to free from the chains of slave morality. Perhaps it is ourselves that we need to give a break to, that we need to get over, when we first look to purge the other of ressentiment. Perhaps we all swim in this current, perhaps we are all Ressentiment's children, and perhaps that is OK – even to the extreme of the using ressentiment unconsciously in the effort to rid the world of ressentiment. Though just in saying so I wouldn't expect that to do much to overturn Ressentiment's reign. No, she is far too puissant for that. But we do not need to rage against the weakness in others because we fear the dependence and weakness in ourselves. ¶ As Vetlesen puts it, defending Amery: "Against Nietzsche, who despised victims because he saw them as weak, as losers in life's struggles, Amery upholds the dignity of having been forced by circumstances beyond one's control into that position, thus reminding Nietzsche that as humans we are essentially relational beings, dependent, not self-sufficient. In hailing the strong and despising the weak, in denying that vulnerability is a basic ineluctably given human condition, a condition from which not only the role of victim springs but that of the morally responsible agent too, Nietzsche fails to be the provocateur he loves to believe he is: He sides with the complacent majority and so helps reinforce the existential and moral loneliness felt by Amery, the individual victim who speaks up precisely in that capacity" (Vetlesen 2006, 43). Perhaps we can begin to see how we have been using the weak, the viewers of Glenn Beck and others, as the targets for our need to find blameworthy agents. And that too is fine. The trouble comes when we think we've gone beyond Ressentiment when in fact we're just listening to her whisperings without realizing it. We think that we can well and truly look down on the Rush Limbaughs, these destroyers of civilization, because they are possessed by something that we are above. And far be it from me to suggest that we should not resent, should not blame; I merely suggest we direct our blame toward more useful ends than where it is currently located.

AT: Ressentiment – Perm Solves/KT Justice

Perm solves – ressentiment may often be destructive, but it is necessary for a baseline of social justice

Soloman 94

(Robert Soloman 94, Philosophy @ UT Austin, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality p. 123-124)

Nietzsche separates what he calls "justice" from the "reactive emotions," defending justice as a rare and unusually noble sentiment while attacking such emotions as resentment for their impotence. This is no less questionable. But we need not therefore disagree when he objects to the abuse of justice as a façade for the defense of one's own interests, whether in the name of "rights" or equality and we need not endorse the consequent "leveling" effect of enforced modernity. In the name of "justice," for example, one may adopt an egalitarian standpoint, but look only in one direction. The French bourgeoisie during the French Revolution only looked up at the aristocrats they wanted to replace, but they never looked down at the rest of the "third estate" who were **much worse off**. The hard question is whether there is any "neutral" social position (other than our position as outside observers) that would provide the proper standpoint for making such evaluations. Justice always begins as situated with the self and its personal passions: **but it need not therefore be selfish, and resentment need not be** petty or **opposed to** a noble sense of generosity and compassion. Indeed, given that we are not Nietzsche's fantasized Ubermenschen, wholly satisfied and in charge of our world, **it is hard to even imagine what justice**—and for that matter morality—**would be without resentment and** the modicum of **selfishness that makes it possible**. Perhaps Duhring was right: the home of justice is to be sought in the "sphere of the reactive feelings."

AT: Suffering

Injustice/Suffering Reps Good

Our critique of structural injustice turns vampirism. Contextualizing vulnerability, and the background of injustice balances emphasizing with material suffering and avoiding sentimentality

Michalinos **Zembylas 13**, Education @ Open (Cyprus), "The 'Crisis of Pity" and the Radicalization of Solidarity: Toward Critical Pedagogies of Compassion", *Educational Studies* 49, p. 512-516

First of all, a politics of compassion that takes into consideration the possible dangers of compassion fatigue, desensitization, and self-victimization has to begin from acknowledging common human vulnerability and its influence in **inspiring meaningful actions that avoid presumptuous paternalism** (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). The recognition of one's own vulnerability can constitute a powerful point of departure for developing compassion and solidarity with the other's vulnerability (Butler 2004). As Butler asserts: "Each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies. ... We cannot ... will away this vulnerability. We must attend to it" (2004, p. 29). Butler's description of the vulnerable body and self refers to the way we perform and are performed upon, and part of what we fear in the other is a projection of our own selves. Hence, Butler suggests that recognition of our own vulnerability opens up the potential for recognition of all humanity as vulnerable. Vulnerability may therefore, be a more appropriate term than suffering to ground the political applications of compassion, because **the focus is not merely on the alleviation of material suffering and hence a slide from compassion to benevolence and sentimentality** (Porter 2006; Whitebook 2002). Suggesting this epistemological shift of focus does not imply, however, **that a narrative that focuses on the alleviation of material suffering will necessarily result in a slide into sentimentality**. Undoubtedly, the political applications of compassion cannot be completely separated from questions of material suffering. Thus, it needs to be acknowledged that although the move away from suffering may be theoretically useful, the shift to a narrative of common human vulnerability is not completely unproblematic. 8 The idea of common vulnerability enables us—teachers and **students** in the classroom, for instance—to explore how we might move beyond dichotomies that single out the self or the other as victims, and therefore as deserving someone else's pity. That is, the idea of common vulnerability puts in perspective the notion of all of us as vulnerable, rather than the individual-other who needs our compassion. This notion addresses the concerns of **students**, for example, who **seem to be stuck in self-victimization claims and refuse to acknowledge that others also suffer**. Although the idea of common vulnerability does not guarantee any departure from such claims, it opens some space to problematize moralistic positioning. In addition, the notion of common vulnerability attacks a major emotional ideology grounded in the view that it is natural or normal to be fearful of the other, especially if it involves racial differences. This is one of the most common and pernicious emotional ideologies underlying resistance (especially among White, middle-class students) to identifying with the other. However, if vulnerability concerns everyone and yet compassion is assigned differently (i.e., students think that some deserve compassion but others do not), then it is important to explore what it would take for students to begin imagining themselves as objects of lesser compassion in an unsuspected vulnerable moment. Through addressing this issue in ways that do not reify stereotypes or promote essentialism, it is possible to respond to some of the desensitization concerns outlined earlier, because the dichotomies between we and they will become meaningless and unproductive. Second, **compassion serves to reinforce a strong connection between the personal and the political** and accentuates the interpersonal and the interrelational (Whitebrook 2002). **Empathetic identification with the plight of others**, then, **is not a sentimental recognition of potential sameness**—you are in pain and so am I, so we both suffer the same—**but a realization of our own common humanity, while acknowledging asymmetries of suffering**, inequality, and injustice. A discourse of vulnerability neither eschews questions of material suffering nor obscures issues of inequality and injustice; on the contrary, it highlights both the symmetries and the asymmetries of vulnerability. That is, although the experience of vulnerability may be more or less universal, the discourse of common vulnerability raises important critical questions such as "vulnerable to what? to whom?" to dismiss the possibility of sliding into a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—which is exactly what a politics of compassion ardently seeks to avoid. Without this double realization—that is, we are all vulnerable but not in the same manner—

our actions run the danger of being a form of charity and condescension toward those who are systematically and institutionally oppressed (Bunch 2002). If properly recognized in schools, this double realization can potentially address both the concern about the desensitization of students and that of their self-victimization, because the distance between spectator and sufferer will not be taken for granted any more, but rather its multiple complexities will be acknowledged and interrogated. In a sense then, the kind of compassion that is explored here requires a simultaneous identification and disidentification with the suffering of the other. The simultaneous recognition of symmetry and asymmetry with the other removes the arrogance of claiming that we know and feel their pain and suffering. This emotional ambivalence of simultaneous identification and disidentification is needed to focus attention on the other's suffering, but not becoming too identified with it—a point raised earlier in Nelson's (2004) reading of Arendt's reporting on Eichmann's trial. Students who already endure forms of suffering, of course, do not need a pedagogy to enlighten them how to disidentify with their own suffering. This does not imply, however, that pedagogies that interrogate pity and encourage critical compassion are not for them; on the contrary, the critical awareness that others are vulnerable, too, is important in the struggle for action-oriented solidarity and the avoidance of egocentricity and cultural narcissism. Finally, the third element of a politics of compassion is attentiveness to how the ethics of compassion questions injustice and inequality. 9 In particular, an important component of a politics of compassion that is critical and justice-oriented is how it deals with anger at injustice (Hoggett 2006). A politics of compassion does not intentionally seek to cause anger, however, but rather encourages students and teachers to develop a critical analysis of anger, as it is likely that they will experience such feelings, when they begin questioning long-held assumptions and beliefs about other people and social events (Zembylas 2007). Anger may call attention to demands for recognition, but also emphasize inequalities (Holmes 2004) and injustices at the civic level (Silber 2011). Anger at injustice can be a positive and powerful source of personal and political insight in education (Lorde 1984), because it helps to move teachers and students out of a cycle of self-pity, blame, or guilt into a mode of action that somehow responds to injustice. For example, civic anger can be promoted in the classroom as a form of cultivating individual and collective political consciousness and social resistance to injustices in the students' community, although anger is not inevitably emancipatory. However, recognizing the positive power of anger and its link to the struggle against injustice in one's own community is valuable, if teachers want to promote options for action that may change the conditions of others' vulnerability. The pedagogical challenge for critical pedagogues is how to encourage students to become active participants with a nuanced understanding of the emotional complexities involved in histories of injustice and oppression.

Alt Bad – Black Suffering

Alt silences black suffering

Rebecca **Wanzo 9**, Associate Professor, Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program, Washington U in St. Louis. The Suffering Will Not Be Televised, 180-3

Recognizing the political valence of pain—of **speaking pain—is essential to black survival**. Given the poorer health status of African Americans in the United States, the fact that pain is often ignored or borne silently before seeking care, and undertreated once care is sought, those who work with African Americans need to emphasize the right to tell stories of pain. Obstacles to black storytelling not only come from white institutional sources, but they also come from self-perceptions that if African Americans can claim nothing else, they can claim strength. The strong-black-woman stereotype, John Henry, the brave and stoic kids integrating the store, and other models of black strength fill the U.S. imaginary. **Reinterpreting the naming and speaking of pain can be an act of power, not an act of powerlessness.** One person who recognized the power in speaking about pain was Audre Lorde. In The Cancer Journals she described how she wanted people to respond to her cancer in a way that was atten- tive her identity, to the fact that she was black and feminist and a lesbian. After her mastectomy, she journaled, "I want to write about the pain."74 She wanted to write about the pain because she would "willingly pay whatever price in pain was needed, to savor the weight of completion; to be utterly fi lled, not with conviction nor with ¶ 181¶ faith, but with experience—knowledge, direct and different from all other certainties." Writing about the pain, speaking about the pain imparts knowledge, a different kind of knowledge than that validated by the allegedly objective methodologies of medicine and science, but knowledge nonetheless. The example of medical storytelling is a visceral example of how black pain has been dismissed or reframed in relationship to various political agendas. **Sentimental political storytelling, for all its faults, provides an important intervention**. ¶ A Coda on Moving from Spectator/ Spectacle to Agents in Our Own Care¶ This intervention can be, as in the best examples of sentimental political storytelling, both public and private, both therapeutic and a political call to arms. When I saw a call for papers for the "Anarcha Symposium," The Anarcha Project's Michigan workshop, I applied with both public and private work. I shared academic scholarship I had written about Anarcha as well as creative nonfi ction about my surgery, fi nding the rare space in the academy that made space for both. Called together in 2007, many of us engaged in scholarship who did not see ourselves as scholars, in creative performance when we did not see ourselves as performers. The group who came together to discuss Anarcha, J. Marion Sims, and the issues the history raised were eclectic: undergraduates taking classes in disability studies, scholars and performers who focused on African American culture, dancers, singers, those who had movement constraints, and those of us who had constraints that were less visible. Over the course of a few days we performed physical and mental exercises, bonding in both small and large groups in order to shape a performance at the end of our time together. We were transformed from spectators into spectacle, but it was a process of constructing a spectacle that was by no means one way—we looked back in history and looked out to those who could engage with us. While minimalist in presentation, it contained the excesses of our emotional response to Anarcha's history and our presents. ¶ If a problem with sentimental political storytelling is the conflation with other kinds of oppressed bodies, the productively messy conflations pushed us to think about a broader nexus of institutional oppression. We were divided into small performance groups, and we ¶ 182¶ struggled to fi nd a collective response that refl ected all of our readings of Anarcha's, Lucy's, and Betsey's histories, as well as the histories of other unnamed women. On a stark stage, with our bodies, micro- phones, and lights shaping the space, my group produced a short choreo-piece after two days of work in which the group collectively prompted individual stories with the refrain, "This is Anarcha's story, and . . ." it was the story of all of us. One of us challenged the his- torical record that Anarcha "willingly consented" in Sims's narrative while also addressing the issue of her relatives' lack of consent to medical experimentation during the Nazi Holocaust. Another of us without the use of her legs told the story of being sexually molested by a medical caregiver, describing "histories and futures lost . . . one black, one white, one slave, one not . . . neither touched by request, both silenced by circumstance." In drawing a comparison between the invisible stories—Anarcha's and her own—she explored how the broader issue of nonconsent and voicelessness in medical care can be read across history and identity. One of us discussed the lack of choices and resistance when fi ghting "medical men"; another discussed fear shaped by history. Drawing on my history, I added to the chorus with a recognition of my difference from Anarcha as well as my sense of connection to her: "I am not Anarcha," but see her story as my story, "not because my issues are hers, but because I need someone to hear her pain . . . and alleviate it." And as we moved in and out of our individual and collective refrains shaped by our specific stories, the chorus built community, acknowledging the differences between our histories and our similar investments at the same time. We learned, as Boal suggests in Theater of the Oppressed, to "practice theater as a language that is living and present, not as a finished product displaying images from the past."75 ¶ I fi nd telling my own story diffi cult; in some ways, telling the story of pain management after my surgery and telling of the Anarcha Symposium performance are equally diffi cult. Two spaces of judgment are possible—judgment of my tolerance for pain and judgment of my creative work, both of which are linked to what it means to make myself vulnerable. I was advised to cut my personal story from this chapter because of the danger of exposing myself. But if we take sentimental political storytelling seriously as an opportunity to treat affect and the story of pain as essential to political progress, what example would I set if I remained continually in a space of academic distance when I believe in the political efficacy ¶ 183¶ of the sentimental narrative? As a subject who has been raced and pained in the United States, I must don the mantle of articulating my affective investment in recognizing the relationship between race and pain without shame. ¶ As I say that it is hard to talk about pain—broadly—in the U.S. without talking about race, I recognize that the claim can be read as hyperbolic, and inadequately supported. The charge of hyperbole is often leveled against sentimental rhetoric. But a review of history, rhetoric, and social and medical discourse reveals that these concepts are often linked in the United States. When we recognize that we can be subjects of various discourses about race and pain, and not only subject to a specialized language, such a shift in understand- ing **may empower people**, as health-care advocates encourage, to be agents in their own care. Silence, as Audre Lorde, famously wrote, will not protect you.76 Allowing stories of pain to be silenced, dismissed, or obscured, however, will surely kill you. We must speak pain to power.

Sentiment w/ Political Action Solves

Their sentiment K is totally wrong---stories of pain combined with political action avoid vampiristic consumption and motivate effective harm-reduction

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Despite my disappointment in these films and frequent annoyance with the narrative trajectory of many of their productions, I admit that I have a bit of a soft spot for the Lifetime network. I, too, used to automatically criticize made-for-television movies "inspired by a true story" about women at risk. I found them exploitative, as any film can be that makes entertainment out of a personal tragedy. Lifetime Television has been called "television for victims," in a criticism of its seemingly endless capacity to show fi lms about the victimization of women.5 One of the questions that this moniker raises is what kind of storylines about people have the most dramatic impact. Popular fi lms with high dramatic impact depict violence, stories of surviv- ing some atypical traumatic event, or struggling with some more powerful person or entity. One aspect of the criticisms of Lifetime is the objection to formulaic melodrama in itself, framed within the gendered derision of women's victimization narratives or, on the other side of the political spectrum, discomfort with such narratives as demeaning, reductive, and trite. The fi lms shown on the network, some produced by Lifetime but most produced elsewhere, vary in quality, but the criticisms of Lifetime raise a question that I have explored throughout this book: What is the best way to represent a story of suffering? ¶ 229¶ Simply crying at a Lifetime film clearly cannot sustain any sub- stantive political work— but what if the crying citizen is directed to, at the very least, awareness, and in the best case scenario, action, after their emotional catharsis? Sorrow produced at the sight of a dead or wounded woman may not accomplish anything **unless the representation is framed in relationship to** some political action, but tears in relation to abolition and child abduction did produce action. However, a major ethical problem with using sympathy and compassion as the primary mechanism for political change is that sentimental politics depends on the cultural feelings of those in power, and the disempowered must depend on patronage. Hannah Arendt argues that compassion cannot embrace a larger population, but pity can, and pity is a dangerous affect because it cannot exist without misfortune, thus "it has just as much vested interest in the existence of the unhappy as thirst for power has a vested interest in the existence of the weak . . . by being a virtue of sentiment, pity can be enjoyed for its own sake, and this will almost automatically lead to a glorifi cation of its cause, which is the suffering of others."6 ¶ Following Arendt, the charge against Lifetime could be that it thus encourages sadism because watchers could take pleasure in pity. Or, as literary critic Marianne Noble has suggested in her study of sentimentality, the network might embrace masochism because watchers would identify with the sufferer and might begin to take pleasure in these fantasies of subjection.7 **However, these readings of the pleasures of consuming stories of subjection are too narrow**. In the case of Lifetime, casting these films as only narratives of victimization is too limited a reading. After watching several fi lms, I began to be compelled by stories I had not heard before about women interven- ing when the state fails to protect them. The stories were clearly not only about victimization, but also about survival. The movies negotiate a balance between structural critique and stories of individual heroism, and I am often disappointed, as with the fi lms discussed above, with how much weight is placed on the side of individual transformation. Nonetheless I later began defending the network out of political principle, as part of a broader effort to challenge the ¶ 230¶ facile denunciation of the word "victim." Lifetime's fi lms are often poor in terms of artistic merit, but the network is contributing to a national conversation about what agency can look like. ¶ My argument may seem as if I am looking for politics in all the wrong places, relying on sentimentality when I should focus on politically rational arguments that eschew the appeals of emotional response. I am not asking for radical progressivism from popular culture. Instead, I am arguing that politics is often accomplished through the popular and conventional work of emotional appeals, as many activists throughout history have demonstrated. The question facing activists for African American women—or, for that matter, advocates for any identity group outside the national imaginary of ideal citizenship—is not only how to expose discrimination, but also how to make use of existing rhetoric so that attacks on their bodies can be read as pressing concerns for all U.S. citizens. Affect and popular culture can be easily criticized as tools of anti-intellectual conservative machines. As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno rightly argue, popular culture focuses on producing narratives of comfort or affects that can ultimately serve the state's purposes.8 Totally escaping the political storytelling of the status quo elicited by mass-produced texts is indeed impossible. However, the impossibility of total escape does not preclude the possibility of making use of tools produced by ideology. Mobilizing affect demands use of proven rhetorical tools, but this use need not forestall a criticism of the need to employ the structures in the first place. Negotiating the relationship between challenging the "master's tools" and making use of them to garner financial support and political power is not an easy project, but it is a necessary one. ¶The book's title is inspired by this very tension between see- ing popular

cultural productions as inevitably politically ineffi cacious and recognizing the possibilities offered by making use of widely circulated genres and media. When Gil Scott-Heron produced his famous choreo-poem, "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised," in 1974, he called attention to the disconnect between radical action and violent struggles taking place in the streets and the pleasures of oblivion offered by scripted television and commercials.9 Television stood in for mass-produced media that would not show what was really occurring in the streets, like "pigs shooting down brothers in instant replay." Scott-Heron pointed to the need for his audience to take to the streets and participate, live, in the revolution. Indeed, a ¶ 231¶ rue revolution requires "live" political action and organizing, and television and many cultural productions neglect a multitude of issues that are politically urgent. However, it is clearly no longer the case that "pigs shooting down brothers in the street is left off of instant replay." Important events are depicted on the news, in scripted tele- vision shows, in genre fi ction, in magazines, in movies, and on the Internet. You can even catch the occasional social message in a television commercial. Rather than reject various media wholesale, we are left with a set of questions about what to do with contemporary media realities. How and why are certain kinds of traditionally neglected issues represented? Once represented, how are they interpreted, and can activists play a role in that interpretation? What do activists do about the complexities lost when they make use of certain kinds of mass-marketed discourses? ¶ Octavia Butler perhaps best articulated this problem in her science-fi ction novel Parable of the Talents. The novel exemplifi es what Lauren Berlant calls the postsentimental text—one that exhibits longing for the unconfl icted intimacy and political promise senti- mentality offers but is skeptical of the ultimate political effi cacy of making feeling central to political change. Her heroine, Olamina, suffers from "hyperempathy" syndrome, which allows her to feel the emotions of others, but Butler is careful to argue that being able to feel the pain of others is not the means for liberation—it is a "delusional disorder." Thus Olamina focuses on other modes of political change, and struggles to gain followers for her politi- cal and spiritual project for survival, Earthseed, in a United States devastated by environmental destruction and the domination of a repressive fusion of government and a religious right organiza- tion called Christian America. Through Olamina's struggle, Butler addresses the intellectual discomfort with consumption by having a character explicitly argue that only strategic commodifi cation will result in successful dissemination of radical ideas. Olamina struggles with the means by which she can circulate Earthseed, until someone suggests to her that she must use the marketing tools she slightly disparages to compel people to her project. Her companion, Len, argues that Olamina must "focus on what people want and tell them how your system will help them get it." She resists the call to "preach" the way her Christian American enemy Jarret does, rejecting "preaching," "telling folksy stories," emphasizing a profi t motive, and self-consciously using her charismatic persona to sell Earthseed. ¶ 232¶ Len argues that her resistance to using the tools of commodifi cation "leaves the fi eld to people who are demagogues—to the Jarrets of the world."10 Butler ultimately presents the moral that the project of producing populist texts for mass consumption cannot be left to those with unproductive or dangerous dreams, abandoned by a Left that desires not only revolution but also political change resulting in real material gains.¶ Clearly, the productions of mass-culture are not the only way to move people to action, but they are no doubt a tool. The dismissiveness accompanying the label of the sentimental in contemporary culture is because academic critics claim that it does not do anything, it is the antithesis of action. However, this book is about how sentimentality is doing things all the time. For better or worse, it teaches people to identify "proper" objects of sympathy. It teaches people how to relate to each other. It teaches people how to make compelling arguments about their pain. The circulation of sentimental political storytelling often depends on media to which many progressives have a schizophrenic relationship. News media and television are often tools of the state, but citizens depend on the news for the free circulation of information and often look for progressive politics in television shows. Others disavow the "idiot box" altogether and have faith only in alternative news sources. However, the dichotomy between the popular and other spaces in which people tell stories about suffering is a false one. Sentimental political storytelling is omnipresent in U.S. culture. While the discourse has many short-comings, people interested in political change are taking a perilous road if they ignore the possibilities of imperfect stories told about citizens in pain.

Perm Solves

That's best --- sentimentality is politically effective when it is recognized as part of a larger project

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However, sentimentality cannot easily be understood as progressive or conservative. When theorists criticize producers of sentimentality for conservative politics, they sometimes attack a rhetoric that is reactionary or designed to serve the status quo. At other times, such critics express disappointment at a text's possibly radical revolutionary or otherwise progressive potential having been short-circuited in favor of feel-good closure offered by the sentimental narrative. World Trade Center provoked exactly this response from movie critic David Edelstein, who wanted the fi lm about the event of 9/11 to be "more political," because the "heartwarming conclusion" to the fi lm is "unrepresentative—to the point where it almost seems like a denial of the deeper and more enduring horror."22 Sentimental texts present themselves frequently as progressive about social justice issues while they eventually preserve the status quo. Indeed, that is an overlying tendency of most sentimental texts. However, the binaries of good and bad, Left and Right are insufficient to categorize sentimentality as it does, by its nature, have a progressive political thrust. It addresses the suffering of the politically disadvantaged but utilizes conventional narratives and practices that will not fundamentally disrupt power. Rather than characterizing U.S. sentimentality as "good" or "bad" politics, a more precise characterization—albeit more of a mouthful and less dramatic—is to call it a **politically effective** but insufficient means of political change.

Agamben

AT: 'Becoming 1ˢᵗ'

Flux Kills Institutions

Openness to flux and constant becoming destroys the foundations for political institutions necessary to sustain radical democratic life---some universal, "fixed" guarantees of equality are crucial to politics

Joseph **Schwartz 8**, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, The Future of Democratic Equality, 56-61

Butler, Brown, and Connolly reject the essentialism of "narrow" identity politics as an inverted "ressentiment" of the Enlightenment desire for a universal, homogenized identity. They judge identity politics to be a politics of "wounding, resentment, and victimization" that only can yield bad-faith moralization Wendy Brown takes to task identity politics for "essentializing" conceptions of group identity. For example, she critiques the work of Catherine MacKinnon as epitomizing "identity" political theory, accusing MacKinnon of denying women agency by depicting them purely as victims.38 Brown also remains wary of the patriarchal, conformist nature of traditional left conceptions of solidarity and citizenship. Brown's implicit concept of radical democratic citizenship rests upon the recognition that political identity is continually in flux and is socially constituted through "agonal" political struggle. Brown celebrates an Arendtian conception of a polity in which both shared and particular identities are continually open to reconstruction. In this "left Nietzschean" view of an "everyperson's" will to power, there can be no cultural certainties or political givens, as such "givens" would repress difference and fluidity.39 But, if the human condition is a world of permanent flux, then we must postulate a human capability of living with constant insecurity, for in this world there can be no stable political institutions or political identities.40 An ability to calculate the probabilities of political actions or public policies would disappear in this world of infinite liminality. By assuming that the pre-eminent democratic value is that of leaving all issues as permanently open to question, post-structuralist "democratic theory" eschews the theoretical and political struggle over what established institutions and consensual values are needed to underpin a democratic society. ¶ Post-structuralist analysis has contributed to a healthy suspicion of narrow and "essentializing" identity politics. But a self-identified feminist, African- American, or lesbian activist is likely to value the shared historical narratives that partly constitute such group identities. Of course, if one is a democrat and a pluralist, one would reject the oppressive homogenization and potentially authoritarian aspects of ethnic or racial chauvinism and of "essentializing" types of identity politics. The democratic political home should be open, fluid, and self-reflective; but if participation is to be open to all, then such a society also needs to reproduce a shared democratic culture and the institutional guarantee of democratic rights. That is, contrary to post-structuralist analysis, not all issues can be open to "agonal struggle" in a democratic society. The traditional radical democratic critique of democratic capitalism remains valid; the equal worth of the individual is devalued by rampant social inequality within and between groups. Thus, a radical democrat, whether post-structuralist or not, must not only be committed to institutional protections of political and civil rights, but also to social rights—the equal access to the basic goods of citizenship (education, health care, housing, child care). Of course, the precise nature and extent of these rights will be politically contested and constructed. But a democratic society cannot leave as totally "open" the minimal institutional basis of democracy— a democratic society cannot be agnostic as to the value of freedom of speech, association, and universal suffrage.¶ Social movements fighting for an expansion of civil, political, and social rights, rarely, if ever, rest their arguments on appeals to epistemological truths— whether "foundational" or "anti-foundational." To remain democratic, their policy goals cannot be so specific that they preclude political argument about both their worth and how best to institutionalize them. If social movements in a 58 democratic society deemed that every policy defeat meant a betrayal of basic democratic principles, there would be no give-and-take or winners and losers within democratic politics. But if a government were to abolish freedom of speech and competitive elections, or deny a social group basic rights, it would be reasonable for an observer to judge that democratic principles had been violated. Democratic political movements and coalitions struggle to construct shared meanings about those political, civil, and social rights that should be guaranteed to all citizens—and they often work to expand the types of persons to be recognized as citizens (such as excluded immigrants). Such arguments are inevitably grounded in normative arguments that go beyond merely asserting the import of "flux," "difference," and "anti-essentialism." The civil rights movement did not demand equal rights for all solely as an "agonal" assertion of the will of the excluded; they desired to gain for persons of color an established set of civil and political rights that had been granted to some citizens and denied to others. The movement correctly assumed that the exclusion of citizens from full political and civil rights violated the basic norms of a democratic society. Thus, postmodern epistemological commitments to "flux" and "openness" cannot in-and-of-themselves sustain the "fixed" moral positions needed to sustain a radical democracy.¶ Post-structuralist theorists openly proclaim their hostility to all philosophical "meta-narratives." They reject comprehensive conceptions of how society operates and the type of society that would best instantiate human freedom. But post-structuralists go beyond rejecting "meta-narratives"; they insist that only an "anti-foundational" epistemology can ground a politics of emancipation. For Butler, Brown, and Connolly, not only do "meta-discourses" invariably fail in their efforts to ground moral positions in a theory of human nature or human reason. They also assert that an

agonal politics of democratic "we" formation can alone sustain democratic society. This agonal politics, they claim, can only be sustained by a recognition of the inconstant signification of discourse and the ineluctable flux of personal and group identity.41 Rejecting the authoritarian, celebration of the "ubermensch" by Nietzsche, they offer a post-Nietzschean, "amoral" conception of democracy as an open-ended project of defining a self and community that is constantly open to the desires of "others." These theorists constantly reiterate the definitiveness (dare we say "foundational truth") of this grounding of democracy, despite the historical reality that social movements often contest dominant narratives in the name of a stable alternative narrative of a democratic and pluralist community.¶ One might well contend that the post-structuralist political stance is guilty of a new meta-narrative of "bad faith," that of "anti-foundationalism." According to this anti-foundational politics, a true democrat must reject any and all a priori truths allegedly grounded upon the nature of human reason or human nature. A committed democrat may well be skeptical of such neo-Kantian or neo-Hegelian conceptions of freedom; but, many committed democrats justify their moral commitments using these philosophical methods. A democrat might also reject (or accept) the arguments of a Jurgen Habermas or Hans Georg Gadamer that the structure of human linguistic communication contains within it the potential for a society based on reasoned argument rather than manipulation and domination. But there are numerous other philosophically "pragmatic" ways to justify democracy, even utilitarian ones. Political democrats may well disagree about the best philosophical defense of democracy. But, invariably, "practicing democrats" will defend the belief (however philosophically "proved" or "justified") that democratic regimes best fulfill the moral commitment to the equal worth of persons and to the equal potential of human beings to freely develop and pursue their life plans.¶ To contend that only an anti-foundationalist, anti-realist epistemology can sustain democracy is to argue precisely for a foundational metaphysical grounding for the democratic project. It is to contend that one's epistemology determines one's politics. Hence, Brown and Butler both spoke at a spring 1998 academic conference at the University of California at Santa Cruz where some attributed "reactionary" and "left cultural conservatism" to belief in "reactionary" "foundationalist humanism."42 Post-structuralism cannot escape its own essentialist conception of identity. For example, Butler contends in Feminist Contentions that democratic feminists must embrace the post-structuralist "nondefinability of woman" as best suited to open democratic constitution of what it is to be a "woman."43 But this is itself a "closed" position and runs counter to the practices of many democratic feminist activists who have tried to develop a pluralist, yet collective identity around the shared experiences of being a woman in a patriarchal society (of course, realizing that working-class women and women of color experience patriarchy in some ways that are distinct from the patriarchy experienced by middle-class white women).¶ One query that post-structuralist theorists might ask themselves: has there ever existed a mass social movement that defined its primary "ethical" values as being those of "instability and flux"? Certainly many sexual politics activists are cognizant of the fluid nature of sexuality and sexual and gender identity. But only a small (disproportionately university educated) segment of the women's and gay and lesbian movement would subscribe to (or even be aware of) the core principles of post-structuralist "anti-essentialist epistemology." Nor would they be agnostic as to whether the state should protect their rights to express their sexuality. Post-structuralist theorists cannot avoid justificatory arguments for why some identities should be considered open and democratic and others exclusionary and anti-democratic. That is, how could post-structuralist political theorists argue that Nazi or Klan "ethics" are antithetical to a democratic society—and that a democratic society can rightfully ban certain forms of "agonal" (e.g. harassing forms of behavior against minorities) struggle on the part of such anti-democratic groups.

Alt Fails

The alt fails---deriding all attempts at action as "freezing becoming" no way to deal with difficult political choices---we also control terminal uniqueness because they can't convince <u>others</u> to abandon liberal subjectivity

Schartz 8

(Joseph Schwartz 8, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, The Future of Democratic Equality, 56-62)

A <u>politics of radical democratic pluralism cannot be securely grounded by a</u> whole-hearted <u>epistemological critique of "enlightenment rationality." For implicit to any radical democratic project is a belief in the equal moral worth of persons; to embrace such a position renders one at least a "critical defender" of enlightenment values of equality and justice,</u> even if one rejects "enlightenment metaphysics" and believes that such values are often embraced by non-Western cultures. Of course, **democratic norms are developed by political practice and** 60 **struggle** rather than **by** abstract **philosophical argument**. But this is a sociological and historical reality rather than a trumping philosophical proof. <u>Liberal democratic publics rarely ground their politics in coherent ontologies and epistemologies; and even among trained philosophers there is no necessary connection between one's metaphysics and one's politics.</u> There have, are, and will be Kantian conservatives (Nozick), liberals (Rawls), and radicals (Joshua Cohen; Susan Okin); teleologists, left, center, and right (Michael Sandel, Alasdair McIntyre, or Leo Strauss); anti-universalist feminists (Judith Butler, Wendy Brown) and quasi-universalist, Habermasian feminists (Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser).¶ Post-structuralists try to read off from an epistemology or ontology a politics; such attempts simply replace enlightenment meta-narratives with postmodern (allegedly anti) meta-narratives. Such efforts represent an idealist version of the materialist effort—which post-structuralists explicitly condemn—to read social consciousness off of the structural position of "the agent." A <u>democratic political theory must offer both a</u> theory of <u>social structure and</u> of the <u>social agents capable of building such a society</u>. In exchanging the gods of Weber and Marx for Nietzsche and Heidegger (or their epigones Foucault and Derrida), <u>poststructuralist theory</u> has <u>abandoned</u> the <u>institutional analysis</u> of social theory <u>for the **idealism** of abstract philosophy.</u> ¶ Connolly, Brown, and Butler reject explicit moral deliberation as a bad faith Nietzschean attempt at "ressentiment." Instead, they celebrate the amoral, yet ethical strivings of a Machiavellian or Gramscian realist "war of position."44 Sheldon Wolin, however, has written convincingly of how Machiavelli can be read as an ethical realist, a theorist of moral utilitarianism.45 Even a Machiavellian or Gramscian political "realist" must depend upon moral argument to justify the social utility of hard political choices. That is, if one reads both as ethical utilitarians who believe that, at times, one must "dirty" one's hands in order to act ethically in politics, then they embrace a utilitarian, "just war" theory of ethical choice. According to this consequentialist moral logic, "bad means" are only justifiable if they are the only, unavoidable way to achieve a greater ethical good—and if the use of such "bad means" are absolutely minimized. Such **"hard" political choices yield** social **policies** and political outcomes **that fix identities as well as transform them**. ¶ Not only in regard to epistemological questions has post-structuralist theory created a new political "metaphysics" which misconstrues the nature of democratic political practice; <u>the post-structuralist analysis of</u> "the death of man" and "**the death of the subject**" also **radically preclude meaningful political agency**. As with Michel Foucault, Butler conceives of "subjects" as "produced" by powerknowledge discourses. In Butler's view, the modernist concept of an autonomous subject is a "fictive construct"; and the very act of adhering to a belief in autonomous human choice is to engage in "exclusion and differentiations, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy."46 That is, the power of discourse, of language and the unconscious, "produces subjects." <u>If those "subjects" conceive of themselves as having the capacity for conscious choice, they are guilty of "repressing" the manner in which their own "subjectivity" is itself produced by discursive</u> 61 exclusion: "if we agree that politics and a power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction."47 Susan Bickford pithily summarizes the post-structuralist rejection of the modernist subject: "power is not wielded by autonomous subjects; rather through power, subjectivity is crafted."48 Bickford grants that post-structuralism provides some insight into how group and individual identity is "culturally constructed." But Bickford goes on to contend that after post-structuralism exposes the "lie of the natural" (that there are no natural human identities), "socially constructed" modern **individuals still wish to act in consort** with others **and to use** human **communication to influence others**: "**people generally understand themselves as culturally constituted and capable of agency**."49¶ For if there is no

"doer behind the deed," but only "performative" acts that constitute the subject, how can the theorist (or activist) assign agency or moral responsibility to actors who are "constituted by discursive practices." ("Discursive practices" engaged in by whom, the observer may ask?) Butler insists that not only is the subject "socially constituted" by power/knowledge discourses, but so too is the "ontologically reflexive self" of the enlightenment. Now if this claim is simply that all social critics are socially-situated, then this view of agency is no more radical a claim than that made by Michael Walzer in his conception of the social critic (or agent). Walzer argues that even the most radical dissident must rely upon the critical resources embedded within his own culture (often in the almost-hidden interstices of that culture).

Effective critical agency cannot depend on some abstract universal, external logic.50 Asserting that critical capacities are themselves socially constructed provides the reader with no means by which to judge whether forms of "resistance" are democratic and which are not. That is, no matter how hard one tries to substitute an aesthetic, "ironic," "amoral ethical sensibility" for morality, the social critic and political activist cannot escape engaging in moral argument and justification with fellow citizens.¶ Butler astutely notes that "resistance" often mirrors the very powerknowledge discourses it rejects—resisting hegemonic norms without offering alternative conceptions of a common political life. But Butler seems to affirm the possibility (by whom?) of effective rejection of such "norming" by "performative resignification." But the "resignification" of "performative" discursive constructions provides no criteria by which to judge whether a given "resignification" is emancipatory or repressive.51 And just who (if not a relatively coherent, choosing human subject) is "performing" the resignification. Furthermore, if all forms of identity and social meaning are predicated upon "exclusion," then the democratic theorist needs to distinguish among those identities which "exclude" in a democratic way and those which exclude in an anti-humanist, racist, and sexist manner. Some social "identities" are democratic and pluralist, such as those created by voluntary affiliations. But other "identities," such as structural, involuntary class differences and racial and sexual hierarchies, must be transformed, even eliminated, if democracy is to be furthered. And how we behave—or "perform"—can subvert (or reinforce) such undemocratic social structures. But if these social structures are immutably inscribed by62 "performative practices," then there can be no democratic resistance. In her call for an ironic politics of "performative resistance," Butler seems to imply that human beings have the capacity to choose which "performative practices" to engage in—and from which to abstain. If this is the case, then a modernist conception of agency and moral responsibility has covertly snuck its way back into Butler's political strategy.52

AT: Change us = Change Institutions

The alternative's emphasis on self-artistry is <u>anti-democratic</u> and has no hope of effectuating political change

Myers 13

(Ella Myers 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at the University of Utah, 2013, Worldly Ethics: Democratic Politics and Care for the World, p. 44-45)

Unfortunately, Connolly is inconsistent in this regard, for he also positions Foucauldian self- artistry as an "essential preliminary to," and even the necessary "condition of," change at the macropolitical level.104 That is, although Connolly claims that micropolitics and political movements work "in tandem," each producing effects on the other,105 he sometimes privileges "action by the self on itself" as a starting point and necessary prelude to macropolitical change. This approach not only avoids the question of the genesis of such reflexive action and its possible harmful effects but also indicates that collective efforts to alter social conditions actually await proper techniques of the self. For example, in a rich discussion of criminal punishment in the United States, Connolly contends that "today the micropolitics of desire in the domain of criminal violence has become a condition for a macropolitics that reconfigures existing relations between class, race, crime and punishment."106 Here and elsewhere in Connolly's writing the sequencing renders these activities primary and secondary rather than mutually inspiring and reinforcing.107¶ It is a mistake to grant chronological primacy to ethical self-intervention, however. How, after all, is such intervention, credited with producing salient effects at the macropolitical level, going to get off the ground, so to speak, or assuredly move in the direction of democratic engagement (rather than withdrawal, for example) if it is not tethered, from the beginning, to public claims that direct attention to a specific problem, defined as publicly significant and changeable? How and why would an individual take up reflexive work on the desire to punish if she were not already attuned, at least partially, to problems afflicting current criminal punishment practices? And that attunement is fostered, crucially, by the macropolitical efforts of democratic actors who define a public matter of concern and elicit the attention of other citizens.108¶ For reflexive self- care to be democratically significant, it must be inspired by and continually connected to larger political mobilizations. Connolly sometimes acknowledges that the arts of the self he celebrates are not themselves the starting point of collaborative action but instead exist in a dynamic, reciprocal relation with cooperative and antagonistic efforts to shape collective arrangements. Yet the self's relation with itself is also treated as a privileged site, the very source of democratic spirit and action.¶ This tendency to prioritize the self's reflexive relationship over other modes of relation defines the therapeutic ethics that ultimately emerges out of Foucault's and, to a lesser degree, Connolly's work. This ethics not only elides differences between caring for oneself and caring for conditions but also celebrates the former as primary or, as Foucault says, "ontologically prior." An ethics centered on the self's engagement with itself may have value, but it is not an ethics fit for democracy.

Fails

The alt fails and locks in the status quo approach to surveillance ---the embrace of \<contingency, radical democracy, alterity\> discounts the role of political institutions in modern life and reduces politics to an individualistic project of ethical self-improvement and becoming

Lavin 6

(Chad, teaches political theory at Tulane University, Fear, Radical Democracy, and Ontological Methadone, Polity (2006) 38, 254-275

While liberalism exhorts us to take comfort in the promises and assurances of a fixed identity, radical democracy suggests revealing this identity for the reification that it is so that we can move beyond a tolerant modus vivendi and toward an ethical comportment of generosity and meaningful democracy. They prescribe, as a cure for postmodern agency panic, an enthusiastic embrace of the contingency of everyday life, a series of practices of the self that force an examination of the existential resentment felt by subjects of liberal capitalism: Don't adhere to a manufactured map! Learn to be at home in homelessness! The problem of fear, they suggest, resides in a dogmatic clinging to an untenable and disintegrating myth of subjectivity with an unrealizable promise of control. Their response to the fear of homelessness runs directly counter to the conspiracy theorist: with a model of contingency rather than conspiracy, there are no villains, thus no reservoir for depositing and segregating one's fear. Rather than depositing this fear at the feet of a scapegoat, face it; overcome it.¶ While challenging the liberal fetish for reifying a historical production and thus closing the door on possibilities for alternative subjects to emerge, radical democrats also acknowledge the work done by liberalism to remove metaphysical obstacles to the expression of agency. As such, their claim is not antiliberal so much as it is postliberal, interrogating the limits of the liberal subject in pursuit of a more open approach to identity and difference. For the identities and attachments that have been forged through liberalism are anything but fetters to the unhindered exercise of democracy and production of difference. They are not only productive of many of the freedoms that we enjoy today in the liberal world (e.g., civil rights and liberties, relative government accountability), they also offer valuable solace from a hostile and increasingly unpredictable existence. But because the prescription for those suffering from agency panic tends to be found in the capitalist myths of merit, autonomy, and authenticity, we might look at liberalism as the opiate of the people, easing our pain, but preventing us from doing the work necessary to attend to the source of our ills. Perhaps liberalism, then, for all its value and appeal, is a habit we need to kick. Radical democrats recommend sobering up and facing our fears head-on. But where's the Betty Ford Center for radical democracy?¶ If the fundamentalist drive to reify assumptions and the democratic drive to challenge them are two responses to the same panic that results from social pluralization (as Connolly convincingly claims), the question remains: why do some subjects flee from this fear (through fundamentalism), while others draw from it strength and forbearance (through radical democracy)? What resources allow some subjects to respond to revealed inadequacies of their foundational beliefs with a gracious humility while others respond by desperately clinging to and fundamentalizing the contested position?¶ The short answer is that the democratic move is not an easy one to make. While liberal cognitive maps respond to the complexity of contemporary power networks with a promise of predictability and stability through the claims to fixed identity, rational control, and market efficiency, radical democracy promises precisely what subjects of liberalism fear: enduring instability. The ethos of forbearance asks subjects not only to accept social and political instability today, but ontological instability forever after (whereas the fundamentalizing moves promise order not only in the future, but now). By introducing contingency into the very substance of being, this approach leaves us in indeterminacy without even a promise of finding answers; it is "tentative, experimental," emphasizing the need for perpetual work of "cultivation" without the promise of attaining a stable system;41 it is "a risky and ambiguous enterprise" always threatening to destroy self-confidence as soon as it is built;42 it offers "no necessary political consequences," but only possible gains in freedom.43¶ Going back to Hobbes, radical democrats suggest that we should embrace rather than run from or even merely tolerate the very conditions we fear: unknowability, instability, and discord. Further, Connolly and Butler insinuate unmistakably that liberal authenticity has been thoroughly debunked, still adhered to only by potential or actual fascists who (at best) have been thoroughly colonized by the culture industry and the ideological apparatuses of the state or (at worst) have no sympathy for the contemporary movements interested in expanding the democratic web to include currently disenfranchised populations. They thus imply that it is the social critic who bears the mantle of democracy, and that it is not fear but a stubborn authoritarian desire that obliges resistors to slap the table to illustrate its non-discursiveness and pound their chests to prove their individuated, corporeal, nonporous existence. (A spectre is haunting criticism—the spectre of Leninism.) We can almost hear radical democrats responding that liberal individualists have nothing to lose but their chains.¶ But if the reigning paradigms of identity

and order offer solace from an increasingly indeterminate and unpredictable world (complete with massive layoffs, abandonment of traditional gender norms, declining national sovereignty, and other existential disintegrations), then by what standard can radical democrats call upon the subjects of liberal capitalism to reject the myths that make lives livable? These calls might be the ontological counterpart of ham-fisted approaches to drug abuse, exhorting addicts to take responsibility for themselves and quit cold turkey, with little attention to the social and psychological dynamics that lead millions of users to abuse narcotics, hallucinogens, opiates, and amphetamines—be they consumers of heroin, religious fervor, Xanax, or extreme corn chips and suburban assault vehicles.¶ The sales pitch for radical democracy rarely accounts for the degree to which citizens are interpellated as subjects of fear. Connolly is more than aware of the interpellations that subjects of capitalism receive; large sections of The Ethos of Pluralization are dedicated to the relationship between economic anxiety and the drive to fundamentalism, and Why I Am Not a Secularist is largely an indictment of secularism (and much of American liberalism) for failing to account for the habits inscribed on the body that rational argumentation cannot erase.44 His attention to what he calls "the visceral register," and his recommendation that the left take a lesson from William Bennett on how to appeal to this register is both compelling and timely.45 Unfortunately, Connolly's intellectual trajectory has shifted away from the social and political apparatuses which inculcate these habits and toward the level of neurology to explain the inward mechanisms of habits and ethics;46 while he never denies the relevance of social and political institutions (he merely argues that "too many cultural theorists" ignore the biological components of thinking and ethics), his trajectory has led him to speak more about what practices of the self might lead to more democracy and less about the institutional production of subjects who actually fear democracy.47 As White convincingly argued well before this latest turn toward biological studies, Connolly takes attitudes to have primacy over issues of justice, leading him to prematurely curtail pursuit of the obviously compatible institutional dimension of criticism.48¶ The common scoundrel in such critiques of liberalism, the prototypical antidemocratic citizen, is typified by Archie Bunker and his white working-class buddies. Resentful, socially and economically conservative, and easily seduced by reactionary propagandists, this was the face of fundamentalism before 9/11. Notably, this is a population whose economic viability and (therefore) ability to live up to conventional norms of masculinity have been taking it in the gut in recent decades. Identifying the threats that have constituted this subject, Connolly notes the familiar targets: civil rights, Vietnam, feminism, dismantling of the welfare state, environmentalism, and a decline in the availability of industrial jobs.49 Along with these transformations in established relations of power, we can also add to this list (which Connolly may or may not have intended to be exhaustive) the supposed death of grand narratives declared by critical intellectuals. Traditional cognitive maps are not only becoming obsolete in the wake of shifting terrain, but they are being criticized for being defective from the get-go. Given this, is the rise in public fear a surprise? As Jameson's, Melley's, and Furedi's attention to the paucity of concepts suggests, isn't the declining availability of cognitive maps to those threatened by shifting networks of power a prime candidate for Connolly's list?50¶ If fundamentalisms feed on the anxieties endemic to late capitalist (dis)order; if market ideology, conspiracy theories, and aggressive nostalgia are degraded attempts to construct cognitive maps that might provide threatened subjects with a sense of agency; what does radical democracy offer in their stead? Traditional fundamentalisms are popular precisely because they treat the agency panic and existential angst accelerated by global capitalism and postmodern culture. Again, Connolly recognizes the absence of viable democratic supplements to the decline of grand narratives, and he laments that the world's most zealous moralizers have effectively filled that void. But claims that rethinking liberalism's ontological commitments cannot be an afterthought of political emancipation (but must be coterminous with or preliminary to it), betray an inattention to how a postmodern ethos is intimately tied to the various psychological, economic, and political securities that cognitive maps often provide. While Connolly's diagnosis of fundamentalist epidemics clearly highlights their social and economic roots, he presents a postmodern sensibility as a treatment for the anxieties of identity without considering the role that this move may have played in actually producing those anxieties by threatening the cherished existence of those perhaps most in need of their help.51 My concern is not the diagnosis, but the prescription, as it is for a regimen that few have any interest in adopting.¶ Radical democracy is premised on the idea that its ontology and ethics are necessary to an enactment of the pluralism that liberalism purports to offer, transcending mere tolerance toward a generous fostering of otherness and a meaningfully democratic way of life. At the same time, however, it is insensitive to the profound threat that genealogy poses to those who receive their only respite from a truly tenuous existence from their myths. While its pitch suggests that it is ontologically more defensible, ethically more admirable, and practically more conducive to a generous ethical-political comportment (contentions with which I agree, incidentally), it does not consider the sheer difficulty (and often terror) in adopting such a position. Certainly, it does not speak to the members of society who are

the most economically, politically, and/or socially disadvantaged, whose daily survival is so tenuous as to not provide the luxury for the practices of self-cultivation which it advocates.¶ I am far from the first to call attention to the dangers of and aversions to genealogy. The aristocratic baggage of Nietzscheanism, from which radical democrats have vigorously sought to distance themselves, stems largely from Nietzsche's acknowledgement of the difficulties of abandoning foundations. No friend of pity, Nietzsche nevertheless prescribes revaluing our constitutive values only to a privileged class, maintaining that we cannot ask lambs to be birds of prey.52 Similarly, William James discusses the differential capacities of modern subjects to be at home in homelessness, expressing concern for those who might not be ready or able to make such a move. He argues (with unfortunate terminology) that the "healthy" has a responsibility to attend to the "sick" soul, and that some are not ready, willing, or able to abandon their most cherished myths: "Some constitutions need them too much."53 Returning to our liberal fundamentalist, Rorty emphasizes that "most people" are not interested in facing the contingency of their identities, and that "there is something very cruel about" revealing their contestability and groundlessness.54¶ While these arguably elitist arguments might sit uncomfortably with the radically democratic impulses of Connolly and Butler, which is more democratic: Throwing everybody into the same pool? Or realizing that not everybody knows how to swim? Or realizing that some citizens, having seen their parents devoured by sharks, might think the waters unsafe? Connolly reads Rorty's courteous capitulation to fear as an abandonment of irony precisely where it is most important. Whereas Rorty coddles subjects of fear, Connolly scolds them for their cowardice.55¶ I do not mean to suggest that consistency would oblige radical democrats to respect discourses hostile to pluralization (Connolly addresses this issue repeatedly). Nor do I want to imply that we should refrain from attacking the antidemocratic presumptions of various fundamentalisms. But I am concerned that the approach to fundamentalism in this literature is something much closer to hostility than sympathy (to say nothing of empathy). For all of its talk of generosity, radical democracy remains quite stingy with regard to this issue. Accepting that there remains a compatibility between foundational thought and undemocratic or authoritarian politics, the apparent expectation that the articulation of this compatibility might convince any lingering fundamentalists of their error **is distressing**. In fact, Connolly effectively labels those lacking in the material, philosophical, or psychological resources necessary for the move he recommends latent brownshirts, thus betraying not only a commitment to liberal voluntarism, but also a striking lack of generosity toward those still in need of comforting maps.56¶ Radical democrats clearly recognize the material conditions that may not provide the comfort necessary to develop an ethos of generosity. As diagnosticians, they are certainly attuned to the tactics applied by institutions (markets, ideologies, militaries) to subjects and the constant interpellation of subjects of fear. Nevertheless, the prescribed micropolitics of desire summons a heroic capacity to respond generously to the myriad threats we encounter. Recommending that subjects abandon the cognitive maps (Christianity, conspiracy theories, market fundamentalism) that allow them to find their bearings in increasingly complicated and vast networks of power, they ultimately reduce liberal fundamentalism to a problem of individual priorities and ethical failures rather than a medical condition requiring professional treatment or (better) a **public health issue** not easily or appropriately tied to any individual's preferences. **As in contemporary U.S. drug policy** rhetoric, **the addiction is** all-**too-easily reduced to an issue of personal responsibility, taking focus away from the institutions** responsible for the daily interpellation of subjects of fear.¶ Conclusion¶ Despite a relatively mature Constitution, Americans are no strangers to instability. In recent decades, the assurances of job security and the welfare state have fallen victim to a vicious market ideology; traditional codes of masculinity and femininity have become increasingly unrealizable with Martha Stewart and J. Lo doing their best to humiliate the ladies, Bill Gates and Vin Diesel the gentlemen; and illusions of effective agency have been ravaged by unprecedented technological and geopolitical transformations. In this condition, though radical democrats denounce the comforting liberal myth of the autonomous individual as a ruse of antidemocratic power, its ideology of identity, authenticity, and responsibility provides relief from the ontological homelessness endemic to a world with ever fewer uncontested narratives. Liberalism allows us to personalize and segregate various anonymous hostilities, facilitating displacements of general anxieties onto welfare moms, homosexual teachers, professional women, non-white street criminals, Zionist Occupied Governments, and Islamic fundamentalists.¶ While the reactionary grasp at liberal fundamentalism certainly constitutes an obstacle to a democratic politics of difference, it is also the case that subjects of late capitalism are interpellated as subjects of fear, reared to understand every component of society with suspicion. Navigating the breathtaking and impersonal forces of bureaucratic capitalism with categories which emphasize (indeed, almost exclusively mention) the powers of isolated individuals, we are led to an ever more hopeless situation. As history moves on and our cognitive maps seem less and less relevant for helping us chart networks of power, we feel an overwhelming sense of powerlessness. The ideology of autonomy, authenticity, and responsibility seems an entirely logical aid for coping with this agency panic. Indeed, liberalism both creates and then assuages the fears of late capitalism.¶ In this age of Panic, in which our surroundings appear at least comparably if not more alive and efficacious than our selves, radical democrats trenchantly reveal liberal ideology as an addictive and distorting source of relief. But in prescribing a micropolitics of desire to kickstart the stalled project of democratization, they locate the work of politics in the contested site of the individual and discount the degree to which these individuals actually fear the unpredictable and radically democratic order being promised. Contesting the validity of the cognitive maps most commonly used to steer a course through institutions of social and political power, they ask subjects to

abandon the anesthetizing components of liberal fundamentalism for a world composed of unstable identities and provisional reconciliations that are grounded in a set of ontological commitments that are weak at best. But as all but the most steadfast purveyors of simplification in the so-called war on drugs realize, addiction is inscribed on the body, and requires both desire and treatment to be overcome. Radical democrats realize why we are identity junkies. But where, oh where, are the ontological treatment centers and methadone clinics?

Queerness

Law Good

K Challenge Heteronorm

Even if the law isn't perfect, sexual activists have been able to strategically use traditional political areas in queer ways to challenge heteronormativity.

Lind 10

(Amy Lind 10, Mary Ellen Heintz Endowed Chair and Professor of Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinatti, Development, Sexual Rights and Global Governance, p 17-18)

In Chapter 8, Sangeeta Budhiraja, Susana T. Fried and Alexandra Teixeira address tensions among identity-based organizing and sexual rights advocacy. On one hand, activists around the world have addressed "lesbian and gay," and later, "lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB)," then "lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT)" or "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and questioning and or queer" (LGBTQ)" rights, the "alphabet soup" approach, as a way to make sexual and gender minorities visible in national and international political and development arenas. Yet, more recently, scholars and activists have turned toward a sexual rights framework as a way to **overcome essentialisms** in positing individuals as singular identities that are often homogenized and universalized in development discourse and practice. Drawing upon their former advocacy work at the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, the authors demonstrate the difficulties of naming and finding a common ground on a global level as well as the useful- ness of utilizing a broad-based sexual rights framework for thinking about sexual identity, gender identity, human rights, and development. They argue that a sexual rights framework allows for greater cross-movement organizing, gives deference to local activists' preferred ways of thinking of and **expressing any gender which falls outside of social and cultural norms,** and encourages modes of organizing that **do not reify gender and sexual binaries.** Yet activists must necessarily use, perhaps strategically, normative categories of gender and sexuality in order to achieve their concrete goals for legal and policy reform, a dilemma that they highlight through- out their chapter. In Chapter 9, Petra Doan discusses how increasing the visibility of gender-variant individuals in the Middle East, a region often characterized in development dis- course in orientalist terms as patriarchal and oppressive to women, might actually "queer" the development process and stimulate change on a broader scale. For Doan, genderqueerness does not begin or end in the West; rather, it has always been part of Middle Eastern societies, but it has been through powerful modern dis- courses such as that of development which have problematized these identities as abnormal or deviant. Despite colonialist legacies, it has been through the **strategic utilization of these modern discourses** that gender-variant individuals in the region have found **creative ways to organize collectively and fight for their rights**.

Other

Alt Cedes Politics

The alt cedes politics to the right and reinscribes gender roles

McCluskey 8

(Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar @ SUNY Buffalo Law (Martha, How Queer Theory Makes Neoliberalism Sexy, Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-15)

Queer theory's anti-moralism works together with its anti-statism to advance not simply "politics," but a specific vision of good "politics" seemingly defined in opposition to progressive law and morality. This anti-statist focus distinguishes queer theory from other critical legal theories that bring questions of power to bear on moral ideals of justice. Kendall Thomas (2002), for example, articulates a critical political model that sees justice as a problem of "power, antagonism, and interest," (p. 86) involving questions of how to constitute and support individuals as citizens with interests and actions that count as alternative visions of the public. Thomas contrasts this political model of justice with a moral justice aimed at discovering principles of fairness or institutional processes based in rational consensus and on personal feelings of respect and dignity. Rather than evaluating the moral costs and benefits of a particular policy by analyzing its impact in terms of harm or pleasure, Thomas suggests that a political vision of justice would focus on analyzing how policies produce and enhance the collective power of particular "publics" and "counterpublics" (pp. 91—5). From this political perspective of justice, neoliberal economic ideology is distinctly moral, even though it appears to be anti-moralist and to reduce moral principles to competition between self-interested power. Free-market economics rejects a political vision of justice, in this sense, in part because of its expressed anti-statism; it turns contested normative questions of public power into objective rational calculations of private individual sensibilities. Queer theory's similar tendency to romanticize power as the pursuit of individualistic pleasure free from public control risks disengaging from and disdaining the collective efforts to build and advance normative visions of the state that arguably define effective politics. Brown and Halley (2002), for instance, cite the Montgomery bus boycott as a classic example of the left's problematic march into legalistic and moralistic identity politics. In contrast, Thomas (2002) analyzes the Montgomery bus boycott as a positive example of a political effort to constitute a black civic public, even though the boycott campaign relied on moral language to advance its cause, because it also emphasized and challenged normative ideas of citizenship (p. 100, note 14). By glorifying rather than deconstructing the neoliberal dichotomy between public and private, between individual interest and group identity, and between demands for power and demands for protection, queer theory's anti-statism and anti-moralism plays into a right-wing double bind. In the current conservative political context, the left appears weak both because its efforts to use state power get constructed as excessively moralistic (the feminist thought police, or the naively paternalistic welfare state) and also because its efforts to resist state power get constructed as excessively relativist (promoting elitism and materialism instead of family values and community well-being). The right, on the other hand, has it both ways, asserting its moralism as inherent private authority transcending human subjectivity (as efficient market forces, the sacred family, or divine will) and defending its cultivation of self-interested power as the ideally virtuous state and market (bringing freedom, democracy, equality to the world by exercising economic and military authoritarianism). From Egalitarian Politics to Renewed Conservative Identity Queer theory's anti-statism and anti-moralism risks not only reinforcing right-wing ideology, but also infusing that ideology with energy from renewed identity politics. Susan Fraiman (2003) analyzes how queer theory (along with other prominent developments in left academics and culture) tends to construct left resistance as a radical individualism modeled on the male "teen rebel, defined above all by his strenuous alienation from the maternal" (p. xii). Fraiman observes that this left vision relies on "a posture of flamboyant unconventionality [that] coexists with highly conventional views of gender [and] is, indeed, articulated through them" (p. xiii). Fraiman links recent left contempt for feminism to a romantic vision of "coolness … epitomized by the modern adolescent boy in his anxious, self-conscious and theatricalized will to separate from the mother" who is by definition uncool—controlling, moralistic, sentimental and not sexy. (p. xii). Even though queer theory distinguishes itself from feminism by

repudiating dualistic ideas of gender, its anti-foundationalism **covertly promotes an essentialist "binary that puts femininity, reproduction, and normativity on the one hand, and masculinity, sexuality, and queer resistance on the other"** (p. 147). This binary permeates queer theory's condemnation of "governance feminism." (Brown and Halley, 2002; Wiegman, 2004) a vague category mobilizing images of the frumpy, overbearing, unexciting, unfunny, and not-so-smart "schoolmarm" (Halley, 2002) whose authority will naturally be undermined when real "men" appear on the scene. Suggesting the importance of gender conventions to the term's power, similar phrases do not seem to have gained comparable academic currency as a way to deride the complex regulatory impact of other specific uses of state authority -for instance postmodernists do not seem to widely denounce "governance anti-racism," "governance socialism," "governance populism," "governance environmentalism" or "governance masculinism" (though Brown and Halley do criticize progressive law reform more generally with the term "governance legalism" (p. 11)). Queer attraction to an adolescent masculinist idea of the "cool' dovetails smoothly with the identity politics of the right. Right-wing politics and culture similarly condemn progressive and feminist policies with the term "nanny state" (McCluskey, 2000; 2005a). The "nanny state" epithet enlists femaleness or femininity as shorthand to make some government authority feel bad to those comfortable with or excited by a masculinist moral order, it adds to this sentimental power by coding the maternal authority to be resisted as a "nanny" (rather than simply a "mommy"), enlisting identities of class, age—and perhaps race and nationality—to enhance uncritical suspicions of disorder and illegitimacy. The "nanny state" slur tells us that a rougher and tougher neoliberal state, market, and family will bring the grown-up pleasures, freedom, and power that are the mark and privilege of ideal manhood. The "nanny state" is not an isolated example of the use of gender identity to disparage progressive or even centrist policies that are not explicitly identified as feminist or gender-related. For example, "girlie-man" gained currency in the 2004 presidential election to disparage opposition to George W. Bush's right-wing economic and national security policies (Grossman and McClain, 2004), and in 2008 critics of presidential candidate Barack Obama similarly linked him to disparaging images of femininity (Campanile 2008; Faludi 2008). These terms open a window into the connections between economic libertarianism and moral fundamentalism. Libertarianism's anti-statism and anti-moralism requires sharp distinctions between public and private, morality and power, individual freedom and social coercion. The problem, if we assume these distinctions are not self-evident facts, is that libertarianism must refer covertly to some external value system to draw its lines. Identity conventions have long helped to do this work, albeit in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. Power appears weak, deceptive, illegitimate, manipulative, controlling, undisciplined, oppressive, exceptional, or naive if it is feminized; but strong, self-satisfying, public-serving, protective, orderly, rational, and a normal exercise of individual freedom if it is masculinized. Conventional political theory and culture identifies legitimate authority with an idea of a masculine power aimed at policing supposedly weaker or subordinate others. A state that publicly depends on and promotes such power enhances rather than usurps private freedom and security in citizenship, market, and family, according to the traditional theory of the patriarchal household as model for the state (see Dubber, 2005). Queer theory updates this pre-modern political ideology into smart postmodernism and transgressive politics by **re-casting its idealized masculine power in the image of a youthful and sexy disdain for feminized concerns about social, bodily, or material limits and support**. In her challenge to this queer romanticization of "coolness," Fraiman (2003) instead urges a feminism that will "question a masculinity overinvested in youth, fearful of the mutable flesh, and on the run from intimacy ... [to] claim, in its place, the jouissance of a body that is aging, pulpy, no longer intact... a subject who is tender-hearted ... who is neither too hard nor too fluid for attachment; who does the banal, scarcely narratable, but helpful things that moms' do" (p. 158). Feminist legal theory concerned with economic politics adds to this alternative vision an ideal that advances and rewards the pleasure, power, and public value of the things done by some of those moms' nannies (McCluskey, 2005a)—or by the many others engaged in the work (both paid and unpaid) that sustains and enhances others' pleasure and power in and out of the home (McCluskey, 2003a; Young, 2001). One means toward that end would be to make the domestic work (and its play and pleasure) conventionally treated as both banal or spiritual (see Roberts, 1997b) deserving of a greater share of state and market material rewards and resources on a more egalitarian basis, as Fineman's (2004) vision would do.

Security

Alt Answers

Security Alt Fails

Have to transform systems from the inside out-otherwise rhetoric changes but not policies.

McCormack 10

(Tara, PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg 59-61)

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of 'emancipatory' security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and 'blindness' to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to 'protect' and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, 'if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed' (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a 'cosmopolitan' legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today's conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis however, the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

Alt Fails

The alt fails—the system's too sticky to simply wish away

Georg **SORENSEN**, British International Studies Association, **98**

[*IR Theory after the cold war*, p. 87-88]

What, then, are the more general problems with the extreme versions of the postpositivist position? The first problem is that they tend to overlook, or downplay, the actual insights produced by non-post-positivists, such as, for example, neorealism. It is entirely true that anarchy is no given, ahistorical, natural condition to which the only possible reaction is adaptation. But the fact that anarchy is a historically specific, socially constructed product of human practice does not make it less real. In a world of sovereign states, anarchy is in fact out there in the real world in some form. In other words, it is not the acceptance of the real existence of social phenomena which produces objectivist reification. Reification is produced by the transformation of historically specific social phenomena into given, ahistorical, natural conditions.21 Despite their shortcomings, neorealism and other positivist theories have produced valuable insights about anarchy, including the factors in play in balance-of-power dynamics and in patterns of cooperation and conflict. Such insights are downplayed and even sometimes dismissed in adopting the notion of 'regimes of truth'. It is, of course, possible to appreciate the shortcomings of neorealism while also recognizing that it has merits. One way of doing so is set forth by Robert Cox. He considers neorealism to be a 'problem-solving theory' which 'takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships . . . as the given framework for action . . . . The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination'.22 At the same time, this 'assumption of fixity' is 'also an ideological bias . . . Problem-solving theories (serve) . . . particular national, sectional or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order'.23 In sum, objectivist theory such as neorealism contains a bias, but that does not mean that it is without merit in analysing particular aspects of international relations from a particular point of view. The second problem with post-positivism is the danger of extreme relativism which it contains. If there are no neutral grounds for deciding about truth claims so that each theory will define what counts as the facts, then the door is, at least in principle, open to anything goes . Steve Smith has confronted this problem in an exchange with Øyvind Østerud. Smith notes that he has never 'met a postmodernist who would accept that "the earth is flat if you say so". Nor has any postmodernist I have read argued or implied that "any narrative is as good as any other"'.24 But the problem remains that if we cannot find a minimum of common standards for deciding about truth claims a post-modernist position appears unable to come up with a metatheoretically substantiated critique of the claim that the earth is flat. In the absence of at least some common standards it appears difficult to reject that any narrative is as good as any other.25 The final problem with extreme post-positivism I wish to address here concerns change. We noted the post-modern critique of neorealism's difficulties with embracing change; their emphasis is on 'continuity and repetition'. But extreme post-positivists have their own problem with change, which follows from their metatheoretical position. In short, how can post-positivist ideas and projects of change be distinguished from pure utopianism and wishful thinking? Post-positivist radical subjectivism leaves no common ground for choosing between different change projects. A brief comparison with a classical Marxist idea of change will demonstrate the point I am trying to make. In Marxism, social change (e.g. revolution) is, of course, possible. But that possibility is tied in with the historically specific social structures (material and non-material) of the world. Revolution is possible under certain social conditions but not under any conditions. Humans can change the world, but they are enabled and constrained by the social structures in which they live. There is a dialectic between social structure and human behaviour.26 The understanding of 'change' in the Marxist tradition is thus closely related to an appreciation of the historically specific social conditions under which people live; any change project is not possible at any time. Robert Cox makes a similar point in writing about critical theory: 'Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world . . . Critical theory thus contains an element of utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order, but its utopianism is constrained by its comprehension of historical processes. It must reject improbable alternatives just as it rejects the

permanency of the existing order'.27 That constraint appears to be absent in post-positivist thinking about change, because radical post-positivism is epistemologically and ontologically cut off from evaluating the relative merit of different change projects. Anything goes, or so it seems. That view is hard to distinguish from utopianism and wishful thinking. If neorealism denies change in its overemphasis on continuity and repetition, then radical post-positivism is

Re-Thinking Fails

Individual rethinking fails -governments' obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decision making

Wight 6

(Colin, Sydney IR professor, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pg 48-50)

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. 'Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.' At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This 'lattice-work' of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: 'people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents'. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce: that is, a system of concepts designating the 'point of contact' between human agency and social structures. This is known as a 'positioned practice' system. In many respects, the idea of 'positioned practice' is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be **understood solely in terms of individual decision-making,** or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu's notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a 'social field'. According to Bourdieu, a social field is 'a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined'. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A habitus (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals' subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of 'internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.' Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the habitus and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the habitus. When placed within Bhaskar's stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, **their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness** or to the attributes **of individuals**. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion.

Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is as Foucault has put it, 'a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables'.

Liberal Int'l Good

We have a defense of the way we view international relations---game-theory proves that liberal internationalism is effective

Recchia and Doyle 11

(Stefano, Assistant Professor in International Relations at the University of Cambridge, and Michael, Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science at Columbia University, "Liberalism in International Relations", In: Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, eds., International Encyclopedia of Political Science (Sage, 2011), pp. 1434-1439)

Relying on new insights from game theory, scholars during the 1980s and 1990s emphasized that so-called international regimes, consisting of agreed-on international norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, can help states **effectively coordinate** their policies and collaborate in the production of international public goods, such as free trade, arms control, and environmental protection. Especially, if embedded in formal multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A), regimes crucially improve the availability of information among states in a given issue area, thereby promoting reciprocity and enhancing the reputational costs of noncompliance. As noted by Robert Keohane, institutionalized multilateralism also reduces strategic competition over relative gains and thus further advances international cooperation. Most international regime theorists accepted Kenneth Waltz's (1979) neorealist assurription of states as black boxes-that is, unitary and rational actors with given interests. Little or no attention was paid to the impact on international cooperation of domestic political processes and dynamics. Likewise, regime scholarship largely disregarded the arguably crucial question of whether prolonged interaction in an institutionalized international setting can fundamentally change states' interests or preferences over outcomes (as opposed to preferences over strategies), thus engendering positive feedback loops of increased overall cooperation. For these reasons, international regime theory is not, properly speaking, liberal, and the term neoliberal institutionalism frequently used to identify it is somewhat misleading. It is only over the past decade or so that liberal international relations theorists have begun to systematically study the relationship between domestic politics and institutionalized international cooperation or global governance. This new scholarship seeks to explain in particular the close interna tional cooperation among liberal democracies as well as higher-than-average levels of delegation b)' democracies to complex multilateral bodies, such as the \ Liberalism in International Relations 1437 European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NAFTA, and the WTO (see, e.g., John Ikenberry, 2001; Helen Milner & Andrew Moravcsik, 2009). The reasons that make liberal democracies particularly enthusiastic about international cooperation are manifold: First, transnational actors such as nongovernmental organizations and private corporations thrive in liberal democracies, and they frequently advocate increased international cooperation; second, elected democratic officials rely on delegation to multilateral bodies such as the WTO or the EU to commit to a stable policy line and to internationally lock in fragile domestic policies and constitutional arrangements; and finally, powerful liberal democracies, such as the United States and its allies, voluntarily bind themselves into complex global governance arrangements to demonstrate strategic restraint and create incentives for other states to cooperate, thereby reducing the costs for maintaining international order. Recent scholarship, such as that of Charles Boehmer and colleagues, has also confirmed the classical liberal intuition that formal international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) or NATO, independently contribute to peace, especially when they are endowed with sophisticated administrative structures and information-gathering capacities. In short, research on global governance and especially on the relationship between democracy and international cooperation is thriving, and it usefully complements liberal scholarship on the democratic peace.

Scenario Planning Good

Bernstein concludes aff---scenario planning is good

Bernstein 2

(Steven, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber, University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley. "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems" European Journal of International Relations 2000; 6; 43

One useful alternative approach is the development of **scenarios**, or narratives with plot lines that map a set of causes and trends in future time. This forward reasoning strategy is based on a notion of **contingent causal mechanisms, in opposition to the standard**, neo-positivist focus on efficient causes, but with no clear parallel in evolutionary biology. It should not be confused with efforts by some to develop social scientific concepts directly analogous to evolutionary mechanisms (such as variation or selection) in biology to explain, for example, transfor~ations in the international system or institutions, or conditions for optimum performance in the international political economy.9¶ **Scenarios** are not **predictions**. rather, they start with the assumption that the future is unpredictable and tell alternative stories of how the future may unfold. Scenarios are generally constructed by distinguishing what we believe is relatively certain from what we think is uncertain. The most important 'certainties' are common to all scenarios that address the same problem or trend, while the most important perceived uncertainties differentiate one scenario from another.¶ This approach differs significantly from a forecasting tournament or competition, where advocates of different theoretical perspectives generate differential perspectives on a single outcome in the hope of subsequently identifYing the 'best' or most accurate performer. Rather, by constructing scenarios, or plausible stories of paths to the future, we can identifY different driving forces (a term that we prefer to independent variable, since it implies a force pushing in a certain direction rather than what is known on one side of an 'equals' sign) and then attempt to combine these forces in logical chains that generate a range of outcomes, rather than single futures. Scenarios make contingent claims rather than point predictions They reinsert a sensible notion of contingency into theoretical arguments that would otherwise tend toward determinism. Scholars in international relations tend to privilege arguments that reach back into the past and parse out one or two causal variables that are then posited to be the major driving forces of past and future outcomes. The field also favors variables that are structural or otherwise parametric, thus downplaying the role of both agency and accident. **Forward reasoning undercuts structural determinism** by raising the possibility and plausibility of multiple futures.¶ Scenarios are impressionistic pictures that build on different combinations of causal variables that may also take on different values in different scenarios. Thus **it is possible to construct scenarios without pre-existing firm proof of theoretical claims** that meet strict positivist standards. The foundation for scenarios is made up of provisional assumptions and causal claims. These become the subject of revision and updating more than testing. A set of scenarios often contains competing or at least contrasting assumptions. It is less important where people start, than it is where they end up through frequent revisions, and how they got there. **A good scenario is an internally consistent hypothesis about how the future might unfold**; it is **a chain of logic** that connects 'drivers' to outcomes (Rosell, 1999: 126). Consider as an example one plausible scenario at the level of a 'global future' where power continues to shift away from the state and towards international institutions, transnational actors and local communities.¶ The state loses its monopoly on the provision of security and basic characteristics of the Westphalian system as we have known it are fundamentally altered. In this setting, key decisions about security, economics and culture will be made by non-state actors. Security may become a commodity that can be bought like other commodities in the global marketplace. A detailed scenario about this transformation would specify the range of changes that are expected to occur and how they are connected to one another. It would also identify what kinds of evidence might support the scenario as these or other processes unfold over the next decade, and what kind of evidence would count against the scenario. This is simply a form of process tracing, or increasing the number of observable implications of an argument, in future rather than past time. Eventually, as in the heuristics of evolutionary biology, future history becomes data. But instead of thinking of data as something that can falsify any particular hypothesis, one should think of it as something capable of distinguishing or selecting the story that was from the stories that might have been.

One Speech =/= Link

One speech act doesn't cause securitization

Ghughunishvili 10

(Irina, "Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies", Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf)

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to "rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a 'one-way causal' relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where **a single speech does not create** the **discourse**, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

No War Impact – 2AC

They have it backwards—wars aren't a byproduct of western desire for control—but ambiguous strategic calculations—preventing shocks is better than radical critique.

Chandler 9

(David, Westminster IR professor, "War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of `Global War'", Security Dialogue, 40.3, SAGE)

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to 'motorized partisans', in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of 'global war' have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with 'global war' thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. **This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines 'global' war today.** Very few studies of the 'war on terror' start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the 'war on terror' (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are 'scaled up' from the international to the global. Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire The alternative reading of 'global war' rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the **lack of political stakes** and strategic structuring of the international sphere **rather than frameworks for asserting global domination**. We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the 'war on terror' campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. There would appear to be a **direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping and structuring interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome.** In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the **lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat** or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and **arbitrary interventions** as states and international institutions use the **lack of strategic**

imperatives to **construct their own meaning through intervention** As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains: war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz's classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. … War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most 'efficient' way of finding one. **The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to 'war'.** In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are **freed from strategic necessities** and **whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against 'real enemies'.** The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the **strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests**.

AT: PAN K

Pan is reductionist and the alt fails

Jones 14

David Martin Jones, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from LSE, Australian Journal of Political Science, February 21, 2014, 49:1, "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident ", Taylor and Francis Online

Notwithstanding this Western fascination with China and the positive response of former Marxists, such as Jacques, to the new China, Pan discerns an Orientalist ideology distorting Western commentary on the party state, and especially its international relations (6). Following Edward Said, Pan claims that such Western Orientalism reveals 'not something concrete about the orient, but something about the orientalists themselves, their recurring latent desire of fears and fantasies about the orient' (16). In order to unmask the limits of Western representations of China's rise, Pan employs a critical 'methodology' that 'draws on constructivist and deconstructivist approaches' (9). Whereas the 'former questions the underlying dichotomy of reality/knowledge in Western study of China's international relations', the latter shows how paradigmatic representations of China 'condition the way we give meaning to that country' and 'are socially constitutive of it' (9). Pan maintains that the two paradigms of 'China threat' and 'China opportunity' in Western discourse shape China's reality for Western 'China watchers' (3). These discourses, Pan claims, are 'ambivalent' (65). He contends that this 'bifocal representation of China, like Western discourses of China more generally, tell us a great deal about the west itself, its self -imagination, its torn, anxious, subjectivity, as well as its discursive effects of othering' (65). This is a large claim. Interestingly, Pan fails to note that after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Chinese new left scholarship also embraced Said's critique of Orientalism in order to reinforce both the party state and a burgeoning sense of Chinese nationalism. To counter Western liberal discourse, academics associated with the Central Party School promoted an ideology of Occidentalism to deflect domestic and international pressure to democratise China. In this, they drew not only upon Said, but also upon Foucault and the post-1968 school of French radical thought that, as Richard Wolin has demonstrated, was itself initiated in an appreciation of Mao's cultural revolution. In other words, the critical and deconstructive methodologies that came to influence American and European social science from the 1980s had a Maoist inspiration (Wolin 2010: 12–18). Subsequently, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, as American sinologist Fewsmith has shown, young Chinese scholars 'adopted a variety of postmodernist and critical methodologies' (2008: 125). Paradoxically, these scholars, such as Wang Hui and Zhang Kuan (Wang 2011), had been educated in the USA and were familiar with fashionable academic criticism of a postmodern and deconstructionist hue that 'demythified' the West (Fewsmith 2008: 125–29). This approach, promulgated in the academic journal Dushu (Readings), deconstructed, via Said and Foucault, Western narratives about China. Zhang Kuan, in particular, rejected Enlightenment values and saw postmodern critical theory as a method to build up a national 'discourse of resistance' and counter Western demands regarding issues such as human rights and intellectual property. It is through its affinity with this self-strengthening, Occidentalist lens, that Pan's critical study should perhaps be critically read. Simply put, Pan identifies a political economy of fear and desire that informs and complicates Western foreign policy and, Pan asserts, tells us more about the West's 'self-imagination' than it does about Chinese reality. Pan attempts to sustain this claim via an analysis, in Chapter 5, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the China threat, followed, in Chapters 6 and 7, by exposure of the false promises and premises of the China 'opportunity'. Pan certainly offers a provocative insight into Western attitudes to China and their impact on Chinese political thinking. In particular, he demonstrates that China's foreign policy-makers react negatively to what they view as a hostile American strategy of containment (101). In this context, Pan contends, accurately, that Sino–US relations are mutually constitutive and the USA must take some responsibility for the rise of China threat (107). This latter point, however, is one that Australian **realists** like Owen Harries, whom Pan cites approvingly, **have made consistently since the late** 19**90s.** In other words, not all Western analysis uncritically endorses the view that China's rise is threatening. Nor is all Western perception of this rise reducible to the threat scenario advanced by recent US administrations. Pan's subsequent argument that the China opportunity thesis leads to inevitable disappointment and subtly reinforces the China

threat paradigm is, also, somewhat misleading. On the one hand, Pan notes that Western anticipation of 'China's transformation and democratization' has 'become a burgeoning cottage industry' (111). Yet, on the other hand, Pan observes that Western commentators, such as Jacques, demonstrate a growing awareness that the democratisation thesis is a fantasy. That is, Pan, like Jacques, argues that China 'will neither democratize nor collapse, but may instead remain politically authoritarian and economically stable at the same time' (132). To merge, as Pan does, the democratisation thesis into its authoritarian antithesis in order to evoke 'present Western disillusionment' (132) with China is somewhat reductionist. Pan's contention that we need a new paradigm shift 'to free ourselves from the positivist aspiration to grand theory or transcendental scientific paradigm itself' (157) might be admirable, but this will not be achieved by a constructivism that would ultimately meet with the approval of what Brady terms China's thought managers (Brady: 6).

Identity

Debate B4 Identity

Don't take <u>self-understanding</u> as an <u>incontrovertible truth</u> – we don't perfectly know ourselves and have a lot to gain by making our beliefs <u>subject</u> to external criticism

McBride 3

(Cillian, Professor of Government @ London School of Economics "Self-transparency and the possibility of deliberative politics," Journal of Political Ideologies, 8.3)

ABSTRACT <u>I argue against the notion of self-transparency which underwrites the politics of presence. This connects situation, identity, and perspective in such a way as to be **incompatible** with deliberative politics and treats self-understand- ing as authoritative, rendering it **insensitive** to the possibility that our self-under- standings may be **distorted**. I propose a hermeneutic, narrative, conception of selfhood on which we **relate** to our lives as authors, constructing our identities by employing the linguistic and narrative resources which our respective situations make available to us. This admits the possibility that **others may provide us with superior interpretations of our lives**, which is a **precondition** of deliberative politics. Given the possibility that our self- understandings may be distorted, deliberative citizens have a **duty** to challenge **problematic self-under- standings**. Anchoring criticism to public deliberation, together with the her- meneutic premise that a measure of self-opacity is universal, secures such challenges against the charge of authoritarianism levelled at traditional ideol- ogy-critique.</u> <u>I want to focus here on the challenge posed to dialogue-centred politics by a particular discourse connecting situation, identity and politics, which Anne Phillips has termed the 'politics of presence'.1 While apparently providing a particularly firm basis for arguments for the inclusion of hitherto marginalized groups within the democratic process, this discourse embodies highly problem- atic views about political dialogue and the nature of the self. I hope to build on an analysis of these flaws to clarify the ontological preconditions of deliberative politics and, furthermore, to draw some conclusions about the nature of the obligations of parties to deliberation.</u> <u>The politics of presence rests on a model of the self as transparent to itself, but not to others, with the consequence that a person's self-understanding, at the very least, must be acknowledged to be authoritative, or incorrigible. This model of the self cannot, however, be made to cohere with a plausible account of communication, and consequently it **must be discarded** in favour of a broadly hermeneutic model of selfhood as situated in and constituted through a network of language and interpretative traditions. While this self is inevitably opaque to itself in certain respects, reflection on this opacity lends a point to dialogue which it cannot have on the assumption of self-transparency. A dialogic politics, which is sensitive to the possibility of distorted self-understanding and aims at facilitating the transformation of perspectives and self- interpretations, must acknowledge as a fundamental premise the **provisional character** of self- under- standing. This, in turn, provides a basis for viewing deliberative citizens as having obligations, in certain circumstances, to **challenge rather than defer to the self-understandings of others**.</u>

AT: Affirmation of Self

Their deployment of identity/social location/privilege arguments shuts down effective collective action – this reifies racism and leads to endless squabbling about authenticity

Rob 13

(the Idealist, Carleton College, JD candidate, 10/1, Tim Wise & The Failure of Privilege Discourse, www.orchestratedpulse.com/2013/10/tim-wise-failure-privilege-discourse/)

I don't find it meaningful to criticize Tim Wise the person and judge whether he's living up to some anti-racist bona fides. Instead, I choose to focus on the paradigm of "White privilege" upon which his work is based, and its conceptual and practical limitations. Although the personal is political, not all politics is personal; we have to attack **systems**. To paraphrase the urban poet and philosopher Meek Mill: there are levels to this shit. How I Define Privilege There are power structures that shape individuals' lived experiences. Those structures provide and withhold resources to people based on factors like class, disability status, gender, and race. It's not a "benefit" to receive resources from an unjust order because ultimately, injustice is cannibalistic. Slavery binds the slave, but destroys the master. So, the point then becomes not to assimilate the "underprivileged", but to instead eradicate the power structures that create the privileges in the first place. The conventional wisdom on privilege often says that it's "benefits" are "unearned". However, this belief ignores the reality and history that privilege is earned and maintained through violence. Systemic advantages are allocated and secured as a class, and simply because an individual hasn't personally committed the acts, it does not render their class dominance unearned. The history and modern reality of violence is why Tim Wise' comparison between whiteness and tallness fails. White supremacy is not some natural evolution, nor did it occur by happenstance. White folks *murdered* people for this thing that we often call "White privilege"; it was bought and paid for by blood and terror. White supremacy is not some benign invisible knapsack. The same interplay between violence and advantage is true of any systemic hierarchy (class, gender, disability, etc). Being tall, irrespective of its advantages, does not follow that pattern of violence. Privilege is Failing Us Unfortunately, I think our use of the term "privilege" is no longer a productive way for us to gain a thorough understanding of systemic injustice, nor is it helping us to develop collective strategies to dismantle those systems. Basically**, I never want to hear the word "privilege" again** because **the term is so thoroughly misused at this point that it does more harm than good.** Andrea Smith, in the essay "The Problem with Privilege", outlines the pitfalls of misapplied privilege theory. Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered… Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Dr. Tommy Curry says it more bluntly, "It's not genius to say that in an oppressive society there are benefits to being in the superior class instead of the inferior one. That's true in any hierarchy, that's not an 'aha' moment." Conceptually, privilege is best used when narrowly focused on explaining how structures generally shape experiences. However, when we overly personalize the problem, then privilege becomes a tit-for-tat exercise in blame, shame, and guilt. In its worst manifestations, this dynamic becomes "oppression Olympics" and people tally perceived life advantages and identities in order to invalidate one another. At best, we treat structural injustice as a personal problem, and moralizing exercises like "privilege confessions" inadequately address the nexus between systemic power and individual behavior. The undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural forms of oppression. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Bigger than Tim Wise However, the problem with White privilege isn't simply that Tim Wise, a white man, can build a career off of Black struggles. As I've already said, White people need to talk to White people about the historical and social construction of their racial identities and power, and the foundation for that conversation often comes from past Black theory and political projects. The problem for me is that privilege work has become a cottage industry of self-help

moralizing that **in no way attacks** the systemic ills that create the personal injustices in the first place. A **substantive critique of privilege requires us to get beyond identity politics**. It's not about good people and bad people; it's a bad system. It's not just White people that participate in the White privilege industry, although not everyone equally benefits/profits (see: Tim Wise). Dr. Tommy Curry takes elite Black academics to task for their role in profiting from the White privilege industry while offering no challenge to White supremacy. These conversations about White privilege are not conversations about race, and certainly not about racism; it's a business where Blacks market themselves as racial therapists for White people… The White privilege discourse became a bourgeois distraction. It's a tool that we use to morally condemn whites for not supporting the political goals of elite black academics that take the vantages of white notions of virtue and reformism and persuade departments, journals, and presses into making concessions for the benefit of a select species of Black intellectuals in the Ivory Tower, without seeing that the white racial vantages that these Black intellectuals claim they're really interested in need to be dissolved, need to be attacked all the way to the very bottom of American society. Dr. Tommy Curry, Radio Interview The truth is that a lot of people, marginalized groups included, simply want more access to existing systems of power. They don't want to challenge and push beyond these systems; they just want to participate. So if we continue to play identity politics and persist with a personal privilege view of power, then **we will lose the struggle**. Barack Obama is president, yet White supremacy marches on, and often with his help (record deportations, expanded a drone war based on profiling, fought on behalf of US corporations to repeal a Haitian law that raised the minimum wage). Adolph Reed, writing in 1996, predicted the quagmire of identity politics in the Age of Obama. In Chicago, for instance, we've gotten a foretaste of the new breed of foundation-hatched black communitarian voices; one of them, a smooth Harvard lawyer with impeccable do-good credentials and vacuous-to-repressive neoliberal politics, has won a state senate seat on a base mainly in the liberal foundation and development worlds. His fundamentally bootstrap line was softened by a patina of the rhetoric of authentic community, talk about meeting in kitchens, small-scale solutions to social problems, and the predictable elevation of process over program — the point where identity politics converges with old-fashioned middle-class reform in favoring form over substance. I suspect that his ilk is the wave of the future in U.S. black politics. Adolph Reed Jr., Class Notes: Posing As Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene Although it has always been the case, Obama's election and subsequent presidency has made it starkly clear that it's not just White people that can perpetuate White supremacy. Systems of oppression condition all members of society to accept systemic injustice, and there are (unequal) incentives for both marginalized and dominant groups to perpetuate these structures. Our approaches to injustice must reflect this reality. This isn't a naïve plea for "unity", nor am I saying that talking about identities/experiences is inherently "divisive". Many of these privilege discussions use empathy to build personal and collective character, and there certainly should be space for us to work together to improve/heal ourselves and one another. People will always make mistakes and our spaces have to be flexible enough to allow for reconciliation. Though we don't have to work with persistently abusive people who refuse to redirect their behavior, there's a difference between establishing boundaries and puritanism. Fighting systemic marginalization and exploitation requires more than good character, and **we cannot fetishize personal morals over collective action**.

2015 NDI 6WS – Defending Apocalyptic Reps

Climate

Generic

Even if our representations aren't completely accurate- Our framing drives action

Schatz 12 (Jul. 2012. Dr. JL Schatz is the director of speech and debate at Binghamton University. He has written several pieces focusing on environmental issues. "The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-of-the-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism" *The Journal of Ecocriticism.* A peer reviewed journal. http://ojs.unbc.ca/index.php/joe/article/viewFile/394/382 //HS)

It is no longer a question that human interaction with the world is destroying the very ecosystems that sustain life[1] . Nevertheless, within academic communities people are divided over which discursive tactic, ontological position, or strategy for activism should be adopted. I contend that regardless of an ecocritic's particular orientation that ecocriticism most effectively produces change when it doesn't neglect the tangible reality that surrounds any discussion of the environment. **This demands including human-induced ecocidal violence within all our accounts**. **Retreating from images of ecological collapse** to speak purely **within** inner-**academic or policymaking circles isolates our conversations** away **from the** rest of the **world—as it dies before our eyes**. * J.L. Schatz (debate@binghamton.edu) Journal of Ecocriticism 4(2) July 2012 The Importance of the Apocalypse (1-20) 21 This is not to argue that interrogating people's discourse, tactics, ontological orientation, or anything else lacks merit. Timothy Luke, Chair and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, explains that Because nothing in Nature simply is given within society, such terms must be assigned significance by every social group that mobilizes them[.] … Many styles of ecologically grounded criticism circulate in present-day American mass culture, partisan debate, consumer society, academic discourse, and electoral politics as episodes of ecocritique, contesting our politics of nature, economy, and culture in the contemporary global system of capitalist production and consumption. (1997: xi) Luke reminds us that regardless of how ecocritics advance their agenda they always impact our environmental awareness and therefore alter our surrounding ecology. In doing so he shows that both literal governmental policies and the symbolic universe they take place within reconstruct the discourses utilized to justify policy and criticism in the first place. This is why films like The Day After Tomorrow and 2012 can put forth realistic depictions of government response to environmental apocalypse. And despite being fictional, these films in turn can influence the reality of governmental policy. Even the science-fiction of weather-controlling weapons are now only steps away from becoming reality[2] . Oftentimes **it takes images of planetary annihilation to motivate people into action** after years of sitting idly by watching things slowly decay. **In reality it takes awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact even piecemeal reform.** On the screen it takes the actual appearance of ecological apocalypse to set the plot in motion. What is constant is that "as these debates unfold, visions of what is the good or bad life … find many of their most compelling articulations as ecocritiques … [that are] mobilized for and against various projects of power and economy in the organization of our everyday existence" (Luke 1997: xi). We cannot motivate people to change the ecological conditions that give rise to thoughts of theorization without reference to the concrete environmental destruction ongoing in reality. This means that, **even when our images of apocalypse aren't fully accurate, our use of elements of scientifically-established reality reconstructs** the surrounding power **structures in beneficial ways**. When we ignore either ecological metaphors or environmental reality we only get part of the picture.`

Their critique of rhetoric creates procrastination- ensures endless climate change and extinction

Schatz 12 (Jul. 2012. Dr. JL Schatz is the director of speech and debate at Binghamton University. He has written several pieces focusing on environmental issues. "The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-of-the-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism" *The Journal of Ecocriticism.* A peer reviewed journal. http://ojs.unbc.ca/index.php/joe/article/viewFile/394/382 //HS)

In recent years, many ecocritics have shied away from the very metaphors that compel a sense of urgency. They have largely done so out of the fear that its deployment will get co-opted by hegemonic institutions. Such critics ignore how **what we advocate alters our understanding of ourselves to the surrounding ecology.** In doing so, our advocacies render such co-optation meaningless because of the possibility to redeploy our

metaphors in the future. In the upcoming sections, I will provide an overview of how <u>poststructuralist thinkers like Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger influence some ecocritics to retreat from omnicidal rhetoric. **This retreat minimizes the main objectives of their ecocriticism**</u>. I argue that **<u>rather than withdrawing from images of apocalypse that we should utilize them in subversive ways to disrupt the current relationship people have to their ecology</u>**. Professor of Sociology at York University, Fuyuki Kurasawa argues that "<u>instead of bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a **dystopian imaginary** … it **can enable** a novel form of transnational **socio-political action** … that can be termed preventive foresight. … [I]t is a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the Journal of Ecocriticism</u> 4(2) July 2012 The Importance of the Apocalypse (1-20) 22 emerging realm of global civil society <u>**…** [by] putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes</u>" (454-455). By <u>understanding how metaphors around the environment operate we can better utilize discourse to steer us away from the brink of apocalypse</u>. <u>The alternative of abandoning apocalyptic deployments is far worse.</u> Put simply, "<u>by minimizing the urgency or gravity of potential threats, procrastination appears legitimate"</u> (Kurasawa 462). In the final section of my essay, I outline how ecocritics can utilize images of omnicide to motivate the evolution of successful tactics that can slow the pace of environmental destruction.

Our rhetoric sparks concern for the climate- spurs action

Hinsliff 06 (Oct. 28, 2006. Gaby Hinsliff is a columnist for The Guardian and is a former political editor of The Observer. "£3.68 trillion: The price of failing to act on climate change" *The Guardian.* http://www.theguardian.com/money/2006/oct/29/greenpolitics.politics //HS)

Britons face the prospect of a welter of new green taxes to tackle climate change, as <u>the most authoritative report on global warming warns it will cost the world up to £3.68 trillion unless it is tackled within a decade. The review by Sir Nicholas Stern</u>, commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and published tomorrow, **<u>marks a crucial point in the debate by underlining how failure to act would trigger a catastrophic global recession.</u>** Unchecked climate change would turn 200 million people into refugees, the largest migration in modern history, as their homes succumbed to drought or flood. Stern also warns that a successor to the Kyoto agreement on cutting greenhouse gas emissions should be signed next year, not by 2010/11 as planned. He forecasts that the world needs to spend 1 per cent of global GDP - equivalent to about £184bn - dealing with climate change now, or face a bill between five and 20 times higher for damage caused by letting it continue. Unchecked climate change could thus cost as much as £566 for every man, woman and child now on the planet - roughly 6.5 billion people. <u>The 700-page report argues that an international framework on climate change covering the globe will be necessary</u>, and that different countries may opt to reduce emissions differently. Options range from many more green taxes to carbon trading. **<u>Stern's verdict will create</u>** fierce <u>political debate, with **a growing belief in government that taxes on activities such as driving or flying will have to rise.**</u> A leaked letter from the Environment Secretary, David Miliband, to the Chancellor, in the Mail on Sunday, proposes a range of 'green' tax increases. Stephen Byers, the former cabinet minister and <u>member of an expert panel of international politicians on climate change, is</u> meanwhile <u>urging new taxes to help change behaviour</u>, including a 'global warming premium' on exotic fruit, vegetables and flowers flown thousands of miles across the world. **<u>'There will</u>** need to **<u>be a global response [to Stern],</u>** but it must also filter down to change at domestic level,' he told an audience of businessmen in China this weekend. 'For the Labour party there must be no no-go areas for policy debate. The politics of taxation is changing and we need to be leading the debate, not playing catch-up. We should consider how we can change the structure of our tax system in a way which benefits the lowest-paid and penalises environmentally damaging activity.' Byers is the first of several senior Labour figures expected to go public over green taxes, reflecting views within Downing Street that the public now fears climate change sufficiently to pay more for gas-guzzling activities. Charles Clarke, the former Home Secretary, is expected to join the debate, while Alan Milburn raised the issue in a recent speech. Such interventions will irritate the Chancellor, who regards taxation as his turf, particularly in advance of his autumn pre-budget report. Air freight is one of the most lightly taxed areas of transport since aviation fuel is tax-free and there are no passengers to pay duty. Yet green campaigners say the planet can ill afford the thousands of 'food miles' travelled by exotic produce. One kilo of kiwi fruit flown from New Zealand to Europe discharges 5kg of carbon into the atmosphere. Other options include hiking car tax on fuel-inefficient vehicles and cutting stamp duty on the purchase of energy-efficient houses. Byers will argue tax rises should be offset by cuts elsewhere. <u>The Stern report will advocate extending the European 'cap and trade' system</u> - under which carbon emissions are capped at a certain level, with businesses

which need to emit more forced to buy spare emissions quotas from low-polluting businesses around the world, **encouraging industry to find cleaner and cheaper ways of operating.** He will also urge a doubling of investment in energy research and a speedier Kyoto process - meaning that negotiations with the US will have to be undertaken while George Bush is still president. International governments had hoped to deal with a more sympathetic successor after 2008. **Downing Street and the Treasury believe that the report marks a decisive moment in international politics.** Stern's is the first heavyweight contribution by an economist rather than a scientist and senior officials believe he <u>will make what might seem a hopelessly ambitious timetable credible.</u> 'This will give us an argument to make,' said a Whitehall source. **'I think we are at a tipping point in terms of the debate,** as we were at a tipping point in 2004/05 in terms of the science.' Stern's forecast cost of 1 per cent of global GDP is roughly the same amount as is spent worldwide on advertising, and half what the World Bank estimates a full-blown flu pandemic would cost. Without early intervention, he estimates the cost would be 5-20 per cent of GDP, some paid by governments, some by the private sector. But he stresses that unilateral action will not be enough - if Britain shut down all its power stations tomorrow, the reduction in global emissions would be cancelled out within 13 months by rising emissions from China. Stern will advocate new funds to help Africa and developing nations adapt, but will argue the key challenge is from emerging nations such as China and India. Emissions from China are nearly level with the US and likely to increase as the Chinese get more cars and electrical goods - up to 30 million households are likely to get digital TVs alone in the next few years. Britain will push this week for more energy-efficient consumer goods. The Tory environment spokesman, Peter Ainsworth, who has argued green tax should rise as a proportion of overall taxation, said he hoped **the Stern report 'spurs the government into being much more proactive than it has been'.**

AT: Biopolitics

Kritiks are irrelevant- even if we get coopted by institutions, we bring attention to climate change and catalyze solvency

Schatz 12 (Jul. 2012. Dr. JL Schatz is the director of speech and debate at Binghamton University. He has written several pieces focusing on environmental issues. "The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-of-the-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism" *The Journal of Ecocriticism.* A peer reviewed journal. http://ojs.unbc.ca/index.php/joe/article/viewFile/394/382 //HS)

Any hesitancy to deploy images of apocalypse out of the risk of acting in a biopolitical manner ignores how any particular metaphor—apocalyptic or not—always risks getting co-opted. It **does not excuse inaction**. Clearly hegemonic forces have already assumed control of determining environmental practices when one looks at the debates surrounding off-shore drilling, climate change, and biodiversity within the halls of Congress. "As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems … will go unsolved … only to fester more ominously into the future. … [E]cological crisis … cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context … of internationalized markets, finance, and communications" (Boggs 774). If it weren't for people such as Watson connecting things like whaling to the end of the world it wouldn't get the needed coverage to enter into public discourse. It takes big news to make headlines and hold attention spans in the electronic age. Sometimes it even takes a reality TV show on Animal Planet. As Luke reminds us, "Those who dominate the world exploit their positions to their advantage by defining how the world is known. Unless they also face resistance, questioning, and challenge from those who are dominated, they certainly will remain the dominant forces" (2003: 413). **Merely sitting back and theorizing over metaphorical deployments does a grave injustice to the gains activists are making on the ground**. **It** also **allows** hegemonic institutions to continually define the debate over the environment by **framing out any attempt for significant change,** whether it be radical or reformist. Only by jumping on every opportunity for resistance can ecocriticism have the hopes of combatting the current ecological reality. This means we must recognize that we cannot fully escape the master's house since the surrounding environment always shapes any form of resistance. Therefore, **we ought to act even if we may get co-opted**. As Foucault himself reminds us, "instead of radial ruptures more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about[.] … And it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional Journal of Ecocriticism 4(2) July 2012 The Importance of the Apocalypse (1-20) 25 integration of power relationships. It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power" (96-97). Here Foucault "asks us to think about resistance differently, as not anterior to power, but a component of it. If we take seriously these notions on the exercise and circulation of power, then we … open … up the field of possibility to talk about particular kinds of environmentalism" (Rutherford 296). This is **not** to say that **all actions are resistant**. Rather, the revolutionary actions that are truly resistant oftentimes appear mundane since it is more about altering the intelligibility that frames discussions around the environment than any specific policy change. Again, this is why people like Watson use one issue as a jumping off point to talk about wider politics of ecological awareness. **Campaigns that look to the government or a single policy but for a moment**, and **then go on to challenge hegemonic interactions with the environment through other tactics, allows us to codify strategic points of resistance in numerous places at once.** Again, this does not mean we must agree with every tactic. It does mean that even failed attempts are meaningful. For example, while PETA's ad campaigns have drawn criticism for comparing factory farms to the Holocaust, and featuring naked women who'd rather go naked than wear fur, their importance extends beyond the ads alone[6] . By bringing the issues to the forefront they draw upon known metaphors and reframe the way people talk about animals despite their potentially anti-Semitic and misogynist underpinnings. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's theorization of the multitude serves as an excellent illustration of how utilizing the power of the master's biopolitical tools can become powerful enough to deconstruct its house despite the risk of co-

<u>optation or backlash.</u> For them, the multitude is defined by the growing global force of people around the world who are linked together by their common struggles without being formally organized in a hierarchal way. While Hardt and Negri mostly talk about the multitude in relation to global capitalism, their understanding of the commons and analysis of resistance is useful for any ecocritic. They explain, [T]he multitude has matured to such an extent that it is becoming able, through its networks of communication and cooperation … [and] its production of the common, to sustain an alternative democratic society on its own. … Revolutionary politics must grasp, in the movement of the multitudes and through the accumulation of common and cooperative decisions, the moment of rupture … that can create a new world. In the face of the destructive state of exception of biopower, then, there is also a constituent state of exception of democratic biopolitics[,] … creating … a new constitutive temporality. (357) <u>Once one understands the world as interconnected— instead of constructed by different nation-states and single environments—conditions in one area of the globe couldn't be conceptually severed from any other.</u> In short, we'd all have a stake in the global commons. <u>Ecocritics can then utilize biopolitics to shape discourse and fight against governmental biopower by waking people up to the pressing need to inaugurate a new future for there to be any future.</u> **Influencing other people through argument and end-of-the-world tactics is not the same biopower of the state** so long as it doesn't singularize itself but for temporary moments. Therefore, "it is not unreasonable to hope that in a biopolitical future (after the defeat of biopower) war will no longer be possible, and the intensity of the cooperation and communication among singularities … will destroy its [very] possibility" (Hardt & Negri 347). In the Journal of Ecocriticism 4(2) July 2012 The Importance of the Apocalypse (1-20) 26 context of capitalism, when wealth fails to trickle down it would be seen as a problem for the top since it would stand testament to their failure to equitably distribute wealth. <u>In the context of environmentalism, not-in-my-backyard reasoning that displaces ecological destruction elsewhere</u> would be <u>exposed for</u> the <u>failure</u> that it is. **There is no backyard that is not one's own**. Ultimately, <u>images of planetary doom demonstrate how we are all interconnected and in doing so inaugurate a new world where multitudes, and not governments, guide the fate of the planet.</u>

AT: Ontology

Ontological thinking is not exclusive with striving for environmental protection- the perm solves

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Beyond the question of discourse, some ecocritics place ontology at the forefront of their analysis. This approach criticizes those who call for action because of how the desire to fix the environment shapes one's Being in managerial ways7 . Here the issue is not fixing certain environmental practices. Instead the focus is on the way people enframe their sense of self to claim the transcendental authority to regulate life. As Ladelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University, points out, We are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. … Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to … scramble to find some way to manage our problems[.] … But over and over again new resource management techniques … disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse[.] … In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. (7-8) **The foundation behind ontological approaches such as McWhorter's is that we should refrain from acting even when we are met with the possibility of extinction**. To clarify, it is not that current practices aren't destructive from this perspective. For such critics, acting to overcome such destruction participates is the same kind of violence because it causes us to forget our relationship with the environment as we become actors over it. "Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers … [in this] kind of forgetfulness, a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things" (McWhorter 10). Once we forget that we are also part of the environment we empty our Being of any meaning and deprive ourselves of the very relationships that give us value in the first place. **The question arises, if we can't act then how can we prevent environmental destruction?** The answer for thinkers that center their criticism on ontology is to rethink the very basis of how we think in the first place. For instance, William Spanos, one of the world's leading experts on Heideggerian thought, argues that there is an urgency of retrieving the unfinished post-structuralist ontological project to rethink thinking itself. By this I mean the need to dis-close, to open up, to think that which the triumphant metaphysical/calculative-technological-disciplinary logic of the imperial West has closed off and accommodated or repressed. To rethink thinking means, in short, to liberate Journal of Ecocriticism 4(2) July 2012 The Importance of the Apocalypse (1-20) 27 precisely that relay of differential forces that the structuralizing and disciplinary imperatives of the ontotheological tradition has colonized in its final "anthropological" phase. (22) Once again, **even for people like Spanos, placing ontology prior to politics does not deny that present actions are unquestionably destructive.** Such an approach also acknowledges that acting is always inevitable because one is already situated within an environment. In this context even thinking is action since engaging in ontological examination produces new forms of thought that alters our will to act. Spanos elaborates that this project is important "not simply … for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives … [and] to make visible … the West's perennial global imperial project" (29). He contends that, once we rethink the way we think, our actions will evolve because focusing on the way ontology grounds our representations alters the way we be-in-the-world. However, **for this strategy to work one's rethinking of thinking must still thoughtfully envision a positive future** for us to evolve toward. We will be powerless to do anything besides produce new enframings of the world if our discussions only exist at the level of abstraction. For both Heidegger and revolutionary environmentalists, there exist possibilities for transformation despite the destructiveness of Enframing. In the midst of technological peril … there emerges a sense of solidarity of human with nonhuman beings. … It is precisely the experience of this solidarity which must be constantly rearticulated … in order to provide a historically and ontologically authentic break with the metaphysics of technical control and capitalist exploitation. Action will only be truly revolutionary if it revolves around engagement in solidarity with nature, where liberation is always seen both as human liberation from the confines of Enframing and simultaneously as liberation of animal nations and eco-regions from human technics. Anything less will always lapse back into … disciplinary control over humans, nonhumans, and the Earth. (Best and Nocella 82) As a result, the problem lies in the way one enframes other creatures as a standing reserve

when they relate to politics, and not in action itself. A deep ecological perspective that recognizes the interconnectedness of all life could enable the possibility of acting without enframing. People like Ric O'Barry, who was Flipper's trainer, serve as excellent examples of how to act while inhabiting such a perspective. Ric used his popularity to make an award-winning documentary, titled The Cove, which brought awareness to the horrors of dolphin killing and the similarities we share with these sentient creatures. It was even powerful enough to stir up debate in Japan about the practice of eating dolphin meat (Becker). It is not that Ric doesn't use his notoriety to push for legislative change at the national and international level. He certainly does. However, he does so without giving up his personal commitment to directly change things in the same way as Watson does. This willingness to act directly alters the ontological representations around which such debates take place by reframing the metaphors policymakers use to justify their legislative initiatives. **Despite the merits of ontological ecocriticism, using it to prohibit ecocritical appeals for concrete action fractures a movement that should work in coalition.** We should not approach our choices as an either/or situation. Strategies of direct action can be compatible with Heideggerian thought so long as we understand such action as always already inevitable and not a way to enframe others. Deploying Journal of Ecocriticism 4(2) July 2012 The Importance of the Apocalypse (1-20) 28 apocalyptic threats can challenge hegemonic systems since they serve as a catalyst for evolving change instead of legislating it. In fact, "the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts. Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters … can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens' involvement in the work of preventive foresight" (Kurasawa 458). Put plainly, we must understand any action in both its social and political dimensions. As the way we confront environmental challenges change so too does the conditions surrounding ecocriticism. To alter conditions in the political or social realm is always already to impact the other. This allows us to redeploy even problematic deployments in order to reshape the public debates surrounding ecological awareness. Just as discourse can serve governmental biopower or civic biopolitics, our ontological connections can at any moment serve both as an avenue for repression or a venue for resistance. It is not the ecocritics' task to proscribe how other people should interact with the environment. Instead they should act within their environment in a way that makes the necessary actions to save our planet beneficial. Our eco-orientation to the world will evolve our Being's very possibility to act in the same way language, technology, and species evolve based upon their interactions with living and social organisms. No doubt, "the power that is inherent in language is thus not something that is centralized, emanating from a pre-given subject. Rather, like the discursive practices in which it inheres, power is dispersed and, most important, is productive of subjects and their worlds" (Doty, 1993: 302-303). In large part the current environmental destruction exists because democratic capitalism has been able to wield its hegemonic influence to exploit the niche of technological production. Sadly, this niche rewards increased GDP over the planet's ecological well-being. The belief that these conditions cannot be unthought is not merely misplaced but also serves to support the hegemonic myth of the inevitability of capitalism. **It is up to each of us to directly act upon this world only after we approach the question of acting differently.** Only then can we see past the current imperial enframing and inspire true collective action.

China

China Aggressive/Action Key

China is aggressive – action is key to preventing conflict

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We now have proof of China's intention to assert its territorial claims with military strength. This week, Beijing set up a new provincial-level city government to administer all its island claims in the South China Sea, as well as administer all the waters in the Sea, and "elected" a mayor for its insta-city of Sansha. The new governing council will represent approximately 1,100 Chinese residents of three island groups, all of which are claimed by multiple countries, including Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, in addition to China. The real news, however, is that Beijing is also setting up a military garrison on Yongxing Island, which is also claimed by Vietnam. The garrison will serve "self-defense" purposes and carry out military operations, according to Chinese news reports. While it is unclear now how large the garrison will be, it is a game-changing political decision by Beijing. It essentially reveals Beijing's plan for controlling disputed territory, which was the concern of those of us who feared what the growth of China's military would mean for how nations acted in Asia. **It makes power politics the reality**, not just the possibility, **in the South China Sea**, and it forces smaller nations to decide if they can in any realistic way continue to oppose China's claims. If accepted by other nations, this week's moves will signal the beginning of true Chinese hegemony in Asia, and the creation of a new norm of regional politics based on might. Beijing's announcement should put enormous pressure on Washington. There are times for quiet diplomacy and behind-closed-doors talk, and **there are times to clearly draw a line in the sand**. This is not a casus belli, of course; but neither can it be overlooked, for one garrison can lead to another and then another. It may not happen this year or next, but if the Sansha garrison becomes an effective power, and is allowed to stand, then it will inexorably spread. **Washington must make clear to Beijing that this course will result in some response from America**, such as enhanced military aid to Southeast Asian nations, the end of military-to-military discussions between China and the U.S., or a refusal to ease export restrictions targeting China. If we do nothing, and hope it's yet another boast from a "paper dragon," we will wake up to a South China Sea that is de facto controlled by China. **That may well lead to an environment in which we will find ourselves pulled into conflict between China and its neighbors,** or one in which we pull up stakes due to the desire to avoid confrontation, and thereby announce the end of our influence in Asia.

China already views the US as a threat – bilateral coop on equal footing is the only way to maintain balance of power – its try or die for the aff

*This card is really long so I kept it broken up in paragraphs so that you can just use what you need

Nathan and Scobell 12 Andrew J. Nathan is a Professor of Political Science at Columbia University Andrew Scobell is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, "How China Sees America", September/October 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-08-16/how-china-sees-america//OF

Americans sometimes view the Chinese state as inscrutable. But given the way that power is divided in the U.S. political system and the frequent power turnovers between the two main parties in the United States, **the Chinese also have a hard time determining U.S. intentions**. Nevertheless, over recent decades, a long-term U.S. strategy seems to have emerged out of a series of American actions toward China. So it is not a hopeless exercise -- indeed, it is necessary -- for the Chinese to try to analyze the United States.

Most Americans would be surprised to learn the degree to which **the Chinese believe the United States is a revisionist power that seeks to curtail China's political influence and harm China's interests.** This view is shaped not only by Beijing's understanding of Washington but also by the broader Chinese view of the international system and China's place in it, a view determined in large part by China's acute sense of its own vulnerability.

THE FOUR RINGS

The world as seen from Beijing is a terrain of hazards, beginning with the streets outside the policymaker's window, to land borders and sea-lanes thousands of miles away, to the mines and oil fields of distant continents. These threats can be described in four concentric rings. In the first ring, the entire territory that China administers or claims, **Beijing believes that China's political stability and territorial integrity are threatened by foreign actors and forces.** Compared with other large countries, China must deal with an unparalleled number of outside actors trying to influence its evolution, often in ways the regime considers detrimental to its survival. Foreign investors, development advisers, tourists, and students swarm the country, all with their own ideas about how China should change. Foreign foundations and governments give financial and technical support to Chinese groups promoting civil society. Dissidents in Tibet and Xinjiang receive moral and diplomatic support and sometimes material assistance from ethnic diasporas and sympathetic governments abroad. Along the coast, neighbors contest maritime territories that Beijing claims. Taiwan is ruled by its own government, which enjoys diplomatic recognition from 23 states and a security guarantee from the United States.

At China's borders, policymakers face a second ring of security concerns, involving China's relations with 14 adjacent countries. No other country except Russia has as many contiguous neighbors. They include five countries with which China has fought wars in the past 70 years (India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Vietnam) and a number of states ruled by unstable regimes. None of China's neighbors perceives its core national interests as congruent with Beijing's.

But China seldom has the luxury of dealing with any of its neighbors in a purely bilateral context. The third ring of Chinese security concerns consists of the politics of the six distinct geopolitical regions that surround China: Northeast Asia, Oceania, continental Southeast Asia, maritime Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. Each of these areas presents complex regional diplomatic and security problems.

Finally, there is the fourth ring: the world far beyond China's immediate neighborhood. China has truly entered this farthest circle only since the late 1990s and so far for limited purposes: to secure sources of commodities, such as petroleum; to gain access to markets and investments; to get diplomatic support for isolating Taiwan and Tibet's Dalai Lama; and to recruit allies for China's positions on international norms and legal regimes.

INSCRUTABLE AMERICA

In each of China's four security rings, the United States is omnipresent. It is the most intrusive outside actor in China's internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, the formal or informal military ally of many of China's neighbors, and the primary framer and defender of existing international legal regimes. This omnipresence means that **China's understanding of American motives determines how the Chinese deal with most of their security issues.**

Beginning with President Richard Nixon, who visited China in 1972, a succession of American leaders have assured China of their goodwill. Every U.S. presidential administration says that China's prosperity and stability are in the interest of the United States. And in practice, the United States has done more than any other power to contribute to China's modernization. It has drawn China into the global economy; given the Chinese access to markets, capital, and technology; trained Chinese experts in science, technology, and international law; prevented the full remilitarization of Japan; maintained the peace on the Korean Peninsula; and helped avoid a war over Taiwan.

Yet **Chinese policymakers are more impressed by policies and behaviors that they perceive as less benevolent.** The American military is deployed all around China's periphery, and the United States maintains a wide network of defense relationships with China's neighbors. Washington continues to frustrate

Beijing's efforts to gain control over Taiwan. The United States constantly pressures China over its economic policies and maintains a host of government and private programs that seek to influence Chinese civil society and politics.

Beijing views this seemingly contradictory set of American actions through three reinforcing perspectives. First, Chinese analysts see their country as heir to an agrarian, eastern strategic tradition that is pacifistic, defense-minded, nonexpansionist, and ethical. In contrast, **they see Western strategic culture -- especially that of the United States -- as militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish.**

Second, although China has embraced state capitalism with vigor, the Chinese view of the United States is still informed by Marxist political thought, which posits that capitalist powers seek to exploit the rest of the world. China expects Western powers to resist Chinese competition for resources and higher-value-added markets. And although China runs trade surpluses with the United States and holds a large amount of U.S. debt, China's leading political analysts believe the Americans get the better end of the deal by using cheap Chinese labor and credit to live beyond their means.

Third, American theories of international relations have become popular among younger Chinese policy analysts, many of whom have earned advanced degrees in the United States. The most influential body of international relations theory in China is so-called offensive realism, which holds that a country will try to control its security environment to the full extent that its capabilities permit. According to this theory, the United States cannot be satisfied with the existence of a powerful China and therefore seeks to make the ruling regime there weaker and more pro-American. Chinese analysts see evidence of this intent in Washington's calls for democracy and its support for what China sees as separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

Whether they see the United States primarily through a culturalist, Marxist, or realist lens, **most Chinese strategists assume that a country as powerful as the United States will use its power to preserve and enhance its privileges and will treat efforts by other countries to protect their interests as threats to its own security.** This assumption leads to a pessimistic conclusion: as China rises, the United States will resist. The United States uses soothing words; casts its actions as a search for peace, human rights, and a level playing field; and sometimes offers China genuine assistance. But the United States is two-faced. It intends to remain the global hegemon and prevent China from growing strong enough to challenge it. In a 2011 interview with Liaowang, a state-run Chinese newsmagazine, Ni Feng, the deputy director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of American Studies, summed up this view. "On the one hand, the United States realizes that it needs China's help on many regional and global issues," he said. "On the other hand, the United States is worried about a more powerful China and uses multiple means to delay its development and to remake China with U.S. values."

A small group of mostly younger Chinese analysts who have closely studied the United States argues that Chinese and American interests are not totally at odds. In their view, the two countries are sufficiently remote from each other that their core security interests need not clash. They can gain mutual benefit from trade and other common interests.

But those holding such views are outnumbered by strategists on the other side of the spectrum, mostly personnel from the military and security agencies, who take a dim view of U.S. policy and have more confrontational ideas about how China should respond to it. They believe that China must stand up to the United States militarily and that it can win a conflict, should one occur, by outpacing U.S. military technology and taking advantage of what they believe to be superior morale within China's armed forces. Their views are usually kept out of sight to avoid frightening both China's rivals and its friends.

WHO IS THE REVISIONIST?

To peer more deeply into the logic of the United States' China strategy, Chinese analysts, like analysts everywhere, look at capabilities and intentions. Although U.S. intentions might be subject to

interpretation, U.S. military, economic, ideological, and diplomatic capabilities are relatively easy to discover -- and from the Chinese point of view, they are potentially devastating.

U.S. military forces are globally deployed and technologically advanced, with massive concentrations of firepower all around the Chinese rim. The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is the largest of the United States' six regional combatant commands in terms of its geographic scope and nonwartime manpower. PACOM's assets include about 325,000 military and civilian personnel, along with some 180 ships and 1,900 aircraft. To the west, PACOM gives way to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for an area stretching from Central Asia to Egypt. Before September 11, 2001, CENTCOM had no forces stationed directly on China's borders except for its training and supply missions in Pakistan. But with the beginning of the "war on terror," CENTCOM placed tens of thousands of troops in Afghanistan and gained extended access to an air base in Kyrgyzstan.

The operational capabilities of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific are magnified by bilateral defense treaties with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Korea and cooperative arrangements with other partners. And to top it off, the United States possesses some 5,200 nuclear warheads deployed in an invulnerable sea, land, and air triad. Taken together, this **U.S. defense posture creates what Qian Wenrong of the Xinhua News Agency's Research Center for International Issue Studies has called a "strategic ring of encirclement."**

Chinese security analysts also take note of **the United States' extensive capability to damage Chinese economic interests.** The United States is still China's single most important market, unless one counts the European Union as a single entity. And the United States is one of China's largest sources of foreign direct investment and advanced technology. From time to time, Washington has entertained the idea of wielding its economic power coercively. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the United States imposed some limited diplomatic and economic sanctions on China, including an embargo, which is still in effect, on the sale of advanced arms. For several years after that, Congress debated whether to punish China further for human rights violations by canceling the low most-favored-nation tariff rates enjoyed by Chinese imports, although proponents of the plan could never muster a majority. More recently, U.S. legislators have proposed sanctioning China for artificially keeping the value of the yuan low to the benefit of Chinese exporters, and the Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney has promised that if elected, he will label China a currency manipulator on "day one" of his presidency.

Although trade hawks in Washington seldom prevail, flare-ups such as these remind Beijing how vulnerable China would be if the United States decided to punish it economically. Chinese strategists believe that the United States and its allies would deny supplies of oil and metal ores to China during a military or economic crisis and that the U.S. Navy could block China's access to strategically crucial sea-lanes. The ubiquity of the dollar in international trade and finance also gives the United States the ability to damage Chinese interests, either on purpose or as a result of attempts by the U.S. government to address its fiscal problems by printing dollars and increasing borrowing, acts that drive down the value of China's dollar-denominated exports and foreign exchange reserves.

Chinese analysts also believe that the United States possesses potent ideological weapons and the willingness to use them. After World War II, the United States took advantage of its position as the dominant power to enshrine American principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments and to install what China sees as Western-style democracies in Japan and, eventually, South Korea, Taiwan, and other countries. Chinese officials contend that the United States uses the ideas of democracy and human rights to delegitimize and destabilize regimes that espouse alternative values, such as socialism and Asian-style developmental authoritarianism. In the words of Li Qun, a member of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee and a rising star in the Communist Party, the Americans' "real purpose is not to protect so-called human rights but to use this pretext to influence and limit China's healthy economic growth and to prevent China's wealth and power from threatening [their] world hegemony."

In the eyes of many Chinese analysts, since the end of the Cold War the United States has revealed itself to be a revisionist power that tries to reshape the global environment even further in its favor. They see evidence of this reality everywhere: in the expansion of NATO; the U.S. interventions in Panama, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo; the Gulf War; the war in Afghanistan; and the invasion of Iraq. In the economic realm, the United States has tried to enhance its advantages by pushing for free trade, running down the value of the dollar while forcing other countries to use it as a reserve currency, and trying to make developing countries bear an unfair share of the cost of mitigating global climate change.

And perhaps most disturbing to the Chinese, the United States has shown its aggressive designs by promoting so-called color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. As Liu Jianfei, director of the foreign affairs division of the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, wrote in 2005, "The U.S. has always opposed communist 'red revolutions' and hates the 'green revolutions' in Iran and other Islamic states. What it cares about is not 'revolution' but 'color.' It supported the 'rose,' 'orange', and 'tulip' revolutions because they served its democracy promotion strategy." As Liu and other top Chinese analysts see it, the United States hopes "to spread democracy further and turn the whole globe 'blue.'"

EXPLOITING TAIWAN

Although American scholars and commentators typically see U.S.-Chinese relations in the postwar period as a long, slow thaw, in Beijing's view, the United States has always treated China harshly. From 1950 to 1972, the United States tried to contain and isolate China. Among other actions, it prevailed on most of its allies to withhold diplomatic recognition of mainland China, organized a trade embargo against the mainland, built up the Japanese military, intervened in the Korean War, propped up the rival regime in Taiwan, supported Tibetan guerillas fighting Chinese control, and even threatened to use nuclear weapons during both the Korean War and the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis. Chinese analysts concede that the United States' China policy changed after 1972. But they assert that the change was purely the result of an effort to counter the Soviet Union and, later, to gain economic benefits by doing business in China. Even then, the United States continued to hedge against China's rise by maintaining Taiwan as a strategic distraction, aiding the growth of Japan's military, modernizing its naval forces, and pressuring China on human rights.

The Chinese have drawn lessons about U.S. China policy from several sets of negotiations with Washington. During ambassadorial talks during the 1950s and 1960s, negotiations over arms control in the 1980s and 1990s, discussions over China's accession to the World Trade Organization in the 1990s, and negotiations over climate change during the decade that followed, the Chinese consistently saw the Americans as demanding and unyielding. But most decisive for Chinese understandings of U.S. policy were the three rounds of negotiations that took place over Taiwan in 1971-72, 1978-79, and 1982, which created the "communiqué framework" that governs U.S. Taiwan policy to this day. When the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement began, Chinese policymakers assumed that Washington would give up its support for Taipei in exchange for the benefits of normal state-to-state relations with Beijing. At each stage of the negotiations, the Americans seemed willing to do so. Yet decades later, the United States remains, in Beijing's view, the chief obstacle to reunification.

When Nixon went to China in 1972, he told the Chinese that he was willing to sacrifice Taiwan because it was no longer strategically important to the United States, but that he could not do so until his second term. On this basis, the Chinese agreed to the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, even though it contained a unilateral declaration by the United States that "reaffirm[ed] its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question," which was diplomatic code for a U.S. commitment to deter any effort by the mainland to take Taiwan by force. As events played out, Nixon resigned before he was able to normalize relations with Beijing, and his successor, Gerald Ford, was too weak politically to fulfill Nixon's promise.

When the next president, Jimmy Carter, wanted to normalize relations with China, the Chinese insisted on a clean break with Taiwan. In 1979, the United States ended its defense treaty with Taiwan but again issued a unilateral statement restating its commitment to a "peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue." Congress then surprised both the Chinese and the administration by adopting the Taiwan Relations Act, which required the United States to "maintain [its] capacity . . . to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security . . . of the people on Taiwan." Once again, the deterrent intent was clear.

In 1982, when President Ronald Reagan sought closer relations with Beijing to ramp up pressure on Moscow, China prevailed on the United States to sign another communiqué, which committed Washington to gradually reducing its weapons sales to Taiwan. But once the agreement was in place, the Americans set the benchmark year at 1979, when arms sales had reached their highest level; calculated annual reductions at a small marginal rate, adjusting for inflation so that they were actually increases; claimed that the more advanced weapons systems that they sold Taiwan were the qualitative equivalents of older systems; and allowed commercial firms to cooperate with the Taiwanese armaments industry under the rubric of technology transfers rather than arms sales. By the time President George W. Bush approved a large package of advanced arms to Taiwan in April 2001, the 1982 communiqué was a dead letter. Meanwhile, as the United States prolonged its involvement with Taiwan, a democratic transition took place there, putting unification even further out of Beijing's reach.

Reviewing this history, Chinese strategists ask themselves why the United States remains so committed to Taiwan. Although Americans often argue that they are simply defending a loyal democratic ally, most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of Washington's behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the United States tie China down. In the words of Luo Yuan, a retired general and deputy secretary-general of the Chinese Society of Military Science, the United States has long used Taiwan "as a chess piece to check China's rise."

THE PERILS OF PLURALISM

The Taiwan Relations Act marked the beginning of a trend toward congressional assertiveness on U.S. China policy, and this continues to complicate Washington's relationship with Beijing. Ten years later, the 1989 Tiananmen incident, followed by the end of the Cold War, shifted the terms of debate in the United States. China had been perceived as a liberalizing regime; after Tiananmen, China morphed into an atavistic dictatorship. And the collapse of the Soviet Union vitiated the strategic imperative to cooperate with Beijing. What is more, growing U.S.-Chinese economic ties began to create frictions over issues such as the dumping of cheap manufactured Chinese goods on the U.S. market and the piracy of U.S. intellectual property. After decades of consensus in the United States, China quickly became one of the most divisive issues in U.S. foreign policy, partially due to the intense advocacy efforts of interest groups that make sure China stays on the agenda on Capitol Hill.

Indeed, since Tiananmen, <u>China has attracted the attention of more American interest groups than any other country</u>. China's political system elicits opposition from human rights organizations; its population-control policies anger the antiabortion movement; its repression of churches offends American Christians; its inexpensive exports trigger demands for protection from organized labor; its reliance on coal and massive dams for energy upsets environmental groups; and its rampant piracy and counterfeiting infuriate the film, software, and pharmaceutical industries. These <u>specific complaints add strength to the broader fear of a "China threat," which permeates American political discourse -- a fear that, in Chinese eyes, not only denies the legitimacy of Chinese aspirations but itself constitutes a kind of threat to China.</u>

Of course, there are also those in Congress, think tanks, the media, and academia who support positions favorable to China, on the basis that cooperation is important for American farmers, exporters, and banks, and for Wall Street, or that issues such as North Korea and climate change are more important than disputes over rights or religion. Those advocates may be more powerful in the long run than those critical of China, but they tend to work behind the scenes. **To Chinese analysts trying to make sense of the cacophony of views expressed in the U.S. policy community, the loudest voices are the easiest to hear, and the signals are alarming.**

SUGARCOATED THREATS

In trying to ascertain U.S. intentions, Chinese analysts also look at policy statements made by senior figures in the executive branch. Coming from a political system where the executive dominates, Chinese analysts consider such statements reliable guides to U.S. strategy. They find that the statements often do two things: they seek to reassure Beijing that Washington's intentions are benign, and at the same time, they seek to reassure the American public that the United States will never allow China's rise to threaten U.S. interests. This combination of themes produces what Chinese analysts perceive as sugarcoated threats.

For example, in 2005, Robert Zoellick, the U.S. deputy secretary of state, delivered a major China policy statement on behalf of the George W. Bush administration. He reassured his American audience that the United States would "attempt to dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States or other friendly countries." But he also explained that China's rise was not a threat because China "does not seek to spread radical, anti-American ideologies," "does not see itself in a death struggle with capitalism," and "does not believe that its future depends on overturning the fundamental order of the international system." On that basis, he said, the two sides could have "a cooperative relationship." But cooperation would depend on certain conditions. China should calm what he called a "cauldron of anxiety" in the United States about its rise. It should "explain its defense spending, intentions, doctrine, and military exercises"; reduce its trade surplus with the United States; and cooperate with Washington on Iran and North Korea. Above all, Zoellick advised, China should give up "closed politics." In the U.S. view, he said, "China needs a peaceful political transition to make its government responsible and accountable to its people."

The same ideas have been repeated in slightly gentler language by the Obama administration. In the administration's first major policy speech on China, in September 2009, James Steinberg, then deputy secretary of state, introduced the idea of "strategic reassurance." Steinberg defined the principle in the following way: "Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China's 'arrival' ... as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of [the] security and well-being of others." China would need to "reassure others that this buildup does not present a threat"; it would need to "increase its military transparency in order to reassure all the countries in the rest of Asia and globally about its intentions" and demonstrate that it "respects the rule of law and universal norms." To Chinese analysts, such statements send the message that Washington wants cooperation on its own terms, seeks to deter Beijing from developing a military capability adequate to defend its interests, and intends to promote change in the character of the Chinese regime.

To be sure, Beijing's suspicion of Washington must contend with the fact that the United States has done so much to promote China's rise. But for Chinese analysts, history provides an answer to this puzzle. As they see it, the United States contained China for as long as it could. When the Soviet Union's rising strength made doing so necessary, the United States was forced to engage with China in order to reinforce its hand against Moscow. Once the United States started to engage with China, it came to believe that engagement would turn China toward democracy and would win back for the United States the strategic base on the mainland of Asia that Washington lost in 1949, when the Communists triumphed in the Chinese Civil War.

In the Chinese view, Washington's slow rapprochement with Beijing was not born of idealism and generosity; instead, it was pursued so that the United States could profit from China's economic opening by squeezing profits from U.S. investments, consuming cheap Chinese goods, and borrowing money to support the U.S. trade and fiscal deficits. While busy feasting at the Chinese table, U.S. strategists overlooked the risk of China's rise until the late 1990s. **Now that the United States perceives China as a threat, these Chinese analysts believe, it no longer has any realistic way to prevent it from continuing to develop**. In this sense, the U.S. strategy of engagement failed, vindicating the advice of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, who in 1991 advocated a strategy of "hiding our light and nurturing our strength." Faced with a China that has risen too far to be stopped, the United States can do no more than it is doing: demand cooperation on U.S. terms, threaten China, hedge militarily, and continue to try to change the regime.

HOW DO YOU HANDLE AN OFFENSIVE REALIST?

Despite these views, mainstream Chinese strategists do not advise China to challenge the United States in the foreseeable future. They expect the United States to remain the global hegemon for several decades, despite what they perceive as initial signs of decline. For the time being, as described by Wang Jisi, dean of Peking University's School of International Studies, "the superpower is more super, and the many great powers less great." Meanwhile, the two countries are increasingly interdependent economically and have the military capability to cause each other harm. **It is this mutual vulnerability that carries the best medium-term hope for cooperation. Fear of each other keeps alive the imperative to work together.**

In the long run, however, the better alternative for both China and the West is to create a new equilibrium of power that maintains the current world system, but with a larger role for China. China has good reasons to seek that outcome. Even after it becomes the world's largest economy, its prosperity will remain dependent on the prosperity of its global rivals (and vice versa), including the United States and Japan. The richer China becomes, the greater will be its stake in the security of sea-lanes, the stability of the world trade and financial regimes, nonproliferation, the control of global climate change, and cooperation on public health. China will not get ahead if its rivals do not also prosper. And Chinese strategists must come to understand that core U.S. interests -- in the rule of law, regional stability, and open economic competition -- do not threaten China's security.

The United States should encourage China to accept this new equilibrium by drawing clear policy lines that meet its own security needs without threatening China's. As China rises, it will push against U.S. power to find the boundaries of the United States' will. Washington must push back to establish boundaries for the growth of Chinese power. But this must be done with cool professionalism, not rhetorical belligerence. Hawkish campaign talk about trade wars and strategic competition plays into Beijing's fears while undercutting the necessary effort to agree on common interests. And in any case, putting such rhetoric into action is not a realistic option. To do so would require a break in mutually beneficial economic ties and enormous expenditures to encircle China strategically, and it would force China into antagonistic reactions.

Space

Space Mil real

Space militarization is real – lack of a legal framework means countries are beginning an arms race

Kamocsai 15 Peter Kamocsai is a graduate student at the George Washington University specializing in space policy, "Op-Ed | Why the U.S. Should Be a Leader in Space Weaponization", 1/10/15, http://spacenews.com/commentary-why-the-u-s-should-be-a-leader-in-space-weaponization//OF

Nations are already using the opportunity that the Outer Space Treaty presents to weaponize space. As some scholars observed, **although we are yet to deploy space-based weapons, we have already made the first steps**. The Soviet Union was building a secret military space station under the Almaz (Diamond) program and was also designing an anti-satellite spacecraft called Polyus. Currently, the Chinese are testing advanced anti-satellite weaponry and the Russians are building a system to neutralize space weapons. **These countries are preparing for a space arms race.** They will surpass the United States if it allows them to do so. The cost of space weaponization might not seem justifiable in the short term, but in the long term the cost of inaction is higher. The public is not yet involved in the space weaponization debate, and therefore explaining the reasons for deploying space weapons to taxpayers is moot. Moreover, the costs of developing, deploying and maintaining space weapons can seem prohibitive. According to some estimates, the Brilliant Pebbles space-based anti-missile weapon proposed in the 1980s would have cost around $20 million apiece in today's dollars.

Space militarization threats are real – tech developments and lack of governance

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Critical dependencies on space-based infrastructure have grown dramati-cally in recent decades, and now extend to small states and the global economy as a whole. However, as geopolitical rivalries re-emerge in more traditional domains of interstate conflict, the prospects for future stability in space appear increasingly dim. **While the consequences of a great-power clash in space could be ruinous, a shared understanding of the perils in-volved has yet to take hold. Strategic interaction along the 'final frontier' is set to enter a period of considerable danger.** Among the various environments into which humans have expanded their economic, military, and scientific ac-tivities, outer space is easily the most unwelcoming and inhospitable. Im-possible to access except through mas-sive expenditures of energy per unit of mass to be placed into orbit, and utterly hostile to human life as well as to many types of man-made machin-ery, the maintenance of a permanent presence outside Earth's protective atmosphere remains a highly ambi-tious undertaking. Despite various complications, however, this presence – which, in most cases, has entailed the placement of unmanned artificial satellites in earth-centric orbits – has become an essential pillar of the global economic and security systems in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. From highly specialized scientific and com-mercial services to everyday applica-tions of information technology (IT), space-based infrastructures now form part of the life-support system of a civilization that has tied its economic well-being and, indeed, its very sur-vival to global connectivity. However, while the economically most developed societies in particular have come to accept this state of depend-ence on space-based systems as fairly natural and unproblematic, the space domain is, in fact, highly vulnerable to the direct and indirect effects of reckless behavior on the part of both commercial and governmental enti-ties. Instances of overcrowding are already in evidence within certain or-bital planes, increasing the likelihood of serious accidents, such as the 2009 collision between the Iridium 33 and Cosmos-2251 communications sat-ellites in low-earth orbit. Decades of ill-regulated activities in space have created millions of pieces of orbital debris, many of which have sufficient kinetic energy to permanently disable a satellite. However, **the most serious threat to the continued accessibility of the space environment by far is the pros-pect of a military confrontation**, in-volving the use of kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weaponry **by any of the grow-ing number of states that now possess the technological wherewithal to field such capabilities.** As was rather vividly demonstrated by the Chinese test of a direct-ascent ASAT missile in January 2007, which is estimated to have created more than two

million pieces of debris up to ten centimeters in size as well as 2,500 larger objects that can be routinely tracked by earth-based sensors, such a conflict would probably result in mas-sive environmental damage. Depend-ing on the number and position of satellites destroyed, the utilization of affected orbital planes could be severe-ly impaired. In a worst-case scenario, these orbits could become virtually unusable for extended periods of time, as most of the debris would remain in place for decades or even centuries, with serious implications for both commercial and military users. <u>Unfortunately, several trends point in the direction of an increased risk over the next 10 – 20 years of terrestrial con-flict that may involve attacks on space systems, including the use of kinetic ASAT weaponry</u>. These <u>trends are pri-marily the results of the re-emergence of sustained strategic rivalries among some great and medium-sized powers</u> – including the US and China in East Asia, the US and Russia in Eurasia, and potentially the China-India-Pa-kistan triangle in South Asia. With the exception of Pakistan, all of these states have already demonstrated a ba-sic anti-satellite capability, and **the US and China in particular are integrat-ing space warfare scenarios into their military planning.**

Threats are real – militarization and debris make the risk mutually reinforcing

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But **even if the norm against attacking another country's satellites is never broken, developing and testing antisatellite weapons still increase the risk of nuclear war.** <u>If, for instance, US military leaders became seriously concerned that China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack, pressure could build for a pre-emptive attack against Chinese or Russian strategic forces</u>. **Should a satellite be struck by a piece of space debris** during a crisis or a low-level terrestrial conflict, **leaders might mistakenly assume that a space war had begun and retaliate before they knew what had actually happened**. Such scenarios may seem improbable, but they are no more implausible than the scenarios that are used to justify the development and use of antisatellite weapons.

The plan's dialogue can de-securitize space development

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<u>China understands why some in the international community are calling for a revival of arms control processes surrounding antisatellite weapons and other outer space issues</u>. And China is generally supportive of arms control in outer space. But as the saying goes, the devil is in the details. **The real question is not whether individual countries support arms control efforts and desire strategic stability—but rather, how these goals will be pursued**, according to which principles, and in pursuit of what priorities. <u>As circumstances change in space, the nature of nations' arms control engagements must change as well.</u> But **if the major players fail to reach a clear, common understanding of new realities in space, it will be difficult to establish constructive dialogue.**

Link Debate

Link Turn – Democracy

Curtailing domestic surveillance policy is necessary to reestablish a more authentic democracy through creating transparency – the alt does nothing to challenge current surveillance policy

Jacqueline L. **Ferreira, 2014** (Jacqueline L. Ferreira, Professor of Sociology at University of Western Ontario, "Testing the Democratic Credibility of an NSA (No∂ Secrets Allowed) Government," 2014, http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=si) K.GEKKER

In explaining their interest, <u>government representatives have stated reasons of national∂ security and monitoring criminal activities</u> (Eddlam, 2013). Since this necessarily means that∂ governments will be monitoring activities that are not yet illegal (and may never be illegal) there∂ is a necessary contradiction with democratic rights. With this in mind, globalization can be said∂ to threaten the integrity of democracy with the introduction of new intelligence-gathering∂ organizations that have been created in order to keep up with the rapidly shrinking virtual world.∂ The <u>integrity of democracy has been threatened through their invention because there has not∂ been the transparency required of a democratic government in these organizations, because their∂ increased presence has resulted in the breaching the human rights of American citizens,</u> and∂ because the government's actions in relation to these organizations have been contradictory to∂ the ideals of democracy. Before addressing these main points, it is important to first understand∂ what type of democracy will be hereafter discussed.∂ <u>Democracy at its most fundamental level is the rule by and for the people</u> – the equal∂ representation of the wishes of each individual person within a sovereign state (Macpherson,∂ 1965). For reasons of simplicity and availability of research, this paper will focus on the liberal∂ democracy practiced in the United States. <u>Liberal democracy exists where the political system of∂ democracy is combined with the attributes of liberalism</u> (Macpherson, 1965; Fichtelberg, 2006).∂ A democratic society will include free elections, the rule of law, and the ability to choose∂ between multiple different political parties (Marable, 2009; Rose, 2009). Liberal attributes relate∂ to human and civil rights as well as political freedoms (Macpherson, 1965). Liberal societies∂ allow citizens the freedom to vote (or not) for whichever political party they may choose. <u>In∂ many liberal democratic societies, these rights are drawn from codified legislation and especially∂ constitutions that dictate what the fundamental rights of citizens are that must be respected∂</u> (Rose, 2009). It is assumed that through exercising these rights, citizens will be appropriately∂ represented by the individuals they elect to govern them and to produce legislation that will∂ accurately represent the desires of the majority (Rose, 2009). The way that an elected∂ government behaves in its everyday functions, as well as under special circumstances as in times∂ of war or likewise, should always take into account the needs of their citizens and respect the∂ rule of the majority. Additionally, <u>it is important for a democratic government to have∂ transparency as one of their guiding principles so that their citizens can remain informed about∂ what is happening in their society. At least, the aforementioned characteristics are what a liberal∂ democracy should ideally adhere</u> to.

Democracy induced policies like the plan check biopolitical violence.

Dickinson 04 (Edward Ross, Associate Professor of History at the University of California-Davis, " Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about "Modernity"", in Central European History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2004), pg 35.)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that

analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can and historically does create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90

Link Turn - Drones

Drones are an instrument of biopower, which the state uses to put forth a state of war

Barringer '14 (Durante, political studies student at Bard College "Global War, Biopower and The Rise of Drone∂ Warfare in the 21st Century" April 2014 http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=durante_barringer) Foronda

Hardt and Negri posit that in order <u>for U.S. counterinsurgency strategy to work there must be a focus on an "unlimited form of dominance that involves all dimensions, the full∂ spectrum of power".</u>82 <u>There are forms of power that present themselves as viable options when∂ trying to control and retard human behavior: coercion, persuasion, and manipulation</u>, but∂ undoubtedly they all have a limit to what they can accomplish. All three forms influence choice,∂ but do not control it and choice leads to action. So, <u>in order to control action and choice, one∂ must control the life of the enemy, which then becomes unlimited due to the encompassing∂ character of life itself</u>. Life can be considered in two different models: one being the life force of∂ a human being and the other being the day-to-day happenings that represent daily life. Foucault∂ creates this dichotomy in The History of Sexuality by explaining the evolution of sovereign power. <u>In former times, the sovereign had the "right to decide life and death"83 while in modern∂ times, sovereign power comes in the form of life-administration. Life-administering is an act,∂ one done for Foucault by an unknown sovereign</u>. This act best shows itself in politics and the∂ business of economics. The power to decide or take life is focused on the destruction of one's∂ physical control through death. However, life-administration seeks to control both the physical∂ and life activities of a person. <u>So not only does biopower seek to control the political life of∂ bodies, but also the social behaviors and interactions as well. This biopower shapes the lives of those in the system through laws and regulations</u>.∂ Hardt and Negri suggest that biopower "threatens us with death but also rules over life".84∂ Death, also serves as a tool of subjugation and as a threat, which tries to reproduce certain∂ behaviors that are deemed acceptable by the powers that be.∂ <u>In</u> the case of <u>the War on Al Qaeda,</u> **<u>we see drones as an instrument of biopower, as administers of death</u>**. Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, echoed this in his address to∂ the Oxford Union. In this address, he argues that <u>there will be a tipping point</u>, "a tipping <u>in which so many</u> of the <u>leaders and operatives of al Qaeda have been killed</u> or captured, and <u>the group is no longer able to</u> attempt or <u>launch a strategic attack against the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, such that al Qaeda∂ as we know it, <u>the organization that</u> our <u>Congress authorized</u> the military to pursue in 2001, <u>has∂ been</u> effectively <u>destroyed</u>".85<u>This statement is biopower</u> at its best for all three scholars.∂ <u>Foucault would point out the life-administering aspects of what the American government is trying to do in terms of al Qaeda. The government is seeking to change a behavior and ultimately produce a human being that would be more acceptable to the status quo. However, if such conditioning is not possible then the only plausible use of biopower would be the use of death as a final control against al Qaeda</u>. This, for Hardt and Negri, is the ultimate culmination of∂ biopower.∂ Hardt and Negri also talk about how counterinsurgency strategies have to be formed in∂ order to possibly compete with guerrilla fighters or in this case, insurgents. Hardt and Negri∂ suggest that "<u>the dominant power</u> (...) <u>must adopt counterinsurgency strategies that seek not only to defeat the enemy through military means but also control it with social, political, ideological, and psychological weapons</u>".86 The reason for this is best viewed through <u>Foucault</u>, who <u>says</u>:∂ "<u>Wars are no

longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on∂ behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of∂ wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity".87 It is no longer enough kill to the opponent;∂ there must be a regulation of the spaces in which their bodies operate. If not, then danger could∂ still exist. In many ways the War on Al Qaeda has become a war of biopower; Al Qaeda seeks to∂ use terrorism to control the actions and militaristic choices of the American people and∂ government, while the U.S. seeks to control, regulate and possibly destroy Al Qaeda. The social,∂ political, ideological and psychological are all processes and concepts that inform how human∂ beings carry out life, the way they behave and what behaviors should be reproduced. By∂ infiltrating the aforementioned realms the dominant power, being America, would seek to kill Al Qaeda as a viable option, as a way of life.∂ The idea of the "global War on Al Qaeda" also falls in line with Foucault's belief that war is fought on "behalf of the existence of everyone".88 George Bush's speech to Congress and∂ the nation on September 20th, 2001 furthered this idea by bringing not only national security to the forefront of American politics, but personal security as well. Security becomes a notion∂ important enough for the masses to engage and exert their might through the extinction of life.∂ However, at the same time even the act of getting the masses to rise and stand is a form of lifeadministering,∂ a positive form of biopower. Foucault also uses the word "purpose" which is∂ important to understand when it comes to trying to understand the meaning of biopower.∂ Biopower is not just an unseen concept, but it is government, it is the ruling body that creates the∂ space for life processes, such as politics, in order for them to play out. Foucault argues: "It is as∂ managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed".89 To manage something is an incredible∂ type of power to hold, especially over the lives of men. And survival, which in a Foucauldian∂ sense would be avoiding death and being productive, is the purpose of biopower. Bodies most∂ live in order to be productive, however what happens when productivity is lost? Death becomes much more realistic as an option for control.

Drones and warfare are tools of the state to extend their power and push their citizens into a perpetual state of exception

Barringer '14 (Durante, political studies student at Bard College "Global War, Biopower and The Rise of Drone∂ Warfare in the 21st Century" April 2014 http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=durante_barringer) Foronda

Hardt and Negri view the concepts of global war, the absolute, and biopower through the overarching theme of security. They observe that there has been a shift from defense to security∂ within politics.97 Defense in itself is reactionary and based upon a set criterion that justifies∂ action. By contrast, with security there is a sense of proactivity, of actively seeking ways to deter∂ and prevent threats. Hardt and Negri put it this way: "security requires rather actively and constantly shaping the environment through military and/or police activity".98 Surveillance and the consequent targeted killings that accompany them are security in its finest form. As Hardt∂ and Negri assert, security is a form of biopower in the sense that security seeks to reshape and∂ produce social life at its most general global scale.99 Security, especially defined within previous∂ National Security strategies, has been aimed at the destruction of Al Qaeda and lessening their∂ influence across the globe. By openly bringing death to Al Qaeda's doorstep and actively∂ exerting power over life, security is reinforced through fear and possibility of death. Death then∂ serves as a deterrent, thus solidifying American security.∂ In looking at drones as a form of security or enforcer of security, taking the place of field∂ soldiers, one has to view drones as more than simple machines. The expansion of drone operations to include targeted killing is a response to the unorthodoxy of insurgency and asymmetric warfare. For a long time, with just ground forces which included spies, soldiers and∂ informants war efforts could only go so far. While still operating on a global field, ground forces can only conduct intelligence gathering for a limited time, especially within a network as∂ amorphous as Al Qaeda. The prospect of conducting targeted killings using ground forces would∂ also seem unconventional. Drones, on the other hand, can target and successfully kill more than one

enemy during an operation; drones can also gather intelligence for an undefined amount of time. These capabilities have become increasingly more desirable in the war against Al Qaeda.∂ **Drones have become the instrument of biopower in technological form**. Both police and∂ military powers are able to be carried out at a very low cost while affording the government maneuverability and global reach; this global reach allows for the regulation of life abroad and∂ ultimately transforms not only the way Al Qaeda operatives live, but the way both domestic and∂ foreign civilians live as well.∂ When looking at how one should view the transformation of war in the 21st century, Al∂ Qaeda and technology become synonymous with ideations of global security. Using Hardt and∂ Negri's framework allows for a comprehensive analysis of the advent of global war and the perpetual state of exception that has become commonplace within U.S. politics today. With the∂ advent of policies such as the AUMF and the Office of Legal Counsel's white paper on the∂ legality of drones, which I will discuss in chapter three, one has to grapple with such questions in∂ an intellectual way.∂ Global War is not something that is merely conceptual. It exists as a part of America's∂ national security strategy. For the past twelve years the U.S. has changed the way in which it∂ fought the war, however it has not changed the political objective of the war, which is a global one; the destruction of the Al Qaeda network completely. With that being said, the U.S. had to∂ adapt to the insurgency tactics of Al Qaeda, which for a military built on conventional strategic and tactical principles was a feat in itself. However, this new unconventional war has led to the∂ expansion of technology as a more efficient and cost effective way of fighting insurgencies.∂ Drones, armed drones, have come to the forefront of American war fighting. One could say that∂ this was bound to happen; drones were being used since the late 1970's, yet not at the capacity∂ they are being used now. In an article written by Frank Strickland called "The Early Evolution of∂ the Predator Drone" he quotes a man by the name of James "Jim" Woolsey, who says, "We have∂ slain a large dragon. But now we live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of".100 This quote speaks directly∂ to the frame of thought that is reflected today in American ideations of global war, exception and∂ the use of drones as an offensive-defensive counterinsurgency weapon. Woolsey said that∂ America, after the fall of Russia, the large dragon, lived in a world where small dangers would∂ pose a threat to security. Woolsey was right. Dangers did exist that were unseen and were hard to∂ keep track of especially with human limitations.

Link Turn – Legal Protections Good

Although the internet makes surveillance easier, spying on people is not the right way to go. Large corporations should not betray the trust of their consumers.

John **Sullivan** Jan 20**14** (Associate Professor of Media and Communication at Muhlenberg College in Allentown, PA. He received his Master's and Ph.D. degrees in Communication. The Political Economy of Communication "Uncovering the data panopticon: The urgent need for critical scholarship in an era of corporate and government surveillance" polecom.org/index.php/polecom/article/view/23/192)

In Philip K. Dick's 1956 science fiction short story, The Minority Report, crime in a futuristic United States has been all but extinguished because the police have discovered the ability to predict future events. In this peaceful dystopia, suspects are arrested and charged before their crimes are even committed. While real-world law enforcement agencies cannot (yet) predict future events, the recent revelations about the scope and nature of the National Security Agency's (NSA) domestic digital spying program suggest they have developed some formidable tools to locate would-be terrorists. Privacy advocates were outraged by whistleblower Edward Snowden's revelation that the NSA, in cooperation with technology companies, routinely stored, processed and analyzed millions of private emails, video chats, online phone calls, and internet file transfers under the auspices of a program called PRISM. Recent news reports based upon Snowden's documents have revealed that even encrypted emails, documents, and online banking transactions are being regularly accessed by the NSA (Larson and Shane, 2013). While these revelations about domestic digital wiretapping without court orders have caused a stir in the American and global press, the privacy dangers associated with this type of data surveillance are not new to the scholarly community. Exactly 20 years ago, communication scholar Oscar H Gandy Jr (1993) meticulously outlined the growing threat to individual privacy posed by the cooperation between corporate and government data gathering in a book called The Panoptic Sort. At a time when the internet was in its infancy, when desktop computer processing was a fraction of what it is today, and five years before the founding of Google, Gandy warned that organizations like Equifax, TRW, and the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) were amassing huge repositories of consumer data that were gathered passively whenever individuals made purchases via credit cards. When these data are combined with sophisticated matching algorithms and sorted against huge government databases like the census, he argued, they enabled precise tracking of individuals' behaviors, political views, and other sensitive private information. The precision of such discrimination transforms the routine sorting of personal data into a powerful form of institutional power. Building upon Foucault's (1995) seminal analysis of disciplinary systems in society, Gandy argued that the scale of the data collection and analysis performed by government and corporate institutions created a panopticon wherein citizen actions would eventually become circumscribed within an ever-widening net of personal data surveillance. The end result, he observed, is "an antidemocratic system of control that cannot be transformed because it can serve no purpose other than that for which it was designed—the rationalization and control of human existence"(Gandy, 1993: 227). We've come a long way since 1993. Who could have imagined services like Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr that not only encourage, but actively incentivize the voluntary dissemination of personal information online? Over the past 20 years, the centrality of the internet to the global communications infrastructure has made it a target for the type of panoptic sorting that Gandy described. Now that the world knows about PRISM, it is tempting to imagine that enhanced public scrutiny will effectively limit these programs. I don't think that is likely. In fact, there are four specific trends that foretell a greater expansion of the data panopticon: convergence and the central place of software in social, commercial and political systems; the growing importance of metadata for routing, storage and sorting of information; the global business of data storage and retrieval; the blurring of lines between corporate and government data mining. The convergence of digital technologies and the importance of software In the previous era of analog technologies, such as wired

telephones and reel-to-reel tapes, each specific technology had a limited range of capabilities alongside a specific set of legal standards to accompany their use. The Wiretap Act of 1968, for example, prohibits law enforcement from wiretapping telephones without a court order because doing so would violate the 4th Amendment protections of both the suspect and anyone that communicates with them. Today, there are few discrete technologies anymore. Thanks to technological convergence, almost all forms of communication today utilize some form of digital communication, and many do this via the Internet. Software has now replaced specific forms of communication hardware as the nexus for new types of digital communication, from Skype and FaceTime to emails and tweets. Creating legal precedents for protecting individual privacy throughout this myriad of new options has been difficult. Indeed, new options are emerging all the time, and software is extremely fungible in functionality as it adapts quickly to new situations and uses. We lack a coherent legal regime to counteract the interception of these communications. For example, Skype phone calls can be protected under the existing federal wiretap laws, but emails and text messages cannot. The rise of metadata The expansion of online communications has generated an explosion of metadata. Metadata are the transaction records that are generated whenever you send an email or text message. It identifies the location from which the message was sent, when it was sent, the subject of the message, the recipient(s) of the message, the web address of the recipient(s), and more. The Obama Administration has argued that its domestic intelligence program complied with the law because it simply scanned the metadata of email transactions to search for anomalies rather than accessing the content of those emails. As a recent article in The Economist (2013) pointed out, however, while the usefulness of metadata in an analog era was limited (hence the lower evidentiary standards required in courts to obtain that information), today, thanks to the internet, "metadata can now provide a detailed portrait of who people know, where they go, and their daily routines." (para. 8) Therefore, the argument that random metadata searches do not violate users' privacy becomes difficult to sustain.

Link Turn – Prisons

Prison is just a subtle form of control the government uses on the people. The isolation, surveillance, labor etc. were used to make prisoners feel separated from society. These feelings are what turned 'deliquents' into law abiding citizens.

Schriltz 99 ("Foucault on the prison: Torturing history to punish capitalism" Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society Karl von Schriltz, published online: 06 Mar 2008. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/08913819908443539

In the third and most important part of his argument, Foucault considers how the structure of the prison came to reflect the imperatives of power, which were roughly coextensive with the goals of Panopticism. The aim of the prison, Foucault opines, ultimately became the transformation of inmates into compliant, law-abiding, economically productive automatons, reflecting the efficiency demands of emerging market economies (163—64). To this end, prisons came to embody the coercive principles of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, as did the school, the hospital, and the factory. Panopticism disciplined its subjects through a program of constant surveillance coupled with strict regimentation according to detailed instructions. Constant surveillance forced subjects to internalize the gaze of authority—enabling them to regulate themselves—while regimentation molded their physical movements to maximize productivity. Foucault identifies five ways in which prisons incorporated Panopticism. First, cellular isolation forced the inmates into greater selfreflection, pushing them to internalize authority (236). Second, constant surveillance achieved the same end (249-50). Third, remunerated prison labor was adopted as a means of regimenting the habits and movements of inmates, while impressing upon them the centrality of wages as the incentive to work (240, 243). Fourth, flexible prison sentences were meted out, reflecting the requirements of psychological rehabilitation rather than the seriousness of the infraction—though Foucault admits that flexible sentencing was practiced only sporadically (244). The final, similar expression of Panopticism in the prison, Foucault asserts, was the cognitive shift from viewing inmates as "law breakers" to viewing them as "delinquents" (255). Prison administrators regarded their inmates no longer in terms of the crimes they had committed, but rather in terms of their lifelong social pathologies, as reflected by their "biographies." The prisoners were seen as, and made to feel alienated from, society. This portion of Foucault's argument is the one that is the most abstracted from reality, and is therefore the most difficult to relate to the historical record; but the actual evolution of the prison during the nineteenth century, and the explicit motivations behind its evolution, seem to diverge markedly from Foucault's account. Industrialization undoubtedly brought an unprecedented awareness of the importance of productivity to economic life, and the emergence of surveillance and hierarchy in schools, factories, and hospitals probably reflected this concern. Foucault is also credible in suggesting that the enhancement of efficiency through discipline initially appeared in the military—where the importance of efficiency was first recognized—long before the Industrial Revolution brought the same concern to other institutions. For this reason, efficiency concerns may have unconsciously undergirded the pronouncements of prison reformers—there is no way of ever verifying their true motivations (Wright 1983, 22). However, the actual extent to which ideas other than Panopticism were reflected in the structure of prisons suggests otherwise. The lukewarm reception of imprisonment in France was reflected in the disorganized state of the French prison system, which consisted of two levels. Roughly 400 local prisons housed half the prison population, including those waiting for trial and petty criminals serving brief sentences (Wright 1983,133-34). These squalid facilities were described by shocked prison inspectors as "filled with stupor and horror"; the lack of segregation according to age, sex, or degree of criminality rendered them veritable "crime factories" (ibid., 134). These prisons remained untouched by the philosophical speculation about incarceration, and certainly exhibited no trace of Panopticism—there was no cellular isolation, no work, and no organized surveillance of any kind.

Impact Debate

Impact Defense – Biopower

Case outweighs biopower – physical violence is worse than disciplinary power

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Perhaps we might say, therefore, that power or pastoral-power recognises the value of the subject as an agent, whereas violence or discipline attempts to extinguish the capacity of the subject for agency. Although Foucault, of course, never describes things in quite these terms, he does come remarkably close to doing so. In particular, he defines violence, in contrast to power, as aiming at domination or as a physical constraint that denies the ability of the other to act: "where the determining factors saturate the whole there is no relationship of power," rather "it is a question of a physical relationship of constraint."27 Similarly, he defines power, in contrast to violence, as able to come into play only where people have a capacity to act, perhaps even a capacity to act freely: "power is exercised over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free," by which "we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized."28 If we thus accept that power always treats the subject as an agent, whereas violence always attempts to extinguish the capacity of the subject for agency, we can see why Foucault's later work on power emphasises that power, unlike violence, necessarily entails a capacity for resistance. To treat someone as an agent, one has to recognise that they can do other than one wishes—they can resist. Power can exist only where people have a capacity to act freely, and so only where they can resist that power. Perhaps, therefore, we should define as violent any relationship—whether overtly violent or not—in which an individual has his action determined for him. Violence manifests itself in any relationship between individuals, groups, or societies in which one denies the agency of the others by seeking to define for them actions they must perform. Power, in contrast, appears in any relationship—although no overtly violent relationship could meet the following requirement—in which an individual does not have his action determined for him. Power manifests itself whenever individuals, groups, or societies act as influences on the agency of the subject without attempting to determine the particular actions the subject performs. Here a rejection of autonomy implies that power is ineliminable, while a defence of agency implies that power need not degenerate into violence. Foucault's final work on the nature of governmentality suggests, therefore, that society need not consist solely of the forms of discipline he had analysed earlier. Society might include an arena in which free individuals attempt only to influence one another. I hope my discussion of Foucault's theory of governmentality has pointed to the way in which a distinction between violence and power might provide us with normative resources for social criticism absent from his earlier work. Provided we are willing to grant that the capacity for agency has ethical value—and this seems reasonable enough—we will denounce violent social relations and champion instead a society based on a more benign power.29 We will favour forms of power that recognise the other as an agent, and so provide openings for resistance. As Foucault suggested, we will judge societies against an ideal of "a minimum of domination."30 A good society must recognise people as agents: it must encourage forms of resistance. What is more, of course, if we are to recognise people as agents and encourage forms of resistance, we must tolerate, perhaps even promote, difference. Most discussions of the sort of ethics poststructuralism might sustain, especially in relation to feminism, highlight the ideas of a recognition of the other and a tolerance of difference.31 What I hope I have added to these discussions is the suggestion that one way of generating these values is to treat Foucault's concept of governmentality as implying a recognition of the subject as an agent but not an autonomous agent. No doubt important questions remain to be answered. Questions such as, can we devise criteria by which to determine the extent of violence within a society? how should we promote resistance? and can we make further relevant distinctions between forms of violence or even between forms of power? It seems clear already, however, that Foucault provides us with a point of departure from which to address these questions. His concept of governmentality encourages us to look at social formations to see how they provide possibilities for agency and resistance understood as key forms of human freedom. As he himself said, "the notion of governmentality allows one, I believe, to set off the freedom of the subject and the relationship to others, i.e., that which constitutes the very matter of ethics."32

Impact Defense – Sovereignty

Sovereignty is not the founding moment of politics—the decision is haunted by the traces of its conceptual predecessors—ontologizing the sovereign decision within the heart of the political is a self-fulfilling prophecy

Barnett '9 Clive Barnett, Reader in Human Geography at The Open University, "Violence and publicity: constructions of political responsibility after 9/11," Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy, 12 (3), 2009, pp. 353-375, http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1080/13698230903127879

If Agamben drastically simplifies Foucault's work on power, then nor should Agamben's allusion to Derrida in the analysis of the state of exception be accepted as the authoritative political interpretation of deconstruction's relevance to contemporary geopolitics. It is common to find deconstructive topics such as undecidability interpreted, with the help of Schmitt, to support an account of 'the political' in terms of arbitrary force and unfounded decisions (see Barnett 2004). **The decisionistic interpretation of the performative force of foundations tends to take Schmitt's account of sovereignty as the power to decide on the exception as axiomatic**. In Schmitt's original formulation and in Agamben's faithful reiteration of it, **the sovereign is defined as the one who decides on the exception. The circularity in this definition** (Bull 2004) **effaces the interval between claiming the necessity of making an exception – of suspending the law – and the successful enactment of this claim. The absence of objective foundational validity to norms is**, through reference to the Derridean theme of undecidability, **made to imply that application and judgement are a purely arbitrary imposition of force by the strongest will. This interpretation misconstrues the practice of judgement that the deconstruction of foundations is meant to throw into new relief** (see Brenkman 2007, 59-77, Zerilli 2005). **In Derrida's writings, the absence of foundations is not the occasion for a depressed resignation to a decisionistic interpretation of sovereign power at all. Rather, a distinctive sense of responsibility is made visible by the undecidability of normative foundations.** Derrida does not locate the 'mystical' foundation of authority in the self-assertive will of the sovereign who decides on the exception, but in the exposure to the demands of others (see Barnett 2005). Derrida clearly articulated his doubts about the sustainability of **Schmitt's account of sovereignty** and the political, on the grounds that it **depends on a logic of conceptual purity in which enmity is always found to be the original source lying behind all apparently reciprocal relationships** (Derrida 1997, 246-247). In his own reflections on the philosophical resonances of contemporary geopolitics after 9/11, Derrida undermines the model of sovereignty as wilful self-assertion upon which the state of exception analysis rests. **The circularity of the Schmittian account of sovereignty maintains the assumption of an 'ipseity' of the self, defined by the security of an "I Can"** (Derrida 2005, 11-13). Against this self-founding circularity, **Derrida affirms the spacing between asserting sovereignty and the enactment of decision which is implied by thinking of sovereignty as performative: "To confer sense or meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to find a reason for it, is already to compromise its deciding exceptionality, to subject it to rules, to a code of law, to some general law, to concepts. It is thus to divide it, to subject it to portioning, to participation, to being shared**" (Derrida 2005, 101). For Derrida, **pure sovereignty on the model of decisionist exceptionality does not and cannot exist, in so far as it would exclude the possibility of sharing upon which sovereignty depends**. In Derrida's account, **sovereignty is divided at is origin by a spacing that implies sovereignty is always distributed, shared with others** (Derrida 2005, 45). The deconstruction of the punctual ipseity of decisionistic sovereignty has consequences for understandings of concepts of force, power and mastery (Derrida 2005, 17). **If violence is a possibility inhabiting all relations, then so equally is its opposite, non-violence.** While Derrida acknowledged that "a certain force and violence" is irreducible in argumentation and discussion, he argued that "none the less this violence can only be practised and can only appear as such on the basis of a nonviolence, a vulnerability, an exposition. […]. I do not believe in non-violence as a descriptive and determinable experience, but rather as an irreducible promise and of the relation to the other as essentially non-instrumental" (Derrida 1996, 83). Reversing and displacing the order of priority found in decisionistic interpretations of deconstruction, Derrida affirms that **violence is always entangled in "a non-appropriative relation to the other that occurs without violence and on the basis of which all violence detaches itself and is**

determined" (Derrida 1996, 83). The point of calling attention to this entangled relationship of violence and non-violence in Derrida's work is to underscore that **if the relationship between norms and authority, justice and law, is understood to be 'undecidable', then this should not be construed as authorizing the sort of conceptualisation of power as necessarily violently sovereign** developed by Agamben (see Johnson 2007, Wortham 2007).

Impact Framing - Pragmatism Good

Conventional political action is the only way to reform power – Foucault's alternative fails

Michael **Walzer**, Social Sciene Prof @ Princeton, **1988**, Company of Critics, p. 207-9

Foucault is certianly right to say that the conventional truths of morality, law, medicine, and psychiatry are implicated in the exercise of power; that is a fact too easily forgotten by conventionally detached scientists, social scientists, and even philosophers. But those same truths also regulate the exercise of power. They set limits on what can rightly be done, and they give shape and conviction to the arguments the prisoners make. The limits are important, even if they are in some sense arbitrary. They aren't entirely arbitrary, however, insofar as they are intrinsic to the particular disciplines (in both senses of the word). It is the truths of jurisprudence and penology, for example, that distinguish punishment from preventive detention. It is the truths of psychiatry that distinguish the internment of madmen from the internment of political dissidents. And it is the commitment to truth itself, even if it is only local truth, that distinguishes the education of citizens from ideological drill. A liberal or social democratic state is one that maintains the limits of its constituent disciplines and disciplinary institutions and that enforces their intrinsic principles. Authoritarian and totalitarian states, by contrast, override those limits, turning education into indoctrination, punishment into repression, asylums into prisons, and prisons into concentration camps. These are crude definitions, but they can easily be elaborated or amended. They indicate, in any case, the enormous importance of the political regime, the sovereign state. For the state is the agency through which society acts upon itself, It is the state that establishes the general framework within which all other disciplinary institutions operate. It is the state that holds open or radically shuts down the possibility of local resistance.* The agents of every Disciplinary institution strive, of course, to extend their reach and and augment their discretionary power. In the long run, only political action and state power can stop them. Every act of local resistance is an appeal for political or legal intervention from the center. Consider, for example, the factory revolts of the 1930s that led (in the United States) to the establishment of collective bargaining and grievance procedures, critical restraints on scientific management, which is one of Foucault's disciplines, though one that he alludes to only occasionally. Success required not only the solidarity of the workers but also the support of the liberal and democratic state. And success was functional not to any state but to a state of that sort; we can easily imagine other "social wholes" that would require other kinds of factory discipline. A genealogical account of this discipline would be fascinating and valuable, and it would undoubtedly overlap with Foucault's accounts of prisons and hospitals. But if it were complete, it would have to include a genealogy of grievance procedures too, and this would overlap with an account that Foucault doesn't provide, of the liberal state and the rule of law. Here is a kind of knowledge—let's call it political theory or philosophical jurisprudence— that regulates disciplinary arrangements across our society. It arises within one set of power relations and extends toward the others; it offers a critical perspective on all the networks of constraint. The possibility of knowledge of this sort, specific to institutions and political cultures rather than to "points" in the power network, suggests that we still require (I don't mean that society requires, or capitalism or even socialism requires, but you and I require) Foucault's general intellectuals. We need men and women who tell us when state power is corrupted or systematically misused, who cry out that something is rotten, and who reiterate the regulative principles with which we might set things right. General intellectuals don't inhabit a realm of pure value, such as Bends described; Foucault is right to insist that there is no such place, no value untouched by power. They stand among us, in this place, here and now, and they find in our laws and norms reasons for argument. But Foucault stands nowhere and finds no reasons. Angrily, he rattles the bars of the iron cage. But he has no plans or projects for turning the cage into something more like a human home. But I don't want to end on this note. I don't want to ask Foucault to be uplifting. That is not the task he has set himself. The point is rather that one can't even be downcast, angry, grim, indignant, sullen, or embittered with reason, one can't be critical, unless one inhabits some social setting and adopts, however tentatively, its codes and categories. Or unless, and this is much harder, one constructs (along with other men and women) a new setting and works out new codes and categories. Foucault refuses to do either of these things, and that refusal, which makes his genealogies so relentless, is also the catastrophe of his political theory and his social criticism.

Alt Debate

Alt Bad - Conservatism DA

The alternative reproduces the ethics of moral conservativism, which ensures it is a constant form of inaction that leaves the subject to be destroyed.

Terry **Eagleton**, fellow of Linacre college, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, **1990**, pg. 393-395

As with Nietzsche, Foucault's vigorously self-mastering individual remains wholly monadic. Society is just an assemblage of autonomous self-disciplining agents, with no sense that their self-realization might flourish within bonds of mutuality. The ethic in question is also troublingly formalistic. What matters is one's control over and prudent distribution of one's powers and pleasures; it is in this ascetic self-restraint that true freedom lies, as the freedom of the artefact is inseparable from its self-imposed law. 'It was not a question', Foucault claims, 'of what was permitted or forbidden among the desires that one felt or the acts that one committed, but of prudence, reflection, and calculation in the way one distributed and controlled his acts' (p. 54). Foucault has now — at last! — introduced the question of critical self-reflection into desire and power, a position perhaps not wholly at one with his Nietzscheanism; but he does so only to produce a formalistic account of morality. The ancients, he writes, did not operate on the assumption that sexual acts were bad in themselves; what matters is not the mode of conduct one prefers but the 'intensity' of that practice, and so an aesthetic rather than ethical criterion. But it is surely not true that some sexual acts are not inherently vicious. Rape, or child abuse, are signal examples. Is rape morally vicious only because it signifies a certain imprudence or immoderacy on the part of the rapist? Is there nothing to be said about the victim? This is a subject-centred morality with a vengeance: 'For the wife [of Greek antiquityl' Foucault writes without the faintest sardonic flicker, 'having sexual relations only with her husband was a consequence of the fact that she was under his control. For the husband, having sexual relations only with his wife was the most elegant way of exercising his control' (p. 151). Chastity is a political necessity for women and an aesthetic flourish for men. There is no reason whatsoever to imagine that Foucault actually approves of this dire condition; but it is one odious corollary of the ethic he most certainly does endorse. It is also true that Foucault, at least at one point in his life, opposed the criminalization of rape. Part of the problem of his approach consists in taking sexuality as somehow paradigmatic of morality in general — a stance which ironically reduplicates the case of the moral conservative, for whom sex would seem to exhaust and epitomize all moral issues. How would Foucault's case work if it were transferred to, say, the act of slander? Is slander acceptable as long as I exercise my power to perform it moderately, judiciously, slandering perhaps three persons but not thirty? Am I morally admirable if I retain a certain controlled deployment of my slanderous powers, letting them out and reining them in in an elegant display of internal symmetry? Does it all come down to a question of how, in postmodernist vein, one 'stylizes~ ones s conduct? What would a stylish rape look like, precisely? Foucault's Greeks believe that one should temper and refine one's practices not because they are inherently good or bad, but because self-indulgence leads to a depletion of one's vital powers — a familiar male fantasy if ever there was one. The more one aesthetically restrains oneself, the richer the powers which accrue to one — which is to say that power here would seem in romantic vein an unquestioned good, a wholly undifferentiated category. The positivity of power can thus be maintained, but converted into the basis of a discriminatory ethics by virtue of adding to it the techniques of prudence and temperance. And the ethical theory which is the upshot of this — that 'the physical regimen ought to accord with the principle of a general aesthetics of existence in which the equilibrium of the body was one of the conditions of the proper hierarchy of the soul' (p. 104) — has long been familiar on the playing fields of Eton. With The Use of Pleasure, Foucault completes his long trek from the hymning of madness to the public school virtues. The ethical techniques with which Foucault is concerned in this book are ones of subjectivization; but how far the long-despised subject actually makes its belated appearance in these pages is a moot point. It is clear that Foucault's repressive hostility to subjectivity, which he can usually see only as self-incarceration, deprives him of all basis for an ethics or a politics, leaving his rebellion a useless passion; and this volume is among other things an attempt to plug that disabling gap. But he still cannot quite bring himself to address the question of the subject as such. What we have here, rather than the subject and its desires, is the body and its pleasures — a half-way, crab-wise, aestheticizing move towards the subject which leaves love as technique and conduct rather than as tenderness and affection, as praxis rather than interiority. It is symptomatic in this respect that the practice closest to sexuality in the book is that of eating. A massive repression, in other words, would still seem operative, as the body stands in for the subject and the aesthetic for the ethical. In one sense, the sudden appearance of the autonomous individual in this work, after an intellectual career devoted to systematically scourging it, comes as something of a surprise; but this individual is a matter, very scrupulously, of surface, art, technique, sensation. We are still not permitted to enter the tabooed realms of affection, emotional - intimacy and compassion, which are not particularly notable among the public school virtues.

Blatant rejections of the make imperialism more insidious – state key to stopping multiple international problems

An attack on the postcolonial state as the author of violence73 and its drive to produce a modern citizenry may seem cathartic, without producing the semblance of an alternative vision of a new political community or fresh forms of life among existing political communi- ties. Central to this critique is an assault on the state and other modern institutions said to disrupt some putatively natural flow of history. Tradition, on this logic, is uprooted to make room for grafted social forms; modernity gives birth to an intolerant and insolent Leviathan, a repository of violence and instrumental rationality's finest speci- men. Civil society - a realm of humaneness, vitality, creativity, and harmony - is superseded, then torn asunder through the tyranny of state-building. The attack on the institution of the state appears to substitute teleology for ontology. In the Third World context, especially, the rise of the modern state has been coterminous with the negation of past histories, cultures, identities, and above all with violence. The stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and alternative forms of social orga- nization. The more durable consequence of this project is in the realm of the political imaginary: the constrictions it has afforded; the denials of alternative futures. The postcolonial state, however, has also grown to become more heterodox - to become more than simply modernity's reckless agent against hapless nativism. The state is also seen as an expression of greater capacities against want, hunger, and injustice; as an escape from the arbitrariness of communities established on narrower rules of inclusion/exclusion; as identity removed somewhat from capri- cious attachments. No doubt, the modern state has undermined tra- ditional values of tolerance and pluralism, subjecting indigenous so- ciety to Western-centered rationality. But tradition can also conceal particularism and oppression of another kind. Even the most elastic interpretation of universality cannot find virtue in attachments re- furbished by hatred, exclusivity, or religious bigotry. A negation of the state is no guarantee that a bridge to universality can be built. Perhaps the task is to rethink modernity, not to seek refuge in a blind celebration of tradition. Outside, the state continues to inflict a self-producing "security dilemma"; inside, it has stunted the emergence of more humane forms of political expres- sion. But there are always sites of resistance that can be recovered and sustained. A rejection of the state as a superfluous leftover of modernity that continues to straitjacket the South Asian imagination must be linked to the project of creating an ethical and humane order based on a restructuring of the state system that privileges the mighty and the rich over the weak and the poor.74 Recognizing the constrictions of the modern Third World state, a reconstruction of state-society re- lations inside the state appears to be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be swallowed by Western-centered globalization and its powerful institutions. A recognition of the patent failure of other institutions either to deliver the social good or to procure more just distributional rewards in the global political economy may provide a sobering reassessment of the role of the state. An appreciation of the scale of human tragedy accompanying the collapse of the state in many local contexts may also provide im- portant points of entry into rethinking the one-sided onslaught on the state. Nowhere are these costs borne more heavily than in the postcolonial, so-called Third World, where time-space compression has rendered societal processes more savage and less capable of ad- justing to rhythms dictated by globalization

Alt Fails – Inaction

Critique without direction a dead end – too much pessimism about modernity.

Loper '11 (Christiane, a graduate student of International Development, "Critique of the Critique: Post-Development and points of criticism" http://www.globalpolitics.cz/clanky/critique-of-the-critique-post-development-and-points-of-criticism) Wadhwani

Post-Development literature is highly influenced by Foucault and the method of discourse analysis: consequently, hegemony and power structures are being deconstructed. But what follows is the ignorance of how discourses can be transformed and resisted at the local level. The celebration of local knowledge and local resistance leads to a romantization and an unquestioned believe in tradition. ,The Local' is set equally with authenticity and emancipation. But power structures are, especially in application of the work of Foucault, ever-present (Jakinow 2008: 313). Why then are grassroots movements guarantors for being inclusive, non-hierarchic and democratic? Local forms of oppression are overlooked (Engel 2001:140). Nederveen Pieterse comments: "while the shift towards cultural sensibilities that accompanies this perspective is a welcome move, the plea for ,people's culture', indigenous culture, local knowledge and culture, can lead if not to ethnochauvinism, to reification of both culture and locality or people. It also envices a one-dimensional view of globalization which is equated with homogenization" (Nederveen Pieterse 1998: 366). Additionally, the exclusive validity of local knowledge precludes the view on multiple knowledge. In consequence the fundamental criticism on modernity and modern science implicates a rejection of the benefits: for example, the rights of the individual as well as the techniques of modern medicine are dismissed, although they brought health security and a higher life-expectancy (Ziai 2007: 102). Nederveen Pieterse even classifies Post- Development to belong "to the neo-traditionalist reaction to modernity" (Nederveen Pieterse 1998: 366?). In his opinion, Post- Development is struck into a paradox: not showing any regard for progressive implications and dialectics of modernity but at the same time dealing with issues like anti-authoritarianism, democratization, emancipation, that all clearly arose out of the Enlightenment and the modern age, is highly inconsistent (ebd. 1998: 365). global structures of inequality are not taken into concern. Storey asks for example how local actors are supposed to find solutions at the global level (Storey 2000). in emphasizing cultural diversity and in rejecting universalism, Post- Development is criticized of being cultural-relativist. Therefore Post- Development stands in suspicion to accept oppression and violence and to be indifferent towards the violation of human rights. Post- Development is accused to feel an affinity for neoliberalism. According to Nederveen Pieterse, it is argued that both approaches reject state intervention and agree on state failure: Escobar is skeptical towards state planning, he questions social engineering and the faith in progress lead by the state. The neoliberal thinker Deepak Lal condemns state-centered development economies (Nedeveen Pieterse 1998: 364). Further, also advocates of a neoliberal capitalism favor a strong civil society and the liberty of all citizens to choose their possibilities. The final criticism is that Post-Development, instead of offering a solution, sticks on the classical development paradigm by being in position of permanent critique. According to Tanja Jakimow Post-Development is "in danger of having to constantly re-manoeuvre to retain its 'alternative' status as elements of its critique are incorporated into the mainstream" (Jakimow 2008: 313). There is no vision of how Post-Development can look like in practice: "Post- Development parallels postmodernism both in its acute institutions and in being directionless in the end, as a consequence

Law Good – Responsibility

Equating politics with exception naturalizes violence and empties the political subject of any responsibility for others and shuts out progressivism

Barnett '9 Clive Barnett, Reader in Human Geography at The Open University, "Violence and publicity: constructions of political responsibility after 9/11," Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy, 12 (3), 2009, pp. 353-375, http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1080/13698230903127879

What do these empirical and theoretical reasons for remaining sceptical of Agamben's diagnosis of modernity reveal about the relationship of this strand of philosophical reflection to the task of conceptualising the double responsibility discussed in the first section of this paper? **The state of exception argument is informed by and also confirms a model of action that is freed from any horizon of responsibility whatsoever**. There are two dimensions to this disavowal of responsibility. First, with respect to political responsibility, **this analysis affirms that all constituted power is tainted with violence and death.** On Agamben's understanding, the actions of modern states always rest on arbitrary decision and violent force. This understanding provides resources with which any and all actions of states can be traced back to this fundamental root (Brenkman 2007, 66). **In turn, the expression of dissent is thereby freed from any sense of the legitimacy of struggling over the control of institutions** (Brennan and Ganguly 2006, 27). Second, **this abjuring of political responsibility is matched by the account of ethical action that likewise leaves no ontological or normative space for responsibility.** Agamben takes his distance from Schmitt only in so far as the latter sought to recuperate foundational, sovereign violence within the scope of the law (Agamben 2005, 59). As Leys (2007, 161) observes, **for Agamben the notion of responsibility is felt to be inherently unethical because it is "irremediably contaminated by law". In line with the persistent drive for conceptual purity** which Derrida identifies in Schmittian political theory, **responsibility is therefore abandoned in favour of a model of untainted ethical action modelled on Benjamin's messianic vision of 'pure violence', which seeks to assure violence "an existence outside of the law"** (Agamben 2005, 59). Benjamin's concept of the pure or divine violence of revolution is recuperated as a preferred figure of authentic ethical action freed from subordination to the law (Agamben 2005, 88). Pure violence is a figure for "action as pure means", with no relation to an end (Agamben 2000). **Agamben takes Benjamin as the inspiration for a model of action entirely freed from any implication in public practices where responsibility even arises, and not least freed from the scenes of exposure to alterity upon which Derrida seeks to erect a deconstructive sense of responsibility. The ontologization of violence leaves little scope for considering the possibility that power can and does circulate in normatively justified and justifiable forms. This posture does little more justice to the potential of concerted action in the public sphere than does the constant trumpeting of unending 'terrorist' threats**. But **there is no good reason to suppose that violence is not a contingent feature of human affairs. A decisionistic view of power is little help in understanding the processes of learning and repair that maintain the fabric of peaceable pluralistic societies** (see Spelman 2002). **Nor is a decisionistic view of power very much help when it comes to thinking about the possibility of addressing issues of security, international terrorism, or war democratically,** that is, through apparatuses of deliberatively generated influence (see Dryzek 2006, Habermas 2006, Young 2007, Ch. 5). **The value of practices of reasoning and reasonableness which are recognizably democratic is derived from their fragility, not their firm foundations in grounds of certainty** (Keane 2004, 3). **It is this fragility that is threatened by recourse to violence as a political instrument. What is required, therefore, is to think about the publicity conditions that function as more or less effective, but always fragile contexts of legitimation and justification that can serve as the basis for further progress towards the democratisation of violence** (Keane 2004, 154-164).

The law is necessary to prevent suffering

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind's supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical 'quick-fixes' is hardly reassuring. What's more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault's Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society's participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

Permutation

Foucault suggests the scrutiny of discourse WITHOUT rejection so the perm solves

Foucault 77 (Michel, philosopher, "The Archaeology of Knowledge," pg. 25 http://monoskop.org/images/9/90/Foucault_Michel_Archaeology_of_Knowledge.pdf) Wadhwani

We must renounce all those themes whose function is to ensure the infinite continuity of discourse and its secret presence to itself in the interplay of a constantly recurring absence. We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in sudden irruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased, and hidden, far from all view, in the dust of books. Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs. These pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without question, must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected definitively of course, but the tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show that they do not come out about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized.

Sovereignty must be used strategically – critique can be simultaneous

Mark Owen **Lombardi**, Associate Political Science Prof @ Tampa, **1996**, Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty, p 161

Sovereignty is in our collective minds. What we look at, the way we look at it and what we expect to see must be altered. This is the call for international scholars and actors. **The assumptions of the paradigm will dictate the solution and approaches considered. Yet, a mere call to change this structure of the system does little except activate reactionary impulses and intellectual retrenchment. Questioning the very precepts of sovereignty**, as has been done in many instances, **does not in and of itself address the problems and issues so critical to transnational relations. That is why theoretical changes and paradigm shifts must be coterminous with applicative studies. One does not and should not precede the other. We cannot wait until we have a neat self-contained and accurate theory of transnational relations before we launch into studies of** Third-World issues and **problem-solving. If we wait we will never address the latter and arguably most important issue-area: the welfare and quality of life for the human race.**

Gameworks

A2 Law Sucks/Excludes Us

Engaging Paradoxically with the law has value – if the law is BAD then the only way it will change is buying getting into the trenches

Hirsch 12 (Dr. Alexander Keller Hirsch is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. His primary field is political theory, and his research and teaching interests focus on the entanglements, impasses, and dreamworlds faced by people who inhabit the afterness of catastrophe, 2012, "The promise of the unforgiven: Violence, power and paradox in Arendt," pgs. 9-11, online @ psc.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/12/13/0191453712467319.full.pdf+html//DM)

My approach to the paradox differs from both Young-Bruehl's and Bar On's in that I am less interested in smoothing over, correcting, or otherwise neutralizing Arendt's aporia. Rather than view it as something to be explained or solved, I contend that the irresolvability of the paradox is precisely its source of generativity. In this sense I follow in line with a number of scholars who have recently argued that paradox, far from an endgame, represents a condition of possibility for a renewed vision of democratic politics as an inherently tragic venture. Perhaps Bonnie Honig has been most effective in this regard. In her marvelous recent collection of essays, Emergency Politics, Honig invokes Rousseau's well-known paradox of politics. For Rousseau, famously, political founding requires virtuous citizens to set it in motion, and yet such a citizenry cannot exist until that founding has conditioned a people capable of founding in the first place. As Honig parses Rousseau, 'In order for there to be a people well-formed enough for good lawmaking, there must be good law, for how else will the people be well formed? The problem is: Where would that good law come from absent an already well-formed, virtuous people?'44 Where most deliberative theorists, such as Seyla Benhabib or Ju¨rgen Habermas, work to find normative or prescriptive principles and procedures for solving Rousseau's paradox, Honig urges us to bracket the inclination to settle, sublimate, or otherwise resolve it at all. Rather she sees the paradox of politics as fecund with possibility. On this point, it is well worth quoting Honig at length: It might seem that acknowledging the vicious circularity of the paradox of politics must be costly to a democracy, or demoralizing: If the people do not exist as a prior – or even as a post hoc – unifying force, then what will authorize or legitimate their exercises of power? But there is ... also promise in such an acknowledgment. Besides, denial is costly too, for we can deny or disguise the paradox of politics only by suppressing or naturalizing the exclusion of those (elements of the) people whose residual, remaindered, minoritized existence might call the pure general will into question. From the perspective of the paradox of politics, unchosen, unarticulated, or minoritized alternatives – different forms of life, identities, solidarities, sexes or genders, alternative categories of justice, unfamiliar tempos – re-present themselves to us daily, in one form or another, sometimes inchoate. The paradox of politics provides a lens through which to re-enliven those alternatives. It helps us to see the lengths to which we go or are driven to insulate ourselves from the remainders of our settled paths. It keeps alive both the centripetal force whereby a people is formed or maintained as a unity and the centrifugal force whereby its other, the multitude, asserts itself.45 Here, Honig highlights those forms of exclusion that get erased when the paradox of politics is resolved or forgotten. Taking the irreparability of that paradox seriously means that new angles of vision get opened up. Specifically, the paradox helps us to see the extent of our attempts to conceal the violence committed in the act of founding a people. What is further revealed is the extent to which the work of democratic politics entails 'not just rupture but maintenance, not just new beginnings but preparation, receptivity, and orientation'.46 This is the tragic condition of the political paradox Honig redeems for democratic thinking. In qualifying what constitutes a tragic condition Honig turns to the moral philosophy of Bernard Williams. For Williams, Honig recalls, tragic situations are 'situations where there is no right thing to do but something must be done. Here every action is inaction.'47 Tragic situations are paradoxical ones. No matter what choice we make we are stuck. In this sense, tragedy questions the view that the subject is the sovereign master of its destiny. Tragedy raises doubts about the Platonist vision of the hyperrational ideal and the Kantian belief in the sufficiency and autonomy of the self.48 Instead, tragedy affirms the notion that the subject and its actions are vulnerable to forces and power not entirely within rational control. Moreover, for Williams, as for Honig, 'the question posed to the moral agent by the

tragic situation is not simply what should we do in a tragic situation but what does the tragic situation do to us and how can we survive it with our moral integrity intact?'49 The goal of moral theory is not to guide action or prescribe the normative 'right thing' to do, but rather to help the agent to survive the situation. 'The goal', Honig writes, 'is to salvage from the wreckage of the situation enough narrative unity for the self to go on.'50 Arendt's paradox is certainly tragic in this sense. If forgiveness is both violent, in its suddenness, and yet redeeming, in its capacity to release us from what we have violently done, we are left wedged between an impossible choice and a no less compelling imperative to act. If promising is what we do to subdue the unexpected and beckoning chaos of the future, then we must promise not to forgive, not to begin, not to do the violence required of us if we are to enter the world of appearances together and generate the conditions for power's emergence. This tragic situation calls for a theory of survivability and survivance, for a salvaging on behalf of the self. Importantly though, I think there is more than a moral dimension to the tragedy at play in the paradox of Arendt's treatment of violence, power, forgiveness and promising. There is a political face too. A tragic view sacralizes the restlessly ongoing and irresolvable quality of conflict endemic to human experience. It also induces a critical responsiveness to ambivalence, what Richard Seaford calls the 'prevalence of duality over unity'.51 Politics, seen as a tragic condition of human life, is conceived less as a means of foreclosing the conflicts that arise out of difference and disagreement than as a channel through which they might be quickened, elaborated and honed. In this sense, tragedy is attuned to an immensely complex field of powers, pressured encounters and civic possibilities. When conceived politically, which is to say tragically, democracy fosters robust and active modes of citizenship engaged in projects of public and counter-public building. These projects are aware both of the omnipresent and ineliminable quality of conflict and that the dynamism of this conflict is the source of political agency in the perpetually disputed and contingent character of the world held in common. This is a world shimmering with plurality, so long as the tragedy of democratic experience is upheld.

A2 Cant Engage the Surveillance Culture

Forum exists in the FISA Court to challenge the NSA – public advocates prove

Nolan et al. 13 (Andrew Nolan, Richard M. Thompson II, and Vivian S. Chu, Legislative Attorneys of the Congressional Research Service, 10/23/2013, "Introducing a Public Advocate into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's Courts: Select Legal Issues," https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/CRS-Report-FISC-Public-Advocate-Oct.-25-2013.pdf)

It is a basic principle of American constitutional law that with one exception[46] the Constitution only applies to the federal government and, via the Fourteenth Amendment and certain other clauses, to the governments of the states.[47] Accordingly, before evaluating the constitutional implications of including a public advocate in FISA proceedings a threshold issue is to assess what the exact role of the FISA advocate is as a legal matter and, more specifically, whether the advocate is a sovereign entity that can be subject to the constraints of the Constitution.[48] At first blush, one can argue that <u>an opposition advocate in a FISA proceeding cannot be considered a government actor, as a public advocate represents the privacy interests of either the general public</u> or those being targeted. Indeed, as one scholar noted in another context regarding the concept of a public advocate, <u>the institution itself,</u> in actively opposing the position of a government agent, <u>is "so different from the traditional three branches of government" that the advocate "would be like a fourth branch of government</u>, totally different from anything contemplated by the framers at the time of the ratification of the Constitution," and, therefore, <u>free of the constraints of the Constitution</u>.[49] Moreover, <u>if one assumes a public advocate is a direct analogue to that of a public defender</u> in a federal criminal case, <u>the adversarial relationship of the FISA advocate with the government arguably prevents consideration of the opposition advocate as an instrument of the federal government.</u>[50] Specifically, <u>a public advocate,</u> being bound by the canons of professional responsibility, <u>must exercise independent judgment on behalf of his client – the public – and cannot be considered a "servant of an administrative superior" – i.e., the government</u>.[51] Put another way, an opponent of the government's position cannot be converted into its "virtual agent."[52] <u>In this light, some proposals for including an advocate have described the advocate's client as not being the government, but the "people of the United States" in "preserving privacy and civil liberties."</u>[53]

Cap Ans

A2: Do Nothing/Negativity Alt

Alt fails and leads to ressetiment
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

But such cinematic labors of the negative are not sufficient; they certainly do not suffice to promote positive attachment to this world. Even a "negative dialectic" does not suffice. If things are left there, the embers of ressentiment can easily become more inflamed. That is one reason Deleuze is never happy with negative critique alone: the next task is to highlight how our participation in a world of real creativity that also finds expression elsewhere in the universe depends on and draws from such fugitive interruptions. To put it too starkly (for situational nuances and adjustments are pertinent here), the more people who experience a positive connection between modes of interruption and the possibility of our modest participation as individuals, constituencies, states, and a species in creative processes extending beyond us, the more apt we are to embrace the new temporal experiences around us as valuable parts of existence as such. Certainly, absent a world catastrophe or a repressive revolution that would create worse havoc than the conditions it seeks to roll back, these consummate features of late-modem life are not apt to dissipate soon. The fastest zones of late-modem life, for instance, are not apt to slow down in the absence of a catastrophe that transforms everything. So the radical task is to find ways to strengthen the connection between the fundamental terms of late-modem existence and positive attachment to life as such. This should be accomplished not by embracing exploitation and suffering, but by challenging them as we come to terms with the larger trends.

A2: Reformism Bad/Negativity Alt

Progressive change is possible and effective – the alt fails and leads to authoritarianism Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

Is it not obligatory to expose and resist the system as such rather than taking cumulative actions to move it? Don't such actions necessarily fold back in on themselves, feeding the dosed system they seek to move? Some theorists on the Left say such things, but they themselves have too dosed a view of the systems they criticize. No system in a world of becoming composed of multiple, interacting systems of different types, with different capacities of self-organization, is entirely dosed. It is both more vulnerable to the outside than the carriers of hubris imagine and periodically susceptible to creative movement from within and without simultaneously. Moreover, pure negativity on the Left does not sustain either critique or militancy for long, but rather, it tends eventually to lapse into resignation or to slide toward the authoritarian practices of the Right that already express with glee the moods of negativity, hubris, or existential revenge. We have witnessed numerous examples of such disappointing transitions in the last several decades, when a negative or authoritarian mood is retained while the creed in which it was set is changed dramatically. We must therefore work on mood, belief; desire, and action together. As we do so we also amplify positive attachment to existence itself amidst the specific political resentments that help to spur us on. To ignore the existential dimension of politics is to increase the risks of converting a noble movement into an authoritarian one and to amplify the power of bellicose movements that mobilize destructive potential. To focus on the negative dimension alone is to abjure the responsibilities of political action during a dangerous time.

To review, none of the role interventions listed above nor all in concert could suffice to break such a global resonance machine. Luck and pregnant points of contact with salutary changes in state actions, other cross-state citizen movements, the policies of international organizations, creative market innovations, and religious organization are needed. But those larger constellations may not themselves move far in a positive direction unless they meet multiple constituencies primed to join them and geared to press them whenever they lapse into inertia, if a world resonance machine of revenge and counter-revenge stretches, twists, and constrains the classical image of sovereign units, regionally anchored creeds, uneven capitalist exchange, and international organizations, while drawing selective sustenance from all of them, a new counter-machine must do so too.

Alt Fails – Withdrawal 2AC

Alt doesn't solve cap

Gordon (PhD from Oxford, teaches environmental politics and ethics at the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies) **12**

(Uri, Anarchist Economics in Practice in The Accumulation of Freedom, pg. 205-7)

Withdrawal

Perhaps better defined as a "non-practice" than as a practice, <u>the term "withdrawal" here indicates the various ways in which anarchists may abstain from participation in central institutions of the capitalist economy</u>-primarily the wage system and the consumption of purchased goods. <u>The goal of such a strategy is to weaken capitalism by sapping its energy</u>, reducing its inputs in terms of both human labor and cultural legitimation. To be sure, <u>the ubiquity of capitalist relations means that the options for withdrawal remain partial at best. Most of us must work for someone else to survive, and buy necessities that are not otherwise available for acquisition</u>. Nevertheless, there are ways in which participation in capitalism can be significantly reduced, or undertaken on its qualitatively different margins. Rather than seeking full employment and aspiring to a lifelong career, anarchists can choose to work part-time or itinerantly, earning enough to supply their basic needs but not dedicating more time to waged work than is absolutely necessary-perhaps on the way towards the abolition of work as compulsory, alienated production.3 In the area of housing, squatting a living space rather than renting one also abstains from participation in capitalism, though this option is less sustainable in most countfies since it will almost certainly end in eviction. Anarchists may also reduce their participation in the moneyed circulation of commodities by reusing and recycling durable goods, and by scavenging or growing some of their own food rather than purchasing it from the supermarket. 4 <u>Such practices can never by themselves destroy capitalism, since in the final analysis they remain confined to the level of personal lifestyle and rely on capitalism's continued existence in order to inhabit its margins and consume its surpluses</u>. Nevertheless, <u>strategies of withdrawal do complement other practices in carving out a separate space from capitalism</u>, as well as in expressing a rejection of its ideologies of dedication to the workplace and of consumption as the road to happiness.

Alt Fails – 1AR

Alt fails – movements too small, elite backlash, no material interests
Gordon (PhD from Oxford, teaches environmental politics and ethics at the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies) **12**
(Uri, Anarchist Economics in Practice in The Accumulation of Freedom, pg. 215)

On the one hand, <u>the</u> anarchist <u>movement is so small that even its most consistent and visible efforts are but a drop in the ocean</u>. On the other hand, <u>political elites have proven themselves extremely proficient at pulling the ground from under movements for social change, be it through direct repression and demonization of the activists, diversion of public attention to security and nationalist agendas,</u> or, at best, minimal concessions that ameliorate the most exploitative aspects of capitalism while contributing to the resilience of the system as a whole. It would seem that ethical commitments to social justice and the enhancement of human freedom can only serve as a motivation for a comparatively small number of people, and that <u>without the presence of genuine material interests among large sections of the population there is little hope for a mass movement to emerge that would herald the departure from existing social, economic, and political arrangements</u>.

Alt Fails – Reform Key

No revolution against cap possible now – the perm is crucial to avoid rightest takeover
Castree (School of Environment and Development, Manchester University) **10**

(N., Crisis, Continuity and Change: Neoliberalism, the Left and the Future of Capitalism. Antipode, 41: 185–213)

This essay had two major objectives. It sought to describe and explain the temporal coincidence of political economic and environmental crises less than a decade into the twenty-first century; and it offered some reasons for a seeming paradox, taking both a national level and international scale example—the paradox of crisis conditions leading to more of the same rather than a sharp turn away from the neoliberal path. The hopeful lessons of Marx's, Polanyi's and O'Connor's work will not (yet) be borne out: "<u>strong reform", never mind something more radical, is still a long way off</u>. <u>What we call "neoliberalism</u>" in the singular <u>is</u>, in reality, <u>a</u> variegated and <u>uneven global formation constituted differentially at a range of scales</u>. <u>Its existence and multiple incarnations are overdetermined</u>. Even so, I've suggested that <u>this</u> fact <u>does not necessarily render neoliberal policies vulnerable</u>, even at a time of perceived "crisis". If my analysis has any validity, then it calls to mind Gramsci's judgement that <u>the "morbid symptoms" of an existing order unwilling to die may persist for some considerable time</u>.

When might these symptoms disappear? Answers to this question are likely to be as reliable as a long-range weather forecast. NaomiKlein (2009:30), sensing the folly of detailed prophecy, offers some general speculations. Reflecting, as I have done, on the coincident political economic and ecological crisis, she argues that "<u>Capitalism can survive this</u> [double] crisis. But the world can't survive another capitalist comeback". I agree entirely with the first part of this statement, but not necessarily the second. <u>Capitalism will morph and adapt as it has always done: the operating hardware will remain intact, even as the all important details will alter quite profoundly</u>. But at what cost? Leftists have not just to hope for, but work vigorously towards, a future that can set capitalism on a path of much greater social and environmental justice. <u>The legacy of neoliberal capitalism constitutes a sickness that can be cured sooner rather than later: but the Left,</u> in its national and international forms, must do a lot more to administer the necessary medicine. <u>An essential</u>, if not sufficient, <u>condition is to occupy the political space vacated by established political parties that claim to be on the left</u>. <u>Until then, the Left's case will remain marginal to public life worldwide.</u>

A2: Change Possible Now/Collapsing Now

Cap isn't collapsing now – the economic and environmental crisis are not sufficient to dislodge the system
Castree (School of Environment and Development, Manchester University) **10**

To my mind, <u>the Left should not get its hopes up</u>—at least not yet. It's sad to say, but <u>only the most wild-eyed optimist could believe that the two perceived crises of our time are harbingers of a better future</u>. Taking two cases—one national scale, one international—I want to argue that Gramsci was right. <u>The "old" may be dying, but it's far from dead</u>. The essay comprises four parts. I begin in the heat of the moment, by describing how and why the idea of two concurrent worldwide "crises" became commonplace in a surprisingly short space of time (2007–2009). Following this, I take a theoretical detour intended to explain why these crises have arisen, and how they might play out. Marx, Karl Polanyi and James O'Connor are my guides. Focusing on Britain as an illustrative case, I then explain why <u>the present moment is not, regrettably, a propitious one for left-wing change-makers</u>. My point is to show that <u>even in neoliberalism's heartlands, in the thick of a financial crisis, there is only weak impetus for change</u>. After this examination of how crisis is playing-out at the scale of one notable nation state, I delve into the world of international emissions trading philosophy and practice—with a particular focus on the European Union's still young scheme. I suggest that the myriad practical failures of this and other market approaches to greenhouse gas mitigation belie the abstract logic of "free market environmentalism". Even so, these approaches will be with us for many years to come in all probability. A short conclusion looks to a future hopefully free of those "morbid symptoms" that Gramsci described just after the Great Crash of 1929. It's a future that will, I fear, be very hard to make. If William James were writing today, he probably would not bet on the Left making its ideals flesh any time soon. Not for the first time, some optimism of the will is required—quite a lot, in fact.

Perm – Reform Solves/Withdrawal Fails

Hybrid strategies like cooperative are crucial to the destruction of capitalism – the alt alone fails

Gordon (PhD from Oxford, teaches environmental politics and ethics at the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies) **12**

(Uri, Anarchist Economics in Practice in The Accumulation of Freedom, pg. 205-7)

There is certainly substance; to these objections. Nevertheless, I have chosen to keep the ten as wide as possible, if only for the reason that readers new to anarchism and less familiar with its internal controversies deserge to be introduced to the entire variety of practices that broadly fall within its sphere and left to make up their own minds. More generally, however, I would like to emphasize that the entire discussion of anarchist economics in practice must take place under the lens of imperfection and experimentation. This has to do with the distinction that Terry Leahy makes between purist and hybrid strategies, that is, between strategies that completely embody anarchist ideals and ones which continue to rely on aspects of capitalism.' Hybrid strategies have always been part of the anarchist repertoire of social resistance; yet the relevant question is whether hybrid strategies are viewed as already embodying the end point of desired social change (that is, a reformed capitalist system), or as necessary but temporary compromises with the ubiquity of capitalist social relations, a stepping-stone towards more comprehensive social change. As Leahy argues,

To an extent hybrid strategies are symbiotic with capitalism. They can be seen as productive for the capitalist class in ameliorating some of capitalism's excesses. Yet they are also antithetical to the culture and economy of capitalism as a system. Given enough time and enough proliferation they will replace capitalism with something completely different... For those who ultimately want nothing but the best that an anarchist utopia can offer, the thing to do is to be mobile and seize opportunities for hybrids as they arise and move on as they grow stale.2

It is in this inclusive and experimental spirit that I offer the following examples. While limitations of space mean that the discussion is necessarily cursory, I have referenced some relevant literature throughout the exposition, and the reader is invited to consult it for further information and analysis.

Varieties of Anarchist Economic Practice

Withdrawal

Perhaps better defined as a "non-practice" than as a practice, the term "withdrawal" here indicates the various ways in which anarchists may abstain from participation in central institutions of the capitalist economy-primarily the wage system and the consumption of purchased goods. The goal of such a strategy is to weaken capitalism by sapping its energy, reducing its inputs in terms of both human labor and cultural legitimation. To be sure, the ubiquity of capitalist relations means that the options for withdrawal remain partial at best. Most of us must work for someone else to survive, and buy necessities that are not otherwise available for acquisition. Nevertheless, there are ways in which participation in capitalism can be significantly reduced, or undertaken on its qualitatively different margins. Rather than seeking full employment and aspiring to a lifelong career, anarchists can choose to work part-time or itinerantly, earning enough to supply their basic needs but not dedicating more time to waged work than is absolutely necessary-perhaps on the way towards the abolition of work as compulsory, alienated production.3 In the area of housing, squatting a living space rather than renting one also abstains from participation in capitalism, though this option is less sustainable in most countfies since it will almost certainly end in eviction. Anarchists may also reduce their participation in the moneyed circulation of commodities by reusing and recycling durable goods, and by scavenging or growing some of their own food rather than purchasing it from the supermarket. 4 Such practices can never by themselves destroy capitalism, since in the final analysis they remain confined to the level of personal lifestyle and rely on capitalism's continued existence in order to inhabit its margins and consume its surpluses. Nevertheless,

<u>strategies of withdrawal do complement other practices in carving out a separate space from capitalism</u>, as well as in expressing a rejection of its ideologies of dedication to the workplace and of consumption as the road to happiness.

Perm – Reform Solves – A2: Market Link

Must work with some companies within the market in order to solve transition wars
Lewis and Canaty (executive director of the Center for Community Enterprise; honorary research fellow at the University of Birmingham and a director of Common Futures) **12**
(Michael and Patrick, The Resilience Imperative: Cooperative Transitions to a Steady-state Economy, New Society Publishers, googlebooks)

The agenda of the Great Transition also encompasses three major dimensions of change. Think of them as the 3 Ps: the personal, practical, and political. Simplistic silver-bullet solutions, and sound bites spun for culturally stunted attention spans, will not do. Consciously acting to link up the three Ps with a multi-level agenda guided by the resilience imperative and cooperative transitions is complex. Balkanized movements cannot contend with the scale of the problems and challenges we face, nor the powerful forces that must be resisted and restrained. All kinds of constituencies must be engaged unions, regionally based small and medium-sized businesses, all manner of community and cooperative enterprises and intermediaries, farmers, credit unions and progressive financial institutions, arts and culture organizations, faith organizations, environmental groups, politicians, and academics. We can also work with large companies, though caution and principled shrewdness is necessary. Companies occupying the low-road/high-carbon economy have too much power, are unaccountable, and are so addicted to the capitalist logic of growth that they represent a real and present danger to all of us. However, there are other companies that are committed to building a highroad/low-carbon economy, and we need their know-how and partnership if we are to navigate the Great Transition without violence.
So there we have it we are challenged to work consciously from local to global across sectors, engage creatively multiple constituencies, while all the while paying attention simultaneously to the macro and micro features of the transition challenge. Isn't life interesting?
We have been acutely conscious, while writing this book, that our concentration has been on the micro side of the transition challenge, though we have attempted to keep the macro side consciously in play as a kind of counterpoint tension. We hope we have shown how crucial change at the macro policy and systems level is for facilitating and easing transition to a low-carbon, more democratic, and fair economy. Indeed, there are a number of key policy questions that we have raised directly or indicated in passing. These evident and practical possibilities can be summarized as: 100 percent debt-free money: Why not mov e step by step toward governments issuing democratic currency free of interest and, indeed, removing from banks the power to freely issue money as high-cost debt?

Perm – Reform Solves – A2: Let It Collapse

Letting the system collapse on its own causes extinction – only struggle within the capitalism can end the system

Schwartzman (Professor in the Department of Biology at Howard University, PhD in Geochemistry from Brown University) **11**

And unlike the New Deal, achieving the GND on a global scale in the context of a robust solar transition, by necessityaccompanied by demilitarization, will not end with a reinforcement of militarized capital, as was the case in WWII and the Cold War aftermath. Rather, <u>the GND has real potential for opening up a path out of capitalism</u> into ecosocialism. WWII and the emergence of the MIC postponed the terminal crisis of capitalism to this century. Now we face the welcome project of taking that terminal crisis on and finishing the job.

<u>We need a strategy of transition</u>. This should be a priority in theory and practice for ecosocialists. Any Left worth its label and demonization by Glenn Beck and company must not only confront the immediate needs of the great majority of those exploited and oppressed by big capital, but also be a leader in organizing to fight back. So jobs, affordable housing, health and child care, environmental quality, and environmental justice must be on the left agenda. But what kind of jobs? For unsustainable or sustainable green production? And what about the conditions for the reproduction of labor power, itself a site of multi-dimensional class struggle, as Michael Lebowitz has argued (2003). Thus, the fightback program must confront the ecological crisis and demand solutions that address climate change by embracing clean energy.

<u>We should never advocate or even think that the "worse the better" will deliver socialism by the collapse of capitalism</u>, <u>anticipating its terminal illness as hope</u>. For <u>capitalism's dead weight will kill us all</u>. <u>No slogan or propaganda alone can achieve success</u>, as important as this ideological struggle is. Rather, <u>only multidimensional and local-to-transnational class struggle within capitalism</u> (see Abramsky's illuminating volume 2010) <u>can terminate this system</u>, which unfortunately will not die a natural death on its own accord. It will have to be put to sleep forever. A critical role of the ecosocialist Left is to identify the strategic class sectors—those existing and those in formation—that will be the gravediggers of capitalism. Additionally, <u>the ecosocialist Left must</u> also, of course, <u>participate in the creation of a collective vision and its realization as embryos within capitalism</u> of the new global civilization ending the rule of capital.

We now witness or can soon anticipate ongoing struggles for social governance of production and consumption on all scales from neighborhood to global. <u>Areas of struggle in this fight should include</u> nationalization of the energy, rail, and telecommunications industries; municipalization of electric and water supplies; <u>the creation and maintenance of</u> decentralized solar power, food, <u>energy</u> and farming <u>cooperatives</u>; the encouragement of worker-owned factories (solidarity economy), the replacement of industrial and GMO agriculture with agroecologies; the creation of green cities; and of course organizing the unorganized in all sectors, especially GND workers. All of these objectives should be part of the ecosocialist agenda for struggles around a GND, which of course, must include the termination of the MIC. One outstanding example of how to begin is found in Mike Davis 2010), who argues for the potential of a radical movement for green urbanism (see my commentary, Schwartzman, 2008).

Perm – Reform Solves – A2: Green Capitalism Link

A Green investment now is crucial to initiate a transition away from capitalism – starting now is key to avoid extinction from warming
Schwartzman (Professor in the Department of Biology at Howard University, PhD in Geochemistry from Brown University) **11**

Indeed, imposing such non-market limits is imperative, but the struggle to impose them must begin in capitalist societies now, and not be posed simply as the policies of future socialism. Yes, aggressive energy conservation is imperative, especially in the United States and other countries of the global North. We can all live better with a sharp reduction of wasteful consumption, breathe clean air, drink clean water, and eat organic food. Nevertheless, there needs to be a global increase in the power capacity, employing clean energy and not fossil fuels or nuclear power, to insure every child born on this planet has the material requirements for the highest quality of life (Schwartzman and Schwartzman 2011).

But should we anticipate that Green Capitalism, even pushed to its limits by class struggle, could indefinitely postpone the final demise of global capitalism and could actually replace the present unsustainable energy base with a renewable power infrastructure fast enough to avoid catastrophic climate change (C3)? I submit this prospect is highly unlikely. The legacy and political economy of real existing capitalism alone makes *global* solar capitalism a delusion (Schwartzman2009). While the Pentagon pretends to go "green," it remains the servant of the imperial system protecting fossil fuel and strategic metals flowing into the MIC, the Military Industrial (Fossil Fuel, Nuclear, State Terror) Complex. The immense power of the MIC is the biggest obstacle to implementing an effective prevention program that has a plausible chance of avoiding C3. The avoidance of C3 requires an end to coal and fossil fuel addiction, giving up the nuclear option, and a rapid conversion to a high-efficiency solar energy infrastructure.

To summarize, the MIC is at present the biggest single obstacle to preventing C3 because: It is the present core of global capital reproduction with its colossal waste of energy and material resources. The fossil fuel and nuclear industries are integrated within the MIC. The MIC has a dominant role in setting the domestic and foreign policy agenda of the United States and other leading capitalist countries. The Pentagon is the "global oil-protection service" for both the U.S. imperial agenda (Klare 2007) and the transnational capital class itself (e.g., Robinson 2004). The MIC's Imperial Agenda blocks the global cooperation and equity required to prevent C3.

Nevertheless, what the struggle for a GND [Green New Deal] can accomplish is very significant, indeed critical to confronting the challenge of preventing C3 [Catastrophic Climate Change]. *Humanity cannot afford to wait for socialism to replace capitalism to begin implementing this prevention program* [Italics Original]. And I have argued that starting this prevention program under existing capitalism can open up a path toward ecosocialist transition, indeed a 21st century Socialism worthy of its name.

Climate science tells us we must proceed now for any plausible chance of avoiding tipping points plunging us into C3. Green job creation is likewise the creation of a new working-class sector committed to ending the fossil fuel addiction. Such an historic shift to renewable energy supplies would be comparable to the industrial revolution that replaced plant power in the form of wood and agricultural products with coal.

AT State Bad

State Debate Good

Inev

Engaging with the law is inevitable and can be effective

Capulong 9 (Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana)

(Eduardo R.C., CLIENT ACTIVISM IN PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING THEORY, CLINICAL LAW REVIEW, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 109, Fall, 2009)

Nevertheless, in contrast to what Steve Bachmann has called the [*116] "a-legal" or "crude Marxist" approach, n19 progressive activists recognize that the legal arena remains a forum for social struggle. n20 This is so for three reasons: First, activists often do not have a choice but to work within the legal system, as when they are arrested or otherwise prevented from engaging in activism by state authorities. Second, because law is relatively autonomous from economic and political interests, n21 campaigns for legal reform can win substantial gains and are frequently the only vehicles through which more far-reaching change takes shape; struggles for reform, in other words, beget more radical possibilities and aspirations. n22 And third, law is constitutive of the social order. Law--or, more accurately, the concept of it--is not (again as some crude analysts would argue) simply a tool of one ruling class or other, but rather an essential component of a just society. n23 Commentators observe that lawyers who base their practice on these three premises are "hungry for theory," n24 for theory checks the "occupational hazards [of] reformism or cynicism." n25 The theoretical project is thus a dialectic: while law reform alone cannot "disturb the basic political and economic organization of modern American society," n26 [*117] law and lawyering are "a complex, contradictory, and open-textured setting that provides opportunities to challenge the status quo."

K2 Short Term Survival

Debate about arcane legal details are crucial to the short-term survival of oppressed populations. Outside of the law being good or bad, legal education is crucial to empower even the most revolutionary of movements.

Arkles et al 10

(Gabriel Arkles, Pooja Gehi and Elana Redfield, The Role of Lawyers in Trans Liberation: Building a Transformative Movement for Social Change, Seattle Journal for Social Justice, 8 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 579, Spring / Summer, 2010, LN)

While agenda-setting by lawyers can lead to the replication of patterns of elitism and the reinforcement of systems of oppression, we do believe that legal work is a necessary and critical way to support movements for social justice. We must recognize the limitations of the legal system and learn to use that to the advantage of the oppressed. If lawyers are going to support work that dismantles oppressive structures, we must radically rethink the roles we can play in building and supporting these movements and acknowledge that our own individual interests or even livelihood may conflict with doing radical and transformative work. n162 A. Community Organizing for Social Justice When we use the term community organizing or organizing, we refer to the activities of organizations engaging in base-building and leadership development of communities directly impacted by one or more social [*612] problems and conducting direct action issue campaigns intended to make positive change related to the problem(s). In this article, we discuss community organizing in the context of progressive social change, but community-organizing strategies can also be used for conservative ends. Community organizing is a powerful means to make social change. A basic premise of organizing is that inappropriate imbalances of power in society are a central component of social injustice. In order to have social justice, power relationships must shift. In Organizing for Social Change: Midwest Academy Manual for Activists (hereinafter, "the Manual"), n163 the authors list three principles of community organizing: n164 (1) winning real, immediate, concrete improvements in people's lives; (2) giving people a sense of their own power; and (3) altering the relations of power. n165 Before any of these principles can be achieved it is necessary to have leadership by the people impacted by social problems. n166 As Rinku Sen points out: [E]ven allies working in solidarity with affected groups cannot rival the clarity and power of the people who have the most to gain and the least to lose . . . organizations composed of people whose lives will change when a new policy is instituted tend to set goals that are harder to reach, to compromise less, and to stick out a fight longer. n167 She also notes that, "[I]f we are to make policy proposals that are grounded in reality and would make a difference either in peoples' lives or in the debate, then we have to be in touch with the people who are at the center of such policies. n168 We believe community organizing has the potential to make fundamental social change that law reform strategies or "movements" led by lawyers cannot achieve on their own. However, community organizing is not always just and effective. Community-organizing groups are not immune to any number of problems that can impact other organizations, including internal oppressive dynamics. In fact, some strains of white, male-dominated [*613] community organizing have been widely criticized as perpetuating racism and sexism. n169 Nonetheless, models of community organizing, particularly as revised by women of color and other leaders from marginalized groups, have much greater potential to address fundamental imbalances of power than law reform strategies. They also have a remarkable record of successes. Tools from community organizers can help show where other strategies can fit into a framework for social change. The authors of the Manual, for example, describe various strategies for addressing social issues and illustrate how each of them may, at least to some extent, be effective. n170 They then plot out various forms of making social change on a continuum in terms of their positioning with regard to existing social power relationships. n171 They place direct services at the end of the spectrum that is most accepting of existing power relationships and community organizing at the end of the spectrum that most challenges existing power relationships. n172 Advocacy organizations are listed in the middle, closer to community organizing than direct services. n173 The Four Pillars of Social Justice Infrastructure model, a tool of the Miami Workers Center, is somewhat more nuanced than the Manual. n174 According to this model, four "pillars" are the key to transformative social justice. n175 They are (1) the pillar of service, which addresses community needs and stabilizes community members' lives; (2) the pillar of policy, which changes policies and institutions and achieves concrete gains with benchmarks for progress; (3) the pillar of consciousness, which alters public opinion and shifts political parameters through media advocacy and popular education; and (4) the pillar of power, which achieves autonomous community power through base-building and leadership development. n176 According to the Miami Workers Center, all of these pillars are essential in making social change, but the pillar of power is most crucial in the struggle to win true liberation for all oppressed communities. n177 [*614] In their estimation, our movements suffer when the pillar of power is forgotten and/or not supported by the other pillars, or when the pillars are seen as separate and independent, rather than as interconnected, indispensable aspects of the whole infrastructure that is necessary to build a just society. n178 Organizations with whom we work are generally dedicated solely to providing services, changing policies, or providing public education. Unfortunately, each of these endeavors exists separate from one another and perhaps most notably, separate from community organizing. In SRLP's vision of change, this separation is part of maintaining structural capitalism that seeks to maintain imbalances of power in our society. Without incorporating the pillar of power, service provision, policy change, and public education can never move towards real social justice. n179 B. Lawyering for Empowerment In the past few decades, a number of alternative theories have emerged that help lawyers find a place in social movements that do not replicate oppression. n180 Some of the most well-known iterations of this theme are "empowerment lawyering," "rebellious lawyering," and "community lawyering." n181 These perspectives share skepticism of the efficacy of impact litigation and traditional direct services for improving the conditions faced by poor clients and communities of color, because they do not and cannot effectively address the roots of these forms of oppression. n182 Rather, these alternative visions of lawyering center on the empowerment of community members and organizations, the elimination of the potential for dependency on lawyers and the legal system, and the collaboration between lawyers and directly impacted communities in priority setting. n183 Of the many models of alternative lawyering with the goal of social justice, we will focus on the idea of "lawyering for empowerment," generally. The goal of empowerment lawyering is to enable a group of people to gain control of the forces that affect their lives. n184 Therefore, the goal of empowerment lawyering for low-income transgender people of [*615] color is to support these communities in confronting the economic and social

policies that limit their life chances. Rather than merely representing poor people in court and increasing access to services, the role of the community or empowerment lawyer involves: organizing, community education, media outreach, petition drives, public demonstrations, lobbying, and shaming campaigns . . . [I]ndividuals and members of community-based organizations actively work alongside organizers and lawyers in the day-to-day strategic planning of their case or campaign. Proposed solutions--litigation or non-litigation based--are informed by the clients' knowledge and experience of the issue. n185 A classic example of the complex role of empowerment within the legal agenda setting is the question of whether to take cases that have low chances of success. The traditional approach would suggest not taking the case, or settling for limited outcomes that may not meet the client's expectations. However, when our goals shift to empowerment, our strategies change as well. If we understand that the legal system is incapable of providing a truly favorable outcome for low-income transgender clients and transgender clients of color, then winning and losing cases takes on different meanings. For example, a transgender client may choose to bring a lawsuit against prison staff who sexually assaulted her, despite limited chance of success because of the "blue wall of silence," her perceived limited credibility as a prisoner, barriers to recovery from the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and restrictions on supervisory liability in § 1983 cases. Even realizing the litigation outcome will probably be unfavorable to her, she may still develop leadership skills by rallying a broader community of people impacted by similar issues. Additionally, she may use the knowledge and energy gained through the lawsuit to change policy. If our goal is to familiarize our client with the law, to provide an opportunity for the client [*616] and/or community organizers to educate the public about the issues, to help our client assess the limitations of the legal system on their own, or to play a role in a larger organizing strategy, then taking cases with little chance of achieving a legal remedy can be a useful strategy. Lawyering for empowerment means not relying solely on legal expertise for decisionmaking. It means recognizing the limitations of the legal system, and using our knowledge and expertise to help disenfranchised communities take leadership. If community organizing is the path to social justice and "organizing is about people taking a role in determining their own future and improving the quality of life not only for themselves but for everyone," then "the primary goal [of empowerment lawyering] is building up the community." n186 C. Sharing Information and Building Leadership A key to meaningful participation in social justice movements is access to information. Lawyers are in an especially good position to help transfer knowledge, skills, and information to disenfranchised communities--the legal system is maintained by and predicated on arcane knowledge that lacks relevance in most contexts but takes on supreme significance in courts, politics, and regulatory agencies. It is a system intentionally obscure to the uninitiated; therefore the lawyer has the opportunity to expose the workings of the system to those who seek to destroy it, dismantle it, reconfigure it, and re-envision it. As Quigley points out, the ignorance of the client enriches the lawyer's power position, and thus the transfer of the power from the lawyer to the client necessitates a sharing of information. n187 Rather than simply performing the tasks that laws require, a lawyer has the option to teach and to collaborate with clients so that they can bring power and voice back to their communities and perhaps fight against the system, become politicized, and take leadership. "This demands that the lawyer undo the secret wrappings of the legal system and share the essence of legal advocacy--doing so lessens the mystical power of the lawyer, and, in practice, enriches the advocate in the sharing and developing of rightful power." n188 Lawyers have many opportunities to share knowledge and skills as a form of leadership development. This sharing can be accomplished, for example, through highly collaborative legal representation, through community clinics, through skill-shares, or through policy or campaign meetings where the lawyer explains what they know about the existing structures and fills in gaps and questions raised by activists about the workings of legal systems. D. Helping to Meet Survival Needs SRLP sees our work as building legal services and policy change that directly supports the pillar of power. n189 Maintaining an awareness of the limitations and pitfalls of traditional legal services, we strive to provide services in a larger context and with an approach that can help support libratory work. n190 For this reason we provide direct legal services but also work toward leadership development in our communities and a deep level of support for our community-organizing allies. Our approach in this regard is to make sure our community members access and obtain all of the benefits to which they are entitled under the law, and to protect our community members as much as possible from the criminalization, discrimination, and harassment they face when attempting to live their lives. While we do not believe that the root causes keeping our clients in poverty and poor health can be addressed in this way, we also believe that our clients experience the most severe impact from state policies and practices and need and that they deserve support to survive them. n191 Until our communities are truly empowered and our systems are fundamentally changed to increase life chances and health for transgender people who are low-income and people of color, our communities are going to continue to have to navigate government agencies and organizations to survive.

Short term survival – Rejecting engagement with the law directly trades off with mechanisms that help ensure the daily survival of underserved populations – [poor people flood legal services offices seeking assistance in accessing welfare benefits, contesting discriminatory employment terminations, petitioning for political asylum, resisting unlawful evictions, obtaining restraining orders from abusive spouses, and recovering illegally withheld wages]

Cummings and Eagly 2k1 (Staff Attorney, Community Development Project, Public Counsel Law Center, Los Angeles, California. J.D., Harvard Law School; Coordinating Attorney, Immigrant Domestic Violence Project, Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA), Los Angeles, California. J.D., Harvard Law School)
(Scott L. and Ingrid V., A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 443, LN)

First, exaggerating the ineffectiveness of traditional legal interventions minimizes the significant institutional restructuring that legal advocacy has achieved. Indeed, creative litigation and court-ordered remedies have changed many aspects of the social, political, and economic landscape. n203 An analysis that obscures this fact truncates progressive legal practice by closing off potential avenues for redress. In addition, the suggestion by proponents of law and organizing that lawyers should act as organizers, facilitators, and educators would require that less time be spent providing conventional representation to low-income clients, n204 who are already drastically underserved. n205 As it stands, [*492] there are only six thousand full-time legal services staff lawyers to meet the legal needs of the forty-five million persons who are income-eligible for free legal services. n206 Each day, poor people flood legal services offices seeking assistance in accessing welfare benefits, contesting discriminatory employment terminations, petitioning for political asylum, resisting unlawful evictions, obtaining restraining orders from abusive spouses, and recovering illegally withheld wages. Given the scarcity of resources in legal aid programs, a shift toward an organizing-centered approach would result in a reduction of basic services to these clients.

AT Agency/Access

Discussing legal changes is possible and can help fuel a collective sense of agency for oppressed groups

Morales-Cruz 5 (teaches at Inter American University of Puerto Rico School of Law)

(Myrta, "Do not hand me fish, teach me how to fish", SELA 2005 Panel 4: The Lawyer's Role, http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Do_not_hand_me_Fish.pdf)

We have found lobbying to be a good strategy for promoting empowerment among our clients. In the court, we, the lawyers, are in control of the process. Lobbying makes it easier for us to work side by side with our clients. They gain power as they speak and argue about their situation, about the law, about how the law should be. Their voice is independent from our voice as lawyers. Focusing on the legislative branch also makes it easier for our clients to gain access to the press and to make alliances with other community groups, which helps to create more public discussion about the issues. The public hearings have been crucial in the empowerment process. Finally, the fact that a statute, once approved, has a direct impact on more people that an average court decision, helps to bring more people into the process and furthers collective empowerment.53

More evidence

Guinier and Torres 14 (Prof of Law @ Harvard; Professor of Law @ Cornell)

(Lani and Gerald, THE MEANING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, June, 2014, Yale Law Journal, 123 Yale L.J. 2740, LN)

In many ways, our project is not new. Like Professor Ackerman, we are challenging the privileging of formal sources of authority that discount or minimize the role of social movement activists and other contentious forms of organized power to name their own reality and give that reality a heart, a soul, and a story. The political transformation of the United States comes not just from what the Court is doing or what arguments the lawyers for the social movements are making. The movement activists themselves are part of the law creation process. They make some arguments more resonant and even more plausible. This is what Adam Liptak, in describing the dueling roles played by iconic Supreme Court cases like Brown v. Board of Education, calls the "music" as opposed to the "logic" of law. n237 Lawyers are usually understood to control the logic of law through their analysis of precedent and commitment to principle. Meanwhile, the activists reveal the music of law by combining legal rights talk with home-grown stories of justice that define normative or narrative frames through which to understand what the courts thought they [*2800] were doing. According to Francesca Polletta, when the Southern civil rights movement organizers "transposed" conceptual frameworks from one institutional domain to another, they provided new energy for resistance. n238 The music these activists composed is the work of "transposition," which combines, for example, legal rights formulations with "locally resonant justificatory rhetorics." n239 Such work, through decentralized structures at some distance from national or state civil rights organizations, encouraged tactical and ideological experimentation and innovation, built organizational solidarity, and enabled movement activists to broaden their appeal in some cases and in other cases to engage, at minimum, in critical reflection. n240 When a "dynamic" constituency names its own reality by, for example, singing spirituals in the church choir, composing its own anthems in the call and response of the amen corner, or summoning in plain English, before a television audience, the brutal hardship of trying to register to vote in Mississippi, movement activists supply additional sources of authority for the lawyer and a new source of accountability for both the lawyer and "the law." By expressing what the law means to those subject to it, activists create new grounds on which to interpret the law and make it harder for elites to say it means something other than what those on the street thought it should mean if it were talking to their experience. Any substantial disjunction is felt as injustice. It is through this potential feedback effect that those who sing the music of law can have a role in composing its logic. By defining winning in its narrowest possible terms, as Joe Rauh did with the MFDP, lawyers may prompt litigants to celebrate important tactical victories. At the same time, the strategic vision essential to sustainable long-term change can be lost. n241 Nonetheless, whatever their historically contingent [*2801] role, Fred Gray's relationship with the MIA shows that law and lawyers ultimately do much of the heavy lifting in shaping a social movement's trajectory in fashioning both its short term objectives and long term consequences. n242 Because lawyers occupy both an elite and expert position and often do not reflect on the impact of their expertise on their imagination, their role in social movements deserves more attention. Cause lawyers and legal scholars have begun to take notice of the multiple ways practicing lawyers, organizers, and policy makers can and do represent marginalized communities to tell different stories and make new law. n243 There is renewed interest in researching the relationship between social movements and lawmaking among legal scholars and practitioners on the left n244 as well as the right. n245 [*2802] Even so, much of the focus is still on discovering new avenues for elite driven social change. Some cause lawyers search for ways to do "public education" or develop "communications strategies" to win support for their cases, but they rarely pause to wonder whether the cases they litigate resonate with the lived experience of their clients, not just their putative supporters and funders. n246 Sociologists, political scientists, and historians have long studied social movements, yet their theories of social change also separate out the role of law and lawyers, as if lawyers and social movement actors function on parallel but distinctive tracks. Similarly, many lawyers and law professors still focus on legal cases and judicial opinions without necessarily considering the social, political, and historical forces that influence the development of legal doctrine. Unlike Professor Ackerman, they concern themselves primarily with formal lawmaking by the judiciary, the legislature, or the executive. Lawyers, in particular, too often assume that their maximum opportunity to influence the [*2803] law is through formal argument in judicial settings. Their argument, however, is not necessarily situated in a larger story that has normative force of its own and may be distinguishable from what the courts say is important. Even when moments of popular constitutionalism are considered, the actions of "the people" count only when they can be canonized through the published opinions of courts or the statutory language of legislators. n247 In either case, it is the judiciary that serves as law's authoritative editor. By contrast, we contend that democratic societies are organized to produce a variety of authoritative interpretive communities. n248 The MFDP, Montgomery Bus Boycott, and UFW stories exemplify the ways a social movement functioning as an authoritative interpretative

community can play a critical role in redefining the meaning of accountability, democratic action, and American democracy. Hamer and the other MFDP delegates were exemplary "wind changers." Their goal was to widen the scope of meaningful participation in decision-making. They questioned the limited definition of what is legitimate representation; they redefined meaningful participation; and they insisted on a wider scope for who should be included in decision-making. By contrast, the politicians and the national leaders, as members of the state apparatus, stood with their wet fingers in the wind without noticing that the weather was changing. The roles played by Fred Gray and other lawyers in the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the story that law ultimately tells, the driving ideal of equality, the assumption about the source of power to make change, and the definition of success all reflect the distinctive interpretive communities to which the lawyers felt they were accountable.

In the case of the bus boycott, law is practiced tactically. It retains its link to a mobilized community that is seeking change to produce justice. A narrative whose higher authority comes from the idea that [*2804] national citizenship applies to black people in Alabama motivates this community. These people are inspired to take risks in support of this ideal because of their belief in a just God and the support they gain from religious cultural rituals, as manifest in the religious tenor, the spirituality, and the singing at mass meetings. Through their collective struggle and communal resourcefulness they gain a sense of agency and create a constituency of resistance that builds a new organization and inspires a series of national movements.

AT Legal Details Bad

Link goes the opposite way – it is white elites who benefit from a lack of formal details

McCann 4 (Professor of Law at University of New Hampshire)

(Michael, Law and Social Movements in The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society Pg. 510)

Law is often especially important to one specific aim of many "outsider" groups _ that of "formalizing" policy formulation and implementation processes. Formality, as understood here, refers to the degree to which relations are conducted according to procedures and standards that are public, general, explicit, and uniform (Lowi, 1979). The basic supposition here is that dominant groups tend to prefer relatively insular (autonomous or hidden) modes of highly discretionary policy implementa- tion unhampered by standardized procedures, substantive guidelines, high visibility, and outside supervision. In such informal settings, established prerogatives of prevailing elites can more easily prevail to minimize costs, maintain control, and protect their own privileges while granting empty symbolic gestures to challengers. By contrast, marginalized groups usually benefit from more formalized processes where specified procedural rights and substantive standards can be employed to render accountable dominant interests who control the bulk of material and organizational resources (Delgado et al., 1985).

AT Liberalism Bad

Rejecting liberalism and while continuing to fight for justice within the law are necessary and compatible

Sharpless 12 (Associate Clinical Professor, University of Miami School of Law)
(Rebecca, MORE THAN ONE LANE WIDE: AGAINST HIERARCHIES OF HELPING IN PROGRESSIVE LEGAL ADVOCACY, 19 Clinical L. Rev. 347, Fall, LN)

Matsuda offers insights based in the "double consciousness" experience of people of color in which "deep criticism" is combined with "an aspirational vision of law." n203 From this point of view, we can believe in both the necessity and the inadequacy of rights. n204 We can believe in both the necessity and the inadequacy of direct service lawyering. Theoretical critiques of liberalism may require the critique of individual client services as, at best, a panacea and, at worst, a practice that perpetuates client domination and the status quo. Yet social reality requires that progressive lawyers work with individual people and within the current legal system. Social justice lawyers can believe in the inadequacy of the liberal rights framework and the adversarial system but still make rights claims in court; reject formalism but still engage in rule-bound lawyering; believe that helping individuals alone will never bring about social justice, but keep helping individuals; understand the indeterminacy of any road towards social justice but still meaningfully debate the best goals and methods; and believe that there is inherent domination whenever lawyers engage with their clients but still offer their professional skills in the service of others and the movement. Progressive legal advocates--attorneys and academics alike--should value the work of those who have the patience and commitment to offer life-sustaining help day in and day out.

AT Passivity/Disempowerment

Legal education empowers a critique of the law, not liberal passivity

Harris and Maeda 4 (Prof @ UC Davis School of Law; Professor of Critical Theory and Social Justice @ Occidental) (Angela Harris and Donna Maeda, Power and Resistance in Contemporary Legal Education, in Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, Project MUSE)

Efforts by progressive students to transform hierarchies indicate the importance of constant resistance, and also the usefulness of a midlevel political analysis: not focusing on the law school (the local) as a fulcrum for changing the world (the global) but understanding legal education as one aspect of very particular social struggles for justice. The Coalition for Diversity in some ways is the embodiment of the kind of resistance Kennedy advocates. Its diffuse structure and efforts have enabled members to figure out how to connect issues, to constantly look for complex relationships of the operations of power, and to set in motion dynamics of change even beyond specific, planned actions. The organization's success may at times appear small, but the complexity of power relationships indi- cates the necessity of such small, constant resistances. Such organizing work, which contributes to the development of complex critical perspectives and coalition-building skills, as well as lessons learned by efforts to change the most elite, hierarchical structures (such as law review), may help prepare such students for struggles in the hierarchically ordered lib- eral legal-political world we inhabit. At the same time, progressive students in the Coalition and elsewhere add to Kennedy's two left stances an ability to treat law as only one thread in a web of relations of power and to bring their prior experiences of sub- ordination, resistance, and critical thinking directly to bear on their law school organizing. Both the liberal and radical stances Kennedy describes understand the law as the law understands itself: as, for good or ill, the foundation of the house of power. This view, however, sustains power relations by appealing only to the realm of law itself for resistance. The belief that law school, the legal profession, and the law more generally are the sole, or even key, places for reproducing or undoing hierarchy sets up this realm as the most significant place for work in confronting power, so that people with legal skills continue to be held up as the most important ac- tors for social change. As an alternative, progressive law students may use their involvement with the law to participate in broader resistance practices. We have focused on connecting resistance against legal hierarchy with the fight for racial justice, but of course there are many other kinds of anti-subordina- tion struggles that can serve as the basis for a valuable praxis. Kennedy's assessment of the circuits of institutional self-replication remains a valu- able one; but left students who come to law school need not choose between liberal naïveté and radical alienation. Instead, law students may draw on their experiences of hierarchy outside legal education to transform their conditions of life, grounded in the knowledge of the necessity of constant struggle and resistance.

AT Roleplaying Bad

First, there's obviously no link

Taking on different roles is a powerful tool of amplifiying collective action. Purely negative critique is dangerous
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

What are possible modes of positive intervention in this amplification machine? Certainly state and interstate actions could make a major difference, even though they cannot dismantle the machine done. Concerted state and interstate pressure to regulate derivative markets, to roll back Israeli settlements, to promote a new state of Palestine (or even a larger, pluralistic Israel) would help immeasurably. So would the end of preemptive wars and the bellicose image the United States has presented to much of the world during large stretches of time. But these and other actions are also insufficient to the times. Equally important, they require significant constituency changes on the ground to make them feasible. A combination of luck, exhaustion of the most militant constituencies on each side, cultural shaming, and creative action by nonstate actors within and across states is also needed to turn the machine in a new direction. The hawkish minorities on each side must be matched and surpassed by counter-constituencies anchored in multiple sites. Here I focus primarily on one dimension of such activity, a "triggering" force that carries Hegel's expressive dimension of sovereignty into contemporary role definitions. It is misleading to divide the political world into individuals, constituency organizations, and states. Each individual, for instance, is ensconced in a variety of roles. And each role both informs the individual and is linked to larger assemblages. The connections are relatively conscious when consumption patterns of dress, hairstyle, housing, entertainment, and car choke forge identity niches. Role specific habits of eye contact are less conscious, as in the street rules of middle class eye contact between the sexes in the United States of the 1950s. Yet those habits helped to constitute a pattern of gender relations that found expression in family life, education, dating, sports, work life, voting habits, and church practices. A role is neither reducible entirely to the individuals who inhabit it nor thoroughly assimilable to the larger assemblages that help to shape and manage it. It is the site of strategic ambiguity, periodically susceptible for that reason to creative political deployment. To consider multiple roles in relation to this global resonance machine suggests how accumulated changes in these practices might make a contribution to turning the machine in a different direction. Certainly, a large number of preachers, imams, rabbis, writers, military leaders, talking heads, and unemployed workers introduced changes into role conduct that helped to organize the current machine. Osama bin Laden's roles as a wealthy man, investor, devotee of Islam, Saudi, and charismatic leader all underwent change when he founded Al Qaeda. We are, variously, teachers, blue collar workers, writers, film directors, consumers, investors, faith devotees, parents, lovers, voters, Internet users, Tv viewers, military veterans, charity donors, members of an age cohort, contributors to retirement funds, homeowners or renters, neighbors, models, athletes, students, advertising executives, geologists, oil drifters, and so on, endlessly. The trick today is to infuse a bit of the warrior ethic into the performance of several of these roles, not in the spirit of Napoleon, Putin, and Bush, of Gandhi, Thoreau, Nietzsche, and Martin Luther King Jr., with the inspiration and strategic sense of each adjusted to the new circumstances of being. The task is to inhabit several roles in more militant, visible, creative, and inspirational ways, as we come to terms with their cumulative effects on the world. The accumulation of rapid shifts in role performance might introduce new pressures into the world. The goals in ascending order are: first, to induce cumulative changes in individual and group conducts that shift the center of gravity in this or that way and encourage others to do so; second, to push collective role assemblages in new directions; and third, to inspire initiatives that draw energy from activity on these first two fronts to escalate both internal and external pressures upon corporations, states, universities, churches and temples, investment firms, the media, the Internet, and international organizations. The initial potentialities are numerous. Consumers can, as the need and opportunity arises, alter patterns of consumption with respect to food acquisition, vehicle use, housing, cuisine, clothing, and entertainment, seeking to gear each mode more closely to a near future that reduces oil dependence, improves food production, and curtails emissions, and also to inspire more active and intense support for collective modes of consumption that reduce inequality within and between regions. Investors and participants in retirement investment funds can readjust the priorities of those investments, as they also organize to demand closer state regulation of volatile markets. Congregants within churches, temples, synagogues, mosques, and madrassas can repudiate publicaliy the most ugly pronouncements and actions taken by others in the name of theft faith, to shame those who have hijacked their creed for retrograde means, and to press their own congregations to change their energy use, relations with other faiths, and relations to corporations and the state. By doing so they also help to recompose the connection between existential faith and drives to implacable revenge so prominent today. Experts in oil exploration, sustainable energy production, electrical engineering, and automobile production can experiment with new modes of transportation and energy use. Writers, Tv producers, actors, bloggers, and film directors can infuse a gratitude for being more actively into their writing, films, and characters, seeking to challenge cynical existential dispositions on the Left that come perilously close to the forces they would resist. Veterans, who have experienced the horror of war up close, can relate that sense of horror to others, while publicizing nonmilitary ways to engage contemporary issues. Reporters and dissident economists can publicize microeconomic experiments in various corners of the world that could be extended, exposing investors, consumers, and producers to a larger range of possibilities than generally recognized. Teachers in schools and universities can teach students how the media work upon them daily at multiple levels of the sensorium, and how they too can acquire sophisticated media skills. The possibilities are endless. The point of individual and group experimentation with role assignments is simultaneously to make a direct difference through our

conduct, to open us to new experiences that might alter our relational sensibilities even further, to unscramble role assumptions assumed by others, to form operational connections with others from which larger political movements might be generated, and to make connections with noble role warriors in other regions and walks of life to enlarge the space and visibility of positive action. A stated change in personal or constituency belief is not enough since the layered embodiment of belief and the actual performance of roles are so closely bound together. A belief is an embodied tendency to performance; concerted practices of performance help to alter or intent efy belief; and new intensities of belief fold back into future desires, performative priorities, and potentialities of political action. Such a spiral can produce positive as well as negative effects. For example, an accumulation of resentments against states, corporations, and consumers for their refusal to address global warming could eventually inspire a cross-regional movement to launch simultaneous general strikes in several states. Such dramatic actions are not apt to take place unless and until the spiritual ground has been prepared and the unity of obstinate elites has been weakened. Effective role adventurism helps. It builds a reservoir of public readiness for more militant action upon and by civil society, state, and interstate institutions. As some churches modify their behavior toward mosques, and vice versa, the door is open to form a cross-state citizen movement to modify the practices of states and international organizations. As those movements coalesce, support for the most bellicose forces on each side wanes. When those effects are consolidated, corporations, churches, states, and international organizations are placed under yet more positive pressure, or alternatively find it possible to take more risks, if and when such a machine becomes organized, each pressure point begins to resonate with the others, creating a resonance machine larger than its parts. At the early stages of such a movement, it is important to think tactically about how to proceed, so as to put effective pressure on others through example, inspiration, and shaming. The goal is to build a resonant assemblage by deploying mobile intersections between belief, role performance, desire, and action to prepare the way for more militant sit-ins, highway blockages, selective refusals of participation, and so on, as events unfold. One key to formation of vibrant cross-state citizen movements is to respond creatively to new and surprising events as they arise, drawing upon the fund of readiness built up by role adventurism to engender larger, more militant actions. Such a combination takes a leaf out of the "shock doctrine" of the neoliberal right while diverging from it in every other respect. As Naomi Klein shows, the neoliberal right has been primed for decades to use surprising events as a pretext to install a neoliberal agenda through top-down action. 17 The shock side of its economic doctrine shows how political neoliberalism is in its essence. It pursues a neoliberal politics of elite control in the service of military bellicosity and regional inequality in the name of freeing a self-regulating economy that it pretends is waiting to emerge. Its politics is top down, war-like, and inegalitarian while its doctrine celebrates the ever receding promise of world markets that thrive most when they are least regulated. We, by contrast, must start in the middle of things and constituencies, pushing out in several directions, responding creatively to new events in a world in which no self-organizing economic system can fulfill the promises of neoliberalism, because the world is composed of multiple, interacting temporal systems, with many containing capacities of selforganization and metamorphosis. Micropolitics on several fronts can render creative mass responses to new events promising because of the dose interinvolvements between role performance, intensities of belief, and political action. Is it not obligatory to expose and resist the system as such rather than taking cumulative actions to move it? Don't such actions necessarily fold back in on themselves, feeding the dosed system they seek to move? Some theorists on the Left say such things, but they themselves have too dosed a view of the systems they criticize. No system in a world of becoming composed of multiple, interacting systems of different types, with different capacities of self-organization, is entirely dosed. It is both more vulnerable to the outside than the carriers of hubris imagine and periodically susceptible to creative movement from within and without simultaneously. Moreover, pure negativity on the Left does not sustain either critique or militancy for long, but rather, it tends eventually to lapse into resignation or to slide toward the authoritarian practices of the Right that already express with glee the moods of negativity, hubris, or existential revenge. We have witnessed numerous examples of such disappointing transitions in the last several decades, when a negative or authoritarian mood is retained while the creed in which it was set is changed dramatically. We must therefore work on mood, belief; desire, and action together. As we do so we also amplify positive attachment to existence itself amidst the specific political resentments that help to spur us on. To ignore the existential dimension of politics is to increase the risks of converting a noble movement into an authoritarian one and to amplify the power of bellicose movements that mobilize destructive potential. To focus on the negative dimension alone is to abjure the responsibilities of political action during a dangerous time. To review, none of the role interventions listed above nor all in concert could suffice to break such a global resonance machine. Luck and pregnant points of contact with salutary changes in state actions, other cross-state citizen movements, the policies of international organizations, creative market innovations, and religious organization are needed. But those larger constellations may not themselves move far in a positive direction unless they meet multiple constituencies primed to join them and geared to press them whenever they lapse into inertia, if a world resonance machine of revenge and counter-revenge stretches, twists, and constrains the classical image of sovereign units, regionally anchored creeds, uneven capitalist exchange, and international organizations, while drawing selective sustenance from all of them, a new counter-machine must do so too.

AT We Know Law Is Bad

Legal education needs to be tailored to specific acts of resistance

Morales-Cruz 12 (teaches at Inter American University of Puerto Rico School of Law)
(Myrta, Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 2, n. 1, ¡Los Filtros Luchan!1 A Case Study of Lawyering and Participatory Democracy: Participatory Lobbying as a Strategy for Working with Marginalized Communities)

Finally, the third image of lawyering presented by White is "lawyering together toward change" (White 1988). This image of lawyering combines pedagogy and strategic action. White (1988 cited Freire 1970 and De Lauretis 1984) is inspired by Paulo Freire's popular education theory and the feminist methodology of consciousness raising. Both show how a critical consciousness can emerge among oppressed groups as they reflect together about their situation (White 1988). This is a learning practice that is non-hierarchical "in which small groups reflect together upon the immediate conditions of their lives" (White 1988, p. 761). It is a "dialogic process of reflection and action" (White 1988, p. 761). In this model, nobody monopolizes the teacher role (White 1988). However, an "outsider" with professional skills can have an important role to play (White 1988, p.762). The lawyer who assumes this role must, according to White, above all else, have humility. The strategic work entailed by this image of lawyering must help the group "devise concrete actions that challenge the patterns of domination that they identify" (White 1988, p. 763). This work is a process where "the group learns to interpret their relationship with those in power as an ongoing drama" instead of a static condition (White 1988, p. 763). They must learn how to design specific acts of resistance, which reveal the wrongness of the positions of the oppressor to itself and to the public (White 1988).

White (1988, p. 765) posits that "fluency in the law" which she describes as a "deep practical understanding of law as a discourse for articulating norms of justice and an array of rituals for resolving social conflict" is beneficial for the type of work that she describes: "An understanding of law as discourse on norms will help [the "outsider"] work with the clients to deepen their own consciousness of their injuries and their needs. Knowledge of the law's procedural rituals will give the group access to a central arena for public resistance and challenge."

State/Reform Good

Law K2 Movements

Momentum Building – Campaigning against particular laws can be effective and is often necessary. Seemingly small reform efforts can be effective tools to mobilize populations. This draw factor disproves their general claim about reformism

Cummings and Eagly 2k1 (Staff Attorney, Community Development Project, Public Counsel Law Center, Los Angeles, California. J.D., Harvard Law School; Coordinating Attorney, Immigrant Domestic Violence Project, Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA), Los Angeles, California. J.D., Harvard Law School)
(Scott L. and Ingrid V., A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 443, LN)

Gordon has offered a particularly comprehensive vision of law and organizing practice. She argues that there are "three interesting and under-explored possibilities for how to use law" in grassroots organizing work. n105 First, law can be used "as a draw" to bring new members into an organization that has larger organizing and reformist goals. n106 The promise of legal assistance on a discrete case can motivate a worker to come to a workers' meeting at which she will be exposed to the broader educational and organizing activities of the group. Second, the law can be used as a "measure of injustice." n107 For instance, as part of educational efforts, workers can be asked to analyze how their own experiences may diverge from what the law defines as basic legal protections. In this way, a discussion of legal issues can highlight discrepancies between the law as written and the law as lived by marginalized workers. n108 The gap between the legal ideal and practical reality can then be used to chart a course for political action and community mobilization. Finally, the law can be used as "part of a larger organizing campaign" n109 in which the ultimate goal is not to win a particular lawsuit, but rather to achieve specific organizing objectives and build power among unrepresented groups. According to this conception, the law serves as a strategic mechanism to support or advance organizing campaigns in practical ways - for example, by filing a lawsuit to call attention to a broader structural issue or to put pressure on an employer or industry to undertake systemic reforms. n110

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Reform K2 Minorities

Marginalized groups use the law precisely because they lack power

Lobel 7 (Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego)
(Orly, THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM: CRITICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937, February, 2007, LN)

In the triangular conundrum of "law and social change," law is regularly the first to be questioned, deconstructed, and then critically dismissed. The other two components of the equation - social and change - are often presumed to be immutable and unambiguous. Understanding the limits of legal change reveals the dangers of absolute reliance on one system and the need, in any effort for social reform, to contextualize the discourse, to avoid evasive, open-ended slogans, and to develop greater sensitivity to indirect effects and multiple courses of action. Despite its weaknesses, however, law is an optimistic discipline. It operates both in the present and in the future. Order without law is often the privilege of the strong. Marginalized groups have used legal reform precisely because they lacked power. Despite limitations, these groups have often successfully secured their interests through legislative and judicial victories. Rather than experiencing a disabling disenchantment with the legal system, we can learn from both the successes and failures of past models, with the aim of constantly redefining the boundaries of legal reform and making visible law's broad reach

Reform K2 Native Americans

Legal reform is vital to provide meaningful redress for past violence to natives—can't fix the law outside of the law

Bradford 2

(William Bradford 2, Chiricahua Apache. LL.M., 2001, Harvard Law School; Ph.D., 1995, Northwestern University, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": 1 Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1)

[*17] Nevertheless, even if the non-Indian majority would reject the American Myth in the interest of mending national fences, the path to Indian redress winds through terrain unmapped heretofore. Compensation and apologies, gestures potentially part of an amicable settlement, are not germane to the resolution of Indian claims for injustices that cannot be remedied save by reinvestiture of lands and sovereignty in self-determining Indian tribes. 70 This requires not merely an abstract acknowledgment of the value of pluralism but a comprehensive program of legal reform that dispenses with doctrines and precedents perpetuating the denial of the human rights of Indian tribes and people. 71 As law, more than any other social variable, has reproduced the subordination of Indians in the United States, 72 legal reform occupies a central position in the claim for Indian redress. 73¶ [*18] In short, proponents of Indian redress must not only displace a flawed version of history: they must articulate a proposal for remediation that transports the American people far beyond the strictures of existing law to enable the peaceful restoration of Indian lands and powers of self-government. 74 Such a transformative mission cannot be accomplished by positing Indians and the non-Indian majority as adversaries, as would reparations; rather, redress of Indian claims and the healing of the American nation -- crucial foci of the drive toward perfection -- necessitate dialogue, reconciliation, and joint authorship of a future history of peace, harmony, and justice. 75¶ Part II of this Article offers a disquieting version of U.S-Indian history that accelerates erosion of the American Myth and acquaints the non-Indian majority with the necessary factual predicate to Indian redress. Parts III and IV contrast the assumptions, procedures, and remedies that distinguish reparations and reconciliation, 76 the dominant contending models of redress available to group victims of human injustice, and demonstrate that, because it offers the best hope for a peaceful American coexistence marked by mutual respect for sovereignty, reconciliation is a more appropriate avenue to Indian redress. Several preliminary proposals, including the introduction of traditional tribal peacemaking as perhaps the most appropriate form of [*19] reconciliation, will be offered to stimulate thinking.

Reform Key

Have to transform systems from the inside out-otherwise rhetoric changes but not policies.

McCormack 10

(Tara, PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg 59-61)

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of 'emancipatory' security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and 'blindness' to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to 'protect' and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, 'if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed' (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a 'cosmopolitan' legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today's conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

AT Alternatives Key

Can only assess the viability of the law in relation to alternatives

Cummings 9 (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law)
(Scott L., A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO LAW AND ORGANIZING: A COMMENT ON "THE STORY OF SOUTH ARDMORE",
42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 631, LN)

The classic justification for public interest law, particularly the lawsuits attacking Jim Crow during the Civil Rights Movement, was the entrenched and immobile political opposition to the cause of racial equality. Law may be a second-best option, but sometimes it is the most powerful weapon available. When organizing groups are contemplating different courses of action, the use of law must be compared to alternative non-legal strategies and their likely outcomes. It may be that in a particular organizing context, law poses significant risks. But what are the risks of other strategies? How might the risks be weighted and usefully compared? Realizing Shdaimah's call for a "fluid" approach to law and organizing requires a genuine analysis of the trade-offs of legal action and non-legal alternatives and a strategic plan of action that combines the best of both.

AT Law = Cap

Law not inherently classist or bad

Robertson 97 (Osgoode Hall Law School, York University)

(Cherie. "The Demystification of Legal Discourse: Reconceiving the Role of the Poverty Lawyer as Agent of the Poor." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 35.3/4 (1997))

The observation has been made that lawyers, as espousers of and adherents to law, are participants in its oppressive nature, in its discriminatory regulation, and in its inequities; lawyers in effect are "greasing the wheels" for the law as a tool of social oppression, and are perpetuating the legitimacy and facilitating the operation of an unjust system. Marxist analyses have attempted to explain how law operates as an instrument of repression promoting the interests of certain classes at the expense of those of others in contemporary Western societies while, at the same time, contributing to shape a climate of thought in these societies that makes possible a reduction of direct repression through law to a minimum. Yet, if all poverty lawyers in Toronto simultaneously withdrew their services, the result would most certainly be increased suffering for the poor. While a reconceptualization of the work that poverty lawyers do is essential, I would argue that it must take place while we continue to represent the poor. We cannot put our work on hold until we devise the perfect way to help poor people. Besides, there will never be unanimous agreement amongst leftist activist lawyers on what the best strategies for self-reform are. Furthermore, I am not of the mind that there is nothing redemptive about law as a mechanism for bringing about positive social change. Of dominant ideologies in society, law is a discourse which at least pays lip-service to the ideals of justice. As such, it continues to be a site where power relations can be debated, challenged and reconstituted. E.P. Thompson's words are inspiring in this regard: It is true that in history the law can be seen to mediate and to legitimize existent class relations. Its forms and procedures may crystallize those relations and mask ulterior injustice. But this mediation, through the forms of law, is something quite distinct from the exercise of unmediated force. The forms and rhetoric of law acquire a distinct identity which may, on occasion, inhibit power and afford some protection to the powerless. 22 Besides, poor people do not have the luxury of choosing whether or not they will engage with law. As Wexler writes, "poor people must go to government officials for many of the things which not-poor people get privately ... . Poverty creates an abrasive interface with society; poor people are always bumping into sharp legal things."23 Consequently, as lawyers, we have to continue to try to renegotiate with legal discourse while simultaneously challenging its inadequacies.

Education about the state is crucial to anti-capitalism

a. The state is not an end, but it is a crucial facet to make massive change possible

Abramsky 10 (visiting fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Science, Technology and Society; fmr. coordinator of the Danish-based World Wind Energy Institute)
(Koyla, SPARKING AN ENERGY REVOLUTION Building New Relations of Production, Exchange, and Livelihood in Sparking A Worldwide Energy Revolution, ed. Koyla Abramsky, pg. 646)

As this book has sought to show, leadership in an emancipatory transition process is unlikely to come predominantly from structures from above, like governments, multilateral institutions and agreements, or corporations. It is more likely that autonomous movements, self-organizing from below in order to gain greater control and autonomy over their own lives, will lead the way.. This is not to say that state regulation is unimportant; it is completely essential in order to secure a legal and institutional framework (as well as financial support) conducive to a grassroots process led from below. However, the regulatory process is very unlikely to be the driving force of the changes, but rather a necessary process that enables wider changes. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that emancipatory regulation that is strong enough to be effective could even come about without major pressure from below.

b. Even if revolutionary change is necessary, Understanding its inner workings is crucial

AK Press 12 (February 17, http://www.revolutionbythebook.akpress.org/accumulation-of-freedom-video-promo-2/)

Anti-capitalism is too often little more than a sentiment, easily captured as a slogan on a wall or banner. Much of the discussion stays close to the surface. It's as if we, as anarchists, don't feel a responsibility to intellectually challenge capitalist dogma on its own terms (because we can't? because it requires an incredible amount of work?). We rail

<u>against capitalist institutions and forms but spend too little time working to understand them and to effectively translate that understanding to others</u>. So it's with pleasure that we welcome works likeAccumulation, David Graeber's Debt, and forthcoming titles like Wayne Price's revamped book on Marx's economics for anarchists (2012), and Geoff Mann's Dissassembly Required: A Field Guide to Actually Existing Capitalism (2013). Those smug anarchists quick to dismiss the study of economic

AT Reject State/Civil Society

Radical politics must engage the state – the alt is right wing take over
Mouffe 10
(What is Radical Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pg. 235)

It is clear that, once we envisage social reality in terms of 'hegemonic and 'counter-hegemonic' practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial' otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation. Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state completely, we leave the door open for others to take control of systems of authority and regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left shows little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too happy to take over the state.

The left is failing because of a suspicion of the nation state – we might fight the right at all levels in order to be effective
Grayson and Little 11
(Deborah Grayson and Ben Little 4 August 2011, The far right are the masters of network politics, not the 'internationalist' left, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/deborah-grayson-and-ben-little/far-right-are-masters-of-network-politics-not-internationa)

While Norway mourns and attends to matters of justice, across Europe the left would be wise to pause and reflect upon the mixed responses to the worst case of child murder in northern Europe since the Second World War. We can only hope that Anders Breivik is a lone operator and that we will not see this kind of politically motivated mass murder repeated in the UK or anywhere else, but in showing how right wing ideology is formed and disseminated through increasingly international networks, the Utoya massacre has lessons for us all. Although globally oriented 'lefties' may like to think this is a contradiction in terms, it is the far right who are pioneering the way towards a new form of internationalism. This is not to say that they have lost their attachment to the nation – for all that vigilantes like Breivik may think in civilisational or European terms, "small state" nationalism remains the bedrock of their politics. Those that see the blurring of boundaries between European and national perspectives as a sign of incoherence which will diminish the power of these ideological beliefs are mistaken. In an age of network politics it's a strength, and one that the left needs to understand if we are to reverse the electoral successes of the centre-right and the populist rise of the far-right across Europe. So far, the left has struggled to match the way far-right networks have learned to scale seamlessly from the local to the civilisational through the conceptual space of the national. The English Defence League, for example, explain local opposition to their marches as stemming from the malign influence of the SWP's campaign, Unite Against Fascism; cite the welfare state as evidence of leftist domination in national politics; and see in the European Court of Human Rights the imposition of socialist, multicultural values across the entire continent. This sense of multiple scales allows the EDL to create a language that reflects their politics at every level, and to communicate their message across local and national boundaries. They create a unified rhetoric that the left, with their suspicion of the national, cannot replicate.

Without the state /civil society the violent will take control -- they exploit the people and replicate the worst aspects of the state structure

Jackson 3 Paul Jackson, International Development Department of the University of Birmingham, UK (2003): Warlords as alternative forms of Governance, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 14:2, 131-150 Tandf online

Use of Violence to Reassert Local Power With the complete breakdown of moral authority and the law, let alone any means of enforcement, the only recourse is to establish rule through force. The violence associated with warlords is the most publicised aspect of their activity, and its seeming randomness is undoubtedly one of the most horrific characteristics of warlords. The casual nature of violence within areas held by warlords is symptomatic of the gang culture outlined by Lary in China, but equally resonant of earlier cultures of violence. Replacement of Formal Structures with Gang Mentality The collapse of formal structures and norms, including formal military structures, lead warlords to develop their own internal structures. In particular, the replacement of hierarchical structures with gang cultures, with the warlord and close associates at the core of the gang. This gang culture manifests itself in particular ways, not least of which is the fact that gangs act as a spur to further violence by subgroups. In other words, the replacement of formal structures by ad hoc, primitive and personalised control leads to a behavioural logic based on the licensing of gratuitous violence. The gang culture has a further element of interest: the development of subgroups. These subgroups may be smaller gangs, or alternatively part of the larger group aiming to progress up the pecking order. One of the features of all periods of warlord rule has been the behaviour of smaller groups of armed men on the periphery of the gang, which adds a further element of randomness into the violence. We will return to this below.

Lack of state authority / civil society means endless war among factions

Woodward 99 Dr. Susan L. Woodward, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, served as Head, Analysis and Assessment Unit, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, UNPROFOR, in 1994, and was associate professor of political science at Yale University prior to joining Brookings   Naval War College Review, 00281484, Spring 99, Vol. 52, Issue 2 "Failed states" Academic Search Premier

The loss of a state's monopoly on authority to legislate, tax, enforce, and restrict the right to bear arms creates a situation of relative balance in resources, especially arms, and in access to finances for war. Examples are regional control over trade routes and customs posts, as can be seen in Bosnia, and over mineral resources, as in Angola today. (The Angolan case shows that where there are such resources, lucrative financial offers are likely to appear from international businesses who have no scruples about dealing with warlords and who do not condition their payments on certain behavior and reforms, as do the United States and international organizations.) Contrary to the stabilizing effects of balance-of-power interstate relations, the most likely result of this anarchic balance of resources (particularly military ones) domestically is unending war of attrition.[7] The equilibrium result--a negative equilibrium, in economists' terms--is "stable anarchy," in which "all resources would be spent in fighting rather than production." There may be temporary cessations of fighting, but only as battlefield stalemates; internal actors cannot on their own end the fight.
This relative balance also creates layer upon layer of security dilemmas. A spiraling dynamic of mutual fear continues to feed such wars once they begin.[8] To understand the disintegration of Yugoslavia or the Bosnian war, for example, one must recognize that once the federal state lost its authority, each group pressed for its own national fights and claimed to be at risk of exploitation and even extirpation by other groups in the same dissolving state; it became critical that each group was a numerical minority and perceived itself as acting only in defensive ways. Interventions that attempt to remain impartial, delivering food and shelter to all civilians but not intervening politically to stop the spiraling dynamic, thus are likely to perpetuate these perceptions and the stalemate; those that do intervene politically, taking one side but not going to war in support of that side (and thereby resolving the battlefield situation) also perpetuate the conflict, by demonstrating to the other sides that they are indeed endangered and that they cannot safely disarm, psychologically or physically.

Ethnic cleansing occurs in the absence of state authority

Duffield 98 Mark Duffield School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, Spring 1998   Post-modern conflict: Warlords,   post-adjustment states and private protection, Civil Wars, 1:1, 65-102 tandfonline

While the Balkan war may have coined the term ethnic cleansing, it is clear that the process of social inclusion and exclusion involved has a much wider application. It is typical of the reworking of political authority in a period of declining nation-state

competence and globalisation. It is these processes and not the alleged reappearance of age-old and suppressed ethnic hatreds (Kaplan, 1994; Kennedy, 1993), which are important. Africa and the European East provide many examples. Regarding the latter, the effects of the demise of central authority have been greatest where pre-existing federal systems collapsed as republics declared their autonomy. That is, in Yugoslavia and parts of the Soviet Union. While less violent, similar processes have been taking place in other areas including Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Without the state, public goods disappear and the population suffers

Rotberg 2 ROBERT I. ROTBERG, Director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and President of the World Peace Foundation. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2002), pp. 127-140   Failed States in a World of Terror   JSTOR

STRONG STATES control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods to their citizens. They perform well according to standard indicators such as per capita GDP, the UN'S Human Development Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House's Freedom in the World report. Strong states offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. They are places of peace and order. In contrast, failed states are tense, conflicted, and dangerous. They generally share the following characteristics: a rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control over their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities; civil war; the use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion; high levels of corruption; a collapsed health system; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capita; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-national currencies; and basic food shortages, leading to starvation. Failed states also face rising attacks on their fundamental legitimacy. As a state's capacity weakens and its rulers work exclusively for themselves, key interest groups show less and less loyalty to the state. The people's sense of political community vanishes and citizens feel disenfranchised and marginalized. The social contract that binds citizens and central structures is forfeit. Perhaps already divided by sectional differences and animosity, citizens transfer their allegiances to communal warlords. Domestic anarchy sets in. The rise of terrorist groups becomes more likely.

The state / civil society prevents pillaging by caspitalism

Moore 96   Richard Moore, Political Scientist, 1996 [THE FATEFUL DANCE OF CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY, p. http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/cyberjournal/frm00089.html].

Maastricht, Scottish independence, ethnic or regional autonomy, stronger international "peace" arrangements -- these are all developments which might have much to be said for them taken in isolation, or if implemented within a democratic framework. But within the context of the corporate elite storming the Bastille of democracy, it is necessary to re-examine all changes and "reforms" from the perspective of whether they strengthen or weaken our fundamental democratic institutions. If we don't look at the big picture, then we'll be like the frog who submits to being cooked -- the victim of a sneaky slow-boiling policy. The fact is that the modern nation state is the most effective democratic institution mankind has been able to come up with since outgrowing the small-scale city-state. With all its defects and corruptions, this gift from the Enlightenment -- the national republic --is the only effective channel the people have to power-sharing with the elites. If the strong nation-state withers away, we will not -- be assured --enter an era of freedom and prosperity, with the "shackles of wasteful governments off our backs". No indeed. If you want to see the future --in which weak nations must deal as-best-they-can with mega-corporations -- then look at the Third World.

AT Sovereignty Bad

Each use of the state has to judged on its own terms. Universal opposition to the state creates multiple other forms of oppression

Derrida 3

(Jacques, THE "WORLD" OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO COME (EXCEPTION, CALCULATION, SOVEREIGNTY), Research in Phenomenology. Pittsburgh: 2003. Vol. 33 pg. 9, 44 pgs)

And yet, in the second place, it would be imprudent and hasty, in truth hardly reasonable, to oppose unconditionally, that is, head on, a sovereignty that is itself unconditional and indivisible. One cannot combat, head on, all sovereignty, sovereignty in general, without threatening at the same time, beyond the nation-state figure of sovereignty, the classical principles of freedom and self-determination. Like the classical tradition of law (and the force that it presupposes), these classical principles remain inseparable from a sovereignty at once indivisible and yet able to be shared. Nation-state sovereignty can even itself, in certain conditions, become an indispensable bulwark against certain international powers, certain ideological, religious, or capitalist, indeed linguistic, hegemonies, which, under the cover of liberalism or universalism, would still represent, in a world that would be little more than a market, a rationalization in the service of particular interests. Yet again, in a context that is **each time singular**, where the respectful attention paid to singularity is not relativist but universalizable and rational, responsibility would consist in orienting ourselves without any determinative knowledge of the rule. To be responsible, to keep within reason [garder raison], would be to invent maxims of transaction for deciding between two just as rational and universal but contradictory exigencies of reason as well as its enlightenment.

AT State Action = Evil

Not this federal government

Past injustice was done by different people in a different government. It Obama isn't responsible for what the Bush administration did, this government can't be held responsible for past wrongs

Institutional guilt applies to all of us

The people were complicitous in past government wrongs. If the federal government must be rejected because of past wrongs, everyone must be rejected. Nothing can be done.

Insisting that government comply with the law undermines the colonial order.

Saito 4 Natsu Saito, professor of law at Georgia State University, December 2004 ["Like a Disembodied Shade: Colonization and Internment as the American Way of Life," Bad Subjects 71, http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2004/71/saito.html]

The other option left us is to follow the advice of Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson who, in his capacity as the chief U.S. prosecutor for the Nuremberg Tribunal (1945), stated, "We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power against the rights of their own people only when we make all men answerable to the law." In this spirit we can insist that the government which purports to represent us comply with the rule of law – as articulated in both the U.S. Constitution and in international law – in all of its actions and with respect to all territories and peoples over whom it exercises jurisdiction. To the extent we fail to do so we are complicit in, and therefore responsible for, the maintenance of a colonial order in which law serves only to protect and privilege the colonizers.

Rejection of government action means black social death (from capitalism)

Ford 10 Glen Ford, Black Agenda Radio 09/15/2010 Black Folks Ain't Got No Money For Bootstraps: The Black Capitalist Dead End   http://www.blackagendareport.com/?q=content/black-folks-aint-got-no-money-bootstraps-black-capitalist-dead-end

The two devastating recessions of the last decade have had catastrophic effects on Black economic prospects. Yet, despite the monstrous setbacks of recent years and the general failure to bridge the racial wage and wealth gap over the last three decades, there still exists a strong current of Black political thought that insists African Americans can pull themselves and the rest of the race up by their financial bootstraps, through hard work and pooling of collective resources. Some of these arguments are unashamedly Black capitalist; others preach a brand of communal partnerships among Black entrepreneurs and consumers that attempts to make the entire Black community a kind of capitalist engine of self-help. What binds the variations on the "bootstrap" theme together, is an essential refusal to challenge the capitalist system. The belief is that Black "buying power" or race-based investment schemes will allow Black folks to rise from the bottom of the American economic barrel. Implicit in this line of thinking is the notion that Blacks are at the bottom because they have not been trying hard enough to move up - which is also the assumption of white racists, whether they call themselves conservatives or liberals. The most fatal flaw in the Black capitalist world view is the assumption that Black people actually have the wealth and discretionary income to build an internal economy that could insulate them from the general capitalist crisis. We know different, because all the data tell us that Black household income is stuck at the same level relative to whites as back in 1979, and Black comparative wealth was steadily eroding

even before the last decade's recessions. And we know that Black wealth has been further diminished relative to whites in the ongoing housing meltdown, in which Blacks are twice as likely to face foreclosure. And we know that Blacks, a majority of whom are renters, bear the brunt of the dislocations caused by rampant gentrification, which in some urban areas forces families to spend more than half their income on rent. "The most fatal flaw in the Black capitalist world view is the assumption that Black people actually have the wealth and discretionary income to build an internal economy that could insulate them from the general capitalist crisis." Simply put, there ain't no damn money for these bootstrap capitalism dreams, and there never was. There was never the possibility of building a Black General Motors - and now General Motors requires billions of dollars in federal infusions to survive. What a great distraction this nonsense about bootstrap racial upward mobility has been - so much wasted time and misdirected dreams over the generations. Worse than that, the bootstraps mythology - sometimes under the shorthand, "Do for Self" - implicitly or explicitly urges Black people to forego making demands of government, as if that amounts to "begging the white man" for something. This attitude surrenders all Black claims to any of the society's resources except those we currently hold in our own pockets - which is the equivalent of social death. President Obama also warns Blacks to expect no redress from their government. At a recent press conference, he once again urged Blacks to be patient, that when the economy grows, everybody will be "swept up into that virtuous circle." It never happened before, and it never will. Blacks need to "Do for Self," but not as aspiring capitalists. We have always made our greatest progress in political struggle. That's the Promised Land that we make, together.

AT Structuralism

Structuralism about the law is wrong

Connolly 13 (Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University)
(William, The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism, pg. 36-38)

A philosophy attending to the acceleration, expansion, irrationalities, interdependencies, and fragilities of late capitalism suggests that we do not know with confidence, in advance of experimental action, just how far or fast changes in the systemic character of neoliberal capitalism can be made. The structures often **seem** solid and intractable, and indeed such a sem- blance may turn out to be true. Some may seem solid, infinitely absorptive, and intractable when they are in fact punctuated by hidden vulnerabilities, soft spots, uncertainties, and potential lines of flight that become appar- ent when they are subjected to experimental action, upheaval, testing, and strain. Indeed no ecology of late capitalism, given the variety of forces to which it is connected by a thousand pulleys, vibrations, impingements, dependencies, shocks, and threads, can specify with supreme confidence the solidity or potential flexibility of the structures it seeks to change. The strength of structural theory, at its best, was in identifying insti- tutional intersections that hold a system together; its conceit, at its worst, was the claim to know in advance how resistant such intersections are to potential change. Without adopting the opposite conceit, it seems important to pursue possible sites of strategic action that might open up room for productive change. Today it seems important to attend to the relation be- tween the need for structural change and identification of multiple sites of potential action. You do not know precisely what you are doing when you participate in such a venture. You combine an experimental temper with the appreciation that living and acting into the future inevitably contain a shifting quotient of uncertainty. The following tentative judgments and sites of action may be pertinent. 1) Neither neoliberal theory, nor socialist productivism, nor deep ecology, nor social democracy in its classic form seems sufficient to the contemporary condition. This is so in part because the powers of market self- regulation are both real and limited in relation to a larger multitude of heterogeneous force fields beyond the human estate with differential powers of self-regulation and metamorphosis. A first task is to challenge neoliberal ideology through critique and by elaborating and publicizing positive alternatives that acknowledge the disparate relations between mar- ket processes, other cultural systems, and nonhuman systems. Doing so to render the fragility of things more visible and palpable. Doing so, too, to set the stage for a series of intercoded shifts in citizen role performances, social movements, and state action. *2)* Those who seek to reshape the ecology of late capitalism might set an interim agenda of radical reform and then recoil back on the initiatives adopted to see how they work. An *interim agenda* is the best thing to focus on because in a world of becoming the more distant future is too cloudy to engage. We must, for instance, become involved in experimental micro- politics on a variety of fronts, as we participate in role experimentations, social movements, artistic displays, erotic-political shows, electoral campaigns, and creative interventions on the new media to help recode the ethos that now occupies investment practices, consumption desires, family savings, state priorities, church assemblies, university curricula, and media reporting. It is important to bear in mind how extant ideologies, estab- lished role performances, social movements, and commitments to state action intersect. To shift some of our own role performances in the zones of travel, church participation, home energy use, investment, and consump- tion, for instance, that now implicate us deeply in foreign oil dependence and the huge military expenditures that secure it, could make a minor dif- ference on its own *and also lift some of the burdens of institutional implica- tion from us* to support participation in more adventurous interpretations, political strategies, demands upon the state, and cross-state citizen actions.

No Link

Negative State Action

We're NOT THE LAW OR STATE AFFIRMATION – demands that a state not exclude groups doesn't reaffirm the state

Newman 10

(Saul, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2)

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state – say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing – is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands **does not necessarily mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy**. On the contrary, demands are made from a **position outside the political order, and they** often **exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure.** They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.

Alt Fails

Corporates DA

Must consider each use of sovereignty as unique – cannot universalize our opposition to the state or we will create the same problems of universal sovereignty and give ourselves over to multiple other forms of oppression

Derrida 3

(Jacques, THE "WORLD" OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO COME (EXCEPTION, CALCULATION, SOVEREIGNTY), Research in Phenomenology. Pittsburgh: 2003. Vol. 33 pg. 9, 44 pgs)

And yet, in the second place, it would be imprudent and hasty, in truth hardly reasonable, to oppose unconditionally, that is, head on, a sovereignty that is itself unconditional and indivisible. One cannot combat, head on, all sovereignty, sovereignty in general, without threatening at the same time, beyond the nation-state figure of sovereignty, the classical principles of freedom and self-determination. Like the classical tradition of law (and the force that it presupposes), these classical principles remain inseparable from a sovereignty at once indivisible and yet able to be shared. Nation-state sovereignty can even itself, in certain conditions, become an indispensable bulwark against certain international powers, certain ideological, religious, or capitalist, indeed linguistic, hegemonies, which, under the cover of liberalism or universalism, would still represent, in a world that would be little more than a market, a rationalization in the service of particular interests. Yet again, in a context that is **each time singular**, where the respectful attention paid to singularity is not relativist but universalizable and rational, responsibility would consist in orienting ourselves without any determinative knowledge of the rule. To be responsible, to keep within reason [garder raison], would be to invent maxims of transaction for deciding between two just as rational and universal but contradictory exigencies of reason as well as its enlightenment.

Cooption DA

Monolithic rejections of the law are wrong – cooption is more likely in non-state activism and fails to compare to alternative mechanisms for change. <u>Concrete mechanisms for success</u> should be your metric for evaluation.

Lobel 7 (Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego)

(Orly, THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM: CRITICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937, February, 2007, LN)

In the following sections, I argue that the extralegal model has suffered from the same drawbacks associated with legal cooptation. I show that as an effort to avoid the risk of legal cooptation, the current wave of suggested alternatives has effects that ironically mirror those of cooptation itself. Three central types of difficulties exist with contemporary extralegal scholarship. First, in the contexts of the labor and civil rights movements, arguments about legal cooptation often developed in response to a perceived gap between the conceptual ideal toward which a social reform group struggled and its actual accomplishments. But, ironically, the contemporary message of opting out of traditional legal reform avenues may only accentuate this problem. As the rise of informalization (moving to nonlegal strategies), civil society (moving to extralegal spheres), and pluralism (the proliferation of norm-generating actors) has been effected and appropriated by supporters from a wide range of political commitments, these concepts have had unintended implications that conflict with the very social reform ideals from which they stem. Second, the idea of opting out of the legal arena becomes self-defeating as it discounts the ongoing importance of law and the possibilities of legal reform in seemingly unregulated spheres. A model encompassing exit and rigid sphere distinctions further fails to recognize a reality of increasing interpenetration and the blurring of boundaries between private and public spheres, profit and nonprofit sectors, and formal and informal institutions. It therefore loses the critical insight that law operates in the background of seemingly unregulated relationships. Again paradoxically, the extralegal view of decentralized activism and the division of society into different spheres in fact have worked to subvert rather than support the progressive agenda. Finally, since extralegal actors view their actions with romantic idealism, they fail to develop tools for evaluating their success. If the critique of legal cooptation has involved the argument that legal reform, even when viewed as a victory, is never radically transformative, we must ask: what are the criteria for assessing the achievements of the suggested alternatives? As I illustrate in the following sections, much of the current scholarship obscures the lines between the descriptive and the prescriptive in its formulation of social activism. If current suggestions present themselves as alternatives to formal legal struggles, we must question whether the new extralegal politics that are proposed and celebrated are capable of producing a constructive theory and meaningful channels for reform, rather than passive status quo politics. A. Practical Failures: When Extralegal Alternatives Are Vehicles for Conservative Agendas We don't want the 1950s back. What we want is to edit them. We want to keep the safe streets, the friendly grocers, and the milk and cookies, while blotting out the political bosses, the tyrannical headmasters, the inflexible rules, and the lectures on 100 percent Americanism and the sinfulness of dissent. n163 A basic structure of cooptation arguments as developed in relation to the labor and civil rights movements has been to show how, in the move from theory to practice, the ideal that was promoted by a social group takes on unintended content, and the group thus fails to realize the original vision. This risk is particularly high when ideals are framed in broad terms that are open to multiple interpretations. Moreover, the pitfalls of the potential risks presented under the umbrella of cooptation are in fact accentuated in current proposals. Paradoxically, as the extralegal movement is framed by way of opposition to formal legal reform paths, without sufficiently defining its goals, it runs the very risks it sought to avoid by working outside the legal system. Extralegal paths are depicted mostly in negative terms and as resorting to new alternative forms of action rather than established models. Accordingly, because the ideas of social organizing, civil society, and legal pluralism are framed in open-ended contrarian terms, they do not translate into specific visions of social justice reform. The idea of civil society, which has been embraced by people from a broad array of often conflicting ideological commitments, is particularly demonstrative. Critics argue that "some ideas fail because they never make the light of day. The idea of civil society ... failed because it [*972] became too popular." n164 Such a broadly conceived ideal as civil society sows the seeds of its own destruction. In former eras, the claims about the legal cooptation of the transformative visions of workplace justice and racial equality suggested that through legal strategies the visions became stripped of their initial depth and fragmented and framed in ways that were narrow and often merely symbolic. This observation seems accurate in the contemporary political arena; the idea of civil society revivalism evoked by progressive activists has been reduced to symbolic acts with very little substance. On the left, progressive advocates envision decentralized activism in a third, nongovernmental sphere as a way of reviving democratic participation and rebuilding the state from the bottom up. By contrast, the idea of civil society has been embraced by conservative politicians as a means for replacing government-funded programs and steering away from state intervention. As a result, recent political uses of civil society have subverted the ideals of progressive social reform and replaced them with conservative agendas that reject egalitarian views of social provision. In particular, recent calls to strengthen civil society have been advanced by politicians interested in dismantling the modern welfare system. Conservative civil society revivalism often equates the idea of self-help through extralegal means with traditional family structures, and blames the breakdown of those structures (for example, the rise of the single parent family) for the increase in reliance and dependency on government aid. n165 This recent depiction of the third sphere of civic life works against legal reform precisely because state intervention may support newer, nontraditional social structures. For conservative thinkers, legal reform also risks increasing dependency on social services by groups who have traditionally

been marginalized, including disproportionate reliance on public funds by people of color and single mothers. Indeed, the end of welfare as we knew it, n166 as well as the [*973] transformation of work as we knew it, n167 is closely related to the quest of thinkers from all sides of the political spectrum for a third space that could replace the traditional functions of work and welfare. Strikingly, a range of liberal and conservative visions have thus converged into the same agenda, such as the recent welfare-to-work reforms, which rely on myriad non-governmental institutions and activities to support them. n168 When analyzed from the perspective of the unbundled cooptation critique, it becomes evident that there are multiple limits to the contemporary extralegal current. First, there have been significant problems with resources and zero-sum energies in the recent campaigns promoting community development and welfare. For example, the initial vision of welfare-to-work supported by liberal reformers was a multifaceted, dynamic system that would reshape the roles and responsibilities of the welfare bureaucracy. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 n169 (PRWORA), supported by President Clinton, was designed to convert various welfare programs, including Aid to Families with Dependent Children, into a single block grant program. The aim was to transform passive cash assistance into a more active welfare system, in which individuals would be better assisted, by both the government and the community, to return to the labor force and find opportunities to support themselves. Yet from the broad vision to actual implementation, the program quickly became limited in focus and in resources. Indeed, PRWORA placed new limits on welfare provision by eliminating eligibility categories and by placing rigid time limits on the provision of benefits. n170 Moreover, the need to frame questions relating to work, welfare, and poverty in institutional arrangements and professional jargon and to comply with various funding block grants has made some issues, such as the statistical reduction of welfare recipients, more salient, whereas other issues, such as the quality of jobs offered, have been largely eliminated from policymakers' consideration. Despite aspects of the reform that were hailed as empowering for those groups they were designed to help, such as individual private training vouchers, serious questions have been raised about the adequacy of the particular [*974] policy design because resources and institutional support have been found lacking. n171 The reforms require individual choices and rely on the ability of private recipients to mine through a vast range of information. As in the areas of child care, health care, and educational vouchers, critics worry that the most disadvantaged workers in the new market will not be able to take advantage of the reforms. n172 Under such conditions, the goal of eliminating poverty may be eroded and replaced by other goals, such as reducing public expenses. Thus, recalling the earlier cooptation critique, once reforms are envisioned, even when they need not be framed in legalistic terms, they in some ways become reduced to a handful of issues, while fragmenting, neglecting, and ultimately neutralizing other possibilities. At this point, the paradox of extralegal activism unfolds. While public interest thinkers increasingly embrace an axiomatic rejection of law as the primary form of progress, their preferred form of activism presents the very risks they seek to avoid. The rejected "myth of the law" is replaced by a "myth of activism" or a "myth of exit," romanticizing a distinct sphere that can better solve social conflict. Yet these myths, like other myths, come complete with their own perpetual perils. The myth of exit exemplifies the myriad concerns of cooptation. For feminist agendas, for example, the separation of the world into distinct spheres of action has been a continuous impediment to meaningful reform. Efforts to create better possibilities for women to balance work and family responsibilities, including relaxing home work rules and supporting stay-at-home parents through federal child care legislation, have been couched in terms of support for individual choice and private decisionmaking. n173 Indeed, recent initiatives in federal child care legislation to support stay-at-home parents have been clouded by preconceptions of the separation of spheres and the need to make one-or-the-other life choices. Most importantly, the emergence of a sphere-oriented discourse abandons a critical perspective that distinguishes between valuing traditional gender-based characteristics and celebrating feminine difference in a universalist and essentialist manner. n174 [*975] Not surprisingly then, some feminist writers have responded to civil society revivalism with great skepticism, arguing that efforts to align feminine values and agendas with classic republican theory of civil society activism should be understood, at least in part, as a way of legitimizing historical social structures that subordinated women. The feminist lesson on the law/exit pendulum reveals a broader pattern. In a classic example of cooptation, activists should be concerned about the infusion (or indeed confusion) of nonlegal strategies with conservative privatization agendas. Indeed, in significant social policy contexts, legal scholarship oriented toward the exploration of extralegal paths reinforces the exact narrative that it originally resisted - that the state cannot and should not be accountable for sustaining and improving the lifeworld of individuals in the twenty-first-century economy and that we must seek alternative ways to bring about social reform. Whether using the terminology of a path-dependent process, an inevitable downward spiral, a transnational prisoner's dilemma, or a global race to the bottom, current analyses often suggest a lack of control over the forces of new economic realities. Rather than countering the story of lack of control, pointing to the ongoing role of government and showing the contradictions between that which is being kept regulated and that which is privatized, alternative extralegal scholarship accepts these developments as natural and inevitable. Similar to the arguments developed in relation to the labor movement - in which focusing on a limited right to collective bargaining demobilized workers and stripped them of their voice, participation, and decisionmaking power - contemporary extralegal agendas are limited to very narrow and patterned sets of reforms. A striking example has been the focus on welfare reform as the single frontier of economic redistribution without a connection being made between these reforms and social services in which the middle class has a strong interest, such as Social Security and Medicare. Similarly, on the legal pluralism frontier, when activists call for more corporate social responsibility, the initial expressions are those of broad demands for sustainable development and overall industry obligations for the social and environmental consequences of their activities. n176 The discourse, however, quickly becomes coopted by a shift to a narrow focus on charitable donations and corporate philanthropy or [*976] private reporting absent an institutionalized compliance structure. n177 Moreover, because of institutional limitations and crowding out effects possible in any type of reform agenda, the focus shifts to the benefits of corporate social responsibility to businesses, as marketing, recruit-ment, public relations, and "greenwashing" strategies. n178 Critics therefore become deeply cynical about the industry's real commitments to ethical conduct. A similar process can be described with regard to the literature on globalization. Globalization scholarship often attempts to produce a unifying narrative and an image of unitary struggle when in fact such unity does not exist. Embodied in the aforementioned irony of a "global anti-globalization" movement, social reform activism that resides under the umbrella of global movements is greatly diverse, some of it highly conservative. An "anti-globalization" movement can be a defensive nationalist movement infused with xenophobia and protective ideologies. n179 In fact, during central instances of collective action, such as those in Seattle, Quebec, Puerto Alegre, and Genoa, competing and conflicting claims were frequently encompassed in the same protest. n180 Nevertheless, there is a tendency to celebrate and idealize these protests as united and world-altering. Similarly, at the local level, grassroots politics often lack a clear agenda and are particularly ripe for cooptation resulting in far lesser achievements than what may have been expected by the groups involved. In a critical introduction to the law and organizing model, Professor Scott Cummings and Ingrid Eagly describe the ways in which new community-based approaches to progressive lawyering privilege grassroots activism over legal reform efforts and the facilitation of community mobilization over conventional lawyering. n181 After carefully unpacking the

ways in which community lawyers embrace [*977] law and organizing, Professor Cummings and Eagly rightfully warn against "exaggerating the ineffectiveness of traditional legal interventions" and "closing off potential avenues for redress." n182 Significantly, the strategies embraced by new public interest lawyers have not been shown to produce effective change in communities, and certainly there has been no assurance that these strategies fare comparatively better than legal reform. Moreover, what are meant to be progressive projects of community action and community economic development frequently can have a hidden effect of excluding worse-off groups, such as migrant workers, because of the geographical scope and zoning restrictions of the project. n183 In the same way that the labor and corporate social responsibility movements have failed because of their embrace of a legal framework, the community economic development movement - so diverse in its ideological appeal yet so prominent since the early 1990s as a major approach to poverty relief - may bring about its own destruction by fracture and diffusion. n184 In all of these cases, it is the act of engagement, not law, that holds the risks of cooptation and the politics of compromise. It is not the particularities of lawyers as a professional group that create dependency. Rather, it is the dynamics between skilled, networked, and resourced components and those who need them that may submerge goals and create reliance. It is not the particularities of the structural limitations of the judiciary that threaten to limit the progressive vision of social movements. Rather, it is the essential difficulties of implementing theory into practice. Life is simply messier than abstract ideals. Cooptation analysis exposes the broad, general risk of assuming ownership over a rhetorical and conceptual framework of a movement for change. Subsequently, when, in practice, other factions in the political debate embrace the language and frame their projects in similar terms, groups experience a sense of loss of control or possession of "their" vision. In sum, in the contemporary context, in the absence of a more programmatic and concrete vision of what alternative models of social reform activism need to achieve, the conclusions and rhetoric of the contemporary critical legal consciousness are appropriated by advocates representing a wide range of political commitments. Understood [*978] from this perspective, cooptation is not the result of the turn to a particular reform strategy. Rather, cooptation occurs when imagined ideals are left unchecked and seemingly progressive rhetoric is reproduced by a conservative agenda. Dominant interpretations such as privatization and market competitiveness come out ahead, whereas other values, such as group empowerment and redistributive justice, receive only symbolic recognition, and in turn serve to facilitate and stabilize the process. n185

Radical politics must engage the state – the alt is right wing take over
Mouffe 10
(What is Radical Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pg. 235)

It is clear that, once we envisage social reality in terms of 'hegemonic and 'counter-hegemonic' practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial' otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation. Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state completely, we leave the door open for others to take control of systems of authority and regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left shows little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too happy to take over the state.

The left is failing because of a suspicion of the nation state – we might fight the right at all levels in order to be effective
Grayson and Little 11
(Deborah Grayson and Ben Little 4 August 2011, The far right are the masters of network politics, not the 'internationalist' left, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/deborah-grayson-and-ben-little/far-right-are-masters-of-network-politics-not-internationa)

While Norway mourns and attends to matters of justice, across Europe the left would be wise to pause and reflect upon the mixed responses to the worst case of child murder in northern Europe since the Second World War. We can only hope that Anders Breivik is a lone operator and that we will not see this kind of politically motivated mass murder repeated in the UK or anywhere else, but in showing how right wing ideology is formed and disseminated through increasingly international networks, the Utoya massacre has lessons for us all.
Although globally oriented 'lefties' may like to think this is a contradiction in terms, it is the far right who

are pioneering the way towards a new form of internationalism. This is not to say that they have lost their attachment to the nation – for all that vigilantes like Breivik may think in civilisational or European terms, "small state" nationalism remains the bedrock of their politics. Those that see the blurring of boundaries between European and national perspectives as a sign of incoherence which will diminish the power of these ideological beliefs are mistaken. In an age of network politics it's a strength, and one that the left needs to understand if we are to reverse the electoral successes of the centre-right and the populist rise of the far-right across Europe. So far, the left has struggled to match the way far-right networks have learned to scale seamlessly from the local to the civilisational through the conceptual space of the national. The English Defence League, for example, explain local opposition to their marches as stemming from the malign influence of the SWP's campaign, Unite Against Fascism; cite the welfare state as evidence of leftist domination in national politics; and see in the European Court of Human Rights the imposition of socialist, multicultural values across the entire continent. This sense of multiple scales allows the EDL to create a language that reflects their politics at every level, and to communicate their message across local and national boundaries. They create a unified rhetoric that the left, with their suspicion of the national, cannot replicate.

State Inev

You can't just wish away institutions
McCormack 10

(Tara, Leicester international politics lecturer, Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches, pg 58)

Contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches reject the possibility of reaching an objective evaluation of the world or social reality because they reject the possibility of differentiating between facts and values. For the contemporary critical theorists, theory can only ever be for someone and for some purpose. As this is so then quite logically critical theorists elevate their own values to be the most important aspect of critical theory. As a result of the rejection of the fact/value distinction we see within the work of contemporary critical theorists a **highly unreflective certainty** about the power of their moral position. Critical theorists argue that all theory is normative, they offer in its place better norms: ones, as we have seen, that will lead to emancipation and will help the marginalised. The claims made for the central role of the values of the theorist reveal the theoretical limits of critical and emancipatory theory today. Yet even good or critical theory has no agency, and **only political action** can lead to change. Theory does of course play an important role in political change. This must be the first step towards a critical engagement with contemporary power structures and discourses. In this sense, we can see that it is critical theory that really has the potential to solve problems, unlike problem-solving theory which seeks only to ensure the smooth functioning of the existing order. Through substantive analysis the critical theorist can transcend the narrow and conservative boundaries of problem-solving theory by explaining how the problematic arises. Unlike problem-solving theory, critical theory makes claims to be able to explain why and how the social world functions as it does, it can go beyond the 'given framework for action'. The critical theorist **must** therefore be able to **differentiate between facts** (or social reality) **and values**, this ability is what marks the critical theorist apart from the traditional or problem-solving theorists, who cannot, because of their values and commitment to the existing social world, go beyond the 'given framework for action'. If we cannot differentiate between our desires or values or norms (or our perspective, to put it in Cox's terms) and actually occurring social and political and historical processes and relationships, it is hard to see how we can have a critical perspective (Jahn, 1998: 614). Rather, through abolishing this division we can no longer draw the line between what we would like and everything else, and thereby contemporary critical theories are as much of a dogma as problem-solving theories. Contemporary critical theorists are like **modern-day alchemists, believing** that **they can transform the base metal of the unjust international order into a golden realm of equality and justice through their own words.** For contemporary critical theorists, all that seems that the crucial step towards progress to a better world order is for the theorist to state that their theory is for the purposes of emancipation and a just world order.

AT Calculus

AT Prior Questions

Expertism Good

Expertism means our epistemology is sound – the alternative devolves into stereotypes and biases that collapses epistemology and turns the kritik
Snjezana 10

(Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences "Trusting Experts: Trust, Testimony, and Evidence". Received: 2010-02-19. Original scientific article. University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Omladinska 14, 51000, Scholar)

Let us define expertism as being a position that is composed of three statements: (i) experts exist; (ii) we should ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to experts due their exceptional expertise; (iii) therefore, we have the epistemic right to trust experts without evidence. Expertism is a genuine anti-evidentialist position with regards to trusting experts. 1. Experts exist. While it is rather plausible that there are experts in science because they deal with facts, the existence of moral or aesthetic experts, who deal with values, is generally much more problematic. For instance, Milton Friedman holds that differences in values are differences caused by people's tastes which are more or less hardwired, undebatable and unchangeable (Friedman, 1984). Logical positivists believe that value judgments are "nonsense" and cannot be a matter of expertise because they are not verifiable. Many people think that most people have reasonable ethical competence and that philosophers (who are the prime candidates for moral experts) are inclined to the same self-serving rationalizations as other people. However, the untouchable status of experts in science can be disputed. From Kant, Kuhn, Quine to Goodman and Putnam, we are aware of an intelligible objection that theoretical hypotheses involve a theory laden, cognitively biased, socially manipulated and subjective interpretation of the world (Goldman, 1999). Also, in science as well as in ethics and aesthetics there are battles between experts who propose opposite theories. In spite of the fact that claiming the first thesis is not without its difficulties, I will assume that it is correct: there are people who are objective (not only reputational) experts. These objective experts are people who, in comparison with other people, are more effective in problem solving. When compared with other people, they are better guides to the truth or better in recognizing a false statement as false, and a true one as true. While the views of ordinary people are typically an ill sorted mass of material derived from experience and tradition which contains inconsistencies and tensions, skilled experts can detect inconsistencies, fallacious inferences, unwarranted generalizations and false premises. In contrast to the average person in ordinary epistemic circumstances, they possess knowledge about the appropriate methods of research and argumentation, more systematized information derived from long term experience of dealing with difficulties, distinctions, critics, and alternative conceptions. They are generally better trained to deal with epistemic, moral or aesthetic issues. Or, we can say like Aristotle that it is reasonable to suppose that none of them can miss the target totally, and that each has gotten something or even a lot of things right. 2. Distinctive testimonial status. In expertism, it is claimed that an expert's testimony requires considerable epistemic deference. I can see at least three reasons why would one ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to experts: (i) standing practice about an expert's reliability; (ii) insufficiency of evidence; (iii) epistemic dependence. Firstly, it could be seen that we have an epistemic right to treat an expert's knowledge and sincerity with the utmost credulity because there is a standing practice, social climate or ongoing policy that considers experts to be the most reliable sources of knowledge or that they are fundamental testimonial authorities in society (Pappas, 2000). By assuming such credentials about experts, it could be seen that a hearer may believe what an expert says without assessment, evaluation or additional evidence. Secondly, many philosophers hold that our evidence in favour of other people's testimonies is principally insufficient (Beanblossom, Lehrer, 1970; Coady, 1981; Webb, 1993; Foley, 1994). If it is true, our evidence in favour of an expert's testimony is even more insufficient: when a layperson relies on an expert, that reliance is necessary blind (Hardwig, 1991). 3 We, as non-experts in a domain, cannot ever possess enough evidence to evaluate an experts' testimony as credible or non credible. An ordinary cognizer in ordinary epistemic circumstances does not possess, or even can never attain, a high enough level of expertise to evaluate the testimonies of experts. We simply do not have enough knowledge and experience in order to be capable of assessing the truth of an expert's testimony or an expert's reliability. Since our reasons for the acceptance of the content of an expert's report – by definition of them being experts and us as non-experts – cannot be the reasons the experts possess, our evidence about an experts' report cannot be ever sufficient for the justified acceptance of her testimony. If we are not experts in a domain, the relevant defeaters (undefeated defeaters) or certain kinds of experiences, doubts and beliefs that can undermine justified trust simply are not present to us. So, it could be seen that we have no choice other than to blindly trust experts. Thirdly, we are deeply

aware of our epistemic dependence on the testimonies of experts. Without other people testimonies "we should have to confess to knowing pitifully little" (Dummet, 1993, 420). But without expert testimonies our knowledge about biology, physics, medicine, geography of the world, history would be devastated. The majority of our beliefs about nature and society that we acquired throughout our lives are based, finally, on what experts 'tell' us (see also in Beanblossom, Lehrer, 1970; Faulkner, 2002). Our judgments of value will be a mass of inconsistent intuitions, prejudices and stereotypes derived from our subjective and partial interests, understandings of tradition, our temper etc. Behind the majority of testimonies lies extensive research and reports by experts and without these basic experts' testimonies "our lives would be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways" (Lackey, 2006, 1). So, it could be said that such an epistemic dependence on experts entails blind trust as a precondition of the functioning of our reason.

Multiple Methods Good

Methodologies are always imperfect – endorsing multiple epistemological frameworks can correct the blindspots of each

Stern and Druckman 00

(Paul, National Research Council and Daniel, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution – George Mason University, International Studies Review, Spring, p. 62-63)

Using several distinct research approaches or sources of information in conjunction is a valuable strategy for developing generic knowledge. This strategy is particularly useful for meeting the challenges of measurement and inference. The nature of historical phenomena makes controlled experimentation—the analytic technique best suited to making strong inferences about causes and effects—practically impossible with real-life situations. Making inferences requires using experimentation in simulated conditions and various other methods, each of which has its own advantages and limitations, but none of which can alone provide the level of certainty desired about what works and under what conditions. We conclude that debates between advocates of different research methods (for example, the quantitative-qualitative debate) are unproductive except in the context of a search for ways in which different methods can complement each other. Because there is no single best way to develop knowledge, the search for generic knowledge about international conflict resolution should adopt an epistemological strategy of triangulation, sometimes called "critical multiplism."53 That is, it should use multiple perspectives, sources of data, constructs, interpretive frameworks, and modes of analysis to address specific questions on the presumption that research approaches that rely on certain perspectives can act as partial correctives for the limitations of approaches that rely on different ones. An underlying assumption is that robust findings (those that hold across studies that vary along several dimensions) engender more confidence than replicated findings (a traditional scientific ideal, but not practicable in international relations research outside the laboratory). When different data sources or methods converge on a single answer, one can have increased confidence in the result. When they do not converge, one can interpret and take into account the known biases in each research approach. A continuing critical dialogue among analysts using different perspectives, methods, and data could lead to an understanding that better approximates international relations than the results coming from any single study, method, or data source.

AT Prior Questions Generic

No prior questions- scholarly orientations cause gridlock
Owen 2

(David, Southampton political theory reader, "Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning", Millennium 31.3, SAGE)

Commenting on the 'philosophical turn' in IR, Wæver remarks that '[a] frenzy for words like "epistemology" and "ontology" often signals this philosophical turn', although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, 'theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program' in that it 'dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory'.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since 'whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry'.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) 'the Highlander view'—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which

gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

Prior questions will never be fully settled---must take action even under conditions of uncertainty
Cochran '99

(Molly, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, "Normative Theory in International Relations", 1999, pg. 272)

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

AT Discourse First

Discourse fails
Schwartz, 9

(Joseph, Poli Sci Prof @ Temple, "The Future of Democratic Equality," Routledge, pg 64-5)

'Discursive' performance is not the sole manner by which individuals deal with (and express) the material and cultural structural realities that both empower and constrain individuals. For example. **individuals cannot readily "discursively perform" themselves out of their socio-economic or class position.** There is a certain materiality to poverty or to being "bossed" that can't simply be "ironically" and "performatively" transformed. Class relations are structural, as well as discursive. The greater difficulty in forming unions in the United States- as compared to other advanced industrial democracies- has much to do with American legal, ideological, and political constraints and not simply with the rel- ative inefficacy of the "performative," "counter-hegemonic" behavior of (frag- mented) individuals. Even the "parodic" possibilities of "gender" reversal are constrained by the communities in which one resides. **Is the "reversal" of "drag" a viable public possibility in a violently homophobic community?** Were not the "performative" options of a Matthew Sheperd (extremely) more limited than those of a gay or lesbian student at a "progressive" residential liberal arts college (and unsafe-and even degrading and violent-social spaces confront gay and lesbian people and women and students of color in the most allegedly "cosmopolitan" of social spaces). Simply put, **distinct "social spaces" set differ- ential constraints on "performative" choices.** Of course, how individuals express class, race, gender, and sexuality does, in part, involve how we "perform" (or "racist") cultural and discursive "norms." Hence, the inevitable controversies over "authenticity" within racial, sexual, and ethnic communities, as well as criticism of people taking on the mores of a class different from those who share their "place" in the labor process, neighborhood, or income strata. But there are material constraints to **performative "choice": one can't "perform" one's way out of an under-funded inner city school** or out of being a **laid-off auto worker with dim prospects of finding a new job with comparable wages and benefits.** Traditional sociological theories of **"structuration"** provide **greater insight into how these individuals would deal with these social dilemmas** than do **micro-level theories of the discursive construction of subjectivity.** To her credit, Wendy Brown is more concerned with issues of class and political economy than are many post-structuralist political theorists. She expressly claims to bring class back into her political analysis and condemns identity poli- tics as a "phantasmagorical reflection of the 'middle-class' American dream." But there is little attention in her work to developing a political strategy that could promise a structural and material redistribution of power, rather than an alter- ation of how we think of epistemology, discourse, and politics." While ideology and culture play a relatively autonomous role in constituting subjectivity, both have a material structure that must be altered if society is to be democratized. Brown implies that radical social change does not as much involve democratiz- ing social structural relations as it does popularizing a radical epistemological approach to discourse. Brown argues that if we will ourselves to "surrender epis- temological foundations" and give up "specifically moral claims" we will all be able to engage in "the sheerly political: 'wars of position' and amoral contests about the just and good in which truth is always grasped as coterminous with power, as always already power, as the voice of power."""' Even if one resists asking whether democracy can rest on "amoral" principles, one can still ask whether Brown's Foucauldian assertation that power and truth are co-terminous can distinguish between more or less democratic forms of power? The post-structuralist hyper- emphasis on "discourse" and the agonal construction of the self also **overly devalues the state as an arena for political reform.** Brown's work makes a positive political contribution by warning social movements about fetishizing the struggle for group rights within the law as potential minefields of "reversed" power/knowledge formations. State regulation and technocratic control which claim to defend the interests of newly, legally- recognized identities may yield the perverse consequence of "domesticating" the identity of the insurgent social group (e.g. state micro-management of the work place in "comparable worth legislation," or enforcement of patriarchal values in regard to punitive workfare or "child support" regulation)?" Sometimes, as Brown contends, new-found rights may enhance separation and alienation between and within individuals and groups, as well as constitute new forms of state regulation in the name of the impersonal subject. But Brown rejects the possibility (and historical reality) that new "rights" can, in other contexts, con- tribute to human emancipation by enhancing individual choice and freedom. To deny this is to ignore the elective affinity between the struggle for "rights" and struggles to achieve political equality for formerly subordinate peoples. Not all new-found rights are "co-optative" and a "reinscribing of domination.""7 Nor will the conflict within the American polity over how we should interpret and defend "rights" ever cease. One only has to witness contemporary political con- conflict over "abortion rights," "voting rights," "gun rights," etc. Rights are both politically contested and protective of certain forms of human choice and agency. **Rights do not "fix" identities** as intransigently as Brown and other post-structuralists claim. Do rights only serve, as Brown contends, to

promote "the discursive denial of historically layered and institutionally secured bounds, by denying with words the effects of relatively wordless, politically invisible, yet material constraints"?"" Patri- cia Williams and other critical race theorists have argued that being included under the state's equal protection law helped limit violence against people of color." Despite legitimate fears about excessive state regulation of sexuality, would Brown reject the use of state force to limit domestic violence? How does her philosophical fear of the bureaucratic-regulatory powers of the state speak to the experience of hundreds of thousands of women who have been spared the "privatization" of domestic violence by the extension of the rights of state author- ity (e.g. the police) to act against violence within the household? Are such prac- tices solely evidence of the "reconstruction of domination by the regulation of the technocratic-bureaucratic state"? Of course, state regulation of domestic violence may, in Brown's language, produce a female subject "dependent upon the pater- nal state" for protection. But is this not preferable to the prior form of paternal state that let a man be the violent definer of "rights" in his home?

AT Individual Ethics First

Individual ethical orientations aren't effective – it's more productive to rearticulate systems from the inside
Pugh 10

(Jonathan, Newcastle Postcolonial Geographer, "The Stakes of Radical Politics have Changed: Post-crisis, Relevance and the State", Globalizations, March-June, ebsco)

In this polemical piece I have just been talking about how, following an ethos of radicalism as withdrawal from the state, some from the radical Left were incapable of being able to respond to the new stakes of radical politics. In particular, they were not found at the state, where the passive public turned to resolve the crisis. I will now go on to examine how in recent years significant parts of the radical Left have also tended to prioritise raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities, over capturing state power. I am going to say that it is important to create this awareness. However, in an effort to draw attention to the stakes of politics as we find them now, post-2008, I will also point out that we should not place too much faith in this approach alone. Against the backdrop of what I have just been saying, it is important to remember that while much attention is focused upon President Obama, in many other parts of the world the Right and fundamentalism are gaining strength through capturing state power. The perception that the USA has changed is accompanied by a sense of relief among many radicals. However, the European Elections of 2009, the largest trans-national vote in history, heralded a continent-wide shift to the Right (and far Right) in many places—in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portgual, Slovenia, Spain, Romania, as just some examples (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Despite Obama's election and a near depression, neo-liberalism continues to be implemented through a world spanning apparatus of governmental and intergovernmental organisations, think tanks and trans-national corporations (Massey, 2009; Castree, 2009). The power of the Right in countries like Iran, while checked, remains unchallenged by the Left. Albertazzi et al. (2009) draw attention to how a disconnected Left is leaving power in the hands of the Right in many other countries nationally, like Italy for example. Reflecting upon contemporary radical politics, the British Labour politician Clare Short (2009, p. 67) concludes: In the fog of the future, I see a rise of fascistic movements . . . I am afraid it will all get nastier before we see a rise in generous, radical politics, but I suspect that history is about to speed up in front of our eyes and all who oppose the radicalisation of fear, ethnic hatred, racialism and division have to be ready to create a new movement that contains the solutions to the monumental historical problems we currently face. So, the stakes of politics are clear. The Right is on the rise. Neo-liberal ideology is still dominant. How is the Left responding to these stakes? I have already discussed how some from the radical Left are placing too much faith in civil society organisations that seek to withdraw from the state. I will now turn to how others have too much faith in the power of raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities. Post-crisis, the increasing popularity of David Chandler's (2004, 2007, 2009a, 2009b) work reflects the sense that radicals too often celebrate the ethical individual as a radical force, at the expense of wider representational programmes for change His central argument is that this leaves radicals impotent. Chandler (2009a, p. 78–79) says that many radicals argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones— there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society. In one way, Chandler's reflective insight here is not particularly unique. Many others also seem to think that radicals today are too isolated and disengaged (Martin, 2009).5 Neither is it particularly original to say that there is too much emphasis upon creativity and spontaneity (what Richard Sennett, 2004, calls 'social jazz'), and not enough upon representational politics. Indeed, go to many radical blogs and you find radicals themselves constantly complaining about how it has become too easy to sign up to ethical web petitions, email complaints, join a variety of ethical causes, without actually developing the political programmes themselves that matter. So it is not Chandler's point about radicals being disengaged from instrumental politics that concerns me here. It is his related point—that there has been a flight into ethics, away from political accountability and responsibility that I find intriguing. Personal statements of ethical awareness have become particularly important within radical politics today. It is therefore interesting to note, as I will now discuss, that we have been here before. In his earlier writings Karl Marx (1982) criticised the German Idealists for retreating into ethics, instead of seizing the institutions of power that mattered for themselves. Unwilling to express their self-interests politically through capturing power, the Idealists would rather make statements about their ethical awareness. Such idealism, along with an unwillingness to be held accountable for political power, often goes hand in hand. For Marx, it is necessary to feel the weight, but also the responsibility of power. Chandler argues that, just as when the early Marx critiqued German Idealism, we should now be drawing attention to the pitfalls of the flights to ethics today. He says: In the case of the German bourgeoisie, Marx concludes that it is their weakness and fragmentation, squeezed between the remnants of the ancien re´gime and the developing industrial proletariat, which explains their ideological flight into values. Rather than take on political responsibility for overthrowing the old order, the German bourgeoisie denied their specific interests and idealised progress in the otherworldly terms of abstract philosophy, recoiling from the consequences of their liberal aspirations in practice. (Chandler, 2007, p. 717) Today we are witnessing a renewed interest in ethics (Lai¨di, 1998; Badiou, 2002). Fragmented, many radicals retreat into abstract ethical slogans like 'another world is possible', 'global human rights', or 'making poverty history'. As discussed above, we are also of course seeing the return of Kant's cosmopolitanism. While I think we should not attack the ethical turn for its values, as many of these around environmental issues and human rights are admirable, it is equally important to say that the turn to ethics seems to reflect a certain lack of willingness to seize power and be held accountable to it. For the flight to ethics, as it often plays out in radical politics today, seems to be accompanied by scepticism toward representational politics. Continuing with this theme for a moment, Slavoj Zizek (2008) also sheds some more light upon why ethics (when compared to representational politics) has become so important to the Left in recent years. He says that many of us (he is of course writing for the Left) feel that we are

<u>unable to make a real difference</u> through representational politics on a larger scale, when it comes to the big political problems of life. Zizek (2008, p. 453) talks of this feeling that 'we cannot ever predict the consequences of our acts'; that nothing we do will 'guarantee that the overall outcome of our interactions will be satisfactory'. And he is right to make this point. Today, our geographical imaginations are dominated by a broader sense of chaos and Global Complexity (Urry, 2003; Stengers, 2005). These ways of thinking, deep in the psyche of many radicals on the Left may be one other reason why so many have retreated into ethics. When we do not really believe that we can change the world through developing fine detailed instruments, capturing the state, or predictive models, we are naturally more hesitant. It is better to try and raise ethical awareness instead. Whereas in the past power was something to be won and treasured, something radicals could use to implement a collective ideology, today, with the risk posed by representation in fragmented societies, top-down power

often becomes a hazard, even an embarrassment, for many on the Left (Laïdi, 1998). This is, as I have already discussed, where the Right and neo-liberal ideologues are seizing the opportunity of the moment. <u>Putting what I have just said another way, there is a need to be clear, perhaps more so in these interdisciplinary times—ethics and politics (particularly representational politics) are different</u>. Of course they are related. You cannot do politics without an ethical perspective. **But my point here is that ==the Right== and neo-liberal ideologues ==will not== simply ==go away if the Left adopt== or raise ==awareness of alternative ethical== lifestyles**. <u>The Right are willing to capture state power, particularly at this time when the state is increasingl</u>y powerful. When we compare the concerted political programme of neo-liberalism, first developed by Reagan, Thatcher, the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, multi-national banks, and the G20, as just some of many examples, ethical individuals across the world offer some counter-resistance. <u>But the 2008 crisis, and the response of protests like the Alternative G20, demonstrated how weak ethical resistance is in the face of the institutions of the neo-liberal economy. Another reason for this is because the ethical individual contributes so much to neo-liberal societies themselves.</u> To explain how, we must briefly step back. The new social movements of previous decades have, in general, been effectively recuperated by the existing system of capital, by satisfying them in a way that neutralised their subversive potential. This is how capital has maintained its hegemonic position in post-Fordist societies. Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) explain how capitalists have worked with, rather than against, the characteristics of new social movements. <u>They say the new social movements desire for autonomy, the ideal of self-management, the anti-hierarchical exigency, and the search for authenticity, were important in developing post-Fordism</u>. These replaced the hierarchical framework of the Fordist period with new forms of networked control. And so, in this way, we see that the relationship between new social movements and capital has been productive. In turn, and this is the important point I want to make about the present moment, clearly the stakes of radical politics have now changed once more. As discussed earlier, it would now seem that post-Fordist society is actually more hierarchical and controllable than many previously thought. <u>Without the neoliberal state, and the public's subordination to its actions, it would not now exist in anything like its present form. ==Our subordination to the state has stopped a post-crisis implosion of neo-liberalism. And this is of course where one of the central characteristics of the ethical individual has== been so productive. Endemic individualism, so dominant in liberal societies, has been recuperated by the ethical individual who is unwilling to seize the state.</u> **So ==the salient point here is== that the ==ethical individual is reflective of the conservative forces in society today.==**

AT Epist First

Causes endless paradigm wars

<u>Wendt</u>, professor of international security – Ohio State University, **'98**

(Alexander, "On Constitution and Causation in International Relations," British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. <u>The **central point** of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how</u> (or whether) <u>we can know how the world works</u>. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn't mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. <u>Let's face it: most IR scholars</u>, including this one, <u>have little or no proper training in epistemology,</u> <u>and</u> as such ==the attempt to solve epistemological problems== anyway ==will **inevitably lead to confusion**== (after all, **after 2000 years, even** the **specialists are still having a hard time**). Moreover, <u>as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions</u> either. <u>It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions.</u> ==In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn't much matter how we came to that knowledge==. In that light, <u>going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics.</u> **Our great ==debates should be about== first-order issues of ==substance==**, like the 'first debate' between Realists and Idealists, **==not== second-order issues of ==method==.**

Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to 'just say no' to ==epistemological discourse==. The problem is that this discourse ==has== already ==contaminated our thinking== about international politics, ==helping to polarize the discipline into '**paradigm wars**'==. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And ==do post-positivists== <u>really</u> mean to ==suggest that students== of social life ==should not ask causal questions or== attempt to ==test==

<u>their claims</u> against empirical evidence? <mark>If so, then it is **not clear by what criteria their work should be judged, or how it differs from art or revelation**</mark>. On both sides, in other words, the result of <u>the</u> Third Debate's **sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures** of science.

AT Ontology First

Questions of ontology shut down pragmatic political action – we never move past ontological "priming" to practiced material struggle
Barnett, Geography Prof at Open, 8

(Political affects in public space: normative blind-spots in non-representational ontologies, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Volume 33, Issue 2)

Thrift's spatial politics of affect and Connolly's neuropolitics of media affects sits, therefore, in a much broader range of work that is concerned with affective aspects of political life. But the examples noted above all focus on the affective aspects of life without adopting a vocabulary of ontological layers, levels and priority. This is in contrast to the characteristic ontologisation of affect in human geography. The ==ontologisation== of affect ==as a layer of preconscious 'priming to act'== ==reduces embodied action== simply ==to the dimension of being attuned to== and coping with ==the world.== **This elides the aspect of embodied knowing that involves** the ==capacity to take part== in 'games of giving and asking for reasons'. While the ==ontologisation== of theory in human geography ==has been accompanied by claims to transform== and reconfigure understandings of what counts as '==the political', this== project ==has been articulated in a register which== ==eschews the conventions of justification==, that is, the giving and asking for reasons. This is particularly evident when it comes to accounting for why the contemporary deployment of affective energy in the public realm is bad for democracy. The contemporary deployment of anxious, obsessive and compulsive affect in the political realm is presented as having 'deleterious consequences' on the grounds that it ==works against democratic expression== (Thrift 2007, 253); ==contributes to== a style of ==democracy that is **consumed but not practised**== (2007, 248); ==promotes== forms of ==sporadic engagement that can be switched on and off== (2007, 240); ==and generally leads to certain dispositions being placed beyond question==. There is certainly a vision of democracy as a particular type of engaged ethical practice at work in these occasional judgements (2007, 14), but the precise normative force of this view is not justified in any detail. The ==eschewing of justification arises== in part ==because the content of these ontologies, which emphasise various layers of knowing== that kick-in prior to representation, ==is projected directly onto the form of exposition.== **There is a particular type of authority put into play** in this move. ==The== avowedly ==antiintentionalist materialism== associated with contemporary cultural-theoretic ontologies of affect **==closes down the conceptual space in which argument and disagreement can even get off the ground==** (see Leys 2007). In contrast, and as outlined above, the argument pursued here follows an avowedly 'nonrepresentationalist' perspective according to which assertions of knowledge, including the types of knowledge asserted by ontologies of affect, always stand in need of reasons, precisely because they emerge as reasons for certain sorts of commitments and entitlements (Brandom 1996, 167). On this understanding ontological assertions act as justifications, and are subject to the demand for justification. If 'placing things in the space of reasons' (McDowell 1994, 5) in this sense is not acknowledged as one aspect of practice, then **==recourse to the ontological register closes down the inconclusive conversations upon which democratic== cultural ==politics depends==** (Rorty 2006).

Ontology doesn't come first: ontological unity is a mirage and judging the impacts of our actions is key to environmental ethics, and human survival
Norton 96

(Professor of Philosophy at the Georgia Institute of Technology

Bryan, "Environmental Pragmatism," Edited by Light and Katz, pg. 106)

Thus ends my explanation of, and please for, a practical environmental ethic that seeks to integrate pluralistic principles across multiple levels/dynamics. **==Rather than reducing==** pluralistic **==principles by relating them to== an underlying ==value==** theory **==that recognizes only==** economic preferences or "inherent" value as the ==**ontological**== stuff that unifies all moral **==judgments. I have sought integration of multiple values== on** three irreducible scales of **human concern** and valuation, choosing **pluralism**

over monism, **and attempting to integrate values within an ecologically informed, multi-scalar model of the human habitat**. I believe that **the non-ontological**, pluralistic **approach** to values **can better express** the inductively based **values and management** approach of Leopold's land ethic, which can be seen as a precursor to the tradition of adaptive management. And, if the problem of environmentalism is the need to support rationally the goals of environmental protection – the problem Callicott misconceived as the need for a realist moral ontology to establish the "objectivity" of environmental goals – then I endorse the broadly Darwinian approach to both epistemology and morals proposed by the American pragmatists. **The environmental community is the community of inquirers**; it is the community of inquirers that, for better or worse, must struggle, immediately as individuals and indefinitely as a community, both to survive and to know. In this struggle useful knowledge will be information about how to survive in a rapidly evolving culture and habitat. It is in this sense that human actors are a part of multi-layered nature; our actions have impacts on multiple dynamics and multiple scales. **We humans will understand our moral responsibilities only if we understand** the **consequences of our action** as they unfold on multiple scales; **and the human community will only survive** to further evolve and adapt **if we learn to achieve individual welfare** and justice in the present in ways **that are less disruptive of the processes**, evolving on larger spatio-temporal scales, **essential to human and ecological communities**.

AT Predictions Bad

The aff's investigation of scenerios is good - even if its low probability it sharpens political science analysis and allows us to test theories

Mahnken and Junio 13

(2013, Thomas, PhD, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and Timothy, Predoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, PhD in Political Science expected 2013, "Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations," International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 374–395, September 2013)

This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating "world views," setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios. In his classic work on scenario analysis, The Art of the Long View, Peter Schwartz commented that "social scientists often have a hard time [building scenarios]; they have been trained to stay away from 'what if?' questions and concentrate on 'what was?'" (Schwartz 1996:31). While Schwartz's comments were impressionistic based on his years of conducting and teaching scenario analysis, his claim withstands empirical scrutiny. Scenarios—counterfactual narratives about the future—are woefully underutilized among political scientists. The method is almost never taught on graduate student syllabi, and a survey of leading international relations (IR) journals indicates that scenarios were used in only 302 of 18,764 sampled articles. The low rate at which political scientists use scenarios—less than 2% of the time—is surprising; the method is popular in fields as disparate as business, demographics, ecology, pharmacology, public health, economics, and epidemiology (Venable, Li, Ginter, and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a **common tool employed by the policymakers** whom political scientists study. This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for **theory building and pedagogy**. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future, **as critics might suggest**, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, **scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy**. In the pages below, a "best practices" guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs. Scenarios in the Discipline What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which **high-consequence, low-probability** events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is **nuclear warfare**, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur: During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US

military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but "dumber," weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region. This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many dimensions of political science theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as "limited," "proportional," or "escalatory" uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how **such stories**, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may **improve the study of IR**. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.

Epistemic uncertainty isn't a <u>voting issue</u>: imaging scenarios, even if unlikely or flawed is a pre requisite to good analysis – the aff isn't a research paper, just dismiss poorly constructed impacts

Wimbush, 08 – director of the Center for Future Security Strategies

(S. Enders, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and the author of several books and policy articles, "A Parable: The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship Breaks Down", Asia Policy, Number 5 (January 2008), 7-24)

What if the U.S.-ROK security relationship were to break down? This essay explores the alternative futures of such a scenario. Analyzing scenarios is one technique for **trying to understand the increasing complexity** of strategic environments. A scenario is an account of an imagined sequence of events. The intent of a scenario is to suggest how alternative futures might arise and where they might lead, where conflicts might occur, how the interests of different actors **might be challenged**, and the kinds of strategies actors might pursue to achieve their objectives. Important to keep in mind is that scenarios are nothing more than **invented, in-depth stories**—stories about what different futures could look like and what might happen along plausible pathways to those futures. The trends and forces that go into building a scenario may be carefully researched, **yet a scenario is not a research paper**. Rather, it is a work of the imagination. As such, scenarios are, first, tools that can help bring order to the way analysts think about what might happen in future security environments; second, scenarios are a provocative way of revealing possible dynamics of future security environments that might not be apparent simply by projecting known trends into the future. Scenarios are particularly useful in suggesting where the interests and actions of different actors might converge or collide with other forces, trends, attitudes, and influences. By using scenarios, to explore the question "what if this or that happened?" in a variety of different ways, with the objective of uncovering as many potential answers as possible, analysts can build hedging strategies for dealing with many different kinds of potential problems. Though they may choose to discount some of these futures and related scenarios, analysts will not be ignorant of the possibilities, with luck avoiding having to say: "I never thought about that."

AT Affirmation of Self

Their deployment of identity/social location/privilege arguments shuts down effective collective action – this reifies racism and leads to endless squabbling about authenticity
Rob 13

(the Idealist, Carleton College, JD candidate, 10/1, Tim Wise & The Failure of Privilege Discourse, www.orchestratedpulse.com/2013/10/tim-wise-failure-privilege-discourse/)

I don't find it meaningful to criticize Tim Wise the person and judge whether he's living up to some anti-racist bona fides. Instead, I choose to focus on the paradigm of "White privilege" upon which his work is based, and its conceptual and practical limitations. Although the personal is political, not all politics is personal; we have to attack **systems**. To paraphrase the urban poet and philosopher Meek Mill: there are levels to this shit. How I Define Privilege There are power structures that shape individuals' lived experiences. Those structures provide and withhold resources to people based on factors like class, disability status, gender, and race. It's not a "benefit" to receive resources from an unjust order because ultimately, injustice is cannibalistic. Slavery binds the slave, but destroys the master. So, the point then becomes not to assimilate the "underprivileged", but to instead eradicate the power structures that create the privileges in the first place. The conventional wisdom on privilege often says that it's "benefits" are "unearned". However, this belief ignores the reality and history that privilege is earned and maintained through violence. Systemic advantages are allocated and secured as a class, and simply because an individual hasn't personally committed the acts, it does not render their class dominance unearned. The history and modern reality of violence is why Tim Wise' comparison between whiteness and tallness fails. White supremacy is not some natural evolution, nor did it occur by happenstance. White folks *murdered* people for this thing that we often call "White privilege"; it was bought and paid for by blood and terror. White supremacy is not some benign invisible knapsack. The same interplay between violence and advantage is true of any systemic hierarchy (class, gender, disability, etc). Being tall, irrespective of its advantages, does not follow that pattern of violence. Privilege is Failing Us Unfortunately, I think our use of the term "privilege" is no longer a productive way for us to gain a thorough understanding of systemic injustice, nor is it helping us to develop collective strategies to dismantle those systems. Basically, **I never want to hear the word "privilege" again** because **the term is so thoroughly misused at this point that it does more harm than good.** Andrea Smith, in the essay "The Problem with Privilege", outlines the pitfalls of misapplied privilege theory. Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered… Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Dr. Tommy Curry says it more bluntly, "It's not genius to say that in an oppressive society there are benefits to being in the superior class instead of the inferior one. That's true in any hierarchy, that's not an 'aha' moment." Conceptually, privilege is best used when narrowly focused on explaining how structures generally shape experiences. However, when we overly personalize the problem, then privilege becomes a tit-for-tat exercise in blame, shame, and guilt. In its worst manifestations, this dynamic becomes "oppression Olympics" and people tally perceived life advantages and identities in order to invalidate one another. At best, we treat structural injustice as a personal problem, and moralizing exercises like "privilege confessions" inadequately address the nexus between systemic power and individual behavior. The undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural forms of oppression. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Bigger than Tim Wise However, the problem with White privilege isn't simply that Tim Wise, a white man, can build a career off of Black struggles. As I've already said, White people need to talk to White people about the historical and social construction of their racial identities and power, and the foundation for that conversation often comes from past Black theory and political projects. The problem for me is that privilege work has become a cottage industry of self-help moralizing that **in no way attacks** the systemic ills that create the personal injustices in the first place. A **substantive critique of privilege requires us to get beyond identity politics**. It's not about good people and bad people; it's a bad system. It's not just White people that participate in the White privilege industry, although not everyone equally benefits/profits (see:

Tim Wise). Dr. Tommy Curry takes elite Black academics to task for their role in profiting from the White privilege industry while offering no challenge to White supremacy. These conversations about White privilege are not conversations about race, and certainly not about racism; it's a business where Blacks market themselves as racial therapists for White people… The White privilege discourse became a bourgeois distraction. It's a tool that we use to morally condemn whites for not supporting the political goals of elite black academics that take the vantages of white notions of virtue and reformism and persuade departments, journals, and presses into making concessions for the benefit of a select species of Black intellectuals in the Ivory Tower, without seeing that the white racial vantages that these Black intellectuals claim they're really interested in need to be dissolved, need to be attacked all the way to the very bottom of American society. Dr. Tommy Curry, Radio Interview The truth is that a lot of people, marginalized groups included, simply want more access to existing systems of power. They don't want to challenge and push beyond these systems; they just want to participate. So if we continue to play identity politics and persist with a personal privilege view of power, then we will lose the struggle. Barack Obama is president, yet White supremacy marches on, and often with his help (record deportations, expanded a drone war based on profiling, fought on behalf of US corporations to repeal a Haitian law that raised the minimum wage). Adolph Reed, writing in 1996, predicted the quagmire of identity politics in the Age of Obama. In Chicago, for instance, we've gotten a foretaste of the new breed of foundation-hatched black communitarian voices; one of them, a smooth Harvard lawyer with impeccable do-good credentials and vacuous-to-repressive neoliberal politics, has won a state senate seat on a base mainly in the liberal foundation and development worlds. His fundamentally bootstrap line was softened by a patina of the rhetoric of authentic community, talk about meeting in kitchens, small-scale solutions to social problems, and the predictable elevation of process over program — the point where identity politics converges with old-fashioned middle-class reform in favoring form over substance. I suspect that his ilk is the wave of the future in U.S. black politics. Adolph Reed Jr., Class Notes: Posing As Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene Although it has always been the case, Obama's election and subsequent presidency has made it starkly clear that it's not just White people that can perpetuate White supremacy. Systems of oppression condition all members of society to accept systemic injustice, and there are (unequal) incentives for both marginalized and dominant groups to perpetuate these structures. Our approaches to injustice must reflect this reality. This isn't a naïve plea for "unity", nor am I saying that talking about identities/experiences is inherently "divisive". Many of these privilege discussions use empathy to build personal and collective character, and there certainly should be space for us to work together to improve/heal ourselves and one another. People will always make mistakes and our spaces have to be flexible enough to allow for reconciliation. Though we don't have to work with persistently abusive people who refuse to redirect their behavior, there's a difference between establishing boundaries and puritanism. Fighting systemic marginalization and exploitation requires more than good character, and we cannot fetishize personal morals over collective action.

AT Reps

China Threat

Rigid rejection of "China threat" gets <u>warped</u> into a new orthodoxy and fuels extremism. Recognizing plural interpretations and linkages is more productive.

Callahan 2k5

(William A., Professor of Politics – University of Manchester, "How to Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power", Review of International Studies, 31)

Although 'China threat theory' is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the key threat to the PRC after 1960. **Refutations of 'China threat theory'** do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of 'threat' as part of critical security studies. Rather they **are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics because they refute 'Chinese' threats as a way of facilitating the production of an America threat**, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms China's national identity. Unfortunately, **by refuting China threat in this bellicose way** – that is by generating a new series of threats – the **China threat theory texts end up confirming the threat** that **they seek to deny**: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are increasingly threatened by China's protests of peace.43 Moreover, the estrangement produced and circulated in China threat theory is not just among nation-states. The recent shift in the focus of the discourse from security issues to more economic and cultural issues suggests that China is estranged from the 'international standards' of the 'international community'. After a long process of difficult negotiations, China entered the WTO in December 2001. Joining the WTO was not just an economic or a political event; it was an issue of Chinese identity.44 As Breslin, Shih and Zha describe in their articles in this Forum, this process was painful for China as WTO membership subjects the PRC to binding rules that are not the product of Chinese diplomacy or culture. Thus although China enters international organisations like the WTO based on shared values and rules, China also needs to distinguish itself from the undifferentiated mass of the globalised world. Since 2002, a large proportion of the China threat theory articles have been published in economics, trade, investment, and general business journals – rather than in international politics, area studies and ideological journals as in the 1990s. Hence China threat theory is one way to differentiate China from these international standards, which critics see as neo-colonial.45 Another way is for China to assert ownership over international standards to affirm its national identity through participation in globalisation.46 Lastly, some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad intentions of the offending texts to conclude that those who promote China threat must be crazy: 'There is a consensus within mainland academic circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the views and practices of the United States toward China in the past few years. It can only be summed up in a word: ''Madness'' '.47 Indians likewise are said to suffer from a 'China threat theory syndrome'.48 This brings us back to Foucault's logic of 'rationality' being constructed through the exclusion of a range of activities that are labelled as 'madness'. The rationality of the rise of China depends upon distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it. **Like** Joseph **Nye's concern that warnings of a China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce the dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. Rather than adding to the debate, they end up** policing **what** Chinese and **foreigners can rationally say**. Conclusion **The argument** of this essay **is** not **that** China is a threat. Rather, it has examined the **productive linkages** that **knit together the image of China as** a **peacefully rising** power **and the discourse of China as a threat to** the **economic and military stability** of East Asia. **It would be easy to join the chorus of those who denounce 'China threat theory'** as the misguided product of the Blue Team, as do many in China and the West. **But that would be a mistake, because depending on circumstances anything** – from rising powers to civilian aircraft – **can be interpreted as a threat. The purpose is not to argue that interpretations are false in relation to some reality** (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful rather than war-

like), **but that it is necessary to unpack the** political and historical **context of each perception of threat**. Indeed, 'China threat' has never described a unified American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among many in debates among academics, public intellectuals and policymakers. **Rather than** inflate extremist positions (in both the West and China) **into irrefutable truth**, **it is more interesting to examine** the **debates** that produced the threat/opportunity dynamic.

The alt causes CCP lashout and makes war more likely

Friedberg 12

(Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and the author of A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. From 2003 to 2005, he served as a Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs in the Office of the Vice President, "Bucking Beijing", Foreign Affairs, September / October)

The primary objection to recalibrating U.S. policy along the lines suggested here is that it would create a self-fulfilling prophecy, strengthening the hand of Beijing's so-called hard-liners while undercutting its reform-minded liberals. The notion that there are good guys among those contending for power in China and that a nonconfrontational approach would favor them has intuitive appeal. At this point, however, the opposite is at least equally plausible. If Washington reverts to a softer stance, Beijing's hard-liners could try to take the credit. They might argue that the change was a direct result of their tough policies, including the sustained military buildup they have long championed. It would be dangerous for American policymakers to try to shape an intraparty competition that they do not fully understand. This does not mean that China's political evolution is a matter of indifference; far from it. But any outside power's influence over the outcome will be indirect and long term. Democratic countries should continue to support the growth of civil society in China, promote the freest possible flow of ideas into and inside China, and speak out in defense of those who take risks for real reform. At least for the moment, the trend lines in Asia are moving in unfavorable directions. Four years after the global financial meltdown, the United States is still mired in recession and hobbled by political deadlock. China's economy, too, shows signs of slowing, but the country continues to grow richer and stronger while the CCP remains in power. In the not-too-distant future, however, the situation is likely to reverse. The United States and the other advanced industrial democracies will bounce back from their present difficulties. A CCP-led China might not. China will have to cope with the combined effects of unchecked corruption, a rapidly aging population, and an investment-driven economic model that most experts believe to be unsustainable. China's ability to engage in a strategic rivalry is likely to diminish, even as the ability of the United States and its allies increases. The challenge facing U.S. policymakers is how best to navigate the intervening period of uncertainty and constraint. China's recent behavior may prove helpful in this regard. Beijing's truculence has caused deep anxiety among many of China's neighbors, making them more inclined than ever to work together to balance the Asian giant. For this reason, other governments in the region have generally welcomed the more muscular rhetoric that has been

emanating from Washington in recent months. But they remain uncertain whether the United States will have the resources and the resolve to back up its brave words. Whoever is elected president in November will have to take steps to dispel these doubts. Developing and funding a credible strategy for countering China's buildup and adopting a tougher approach to economic engagement will both be important. So, too, will be continuing to stand firm on issues of principle. As it engages and balances Beijing, the United States must do what it can to encourage what George Kennan might have termed the "gradual mellowing" of Chinese power.

Suffering

Our critique of structural injustice turns vampirism. Contextualizing vulnerability, and the background of injustice balances emphasizing with material suffering and avoiding sentimentality

Michalinos **Zembylas 13**, Education @ Open (Cyprus), "The 'Crisis of Pity" and the Radicalization of Solidarity: Toward Critical Pedagogies of Compassion", *Educational Studies* 49, p. 512-516

First of all, a politics of compassion that takes into consideration the possible dangers of compassion fatigue, desensitization, and self victimization has to begin from acknowledging common human vulnerability and its influence in **inspiring meaningful actions that avoid presumptuous paternalism** (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). The recognition of one's own vulnerability can constitute a powerful point of departure for developing compassion and solidarity with the other's vulnerability (Butler 2004). As Butler asserts: "Each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies. ... We cannot ... will away this vulnerability. We must attend to it" (2004, p. 29). Butler's description of the vulnerable body and self refers to the way we perform and are performed upon, and part of what we fear in the other is a projection of our own selves. Hence, Butler suggests that recognition of our own vulnerability opens up the potential for recognition of all humanity as vulnerable. Vulnerability may therefore, be a more appropriate term than suffering to ground the political applications of compassion, because **the focus is not merely on the alleviation of material suffering and hence a slide from compassion to benevolence and sentimentality** (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). Suggesting this epistemological shift of focus does not imply however, **that a narrative that focuses on the alleviation of material suffering will necessarily result in a slide into sentimentality**. Undoubtedly, the political applications of compassion cannot be completely separated from questions of material suffering Thus, it needs to be acknowledged that although the move away from suffering may be theoretically useful, the shift to a narrative of common human vulnerability is not completely unproblematic. 8 The idea of common vulnerability enables us—teachers and **students** in the classroom, for instance—to explore how we might move beyond dichotomies that single out the self or the other as victims, and therefore as deserving someone else's pity. That is, the idea of common vulnerability puts in perspective the notion of all of us as vulnerable, rather than the individual-other who needs our compassion. This notion addresses the concerns of **students** for example, who **seem to be stuck in self-victimization claims and refuse to acknowledge that others also suffer**. Although the idea of common vulnerability does not guarantee any departure from such claims, it opens some space to problematize moralistic positioning. In addition, the notion of common vulnerability attacks a major emotional ideology grounded in the view that it is natural or normal to be fearful of the other, especially if it involves racial differences. This is one of the most common and pernicious emotional ideologies underlying resistance (especially among White, middle-class students) to identifying with the other. However, if vulnerability concerns everyone and yet compassion is assigned differently (i.e., students think that some deserve compassion but others do not), then it is important to explore what it would take for students to begin imagining themselves as objects of lesser compassion in an unsuspected vulnerable moment. Through addressing this issue in ways that do not reify stereotypes or promote essentialism, it is possible to respond to some of the desensitization concerns outlined earlier, because the dichotomies between we and they will become meaningless and unproductive. Second, **compassion serves to reinforce a strong connection between the personal and the political** and accentuates the interpersonal and the interrelational (Whitebrook 2002). **Empathetic identification with the plight of others**, then, **is not a sentimental recognition of potential sameness**—you are in pain and so am I, so we both suffer the same—**but a realization of our own common humanity, while acknowledging asymmetries of suffering**, inequality, and injustice. A discourse of vulnerability neither eschews questions of material suffering nor obscures issues of inequality and injustice; on the contrary, it highlights both the symmetries and the asymmetries of vulnerability. That is, although the experience of vulnerability may be more or less universal, the discourse of common vulnerability raises important critical questions such as "vulnerable to what? to whom?" to dismiss the possibility of sliding into a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—which is exactly what a politics of compassion ardently seeks to avoid. Without this double realization—that is, we are all vulnerable but not in the same manner—our actions run the danger of being a form of charity and condescension toward those who are systematically and institutionally oppressed (Bunch 2002). If properly recognized in schools, this double realization can potentially address both the concern about the desensitization of students and that of their self-

victimization, because **the distance between spectator and sufferer will not be taken for granted** any more, but rather **its multiple complexities will be acknowledged and interrogated** In a sense then, the kind of compassion that is explored here requires a simultaneous identification and disidentification with the suffering of the other. The simultaneous recognition of symmetry and asymmetry with the other removes the arrogance of claiming that we know and feel their pain and suffering. This emotional ambivalence of simultaneous identification and disidentification is needed to focus attention on the other's suffering, but not becoming too identified with it —a point raised earlier in Nelson's (2004) reading of Arendt's reporting on Eichmann's trial. Students who already endure forms of suffering, of course, do not need a pedagogy to enlighten them how to disidentify with their own suffering. This does not imply, however, that pedagogies that interrogate pity and encourage critical compassion are not for them; on the contrary, the critical awareness that others are vulnerable too, is important in the struggle for **action-oriented solidarity** and the avoidance of egocentricity and cultural **narcissism** Finally, the third element of a politics of compassion is attentiveness to how the ethics of compassion questions injustice and inequality. 9 In particular, an important component of a politics of compassion that is critical and justice-oriented is how it deals with anger at injustice (Hoggett 2006). A politics of compassion does not intentionally seek to cause anger, however, but rather encourages students and teachers to develop a critical analysis of anger, as it is likely that they will experience such feelings, when they begin questioning long-held assumptions and beliefs about other people and social events (Zembylas 2007). Anger may call attention to demands for recognition, but also emphasize inequalities (Holmes 2004) and injustices at the civic level (Silber 2011). Anger at injustice can be a positive and powerful source of personal and political insight in education (Lorde 1984), because it helps to move teachers and students out of a cycle of self-pity, blame, or guilt into a mode of action that somehow responds to injustice. For example, civic anger can be promoted in the classroom as a form of cultivating individual and collective political consciousness and social resistance to injustices in the students' community, although anger is not inevitably emancipatory. However, recognizing the positive power of anger and its link to the struggle against injustice in one's own community is valuable, if teachers want to promote options for action that may change the conditions of others' vulnerability. The pedagogical challenge for critical pedagogues is how to encourage students to become active participants with a nuanced understanding of the emotional complexities involved in histories of injustice and oppression.

Their sentiment K is totally wrong---stories of pain combined with political action avoid vampiristic consumption and motivate effective harm-reduction

Rebecca **Wanzo 9**, Associate Professor, Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program, Washington U in St. Louis. The Suffering Will Not Be Televised, 228-232

Despite my disappointment in these films and frequent annoyance with the narrative trajectory of many of their productions, I admit that I have a bit of a soft spot for the Lifetime network. I, too, used to automatically criticize made-for-television movies "inspired by a true story" about women at risk. I found them exploitative, as any film can be that makes entertainment out of a personal tragedy. Lifetime Television has been called "television for victims," in a criticism of its seemingly endless capacity to show fi lms about the victimization of women.5 One of the questions that this moniker raises is what kind of storylines about people have the most dramatic impact. Popular fi lms with high dramatic impact depict violence, stories of surviv- ing some atypical traumatic event, or struggling with some more powerful person or entity. One aspect of the criticisms of Lifetime is the objection to formulaic melodrama in itself, framed within the gendered derision of women's victimization narratives or, on the other side of the political spectrum, discomfort with such narratives as demeaning, reductive, and trite. The fi lms shown on the network, some produced by Lifetime but most produced elsewhere, vary in quality, but the criticisms of Lifetime raise a question that I have explored throughout this book: What is the best way to represent a story of suffering? ¶ 229¶ Simply crying at a Lifetime film clearly cannot sustain any sub- stantive political work— but what if the crying citizen is directed to, at the very least, awareness, and in the best case scenario, action, after their emotional catharsis? Sorrow produced at the sight of a dead or wounded woman may not accomplish anything **unless the representation is framed in relationship to** some **political action**, but tears in relation to abolition and child abduction did produce action. However, a major ethical problem with using sympathy and compassion as the primary mechanism for political change is that sentimental politics depends on the cultural feelings of those in power, and the disempowered must depend on patronage. Hannah Arendt argues that compassion cannot embrace a larger population, but pity can, and pity is a dangerous affect because it cannot exist without misfortune, thus "it has just as much vested interest in the existence of the unhappy as thirst for power has a vested interest in the existence of the weak . . . by being a virtue of sentiment, pity can be enjoyed for its own sake, and this will almost automatically lead to a glorifi cation of its cause, which is the suffering of others."6 ¶ Following Arendt, the charge against Lifetime could be that it thus encourages sadism because watchers could take pleasure in pity. Or, as literary critic Marianne Noble has suggested in her study of sentimentality, the network might embrace masochism because watchers would identify with the sufferer and might begin to take pleasure in these fantasies of subjection.7 **However, these readings of the pleasures of consuming stories of subjection are too narrow**. In the case of Lifetime, casting these films as only narratives of victimization is too limited a reading. After watching several fi lms, I began to be compelled by stories I had not heard before about women interven- ing when the state fails to protect them. The stories were clearly not only about victimization, but also about survival. The movies negotiate a balance between structural critique and stories of individual heroism, and I am often disappointed, as with the fi lms discussed above, with how much weight is placed on the side of individual transformation. Nonetheless I later began defending the network out of political principle, as part of a broader effort to challenge the ¶ 230¶ facile denunciation of the word "victim." Lifetime's fi lms are often poor in terms of artistic merit, but the network is contributing to a national conversation about what agency can look like. ¶ My argument may seem as if I am looking for politics in all the wrong places, relying on

sentimentality when I should focus on politically rational arguments that eschew the appeals of emotional response. I am not asking for radical progressivism from popular culture. Instead, I am arguing that politics is often accomplished through the popular and conventional work of emotional appeals, as many activists throughout history have demonstrated. The question facing activists for African American women—or, for that matter, advocates for any identity group outside the national imaginary of ideal citizenship—is not only how to expose discrimination, but also how to make use of existing rhetoric so that attacks on their bodies can be read as pressing concerns for all U.S. citizens. Affect and popular culture can be easily criticized as tools of anti-intellectual conservative machines. As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno rightly argue, popular culture focuses on producing narratives of comfort or affects that can ultimately serve the state's purposes.8 Totally escaping the political storytelling of the status quo elicited by mass-produced texts is indeed impossible. However, the impossibility of total escape does not preclude the possibility of making use of tools produced by ideology. Mobilizing affect demands use of proven rhetorical tools, but this use need not forestall a criticism of the need to employ the structures in the first place. Negotiating the relationship between challenging the "master's tools" and making use of them to garner financial support and political power is not an easy project, but it is a necessary one. ¶ The book's title is inspired by this very tension between see- ing popular cultural productions as inevitably politically ineffi cacious and recognizing the possibilities offered by making use of widely circulated genres and media. When Gil Scott-Heron produced his famous choreo-poem, "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised," in 1974, he called attention to the disconnect between radical action and violent struggles taking place in the streets and the pleasures of oblivion offered by scripted television and commercials.9 Television stood in for mass-produced media that would not show what was really occurring in the streets, like "pigs shooting down brothers in instant replay." Scott-Heron pointed to the need for his audience to take to the streets and participate, live, in the revolution. Indeed, a ¶ 231¶ rue revolution requires "live" political action and organizing, and television and many cultural productions neglect a multitude of issues that are politically urgent. However, it is clearly no longer the case that "pigs shooting down brothers in the street is left off of instant replay." Important events are depicted on the news, in scripted tele- vision shows, in genre fi ction, in magazines, in movies, and on the Internet. You can even catch the occasional social message in a television commercial. Rather than reject various media wholesale, we are left with a set of questions about what to do with contemporary media realities. How and why are certain kinds of traditionally neglected issues represented? Once represented, how are they interpreted, and can activists play a role in that interpretation? What do activists do about the complexities lost when they make use of certain kinds of mass-marketed discourses? ¶ Octavia Butler perhaps best articulated this problem in her science-fi ction novel Parable of the Talents. The novel exempli es what Lauren Berlant calls the postsentimental text—one that exhibits longing for the unconfl icted intimacy and political promise senti- mentality offers but is skeptical of the ultimate political effi cacy of making feeling central to political change. Her heroine, Olamina, suffers from "hyperempathy" syndrome, which allows her to feel the emotions of others, but Butler is careful to argue that being able to feel the pain of others is not the means for liberation—it is a "delusional disorder." Thus Olamina focuses on other modes of political change, and struggles to gain followers for her politi- cal and spiritual project for survival, Earthseed, in a United States devastated by environmental destruction and the domination of a repressive fusion of government and a religious right organiza- tion called Christian America. Through Olamina's struggle, Butler addresses the intellectual discomfort with consumption by having a character explicitly argue that only strategic commodifi cation will result in successful dissemination of radical ideas. Olamina struggles with the means by which she can circulate Earthseed, until someone suggests to her that she must use the marketing tools she slightly disparages to compel people to her project. Her companion, Len, argues that Olamina must "focus on what people want and tell them how your system will help them get it." She resists the call to "preach" the way her Christian American enemy Jarret does, rejecting "preaching," "telling folksy stories," emphasizing a profi t motive, and self-consciously using her charismatic persona to sell Earthseed. ¶ 232¶ Len argues that her resistance to using the tools of commodifi cation "leaves the fi eld to people who are demagogues—to the Jarrets of the world."10 Butler ultimately presents the moral that the project of producing populist texts for mass consumption cannot be left to those with unproductive or dangerous dreams, abandoned by a Left that desires not only revolution but also political change resulting in real material gains.¶ Clearly, the productions of mass-culture are not the only way to move people to action, but they are no doubt a tool. The dismissiveness accompanying the label of the sentimental in contemporary culture is because academic critics claim that it does not do anything, it is the antithesis of action. However, this book is about how sentimentality is doing things all the time. For better or worse, it teaches people to identify "proper" objects of sympathy. It teaches people how to relate to each other. It teaches people how to make compelling arguments about their pain. The circulation of sentimental political storytelling often depends on media to which many progressives have a schizophrenic relationship. News media and television are often tools of the state, but citizens depend on the news for the free circulation of information and often look for progressive politics in television shows. Others disavow the "idiot box" altogether and have faith only in alternative news sources. However, the dichotomy between the popular and other spaces in which people tell stories about suffering is a false one. Sentimental political storytelling is omnipresent in U.S. culture. While the discourse has many short-comings, people interested in political change are taking a perilous road if they ignore the possibilities of imperfect stories told about citizens in pain.

Suffering - Blackness

Alt silences black suffering

Rebecca **Wanzo 9**, Associate Professor, Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program, Washington U in St. Louis. The Suffering Will Not Be Televised, 180-3

Recognizing the political valence of pain—of **speaking pain—is essential to black survival.** Given the poorer health status of African Americans in the United States, the fact that pain is often ignored or borne silently before seeking care, and undertreated once care is sought, those who work with African Americans need to emphasize the right to tell stories of pain. Obstacles to black storytelling not only come from white institutional sources, but they also come from self-perceptions that if African Americans can claim nothing else, they can claim strength. The strong-black-woman stereotype, John Henry, the brave and stoic kids integrating the store, and other models of black strength fill the U.S. imaginary. **Reinterpreting the naming and speaking of pain can be an act of power, not an act of powerlessness.** One person who recognized the power in speaking about pain was Audre Lorde. In The Cancer Journals she described how she wanted Anarcha as well as creative nonfiction about my surgery, finding the rare space in the academy that made space for both. Called together in 2007, many of us engaged in scholarship who did not see ourselves as scholars, in creative performance when we did not see ourselves as performers. The group who came together to discuss Anarcha, J. Marion Sims, and the issues the history raised were eclectic: undergraduates taking classes in disability studies, scholars and performers who focused on African American culture, dancers, singers, those who had movement constraints, and those of us who had constraints that were less visible. Over the course of a few days we performed physical and mental exercises, bonding in both small and large groups in order to shape a performance at the end of our time together. We were transformed from spectators into spectacle, but it was a process of constructing a spectacle that was by no means one way—we looked back in history and looked out to those who could engage with us. While minimalist in presentation, it contained the excesses of our emotional response to Anarcha's history and our presents. ¶ If a problem with sentimental political storytelling is the conflation with other kinds of oppressed bodies, the productively messy conflations pushed us to think about a broader nexus of institutional oppression. We were divided into small performance groups, and we ¶ 182¶ struggled to find a collective response that reflected all of our readings of Anarcha's, Lucy's, and Betsey's histories, as well as the histories of other unnamed women. On a stark stage, with our bodies, micro-phones, and lights shaping the space, my group produced a short choreo-piece after two days of work in which the group collectively prompted individual stories with the refrain, "This is Anarcha's story, and . . ." it was the story of all of us. One of us challenged the his-torical record that Anarcha "willingly consented" in Sims's narrative while also addressing the issue of her relatives' lack of consent to medical experimentation during the Nazi Holocaust. Another of us without the use of her legs told the story of being sexually molested by a medical caregiver, describing "histories and futures lost . . . one black, one white, one slave, one not . . . neither touched by request, both silenced by circumstance." In drawing a comparison between the invisible stories—Anarcha's and her own—she explored how the broader issue of nonconsent and voicelessness in medical care can be read across history and identity. One of us discussed the lack of choices and resistance when fighting "medical men"; another discussed fear shaped by history. Drawing on my history, I added to the chorus with a recognition of my difference from Anarcha as well as my sense of connection to her: "I am not Anarcha," but see her story as my story, "not because my issues are hers, but because I need someone to hear her pain . . . and alleviate it." And as we moved in and out of our individual and collective refrains shaped by our specific stories, the chorus built community, acknowledging the differences between our histories and our similar investments at the same time. We learned, as Boal suggests in Theater of the Oppressed, to "practice theater as a language that is living and present, not as a finished product displaying images from the past."75 ¶ I find telling my own story difficult; in some ways, telling the story of pain management after my surgery and telling of the Anarcha Symposium performance are equally difficult. Two spaces of judgment are possible—judgment of my tolerance for pain and judgment of my creative work, both of which are linked to what it means to make myself vulnerable. I was advised to cut my personal story from this chapter because of the danger of exposing myself. But if we take sentimental political storytelling seriously as an opportunity to treat affect and the story of pain as essential to political progress, what example would I set if I remained continually in a space of academic distance when I believe in the political efficacy ¶ 183¶ of the sentimental narrative? As a subject who has been raced and pained in the United States, I must don the mantle of articulating my affective investment in recognizing the relationship between race and pain without shame. ¶ As I say that it is hard to talk about pain—broadly—in the U.S. without talking about race, I recognize that the claim can be read as hyperbolic, and inadequately supported. The charge of hyperbole is often leveled against sentimental rhetoric. But a review of history, rhetoric, and social and medical discourse reveals that these concepts are often linked in the United States. When we recognize that we can be subjects of various discourses about race and pain, and not only subject to a specialized language, such a shift in understand-ing **may empower people**, as health-care advocates encourage, to be agents in their own care. Silence, as Audre Lorde, famously wrote, will not protect you.76 Allowing stories of pain to be silenced, dismissed, or obscured, however, will surely kill you. We must speak pain to power.

Suffering - Perm

That's best --- sentimentality is politically effective when it is recognized as part of a larger project

Rebecca **Wanzo 9**, Associate Professor, Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program, Washington U in St. Louis. The Suffering Will Not Be Televised, p. 9

However, sentimentality cannot easily be understood as progressive or conservative. When theorists criticize producers of sentimentality for conservative politics, they sometimes attack a rhetoric that is reactionary or designed to serve the status quo. At other times, such critics express disappointment at a text's possibly radical revolutionary or otherwise progressive potential having been short-circuited in favor of feel-good closure offered by the sentimental narrative. World Trade Center provoked exactly this response from movie critic David Edelstein, who wanted the fi lm about the event of 9/11 to be "more political," because the "heartwarming conclusion" to the fi lm is "unrepresentative—to the point where it almost seems like a denial of the deeper and more enduring horror."22 Sentimental texts present themselves frequently as progressive about social justice issues while they eventually preserve the status quo. Indeed, that is an overlying tendency of most sentimental texts. However, the binaries of good and bad, Left and Right are insufficient to categorize sentimentality as it does, by its nature, have a progressive political thrust. It addresses the suffering of the politically disadvantaged but utilizes conventional narratives and practices that will not fundamentally disrupt power. Rather than characterizing U.S. sentimentality as "good" or "bad" politics, a more precise characterization—albeit more of a mouthful and less dramatic—is to call it a **politically effective** but insufficient means of political change.

Terror

Terrorism studies are epistemologically valid---our authors are self-reflexive
Boyle 2k8

(**Michael J. Boyle, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, "A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies," Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64)**

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed 'Orthodox Terrorism Studies'. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problem-solving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be 'a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism "knowledge"'. An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological problems. In fact, terrorism scholars are **not only well aware of these problems**, but also have provided their own searching critiques of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, 'Understanding Terrorism'). Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism implied in 'Orthodox Terrorism Studies' have also engaged in **deeply critical examinations** of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by Schmid and Jongman (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they point out that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the failure to address persistent conceptual and data problems has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, Silke's (2004) volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.

A new study incorporating long-term metrics proves counter-terrorism is successful
Price, 12 - major in the U.S. Army and former Assistant Professor of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy

(**Bryan, "Targeting Top Terrorists" International Security, Spring, http://shakes31471.typepad.com/files/how-leadership-decapitation-contributes-to-counterterrorism.pdf)**

I argue that leadership decapitation significantly increases the mortality rate of terrorist groups, even after controlling for other factors. Using an original database—the **largest and most comprehensive of its kind**—I analyzed the effects of leadership decapitation on the mortality rate of 207 terrorist groups from 1970 to 2008. The analysis differs from previous quantitative studies because it evaluates the effects of decapitation on the duration of terrorist groups as opposed to the number, frequency, or

lethality of attacks after a group experiences leadership decapitation.15 In doing so, it challenges the conventional wisdom regarding terrorist group duration and addresses some of the most pressing questions about the effectiveness of decapitation. For example, does it matter whether a terrorist group leader is killed versus captured? Does the size, ideology, or age of the group increase its susceptibility to organizational death? In addition to answering these questions, this study illustrates the importance of evaluating the long-term effects of counterterrorism policies in conjunction with the short-term metrics more commonly used today. The article is structured as follows. First, I survey the literature on leadership decapitation and show why new metrics are needed to accurately evaluate its effectiveness. I then use concepts from leadership studies, organizational ecology, and terrorism to provide a theoretical explanation for why terrorist groups are particularly susceptible to decapitation tactics. I argue that terrorist groups have unique organizational characteristics that amplify the importance of their top leaders and make leadership succession more difficult. After discussing the data limitations inherent in terrorism research, I identify the covariates most likely to influence terrorist group duration and then explain how I estimated them. Following a review of the main findings, I conclude with some thoughts on the possible implications of bin Laden's death for al-Qaida and recommendations for policymakers.

Warming

It's good and solves
Veldman 12

(Robin, Flordida religion PhD student, "Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists", Ethics and the Environment, 17.1, JSTOR)

As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several "interpretive communities," which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled "alarmists," described climate change ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 17(1) 2012 using apocalyptic language, such as "Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation," "Heat waves, it's gonna kill the world," and "Death of the planet" (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists "were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions" (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz's findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled "the Alarmed" (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) "are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response" (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that "[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, **the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet** (31%)" (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.

Impact Framing

AT RC

RC Generic

Root cause logic is poor scholarship

Sharpe 10

(lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, '10

(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233)

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new 'quilting' framework to explain Žižek's theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of 'Theory' in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the 'cultural turn' of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek's paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about 'the political'. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze's and Guattari's) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of **criticism, as a reductive passing over** the **empirical and analytic distinctness of** the **different** object **fields in complex societies.** In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of 'master thinkers' who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the 'master thinker' is also always in danger of passing over the salient differences and features of political life – differences only too evident to people 'on the ground'. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall (or 'politically correct screen') of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato's timeless cave allegory to Žižek's theory of ideology. We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly 'post-metaphysical'. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower ... Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a **multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary** critical **theory** that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single-handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. **It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines**, most of **whom** today **pointedly reject Theory's legitimacy,** neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

RC Patriarchy

Patriarchy's not the root cause

Bell, senior lecturer – Department of Politics and International Studies @ Cambridge University, **'6**

(Duncan, "Beware of false prophets: biology, human nature and the future of International Relations theory," International Affairs 82, 3 p. 493–510)

Writing in *Foreign Aff airs* in 1998, Francis Fukuyama, tireless promulgator of the 'end of history' and now a member of the President's Council on Bioethics, employed EP reasoning to argue for the central role in world politics of 'masculine values', which are 'rooted in biology'. His argument starts with the claim that male and female chimps display asymmetric behaviour, with the males far more prone to violence and domination. 'Female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik.' Moreover, the 'line from chimp to modern man is continuous' and this has signifi cant consequences for international politics.46 He argues that the world can be divided into two spheres, an increasingly peaceful and cooperative 'feminized' zone, centred on the advanced democracies, and the brutal world outside this insulated space, where the stark realities of power politics remain largely masculine. This bifurcation heralds dangers, as 'masculine policies' are essential in dealing with a masculine world: 'In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability.' Fukuyama concludes the essay with the assertion that the form of politics best suited to human nature is—surprise, surprise— free-market capitalist democracy, and that other political forms, especially those promoted by feminists and socialists, do not correspond with our biological inheritance.47 Once again **the authority of science is invoked in order to naturalize a** particular **political objective.** This is a pattern that has been repeated across the history of modern biology and remains potent to this day.48 It is worth noting in brief that Fukuyama's argument is badly flawed even in its own terms. As anthropologist R. Brian Ferguson states, Fukuyama's claims about the animal world display 'a breathtaking leap over a mountain of contrary evidence'.49 Furthermore, Joshua Goldstein concludes in **the most detailed analysis of the data on war and gender** that although biological differences do play a **minor role,** focusing so heavily on them is **profoundly misleading**.50 The simplistic claims, crude stereotyping and casual use of evidence that characterize Fukuyama's essay unfortunately recur throughout the growing literature on the biology of international politics.

Extinction First

Ext O/W

Extinction is unique—if you think there's a one in 75 million chance of our disad you should vote neg

POSNER 2004 (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 249-250)

Even if our insouciant reaction to small probabilities of great losses is accepted as an authentic basis for estimating the value of life in most such situations, the reaction may not generalize to ones in which the loss, should it materialize, would be the near or total extinction of the human race. If the annual probability of an asteroid collision that would kill 6 billion people is only 1 in 75 million, the expected number of deaths worldwide is only 80 per year, which may not seem a large enough number to justify the expense of an effective defense against an asteroid collision. (This of course ignores smaller but still lethal collisions; but read on.) But if there is a minute chance that the entire human race, both current and future, would be wiped out, together with all or most of the world's animal population, we (the ambiguous "we" of policy analysis, but there it may represent dominant public opinion) may think that *something* should be done to eliminate or reduce the risk, slight as it is, beyond what a standard cost-benefit analysis would imply; may be willing, if the risk and the possible responses are explained carefully, to incur some cost in higher taxes or otherwise to reduce the risk.

Uncertainty doesn't matter—any risk of extinction outweighs any other impact

SCHELL 1982 (Jonathan, Fate of the Earth, pp. 93-96)

To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation – just as it would be a misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished. We are left with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass – of "the basic power of the universe" – and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than that of any other risk and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the framework of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a

mathematician's analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now post to the world and to ourselves.

Extinction O/W - Ethics

Extinction impacts must be prioritized-any alternative frame fails in the context of public policy
Isaac 2

(Jeffrey, political science professor Indiana University, "Ends, Means, and Politics, Dissent Magazine, Spring 2002)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. ==To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary== to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond moral- ity. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an ==unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility==. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the ==purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends==. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean con- science of their supporters; (2) ==it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is== not simply a form of powerless- ness; ==it is often a form of complicity in injustice==. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3==) it fails to see that politics== is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it ==is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action==, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. ==Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness==.

Extinction O/W - Nietzsche

Global extinction risks require a revision of the politics of compassion – survival is still paramount. New risks dictate embracing our ethic DEPSITE their impacts

Winchester 94

(James J. Winchester teaches Philosophy at Spelman College

Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn)

As uninformed as it is to assume that there is an easy connec- tion between his thought and National Socialism, it is neither diffi- cult nor misguided to consider his lack of social concern. Nietzsche saw one danger in our century, but failed to see a second. His critique of herd mentality reads like a prophetic warning against the dictatorships that have plagued and continue to haunt the twentieth cen- tury. But the context of our world has changed in ways that Nietzsche never imagined. We now have, as never before, the ability to destroy-the planet. The threat of the destruction of a society is not new. From the beginnings of Western literature in the Iliad and the Odyssey, the Western mind has contemplated the destruction that, for example, warfare has wrought. Although the Trojan war destroyed almost everyone involved, both the victors and the van- quished, it did not destroy the entire world. In the twentieth century, what has changed is the scale of destruction. If a few countries destroy the ozone layer, the whole world perishes, or if two countries fight a nuclear or biological war, the whole planet is threatened. This is something new in the history of the world/ The intercon- nectedness of the entire world has grown dramatically. We live, as never before, in a global community where our actions effect ever- larger numbers of the world's population. The earth's limits have become more apparent. Our survival depends on working together to solve problems like global pollution. **Granted** mass movements have instituted reigns of terror, **but** our survival as a planet is becoming ever-more predicated on community efforts of the sort that Nietzsche's thought seems to denigrate if not preclude. I do not criticize Nietzsche for failing to predict the rise of problems requiring communal efforts such as the disintegration of the ozone layer, acid rain, and the destruction of South American rain forests. Noting his lack of foresight and his occasional extrem- ism, I propose, in a Nietzschean spirit, to reconsider his particular tastes, without abandoning his aesthetic turn. Statements like "com- mon good is a self-contradiction" are extreme, even for Nietzsche. He was not always so radical. Yet there is little room in Nietzsche's egoism for the kind of cooperation and sense of community that is today so important for our survival. I am suggesting that the time for Nietzsche's radical individualism is past. There are compelling prag- matic and aesthetic reasons why we should now be more open to the positive possibilities of living in a community. There is nothing new about society's need to work together. What has changed is the level of interconnectedness that the technological age has pressed upon us.

Life = Prereq

Life is a pre-requisite to death's symbolic value---fearing death doesn't preclude recognizing life's finitude and its inevitability---we can still create provisional value in life---individuals should have the option to live

Kalnow 9

(Cara Kalnow 9 A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil at the University of St. Andrews "WHY DEATH CAN BE BAD AND IMMORTALITY IS WORSE" https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/724/3/Cara%20Kalnow%20MPhil%20thesis.PDF)

(PA) also provided us with good reason to reject the Epicurean claim that the finitude of life cannot be bad for us. With (PA), we saw that our lives could accumulate value through the satisfaction of our desires beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But Chapter Four determined that the finitude of life is a necessary condition for the value of life as such and that many of our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life. I therefore argued that an indefinite life cannot present a desirable alternative to our finite life, because life as such would not be recognized as valuable. In this chapter, I have argued that the finitude of life is instrumentally good as it provides the recognition that life itself is valuable. Although I ultimately agree with the Epicureans that the finitude of life cannot be an evil, this conclusion was not reached from the Epicurean arguments against the badness of death, and I maintain that (HA) and (EA) are insufficient to justify changing our attitudes towards our future deaths and the finitude of life. Nonetheless, the instrumental good of the finitude of life that we arrived at through the consideration of immortality should make us realize that the finitude of life cannot be an evil; it is a necessary condition for the recognition that life as such is valuable. Although my arguments pertaining to the nature of death and its moral implications have yielded several of the Epicurean conclusions, my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams, as (PA) accounts for the intuition that it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided. I have therefore reached three of the Epicurean conclusions pertaining to the moral worth of the nature of death: (1) that the state of being dead is nothing to us, (2) death simpliciter is nothing to us, and (3) the finitude of life is a matter for contentment. But against the Epicureans, I have argued that we can rationally fear our future deaths, as categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect of death is rationally held as an evil to be avoided. Finally, I also claimed against the Epicureans, that the prospect of death can rationally be regarded as morally good for one if one no longer desires to continue living. 5.3 Conclusion I began this thesis with the suggestion that in part, the Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us. I went on to defend the Epicurean position against the objections raised by the deprivation theorists and Williams. I argued that the state of being dead, and death simpliciter, cannot be an evil of deprivation or prevention for the person who dies because (once dead), the person—and the grounds for any misfortune—cease to exist. I accounted for the anti-Epicurean intuition 115 that it is rational to fear death and to regard death as an evil to be avoided, not because death simpliciter is bad, but rather because the prospect of our deaths may be presented to us as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable. In this chapter, I concluded that even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, we can attach two distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect of our own individual deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. How to decide on the balance of those values is a matter for psychological judgment.

Nuclear War Turns

Turns Disability/Ageism

Nuclear war would disproportionately hurt children, the elderly, and disabled people

FME 2006 (For Mother Earth, "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," Last Modified 4-17-06, http://www.motherearth.org/nuke/begin2.php)

From a psychological point of view, limited nuclear war probably is the worst of all worlds.

The imagery of nuclear war, the widespread casualties, and the intense fear of radioactivity would lead to the "nuclear war survivor syndrome". This powerful sense of personal vulnerability, helplessness, guilt, isolation and fear, was seen to varying degrees in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors. The powerful psychological effects of the fear of radioactivity, and the "loss of trust" were described in studies of the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island. The spread of radioactive fallout would create the image of nuclear threat and vulnerability across wide areas.

The very short period required to carry out highly destructive nuclear attacks would intensify the emotional impact, particularly those reactions associated with denial of the true extent of the damage or fostering flight from damaged areas.

Robert J. Lifton, in his study of Hiroshima survivors, described the psychological effect as "a sudden and absolute shift from normal existence to an overwhelming encounter with death." The reaction, as reported by a witness to the disaster, Father Siemes: "Among the passers-by, there are many who are uninjured. In a purposeless, insensate manner, distraught by the magnitude of the disaster, most of them rush by and none conceives the thought of organizing help on his own initiative. They are concerned only with the welfare of their own families." In some cases even families were abandoned. The result of this experience was a deep fear of returning to the cities to rebuild the any form of normal life that may be possible after a nuclear attack.

Families would be broken up by death, severe injury, disease, evacuation, or military and labour conscription. The young, elderly, and handicapped would suffer disproportionately since they depend most on society's material and institutional resources. For example, the young and elderly showed significant increases in accidental death attributed to neglect in Great Britain in World War II. The loss of material and institutional resources in urban-industrial attacks would make survival in the post-attack period difficult for individuals and groups alike, compounding the psychological stresses of the attack itself. Satisfying even the simplest survival requirements (food, shelter, and clothing) would become major tasks.

Turns Racism/Sexism/Etc

Nuclear war would cause authoritarianism, racism, xenophobia, sexism, and religious intolerance

FME 2006 (For Mother Earth, "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," Last Modified 4-17-06, http://www.motherearth.org/nuke/begin2.php)

To understand the effects of a nuclear war it is important to distinguish it from conventional war or a natural disaster. In particular, all the factors that would make it possible to cope with a normal emergency situation would be lacking: limited damage, a relatively small number of casualties, surviving political or social leadership, a desire to perform common emergency work rather than look after ones own family, large reservoirs of external, easily mobilized skilled workers, material resources, and organizational skills.

The massive and simultaneous destruction of economic and human resources would result in an inability to provide immediate and sufficient human and material aid to damaged areas. There will be no time to adapt and to innovate as nations did in World War II. More importantly, the lack of outside aid would create a sense of individual and common isolation. Aid symbolizes a reconnection with a larger, normal world. This connection helps provide the impetus for rebuilding the damaged society, creating a sense of vitality and ability to dispel the continuing perception of isolation. It also has an important function for binding together society, restating a common thread of hope and shared aspirations.

Economic destruction, loss of political leadership (especially at the local level), and the need to mobilize resources for relief and recovery would present extraordinary demands on weakened political institutions. In the interest of implementing survival programs, legal norms and practices would have to be suspended for prolonged periods in many areas. The character of political institutions and authority would almost certainly change, especially if hostilities or the threat of hostilities persisted. Both old and new political structures would be likely to suffer from greatly reduced credibility. Decentralization of political power and more authoritarian methods of political, social, and economic control would be probable responses to post-attack conditions.

However, even before any outbreak of nuclear war, the presence of nuclear weapons has an enormous potential to distort social and economic priorities. Each of the nuclear weapons states has spent billions of dollars on constructing, maintaining and protecting its nuclear weapons. It is not necessary to point out that this money could have been better spent on providing health care, education or other public services.

The development of nuclear weapons also makes it necessary to create an unaccountable "nuclear elite", made up of scientists, military and civil servants, who work largely in secret to control the development, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons. This makes the presence of nuclear weapons incompatible with a democratic society.

It is possible to link an increased importance of the military, and a general increase in militarism, to a growth of xenophobia, racial and religious intolerance, as well as male chauvinism.

Nuclear war would create widespread psychological problems that magnify the effect of war, cause authoritarianism, and encourage racism, war, and ethnic conflict

KATZ AND OSDOBY 1982 (Arthur, nuclear war researcher, served as consultant to the Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production, Sima, graduate student in the Department of Political Science, The Johns Hopkins University, "The Social and Economic Effects of Nuclear War," April 21, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa009.html)

To understand the effects of a nuclear war it is important to distinguish it from common disasters, even World War II. Especially if hostilities continue or their resumption is threatened, all the elements that make a small disaster tractable will be lacking: limited damage, modest casualties, surviving leadership, a diminishing incidence of role conflict (desire to protect one's family rather than to perform emergency work) and large reservoirs of external, easily mobilized skilled workers, material resources, and organizational skills.

The massive and simultaneous destruction of economic and human resources would result in an inability to provide immediate and sufficient human and material aid to damaged areas. There will be no time to adapt and to innovate as nations did in World War II (U.S.S.R. as previously cited is an

example). More important, the <u>lack of outside aid would create a sense of individual and communal isolation. Aid</u> symbolizes a reconnection with a larger, normal world. This connection helps provide the impetus for rebuilding the damaged society, creating a sense of vitality and competence to dispel the continu- ing perception of isolation. It also <u>has an important function for binding together society</u>, restating a common thread of hope and shared aspirations that are the essence of national life. The post-attack situation could be like Japan near the end of World War II.

There could be "<u>a drift toward accomplishing personal and private aims</u> rather than those which are national...farmers...growing little more than is required for their own subsistence,"[17] <u>or more likely,</u> the <u>complete demoralization</u> seen in an earlier tragedy: "<u>Survivors of the Black Death in growing helplessness fell into apathy, leaving ripe wheat uncut and livestock untended...no one had any inclination to concern themselves about the future</u>."[18] More pertinent, a panel of experts in a study of social consequence of nuclear war for the Office of Civil Defense concluded: "One month after the attack, less than half the potential labor force could be expected to work without immediately beneficial compensation, and that, of these, one in five would be able to function only at a level greatly degraded from his normal abilities."[19]

The experience of <u>nuclear war is likely to have devastating psychological effects</u>, especially for Americans, whose homes and institutions have essentially escaped the ravages of recent wars. The very short period required to carry out highly destructive nuclear attacks would intensify the emotional impact, particularly those reactions associated with denial of the true extent of the damage or fostering flight from and resistance to reentering damaged areas.

Robert J. Lifton, in his study of Hiroshima survivors, described the psychological effect as "a sudden and absolute shift from normal existence to an overwhelming encounter with death."[20] The reaction, as reported by a witness to the disaster, Father Siemes: "Among the passersby, there are many who are uninjured. In a purposeless, insensate manner, distraught by the magnitude of the disaster, most of them rush by and none conceives the thought of organizing help on his own initiative. They are concerned only with the welfare of their own families."[21] In some cases even families were abandoned. The result of this experience was, as Fred Ikle described it 25 years ago, a deep aversion to returning to the cities to rebuild the economy. "And thus a very different situation will exist from that envisaged in most civil defense plans (in the 1950s)."[22] The economic implications of this type of withdrawal would be serious.

<u>A high incidence of abnormal behavior, ranging from the nonfunctional to the antisocial, could be anticipated. Specific psychological effects would include disorientation, fear, doubt, apathy, and antipathy toward authorities</u>. The effects on Hiroshima/Nagasaki survivors provide ample evidence to support these concerns.

Families would be broken up by death, severe injury, disease, evacuation, or military and labor conscription. <u>The young, elderly, and handicapped would suffer disproportionately</u> since they depend most on society's material and institutional resources. For example, the young and elderly showed significant increases in accidental death attributed to neglect in Great Britain in World War II.

The loss of material and institutional resources in urban-industrial attacks would make survival in the post-attack period difficult for individuals and groups alike, compounding the psychological stresses of the attack itself. Satisfying even the simplest survival requirements -- food, shelter, and clothing -- would become major tasks.

<u>Significant interpersonal, intergroup, and inter-regional conflicts would probably arise. Ethnic, racial, regional, and economic conflicts present in the pre-attack society</u>, while minimized in the period immediately after an attack, <u>would be heightened</u> after only a limited time <u>by</u> the extent of the <u>deprivation</u> and the resulting tensions. <u>New antagonisms would develop between hosts and evacuees or refugees over the possession and use of surviving resources</u>.

These phenomena were observed both in Britain and in Japan during World War II. The Allnutt study predicted these <u>conflicts would be so serious that they "would necessitate the imposition of martial law or other authoritarian system</u> in many localities, <u>and the widespread use of troops to maintain order</u>." r 231

Continuing hostilities or prolonged threat of renewed war would engender even more profound changes in the social fabric. Major, possibly permanent, changes in social values and institutions could be expected as society sought to adjust to a radically altered environment dominated by the question of physical survival.

Economic destruction, loss of political leadership (especially at the local level), and the need to mobilize resources for relief and recovery would present extraordinary demands on weakened political institutions. In the interest of implementing survival programs, <u>legal norms and practices would have to be suspended</u> for prolonged periods in many areas. <u>The character of political institutions and authority would almost certainly change, especially if hostilities or the threat of hostilities persisted. Both old and new political structures would be likely to suffer from greatly reduced credibility. Decentralization of political</u>

power and more authoritarian methods of political, social, and economic control would be probable responses to post-attack conditions.

Turns Structural Violence

Nuclear war exacerbates inequality and violence against women, children, the poor, and nonhuman species

MALLAVARAPU 2013 (Siddharth Mallavarapu, Mallavarapu is an associate professor in, and chairperson of, the Department of International Relations at South Asian University in New Delhi, "Monumental failure in an interconnected world," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 4, http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-detonations-contemplating-catastrophe/monumental-failure-interconnected-world)

Dire circumstances. But given all that, how would a nuclear detonation affect poor and middle-income nations and their development goals? To begin with, nations situated well beyond the blast site would feel the effects. The world today is deeply interconnected and events can no longer be confined to the areas where they occur. The United Nations Development Programme underscores this reality in its 2013 Human Development Report, which argues that "as global development challenges become more complex and transboundary in nature, coordinated action on the most pressing challenges of our era, whether they be poverty eradication, climate change, or peace and security, is essential." And efforts to contend with the four areas of development upon which the report focuses—"enhancing equity, including on the gender dimension; enabling greater voice and participation of citizens, including youth; confronting environmental pressures; and managing demographic change"—would in every case be seriously complicated by a nuclear detonation.

Indeed, as argued succinctly by Ray Acheson of the disarmament organization Reaching Critical Will, a detonation would seriously compromise efforts to achieve all the Millennium Development Goals. It would undermine poverty alleviation initiatives as well as cooperative efforts to foster development; limit agricultural productivity; undermine women's and children's well-being; damage national infrastructures; and reduce the planet's biodiversity.

Nuclear war would disproportionately affect women and children

MALLAVARAPU 2013 (Siddharth Mallavarapu, Mallavarapu is an associate professor in, and chairperson of, the Department of International Relations at South Asian University in New Delhi, "Monumental failure in an interconnected world," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 4, http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-detonations-contemplating-catastrophe/monumental-failure-interconnected-world)

Third, the health and well-being of populations in the developing world would be seriously threatened. Not only would food prices increase, but essential drugs would likely be in short supply—both in the areas directly affected and, as supplies were directed to these areas, in other regions as well. The well-being of women and children in particular might be severely threatened—as Acheson observes, "women suffer disproportionately in disasters and … their specific needs are usually ignored during relief and rehabilitation initiatives." She also notes that "violence against women soars under the stress in post-disaster environments." The negative impact on women's quality of life would likely have a direct bearing on the well-being of children: Women's capacity to care for their children would be diminished, and children would be affected in areas ranging from nutrition to cognitive development.

AT K Impacts

AT Biopower

No impact – democratic norms and civil society check totalitarianism and genocide
Dickinson, associate professor of history – UC Davis, **'4**

(Edward, Central European History, 37.1)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. **But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading**, because it obfuscates the **profoundly different** strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively **quite different from totalitarianism.** Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is **functionally incompatible** with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly **narrow limits on coercive policies**, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufé cient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic coné guration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "liberty," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point** for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. **This notion is not** at all **at odds with the core of Foucauldian** (and Peukertian) **theory.** Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not "opposites," in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept "power" should not be read as a universal stiè ing night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively "the same." Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, "tactically polyvalent." Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create "multiple modernities," modern societies with quite **radically differing potentials.**91

Their internal link is terrible causality and empirically denied
Amy 7, professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke College

(Douglas, "More Government Does Not Mean Less Freedom," Government is Good, http://governmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=18&print=1)

The minimal-government crowd uses this "more government = less freedom" formula to make all sorts of alarmist claims. For example, **some suggest that every increase in government power is a step down the road to totalitarianism** and repression. This is a favorite argument of many conservatives and they use it to oppose even small and seemingly reasonable increases in government programs or regulations. For example, they argue is that if we allow the government to insist on background checks to buy guns, this will lead to mandatory gun registration, which will eventually lead to confiscation of guns, and this will put the government in a position to repress a disarmed and helpless citizenry. Or they suggest that legalizing assisted-suicide for terminally ill patients will only set the stage for government euthanasia programs aimed at the handicapped and others. Or they fear that mandating non-smoking areas is merely a step toward outlawing cigarettes altogether. Or they contend that if we allow environmental regulations to restrict how an owner deals with wetlands on their property, we are going down a road in which property rights will eventually be meaningless because the state will control all property. This seems to be the view of the conservative judge Janice Rogers – one of George W. Bush's appointees to the federal judiciary. In one of her opinions, she railed against local restrictions on the rights of real estate developers in California and concluded that "Private property, already an endangered species in California, is now entirely extinct in San Francisco."6 In his book, Defending Government, Max Nieman has labeled this argument the "Big Brother Road to Dictatorship." It suggests that the expansion of government powers in the U.S. during the last 75 years has been inevitably leading us down the path toward totalitarianism. But as he has noted, **there is** really **no** valid **evidence for this theory**. If we look at how **modern dictatorships** have come about, they **have not been the product of gradually increasing social programs and regulations** over property and business. As Neiman explains: It is common among conservative critics of public sector activism to characterize government growth in the arena of social welfare, environment, consumer and worker protection, and income security as steps toward the loss of liberty and even totalitarianism. Many critics of the emergence of the modern social welfare state … have tried to convey the sense that the road to totalitarian hell is paved with the good intentions of the social democratic program. …There is no record, however, of any oppressive regime having taken power by advancing on the social welfare front. Lenin and Stalin, Mussolini, Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro, and Chile's Pinochet did not consolidate power by gradually increasing social welfare programs, taxes, and regulation of the environment or workplace. **Rather, these assaults on personal freedom and democratic governance involved limitation on civil rights and political rights, the legitimization of oppression and discrimination against disfavored or unpopular groups**, and the centralization and expansion of military and policy forces. **Hitler did not become the supreme ruler of the Nazi state by first taking over the health department.**7

AT Endless War

No risk of endless warfare
GRAY 7

(Colin, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, [July 2007, "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration," http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy's military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention's critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.

No endless war

Rodwell 5

(Jonathan Rodwell is a PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy of the late 70's / rise of 'neo-cons' and Second Cold War, "Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson," http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through 'othering' it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn't produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the 'Evil Empire'. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive 'othering' of an 'alien' people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. **Why not North Korea? Or Scotland**? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it's own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980's? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell's original work on which Jackson's approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that 'always results in an other being marginalized' or has the potential for 'demonisation'[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 "is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as 'evil', 'inhuman' and 'faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated"[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940's and 50's even subjected to the language of the 'Red Scare' it's obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an 'other' of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of 'evil' and 'inhumanity' does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an 'other'. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model

Endless violence is not a thing

Chandler 9

(David, Westminster IR professor, "War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of `Global War'", Security Dialogue, 40.3, SAGE)

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to 'motorized partisans', in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of 'global war' have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with

'global war' thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control **This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines 'global' war today.** Very few studies of the 'war on terror' start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the 'war on terror' (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are 'scaled up' from the international to the global. Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire The alternative reading of 'global war' rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the **lack of political stakes** and strategic structuring of the international sphere **rather than frameworks for asserting global domination** We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the 'war on terror' campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. There would appear to be a **direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping** and structuring **interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome.** In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the **lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat** or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and **arbitrary interventions as** states and international institutions use the **lack of strategic imperatives** to **construct their own meaning through intervention** As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains: war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz's classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. …. War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most 'efficient' way of finding one. **The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would** appear to **be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to 'war'.** In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are **freed from strategic necessities** and **whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against 'real enemies'.** The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the **strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests**.

No global war impact

Teschke 11

(Benno Gerhard, IR prof at the University of Sussex, "Fatal attraction: a critique of Carl Schmitt's international political and legal theory", International Theory (2011), 3 : pp 179-227)

For at the centre of the heterodox – partly post-structuralist, partly realist – neo-Schmittian analysis stands the conclusion of The Nomos: the thesis of a structural and continuous relation between liberalism and violence (Mouffe 2005, 2007; Odysseos 2007). It suggests that, in sharp contrast to the liberal-cosmopolitan programme of 'perpetual peace', the geographical expansion of liberal modernity was accompanied by the intensification and de-formalization of war in the international construction of liberal-constitutional states of law and the production of liberal subjectivities as rights-bearing individuals. Liberal world-ordering proceeds via the conduit of wars for humanity, leading to Schmitt's 'spaceless universalism'. In this perspective, a straight line is drawn from WWI to the War on Terror to verify Schmitt's long-term prognostic of the 20th century as the age of 'neutralizations and de-politicizations' (Schmitt 1993). But this attempt to read the history of 20th century international relations in terms of a succession of confrontations between the carrier-nations of liberal modernity and the criminalized foes at its outer margins seems unable to comprehend the complexities and specificities of 'liberal' world-ordering, then and now. For in the cases of Wilhelmine, Weimar and fascist Germany, the assumption that their conflicts with the Anglo-American liberal-capitalist heartland were grounded in an antagonism between liberal modernity and a recalcitrant Germany outside its geographical and conceptual lines runs counter to the historical evidence. For this reading presupposes that late-Wilhelmine Germany was not already substantially penetrated by capitalism and fully incorporated into the capitalist world economy, posing the question of whether the causes of WWI lay in the capitalist dynamics of inter-imperial rivalry (Blackbourn and Eley 1984), or in processes of belated and incomplete liberal-capitalist development, due to the survival of 're-feudalized' elites in the German state classes and the marriage between 'rye and iron' (Wehler 1997). It also assumes that the late-Weimar and early Nazi turn towards the construction of an autarchic German regionalism – Mitteleuropa or Großraum – was not deeply influenced by the international ramifications of the 1929 Great Depression, but premised on a purely political–existentialist assertion of German national identity. Against a reading of the early 20th century conflicts between 'the liberal West' and Germany as 'wars for humanity' between an expanding liberal modernity and its political exterior, there is more evidence to suggest that these confrontations were interstate conflicts within the crisis-ridden and nationally uneven capitalist project of modernity. Similar objections and caveats to the binary opposition between the Western discourse of liberal humanity against non-liberal foes apply to the more recent period. For how can this optic explain that the 'liberal West' coexisted (and keeps coexisting) with a large number of pliant authoritarian client-regimes (Mubarak's Egypt, Suharto's Indonesia, Pahlavi's Iran, Fahd's Saudi-Arabia, even Gaddafi's pre-intervention Libya, to name but a few), which were and are actively managed and supported by the West as anti-liberal Schmittian states of emergency, with concerns for liberal subjectivities and Human Rights secondary to the strategic interests of political and geopolitical stability and economic access? Even in the more obvious cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and, now, Libya, the idea that Western intervention has to be conceived as an encounter between the liberal project and a series of foes outside its sphere seems to rely on a denial of their antecedent histories as geopolitically and socially contested state-building projects in pro-Western fashion, deeply co-determined by long histories of Western anti-liberal colonial and post-colonial legacies. If these states (or social forces within them) turn against their imperial masters, the conventional policy expression is 'blowback'. And as the Schmittian analytical vocabulary does not include a conception of human agency and social forces – only friend/enemy groupings and collective political entities governed by executive decision – it also lacks the categories of analysis to comprehend the social dynamics that drive the struggles around sovereign power and the eventual overcoming, for example, of Tunisian and Egyptian states of emergency without US-led wars for humanity. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the generic idea of liberal world-ordering and the production of liberal subjectivities can actually explain why Western intervention seems improbable in some cases (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen or Syria) and more likely in others (e.g. Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya). Liberal world-ordering consists of differential strategies of building, coordinating, and drawing liberal and anti-liberal states into the Western orbit, and overtly or covertly intervening and refashioning them once they step out of line. These are conflicts within a world, which seem to push the term liberalism beyond its original meaning. The generic Schmittian idea of a liberal 'spaceless universalism' sits uncomfortably with the realities of maintaining an America-supervised 'informal empire', which has to manage a persisting interstate system in diverse and case-specific ways. But it is this persistence of a worldwide system of states, which encase national particularities, which renders challenges to American supremacy possible in the first place.

AT Extinction Inev

Extinction does not make our efforts worthless.
Trisel 4

[Brooke Alan Trisel, Medical Facilities Consultant with the Ohio Department of Health, "Human Extinction and the Value of Our Efforts," *The Philosophical Forum*, Volume XXXV, Number 3, Fall, 2004, p. 390-391]

Although our works will not last forever, this should not matter if we accomplished what we set out to do when we created these works. Wanting our [end page 390] creations to endure forever was not likely part of our goal when we created them. If we accomplish our goals and then later in life conclude that these accomplishments were of no significance, then this is a sign that a desire for long-lastingness has crept into the standards that we use to judge significance. Escalating desires can lead to escalating standards since the standards that we establish reflect our goals and desires. Including long-lastingness as a criterion for judging the significance of our efforts is unreasonable. If one includes long-lastingness as part of the standard, then one will feel that it is necessary for humanity to persist forever. There is no need for humanity to live forever for our lives and works to be significant. If the standard that we adopt for judging significance does not include long-lastingness as part of the standard, then it will not matter whether humanity will endure for a long time. Like Tolstoy, we may be unable to keep from wanting to have our achievements remembered forever. We may also be unable to keep from wanting our works to be appreciated forever. But we can refrain from turning these desires into standards for judging whether our efforts and accomplishments are significant. If we can keep from doing this, it will be to our advantage. Then, during those times when we look back on life from an imagined perspective that encompasses times after humanity has become extinct, we will not conclude that our efforts amounted to nothing. Rather, we will conclude that many people made remarkable accomplishments that made their lives, and possibly the lives of others, better than they would have been if these goals had never been pursued. And if we expand our evaluation, as we should, to take into account all experiences associated with living, not just goal-related experiences, we will conclude not that life was empty, but that living was worthwhile.

AT Libidinal Econ

Their insidious targeting arg relies on the libidinal economy which is wrong and cannot be the foundation for ethics or the political

Gordon 1

(Paul, psychotherapist living and working in London **Psychoanalysis and Racism**: The politics of defeat Race & Class v. 42, n. 4)

The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with disappointment. All the tragedies of the political project of emancipation ± the evils of Stalinism in particular ± are seen as the inevitable product of men and women trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into discourse and deconstruction and representation ± as though to interpret the world is more important than to change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'.58 To justify their flight from a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals and abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case, psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers `a world-historical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human-kind to be free. At every turn for such theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners: there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; however, once we grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax.59 Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory power of his new faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always `imagined', which, in his view, means based on fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are dismissed as `fantasies of self-sufficient combination'.60 In this scenario, the idea that people might come together, think together, analyse together and act together as rational beings is impossible The idea of a genuine community of equals becomes a pure fantasy a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the first place: `Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented traditions.'61 Now, this is not only non- sense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history `always false'? Did the Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always `imagined'? Or, as Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle? Furthermore, all attempts to legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other firrm action against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded `understand- ing' or even help through psychotherapy. It is indeed a strange kind of `anti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up. In their move from politics to the academy and the world of `discourse', the postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical materialism, for another, psychoanalysis.62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed radicalism of psycho- analysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret it, need to look elsewhere.

Libidinal economy doesn't explain violence

Havi **Carel 6**, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England, "Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger", googlebooks

Secondly, the constancy principle on which these ideas are based is incompatible with observational data. Once the passive model of the nervous system has been discarded, there was no need for external excitation in order for discharge to take place, and more generally, "the behavioural picture seemed to negate the notion of drive, as a separate energizer of behaviour" {Hcbb. 1982. p.35}. According to Holt, the nervous system is not passive; it does not take in and conduct out energy from the environment, and it shows no tendency to discharge its impulses. 'The principle of constancy is quite without any biological basis" (1965, p. 109). He goes on to present the difficulties that arise from the pleasure principle as linked to a tension-reduction theory. The notion of tension is "conveniently ambiguous": it has phenomenological, physiological and abstract meaning. But empirical evidence against the theory of tension reduction has been "mounting steadily" and any further attempts to link pleasure with a reduction of physiological tension are "decisively refuted" (1965, pp. 1102). Additionally, the organism and the mental system are no longer considered closed systems. So the main arguments for the economic view collapse, as does the entropic argument for the death drive (1965, p. 114). A final, more general criticism of Freud's economic theory is sounded by Compton, who argues, "Freud fills in psychological discontinuities with neurological hypotheses" (1981, p. 195). The Nirvana principle is part and parcel of the economic view and the incomplete and erroneous assumptions about the nervous system (Hobson, 1988, p.277). It is an extension ad extremis of the pleasure principle, and as such is vulnerable to all the above criticisms. The overall contemporary view provides strong support for discarding the Nirvana principle and reconstructing the death drive as aggression.

No empirical basis for scaling up psychoanalysis

Epstein, senior lecturer in government and IR – University of Sydney, **'10**

(Charlotte, "Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics," European Journal of International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

One key advantage of the Wendtian move, granted even by his critics (see Flockhart, 2006), is that it simply does away with the level-of-analysis problem altogether. If states really are persons, then we can apply everything we know about people to understand how they behave. The study of individual identity is not only theoretically justified but it is warranted. This cohesive self borrowed from social psychology is what allows Wendt to bridge the different levels of analysis and travel between the self of the individual and that of the state, by way of a third term, 'group self', which is simply an aggregate of individual selves. Thus for Wendt (1999: 225) 'the state is simply a "group Self" capable of group level cognition'. Yet that the individual possesses a self does not logically entail that the state possesses one too. It is in this leap, from the individual to the state, that IR's fallacy of composition surfaces most clearly. Moving beyond Wendt but maintaining the psychological self as the basis for theorizing the state Wendt's bold ontological claim is far from having attracted unanimous support (see notably, Flockhart, 2006; Jackson, 2004; Neumann, 2004; Schiff, 2008; Wight, 2004). One line of critique of the states-as-persons thesis has taken shape around the resort to psychological theories, specifically, around the respective merits of Identity Theory (Wendt) and SIT (Flockhart, 2006; Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 2005) for understanding state behaviour.9 Importantly for my argument, that the state has a self, and that this self is pre-social, remains unquestioned in this further entrenching of the psychological turn. Instead questions have revolved around how this pre-social self (Wendt's 'Ego') behaves once it encounters the other (Alter): whether, at that point (and not before), it takes on roles prescribed by pre-existing cultures (whether Hobbessian, Lockean or Kantian) or whether instead other, less culturally specific, dynamics rooted in more universally human characteristics better explain state interactions. SIT in particular emphasizes the individual's basic need to belong, and it highlights the dynamics of in-/out-group categorizations as a key determinant of behaviour (Billig, 2004). SIT seems to have attracted increasing interest from IR scholars, interestingly, for both critiquing (Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 1995) and rescuing constructivism (Flockhart, 2006). For Trine Flockart (2006: 89–91), SIT can provide constructivism with a different basis for developing a theory of agency that steers clear of the states-as-persons thesis while filling an important gap in the socialization literature, which has tended to focus on norms rather than the actors adopting them. She shows that a state's adherence to a new norm is best understood as the act of joining a group that shares a set of norms and values, for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What SIT draws out are the benefits that accrue to the actor from belonging to a group, namely increased self-esteem and a clear cognitive map for categorizing other states as 'in-' or 'out-group' members and, from there, for orientating states' self–other relationships. Whilst coming at it from a stance explicitly critical of constructivism, for Jonathan Mercer (2005: 1995) the use of psychology remains key to correcting the systematic evacuation of the role of emotion and other 'non-rational' phenomena in rational choice and behaviourist analyses, which has significantly impaired the understanding of international politics. SIT serves to draw out the emotional component of some of the key drivers of international politics, such as trust, reputation and even choice (Mercer, 2005: 90–95; see also Mercer, 1995). Brian Greenhill (2008) for his part uses SIT amongst a broader array of psychological theories to analyse the phenomenon of self–other recognition and, from there, to take issue with the late Wendtian assumption that mutual recognition can provide an adequate basis for the formation of a collective identity amongst states. The main problem with this psychological turn is the very utilitarian, almost mechanistic, approach to non-

rational phenomena it proposes, which tends to evacuate the role of meaning. In other words, it further shores up the pre-social dimension of the concept of self that is at issue here. Indeed norms (Flockhart, 2006), emotions (Mercer, 2005) and recognition (Greenhill, 2008) are hardly appraised as symbolic phenomena. In fact, in the dynamics of in- versus out-group categorization emphasized by SIT, language counts for very little. Significantly, in the design of the original experiments upon which this approach was founded (Tajfel, 1978), whether two group members communicate at all, let alone share the same language, is non-pertinent. It is enough that two individuals should know (say because they have been told so in their respective languages for the purposes of the experiment) that they belong to the same group for them to favour one another over a third individual. The primary determinant of individual behaviour thus emphasized is a pre-verbal, primordial desire to belong, which seems closer to pack animal behaviour than to anything distinctly human. What the group stands for, what specific set of meanings and values binds it together, is unimportant. What matters primarily is that the group is valued positively, since positive valuation is what returns accrued self-esteem to the individual. In IR Jonathan Mercer's (2005) account of the relationship between identity, emotion and behaviour reads more like a series of buttons mechanically pushed in a sequence of the sort: positive identification produces emotion (such as trust), which in turn generates specific patterns of in-/out-group discrimination. Similarly, Trine Flockhart (2006: 96) approaches the socializee's 'desire to belong' in terms of the psychological (and ultimately social) benefits and the feel-good factor that accrues from increased self-esteem. At the far opposite of Lacan, the concept of desire here is reduced to a Benthamite type of pleasure- or utility-maximization where meaning is nowhere to be seen. More telling still is the need to downplay the role of the Other in justifying her initial resort to SIT. For Flockhart (2006: 94), in a post-Cold War context, 'identities cannot be constructed purely in relation to the "Other"'. Perhaps so; but not if what 'the other' refers to is the generic, dynamic scheme undergirding the very concept of identity. At issue here is the confusion between the reference to a specific other, for which Lacan coined the concept of *le petit autre*, and the reference to *l'Autre*, or Other, which is that symbolic instance that is essential to the making of *all* selves. As such it is not clear what meaning Flockhart's (2006: 94) capitalization of the 'Other' actually holds. The individual self as a proxy for the state's self

Another way in which the concept of self has been centrally involved in circumventing the level-of-analysis problem in IR has been to treat the self of the individual as a proxy for the self of the state. The literature on norms in particular has highlighted the role of individuals in orchestrating norm shifts, in both the positions of socializer (norm entrepreneurs) and socializee. It has shown for example how some state leaders are more susceptible than others to concerns about reputation and legitimacy and thus more amenable to being convinced of the need to adopt a new norm, of human rights or democratization, for example (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2001). It is these specific psychological qualities pertaining to their selves (for example, those of Gorbachev; Risse, 2001) that ultimately enable the norm shift to occur. Once again the individual self ultimately remains the basis for explaining the change in state behaviour. To summarize the points made so far, whether the state is literally considered as a person by ontological overreach, whether so only by analogy, or whether the person stands as a proxy for the state, the 'self' of that person has been consistently taken as the reference point for studying state identities. Both in Wendt's states-as-persons thesis, and in the broader psychological turn within constructivism and beyond, the debate has consistently revolved around the need to evaluate which of the essentialist assumptions about human nature are the most useful for explaining state behaviour. It has never questioned the validity of starting from these assumptions in the first place. That is, what is left unexamined is this assumption is that what works for individuals will work for states too. This is IR's central fallacy of composition, by which it has persistently eschewed rather than resolved the level-of-analysis problem. Indeed, in the absence of a clear demonstration of a logical identity (of the type A=A) between states and individuals, the assumption that individual interactions will explain what states do rests on little more than a leap of faith, or indeed an analogy.

AT Ressentiment

Resentment of particular aspects of the world is inevitable and necessary – it is only Loyola's resentment of the very terms of human experience that is truly dangerous. We must begin with an affirmation of belief in the world
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

By "belief in this world:' neither Deleuze nor I, again, means that the established distribution of power, exploitation, and inequality now in place is to be protected, though some critics love to jump to this conclusion. Such arrangements make people suffer too much, and they rest upon the repression of essential features of the contemporary condition, including the minoritization of the world occurring at a more rapid pace. Exploitation and domination are things to contest and oppose, as Deleuze did actively while embracing the points reviewed above. The restoration of belief in this world provides an existential resource to draw upon as those struggles are fought energetically and creatively. Nor do we mean that it is always illegitimate to resent your place in the world. Resentment is often a needed impetus to action, even if it carries the danger of becoming transfigured into ressontimont. It is existential resentment we worry about most, the kind that is apparent today in practices of capitalist greed, religious exclusivity; media bellicosity, authoritarian strategies, sexual narrowness, and military aggression. We mean, first, positive affirmation of the cosmos in which human beings are set, as you yourself understand that cosmos, second, coming to terms in a positive way with the enduring modem fact of interruptions in experience and the faster pace at which minorithation occurs, and third, accepting the contestability of your existential creed without profound resentment of that condition.

No internal link to their lash out impact – It is only when the desire for revenge and redemptive justice is allowed to take precedence is action against suffering resentful and dangerous
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

It is perhaps salient to point out again how my attention to the rolling and roiling interactions between hubris and existential resentment does not carry with it a denial of the positive role that anger, resentment, indignation, and the like can and do play in politics. There is no politics without passion. It is when the trials of life /or the hubris of mastery slide into institutionally embedded drives to existential revenge that things become most dangerous. That is a risk accompanying any and every positive social movement. As we saw in chapter 3, it is also a risk that we should engage self-critically as we respond to new configurations of struggle.

Ressentiment doesn't come first – extinction and material impacts do

Torbjörn **Tännsjö 11**, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, "Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing," online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one's genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide "survivors" confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

AT Social Death

Social death is an incorrect homogenization of the past AND reifies colonial power relations by placing European whiteness at the center of symbolic examination

Walker 12

(Tracey, Birkbeck University Masters in Psychosocial Studies, "The Future of Slavery: From Cultural Trauma to Ethical Remembrance", Graduate Journal of Social Science, 9.2, July, JSTOR)

To argue that there is more to the popular conception of slaves as victims who experienced social death within the abusive regime of transatlantic slavery is not to say that these subjectivities did not exist. When considering the institution of slavery we can quite confidently rely on the assumption that it did indeed destroy the self-hood and the lives of millions of Africans. Scholar Vincent Brown (2009) however, has criticised Orlando Patterson's (1982) seminal book Slavery and Social Death for positioning the slave as a subject without agency and maintains that those who managed to dislocate from the nightmare of plantation life 'were not in fact the living dead', but 'the mothers of gasping new societies' (Brown 2009, 1241). The Jamaican Maroons were one such disparate group of Africans who managed to band together and flee the Jamaican plantations in order to create a new mode of living under their own rule. These 'runaways' were in fact 'ferocious fighters and master strategists', building towns and military bases which enabled them to fight and successfully win the war against the British army after 200 years of battle (Gotlieb 2000,16). In addition, the story of the Windward Jamaican Maroons disrupts the phallocentricism inherent within the story of the slave 'hero' by the very revelation that their leader, 'Queen Nanny' was a woman (Gotlieb 2000). As a leader, she was often ignored by early white historians who dismissed her as an 'old hagg' or 'obeah' woman (possessor of evil magic powers) (Gotlieb 2000, xvi). Yet, despite these negative descriptors, Nanny presents an interesting image of an African woman in the time of slavery who cultivated an exceptional army and used psychological as well as military force against the English despite not owning sophisticated weapons (Gotlieb 2000). As an oral tale, her story speaks to post-slavery generations through its representation of a figure whose gender defying acts challenged the patriarchal fantasies of the Eurocentric imaginary and as such 'the study of her experiences might change the lives of people living under paternalistic, racist, classist and gender based oppression' (Gotlieb 2000, 84). The label of 'social death' is rejected here on the grounds that it is a narrative which is positioned from the vantage point of a European hegemonic ideology. Against the social symbolic and its gaze, black slaves were indeed regarded as non-humans since their lives were stunted, diminished and deemed less valuable in comparison to the Europeans. However, Fanon's (1967) assertion that 'not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man' (Fanon 1967, 110) helps us to understand that this classification can only have meaning relative to the symbolic which represents the aliveness of whiteness against the backdrop of the dead black slave (Dyer 1997). Butler (2005) makes it clear that the 'death' one suffers relative to the social symbolic is imbued with the fantasy that having constructed the Other and interpellated her into 'life', one now holds the sovereignty of determining the subject's right to live or die: this death, if it is a death, is only the death of a certain kind of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of the fantasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had, in other words it is a necessary grief (Butler 2005, 65). The point to make here is that although the concept of social death has proved useful for theorists to describe the metaphysical experience of those who live antagonistically in relation to the social symbolic, it is nevertheless a colonial narrative within which the slaves are confined to a one dimensional story of terror. In keeping with Gilroy's (1993b) argument that the memory of slavery must be constructed from the slaves' point of view, we might instead concentrate, not on the way in which the slaves are figured within the European social imaginary, but on how they negotiated their own ideas about self and identity. We might therefore find some value in studying a group like the Maroons who not only managed to create an autonomous world outside of the hegemonic discourse which negated them, but also, due to their unique circumstances, were forced to create new modes of communication which would include a myriad of African cultures, languages and creeds (Gottlieb 2000). This creative and resistive energy of slave subjectivity not only disrupts the colonial paradigm of socially dead slaves, but also implies the ethical tropes of creation, renewal and mutual recognition. In contrast, the passive slave proved to feature heavily in the 2007 bicentenary commemorations causing journalist Toyin Agbetu to interrupt the official speeches and exclaim that it had turned into a discourse of freedom engineered mostly by whites with stories of black agency excluded8.

Young's argument that 'one of the damaging side effects of the focus on white people's role in abolition is that Africans are represented as being passive in the face of oppression', appears to echo the behaviour in the UK today given that a recent research poll reveals that the black vote turnout is significantly lower than for the white majority electorate and that forty percent of second generation 'immigrants' believe that voting 'doesn't matter'.9 Yet, Gilroy (1993a) argues that this political passivity may not simply be a self fulfilling prophecy, but might allude to the 'lived contradiction' of being black and English which affects one's confidence about whether opinions will be validated in a society that, at its core, still holds on to the fantasy of European

superiority (Gilroy 1993a). ==Without considering the slaves' capacity for surviv==al and their fundamental role in overthrowing the European regime of slavery, ==we limit the use–value of the memory and risk becoming overly attached to singular slave subjectivities seeped in death and passivity.== The Maroons story how-ever, enables slave consciousness to rise above the mire of slavery's abject victims and establishes an ethical relation with our ancestors who lived and survived in the time of slavery.

The Black body should be understood as active subject – refuse to allow their notion of a monolithic white civil society control all description of the world

Yancy (Prof of Philosophy at Duqesne) **8**

(George, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Contining Significance of Race, Pg. 122)

As agential, Black people confront the world and construct the world from unique perspectives. They take up their ex-istence within the framework of a given set of circumstances.42 Despite the horrible conditions that came with being forced to live and to work on plantations, many Blacks were able to reconfigure what was given, They were able to take a stand against dehuman-ization and negotiate ways of achieving a sense of dignity. Moreover, this had to be done while making whites think that they had succeeded in producing the most obedient and docile slaves around. In short, Blacks had to "conform" to white myths while undermining those myths simultaneously. The negotiation between myth and reality took place within a variety of work activities, For example, as stated, many Blacks would break tools and destroy crops, As stated, whites rationalized such behaviors as the result of clumsiness and stupidity, Apparently, these same tools were not broken when Blacks worked their own meager areas for planting. In fact, "one slaveholder felt aggrieved when he saw that the small patches which his Negroes cultivated for themselves were better cared for and more productive than his own field."43 This suggests a process of selective valuing. To be selective, of course, involves deliberation, which is indicative of having a perspective on the world. Hence, contrary to the myth that Black people were devoid of agency, they cultivated these small patches of their own in order to exercise a measure of economic independence and agency. Blacks would grow their own food, as well as steal food from the plantation, selling it through a complex network of trade with passing ships.
Breaking tools was one way that enslaved Black people were able to exercise control over their work. To break a tool (or destroy a patch of land) requires the establishment of a different/alternative way of relating to a given object (the tool or the land). To engage in this type of alternative engagement involves the telic dimensions of embodied subjectivity. In short, Blacks assumed a position of transcendence in relationship to a field of objects, Deborah White notes, "While some Southern whites called such behavior [breaking tools, for example] 'rascality,' slaves [or the ensltma) understood it to be an effective form of resistance,"

AT Structural Violence

No impact to structural violence

a. Declining Now

Larry **Obhof**, JD @ Yale, 200**3** ("WHY GLOBALIZATION? A LOOK AT GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND ITS EFFECTS". University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy. Fall 2003)

The effects of globalization have largely been positive for both developed and developing countries. Consider, for example, the effects of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and resulted in agreements to reduce tariffs and other non-tariff barriers. Advanced countries agreed to lower their tariffs by an average of 40%, and [*99] the signatories agreed to liberalize trade in the important areas of agriculture and clothing. n32 The effects of the Uruguay Round have been both positive and large. Reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers has produced annual increases in global GDP of $ 100-300 billion. n33 This figure is five times larger than the total worldwide aid to developing countries. n34 More importantly, a significant share of this increase has gone to the poorest people. The percentage of the population in developing countries living under $ 1 per day has fallen from 30% to 24% in the past decade. n35 The recent experience of Mexico offers an excellent example of global capitalism in action. The extent of poverty in Mexico is shocking; 20 million people live on less than $ 2 per day. n36 This is so for a number of reasons, including government intervention in the market in the form of protectionist measures intended to help ailing or failing industries. Using government interventions to shape the allocation of resources traditionally led to gross inefficiencies and a low pace of innovation and adoption of new technologies. n37 Trade liberalization has helped curb such interventions - indeed, the opening of its markets has become one of the most important and far-reaching reforms in Mexico. The effects of trade liberalization on the Mexican economy have been significant. Exports in Mexico have increased sixfold since 1985, and the GDP of the country has grown at an average rate of 5.4% per year since 1996. n38 Since NAFTA created a "free trade area" among the United States, Canada, and Mexico in 1994, Mexican labor productivity has grown fast in its tradable sectors. n39 Not surprisingly, however, productivity has remained stagnant in nontradable sectors. n40 NAFTA has also improved Mexico's aggregate trade balance and helped to ameliorate the effect of the [*100] peso crisis on capital flows. n41 As most economists predicted during the NAFTA debate, the effects of the agreement have been positive and large for Mexico. n42 The effects have also been positive, although smaller, for the United States. This is also consistent with the pre-NAFTA analyses of most economists. n43 The positive effects of globalization have been consistent throughout the developing world. Dramatic increases in per capita income have accompanied the expansion of trade in countries that have become more globalized. Korea, for example, has seen average incomes increase eightfold since 1960. n44 China has experienced an average growth of 5.1% during the same period, and other countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have experienced faster growth than that in advanced countries. n45 The evidence is incredibly one-sided. "[P]romoting openness, and supporting it with sound domestic policies, leads to faster growth." n46 The most successful third of developing countries have lowered average import tariffs by 34% and increased trade relative to income by 104% since 1980. n47 Per capita income in these countries rose by a yearly average of [*101] 3.5% in the 1980s, and a yearly average of 5% in the 1990s. n48 The remaining developing countries, which have lowered tariffs by an average of only 11%, experienced "little or no growth in GDP per capita in the post-1980 period." n49 In countries that have become more open, increased growth has undoubtedly been good for the poor. "Cross-country evidence suggests that the incomes of the poorest 20 percent of the population increase roughly one-for-one with the average per capita income." n50 Some studies have found an even stronger effect: a 1% increase in the average per capita income is associated with a reduction in poverty rates by up to 3.5%. n51 Poverty rates fall, almost always, simultaneously with growth in average living standards. The evidence is clear: increasing integration leads to greater growth, and with it, greater income levels, particularly for the poorest. n52

b. Not root of war and Case Turns it

Goldstein 1 (Joshua S., Professor Emeritus of International Relations – American University, Adjunct Professor in the Watson Institute for International Studies – Brown University, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, p. 412)

First, <u>peace **activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war**</u> <u>and working for peace. Many peace</u> scholars and <u>activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice."</u> Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. <u>This approach</u> brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but <u>rests on the assumption that injustices</u> <u>cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that</u> <mark>causality runs</mark> <u>at least as strongly</u> <mark>the other way. War</mark> <mark>is not a product of</mark> capitalism, imperialism, <mark>gender</mark>, innate aggression, <mark>or any other single cause</mark>, although all of these influence wars' outbreaks and outcomes. <u>Rather,</u> <mark>war has</mark> in part <mark>fueled</mark> and sustained <mark>these and other</mark> <u>injustices. So</u>, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, <u>if you want justice</u> (gender and others), <mark>work for</mark> <mark>peace</mark>. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that <mark>changes in attitudes towards war</mark> and the military <mark>may be the most</mark> <mark>important way to "reverse women's oppression</mark>." The dilemma is that <u>peace work focused on justice brings</u> <u>to the peace movement energy, allies</u>, and moral grounding, <u>yet, in light of this book's evidence, the emphasis</u> <u>on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.</u>

AT VTL

Life has intrinsic and objective value achieved through subjective pleasures---its preservation should be an a priori goal

Kacou 8

(Amien WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of "Life", Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008)
cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184)

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without "life," as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of "pleasure," in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to "mediate" all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that "good" is absolutely synonymous with "pleasant"—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, "living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living," and saying, "I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living," whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, "life gives me pleasure," says little more than, "I like life." Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

Life is always valuable

Torchia 2, Professor of Philosophy, Providence College, Phd in Philosophy, Fordham College (Joseph, "Postmodernism and the Persistent Vegetative State," The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly Summer 2002, Vol. 2, No. 2, http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/torc/torc_01postmodernismandpvs1.html)

Ultimately, Aquinas' theory of personhood requires a metaphysical explanation that is rooted in an understanding of the primacy of the existence or esse of the human person. For humans beings, the upshot of this position is clear: while human personhood is intimately connected with a broad range of actions (including consciousness of oneself and others), the definition of personhood is not based upon any specific activity or capacity for action, but upon the primacy of esse. Indeed, human actions would have neither a cause nor any referent in the absence of a stable, abiding self that is rooted in the person's very being. A commitment to the primacy of esse, then, allows for an adequate recognition of the importance of actions in human life, while providing a principle for the unification and stabilizing of these behavioral features. In this respect, the human person is defined as a dynamic being which actualizes the potentiality for certain behavior or operations unique to his or her own existence. Esse thereby embraces all that the person is and is capable of doing. In the final analysis, **any attempt to define the person in terms of a single attribute, activity, or capability** (e.g., consciousness) flies in the face of the depth and multi-dimensionality which is part and parcel of personhood itself. To do so **would abdicate the ontological core of the person and the very center which renders human activities intelligible.** And Aquinas' anthropology, I submit, provides an effective philosophical lens through which the depth and profundity of the human reality comes into sharp focus. In this respect, Kenneth Schmitz draws an illuminating distinction between "person" (a term which conveys such hidden depth and profundity) and "personality" (a term which pertains to surface impressions and one's public image).40 The preoccupation with the latter term, he shows, is very much an outgrowth of the eighteenth century emphasis upon a human individuality that is understood in terms of autonomy and privacy. This notion of the isolated, atomistic individual was closely linked with a subjective focus whereby the "self" became the ultimate referent for judging reality. By extension, such a presupposition led to the conviction that only self-consciousness provides a means of validating any claims to personhood and membership in a community of free moral agents capable of responsibilities and worthy of rights. In contrast to such an isolated and enclosed conception (i.e., whereby one is a person by virtue of being "set apart" from others as a privatized entity), Schmitz focuses upon an intimacy which presupposes a certain relation between persons. From this standpoint, intimacy is only possible through genuine self-disclosure, and the sharing of self-disclosure that allows for an intimate knowledge of the other.41 For Schmitz, such a revelation of one's inner self transcends any specific attributes or any overt capacity the individual might possess.42 Ultimately, Schmitz argues, intimacy is rooted in the unique act of presencing, whereby the person reveals his or her personal existence. But such a mystery only admits of a metphysical explanation, rather than an epistemological theory of meaning which confines itself to what is observable on the basis of perception or sense experience. Intimacy, then, discloses a level of being that transcends any distinctive properties. Because intimacy has a unique capacity to disclose being, it places us in touch with the very core of personhood. Metaphysically speaking, intimacy is not grounded in the recognition of this or that characteristic a person has, but rather in the simple unqualified presence the person is.43

Preventing death is the first ethical priority – it's the only impact you can't recover from.

Bauman 95 Zygmunt Bauman, University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71

The being-for is like living towards-the-future: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other, as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The self stretches

towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching-toward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not-yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly an-other Other, that life can be lived - not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all-too-familiar unsure-of-itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' - both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of *being fu filled,* but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its *unfu filment.* One may say that the paradox *of hope* (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being-for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self-defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a *mystery.* And being-for-the-Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view - makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place - but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being-for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is *unspoken,* the responsibility undertaken is *unconditional;* it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery - noted Max Frisch - (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed - soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to the musical-chairs game of the real and the potential - it once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly open and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the *must* of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of being-for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition - an end to itself. Without knowing - without being capable of knowing - that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness (the being-for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre-empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place. The togetherness of being-for is always in the future, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The being-for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted. This is the tragedy of being-for - the reason why it cannot but be death-bound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love. The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end, and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. Morality, like the future itself, is forever not-yet. (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being-with) that we turn into moral selves. And it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally, and sometimes even of being good, in the present.

AT Specific Ks

AT Derrida NW K (Hidden in Nietzsche Generic)

NW = Real

War is possible--geopolitics

Ferguson 8 [Niall – Prof History @ Harvard. Hoover Digest, No 1 Winter 2008]

The risk of a major geopolitical crisis in 2007 is certainly lower than it was in 1914. Yet it is not so low as to lie altogether beyond the realm of probability. The escalation of violence in the Middle East as Iraq disintegrates and Iran presses on with its nuclear program is close to being a certainty, as are the growing insecurity of Israel and the impossibility of any meaningful U.S. exit from the region. All may be harmonious between the United States and China today, yet **the potential for tension over trade and exchange rates has unquestionably increased** since the Democrats gained control of Congress. **Nor should we forget about security flashpoints** such as the independence of Taiwan, the threat of North Korea, and the nonnuclear status of Japan. To consign political risk to the realm of uncertainty seems almost as **rash today as it was in the years leading up the First World War**. Anglo-German economic commercial ties reached a peak in 1914, but geopolitics trumped economics. It often does.

Great power wars are possible

Kagan 99 [Donald. Hillhouse Professor of History and Classics at Yale University "History Is Full Of Surprises," *Survival*, Volume 41, Number 2, Summer, p. 141]

Now having said all this, even if all these men were wrong, this does not mean that Michael Mandelbaum cannot be right. But it should inspire some degree of modesty and caution. In fact Mandelbaum is very cautious in the language that he uses. Major war is not necessarily finished, he concedes. It's **not dead**, it's obsolete. This is a charming term that seems to say more than it does, because that allows Mandelbaum to draw back from the more total claims later on. A major war is unlikely but not unthinkable, which is to say he thinks it can happen. It is obsolete, he writes, in the sense that it is no longer fashionable. To pick up the metaphor is to see some of its limitations as well as its charm. Is war really a matter of fashion? And even if it is, don't we have to face the fact that there are some people who choose to be unfashionable, and then there are other people who have never heard of fashion in the first place? China and Russia are two cases to which the writer points. He identifies the Taiwan Straits and the Russo-Ukrainian border as places where wars may well break out, should they erupt anywhere. They are the 'potential Sarajevos of the twenty-first century'. He is right. And, of course, it is this concession, however genuinely and generously and modestly expressed, that **gives away the game**. Since there are at least two places where major wars between great powers might well break out even today – and two are quite enough – it seems to me that his **entire thesis** is undermined.

One nuke is all it takes

Betts 2k [Richard Professor and the Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia, "Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism," The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, ed. Utgoff p. 82]

Quite opposite reactions are imaginable. The shock might jar sluggish statesmen into taking the danger seriously, cutting through diplomatic and military red tape, and undertaking dramatic actions to push the genie back in the bottle. Or the shock might prompt panic and a rush to stock up on WMD, as the possibility of use underlines the need for deterrent capability, or the effectiveness of such weapons as instruments of policy One seldom-noticed danger is that breakage of the taboo

could demystify the weapons and make them look more conventional than our post-Hiroshima images of them. It helps to recall that in the 1930s, popular images of conventional strategic bombing were that it would be apocalyptic, bringing belligerent countries to their knees quickly. The apocalyptic image was fed by the German bombing of Guernica, a comparatively small city in Spain. When World War II came in Europe, both British and Germans initially refrained from bombing attacks on cities. Once city bombing began and gathered steam, however, it proved to be far less decisive than many had expected. British and German populations managed to adjust and absorb it. Over time, however, the ferocity of Allied bombing of Germany and Japan did approach the apocalyptic levels originally envisioned. In short, dire assumptions about the awesomeness of strategic bombing deterred its initiation, but once initiated did not prevent gradual escalation to the devastating level originally envisioned. Nuclear weapon inventories of countries like India and Pakistan are likely to remain small in number and yield for some time. According to press reports, by some U.S. estimates the yields of the 1998 tests were only a few kilotons. If the first weapon detonated in combat is a low-yield device in a large city with uneven terrain and lots of reinforced concrete, it might only destroy a small part of the city A bomb that killed 10,000 to 20,000 people would be seen as a stunning catastrophe, but there are now many parts of the world where that number would be less than 1 percent of a city's population. The disaster could seem surprisingly limited, since in the popular imagination (underwritten by the results in the small and flimsy cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), nuclear weapons mean 'one bomb, one city" Awful destruction that yet seems surprisingly limited could prompt revisionist reactions among lay elites in some countries about the meaning of nuclear ordnance.

Breaking the nuclear taboo ensures escalation

Alagappa 9 [Muthiah. The Long Shadow, 2009, Pg 480-1]

Nuclear weapons cast a long shadow that informs in fundamental ways the strategic policies and behavior of major powers (all but one of which possess nuclear weapons), their allies, and those states facing existential threats. They induce caution and set boundaries to the strategic interaction of nuclear weapon states and condition the role and use of force in their interactions. The danger of escalation limits military options in a crisis between nuclear weapon states and shapes the purpose and manner in which military force is used. Although relevant only in a small number of situations, these include the most serious regional conflicts that could escalate to large-scale war. Nuclear weapons help prevent the outbreak of hostilities, keep hostilities limited when they do break out, and prevent their escalation to major wars. Nuclear weapons enable weaker powers to deter stronger adversaries and help ameliorate the effects of imbalance in conventional military capability. By providing insurance to cope with unanticipated contingencies, they reduce immediate anxieties over military imbalances and vulnerabilities. Nuclear weapons enable major powers to take a long view of the strategic environment, set a moderate pace for their force development, and focus on other national priorities, including mutually beneficial interaction with other nuclear weapon states. Although nuclear weapons by themselves do not confer major power status, they are an important ingredient of power for countries that conduct themselves in a responsible manner and are experiencing rapid growth in other dimensions of power.

Accidental launch is highly likely – malfunctions, accidents, deteriorating systems

Helfand et. al 98 Co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and a past president of the organization's U.S. affiliate, Physicians for Social Responsibility (Ira, "Accidental Nuclear War — A Post–Cold War Assessment", The New England Journal of Medicine, 1998, http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM199804303381824#t=article) //BZ

Although many people believe that the threat of a nuclear attack largely disappeared with the end of the Cold War, there is considerable evidence to the contrary.10 The United States and Russia no longer confront the daily danger of a deliberate, massive nuclear attack, but both nations continue to operate nuclear forces as though this

danger still existed. **Each side routinely maintains thousands of nuclear warheads on high alert**.

Furthermore, to compensate for its weakened conventional armed forces, Russia has abandoned its "no first use" policy.[11] Even though both countries declared in 1994 that they would not aim strategic missiles at each other, not even one second has been added to the time required to launch a nuclear attack: providing actual targeting (or retargeting) instructions is simply a component of normal launch procedures.[12-14] The default targets of U.S. land-based missiles are now the oceans, but Russian missiles launched without specific targeting commands automatically revert to previously programmed military targets.[13] There have been numerous "broken arrows" (major nuclear-weapons accidents) in the past, including at least five instances of U.S. missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear devices flying over or crashing in or near the territories of other nations.[15,16] From 1975 to 1990, 66,000 military personnel involved in the operational aspects of U.S. nuclear forces were removed from their positions. Of these 66,000, 41 percent were removed because of alcohol or other drug abuse and 20 percent because of psychiatric problems.[17,18] General George Lee Butler, who as commander of the U.S. Strategic Command from 1991 to 1994 was responsible for all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, recently reported that he had "investigated a dismaying array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces."[19] **Any nuclear arsenal is susceptible to accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized use**.[20,21] This is true both in countries declared to possess nuclear weapons (the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China) and in other countries widely believed to possess nuclear weapons (Israel, India, and Pakistan). The combination of the massive size of the Russian nuclear arsenal (almost 6000 strategic warheads) and growing problems in Russian control systems makes Russia the focus of greatest current concern. **Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's nuclear command system has steadily deteriorated**. Aging nuclear communications and computer networks are malfunctioning more frequently, and deficient early-warning satellites and ground radar are more prone to reporting false alarms.[10,22-24] The saga of the Mir space station bears witness to the problems of aging Russian technical systems. In addition, budget cuts have reduced the training of nuclear commanders and thus their proficiency in operating nuclear weapons safely. Elite nuclear units suffer pay arrears and housing and food shortages, which contribute to low morale and disaffection. New offices have recently been established at Strategic Rocket Forces bases to address the problem of suicide[25] (and unpublished data). Safeguards against a nuclear attack will be further degraded if the Russian government implements its current plan to distribute both the unlock codes and conditional launch authority down the chain of command. Indeed, a recent report by the Central Intelligence Agency, which was leaked to the press, warned that some Russian submarine crews may already be capable of authorizing a launch.[26] As then Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov warned last year, "No one today can guarantee the reliability of our control systems. . . . Russia might soon reach the threshold beyond which its rockets and nuclear systems cannot be controlled."[24] A particular danger stems from the reliance by both Russia and the United States on the strategy of "launch on warning" — the launching of strategic missiles after a missile attack by the enemy has been detected but before the missiles actually arrive. Each country's procedures allow a total response time of only 15 minutes: a few minutes for detecting an enemy attack, another several minutes for top-level decision making, and a couple of minutes to disseminate the authorization to launch a response.[27,28]

Possible scenarios of an accidental or otherwise unauthorized nuclear attack range from the launch of a single missile due to a technical malfunction to the launch of a massive salvo due to a false warning. A strictly mechanical or electrical event as the cause of an accidental launch, such as a stray spark during missile maintenance, ranks low on the scale of plausibility.[29] Analysts also worry about whether computer defects in the year 2000 may compromise the control of strategic missiles in Russia, but the extent of this danger is not known. Several authorities consider a launch based on a false warning to be the most plausible scenario of an accidental attack.[20,29] This **danger is not merely theoretical**. Serious false alarms occurred in the U.S. system in 1979 and 1980, when human error and computer-chip failures resulted in indications of a massive Soviet missile strike.[10,30] On January 25, 1995, a warning related to a U.S. scientific rocket launched from Norway led to the activation, for the first time in the nuclear era, of the "nuclear suitcases" carried by the top Russian leaders and initiated an emergency nuclear-decision-making conference involving the leaders and their top nuclear advisors. It took about eight minutes to conclude that the launch was not part of a surprise nuclear strike by Western submarines — less than four minutes before the deadline for ordering a nuclear response under standard Russian launch-on-warning protocols.[10,24,27] **A missile launch activated by false warning is thus possible in both U.S. and Russian arsenals**. For the reasons noted above, an accidental Russian launch is currently considered the greater risk.

Leaders are irrational – war can generate personal benefit that doesn't affect the population

Chiozza and Goemans 4 Assistant Professor Vanderbilt University and Associate Professor at University of Rochester (Giacomo and Hein, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still "Ex Post" Inefficient?", *American Journal of Political Science*, July 2004, Vol. 48. No. 3, pp. 604-619, http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdfplus/1519919.pdf?&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true)

In an important article, <u>Fearon</u> (1995) <u>sought to provide answers for what he called the fundamental puzzle of war: the occurrence of war in spite of its costliness</u>. Central to his argument is the claim that" <u>[a]s long as both sides suffer some costs for fighting, then war is always inefficient ex post</u>" <u>for rational unitary-actors</u> (383). War is inefficient ex post because the pie to be divided between the opponents will be smaller after the war than it was before the war. He proposed three mechanisms to explain why, <u>when war is negative-sum</u>, ==rational== unitary-==actors may be un-able to reach agreements that avoid war==. <u>Specifically</u>: (1) <u>private information and incentives to misrepresent one's capabilities</u>, resolve, or anticipated costs of war, (2) <u>commitment problems</u>, <u>and</u> (3) <u>issue indivisibilities</u>. Nevertheless, Fearon explicitly acknowledged that his focus on "rational unitary-actor explanations" addressed only one of three types of arguments that could explain the occurrence of costly wars. The first of these two alternative types of arguments claims that **==leaders are== sometimes, or even ==always, irrationa==**l. Such arguments currently are poor candidates for systematic examination. The second alternative, however, is not. As Fearon noted, "**==war may be rational for... leaders if they will enjoy various benefits of war without suffering costs imposed on the population==**." It deserves emphasis to note that he continued "I believe that 'second-image' mechanisms of this sort are very important empirically..." (379, fn. 1). ==If leaders enjoy "various benefits of war"== which more than off- set their costs, ==then war is obviously no longer ex post inefficient for the opposing leader==s, and Fearon's three mechanisms are no longer sufficient to explain war. In- stead, new mechanisms could come to the fore, perhaps explaining why, when, and which leaders enjoy "various benefits of war" that more than offset its costs.

Nuclear Reps Good

No Impact

No impact to our process of securitization --- it's a <u>process</u>
Ghughunishvili 10

(Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf)

<u>As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act</u>, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. <u>The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized</u> by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. <u>To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to "rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them</u>. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a 'one-way causal' relationship between the audience and the actor. <u>The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered</u>. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where **a single speech <u>does not create</u>** the <u>discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital.</u> 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as <u>it is more likely that **a single speech will not** be able to securitize an issue,</u> but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

Expertism Good

Expertise inevitable and good on national security- the alt fails
Cole '12

(David Cole, Professor Of Law at Georgetown, "Confronting the Wizard of Oz: National Security,

Expertise, and Secrecy" 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1617-1625 (2012), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1085, 2012)

Rana is right to focus our attention on the assumptions that frame modern Americans' conceptions about national security, but his assessment raises three initial questions. First, it seems **far from clear** that there ever was a "golden" era in which national security decisions were made by the common man, or "the people themselves," as Larry Kramer might put it.8 Rana argues that neither Hobbes nor Locke would support a worldview in which certain individuals are vested with superior access to the truth, and that faith in the superior abilities of so-called "experts" is a phenomenon of the New Deal era.9 While an increased faith in scientific solutions to social problems may be a contributing factor in our current overreliance on experts,10 I doubt that national security matters were ever truly a matter of widespread democratic deliberation. Rana notes that in the early days of the republic, every able-bodied man had to serve in the militia, whereas today only a small (and largely disadvantaged) portion of society serves in the military.11 But serving in the militia and making decisions about national security are two different matters. The early days of the Republic were at least as dominated by "elites" as today. Rana points to no evidence that decisions about foreign affairs were any more democratic then than now. And, of course, the nation as a whole was far less democratic, as the majority of its inhabitants could not vote at all.12 Rather than moving away from a golden age of democratic decision-making, it seems more likely that we have simply replaced one group of elites (the aristocracy) with another (the experts). Second, to the extent that there has been an epistemological shift with respect to national security, it seems likely that it is at least in some measure **a response to objective conditions**, not just an ideological development. If so, it's not clear that we can solve the problem **merely by "thinking differently**" about national security. **The world has, in fact, become more interconnected and dangerous** than it was when the Constitution was drafted. At our founding, the oceans were a significant buffer against attacks, weapons were primitive, and travel over long distances was extremely arduous and costly. The attacks of September 11, 2001, or anything like them, would have been inconceivable in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Small groups of non-state actors can now inflict the kinds of attacks that once were the exclusive province of states. But because such actors do not have the governance responsibilities that states have, they are less susceptible to deterrence. The Internet makes information about dangerous weapons and civil vulnerabilities far more readily available, airplane travel dramatically increases the potential range of a hostile actor, and it is not impossible that terrorists could obtain and use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.13 The knowledge necessary to monitor nuclear weapons, respond to cyber warfare, develop technological defenses to technological threats, and gather intelligence is **increasingly specialized**. The problem is **not just how we think about security** threats; it is also at least in part **objectively based**.

Expertism means our epistemology is sound – the alternative devolves into stereotypes and biases that collapses epistemology and turns the kritik
Snjezana 10

(Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences "Trusting Experts: Trust, Testimony, and Evidence". Received: 2010-02-19. Original scientific article. University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Omladinska 14, 51000, Scholar)

Let us define expertism as being a position that is composed of three statements: (i) experts exist; (ii) we should ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to experts due their exceptional expertise; (iii) therefore, we have the epistemic right to trust experts without evidence. Expertism is a genuine anti-evidentialist position with regards to trusting experts. 1. Experts exist. While it is rather plausible that

there are experts in science because they deal with facts, the existence of moral or aesthetic experts, who deal with values, is generally much more problematic. For instance, Milton Friedman holds that differences in values are differences caused by people's tastes which are more or less hardwired, undebatable and unchangeable (Friedman, 1984). Logical positivists believe that value judgments are "nonsense" and cannot be a matter of expertise because they are not verifiable. Many people think that most people have reasonable ethical competence and that philosophers (who are the prime candidates for moral experts) are inclined to the same self-serving rationalizations as other people. However, the untouchable status of experts in science can be disputed. From Kant, Kuhn, Quine to Goodman and Putnam, we are aware of an intelligible objection that theoretical hypotheses involve a theory laden, cognitively biased, socially manipulated and subjective interpretation of the world (Goldman, 1999). Also, in science as well as in ethics and aesthetics there are battles between experts who propose opposite theories. In spite of the fact that claiming the first thesis is not without its difficulties, I will assume that it is correct: there are people who are objective (not only reputational) experts. These objective experts are people who, in comparison with other people, are more effective in problem solving. When compared with other people, they are better guides to the truth or better in recognizing a false statement as false, and a true one as true. While the views of ordinary people are typically an ill sorted mass of material derived from experience and tradition which contains inconsistencies and tensions, skilled experts can detect inconsistencies, fallacious inferences, unwarranted generalizations and false premises. In contrast to the average person in ordinary epistemic circumstances, they possess knowledge about the appropriate methods of research and argumentation, more systematized information derived from long term experience of dealing with difficulties, distinctions, critics, and alternative conceptions. They are generally better trained to deal with epistemic, moral or aesthetic issues. Or, we can say like Aristotle that it is reasonable to suppose that none of them can miss the target totally, and that each has gotten something or even a lot of things right. 2. Distinctive testimonial status. In expertism, it is claimed that an expert's testimony requires considerable epistemic deference. I can see at least three reasons why would one ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to experts: (i) standing practice about an expert's reliability; (ii) insufficiency of evidence; (iii) epistemic dependence. Firstly, it could be seen that we have an epistemic right to treat an expert's knowledge and sincerity with the utmost credulity because there is a standing practice, social climate or ongoing policy that considers experts to be the most reliable sources of knowledge or that they are fundamental testimonial authorities in society (Pappas, 2000). By assuming such credentials about experts, it could be seen that a hearer may believe what an expert says without assessment, evaluation or additional evidence. Secondly, many philosophers hold that our evidence in favour of other people's testimonies is principally insufficient (Beanblossom, Lehrer, 1970; Coady, 1981; Webb, 1993; Foley, 1994). If it is true, our evidence in favour of an expert's testimony is even more insufficient: when a layperson relies on an expert, that reliance is necessary blind (Hardwig, 1991). 3 We, as non-experts in a domain, cannot ever possess enough evidence to evaluate an experts' testimony as credible or non credible. An ordinary cognizer in ordinary epistemic circumstances does not possess, or even can never attain, a high enough level of expertise to evaluate the testimonies of experts. We simply do not have enough knowledge and experience in order to be capable of assessing the truth of an expert's testimony or an expert's reliability. Since our reasons for the acceptance of the content of an expert's report – by definition of them being experts and us as non-experts – cannot be the reasons the experts possess, our evidence about an experts' report cannot be ever sufficient for the justified acceptance of her testimony. If we are not experts in a domain, the relevant defeaters (undefeated defeaters) or certain kinds of experiences, doubts and beliefs that can undermine justified trust simply are not present to us. So, it could be seen that we have no choice other than to blindly trust experts. Thirdly, we are deeply aware of our epistemic dependence on the testimonies of experts. Without other people testimonies "we should have to confess to knowing pitifully little" (Dummet, 1993, 420). But without expert testimonies our knowledge about biology, physics, medicine, geography of the world, history would be devastated. The majority of our beliefs about nature and society that we acquired throughout our lives are based, finally, on what experts 'tell' us (see also in Beanblossom, Lehrer, 1970; Faulkner, 2002). Our judgments of value will be a mass of inconsistent intuitions, prejudices and stereotypes derived from our subjective and partial interests, understandings of tradition, our temper etc. Behind the majority of testimonies lies extensive research and reports by experts and without these basic experts' testimonies "our lives would be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways" (Lackey, 2006, 1). So, it could be said that such an epistemic dependence on experts entails blind trust as a precondition of the functioning of our reason.

Engagement with technocracy is more effective than passive rejection

Jiménez-Aleixandre, professor of education – University of Santiago de Compostela, and Pereiro-Muñoz High School Castelao, Vigo (Spain), **'2**

If science education and environmental education have as a goal to develop critical thinking and to promote decision making, it seems that the acknowledgement of a variety of experts and expertise is of relevance to both. Otherwise citizens could be unable to challenge a common view that places economical issues and technical features over other types of values or concerns. As McGinn and Roth (1999) argue, citizens should be prepared to participate in scientific practice, to be involved in situations where science is, if not created, at least used. The assessment of environmental management is, in our opinion, one of these, and citizens do not need to possess all the technical knowledge to be able to examine the positive and negative impacts and to weigh them up. The identification of instances of scientific practice in classroom discourse is difficult especially if this practice is viewed as a complex process, not as fixed 'steps'. Several instances were identified when it could be said that students acted as a knowledge-producing community in spite of the fact that the students, particularly at the beginning of the sequence, expressed doubts about their capacities to assess a project written by experts and endorsed by a government office. Perhaps these doubts relate to the nature of the project, a 'real life' object that made its way into the classroom, into the 'school life'. As Brown et al. (1989) point out, there is usually a difference between practitioners' tasks and stereotyped school tasks and, it could be added, students are not used to being confronted with the complexity of 'life-size' problems. However, as the sequence proceeded, the students assumed the role of experts, exposing inconsistencies in the project, offering alternatives and discussing it with one of its authors. The issue of expertise is worthy of attention and it needs to be explored in different contexts where the relationships among technical expertise, values hierarchies and possible biases caused by the subject matter could be unravelled. One of the objectives of environmental education is to empower people with the capacity of decision making; for this purpose the acknowledging of multiple expertise is crucial.

Security Good

You essentialize security and ignore its political potential

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This tendency in the literature is problematic for the critique of security in at least three ways. First, it constitutes a blind spot in the effort of politicization. The assumption of an exclusionary, totalizing or violent logic of security can be seen as an essentialization and a moment of closure. To be faithful to itself, the politicization of security would need to recognize that there is nothing natural or necessary about security – and that security as a paradigm of thought or a register of meaning is also a construction that depends upon its reproduction and performance through practice. The exclusionary and violent meanings that have been attached to security are themselves the result of social and historical processes, and can thus be changed. Second, the institution of this apolitical realm runs counter to the purposes of critique by foreclosing an engagement with the different ways in which security may be constructed. As Matt McDonald (2012) has argued, because security means different things for different people, one must always understand it in context. Assuming from the start that security implies the narrowing of choice and the empowerment of an elite forecloses the acknowledgment of security claims that may seek to achieve exactly the opposite: alternative possibilities in an already narrow debate and the contestation of elite power.5 In connection to this, the claims to insecurity put forward by individuals and groups run the risk of being neglected if the desire to be more secure is identified with a compulsion towards totalization, and if aspirations to a life with a degree of predictability are identified with violence. Finally, this tendency blunts critical security studies as a resource for practical politics. By overlooking the possibility of reconsidering security from within – opting instead for its replacement with other ideals – the critical field weakens its capacity to confront head-on the exceptionalist connotations that security has acquired in policymaking circles. Critical scholars run the risk of playing into this agenda when they tie security to exclusionary and violent practices, thereby failing to question security actors as they take those views for granted and act as if they were inevitable. Overall, security is just too important – both as a concept and as a political instrument – to be simply abandoned by critical scholars. As McDonald (2012: 163) has put it, If security is politically powerful, is the foundation of political legitimacy for a range of actors, and involves the articulation of our core values and the means of their protection, we cannot afford to allow dominant discourses of security to be confused with the essence of security itself. In sum, the trajectory that critical security studies has taken in recent years has significant limitations. The politicization of security has made extraordinary progress in problematizing predominant security ideas and practices; however, it has paradoxically resulted in a depoliticization of the meaning of security itself. By foreclosing the possibility of alternative notions of security, this imbalanced politicization weakens the analytical capacity of critical security studies, undermines its ability to function as a political resource and runs the risk of being politically counterproductive. Seeking to address these limitations, the next section revisits emancipatory understandings of security.

Their impact essentializes national identity as a source of violence. This is a rigged game more vulnerable to self-fulfilling prophecy than *provisional* and *empirical* uses for security

Fierke 2k1

(Karin FIERKE Politics @ Queens Univ. Belfast '1 in Constructing International Relations eds. Fierke and Jorgensen p. 119-120)

There are several underline{poststructuralist assumptions that are problematic} from a constructivist perspective. First, poststructuralists, in Campbells argument, focus on the theorization of identity, rather than assuming an a priori agency or pre-given subjects, as many constructivists do. However, ==the poststructuralist emphasis on theorizing identity often leads to a practice that is not qualitatively different than the "positivist orthodoxy"== they criticize, that is. ==the **reification of a set of assumptions** prior to detailed analysis==.' In this case==, the theoretical maxim is that identity is constituted in difference==, and-this has been modified since the end of the Cold War- this is an antagonistic relationship. As Ole Waever (1996a. 122) notes, ==there is reason to question this assumption==: Many critical and poststructuralist authors enjoy remonstrating against the alleged 'other" that is at present taking place in relation to Russia. North Africa, or Asia. Many authors-including Campbell-balance between, on the one hand, (formally) saying that identity does not demand an Other. does not demand antagonism, only difference(s) that can be non-antagonistic and. on the other, actually assuming that identity is always based on an antagonistic relationship to an other. is always constituted as absolute difference. In the current situation, because of this unfortunate habit, when one notices that there are efforts in identity creation for Europe, one immediately looks wound and asks. "Who can it be directed against?' and then one discerns some more or less well-founded examples of, for example, Russia being castigated as other. 1 am not convinced. The dominant aspiration is rather to constitute Europe as a pole of attraction with graduated membership so that Europe fades out but is not constituted against an external enemy. Some of Europe's mechanisms for stabilizing or disciplining eastern Europe rely exactly on this non-definition of an eastern border. on the image of an open but heterogeneous polity of which some are more members than others, but none are defined as total outsiders or opponents. The context of post Cold War Europe raises questions about the assumption that identity requires an Other. In contrast to the emphasis on theorizing identity. Adler argues that underline{constructivists want to know in detail how identities and interests are constituted in particular cases. If one takes the practices of actors in the world seriously, then a more fruitful analysis would}, to cite Wittgenstein (1958. 66-67). 'look and underline{see" how identities are constituted in specific contexts}. As Onuf (199Kb. I) emphasizes, constructivism is not a theory: it is a "way of studying social relations." Second. underline{from Campbell's perspective, constructivists are too easily drawn into the "protocols of 'empirical social science' rule}, to the detriment of a politicized account of important practices" (Campbell 1998a, 225) This sounds very similar to Ashley's claim that ==poststructuralists are 'not especially interested in the meticulous examination of particular cases== or sites for purposes of understanding them in their own terms" (Ashley. 1989. 278). In fact, one can argue that ==the critical endeavor of the poststructuralists suffers precisely because their own, often very **abstract, theoretical assumptions** are not sufficiently related to the analysis of actual practices==. While ==claiming a desire to open up spaces for marginalized voices to speak, there is often a closing down of that possibility precisely because of another assumption==, which shares a family resemblance with realist accounts, ==that is, states do reproduce realist practices==. underline{Campbell, and} other poststructuralists (underline{Doty}, 1993underline{)?} ask how state action becomes possible; they emphasize processes of marginalization rather than how alternatives, which had been considered unrealistic, become possible. Subsequently. Campbell (1998, 7- 8) underline{suggests that the practices of states remain largely unchanged} since the end of the Cold War, ' By contrast. constructivists such as Koslowski and Kratochwil (1995) and Fierke (1998) have taken

dissident practice in the context of the ending Cold War seriously. As a result, there is an increasing awareness of the role of these actors in constituting the possibility of a change (Adler 1997, 342). When a detailed analysis of the practices of these actors is taken seriously, a different and more nuanced reading of both the end of the Cold War and the post Cold War practices of states is in order.

Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards – failure to express our fears causes them to occur

Macy 95

(Joanna, General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist, Ecopsychology)

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that "to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen." Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, "When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate." But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate

Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

McCormack 10

(Tara McCormack, '10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield's important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development.

Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are 'insured' – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

Security is not an ideology of survival --- it is survival-plus --- that allows individuals the choice to act and become

Booth 2k5

(Ken – visiting researcher – US Naval War College, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22)

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that **some degree of insecurity**, as a life-determining condition, **is universal**. To the **extent** an individual or group is insecure, to the extent their life choices and changes are **taken away**; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in **seeking safety** from domineering threats–whether these are the lack of food for one's children, or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security **creates life possibilities**. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with **opening up space** in people's lives. This allows for individual and collective **human becoming**–the capacity to have some choice about living differently–consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusion follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, **security is not synonymous simply with**

survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is **survival-plus**, the plus being the **possibility to explore human becoming**. As an instrumental value, security is sought because it free people(s) to some degree to do other than **deal with threats** to their human being. The achievement of a level of security –and security is always relative – gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope **to choose to be** or become, other than **merely surviving** as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can **reinvent itself** beyond the merely biological.

Securitization is good – results in contesting antagonistic logic of security and breaks down competitive structures

Trombetta '8

(Maria Julia Trombetta, (Delft University of Technology, postdoctoral researcher at the department of Economics of Infrastructures) 3/19/08 http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Trombetta-the_securitization_of_the_environment_and_the_transformation_of_security.pdf)

On the one hand, an approach that considers the discursive formation of security issues provides a new perspective to analyse the environmental security discourse and its transformative potential. First, it allows for an investigation of the political process behind the selection of threats, exploring why some of them are considered more relevant and urgent than others. The focus shifts from the threats to the collectivities, identities and interests that deserve to be protected and the means to be employed. Second, securitization suggests that the awareness of environmental issues can have a relevant role in defining and transforming political communities, their interests and identities, since the process creates new ideas about who deserve to be protected and by whom. Finally, as Behnke points out, **securitization can open the space for a "genuinely political" constitutive and formative struggle through which political structures are contested and reestablished**.(Behnke 2000: 91) Securitization allows for the breaking and transforming of rules that are no longer acceptable, including the practices associated with an antagonistic logic of security. On the other hand, securitization is problematic because of the set of practices it is supposed to bring about. For the CopS security "carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape."(Wæver 1995: 47) While securitizing an issue is a political choice, the practices it brings about are not. Accordingly, transforming an issue into a security issue is not always an improvement. In the case of the environment, the warning seems clear: "When considering securitizing moves such as 'environmental security'...one has to weigh the always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 29) The School shares the normative suggestion that "[a] society whose security is premised upon a logic of war should be re-shaped, re-ordered, simply changed."(Aradau 2001: introduction) For the CopS this does not mean to transform the practices and logic of security, because, as it will be shown below, for the School, this is impossible. The CopS suggests avoiding the transformation of issues into security issues. It is necessary "to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means, as politics, economy, culture, and so on."(Wæver 1995: 55, quoting Jahn). This transformation, for the CopS, is "desecuritization", and the School has introduced a distinction between politicization - "meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resources allocation s"(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 23) - and securitization - "meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 23) The slogan is: "less security, more politics!"(Wæver 1995: 56) Nevertheless, there are two major problems behind this suggestion. First, if securitization is normatively problematic, desecuritization can be even more problematic. It can lead to a depoliticization and marginalisation of urgent and serious issues, while leaving unchallenged the practices associated with security. In the case of the environment, many appeals to security are aimed at both soliciting action and transforming what counts as security and the way of providing it. Second, within the School's framework, desecuritization cannot be possible. Securitization in fact can be inescapable, the unwanted result of discussing whether

or not the environment is a security issue. As Huysmans has noticed, the performative, constitutive approach suggested by the speech act theory implies that even talking and researching about security can contribute to the securitization of an issue, even if that (and the practices associated with it) is not the desired result. "The normative dilemma thus consists of how to write or speak about security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitization of migration, drugs and so forth."(Huysmans 2002: 43) When the understanding of security is the problematic one described by the CopS, research itself can become a danger. This captures a paradox that characterizes the debate about environmental security. As Jon Barnett has showed in The Meaning of Environmental Security (2001) the securitization of the environment can have perverse effects and several attempts to transform environmental problems into security issues have resulted in a spreading of the national security paradigm and the enemy logic, even if the intentions behind them were different. Barnett has argued that "environmental security is not about the environment, it is about security; as a concept, it is at its most meaningless and malign"(2001: 83) in this way, he seems to accept the ineluctability of the security mindset or logic evoked by securitization. However, his suggestion of promoting a "human centered" understanding of security, in which environmental security is not about (national) security but about people and their needs, within the securitization logic, cannot escape the trap he has described. Why, in fact, should the sort of his claim be different from that of similar ones? 2. The fixity of Security practices   These dilemmas, however, are based on the idea that security practices are inescapable and unchangeable and the theory of securitization, as elaborated by the CopS, has contributed to suggest so. The CopS has achieved the result of making a specific, negative understanding of security – which has characterised the dominant Realist discourse within IR - appear as "natural" and unchangeable since all the attempts to transform it appear to reinforce its logic. To challenge this perverse mechanism it is necessary to unpack securitization further. First, it will be shown that securitization is not analytically accurate, the environment representing a relevant case. Second, the assumptions behind this problematic fixity will be explored.   The CopS explores the specificity of the environmental sector in Security: A Framework for Analysis (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998) (Security hereafter), the theoretical book where the CopS illustrates the theory of securitization and analyses the dynamics of securitization within five relevant sectors. For each sector the School identifies the actors or objects (referent objects) that are threatened, specifies the relevant threats and the agents that promote or facilitate securitization.11[11] The environmental sector is rather different from the others and the transformative intent that is associated with the appeal to environmental security is more evident.12[12] Amongst the peculiarities of the environmental sector described by the School, three deserve a specific analysis for their implications: First, the presence of two agendas - a scientific and a political one; second, the multiplicity of actors; third, the politicization/securitization relationship. They will be analysed in turn "One of the most striking features of the environmental sector," it is argued in Security, "is the existence of two different agendas: a scientific agenda and a political agenda."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71) The scientific one refers mainly to natural science and non-governmental activities. The "scientific agenda is about the authoritative assessment of threat,"(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde admit that "the extent to which scientific argument structures environmental security debates strikes us as exceptional."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) Quoting Rosenau, they suggest that "the demand for scientific proof is a broader emerging characteristic in the international system."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) This 11[11] So for instance in the military sector the referent object is usually the state and the threats are mainly military ones, while in the societal sector the referent objects are collective identities "that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 22-3) 12[12] This is the case even if the School adopts a conservative strategy that appears from the choice of the referent object (or what is threatened). In the first works of the School, the referent object within the environmental sector was the biosphere: "Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend." (Buzan 1991: 19) In Security the School narrows down this perspective and identifies the level of civilization (with all the contradictions that contribute to environmental problems) as the main referent object. This move favours a conservative perspective which considers the securitization of the environment as a way to preserve the status quo and the security strategies on which it is based. Despite this, the description of the environmental sector captures the specificity of the sector and reveals the tensions within the overall framework. questions the "self referentiality" of the speech act security. Are some threats more "real" than others thanks to scientific proof? Can considerations developed to characterize reflective behaviours be applied to natural systems? Even if dealing with these issues is beyond the scope of this article, it is necessary to note that the appeal to an external discourse has serious implications. First, it questions the possibility and opportunity of desecuritization. Is it possible and what does it mean to "desecuritize" an issue which is on the scientific agenda? If scientific research outlines the dangerousness of an environmental problem, how is it possible to provide security? Second, it suggests that security and the practices associated with it can vary from one sector to another and thus from one context to another. The second peculiarity of the environmental sector is the presence of many actors. This contrasts with Wæver's suggestion that "security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites."(Wæver 1995: 57) The multiplicity of actors is largely justified by the School with the relative novelty of the securitization of the environment. "The discourses, power struggles, and securitizing moves in the other sectors are reflected by and have sedimented over time in concrete types of organizations - notably states...nations (identity configurations), and the UN system,"(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71) however, this is not the case with the environment: "It is as yet undetermined what kinds of political structures environmental concerns will generate."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71). In this way a tension appears since the attempts to securitize the environment are described as having a transforming potential, requiring and calling for new institutions. Within the environmental sector securitization moves seem to have a transformative intent that contrasts with the conservative one, that characterizes other sectors. The third peculiarity is that many securitizing moves result in politicization. This is problematic for the School, which argues that "transcending a security problem by politicising it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away from such terms."(Wæver 1995: 56) For the School, once the enemy logic has been inscribed in a context, it is very difficult to return to an open debate. Nevertheless the various politicizations of environmental issues that followed the appeal to security – those the CopS dismissed as failed

securitizations - seem to reinforce the argument, suggested by Edkins, that there is a tendency to politicize issues through their securitization. (Edkins 1999: 11) **This represents another signal that securitization**, within the environmental sector, **can take a different form, and that the problematic aspects of evoking security are not so evident.** Securitization theory, for the CopS, is meant to be descriptive, however the environmental sector suggests that some of its aspects prevent it from providing an adequate instrument for analysis. To understand why this occurs, it is necessary to explore in more detail the conceptualization of security by Wæver, who has introduced securitization.

Our securitiziation is good - Extinction is <u>categorically different</u> than what they criticize --- our ontology/reps of fear are critical to compassion with the Other --- this solves and turns the kritik

Macy 2k

(Joanna Macy, adjunct professor at the California Institute of Integral Studies, 2000, Environmental Discourse and Practice: A Reader, p. 243)

The move to a wider ecological sense of self is in large part a function of the dangers that are threatening to overwhelm us. We are confronted by social breakdown, wars, nuclear proliferation, and the progressive destruction of our biosphere. Polls show that people today are aware that the world, as they know it, may come to an end. This loss of certainty that there will be a future is the pivotal psychological reality of our time. Over the past twelve years my colleagues and I have worked with tens of thousands of people in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, helping them confront and explore what they know and feel about what is happening to their world. The purpose of this work, which was first known as "Despair and Empowerment Work," is to overcome the numbing and powerlessness that result from suppression of painful responses to massively painful realities. As their grief and **fear for the world is** allowed to be **expressed** without apology or argument and validated as a wholesome, life-preserving response, people break through their avoidance mechanisms, break through their sense of futility and **isolation**. Generally what they break through into is a larger sense of identity. It is as if the pressure of their acknowledged awareness of the suffering of our world stretches or **collapses** the culturally **defined** boundaries of the self. It becomes clear, for example, that the grief and **fear** experienced for **our world** and our common future are **categorically different** from similar sentiments relating to one's personal welfare. This pain cannot be equated with dread of one's own individual demise. Its source lies less in concerns for personal survival than in apprehensions of collective suffering – of what looms for human life and other species and unborn generations to come. Its nature is akin to the original meaning of compassion – "suffering with." It is the distress we feel on behalf of the larger whole of which we are a part. And, when it is so defined, it serves as a trigger or getaway to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life in which we are as intricately connected as cells in a larger body. This shift in consciousness is an appropriate, adaptive response. For the crisis that threatens our planet, be it seen in its military, ecological, or social aspects, derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self. It is a mistake about our place in the order of things. It is the delusion that the self is so separate and fragile that we must delineate and defend its boundaries, that it is so small and needy that we must endlessly acquire and endlessly consume, that it is so aloof that we can – as individuals, corporations, nation-states, or as a species – be immune to what we do to other beings.

AT Threat Con

No impact – threat construction isn't sufficient to cause wars

Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, **'9**

(Stuart J, "Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case," *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.** Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

Threats aren't psychological projections and the alt fails

Hoffman, 86

(Stanley, Center for European Studies at Harvard, "On the Political Psychology of Peace and War: A Critique and an Agenda," Political Psychology 7.1 JSTOR)

The traditionalists, even when, in their own work, they try scrupulous-ly to transcend national prejudices and to seek scientific truth, believe that it is unrealistic to expect statesmen to stand above the fray: By definition, the statesmen are there to worry not only about planetary survival, but — first of all—about national survival and safety. To be sure, they ought to be able to see how certain policies, aimed at enhancing security, actually increase in-security all around. But there are sharp limits to how far they can go in their mutual empathy or in their acts (unlike intellectuals in their advice), as long as the states' antagonisms persist, as long as uncertainty about each other's intentions prevails, and as long as there is reason to fear that one side's wise restraint, or unilateral moves toward "sanity," will be met, not by the rival's similar restraint or moves, but either by swift or skillful political or military exploitation of the opportunity created for unilateral gain, or by a for-midable domestic backlash if national self-restraint appears to result in ex-ternal losses, humiliations or perceptions of weakness. There is little point in saying that the state of affairs which imposes such limits is "anachronistic" or "unrational." To traditionalists, the radicals' stance — condemnation from the top of Mount Olympus — can only impede understanding of the limits and possibilities of reform. To be sure, the fragmentation of mankind is a formidable obstacle to the solution of many problems that cannot be handled well in a national framework, and a deadly peril insofar as the use of force, the very distinctive feature of world politics, now entails the risk of nuclear war. But one can hardly call anachronistic a phenomenon—the assertion of national identity — that, to the bulk of [HU]mankind, appears not only as a necessity but also as a positive good, since humanity's fragmentation results from the very

aspiration to self-determination. Many people have only recently emerged from foreign mastery, and have reason to fear that the alternative to national self-mastery is not a world government of assured fairness and efficiency, but alien domination. As for "unrationality," the drama lies in the contrast between the ra-tionality of the whole, which scholars are concerned about—the greatest good of the greatest number, in utilitarian terms — and the rationality or greatest good of the part, which is what statesmen worry about and are responsible for. What the radicals denounce as irrational and irresponsible from the viewpoint of mankind is what Weber called the statesman's ethic of responsibility. What keeps ordinary "competitive conflict processes" (Deutsch, 1983)— the very stuff of society — from becoming "unrational" or destructive, isprecisely what the nature of world politics excludes: the restraint of the partners either because of the ties of affection or responsibility that mitigate the conflict, or because of the existence of an outsider — marriage counselor, arbitrator, judge, policeman or legislator— capable of inducing or imposing restraints. Here we come to a third point of difference. The very absence of such safeguards of rationality, the obvious discrepancy between what each part intends, and what it (and the whole world) ends with, the crudeness of some of the psychological mechanisms at work in international affairs—as one can see from the statements of leaders, or from the media, or from inflamed publics—have led many radicals, especially among those whose training or profession is in psychoanalysis or mental health, to treat the age-old contests of states in terms, not of the psychology of politics, but of individual psychology and pathology. There are two manifestations of this. One is the tendency to look at nations or states as individuals writ large, stuck at an early stage of development (similarly, John Mack (1985) in a recent paper talks of political ideologies as carrying "forward the dichotomized structures of childhood"). One of my predecessors writes about "the correspondence between development of the individual self and that of the group or nation," and concludes "that intergroup or international conflict contains the basic elements of the conflict each individual experiences psychologically" (Volkan, 1985). Robert Holt, from the viewpoint of cognitive psychology, finds "the largest part of the American public" immature, in a "phase of development below the Conscientious" (Holt, 1984). The second related aspect is the tendency to look at the notions statesmen or publics have of "the enemy," not only as residues of childhood or adolescent phases of development, but as images that express "disavowed aspects of the self" (Stein, 1985), reveal truths about our own fears and hatreds, and amount to masks we put on the "enemy," because of our own psychological needs. Here is where the clash between traditionalists and radicals is strongest. Traditionalists do not accept a view of group life derived from the study of individual development or family relations, or a view of modern society derived from the simplistic Freudian model of regressed followers identifying with a leader. They don't see in ideologies just irra-tional constructs, but often rationally selected maps allowing individuals to cope with reality. They don't see national identification as pathological, as an appeal to the people's baser instincts, more aggressive impulses or un-sophisticated mental defenses; it is, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau so well understood, the competition of sovereign states that frequently pushes people from "sane" patriotism to "insane" nationalism (Rousseau's way of preventing the former from veering into the latter was, to say the least, im-practical: to remain poor in isolation). Nor do they see anything "primitive" in the nation's concern for survival: It is a moral and structural requirement. Traditionalists also believe that the "intra-psychic" approach distorts reality. Enemies are **not** mere **projections of negative identities; they are** often quite **real** . To be sure, the Nazis' view of the Jews fits the metaphor of the mask put on the enemy for one's own needs. But were, in return, those Jews who understood what enemies they had in the Nazis, doing the same? Is the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, is the Soviet regime's treatment of dissidents, was the Gulag merely a convenient projection of our intrapsychic battles? Clichés such as the one about how our enemy "understands only force" may tell us a great deal about ourselves; but sometimes they contain half-truths about him, and not just revelations about us. Our fears flow not only from our private fantasies but also from concrete realities and from the fantasies which the international state of nature generates. In other words, the psychology of politics which traditionalists deem adequate is not derived from theories of psychic development and health; it is derived from the logic of the international milieu, which breeds the kind of vocabulary found in the historians and theorists of the state of nature: fear and power, pride and honor, survival and security, self-interest and reputation, distrust and misunderstanding, commitment and credibility. It is also derived from the social psychology of small or large groups, which resorts to the standard psychological vocabulary that describes mental mechanisms or maneuvers and cognitive processes: denial, projection, guilt, repression, closure, rigidity, etc.... But using this vocabulary does not imply that a group whose style of politics is paranoid is therefore composed of people who, as private individuals, are paranoid. Nor does it relieve us of the duty to look at the objective reasons and functions of these mental moves, and of the duty to make explicit our assumptions about what constitutes a "healthy," wise, or proper social process. Altogether, traditionalists find the mental health approach to world affairs unhelpful. Decisions about war and peace are usually taken by small groups of people; the temptation of analyzing their behavior either, literal-ly, in terms of their personalities, or, metaphysically, in terms borrowed from the study of human

development, rather than in those of group dynamics or principles of international politics is understandable. But it is misleading. What is pathological in couples, or in a well-ordered community, is, alas, frequent, indeed normal, among states, or in a troubled state. What is malignant or crazy is usually not the actors or the social process in which they are engaged: it is the possible results. The grammar of motives which the mental health approach brands as primitive or immature is actually rational for the actors. to the substitution of labels for explanations, to bad analysis and fanciful prescriptions. Bad analysis: the tendency to see in group coherence a regressive response to a threat, whereas it often is a rational response to the "existential" threats entailed by the very nature of the international milieu. Or the tendency to see in the effacement or minimization of individual differences in a group a release of unconscious instincts, rather than a phenomenon that can be perfectly adaptive—in response to stress or threats—or result from governmental manipulation or originate in the code of conduct inculcated by the educational system, etc.. . The habit of comparing the state, or modern society, with the Church or the army, and to analyze human relations in these institutions in ways that stress the libidinal more than the cognitive and superego factors, or equate libidinal bonds and the desire for a leader. The view that enemies are above all products of mental drives, rather than inevitable concomitants of social strife at every level. Or the view that the contest with the rival fulfills inter-nal needs, which may be true, but requires careful examination of the nature of these needs (psychological? bureaucratic? economic?), obscures the objective reasons of the contest, and risks confusing cause and function. Indeed, such analysis is particularly misleading in dealing with the pre-sent scene. The radicals are so (justifiably) concerned with the nuclear peril that the traditional ways in which statesmen and publics behave seem to vindicate the pathological approach. But this, in turn, incites radicals to overlook the fundamental ambiguity of contemporary world politics. On the one hand, there is a nuclear revolution—the capacity for total destruction. On the other hand, many states, without nuclear weapons, find that the use of force remains rational (in terms of a rationality of means) and beneficial at home or abroad—ask the Vietnamese, or the Egyptians after October 1973, or Mrs. Thatcher after the Falklands, or Ronald Reagan after Grenada. The superpowers themselves, whose contest has not been abolished by the nuclear revolution (it is the stakes, the costs of failure that have, of course, been transformed), find that much of their rivalry can be conducted in traditional ways — including limited uses of force —below the level of nuclear alarm. They also find that nuclear weapons, while—perhapsunusable rationally, can usefully strengthen the very process that has been so faulty in the prenuclear ages: deterrence (this is one of the reasons for nuclear proliferation). The pathological approach interprets deterrence as expressing the deterrer's belief that his country is good, the enemy's is bad. This is often the case, but it need not be; it can also reflect the conviction that one's country has interests that are not mere figments of the imagination, and need to be protected both because of the material costs of losing them, and because of the values embedded in them. As for war planning, it is not a case of "psychological denial of unwelcome reality" (Montville, 1985). but a — perhaps futile, perhaps dangerous— necessity in a world where deterrence may once more fail. The prescriptions that result from the radicals' psychological approach also run into traditionalist objections. Even if one accepts the metaphors of collective disease or pathology, one must understand that the "cure" can only be provided by politics. All too often, the radicals' cures consist of perfectly sensible recommendations for lowering tensions, but fail to tell us how to get them carried out —they only tell us how much better the world would be, if only "such rules could be established" (Deutsch, 1983). Sometimes, they express generous aspirations — for common or mutual security—without much awareness of the obstacles which conflict-ing interests, fears about allies or clients, and the nature of the weapons themselves, continue to erect. Sometimes, they too neglect the ambiguity of life in a nuclear world: The much lamented redundancy of weapons, a calamity if nuclear deterrence fails, can also be a cushion against failure. Finally, many of the remedies offered are based on an admirable liberal model of personality and politics: the ideal of the mature, well-adjusted, open-minded person (produced by liberal education and healthy family relations) transposed on the political level, and thus accompanied by the triumph of democracy in the community, by the elimination of militarism and the spread of functional cooperation abroad. But three obstacles remain unconquered: first, a major part of the world rejects this ideal and keeps itself closed to it (many of the radicals seem to deny it, or to ignore it, or to believe it doesn't matter). Second, the record shows that real democracies, in their behavior toward non-democratic or less "advanced" societies, do not conform to the happy model (think of the US in Central America). Third, the task of reform, both of the publics and of the statesmen, through consciousness raising and education is hopelessly huge, incapable of being pursued equally in all the important states, and — indeed — too slow if one accepts the idea of a mortal nuclear peril. These, then, are the dimensions of a split that should not be minimized or denied

AT Schlag

AFF = Agency

The AFF specifically activates agency
Hanghoj 8

(Thorkild, University of Aarhus School of Education Assistant Professor, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming", http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin's dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider's (participant) perspective and to an outsider's (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider's perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as "ideological becoming", which represents "the process of selectively assimilating the words of others" (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

The inclusion of hypothetical impact scenarios supercharges the deliberative process by providing a normative means of assessing consequences
Larsen et al 9

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In constructing normative scenarios a set of images are generated illustrating future ways of living, travelling and consuming products and services where certain goal such as a reduced climate impact is fulfilled. These are not predictions of the future, but can be used as a way to act in accordance to achieving a desired future development. They can also be a contribution to the general debate or foundations for policy decisions. These scenarios also often include an account of changes in terms of consumption patterns and behavioural change. In this sense, these scenarios are extended beyond socio-economic predictions and relations to environmental load dealt within other field, such as climatechange predictions in the work of IPCC. The scenarios in focus here build on some predictive elements, but in addition the sustainability focus when including behavioural change also includes some normative elements as how to achieve a sustainable society in the future. In essence, this also means that images of behavioural change are included, but not necessary including explanations on how these changes came about (Larsen & Höjer, 2007). The behavioural change is there formulated by describing level of acceptance (of introducing a new environmental tax) or new behaviour in daily travel patterns (new modes of transport). However, even though scenario construction is often a creative process including a range of participants demanding change, trust is built and ideas exchanged, these processes are seldom analyzed as deliberative processes. Deliberation takes places in communicative processes where participants with diverse opinions, but open to preference shifts, are seen as equal (see Hendriks, Dryzek, & Hunold, 2007). Process values such as learning and mutual understanding are created in addition to outputs such as policies. Experiences from exploring transition pathways towards sustainability distinguish between process management aspects of learning (learns how?), learning about policy options and the context in which decisions take place (learns what?), the subjects of learning (who learns?), and the results of learning (Van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek, 2005: 735). Especially questions such as who takes part in the process and whom these participants are to represent become important since the scenarios often expect great behavioural changes. Is it legitimate to expect all people to change even if they did not feel as they were represented? It is important to keep in mind that scenario making processes are not set up only to share ideas and create mutual understanding, they aim at solving specific targets such as minimizing climate change. Some writers (e.g. Hendriks et al., 2007) underline the importance of deliberative

processes being open and diverse and do not put as much attention to the outcome. Understanding the importance of legitimacy we see the **process** as crucial, but aiming for goals such as **minimized climatechange** both the content and the **impact** of the output are also critical. Thus, we agree with Connelly and Richardson (in press) seeing effective deliberation as a process where stakeholders are engaged and the primary assessment should be regarding the process' "effectiveness in delivering an intended policy". They also underline that governance as a whole should be assessed regarding its possibilities to take action and achieve legitimacy, where legitimacy is understood as "**the recognised right to make policy**" (Connelly & Richardson, in press). There are thus three dimensions Connelly and Richardson (in press) find important: content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy. We believe those dimensions are also important for participatory processes generating scenarios aiming at mitigation as well as adaptation to climatechange, otherwise they will not have any strong (and legitimate) impact on development. Hendriks et al. (2007) make an important distinction between partisan and non-partisan forums. We believe this distinction is important also when analysing scenario generating processes since it affects the legitimacy of the outcome. Partisans can be activists or belong to interest groups, organisations or associations, which strive for particular matters. Partisans are thus committed to certain agendas and are therefore often seen as poor deliberators (Hendriks et al., 2007: 362). However, from a democracy perspective they are seen as important since they legitimate processes by making sure that particular stakes are represented. While partisan forums are made up to represent interest groups in society, non-partisan forums consist of randomly selected citizens, which ideally have rather open preferences. When exploring one partisan and one non-partisan process Hendriks et al. (2007) found that contrary to common expectations, partisan forums can have substantial legitimacy and impact problems. They also found that non-partisan forums might be favourable in deliberative capacity but they might fall short in external legitimacy and policy impact. The fact was that partisan participants accepted that deliberation means that you must be willing to adjust preferences, but they failed to do so (Hendriks et al., 2007: 370). Both the partisan and non-partisan forums included participants who stuck to their positions, but non-partisan participants had greater autonomy "so their deliberative capacity can be judged superior to that of partisan forums" (Hendriks et al., 2007: 371). In the study by Hendriks et al. (2007: 372) legitimacy is defined and operationalized as: "the extent to which key-actors, decision-makers and the media accept and support the procedure and its outcomes." In other words, the legitimacy (as defined in that study) is grounded on actors largely outside the forums active in the deliberation processes. This study also showed (by interviews of experts themselves) that the deliberation by citizens and capacity of lay people was questioned by some experts (Hendriks et al., 2007: 373–374). In addition to this distinction of external legitimacy, the concept of legitimacy is in the literature largely divided in strategic and institutional legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 572). The strategic tradition stresses the managerial standpoint in how organisations making legitimate strategies resulting in manipulating to gain societal support. Hence, rather than emphasising participatory processes (and the inherent process values), these values and the participatory process can be by-passed by e.g. "astroturfing"1 or other strategic options adopted. The branch of institutional studies of legitimacy, instead, emphasizes the "normative and cognitive forces that constrain, construct, and empower the organizational actors" as described in Suchman (1995: 571) examining the two approaches. The conclusion of this examination of the two parallel domains of research on legitimacy concludes three categories: pragmatic (based on audience self-interest), moral (based on normative approval) and cognitive (based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness). In practical cases one of these categories can be more protruding or legitimacy being a blend of these three. The external legitimacy category, discussed previously, share some common traits with the audience self-interest category (labelled pragmatic) in the sense that actors external to the deliberative process (the audience consisting of experts and media) has a strong saying in the legitimate value of the outcome. The constellations of forums and involvement of stakeholders in governance processes is also featured in studies recognised as communicative planning theory (Healey, 1996) and the question also becomes relevant when implementing future-oriented development in European metropolitan regions (Healey, 2000). Campbell (2006) underlines that conceptualization of justice in contemporary planning theory is much about procedural concerns. However, individual liberties may be in conflict or as Campbell (2006: 95) puts it: "In relation to planning matters, the nature of interests is often complex and problematic; for example, individuals generally both desire clean air and to be able to drive their car(s) freely. Our preferences are therefore often inconsistent and overlapping." Also the previous work with Swedish futures studies construction in the 1960–1970s having aims at democratic scenario construction by proposing a "particular responsibility to society's weakest groups" (Andersson, 2006: 288). At that time these groups were discussed in terms of the "weakest groups" (including the poor, elderly, unemployed and the disabled). Other examples of relevance when discussing communication among actors can be found in game theory (Sally, 1995). **Conditions where reciprocity and trust can help overcome self-interests are built by "cheap talk".** As we will see, content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy are intimately connected. Findings from studies of collective actions frequently find that "when the users of a common-pool resource organize themselves to devise and enforce some of their own basic rules, they tend to manage local resources more sustainably than when rules are externally imposed on them" (Ostrom, 2000: 148). Common-pool resources are in this case understood as "natural or humanly created systems that generate a finite flow of benefits where it is costly to exclude beneficiaries and one person's consumption subtracts from the amount of benefits available to others" (Ostrom, 2000: 148). The explanation from game theory is that individuals obtain results that are "better than rational" when they are allowed to communicate, or do "cheap talk" as some economists call it (see e.g. Ostrom, 1998). In other words, communicative approaches can make collaboration work better since people have the possibility to bond with each other. From this reasoning we conclude that in a process where participants are active, open to preference shifts and are allowed to actually influence the result, both the content sustainability and the capacity to act might increase.

Our heuristic overcomes disbelief and mobilizes public responses
<u>Romm 12</u>

(Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, which New York Times columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 "Best Blogs of 2010." In 2009, Rolling Stone put Romm #88 on its list of 100 "people who are reinventing America." Time named him a "Hero of the Environment" and "The Web's most influential climate-change blogger." Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, where he oversaw $1 billion in R&D, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon technology. He is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT., 2/26/2012, "Apocalypse Not: The Oscars, The Media And The Myth of 'Constant Repetition of Doomsday Messages' on Climate", http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2012/02/26/432546/apocalypse-not-oscars-media-myth-of-repetition-of-doomsday-messages-on-climate/#more-432546)

The two greatest myths about global warming communications are 1) constant repetition of doomsday messages has been a major, ongoing strategy and 2) that strategy doesn't work and indeed is actually counterproductive! These myths are so deeply ingrained in the environmental and progressive political community that when we finally had a serious shot at a climate bill, the powers that be decided not to focus on the threat posed by climate change in any serious fashion in their $200 million communications effort (see my 6/10 post "Can you solve global warming without talking about global warming?"). These myths are so deeply ingrained in the mainstream media that such messaging, when it is tried, is routinely attacked and denounced — and the flimsiest studies are interpreted exactly backwards to drive the erroneous message home (see "Dire straits: Media blows the story of UC Berkeley study on climate messaging") The only time anything approximating this kind of messaging — not "doomsday" but what I'd call blunt, science-based messaging that also makes clear the problem is solvable — was in 2006 and 2007 with the release of An Inconvenient Truth (and the 4 assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and media coverage like the April 2006 cover of Time). The data suggest that strategy measurably moved the public to become more concerned about the threat posed by global warming (see recent study here). You'd think it would be pretty obvious that the public is not going to be concerned about an issue unless one explains why they should be concerned about an issue. And the social science literature, including the vast literature on advertising and marketing, **could not be clearer that only repeated messages have any chance of sinking in and moving the needle**. Because I doubt any serious movement of public opinion or mobilization of political action could possibly occur until these myths are shattered, I'll do a multipart series on this subject, featuring public opinion analysis, quotes by leading experts, and the latest social science research. Since this is Oscar night, though, it seems appropriate to start by looking at what messages the public are exposed to in popular culture and the media. It ain't doomsday. Quite the reverse, climate change has been mostly an invisible issue for several years and the message of conspicuous consumption and business-as-usual reigns supreme. The motivation for this post actually came up because I received an e-mail from a journalist commenting that the "constant repetition of doomsday messages" doesn't work as a messaging strategy. I had to demur, for the reasons noted above. But it did get me thinking about what messages the public are exposed to, especially as I've been rushing to see the movies nominated for Best Picture this year. I am a huge movie buff, but as parents of 5-year-olds know, it isn't easy to stay up with the latest movies. That said, good luck finding a popular movie in recent years that even touches on climate change, let alone one a popular one that would pass for doomsday messaging. Best Picture nominee The Tree of Life has been billed as an environmental movie — and even shown at environmental film festivals — but while it is certainly depressing, climate-related it ain't. In fact, if that is truly someone's idea of environmental movie, count me out. The closest to a genuine popular climate movie was the dreadfully unscientific The Day After Tomorrow, which is from 2004 (and arguably set back the messaging effort by putting the absurd "global cooling" notion in people's heads! Even Avatar, the most successful movie of all time and "the most epic piece of environmental advocacy ever captured on celluloid," as one producer put it, omits the climate doomsday message. One of my favorite eco-movies, "Wall-E, is an eco-dystopian gem and an anti-consumption movie," but it isn't a climate movie. I will be interested to see The Hunger Games, but I've read all 3 of the bestselling post-apocalyptic young adult novels — hey, that's my job! — and they don't qualify as climate change doomsday messaging (more on that later). So, no, the movies certainly don't expose the public to constant doomsday messages on climate. Here are the key points about what repeated messages the American public is exposed to: The broad American public is exposed to virtually no doomsday messages, let alone constant ones, on climate change in popular culture (TV and the movies and even online). There is not one single TV show on any network devoted to this subject, which is, arguably, more consequential than any other preventable issue we face. The same goes for the news media, whose coverage of climate change has collapsed (see "Network News Coverage of Climate Change Collapsed in 2011"). When the media do cover climate change in recent years, the overwhelming majority of coverage is devoid of any doomsday messages — and many outlets still feature hard-core deniers. Just imagine what the public's view of climate would be if it got the same coverage as, say, unemployment, the housing crisis or even the deficit? When was the last time you saw an "employment denier" quoted on TV or in a newspaper? The public is exposed to constant messages promoting business as usual and indeed idolizing

conspicuous consumption. See, for instance, "Breaking: The earth is breaking … but how about that Royal Wedding? Our political elite and intelligentsia, including MSM pundits and the supposedly "liberal media" like, say, MSNBC, hardly even talk about climate change and when they do, it isn't doomsday. Indeed, there isn't even a single national columnist for a major media outlet who writes primarily on climate. Most "liberal" columnists rarely mention it. At least a quarter of the public chooses media that devote a vast amount of time to the notion that global warming is a hoax and that environmentalists are extremists and that clean energy is a joke. In the MSM, conservative pundits routinely trash climate science and mock clean energy. Just listen to, say, Joe Scarborough on MSNBC's Morning Joe mock clean energy sometime. The major energy companies bombard the airwaves with millions and millions of dollars of repetitive pro-fossil-fuel ads. The environmentalists spend far, far less money. As noted above, the one time they did run a major campaign to push a climate bill, they and their political allies including the president explicitly did NOT talk much about climate change, particularly doomsday messaging Environmentalists when they do appear in popular culture, especially TV, are routinely mocked. There is very little mass communication of doomsday messages online. Check out the most popular websites. General silence on the subject, and again, what coverage there is ain't doomsday messaging. Go to the front page of the (moderately trafficked) environmental websites. Where is the doomsday? If you want to find anything approximating even modest, blunt, science-based messaging built around the scientific literature, interviews with actual climate scientists and a clear statement that we can solve this problem — well, you've all found it, of course, but the only people who see it are those who go looking for it. Of course, this blog is not even aimed at the general public. Probably 99% of Americans haven't even seen one of my headlines and 99.7% haven't read one of my climate science posts. And Climate Progress is probably the most widely read, quoted, and reposted climate science blog in the world. Anyone dropping into America from another country or another planet who started following popular culture and the news the way the overwhelming majority of Americans do would get the distinct impression that nobody who matters is terribly worried about climate change. And, of course, they'd be right — see "The failed presidency of Barack Obama, Part 2." It is total BS that somehow the American public has been scared and overwhelmed by repeated doomsday messaging into some sort of climate fatigue. If the public's concern has dropped — and public opinion analysis suggests it has dropped several percent (though is bouncing back a tad) — that is primarily due to the conservative media's disinformation campaign impact on Tea Party conservatives and to the treatment of this as a nonissue by most of the rest of the media, intelligentsia and popular culture.

Simulation allows us to influence state policy AND is key to agency
Eijkman 12

(The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal)

However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with role-playing. The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. 'No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore' (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to

achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, policy development simulations—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action ('the five Cs'). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below.

Simulation doesn't jeopardize agency
Hanghoj 8

(Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor.
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Thus, **debate games** require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin's **dialogical philosophy** also offers an explanation of why **debate games** (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and **imagined scenario** both in relation to an insider's (participant) perspective and to an outsider's (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the **outsider's perspective** reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and **find their own voice**. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as **"ideological becoming"**, which represents "the process of selectively assimilating the words of others" (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing **debate scenarios,** it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

PRECONDITION for education
Hanghoj 8

(Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for

4.2.1. Play and imagination Among educational theorists, John Dewey is well-known for stressing the learning potential of play and game activities within education (Makedon, 1993; Vaage, 2000). Thus, Dewey devotes an entire chapter in Democracy and Education to "Play and Work in the Curriculum". In tune with the main argument presented throughout the book, he begins the chapter by noting that it is "desirable" that education, as such, starts "from and with the experience and capacities of learners" (Dewey, 1916: 202). This can be done through the "the introduction of forms of activity, in play and work, similar to those in which children and youth engage outside of school" (Dewey, 1916: 202). Dewey makes no fundamental distinction between play and work activities, as they "both involve ends consciously entertained and the selection and adaptation of materials and processes designed to affect the desired ends" (Dewey, 1916: 210). Thus, play and work mostly differ in terms of "timespans", which "influence the directness of means and ends" (Dewey, 1916: 210). In this sense, play and work activities simply represent two different aspects on a continuum of meaningful relations between ends and means. This assertion also goes against the commonsensical notion that play is goal-free or is an end in itself. In summary, Dewey views play as being meaningful, goal-oriented, and interestbased. Moreover, play is free and plastic as it is both directed toward present and future (projected) activities (cf. chapter 2). However, in order to realise the educational value of play it is necessary to understand play as an imaginative activity (Dewey, 1916: 245). Play activities are too important to be reduced to a purely developmental phenomenon among children: It is still usual to regard this [imaginative] activity as a specially marked-off stage of childish growth, and to overlook the fact that the difference between play and what is regarded as serious employment should be not a difference between the presence and absence of imagination, but a difference in the materials with which imagination is occupied (Dewey, 1916: 245). In this way, play is closely linked with the imagination, which is "the medium of realization of every kind of thing which lies beyond the scope of direct physical response" (Dewey, 1916: 245). Put differently, Dewey's conception of imagination represents "the capacity to concretely perceive what is before us in light of what could be" (Fesmire, 2003: 65). Thus, the educational value of play activities must be based on the understanding that: The imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular movement. The educative value of manual activities and of laboratory exercises, as well as of play, depends upon the extent in which they aid in bringing about a sensing of the meaning of what is going on. In effect, if not in name, they are dramatizations. Their utilitarian value in forming habits of skill to be used for tangible results is important, but not when isolated from the appreciative side. Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it (Dewey, 1916: 245-6; my emphasis added). Play activity as such is no guarantee for avoiding "mechanical methods in teaching" (Dewey, 1916: 245). Thus, the value of **educational gaming** is **entirely dependent** upon whether the imaginative aspects of play are able to support students understanding of "what is going on". In this way, imaginative play allows meaning to be created through "dramatizations" of particular aspects of knowledge. Consequently, the presumably distinct categories of imagination and reality represent a subtle continuum of finely graded experience as human beings do not experience reality directly but always through symbols, language, and social interaction (Waskul & Lust, 2004

AT Tuck and Yang

Suffering Reps Good

Our critique of structural injustice turns vampirism. Contextualizing vulnerability, and the background of injustice balances emphasizing with material suffering and avoiding sentimentality

Michalinos **Zembylas 13**, Education @ Open (Cyprus), "The 'Crisis of Pity" and the Radicalization of Solidarity: Toward Critical Pedagogies of Compassion", *Educational Studies* 49, p. 512-516

First of all, a politics of compassion that takes into consideration the possible dangers of compassion fatigue, desensitization, and self-victimization has to begin from acknowledging common human vulnerability and its influence in **inspiring meaningful actions that avoid presumptuous paternalism** (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). The recognition of one's own vulnerability can constitute a powerful point of departure for developing compassion and solidarity with the other's vulnerability (Butler 2004). As Butler asserts: "Each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies. ... We cannot ... will away this vulnerability. We must attend to it" (2004, p. 29). Butler's description of the vulnerable body and self refers to the way we perform and are performed upon, and part of what we fear in the other is a projection of our own selves. Hence, Butler suggests that recognition of our own vulnerability opens up the potential for recognition of all humanity as vulnerable. Vulnerability may therefore, be a more appropriate term than suffering to ground the political applications of compassion, because **the focus is not merely on the alleviation of material suffering and hence a slide from compassion to benevolence and sentimentality** (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). Suggesting this epistemological shift of focus does not imply however, **that a narrative that focuses on the alleviation of material suffering will necessarily result in a slide into sentimentality.** Undoubtedly, the political applications of compassion cannot be completely separated from questions of material suffering. Thus, it needs to be acknowledged that although the move away from suffering may be theoretically useful, the shift to a narrative of common human vulnerability is not completely unproblematic. 8 The idea of common vulnerability enables us—teachers and **students** in the classroom, for instance—to explore how we might move beyond dichotomies that single out the self or the other as victims, and therefore as deserving someone else's pity. That is, the idea of common vulnerability puts in perspective the notion of all of us as vulnerable, rather than the individual-other who needs our compassion. This notion addresses the concerns of **students** for example, who **seem to be stuck in self-victimization claims and refuse to acknowledge that others also suffer.** Although the idea of common vulnerability does not guarantee any departure from such claims, it opens some space to problematize moralistic positioning. In addition, the notion of common vulnerability attacks a major emotional ideology grounded in the view that it is natural or normal to be fearful of the other, especially if it involves racial differences. This is one of the most common and pernicious emotional ideologies underlying resistance (especially among White, middle-class students) to identifying with the other. However, if vulnerability concerns everyone and yet compassion is assigned differently (i.e., students think that some deserve compassion but others do not), then it is important to explore what it would take for students to begin imagining themselves as objects of lesser compassion in an unsuspected vulnerable moment. Through addressing this issue in ways that do not reify stereotypes or promote essentialism, it is possible to respond to some of the desensitization concerns outlined earlier, because the dichotomies between we and they will become meaningless and unproductive. Second, **compassion serves to reinforce a strong connection between the personal and the political** and accentuates the interpersonal and the interrelational (Whitebrook 2002). **Empathetic identification with the plight of others**, then, **is not a sentimental recognition of potential sameness**—you are in pain and so am I, so we both suffer the same—**but a realization of our own common humanity, while acknowledging asymmetries of suffering**, inequality, and injustice. A discourse of vulnerability neither eschews questions of material suffering nor obscures issues of inequality and injustice; on the contrary, it highlights both the symmetries and the asymmetries of vulnerability. That is, although the experience of vulnerability may be more or less universal, the discourse of common vulnerability raises important critical questions such as "vulnerable to what? to whom?" to dismiss the possibility of sliding into a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—which is exactly what a politics of compassion ardently seeks to avoid. Without this double realization—that is, we are all vulnerable but not in the same manner—our actions run the danger of being a form of charity and condescension toward those who are systematically and institutionally oppressed (Bunch 2002). If properly recognized in schools, this double realization can potentially address both the concern about the desensitization of students and that of their self-

victimization, because **the distance between spectator and sufferer will not be taken for granted** any more, but rather **its multiple complexities will be** acknowledged and interrogated. In a sense then, the kind of compassion that is explored here requires a simultaneous identification and disidentification with the suffering of the other. The simultaneous recognition of symmetry and asymmetry with the other removes the arrogance of claiming that we know and feel their pain and suffering. This emotional ambivalence of simultaneous identification and disidentification is needed to focus attention on the other's suffering, but not becoming too identified with it—a point raised earlier in Nelson's (2004) reading of Arendt's reporting on Eichmann's trial. Students who already endure forms of suffering, of course, do not need a pedagogy to enlighten them how to disidentify with their own suffering. This does not imply, however, that pedagogies that interrogate pity and encourage critical compassion are not for them; on the contrary, the critical awareness that others are vulnerable, too, is important in the struggle for **action-oriented solidarity** and the avoidance of egocentricity and cultural **narcissism**. Finally, the third element of a politics of compassion is attentiveness to how the ethics of compassion questions injustice and inequality. 9 In particular, an important component of a politics of compassion that is critical and justice-oriented is how it deals with anger at injustice (Hoggett 2006). A politics of compassion does not intentionally seek to cause anger, however, but rather encourages students and teachers to develop a critical analysis of anger, as it is likely that they will experience such feelings, when they begin questioning long-held assumptions and beliefs about other people and social events (Zembylas 2007). Anger may call attention to demands for recognition, but also emphasize inequalities (Holmes 2004) and injustices at the civic level (Silber 2011). Anger at injustice can be a positive and powerful source of personal and political insight in education (Lorde 1984), because it helps to move teachers and students out of a cycle of self-pity, blame, or guilt into a mode of action that somehow responds to injustice. For example, civic anger can be promoted in the classroom as a form of cultivating individual and collective political consciousness and social resistance to injustices in the students' community, although anger is not inevitably emancipatory. However, recognizing the positive power of anger and its link to the struggle against injustice in one's own community is valuable, if teachers want to promote options for action that may change the conditions of others' vulnerability. The pedagogical challenge for critical pedagogues is how to encourage students to become active participants with a nuanced understanding of the emotional complexities involved in histories of injustice and oppression.

Their sentiment K is totally wrong---stories of pain combined with political action avoid vampiristic consumption and motivate effective harm-reduction

Rebecca **Wanzo 9**, Associate Professor, Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program, Washington U in St. Louis. The Suffering Will Not Be Televised, 228-232

Despite my disappointment in these films and frequent annoyance with the narrative trajectory of many of their productions, I admit that I have a bit of a soft spot for the Lifetime network. I, too, used to automatically criticize made-for-television movies "inspired by a true story" about women at risk. I found them exploitative, as any film can be that makes entertainment out of a personal tragedy. Lifetime Television has been called "television for victims," in a criticism of its seemingly endless capacity to show fi lms about the victimization of women.5 One of the questions that this moniker raises is what kind of storylines about people have the most dramatic impact. Popular fi lms with high dramatic impact depict violence, stories of surviv- ing some atypical traumatic event, or struggling with some more powerful person or entity. One aspect of the criticisms of Lifetime is the objection to formulaic melodrama in itself, framed within the gendered derision of women's victimization narratives or, on the other side of the political spectrum, discomfort with such narratives as demeaning, reductive, and trite. The fi lms shown on the network, some produced by Lifetime but most produced elsewhere, vary in quality, but the criticisms of Lifetime raise a question that I have explored throughout this book: What is the best way to represent a story of suffering? ¶ 229¶ Simply crying at a Lifetime film clearly cannot sustain any sub- stantive political work— but what if the crying citizen is directed to, at the very least, awareness, and in the best case scenario, action, after their emotional catharsis? Sorrow produced at the sight of a dead or wounded woman may not accomplish anything **unless the representation is framed in relationship to** some **political action**, but tears in relation to abolition and child abduction did produce action. However, a major ethical problem with using sympathy and compassion as the primary mechanism for political change is that sentimental politics depends on the cultural feelings of those in power, and the disempowered must depend on patronage. Hannah Arendt argues that compassion cannot embrace a larger population, but pity can, and pity is a dangerous affect because it cannot exist without misfortune, thus "it has just as much vested interest in the existence of the unhappy as thirst for power has a vested interest in the existence of the weak . . . by being a virtue of sentiment, pity can be enjoyed for its own sake, and this will almost automatically lead to a glorifi cation of its cause, which is the suffering of others."6 ¶ Following Arendt, the charge against Lifetime could be that it thus encourages sadism because watchers could take pleasure in pity. Or, as literary critic Marianne Noble has suggested in her study of sentimentality, the network might embrace masochism because watchers would identify with the sufferer and might begin to take pleasure in these fantasies of subjection.7 **However, these** readings of the pleasures of consuming stories of subjection are too narrow. In the case of Lifetime, casting these films as only narratives of victimization is too limited a reading. After watching several fi lms, I began to be compelled by stories I had not heard before about women interven- ing when the state fails to protect them. The stories were clearly not only about victimization, but also about survival. The movies negotiate a balance between structural critique and stories of individual heroism, and I am often disappointed, as with the fi lms discussed above, with how much weight is placed on the side of individual transformation. Nonetheless I later began defending the network out of political principle, as part of a broader effort to challenge the ¶ 230¶ facile denunciation of the word "victim." Lifetime's fi lms are often poor in terms of artistic merit, but the network is contributing to a national conversation about what agency can look like. ¶ My argument may seem as if I am looking for politics in all the wrong places, relying on

sentimentality when I should focus on politically rational arguments that eschew the appeals of emotional response. I am not asking for radical progressivism from popular culture. Instead, I am arguing that politics is often accomplished through the popular and conventional work of emotional appeals, as many activists throughout history have demonstrated. The question facing activists for African American women—or, for that matter, advocates for any identity group outside the national imaginary of ideal citizenship—is not only how to expose discrimination, but also how to make use of existing rhetoric so that attacks on their bodies can be read as pressing concerns for all U.S. citizens. Affect and popular culture can be easily criticized as tools of anti-intellectual conservative machines. As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno rightly argue, popular culture focuses on producing narratives of comfort or affects that can ultimately serve the state's purposes.8 Totally escaping the political storytelling of the status quo elicited by mass-produced texts is indeed impossible. However, the impossibility of total escape does not preclude the possibility of making use of tools produced by ideology. Mobilizing affect demands use of proven rhetorical tools, but this use need not forestall a criticism of the need to employ the structures in the first place. Negotiating the relationship between challenging the "master's tools" and making use of them to garner financial support and political power is not an easy project, but it is a necessary one. ¶ The book's title is inspired by this very tension between see- ing popular cultural productions as inevitably politically ineffi cacious and recognizing the possibilities offered by making use of widely circulated genres and media. When Gil Scott-Heron produced his famous choreo-poem, "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised," in 1974, he called attention to the disconnect between radical action and violent struggles taking place in the streets and the pleasures of oblivion offered by scripted television and commercials.9 Television stood in for mass-produced media that would not show what was really occurring in the streets, like "pigs shooting down brothers in instant replay." Scott-Heron pointed to the need for his audience to take to the streets and participate, live, in the revolution. Indeed, a ¶ 231¶ rue revolution requires "live" political action and organizing, and television and many cultural productions neglect a multitude of issues that are politically urgent. However, it is clearly no longer the case that "pigs shooting down brothers in the street is left off of instant replay." Important events are depicted on the news, in scripted tele- vision shows, in genre fi ction, in magazines, in movies, and on the Internet. You can even catch the occasional social message in a television commercial. Rather than reject various media wholesale, we are left with a set of questions about what to do with contemporary media realities. How and why are certain kinds of traditionally neglected issues represented? Once represented, how are they interpreted, and can activists play a role in that interpretation? What do activists do about the complexities lost when they make use of certain kinds of mass-marketed discourses? ¶ Octavia Butler perhaps best articulated this problem in her science-fi ction novel Parable of the Talents. The novel exempli es what Lauren Berlant calls the postsentimental text—one that exhibits longing for the unconfl icted intimacy and political promise senti- mentality offers but is skeptical of the ultimate political effi cacy of making feeling central to political change. Her heroine, Olamina, suffers from "hyperempathy" syndrome, which allows her to feel the emotions of others, but Butler is careful to argue that being able to feel the pain of others is not the means for liberation—it is a "delusional disorder." Thus Olamina focuses on other modes of political change, and struggles to gain followers for her politi- cal and spiritual project for survival, Earthseed, in a United States devastated by environmental destruction and the domination of a repressive fusion of government and a religious right organiza- tion called Christian America. Through Olamina's struggle, Butler addresses the intellectual discomfort with consumption by having a character explicitly argue that only strategic commodifi cation will result in successful dissemination of radical ideas. Olamina struggles with the means by which she can circulate Earthseed, until someone suggests to her that she must use the marketing tools she slightly disparages to compel people to her project. Her companion, Len, argues that Olamina must "focus on what people want and tell them how your system will help them get it." She resists the call to "preach" the way her Christian American enemy Jarret does, rejecting "preaching," "telling folksy stories," emphasizing a profi t motive, and self-consciously using her charismatic persona to sell Earthseed. ¶ 232¶ Len argues that her resistance to using the tools of commodifi cation "leaves the fi eld to people who are demagogues—to the Jarrets of the world."10 Butler ultimately presents the moral that the project of producing populist texts for mass consumption cannot be left to those with unproductive or dangerous dreams, abandoned by a Left that desires not only revolution but also political change resulting in real material gains.¶ Clearly, the productions of mass-culture are not the only way to move people to action, but they are no doubt a tool. The dismissiveness accompanying the label of the sentimental in contemporary culture is because academic critics claim that it does not do anything, it is the antithesis of action. However, this book is about how sentimentality is doing things all the time. For better or worse, it teaches people to identify "proper" objects of sympathy. It teaches people how to relate to each other. It teaches people how to make compelling arguments about their pain. The circulation of sentimental political storytelling often depends on media to which many progressives have a schizophrenic relationship. News media and television are often tools of the state, but citizens depend on the news for the free circulation of information and often look for progressive politics in television shows. Others disavow the "idiot box" altogether and have faith only in alternative news sources. However, the dichotomy between the popular and other spaces in which people tell stories about suffering is a false one. Sentimental political storytelling is omnipresent in U.S. culture. While the discourse has many short-comings, people interested in political change are taking a perilous road if they ignore the possibilities of imperfect stories told about citizens in pain.

Blackness Turn

Alt silences black suffering

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Recognizing the political valence of pain—of **speaking pain—is essential to black survival.** Given the poorer health status of African Americans in the United States, the fact that pain is often ignored or borne silently before seeking care, and undertreated once care is sought, those who work with African Americans need to emphasize the right to tell stories of pain. Obstacles to black storytelling not only come from white institutional sources, but they also come from self-perceptions that if African Americans can claim nothing else, they can claim strength. The strong-black-woman stereotype, John Henry, the brave and stoic kids integrating the store, and other models of black strength fill the U.S. imaginary. **Reinterpreting the naming and** speaking of pain can be an act of power, not an act of powerlessness. One person who recognized the power in speaking about pain was Audre Lorde. In The Cancer Journals she described how she wanted people to respond to her cancer in a way that was atten- tive her identity, to the fact that she was black and feminist and a lesbian. After her mastectomy, she journaled, "I want to write about the pain."74 She wanted to write about the pain because she would "willingly pay whatever price in pain was needed, to savor the weight of completion; to be utterly fi lled, not with conviction nor with ¶ 181¶ faith, but with experience—knowledge, direct and different from all other certainties." Writing about the pain, speaking about the pain imparts knowledge, a different kind of knowledge than that validated by the allegedly objective methodologies of medicine and science, but knowledge nonetheless. The example of medical storytelling is a visceral example of how black pain has been dismissed or reframed in relationship to various political agendas. **Sentimental political storytelling, for all its faults, provides an important intervention.** ¶ A Coda on Moving from Spectator/ Spectacle to Agents in Our Own Care¶ This intervention can be, as in the best examples of sentimental political storytelling, both public and private, both therapeutic and a political call to arms. When I saw a call for papers for the "Anarcha Symposium," The Anarcha Project's Michigan workshop, I applied with both public and private work. I shared academic scholarship I had written about Anarcha as well as creative nonfi ction about my surgery, fi nding the rare space in the academy that made space for both. Called together in 2007, many of us engaged in scholarship who did not see ourselves as scholars, in creative performance when we did not see ourselves as performers. The group who came together to discuss Anarcha, J. Marion Sims, and the issues the history raised were eclectic: undergraduates taking classes in disability studies, scholars and performers who focused on African American culture, dancers, singers, those who had movement constraints, and those of us who had constraints that were less visible. Over the course of a few days we performed physical and mental exercises, bonding in both small and large groups in order to shape a performance at the end of our time together. We were transformed from spectators into spectacle, but it was a process of constructing a spectacle that was by no means one way—we looked back in history and looked out to those who could engage with us. While minimalist in presentation, it contained the excesses of our emotional response to Anarcha's history and our presents. ¶ If a problem with sentimental political storytelling is the conflation with other kinds of oppressed bodies, the productively messy conflations pushed us to think about a broader nexus of institutional oppression. We were divided into small performance groups, and we ¶ 182¶ struggled to fi nd a collective response that refl ected all of our readings of Anarcha's, Lucy's, and Betsey's histories, as well as the histories of other unnamed women. On a stark stage, with our bodies, micro- phones, and lights shaping the space, my group produced a short choreo-piece after two days of work in which the group collectively prompted individual stories with the refrain, "This is Anarcha's story, and . . ." it was the story of all of us. One of us challenged the his- torical record that Anarcha "willingly consented" in Sims's narrative while also addressing the issue of her relatives' lack of consent to medical experimentation during the Nazi Holocaust. Another of us without the use of her legs told the story of being sexually molested by a medical caregiver, describing "histories and futures lost . . . one black, one white, one slave, one not . . . neither touched by request, both silenced by circumstance." In drawing a comparison between the invisible stories—Anarcha's and her own—she explored how the broader issue of nonconsent and voicelessness in medical care can be read across history and identity. One of us discussed the lack of choices and resistance when fi ghting "medical men"; another discussed fear shaped by history. Drawing on my history, I added to the chorus with a recognition of my difference from Anarcha as well as my sense of connection to her: "I am not Anarcha," but see her story as my story, "not because my issues are hers, but because I need someone to hear her pain . . . and alleviate it." And as we moved in and out of our individual and collective refrains shaped by our specific stories, the chorus built community, acknowledging the differences between our histories and our similar investments at the same time. We learned, as Boal suggests in Theater of the Oppressed, to "practice theater as a language that is living and present, not as a finished product displaying images from the past."75 ¶ I fi nd telling my own story diffi cult; in some ways, telling the story of pain management after my surgery and telling of the Anarcha Symposium performance are equally diffi cult. Two spaces of judgment are possible—judgment of my tolerance for pain and judgment of my creative work, both of which are linked to what it means to make myself vulnerable. I was advised to cut my personal story from this chapter because of the danger of exposing myself. But if we take sentimental political storytelling seriously as an opportunity to treat affect and the story of pain as essential to political progress, what example would I set if I remained continually in a space of academic distance when I believe in the political efficacy ¶ 183¶ of the sentimental narrative? As a subject who has been raced and pained in the United States, I must don the mantle of articulating my affective investment in recognizing the relationship between race and pain without shame. ¶ As I say that it is hard to talk about pain—broadly—in the U.S. without talking about race, I recognize that the claim can be read as hyperbolic, and inadequately supported. The charge of hyperbole is often leveled against sentimental rhetoric. But a review of history, rhetoric, and social and medical discourse reveals that these concepts are often linked in the United States. When we recognize that we can be subjects of various discourses about race and pain, and not only subject to a specialized language, such a shift in understand- ing **may empower people**, as health-care advocates encourage, to be agents in their own care. Silence, as Audre Lorde, famously wrote, will not protect you.76 Allowing stories of pain to be silenced, dismissed, or obscured, however, will surely kill you. We must speak pain to power.

Perm

That's best --- sentimentality is politically effective when it is recognized as part of a larger project

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However, sentimentality cannot easily be understood as progressive or conservative. When theorists criticize producers of sentimentality for conservative politics, they sometimes attack a rhetoric that is reactionary or designed to serve the status quo. At other times, such critics express disappointment at a text's possibly radical revolutionary or otherwise progressive potential having been short-circuited in favor of feel-good closure offered by the sentimental narrative. World Trade Center provoked exactly this response from movie critic David Edelstein, who wanted the fi lm about the event of 9/11 to be "more political," because the "heartwarming conclusion" to the fi lm is "unrepresentative—to the point where it almost seems like a denial of the deeper and more enduring horror."22 Sentimental texts present themselves frequently as progressive about social justice issues while they eventually preserve the status quo. Indeed, that is an overlying tendency of most sentimental texts. However, the binaries of good and bad, Left and Right are insufficient to categorize sentimentality as it does, by its nature, have a progressive political thrust. It addresses the suffering of the politically disadvantaged but utilizes conventional narratives and practices that will not fundamentally disrupt power. Rather than characterizing U.S. sentimentality as "good" or "bad" politics, a more precise characterization—albeit more of a mouthful and less dramatic—is to call it a **politically effective** but insufficient means of political change.

AT Col K

Wrong

Their colonialism K is WRONG
Youngs, Director-General FRIDE, '11

[February 2011, Richard- Professor Politics University of Warwick, "Misunderstanding The Maladies Of Liberal Democracy Promotion" http://www.eurasiareview.com/misunderstanding-the-maladies-of-liberal-democracy-promotion-18022011/]

Reflections on liberalism's future Current international political trends are complex and still in flux. History shows that there are no iron laws of democratisation, and dominant political dynamics can prove strikingly changeable. The easy triumphalism of the liberal democracy agenda in the 1990s was misplaced. However, much criticism now risks over-shooting.18 The Bush administration provided an easy dog to kick. But its excessive awfulness skewered the nature of conceptual debate: critical theory has become as lacking in self-reflexivity as the 'liberal imperialism' it everywhere sees and excoriates. A nuanced view is warranted of the 'democracy backlash'.19 We should be attentive to a lack of flexibility in the conceptualisation of democracy. The consideration of a variety of models is necessary and desirable. However, the evidence does not sustain the suggestion that the most serious problem with democracy promotion today is an excess of the 'liberal' in liberal democracy. Indeed, in many places quite the reverse is true. The most worrying problem is not practitioners' lack of willingness to consider varieties of democratic institutions, but the lack of priority attached to advancing core liberal rights. As Western powers decline, this trend is likely to deepen in the future. Liberalism will increasingly be on the back foot. In this sense, those that assume that liberalism is dominant risk lagging behind the policy curve. Dahl's definition of democracy may be partial and narrow, but can we really not say with confidence that it is better than the authoritarianism that the West is still propping up under the guise of respect for 'local values'? Moreover, the 'liberal overdose' argument is curious to the extent that since the end of the 1990s a central thrust of debate common to development, security and governance circles has been 'the rediscovery of the state'. The stress on core liberal political norms is today under- not over-played. It continues to be the centrally important area where local reformers look to the international community for support – most commonly, in vain. Deliberations over precise institutional configurations and second-generation reforms are of a lesser order of importance. Michael McFaul observes that some debates about the intricate sequencing of reform and different varieties of institutional pathways look incongruous, as the US can today do little to influence such details, but rather simply back core democratic values.20 Yet it still hesitates to do so, for all the standard commentary on US 'liberal imperialism'. Liberal internationalism is still de-legitimised by the pervasive assumption that it is concerned primarily with mobilising military force in support of democratic values; it must be made clearer that military power is simply anathema to the standard day-to-day agenda of democracy support. There are different levels of critique, which risk elision. One thing is to argue that Western powers should support core liberal democratic principles, then from this base work to build into their policies a concern with social equality, participation, deliberation and religious identity. It would be entirely convincing to argue that, while democracy promoters have advanced, they could and should be doing more in this direction. But it is quite another thing to suggest that such aims should be supported against or instead of core liberal norms. In practice, what many critics appear to advocate is not a cumulative combination, but a dilution of the liberal component in favour of other forms. They betray a core inconsistency: they dislike democracy promotion for being overly intrusive, but then advocate modifications that would make it more, not less, intrusive. This is because most suggested 'alternative forms of democracy' breach the line between process and substantive policy outputs – they advocate particular ends, not just a type of policy-making means. The concrete examples of European policies demonstrate that it is hardly credible to 'accuse' Brussels of being an unthinking citadel of blinkered liberalism. Indeed, in this author's experience, conversations with policy-makers reveal this to be akin to an almost unmentionable L-word. When so much doubt and ambivalence now suffuses democracy support strategies, it is unconvincing to admonish the latter for being uniformly, heavily prescriptive. Donors' tendency to see democracy

through the prism of their own political systems still often surfaces. But in terms of the way that the 'democracy' in democracy support is defined conceptually it would seem somewhat redundant now to warn donors of the dangers of heavily-prescriptive institutional templates. There is some evidence of the self-reflexive policy-learning on the part of democracy promotion practitioners that many critics assume is entirely lacking. Indeed, genuine doubt over the most suitable paths forward has reached the point where some actors' policies are reduced to immobilism. The problem is that while policy-relevant knowledge has accumulated, it has done so in an ad hoc fashion and has not been systematised into common or comprehensive new approaches.21 The influences on democracy strategy of academic traditions are eclectic. If we were to trace the philosophical roots of European good governance and democracy support policies, it is simply not the case that Locke prevails over all else. The breadth of democracy assistance programmes goes way beyond the Schumpeterian. The stress on the role of the state and the existential identity-value of the political community found in many current policy initiatives finds resonance (if unconsciously) in thinking that historically stood as the antithesis to political liberalism. Such a line can be traced from Aristotle's view of the political community as a biological organism; to Rousseau's insistence that the general will embodies a mystical, spiritual collective identity of the political community above and beyond the will of the majority; through to Hegel's system centred on the state as the organic embodiment of collective interests and identity, the 'absolute' within which the individual finds his very meaning. This is not to say any such strand of thinking would capture entirely the ideas that inform today's foreign policies. However, the pertinent point is that the underpinnings of these policies can be seen in writers who were in combat with Lockean liberalism. The standard European discourse on equality being more important than formal political democracy has a direct echo in (politically) anti-liberal Rousseau. Concerns over the 'tyranny of the majority' that inform power-sharing strategies in post-conflict situations have a long line of antecedent philosophers who inveighed strongly against the will of the majority, from Aristotle through even to Kant (who was concerned with the republican separation of executive and legislation but certainly not with augmenting popular power against the aristocracy). Even Benthamite radical utilitarianism shines through, in its concern with a strong rule of law to restrain individual freedoms and ensure greater equality in the furtherance of collective interests. If any modern philosopher is the thinker of choice for today's discerning Eurocrat it is Habermas, not the classic liberals. In general, deliberative democracy has been most widely advocated as a means of situating abstract cosmopolitan universalism within concrete and varied social settings.22 And all this is quite apart from the more obvious cases of

cynical realpolitik that take their cue from the more violent illiberalism of Machiavelli and Hobbes.23 It is self-evident that liberal democracy now shares the conceptual field with rivals in a way that it did not in the 1990s. This may provide for vibrant debate and much-needed selfexamination. But it does not necessarily mean that alternatives have superior legitimacy. Allowing analytic space for a wider variety of forms and definitions of democracy does not mean that sovereign democracy, Islamic democracy, tribal democracy or Bolivarian democracy are necessarily superior or more in tune with local demands. With the West accused of being overly-prescriptive of a liberal form of democracy, it would be subversive of the critique to jump straight into advocating other pre-cooked forms. It should be remembered that a form such as social democracy is just as 'Western' in it origins as liberal democracy: there is no reason a priori to assume that it corresponds more closely to 'local demands' in the way that is routinely and rather uncritically suggested (however one may oneself desire socially democratic outcomes). If the ascendance of conceptual competitors can add usefully to the parameters of desirable political reform, it is not incompatible with this that they should at the same time sharpen the West's defence of core liberalism. Critical theorists skate a thin line: they issue pleas for a rethinking of democracy, but scratch beneath the surface and what they really lionise is undemocratic state-led development; theirs is in fact not a genuine concern with reconceptualising democracy so much as a pretty wholesale questioning of the democracy agenda, dressed up in softened discourse. A central pivot of many such critiques is the criticism of liberalism's teleological arrogance. But this centres too much on one influential book published at one rather distinctive moment in time24; liberalism more broadly and properly understood is not teleology. Moreover, many writers argue against teleology and prescription but then in the next breath confidently assert that social democracy must be a superior and more acceptable form of democracy outside the West and one which has a more sustainable long-term future. This may be the case, but they have no philosophical justification for saying so without replicating the very same methodological features they profess to dislike in 'liberal' tenets – and thus contradicting themselves. Clearly, more debate about different forms of political representation would be healthy. Allowing space for a plurality of routes to and types of political reform would sit well with the core spirit of democracy. However, while more flexibility and open mindedness are still required in democracy promotion, there is a risk of being unduly defensive about the virtues of liberal democracy's core tenets. The problem in many places of the world is the absence of liberalism's core values, not their excess. Vigilance in the need for democracy's reconceptualisation is

indeed merited. But it would be a muddled reasoning that took this to provide a case for the wholesale pull back from the (already anaemic) support for liberal democracy's notion of fundamental political rights. We need more fully to understand local demands. But there is an automatic assumption routinely made that such demands are for more diverse, anti-liberal political forms. This may in many places be the case, but the evidence must be assembled. One cannot simply assert this as if it were axiomatic to the emerging world order; there is no reason for supposing a priori that this is a natural outcome of the rebalancing of international order. The evidence that exists points, again, to a more nuanced conclusion: a demand for the essential tenets of liberal universalism, made relevant to and expressed through the language and concepts of local cultures and histories. A growing focus within political philosophy has been on 'capabilities': negative liberal freedoms need to be deepened but also combined with the locally-rooted capabilities that ensure their effective realisation.25 The central thrust of Locke's liberalism was anti-dogmatism and prudence. The irony – and, for anyone concerned over democracy's health, the tragedy – is that international support for a supposedly liberal democratic agenda is today associated with exactly the opposite of these values. It is the non-dogmatic spirit that liberalism must work to recover: liberal democracy as a system that (simply) creates space for a variety of different local choices. Advocates and opponents of liberalism are trapped in a circular debate over this matter: while core liberal freedoms are required to make such local choices, critics insist that those very liberal rights are themselves a corruption of local autonomy. The imperative is not for liberalism to cede to other creeds, but to work towards squaring the circle that has always existed at its heart: that is, liberalism is in its very essence the rejection of utopian political design, yet, if not pursued with care, it can appear as an unbending utopia. This defines its challenge: can liberalism stand convincingly as an anti-utopian creed whose own propulsion requires courageous normative conviction? Can it strike the Rawlsian balance of deepening a plurality of values without descent into relativism?

Sovereignty is not a western notion. It predates the colonizers.

Cobb 6 (Amanda J Cobb, June 2006, American Studies Journal, Kansas University, pp. 118-119, Accessed 7/19/15, https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/view/2956/2915) CH

At base, sovereignty is a nation's power to self-govern, to determine its own way of life, and to live that life—to whatever extent possible—free from interference. This is no different for tribal sovereignty, which by and large shares the attributes and characteristics of sovereignty as contextualized above. Native nations are culturally distinct peoples with recognizable governments and, in most cases, recognizable and defined territories. The sovereignty of Native nations is inherent and ancient. For Native nations within the boundaries of the United States, the underscoring of the inherent nature of sovereignty is critical because of the colonial process—a process that continues to dramatically diminish our ability to fully exercise tribal sovereignty. As David Wilkins (Lumbee) and K. Tsianina Lomawaima (Creek/Cherokee) have argued, "Tribes existed before the United States of America, so theirs is a more mature sovereignty, predating the Constitution; in that sense, tribal sovereignty exists 'outside' the Constitution."15 Kidwell and Velie agree that sovereignty "is held to be an inherent right" but emphasize that "its political effect depends upon its recognition by other sovereigns."16 Inherency and recognition are characteristics of sovereignty for all nations; however, the recognition and respect necessary to exercise sovereignty fully has not been consistently accorded Native nations by other sovereigns, particularly the United States. In fact, "[f]rom 1775 to the present, federal and state intentions toward tribes have changed direction in various ways. One could argue that indeterminacy or inconsistency is the hallmark of the tribal federal relationship."17 Because of this inconsistency, Native nations must constantly endeavor to exercise their sovereignty "under negotiation with states, in federal courts, and with the Congress of the United States."18 That dynamic is virtually inescapable for tribal peoples on one level or another. The recognition and exercise of tribal sovereignty is complicated by the power imbalance between the United States and Native nations. The American nation-state is so powerful, so hegemonic, that its cloak of sovereignty becomes almost invisible. The United States is so used to

looking through the lens of its own powerful sovereignty—and, importantly, to having that image reflected back to it by other nations—that the United States, including its citizens, too often cannot recognize that what is looked through is merely a lens. Too often, the United States falls into the trap of mistaking that lens for its eye. As Alfred has pointed out, "the Western view of power and human relationships is so thoroughly entrenched that it appears valid, objective, and natural."19 In other words, United States sovereignty has become normalized to such an extent that it rarely questions or is even conscious of any limit to its own sovereign power

Sovereignty good – helps make concrete political change on behalf of natives.

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The concept of sovereignty, however convoluted and contradictory, remains an important part of federal Indian law. Tribal councils established under the Indian Reorganization Act are regarded as vehicles of "tribal sovereignty"; they act as governments and not just as corporations, though they are often limited by federal funding and authority. Indian hunting and fishing rights have been protected against state and local regulation, though an ultimate authority has been reserved outside the realm of tribal sovereignty. Indian nations are regarded as immune from suit without their consent, under the doctrine of "sovereign immunity," yet their power over non-members of the particular nation is sometimes severely limited. In short, the idea that indigenous nations have at their roots some aspect of their original, pre-colonial status as independent nations operates -- sometimes directly and sometimes by implication -- throughout federal Indian law today. This idea is accompanied by the colonial legacy of superior authority claimed over indigenous nations by the federal government. Both these ideas have been part of federal Indian law from its inception, and are the reason why Chief Justice Marshall could say, in formulating the foundations of this law in the *Cherokee Nation* case, "The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence."

We don't defend the western notion of seovereignty – we defend indigenous sovereignty, or self-determination.

Gilio-Whitaker, 13 (Dina. Research Associate at CWIS, Freelance Writer and Indigenous Studies Scholar, MA University of New Mexico, American Studies, BA University of New Mexico, Native American Studies. "Indian Self-Determination and Sovereignty." *Indian Country Today Media Network.com*. 17 Jan. 2013. Web. 26 July 2015. http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/indian-self-determination-and-sovereignty-147025)TB

In general there's a huge difference between what the federal government means when it talks about Indian sovereignty and self-determination and the kind tribal nations mean. Although it can be said that the concepts probably vary from tribe to tribe, self-determination for Indian people overall is representative of the state of political independence that existed prior to colonization. The process of colonization has given a new meaning to the idea of self-determination for the colonized, and the process of decolonizing the relationships between tribes and the United States is, at least in part, about how we define the terms of "sovereignty" and "self-determination." Self-determination and sovereignty have become concepts that colonizing states have defined for the colonized, and indigenous peoples worldwide have pushed back against those limiting and self-serving definitions, which is why it took 22 years to pass the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Self-determination and sovereignty for indigenous peoples is seen by colonizing states (especially the US) as "aspirational," that which doesn't really exist

but may (or may not) at some point in the future. There is, however, an important difference between the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty, reflected in a growing and sophisticated body of academic literature by Native scholars. For example, we find that the roots of the concept of sovereignty (and the modern nation-state) are in feudal European monarchies, characterized by hierarchical power structures with profound religious overtones. Because these kinds of governing structures were typically foreign to indigenous peoples, sovereignty is said to be an inappropriate concept for Indian nations. Self-determination, on the other hand, is as the name implies the ability to be self-determining independent of an outside power. The problem is that in the context of a colonial relationship such as the one between the United States and tribal nations, self-determination is reduced to the ability of a tribal nation to be merely self-governing. There's nothing innately wrong with tribes being allowed to govern themselves (as they have always done), but it leaves unaddressed a whole host of other problems that the colonial relationship presents, embodied in the system of domestic law that tribal nations are unconsentingly subjugated to, complete with its doctrines of discovery, plenary power, domestic dependent nationhood and trust. It is still a paternalistic relationship with tribes generally thought of as incapable, if not undeserving of the type of self-determination reserved for nation-states—despite their centuries-long histories of foreign relations with outside and international actors.

Global/Local

Alt = Conservatism

The left is failing because of a suspicion of the nation state – we might fight the right at all levels in order to be effective

Grayson and Little 11

(Deborah Grayson and Ben Little 4 August 2011, The far right are the masters of network politics, not the 'internationalist' left, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/deborah-grayson-and-ben-little/far-right-are-masters-of-network-politics-not-internationa)

While Norway mourns and attends to matters of justice, across Europe the left would be wise to pause and reflect upon the mixed responses to the worst case of child murder in northern Europe since the Second World War. We can only hope that Anders Breivik is a lone operator and that we will not see this kind of politically motivated mass murder repeated in the UK or anywhere else, but in showing how right wing ideology is formed and disseminated through increasingly international networks, the Utoya massacre has lessons for us all.

Although globally oriented 'lefties' may like to think this is a contradiction in terms, it is the far right who are pioneering the way towards a new form of internationalism. This is not to say that they have lost their attachment to the nation – for all that vigilantes like Breivik may think in civilisational or European terms, "small state" nationalism remains the bedrock of their politics. Those that see the blurring of boundaries between European and national perspectives as a sign of incoherence which will diminish the power of these ideological beliefs are mistaken. In an age of network politics it's a strength, and one that the left needs to understand if we are to reverse the electoral successes of the centre-right and the populist rise of the far-right across Europe. So far, the left has struggled to match the way far-right networks have learned to scale seamlessly from the local to the civilisational through the conceptual space of the national. The English Defence League, for example, explain local opposition to their marches as stemming from the malign influence of the SWP's campaign, Unite Against Fascism; cite the welfare state as evidence of leftist domination in national politics; and see in the European Court of Human Rights the imposition of socialist, multicultural values across the entire continent. This sense of multiple scales allows the EDL to create a language that reflects their politics at every level, and to communicate their message across local and national boundaries. They create a unified rhetoric that the left, with their suspicion of the national, cannot replicate.

Perm Solves

Perm Do Both –connecting the global and local are key to movements success AND Acting only at the local level ensures domination **is just moved to some other locality**

Davis (Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Hawaii) **11**
(Sasha, The US military base network and contemporary colonialism: Power projection, resistance and the quest for operational unilateralism, Political Geography xxx (2011))

 In this analysis of the shifting US military base network I have endeavored to examine the impacts and resistances going on in these "towns and villages" so as to better understand the US military's global network. As geographers have long been aware, <u>acting at the global or local scale is not an either/or choice</u>: <u>acting in the world at any scale has ramifications at a variety of scales</u>. Increasingly, <u>local anti-militarization groups have recognized this and have started to more formally engage in activism at a variety of other scales including the global</u>. At the global conference against military bases in 2007 activists put forward the view that the global imperial present is held together by violences committed in (colonized) place. That violence may be wielded globally, but it is produced at local sites. Furthermore, its operation relies on particular sites being legitimately seen as landscapes of emptiness or sacrifice. So when people resist these interpretations of place and claim them as places of life it not only makes everyday life more tolerable but also has repercussions at other scales. The military has currently been able to use its ability to spatially shift its activities to maintain its domination. <u>Activists</u>, however, <u>are attempting to incorporate a global vision into their movements so that local victories do not become someone else's loss; rather   they become the beginning of the empire's unraveling</u>.

AT Cooption/State

And despite threats of cooption, being able to forge ties with those in power is necessary to the success of movements

Yeo (Assistant Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America) **11**
(Andrew, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests, Cambridge University Press, pg 196-7)

In the previous section, 1 covered several policy implications and prescriptions for U.S. overseas basing strategy. What insights and lessons can be drawn for anti-base movements? I offer four sets of recommendations for activists regarding anti-base movement strategy and advocacy. The first suggestion stems directly from the security consensus framework: when possible, activists should form ties with political elites. As discussed in the introductory chapter, U.S. base policies are ultimately decided by government officials. Therefore, anti-base movements gain greater leverage and influence on basing policy outcomes when they form ties with key elites. This was certainly the case with successful anti-base movements such as the Anti-Treaty Movement in the Philippines and No Bases Coalition in Ecuador. Although not included in this volume, ties qeen Puerto Rican anti-base activists and several U.S. congressional repre utatives helped activists shut down Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Vieques it, Loo-i. The support of several prominent U.S. political figures such as Hillary Clinton and Jesse Jackson, and the direct involvement of U.S. representatives 11ch as Nydia M. Velasquez and Luis V. Gutierrez, increased publicity and political leverage for the Vieques movement.57 Encouraging anti-base movements to form ties with sympathetic elites seems u'f-evident. Yet, one might find surprising the level of resistance to this suggestion by some activists. Ties to political elites raise the specter of co-optation. The lack of trust in politicians, the political establishment, or more generally formal politics often stems from activists' own experience and interaction with government officials over the course of several movement episodes. This attitude was expressed by several anti-base activists in South Korea, Japan, and even the Philippines. Activists in \ticeura also faced heated discussions over strategy: Should they maintain support for radical left parties? At the local level, should movement leaders move from informal to more formal avenues of politics? Although the wariness of movements in engaging formal political actors is understandable, research across several anti-base movement episodes suggests that movements that form alliances with political elites and engage base politics through both formal and informal channels tend to have a greater impact on basing policy outcomes.

AT Tradeoff

No Trade Off

a. Rooted cosmopolitanism solves their offence – their focus arguments are a false dichotomy. Our evidence includes testimony from activists that empirically disprove their value to life claims

Yeo (Assistant Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America) **9**
(Andrew, Not in Anyone's Backyard: The Emergence and Identity of a Transnational Anti-Base Network, International Studies Quarterly (2009) 53, 571–594)

The choice between local and global is admittedly a false dichotomy. Although an activist may identify more closely with their local movement over the global anti-base movement or vice-versa, to some degree, actors identify with both movements. In response to a question asking whether one identifies more with the local or global movement, a Philippine activist and IOC member reported, ''[i]t is important for me to say both (emphasis hers). My work and grounding in the national anti-bases movement in the Philippines is what I carry and take with me as part of the Global No Bases Movement. Both works have to be integrated. I can not be an effective member of a global No Bases movement if I am not grounded in our own local struggle in the Philippines.'' This comment is telling because it sheds light on the identity of transnational anti-base activists. The IOC member's comment confirms what scholars have earlier argued about transnational activists: they are ''rooted cosmopolitans.'' The notion of a rooted cosmopolitan is what enables activists to connect their local frame of movement with the global No Bases movement.

b. Working at the global level does not erase local concerns – modern anti-militarism movements proves

Yeo (Assistant Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America) **9**
(Andrew, Not in Anyone's Backyard: The Emergence and Identity of a Transnational Anti-Base Network, International Studies Quarterly (2009) 53, 571–594)

Without denying the importance of previous anti-base solidarity efforts, I argue that the Iraq War enabled anti-base activists to take advantage of global frames to accelerate the process of organizing an international network against foreign military bases. For sure, a small space at the transnational level existed even prior to the Iraq War through processes of diffusion and scale shift. The Iraq War, however, facilitated a horizontal spillover process. In particular, anti-base actors active in broader anti-war and global justice movements acted as brokers, taking concrete steps in forming an international anti-base network. Through frame-bridging and frame extension, anti-base activists were able to reframe the bases issue. A master frame identifying military bases as ''instruments of war and impe-rialism'' naturally resonated with actors in the larger ''network of networks.'' Whether intentional or not, this master frame helped solidify a transnational anti-base identity. Paradoxically, however, I argue that even as actors crossed horizontal divides and vertical gaps to come together at the transnational dimen- sion, transnational identities did not necessarily replace national ones, confirming the notion of transnational activists as ''rooted cosmopolitans.'' This conclusion is supported by the author's findings through participant observation, group discussions, and a preliminary survey conducted at the 2007 International No Bases conference. Figure 1 highlights the vertical and horizontal processes behind the emerging international No-Bases network.

AT Security

No Impact

No impact to our process of securitization --- it's a process
Ghughunishvili 10

(Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf)

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to "rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a 'one-way causal' relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

Expertism Good

Expertise inevitable and good on national security- the alt fails
Cole '12

Rana is right to focus our attention on the assumptions that frame modern Americans' conceptions about national security, but his assessment raises three initial questions. First, it seems far from clear that there ever was a "golden" era in which national security decisions were made by the common man, or "the people themselves," as Larry Kramer might put it.8 Rana argues that neither Hobbes nor Locke would support a worldview in which certain individuals are vested with superior access to the truth, and that faith in the superior abilities of so-called "experts" is a phenomenon of the New Deal era.9 While an increased faith in scientific solutions to social problems may be a contributing factor in our current overreliance on experts,10 I doubt that national security matters were ever truly a matter of widespread democratic deliberation. Rana notes that in the early days of the republic, every able-bodied man had to serve in the militia, whereas today only a small (and largely disadvantaged) portion of society serves in the military.11 But serving in the militia and making decisions about national security are two different matters. The early days of the Republic were at least as dominated by "elites" as today. Rana points to no evidence that decisions about foreign affairs were any more democratic then than now. And, of course, the nation as a whole was far less democratic, as the majority of its inhabitants could not vote at all.12 Rather than moving away from a golden age of democratic decision-making, it seems more likely that we have simply replaced one group of elites (the aristocracy) with another (the experts). Second, to the extent that there has been an epistemological shift with respect to national security, it seems likely that it is at least in some measure a response to objective conditions, not just an ideological development. If so, it's not clear that we can solve the problem merely by "thinking differently" about national security. The world has, in fact, become more interconnected and dangerous than it was when the Constitution was drafted. At our founding, the oceans were a significant buffer against attacks, weapons were primitive, and travel over long distances was extremely arduous and costly. The attacks of September 11, 2001, or anything like them, would have been inconceivable in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Small groups of non-state actors can now inflict the kinds of attacks that once were the exclusive province of states. But because such actors do not have the governance responsibilities that states have, they are less susceptible to deterrence. The Internet makes information about dangerous weapons and civil vulnerabilities far more readily available, airplane travel dramatically increases the potential range of a hostile actor, and it is not impossible that terrorists could obtain and use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.13 The knowledge necessary to monitor nuclear weapons, respond to cyber warfare, develop technological defenses to technological threats, and gather intelligence is increasingly specialized. The problem is not just how we think about security threats; it is also at least in part objectively based.

Expertism means our epistemology is sound – the alternative devolves into stereotypes and biases that collapses epistemology and turns the kritik
Snjezana 10

Let us define expertism as being a position that is composed of three statements: (i) experts exist; (ii) we should ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to experts due their exceptional expertise; (iii) therefore, we have the epistemic right to trust experts without evidence. Expertism is a genuine anti-evidentialist position with regards to trusting experts. 1. Experts exist. While it is rather plausible that

there are experts in science because they deal with facts, the existence of moral or aesthetic experts, who deal with values, is generally much more problematic. For instance, Milton Friedman holds that differences in values are differences caused by people's tastes which are more or less hardwired, undebatable and unchangeable (Friedman, 1984). Logical positivists believe that value judgments are "nonsense" and cannot be a matter of expertise because they are not verifiable. Many people think that most people have reasonable ethical competence and that philosophers (who are the prime candidates for moral experts) are inclined to the same self-serving rationalizations as other people. However, the untouchable status of experts in science can be disputed. From Kant, Kuhn, Quine to Goodman and Putnam, we are aware of an intelligible objection that theoretical hypotheses involve a theory laden, cognitively biased, socially manipulated and subjective interpretation of the world (Goldman, 1999). Also, in science as well as in ethics and aesthetics there are battles between experts who propose opposite theories. In spite of the fact that claiming the first thesis is not without its difficulties, I will assume that it is correct: there are people who are objective (not only reputational) experts. These objective experts are people who, in comparison with other people, are more effective in problem solving. When compared with other people, they are better guides to the truth or better in recognizing a false statement as false, and a true one as true.While the views of ordinary people are typically an ill sorted mass of material derived from experience and tradition which contains inconsistencies and tensions, skilled experts can detect inconsistencies, fallacious inferences, unwarranted generalizations and false premises. In contrast to the average person in ordinary epistemic circumstances, they possess knowledge about the appropriate methods of research and argumentation, more systematized information derived from long term experience of dealing with difficulties, distinctions, critics, and alternative conceptions. They are generally better trained to deal with epistemic, moral or aesthetic issues. Or, we can say like Aristotle that it is reasonable to suppose that none of them can miss the target totally, and that each has gotten something or even a lot of things right. 2. Distinctive testimonial status. In expertism, it is claimed that an expert's testimony requires considerable epistemic deference. I can see at least three reasons why would one ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to experts: (i) standing practice about an expert's reliability; (ii) insufficiency of evidence; (iii) epistemic dependence. Firstly, it could be seen that we have an epistemic right to treat an expert's knowledge and sincerity with the utmost credulity because there is a standing practice, social climate or ongoing policy that considers experts to be the most reliable sources of knowledge or that they are fundamental testimonial authorities in society (Pappas, 2000). By assuming such credentials about experts, it could be seen that a hearer may believe what an expert says without assessment, evaluation or additional evidence. Secondly, many philosophers hold that our evidence in favour of other people's testimonies is principally insufficient (Beanblossom, Lehrer, 1970; Coady, 1981; Webb, 1993; Foley, 1994). If it is true, our evidence in favour of an expert's testimony is even more insufficient: when a layperson relies on an expert, that reliance is necessary blind (Hardwig, 1991).3 We, as non-experts in a domain, cannot ever possess enough evidence to evaluate an experts' testimony as credible or non credible. An ordinary cognizer in ordinary epistemic circumstances does not possess, or even can never attain, a high enough level of expertise to evaluate the testimonies of experts. We simply do not have enough knowledge and experience in order to be capable of assessing the truth of an expert's testimony or an expert's reliability. Since our reasons for the acceptance of the content of an expert's report – by definition of them being experts and us as non-experts – cannot be the reasons the experts possess, our evidence about an experts' report cannot be ever sufficient for the justified acceptance of her testimony. If we are not experts in a domain, the relevant defeaters (undefeated defeaters) or certain kinds of experiences, doubts and beliefs that can undermine justified trust simply are not present to us. So, it could be seen that we have no choice other than to blindly trust experts. Thirdly, we are deeply aware of our epistemic dependence on the testimonies of experts. Without other people testimonies "we should have to confess to knowing pitifully little" (Dummet, 1993, 420). But without expert testimonies our knowledge about biology, physics, medicine, geography of the world, history would be devastated. The majority of our beliefs about nature and society that we acquired throughout our lives are based, finally, on what experts 'tell' us (see also in Beanblossom, Lehrer, 1970; Faulkner, 2002). Our judgments of value will be a mass of inconsistent intuitions, prejudices and stereotypes derived from our subjective and partial interests, understandings of tradition, our temper etc. Behind the majority of testimonies lies extensive research and reports by experts and without these basic experts' testimonies "our lives would be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways" (Lackey, 2006, 1). So, it could be said that such an epistemic dependence on experts entails blind trust as a precondition of the functioning of our reason.

Engagement with technocracy is more effective than passive rejection

Jiménez-Aleixandre, professor of education – University of Santiago de Compostela, and Pereiro-Muñoz High School Castelao, Vigo (Spain), **'2**

(Maria-Pilar and Cristina, "Knowledge producers or knowledge consumers? Argumentation and decision making about environmental management," International Journal of Science Education Vol. 24, No. 11, p. 1171–1190)

If science education and environmental education have as a goal to develop **critical thinking and** to promote **decision making**, it seems that the acknowledgement of a variety of experts and expertise is of relevance to both. **Otherwise citizens could be unable to challenge a common view** that places economical issues and technical features over other types of values or concerns. As McGinn and Roth (1999) argue, citizens should be prepared to participate in scientific practice, to be involved in situations where science is, if not created, at least used. The assessment of environmental management is, in our opinion, one of these, and citizens do not need to possess all the technical knowledge to be able to examine the positive and negative impacts and to weigh them up. The identification of instances of scientific practice in classroom discourse is difficult especially if this practice is viewed as a complex process, not as fixed 'steps'. Several instances were identified when it could be said that students acted as a knowledge-producing community in spite of the fact that the students, particularly at the beginning of the sequence, expressed doubts about their capacities to assess a project written by experts and endorsed by a government office. Perhaps these doubts relate to the nature of the project, a 'real life' object that made its way into the classroom, into the 'school life'. As Brown et al. (1989) point out, there is usually a difference between practitioners' tasks and stereotyped school tasks and, it could be added, students are not used to being confronted with the complexity of 'life-size' problems. However, as the sequence proceeded, **the students assumed the role of experts**, exposing inconsistencies in the project, offering alternatives and discussing it with one of its authors. The issue of expertise is worthy of attention and it needs to be explored in different contexts where the relationships among technical expertise, values hierarchies and possible biases caused by the subject matter could be unravelled. One of the objectives of environmental education is to **empower people with the capacity of decision making**; for this purpose the acknowledging of multiple **expertise is crucial.**

Security Good

You essentialize security and ignore its political potential

Nunes 12 -- post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, and has a PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth University, Wales (Joao, 8/15/2012, "Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies," Security Dialogue 43(4), Sage)

This tendency in the literature is problematic for the critique of security in at least three ways. First, it constitutes a blind spot in the effort of politicization. The assumption of an exclusionary, totalizing or violent logic of security can be seen as an essentialization and a moment of closure. To be faithful to itself, the politicization of security would need to recognize that there is nothing natural or necessary about security – and that security as a paradigm of thought or a register of meaning is also a construction that depends upon its reproduction and performance through practice. The exclusionary and violent meanings that have been attached to security are themselves the result of social and historical processes, and can thus be changed. Second, the institution of this apolitical realm runs counter to the purposes of critique by foreclosing an engagement with the different ways in which security may be constructed. As Matt McDonald (2012) has argued, because security means different things for different people, one must always understand it in context. Assuming from the start that security implies the narrowing of choice and the empowerment of an elite forecloses the acknowledgment of security claims that may seek to achieve exactly the opposite: alternative possibilities in an already narrow debate and the contestation of elite power.5 In connection to this, the claims to insecurity put forward by individuals and groups run the risk of being neglected if the desire to be more secure is identified with a compulsion towards totalization, and if aspirations to a life with a degree of predictability are identified with violence. Finally, this tendency blunts critical security studies as a resource for practical politics. By overlooking the possibility of reconsidering security from within – opting instead for its replacement with other ideals – the critical field weakens its capacity to confront head-on the exceptionalist connotations that security has acquired in policymaking circles. Critical scholars run the risk of playing into this agenda when they tie security to exclusionary and violent practices, thereby failing to question security actors as they take those views for granted and act as if they were inevitable. Overall, security is just too important – both as a concept and as a political instrument – to be simply abandoned by critical scholars. As McDonald (2012: 163) has put it, If security is politically powerful, is the foundation of political legitimacy for a range of actors, and involves the articulation of our core values and the means of their protection, we cannot afford to allow dominant discourses of security to be confused with the essence of security itself. In sum, the trajectory that critical security studies has taken in recent years has significant limitations. The politicization of security has made extraordinary progress in problematizing predominant security ideas and practices; however, it has paradoxically resulted in a depoliticization of the meaning of security itself. By foreclosing the possibility of alternative notions of security, this imbalanced politicization weakens the analytical capacity of critical security studies, undermines its ability to function as a political resource and runs the risk of being politically counterproductive. Seeking to address these limitations, the next section revisits emancipatory understandings of security.

Their impact essentializes national identity as a source of violence. This is a rigged game more vulnerable to self-fulfilling prophecy than *provisional* and *empirical* uses for security

Fierke 2k1

(Karin FIERKE Politics @ Queens Univ. Belfast '1 in Constructing International Relations eds. Fierke and Jorgensen p. 119-120)

There are several underline{poststructuralist assumptions that are problematic} from a constructivist perspective. First, poststructuralists, in Campbells argument, focus on the theorization of identity, rather than assuming an a priori agency or pre-given subjects, as many constructivists do. However, the poststructuralist emphasis on theorizing identity often leads to a practice that is not qualitatively different than the "positivist orthodoxy" they criticize, that is. the **reification of a set of assumptions prior to detailed analysis**.' In this case, the theoretical maxim is that identity is constituted in difference, and-this has been modified since the end of the Cold War- this is an antagonistic relationship. As Ole Waever (1996a. 122) notes, there is reason to question this assumption: Many critical and poststructuralist authors enjoy remonstrating against the alleged 'other" that is at present taking place in relation to Russia. North Africa, or Asia. Many authors-including Campbell-balance between, on the one hand, (formally) saying that identity does not demand an Other. does not demand antagonism, only difference(s) that can be non-antagonistic and. on the other, actually assuming that identity is always based on an antagonistic relationship to an other. is always constituted as absolute difference. In the current situation, because of this unfortunate habit, when one notices that there are efforts in identity creation for Europe, one immediately looks wound and asks. "Who can it be directed against?' and then one discerns some more or less well-founded examples of, for example, Russia being castigated as other. 1 am not convinced. The dominant aspiration is rather to constitute Europe as a pole of attraction with graduated membership so that Europe fades out but is not constituted against an external enemy. Some of Europe's mechanisms for stabilizing or disciplining eastern Europe rely exactly on this non-definition of an eastern border. on the image of an open but heterogeneous polity of which some are more members than others, but none are defined as total outsiders or opponents. The context of post Cold War Europe raises questions about the assumption that identity requires an Other. In contrast to the emphasis on theorizing identity. Adler argues that constructivists want to know in detail how identities and interests are constituted in particular cases. If one takes the practices of actors in the world seriously, then a more fruitful analysis would, to cite Wittgenstein (1958. 66-67). 'look and see" how identities are constituted in specific contexts. As Onuf (199Kb. I) emphasizes, constructivism is not a theory: it is a "way of studying social relations." Second. from Campbell's perspective, constructivists are too easily drawn into the "protocols of 'empirical social science' rule, to the detriment of a politicized account of important practices" (Campbell 1998a, 225) This sounds very similar to Ashley's claim that poststructuralists are 'not especially interested in the meticulous examination of particular cases or sites for purposes of understanding them in their own terms" (Ashley. 1989. 278). In fact, one can argue that the critical endeavor of the poststructuralists suffers precisely because their own, often very **abstract, theoretical assumptions** are not sufficiently related to the analysis of actual practices. While claiming a desire to open up spaces for marginalized voices to speak, there is often a closing down of that possibility precisely because of another assumption, which shares a family resemblance with realist accounts, that is, states do reproduce realist practices. Campbell, and other poststructuralists (Doty, 1993)? ask how state action becomes possible; they emphasize processes of marginalization rather than how alternatives, which had been considered unrealistic, become possible. Subsequently. Campbell (1998, 7- 8) suggests that the practices of states remain largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War, ' By contrast. constructivists such as Koslowski and Kratochwil (1995) and Fierke (1998) have taken

dissident practice in the context of the ending Cold War seriously. As a result, there is an increasing awareness of the role of these actors in constituting the possibility of a change (Adler 1997, 342). When a detailed analysis of the practices of these actors is taken seriously, a different and more nuanced reading of both the end of the Cold War and the post Cold War practices of states is in order.

Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards – failure to express our fears causes them to occur

Macy 95

(Joanna, General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist, Ecopsychology)

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that "to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen." Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, "When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate." But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate

Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

McCormack 10

(Tara McCormack, '10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield's important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development.

Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are 'insured' – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

Security is not an ideology of survival --- it is survival-plus --- that allows individuals the choice to act and become

Booth 2k5

(Ken – visiting researcher – US Naval War College, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22)

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that **some degree of insecurity**, as a life-determining condition, **is universal**. To the **extent** an individual or group is insecure, to the extent their life choices and changes are **taken away**; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in **seeking safety** from domineering threats–whether these are the lack of food for one's children, or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security **creates life possibilities**. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with **opening up space** in people's lives. This allows for individual and collective **human becoming**–the capacity to have some choice about living differently–consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusion follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, **security is not synonymous simply with**

survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is **survival-plus**, the plus being the **possibility to explore human becoming**. As an instrumental value, security is sought because it free people(s) to some degree to do other than **deal with threats** to their human being. The achievement of a level of security –and security is always relative – gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope **to choose to be** or become, other than **merely surviving** as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can **reinvent itself** beyond the merely biological.

Securitization is good – results in contesting antagonistic logic of security and breaks down competitive structures

Trombetta '8

(Maria Julia Trombetta, (Delft University of Technology, postdoctoral researcher at the department of Economics of Infrastructures) 3/19/08 http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Trombetta-the_securitization_of_the_environment_and_the_transformation_of_security.pdf)

On the one hand, an approach that considers the discursive formation of security issues provides a new perspective to analyse the environmental security discourse and its transformative potential. First, it allows for an investigation of the political process behind the selection of threats, exploring why some of them are considered more relevant and urgent than others. The focus shifts from the threats to the collectivities, identities and interests that deserve to be protected and the means to be employed. Second, securitization suggests that the awareness of environmental issues can have a relevant role in defining and transforming political communities, their interests and identities, since the process creates new ideas about who deserve to be protected and by whom. Finally, as Behnke points out, **securitization can open the space for a "genuinely political"** constitutive and formative **struggle through which political structures are contested and reestablished**.(Behnke 2000: 91) Securitization allows for the breaking and transforming of rules that are no longer acceptable, including the practices associated with an antagonistic logic of security. On the other hand, securitization is problematic because of the set of practices it is supposed to bring about. For the CopS security "carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape."(Wæver 1995: 47) While securitizing an issue is a political choice, the practices it brings about are not. Accordingly, transforming an issue into a security issue is not always an improvement. In the case of the environment, the warning seems clear: "When considering securitizing moves such as 'environmental security'...one has to weigh the always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 29) The School shares the normative suggestion that "[a] society whose security is premised upon a logic of war should be re-shaped, re-ordered, simply changed."(Aradau 2001: introduction) For the CopS this does not mean to transform the practices and logic of security, because, as it will be shown below, for the School, this is impossible. The CopS suggests avoiding the transformation of issues into security issues. It is necessary "to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means, as politics, economy, culture, and so on."(Wæver 1995: 55, quoting Jahn). This transformation, for the CopS, is "desecuritization", and the School has introduced a distinction between politicization - "meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resources allocation s"(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 23) - and securitization - "meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 23) The slogan is: "less security, more politics!"(Wæver 1995: 56) Nevertheless, there are two major problems behind this suggestion. First, if securitization is normatively problematic, desecuritization can be even more problematic. It can lead to a depoliticization and marginalisation of urgent and serious issues, while leaving unchallenged the practices associated with security. In the case of the environment, many appeals to security are aimed at both soliciting action and transforming what counts as security and the way of providing it. Second, within the School's framework, desecuritization cannot be possible. Securitization in fact can be inescapable, the unwanted result of discussing whether

or not the environment is a security issue. As Huysmans has noticed, the performative, constitutive approach suggested by the speech act theory implies that even talking and researching about security can contribute to the securitization of an issue, even if that (and the practices associated with it) is not the desired result. "The normative dilemma thus consists of how to write or speak about security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitization of migration, drugs and so forth."(Huysmans 2002: 43) When the understanding of security is the problematic one described by the CopS, research itself can become a danger. This captures a paradox that characterizes the debate about environmental security. As Jon Barnett has showed in The Meaning of Environmental Security (2001) the securitization of the environment can have perverse effects and several attempts to transform environmental problems into security issues have resulted in a spreading of the national security paradigm and the enemy logic, even if the intentions behind them were different. Barnett has argued that "environmental security is not about the environment, it is about security; as a concept, it is at its most meaningless and malign"(2001: 83) in this way, he seems to accept the ineluctability of the security mindset or logic evoked by securitization. However, his suggestion of promoting a "human centered" understanding of security, in which environmental security is not about (national) security but about people and their needs, within the securitization logic, cannot escape the trap he has described. Why, in fact, should the sort of his claim be different from that of similar ones? 2. The fixity of Security practices These dilemmas, however, are based on the idea that security practices are inescapable and unchangeable and the theory of securitization, as elaborated by the CopS, has contributed to suggest so. The CopS has achieved the result of making a specific, negative understanding of security – which has characterised the dominant Realist discourse within IR - appear as "natural" and unchangeable since all the attempts to transform it appear to reinforce its logic. To challenge this perverse mechanism it is necessary to unpack securitization further. First, it will be shown that securitization is not analytically accurate, the environment representing a relevant case. Second, the assumptions behind this problematic fixity will be explored. The CopS explores the specificity of the environmental sector in Security: A Framework for Analysis (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998) (Security hereafter), the theoretical book where the CopS illustrates the theory of securitization and analyses the dynamics of securitization within five relevant sectors. For each sector the School identifies the actors or objects (referent objects) that are threatened, specifies the relevant threats and the agents that promote or facilitate securitization.11[11] The environmental sector is rather different from the others and the transformative intent that is associated with the appeal to environmental security is more evident.12[12] Amongst the peculiarities of the environmental sector described by the School, three deserve a specific analysis for their implications: First, the presence of two agendas - a scientific and a political one; second, the multiplicity of actors; third, the politicization/securitization relationship. They will be analysed in turn "One of the most striking features of the environmental sector," it is argued in Security, "is the existence of two different agendas: a scientific agenda and a political agenda."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71) The scientific one refers mainly to natural science and non-governmental activities. The "scientific agenda is about the authoritative assessment of threat,"(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde admit that "the extent to which scientific argument structures environmental security debates strikes us as exceptional."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) Quoting Rosenau, they suggest that "the demand for scientific proof is a broader emerging characteristic in the international system."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) This 11[11] So for instance in the military sector the referent object is usually the state and the threats are mainly military ones, while in the societal sector the referent objects are collective identities "that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 22-3) 12[12] This is the case even if the School adopts a conservative strategy that appears from the choice of the referent object (or what is threatened). In the first works of the School, the referent object within the environmental sector was the biosphere: "Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend." (Buzan 1991: 19) In Security the School narrows down this perspective and identifies the level of civilization (with all the contradictions that contribute to environmental problems) as the main referent object. This move favours a conservative perspective which considers the securitization of the environment as a way to preserve the status quo and the security strategies on which it is based. Despite this, the description of the environmental sector captures the specificity of the sector and reveals the tensions within the overall framework. questions the "self referentiality" of the speech act security. Are some threats more "real" than others thanks to scientific proof? Can considerations developed to characterize reflective behaviours be applied to natural systems? Even if dealing with these issues is beyond the scope of this article, it is necessary to note that the appeal to an external discourse has serious implications. First, it questions the possibility and opportunity of desecuritization. Is it possible and what does it mean to "desecuritize" an issue which is on the scientific agenda? If scientific research outlines the dangerousness of an environmental problem, how is it possible to provide security? Second, it suggests that security and the practices associated with it can vary from one sector to another and thus from one context to another. The second peculiarity of the environmental sector is the presence of many actors. This contrasts with Wæver's suggestion that "security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites."(Wæver 1995: 57) The multiplicity of actors is largely justified by the School with the relative novelty of the securitization of the environment. "The discourses, power struggles, and securitizing moves in the other sectors are reflected by and have sedimented over time in concrete types of organizations - notably states...nations (identity configurations), and the UN system,"(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71) however, this is not the case with the environment: "It is as yet undetermined what kinds of political structures environmental concerns will generate."(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71). In this way a tension appears since the attempts to securitize the environment are described as having a transforming potential, requiring and calling for new institutions. Within the environmental sector securitization moves seem to have a transformative intent that contrasts with the conservative one, that characterizes other sectors. The third peculiarity is that many securitizing moves result in politicization. This is problematic for the School, which argues that "transcending a security problem by politicising it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away from such terms."(Wæver 1995: 56) For the School, once the enemy logic has been inscribed in a context, it is very difficult to return to an open debate. Nevertheless the various politicizations of environmental issues that followed the appeal to security – those the CopS dismissed as failed

securitizations - seem to reinforce the argument, suggested by Edkins, that there is a tendency to politicize issues through their securitization. (Edkins 1999: 11) **This represents another signal that securitization**, within the environmental sector, **can take a different form, and that the problematic aspects of evoking security are not so evident.** Securitization theory, for the CopS, is meant to be descriptive, however the environmental sector suggests that some of its aspects prevent it from providing an adequate instrument for analysis. To understand why this occurs, it is necessary to explore in more detail the conceptualization of security by Wæver, who has introduced securitization.

Our securitiziation is good - Extinction is <u>categorically different</u> than what they criticize --- our ontology/reps of fear are critical to compassion with the Other --- this solves and turns the kritik

Macy 2k

(Joanna Macy, adjunct professor at the California Institute of Integral Studies, 2000, Environmental Discourse and Practice: A Reader, p. 243)

The move to a wider ecological sense of self is in large part a function of the dangers that are threatening to overwhelm us. We are confronted by social breakdown, wars, nuclear proliferation, and the progressive destruction of our biosphere. Polls show that people today are aware that the world, as they know it, may come to an end. This loss of certainty that there will be a future is the pivotal psychological reality of our time. Over the past twelve years my colleagues and I have worked with tens of thousands of people in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, helping them confront and explore what they know and feel about what is happening to their world. The purpose of this work, which was first known as "Despair and Empowerment Work," is to overcome the numbing and powerlessness that result from suppression of painful responses to massively painful realities. As their grief and fear for the world is allowed to be expressed without apology or argument and validated as a wholesome, life-preserving response, people break through their avoidance mechanisms, break through their sense of futility and isolation. Generally what they break through into is a larger sense of identity. It is as if the pressure of their acknowledged awareness of the suffering of our world stretches or collapses the culturally defined boundaries of the self. It becomes clear, for example, that the grief and fear experienced for our world and our common future are categorically different from similar sentiments relating to one's personal welfare. This pain cannot be equated with dread of one's own individual demise. Its source lies less in concerns for personal survival than in apprehensions of collective suffering – of what looms for human life and other species and unborn generations to come. Its nature is akin to the original meaning of compassion – "suffering with." It is the distress we feel on behalf of the larger whole of which we are a part. And, when it is so defined, it serves as a trigger or getaway to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life in which we are as intricately connected as cells in a larger body. This shift in consciousness is an appropriate, adaptive response. For the crisis that threatens our planet, be it seen in its military, ecological, or social aspects, derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self. It is a mistake about our place in the order of things. It is the delusion that the self is so separate and fragile that we must delineate and defend its boundaries, that it is so small and needy that we must endlessly acquire and endlessly consume, that it is so aloof that we can – as individuals, corporations, nation-states, or as a species – be immune to what we do to other beings.

AT Threat Con

No impact – threat construction isn't sufficient to cause wars

Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, **'9**

(Stuart J, "Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case," *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.** Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic** explains why ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

Threats aren't psychological projections and the alt fails

Hoffman, 86

(Stanley, Center for European Studies at Harvard, "On the Political Psychology of Peace and War: A Critique and an Agenda," Political Psychology 7.1 JSTOR)

The traditionalists, even when, in their own work, they try scrupulous-ly to transcend national prejudices and to seek scientific truth, believe that it is unrealistic to expect statesmen to stand above the fray: By definition, the statesmen are there to worry not only about planetary survival, but — first of all—about national survival and safety. To be sure, they ought to be able to see how certain policies, aimed at enhancing security, actually increase in-security all around. But there are sharp limits to how far they can go in their mutual empathy or in their acts (unlike intellectuals in their advice), as long as the states' antagonisms persist, as long as uncertainty about each other's intentions prevails, and as long as there is reason to fear that one side's wise restraint, or unilateral moves toward "sanity," will be met, not by the rival's similar restraint or moves, but either by swift or skillful political or military exploitation of the opportunity created for unilateral gain, or by a for-midable domestic backlash if national self-restraint appears to result in ex-ternal losses, humiliations or perceptions of weakness. There is little point in saying that the state of affairs which imposes such limits is "anachronistic" or "unrational." To traditionalists, the radicals' stance — condemnation from the top of Mount Olympus — can only impede understanding of the limits and possibilities of reform. To be sure, the fragmentation of mankind is a formidable obstacle to the solution of many problems that cannot be handled well in a national framework, and a deadly peril insofar as the use of force, the very distinctive feature of world politics, now entails the risk of nuclear war. But one can hardly call anachronistic a phenomenon—the assertion of national identity — that, to the bulk of [HU]mankind, appears not only as a necessity but also as a positive good, since humanity's fragmentation results from the very

aspiration to self-determination. Many people have only recently emerged from foreign mastery, and have reason to fear that the alternative to national self-mastery is not a world government of assured fairness and efficiency, but alien domination. As for "unrationality," the drama lies in the contrast between the ra-tionality of the whole, which scholars are concerned about—the greatest good of the greatest number, in utilitarian terms — and the rationality or greatest good of the part, which is what statesmen worry about and are responsible for. What the radicals denounce as irrational and irresponsible from the viewpoint of mankind is what Weber called the statesman's ethic of responsibility. What keeps ordinary "competitive conflict processes" (Deutsch, 1983)— the very stuff of society — from becoming "unrational" or destructive, isprecisely what the nature of world politics excludes: the restraint of the partners either because of the ties of affection or responsibility that mitigate the conflict, or because of the existence of an outsider — marriage counselor, arbitrator, judge, policeman or legislator— capable of inducing or imposing restraints. Here we come to a third point of difference. The very absence of such safeguards of rationality, the obvious discrepancy between what each part intends, and what it (and the whole world) ends with, the crudeness of some of the psychological mechanisms at work in international affairs—as one can see from the statements of leaders, or from the media, or from inflamed publics—have led many radicals, especially among those whose training or profession is in psychoanalysis or mental health, to treat the age-old contests of states in terms, not of the psychology of politics, but of individual psychology and pathology. There are two manifestations of this. One is the tendency to look at nations or states as individuals writ large, stuck at an early stage of development (similarly, John Mack (1985) in a recent paper talks of political ideologies as carrying "forward the dichotomized structures of childhood"). One of my predecessors writes about "the correspondence between development of the individual self and that of the group or nation," and concludes "that intergroup or international conflict contains the basic elements of the conflict each individual experiences psychologically" (Volkan, 1985). Robert Holt, from the viewpoint of cognitive psychology, finds "the largest part of the American public" immature, in a "phase of development below the Conscientious" (Holt, 1984). The second related aspect is the tendency to look at the notions statesmen or publics have of "the enemy," not only as residues of childhood or adolescent phases of development, but as images that express "disavowed aspects of the self" (Stein, 1985), reveal truths about our own fears and hatreds, and amount to masks we put on the "enemy," because of our own psychological needs. Here is where the clash between traditionalists and radicals is strongest. Traditionalists do not accept a view of group life derived from the study of individual development or family relations, or a view of modern society derived from the simplistic Freudian model of regressed followers identifying with a leader. They don't see in ideologies just irra-tional constructs, but often rationally selected maps allowing individuals to cope with reality. They don't see national identification as pathological, as an appeal to the people's baser instincts, more aggressive impulses or un-sophisticated mental defenses; it is, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau so well understood, the competition of sovereign states that frequently pushes people from "sane" patriotism to "insane" nationalism (Rousseau's way of preventing the former from veering into the latter was, to say the least, im-practical: to remain poor in isolation). Nor do they see anything "primitive" in the nation's concern for survival: It is a moral and structural requirement. Traditionalists also believe that the "intra-psychic" approach distorts reality. Enemies are **not** mere **projections of negative identities; they are** often quite **real** . To be sure, the Nazis' view of the Jews fits the metaphor of the mask put on the enemy for one's own needs. But were, in return, those Jews who understood what enemies they had in the Nazis, doing the same? Is the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, is the Soviet regime's treatment of dissidents, was the Gulag merely a convenient projection of our intrapsychic battles? Clichés such as the one about how our enemy "understands only force" may tell us a great deal about ourselves; but sometimes they contain half-truths about him, and not just revelations about us. Our fears flow not only from our private fantasies but also from concrete realities and from the fantasies which the international state of nature generates. In other words, the psychology of politics which traditionalists deem adequate is not derived from theories of psychic development and health; it is derived from the logic of the international milieu, which breeds the kind of vocabulary found in the historians and theorists of the state of nature: fear and power, pride and honor, survival and security, self-interest and reputation, distrust and misunderstanding, commitment and credibility. It is also derived from the social psychology of small or large groups, which resorts to the standard psychological vocabulary that describes mental mechanisms or maneuvers and cognitive processes: denial, projection, guilt, repression, closure, rigidity, etc.... But using this vocabulary does not imply that a group whose style of politics is paranoid is therefore composed of people who, as private individuals, are paranoid. Nor does it relieve us of the duty to look at the objective reasons and functions of these mental moves, and of the duty to make explicit our assumptions about what constitutes a "healthy," wise, or proper social process. Altogether, traditionalists find the mental health approach to world affairs unhelpful. Decisions about war and peace are usually taken by small groups of people; the temptation of analyzing their behavior either, literal-ly, in terms of their personalities, or, metaphysically, in terms borrowed from the study of human

development, rather than in those of group dynamics or principles of international politics is understandable. But it is misleading. What is pathological in couples, or in a well-ordered community, is, alas, frequent, indeed normal, among states, or in a troubled state. What is malignant or crazy is usually not the actors or the social process in which they are engaged: it is the possible results. The grammar of motives which the mental health approach brands as primitive or immature is actually rational for the actors. to the substitution of labels for explanations, to bad analysis and fanciful prescriptions. Bad analysis: the tendency to see in group coherence a regressive response to a threat, whereas it often is a rational response to the "existential" threats entailed by the very nature of the international milieu. Or the tendency to see in the effacement or minimization of individual differences in a group a release of unconscious instincts, rather than a phenomenon that can be perfectly adaptive—in response to stress or threats—or result from governmental manipulation or originate in the code of conduct inculcated by the educational system, etc.. . The habit of comparing the state, or modern society, with the Church or the army, and to analyze human relations in these institutions in ways that stress the libidinal more than the cognitive and superego factors, or equate libidinal bonds and the desire for a leader. The view that enemies are above all products of mental drives, rather than inevitable concomitants of social strife at every level. Or the view that the contest with the rival fulfills inter-nal needs, which may be true, but requires careful examination of the nature of these needs (psychological? bureaucratic? economic?), obscures the objective reasons of the contest, and risks confusing cause and function. Indeed, such analysis is particularly misleading in dealing with the pre-sent scene. The radicals are so (justifiably) concerned with the nuclear peril that the traditional ways in which statesmen and publics behave seem to vindicate the pathological approach. But this, in turn, incites radicals to overlook the fundamental ambiguity of contemporary world politics. On the one hand, there is a nuclear revolution—the capacity for total destruction. On the other hand, many states, without nuclear weapons, find that the use of force remains rational (in terms of a rationality of means) and beneficial at home or abroad—ask the Vietnamese, or the Egyptians after October 1973, or Mrs. Thatcher after the Falklands, or Ronald Reagan after Grenada. The superpowers themselves, whose contest has not been abolished by the nuclear revolution (it is the stakes, the costs of failure that have, of course, been transformed), find that much of their rivalry can be conducted in traditional ways — including limited uses of force —below the level of nuclear alarm. They also find that nuclear weapons, while—perhapsunusable rationally, can usefully strengthen the very process that has been so faulty in the prenuclear ages: deterrence (this is one of the reasons for nuclear proliferation). The pathological approach interprets deterrence as expressing the deterrer's belief that his country is good, the enemy's is bad. This is often the case, but it need not be; it can also reflect the conviction that one's country has interests that are not mere figments of the imagination, and need to be protected both because of the material costs of losing them, and because of the values embedded in them. As for war planning, it is not a case of "psychological denial of unwelcome reality" (Montville, 1985). but a — perhaps futile, perhaps dangerous— necessity in a world where deterrence may once more fail. The prescriptions that result from the radicals' psychological approach also run into traditionalist objections. Even if one accepts the metaphors of collective disease or pathology, one must understand that the "cure" can only be provided by politics. All too often, the radicals' cures consist of perfectly sensible recommendations for lowering tensions, but fail to tell us how to get them carried out —they only tell us how much better the world would be, if only "such rules could be established" (Deutsch, 1983). Sometimes, they express generous aspirations — for common or mutual security—without much awareness of the obstacles which conflict-ing interests, fears about allies or clients, and the nature of the weapons themselves, continue to erect. Sometimes, they too neglect the ambiguity of life in a nuclear world: The much lamented redundancy of weapons, a calamity if nuclear deterrence fails, can also be a cushion against failure. Finally, many of the remedies offered are based on an admirable liberal model of personality and politics: the ideal of the mature, well-adjusted, open-minded person (produced by liberal education and healthy family relations) transposed on the political level, and thus accompanied by the triumph of democracy in the community, by the elimination of militarism and the spread of functional cooperation abroad. But three obstacles remain unconquered: first, a major part of the world rejects this ideal and keeps itself closed to it (many of the radicals seem to deny it, or to ignore it, or to believe it doesn't matter). Second, the record shows that real democracies, in their behavior toward non-democratic or less "advanced" societies, do not conform to the happy model (think of the US in Central America). Third, the task of reform, both of the publics and of the statesmen, through consciousness raising and education is hopelessly huge, incapable of being pursued equally in all the important states, and — indeed — too slow if one accepts the idea of a mortal nuclear peril. These, then, are the dimensions of a split that should not be minimized or denied

Queerness

AT Edelman

Cooption

The K will be co-opted by right wing and abandon the queer community to immediate social violence
Fitzpatrick (associate professor of media studies @ Pomona College) **7**

(Kathleen, must we abandon reproductive futurism?, December 3, http://machines.pomona.edu/149-2007/node/225)

Edelman makes the disclaimer that this is more of a theoretical exercise of resistance, however, it seems a dangerous road to go down **given the possibility for co-optation by a violent right wing rhetoric**. He hails the Right for their acknowledgment of the truly devastating connotations of queerness, in light of the less radical-discourse of the Left which refuses to speak in terms of apocalyptic scale. Yet I can imagine an indignant Neo-Con reading this as the ultimate proof that the gays want to destroy us all - and while all of us are busy taking up Edelman's call for rhetorical queerness against reproductive futurism, **there remains the queer community receiving the social violence of oppression as a result of this getting to the wrong hands**. Pardon my paranoid musing,; I'm just concerned with the implications of making these delineations.

<u>Kills Collective Politics</u>

Aff makes collective resistance to oppression impossible and reprivatizes queerness
Fox (poet and writer) **7**

(Dominic, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, June 15th, http://codepoetics.com/poetix/?p=418)

<u>The snare that</u> I think <u>proves most damaging</u> to **No Future**'s thesis <u>is not in fact that of special pleading on behalf of "the queer"</u>, with all the attendant question-begging issues of identification that would entail, <u>but</u> <u>that of emphasizing the particularity of the **sinthome** over its universality: **both are equally destructive of communal politics**</u>, but it is in the latter that the aleatory trajectory of the affinitive comes into play. This, needless to say, remains to be worked out, but <u>the specific problem with **Edelman's emphasis on particularity, primary narcissism and an essentially private communing** with the real of the drives is that it reinvests precisely the psychiatric model of queerness as individual perversion and social disorder that the "queer event" sought to overturn.</u> <u>The urgent question remains that of the **anabasis** which might convoke a collective body – and with it a politics worthy of the name</u>.

Utopianism Good

Refusing the future is a gay white male's bourgeois fantasy – it imagines a queer subject abstracted from the multiude of oppressions that mark everyday life. [We must reposition queerness as the desire for another way of being, to queer the future, not abandon it]
Munoz (the chair of the Department of Performance Studies at Tisch School of the Arts, New York University) **7**

(Jose Esteban, Cruising the Toilet: LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka, Radical Black Traditions, and Queer Futurity, GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 13.2-3, 353-367)

The question of children hangs heavily when one considers Baraka's present. On August 12, 2003, one of his daughters, Shani Baraka, and her female lover, Rayshon Holmes, were killed by the estranged husband of Wanda Pasha, who is also one of Baraka's daughters. The thirty-one- and thirty-year-old women's murders were preceded a few months earlier by another hate crime in Newark, the killing of fifteen-year-old Sakia Gunn. Gunn was a black transgendered youth who traveled from Hoboken to Greenwich Village and the Christopher Street piers to hang out with other young queers of color. Baraka and his wife, Amina, have in part dealt with the tragic loss of their daughter by turning to activism. The violent fate of their child has alerted them to the systemic violence that faces queer people (and especially young people) of color. The Barakas have both become ardent antiviolence activists speaking out directly on LGBT issues. Real violence has ironically brought Baraka back to a queer world that he had renounced so many years ago. Through his tremendous loss he has decided to further diversify his consistent commitment to activism and social justice to include what can only be understood as queer politics. In the world of *The Toilet* there are no hate crimes, no lexicon that identifies homophobia per se, but there is the fact of an aggression constantly on the verge of brutal actualization. The mimetic violence resonates across time and to the scene of the loss that the author will endure decades later. This story from real life is not meant to serve as the proof for my argument. Indeed, the play's highly homoerotic violence is in crucial ways nothing like the misogynist violence against women that befell the dramatist's family or the transgenderphobic violence that ended Gunn's young life. I mention these tragedies because it makes one simple point. The future is only the stuff of *some* kids. Racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity. While Edelman does indicate that the future of the child as futurity is different from the future of actual children, his framing nonetheless **accepts and reproduces this monolithic figure of the child that is indeed always already white**. He all but ignores the point that other modes of particularity within the social are constitutive of subjecthood beyond the kind of *jouissance* that refuses both narratological meaning and what he understands as the fantasy of futurity. He anticipates and bristles against his future critics with a precognitive paranoia in footnote 19 of his first chapter. He rightly predicts that **[End Page 364]** some identitarian critics (I suppose that would be me in this instance, despite my ambivalent relation to the concept of identity) would dismiss his polemic by saying it is determined by his middle-class white gay male positionality. This attempt to inoculate himself from those who engage his polemic does not do the job. In the final analysis, white gay male crypto-identity politics (the restaging of whiteness as universal norm via the imaginary negation of all other identities that position themselves as not white) is beside the point. The deeper point is indeed "political," as, but certainly not more, political as Edelman's argument. It is important not to hand over futurity to normative white reproductive futurity. That dominant mode of futurity is indeed "winning," but that is all the more reason to call on a utopian political imagination that will enable us to glimpse another time and place: **a "not-yet" where queer youths of color actually get to grow up**. Utopian and willfully idealistic practices of thought are in order if we are to resist the perils of **heteronormative pragmatism and Anglo-normative pessimism**. Imagining a queer subject who is abstracted from the **sensuous intersectionalities that mark our experience is an ineffectual way out**. Such an escape via singularity is a ticket whose price most cannot afford. The way to deal with the asymmetries and violent frenzies that mark the present **is not to forget the future**. The here and now is simply not enough. Queerness should and could be **about a desire for another way of being** in both the world and time, a desire that resists mandates to accept that which is not enough.

Futurity Good

Frontline

Focusing on the future is good

a) Only way to challenge oppressive structures

b) It's not deterministic – focus on reproductive futurism allows us to be reflexive of the past and present as well

Unger 7

Roberto Mangabeira Unger Professor of Law Harvard, http://www.law.harvard.edu/unger/english/docs/pragmatism.doc.THE SELF AWAKENED: PRAGMATISM UNBOUND

The third theme is Futurity. Whether or not time is for real in the vast world of nature, of which our knowledge always remains at once remote and contradictory, is a subject that will always continue to arouse controversy. That time is for real in human existence is not, however, a speculative thesis; it is a pressure we face with mounting force, so long as we remain conscious and not deluded, in our passage from birth to death. The temporal character of our existence is the consequence of our embodiment, the stigma of our finitude, and the condition that gives transcendence its point. We are not exhausted by the social and cultural worlds we inhabit and build. They are finite. We, in comparison to them, are not. We can see, think, feel, build, and connect in more ways than they can allow. That is why we are required to rebel against them: to advance our interests and ideals as we now understand them, but also to become ourselves, affirming the polarity that constitutes the law-breaking law of our being. To seek what goes beyond the established structure and represents, for that very reason, the **possible beginning of another structure,** even of a structure that organizes its own remaking, is **to live for the future**. Living for the future is a way of living in the present as a being not wholly determined by the present conditions of its existence. We never completely surrender. We go about our business of passive submission, of voiceless despair, as if we knew that the established order were not for keeps, and had no final claim to our allegiance. Orientation to the future -- futurity -- is a defining condition of personality. So fundamental is this feature of our existence that it also shapes the experience of thinking, even when our thoughts are directed away from ourselves to nature. Ceaselessly reorganizing our experience of particulars under general headings, constantly breaking up and remaking the headings to master the experience, intuiting in one set of known relations the existence of another, next to it or hidden under it, finding out one thing when we had set out to find out another, and discovering indeed what our assumptions and methods may have ruled out as paradoxical, contradictory, or impossible, we come to see the next steps of thought -- its possibilities, its future -- as the point of the whole past of thought. Futurity should cease to be a predicament and should become a program: we should radicalize it to empower ourselves. That is the reason to take an interest in ways of organizing thought and society that diminish the influence of what happened before on what can happen next. Such intellectual and institutional innovations make change in thought less dependent on the pressure of unmastered anomalies and change in society less dependent on the blows of unexpected trauma. In any given historical situation, the effort to live for the future has consequences for how we order our ideas and for how we order our societies. There is a structure to the organized revision of structures. Its constituents, however, are not timeless. We paste them together with the time-soaked materials at hand.

Provides a value to life

Unger 7

Roberto Mangabeira Unger Professor of Law Harvard, http://www.law.harvard.edu/unger/english/docs/pragmatism.doc.THE SELF AWAKENED: PRAGMATISM UNBOUND

The hope held out by the thesis that we can change our relation to our contexts will remain hollow unless we can change this relation in biographical as well as in historical time, independently of the fate of all collective projects of transformation. It will be hollow as well unless that change will give us other people and the world itself more fully. That the hope is not hollow in any such sense represents part of the thesis implicit in the idea of futurity: to **live for the future** is to live in the present as a

being not fully determined by the present settings of organized life and thought and therefore more capable of openness to the other person, to the surprising experience, and to the entire phenomenal world of time and change. It is in this way that we can embrace the joy of life in the moment as both a revelation and a prophecy rather than discounting it as a trick that nature plays on spirit the better to reconcile us to our haplessness and our ignorance. The chief teaching of this book is that we become more godlike to live, not that we live to become more godlike. The reward of our striving is not arousal to a greater life later; it is arousal to a greater life now, a raising up confirmed by our **opening up to the other and to the new**. A simple way to grasp the point of my whole argument, from the vantage point of this its middle and its center, is to say that it explores a world of ideas about nature, society, personality, and mind within which this teaching makes sense and has authority.

Futurity k2 Queerness

Edelman has it entirely backwards. Queerness requires futurity. Their framework closes off the possibility of altering the present, thereby crushing social change and naturalizing hetero-normativity

Muñoz 6

José Esteban, Associate Professor of Performance Studies at NYU, PMLA, v121, n3, May, p. 825-826

I have chosen to counter polemics that argue for antirelationality by insisting on the essential need for an understanding of queerness as collectivity. At the 2005 MLA panel, in recent essays, and in my forthcoming book *Cruising Utopia*, I respond to the assertion that there is no future for the queer by arguing that **queerness is primarily about futurity**. Queerness is always on the horizon. Indeed, for queerness to have any value whatsoever, it must be considered visible only on the horizon. My argument is therefore interested in critiquing the ontological certitude that I understand to accompany the politics of presentist and pragmatic contemporary gay identity. This certitude is often represented through a narration of disappearance and negativity that boils down to another game of fort-da. My conference paper and the forthcoming book it is culled from have found much propulsion in the work of Ernst Bloch and other Marxist thinkers who did not dismiss utopia. Bloch found strident grounds for a critique of a totalizing and naturalizing idea of the present in his concept of the no-longer-conscious. A turn to the no-longer-conscious enabled a critical hermeneutics attuned to comprehending the not yet here. This temporal calculus deployed the past and the future as armaments to combat the devastating logic of the here and now, in which nothing exists outside the current moment and which **naturalizes cultural logics like capitalism and heteronormativity**. Concomitantly, Bloch has also sharpened our critical imagination's emphasis on what he famously called "a principle of hope." Hope is an easy target for antiutopians. But while antiutopians might understand themselves as critical in the rejection of hope, they would, in the rush to denounce it, miss the point that hope is spawned of a critical investment in utopia that is nothing like naive but, instead, profoundly resistant to the stultifying temporal logic of a broken-down present. My turn to Bloch, hope, and utopia challenges theoretical insights that have been stunted by the lull of presentness and by various romances of negativity and that have thus become routine and **resoundingly anticritical**.

Edelman is wrong about social change—Democratic politics can transform social relations without reaffirming homophobia

Brenkman 2

John, Professor of English and Comparative Literature, CUNY Graduate School, "Politics, Mortal and Natal: An Arendtian Rejoinder," Narrative 10:2, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/narrative/v010/10.2brenkman02.html, p. 187-8,

In my view, Edelman effaces this difference between democracy and totalitarianism. He attributes to democracy the workings of totalitarianism: he makes no distinction between civil society and the state, equates "the social order" with politics as such, and equates both with the symbolic order. This misconception of democratic politics is what anchors his call for "a true oppositional politics" whose meaning-dissolving, identity-dissolving ironies would come from "the space outside the frame within which 'politics' appears" ("Post-Partum" 181). The democratic state, as opposed to the totalitarian, does not rule civil society but secures its possibility and flourishing; conversely, civil society is the nonpolitical realm from which emerge those initiatives that transform, moderately or radically, the political realm of laws and rights. For that very reason, the political frame of laws and rights, and of debate and decision, is intrinsically inadequate to the plurality of projects and the social divisions within society—there is always a gap in its

political representation of the "real" of the social—and for that very reason the political realm itself is **open to change and innovation**. Innovation is a crucial concept for understanding the gay and lesbian movement, which emerged from within civil society as citizens who were stigmatized and often criminalized for their sexual lives created new forms of association, transformed their own lifeworld, and organized a political offensive on behalf of political and social reforms. There was an innovation of rights and freedoms, and what I have called innovations in sociality. Contrary to the liberal interpretation of liberal rights and freedoms, I do not think that gays and lesbians have merely sought their place at the table. Their struggle has radically altered the scope and meaning of the liberal rights and freedoms they sought, first and foremost by making them include sexuality, sexual practices, and the shape of household and family. Where the movement has succeeded in changing the laws of the state, it has also opened up new possibilities within civil society. To take an obvious example, wherever it becomes unlawful to deny housing to individuals because they are gay, there is set in motion a transformation of the everyday life of neighborhoods, including the lives of heterosexuals and their children. Within civil society, this is a work of enlightenment, however uneven and fraught and frequently dangerous. It is **not** a reaffirmation of the symbolic and structural underpinnings of homophobia; on the contrary, it is a challenge to homophobia and a volatilizing of social relations within the nonpolitical realm.

Edelman's claim that sexual reproduction is the core of politics is just wrong. He treats reactionary movement as the norm and would reverse decades of cultural change

Brenkman 2

John, Professor of English and Comparative Literature, CUNY Graduate School, "Politics, Mortal and Natal: An Arendtian Rejoinder," Narrative 10:2, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/narrative/v010/10.2brenkman02.html, p. 188-9,

> What I have challenged is the claim that this discourse defines, or even dominates, the political realm as such. It is the discourse of conservative Catholicism and Christian fundamentalism, and even though it resonates in strands of liberal discourse, it represents an intense reaction, backlash, against changes that have already taken place in American society, many of them as the direct result of feminism and the gay and lesbian movement. It is indeed important not to underestimate the depth and danger of this reaction, but it is a reactionary, not a foundational, discourse. The **uncoupling** of sexuality and reproduction is ubiquitous in American culture today as a result of multiple developments beyond the expansion of gay rights and the right to abortion, including birth control, divorce, and changing patterns of family life, as well as consumerism and mass culture; it may well be that the sheer scope, and **irreversibility**, of these developments also intensifies the targeting of gays by conservative ideology and Christian fundamentalist movements. But that is **all the more reason** to recognize that the deconstruction of the phobic **figuration of the queer is a struggle to be pursued** inside as well as outside politics.

( ) Queer politics aren't a root cause – focus on reproductive futurism can't explain gay oppression in family life, consumerism, mass culture or religion. Accepting the multiple intersections underscores the <u>necessity</u> of working through political institutions to achieve change.

Political calculation doesn't necessitate a conservative social order. Edelman's argument is ridiculously totalizing

Brenkman 2

John, Professor of English and Comparative Literature, CUNY Graduate School, "Politics, Mortal and Natal: An Arendtian Rejoinder," <u>Narrative</u> 10:2, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/narrative/v010/10.2brenkman02.html, p. 189,

> I stand by my claim that Edelman builds a psychoanalytic theory of the political realm, in the sense that he gives a psychoanalytic account of what the political realm is. Politics in his account fuses the Symbolic order to the social order and, in response to the Symbolic's inherent failure to symbolize the Real of the drives that unhinge every human being's integration into the social-symbolic order, generates a subtending futurist-nostalgic fantasy of sexuality as reproduction. Because the fantasy too is everywhere exceeded by reality, this mechanism in turn produces the homophobic figuration Edelman has described in "The Future is Kid Stuff": "the order of social reality demands some figural repository for what the logic of its articulation is destined to foreclose, for the fracture that persistently haunts it as the death within itself" ("Future is Kid Stuff" 28). I cited Claude Lefort at some length because he visits the same precincts of the psychoanalytic theory of discourse in order to formulate the discursive dynamic of democracy. But rather than conceptualizing the **entire** social-political order as a psychic apparatus as Edelman does, Lefort draws on Lacan's notion of the inherent gap between symbolization and the "real" to formulate the modern state's representation of the "real" of the social. Since the democratic state limits its own powers and thus delimits civil society as the nonpolitical space it impossibly must represent, the gap between symbolic and real is the **opening of political conflict and change, not an endless replication or reaffirmation of *the* social order**. Every ideological or political articulation—whether the particular discourses of power (<u>law, economics, aesthetics</u>, etc.) <u>or</u>

the institution of the state itself—holds a potentiality for change *because of*, not in spite of the fact that its representation of the "real" fails.

( ) Queer pessimism is fatalism at its worst – the gap created by the symbolic and the Real <u>is</u> civil society – progressive politics are possible in the state <u>because</u> the representation of the Real is not totalizing.

Futurity k2 Social Change

Failure to evaluate responsibility for the future denies any collective social change

Grossberg 3

Lawrence, Professor of Communication Studies at UNC-Chapel Hill, "Cultural studies, the war against kids, and the re-becoming of US modernity," Postcolonial Studies, 6:3, 346-347

The war on kids is about erasing the future as a burden on the present. Or better, it is about changing the very mode by which the future functions, for the future is itself necessary to the possibility of an individualizing identity built on labour and citizenship. The rejection of kids as the core of our common national and social identity is, at the same time, a rejection of the future as an affective investment. Increasingly, the future is defined as either indistinguishable from the present35 (and therefore as the servant of the present rather than vice versa), or apocalyptically (as radically other than the present, without any continuity). To put it simply, <u>the claim that we are **no longer responsible to**</u>/for our **children** (because they no longer deserve it) '<u>signifies</u>', if you will, <u>that the present is no longer responsible to the future</u>. On the contrary, in the re-imagined modernity, the future is to be held responsible to the present. We may be witnessing the attempt to reinvent the individual and the relationship of individuality to the forces that produce reality and are producing our collective futures, and the emergence of a new and distinct mode of individualization and (as)sociation. This 'revolution' involves economic, political, ideological, social, theoretical, cultural and media vectors, all together, and their multiple articulations. It is what brings together new conservative, neo-conservative and neo-liberal groups, and sometimes other constituencies, however temporarily. What is at stake is the production of a new modernity and of the impossibility of those conceptions of agency which have sustained us for centuries. <u>This new modernity would</u> seem to negate the very reality, and even the possibility, of the social or, more accurately, of social agency. What we are witnessing, what I have been trying to describe and imagine, is the production of a new context, a new modernity, out of the old. This production seems to <u>require</u> and seek <u>the negation of many forms of **individual and collective agency**, including the very possibility of</u> imagining alternative futures, of <u>imagining the future as always holding open the possibility of alternatives</u>. That is, the attack on kids is about the relationship between individuality and time. It is a struggle to change our investment in and the possibility of imagining the future. And it is, as Bauman says, a struggle about escaping from the present.36 Because <u>as long as you believe in the future, there's</u> always <u>an escape route</u>, there's always <u>a way to get from here to there. And as long as there's an escape route, there is always a possibility of a community defined **in opposition** to the present</u>. This struggle against modernity (in the name of a new modernity) must negate the possibility of imagination, of the imaginative power of the future. And in fact, the new modernity seems to demand that we deny the importance of the future. But **if we are to take back control of our present**, if we are to take back the possibility of imagining the future, <u>we must **somehow return to kids**</u>—all over the world—<u>the possibility of embodying hope for themselves</u> (without once again imposing on them the burden that they embody hope for us as well). We must also claim hope for ourselves as intellectuals. I recognize that my argument may stretch one's credulity, but I want to defend myself by agreeing with my good friend Meaghan Morris, who has suggested, 'Things are too urgent now to be giving up our imagination'.37 I want to suggest that there is no other way except imaginatively to make sense of what is going on and that, in the end, <u>it is precisely our ability to imagine that is at stake in the current political struggle</u>.

Futurity is key to new social orders which are less oppressive

Bateman 6

R. Benjamin, Doctoral candidate in English, University of Virginia, "The Future of Queer Theory," Minnesota Review, Spring,

http://www.theminnesotareview.org/journal/ns6566/bateman_r_benjamin_ns6566_stf1.shtml

Certain readers might chafe at Edelman's suggestion that Butler's politics is insufficiently radical. After all, Butler has been criticized, like Edelman, for trafficking in recondite theories and postmodern argot and for failing to offer a viable model of political agency. To be sure, Butler's post-structuralist and Foucaultian commitments constrain her ability to posit a stable political agent and to conceive a politics that would radically oppose, rather than merely reinforce or marginally reinflect, a dominant cultural order. But in her recent work, perhaps most strikingly in 2004's **Undoing Gender**, Butler has turned to the "question of social transformation" (the title of **UG**'s tenth chapter), arguing, quite programmatically, that social transformation "...is a question of developing, within law, within psychiatry, within social and literary theory, a new legitimating lexicon for the gender complexity that we have always been living" (219). Lest she be accused of nominalism, Butler stresses the importance of real bodies in forging such a vocabulary: "...the body is that which can occupy the norm in myriad ways, exceed the norm, rework the norm, and expose realities to which we thought we were confined as open to transformation" (217). While Edelman rejects the future as a site of social reproduction, Butler prizes it as a space of uncertainty, an ambiguous terrain upon which competing and perhaps unforeseeable claims will be made and new social orders elaborated. Butler's model offers queer theory a brighter future than Edelman's, not simply because it confers agency upon social actors and highlights the social's capacity for transformation, but because it supersedes the liberal inclusiveness for which Edelman faults it. Butler's queer world is not one in which the dominant order remains stable as it incorporates, or ingests, peripheral sexualities into its fold. Rather, it is one in which the **periphery remakes the center**, rearticulating what it means to be "normal" or "American" or "queer." Thus, queers do not simply enter society on heterosexuality's terms; they recast such terms, seizing upon instabilities in signification to elaborate previously unarticulated and perhaps unanticipatable ways of life. Edelman's point that 'queer' names "the resistance of the social to itself" (2002) combats the very anti-futurism he endorses; in this formulation, queerness functions as the force that prevents a particular social order from coinciding with itself, from congealing into a futureless nightmare. Queer, then, might denote the instability of all norms and social orders, their intrinsic capacity for change.

Futurity is necessary to alter the current social order

Kurasawa 4

Fuyuki, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, "Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight," Constellations, 11:4, p. 454

But neither evasion nor fatalism will do. Some authors have grasped this, reviving hope in large-scale socio-political transformation by sketching out utopian **pictures of an alternative world order**. Endeavors like these are essential, for they spark ideas about possible and desirable futures that transcend the existing state of affairs and undermine the flawed prognoses of the post-Cold War world order; what ought to be and the Blochian 'Not-Yet' remain powerful figures of critique of what is, and inspire us to contemplate how social life could be organized differently. Nevertheless, my aim in this paper is to pursue a different tack by exploring how a dystopian imaginary can lay the foundations for a constructive engagement with the future.

Futurity k2 Environment

Focusing on the future is key to prevent environmental destruction

Dator 99

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http://www.futures.hawaii.edu/dator/governance/futgen.html

But simultaneously, and in stark contrast, "the environmental movement" began to question "development" as a proper basis for anticipating the future. Looming threats of environmental pollution, resource exhaustion, overpopulation, and global change seemed to many people vastly more important than continuing to urge blind economic growth. Fretting over the problems of a world of abundance and leisure was viewed as utter folly. Indeed, it was the unanticipated consequences of continued economic growth itself which caused many people to have such a bleak and fearful view of the future. "Development" was definitely not all it was cracked up to be. So, whatever view one might have of the future--be it bright or dark, prosperous or penurious--more and more people were becoming aware of their obligation to take the needs of **future generations into account** when making present decisions. Various advocates for governmental foresight have created, or attempted to create, new processes or institutions within existing systems of democratic government in different parts of the world. These include long-range planning departments, futures commissions, requirements that legislatures conduct future-impact statements on proposed legislation, environmental protection agencies, offices of technology assessment, and the like. Examples of these are discussed elsewhere in this volume.

Environmental destruction causes extinction

Richard **Margoluis**, Biodiversity Support Program, 19**96**, http://www.bsponline.org/publications/showhtml.php3?10

Biodiversity not only provides direct benefits like food, medicine, and energy; it also affords us a "life support system." Biodiversity is required for the recycling of essential elements, such as carbon, oxygen, and nitrogen. It is also responsible for mitigating pollution, protecting watersheds, and combating soil erosion. Because biodiversity acts as a buffer against excessive variations in weather and climate, it protects us from catastrophic events beyond human control. The importance of biodiversity to a healthy environment has become increasingly clear. We have learned that the future well-being of **all humanity depends on** our stewardship of **the Earth**. When we overexploit living resources, we threaten our own survival.

Focusing on the future solves extinction – solves resource planning that averts conflict and environmental collapse

Dator 99

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http://www.futures.hawaii.edu/dator/governance/futgen.html

Thus, **future-oriented political philosophies** and processes are given meaning not through specific policies about the future per se, but through certain perspectives, institutions, and actions intended to bring the interests of future generations into the decision making and implementation of the present. Future-oriented actions also include those made by governments and citizens which attempt seriously to assess the

potential impacts of proposed policies on future generations before the policies are made or implemented. Recent discussions about why we need to be aware of our obligations to future generations fall into four general categories: fairness, maintaining options, quality of life, and humility. The "fairness" obligation concerns not imposing risks on future generations that present generations would also not accept. For example, MacLean states that "levels of risk to which future generations will be subjected will be no greater than those of present persons'" [4]. Risks can include those of premature "death owing to environmental or other preventable catastrophes" [5] or other significant threats to the quality of life. "Fairness" also implies "consent." According to Schrader-Frechette, "until or unless a risk imposition receives the consent of those who are its potential victims, it cannot be justified"[6]. Future generations can offer no such consent, so ways need to be invented and created which attempt to include the interests, and consent, of future generations in all current decisions which will impact them. The "maintaining options" obligation entails giving to our posterity future worlds that are as free of human-made constraints as possible. In other words, there is a need to prevent environmental and other catastrophes "that would restrict the future of the human race by cutting off certain possible futures" [7]. By cutting off many futures, the ability of future societies to grow and mature is reduced [8] as is the freedom for people to "reason about means and ends and evaluate preferences, to match desires and beliefs and then act" [9]. Frankenfeld [10] argues that current generations owe posterity a world as simple, controllable, and affordable as possible. Brown's "Principle of Conservation of Options" holds that "each generation should conserve the diversity of the natural and cultural resource base so that is does not unduly restrict options available to future generations..." [11]. The "quality-of-life" obligation refers to ensuring that **future generations** enjoy all the most important aspects of life. From an international survey, Tough distilled the following quality-of-life obligations to future generations: peace and security, a healthy environment, a small risk of preventable catastrophe, stable governments, conservation of knowledge, a good life for children, and opportunities for living [12]. DesJardings' three quality-of-life obligations to future generations are development of alternative energy sources, conservation of energy resources, and a reasonable chance of happiness [13]. Economic concerns relating to quality-of-work and increasing standards of living could be added to this list, in addition to other variables that are found important by the world's diversity of cultures. Bell believes that "humility" should inhibit humanity from creating obligations to future generations. In his words, "humble ignorance ought to lead present generations to act with prudence toward the well-being of future generations." In addition, he states that "there is a prima facie obligation of present generations to ensure that important business is not left unfinished" [14] National governments make numerous decisions that bear on such obligations, either positively or negatively. Decisions within the sphere of the interest of obligations to future generations include environmental and energy policies, science and space programs, agriculture, land use, infrastructure, and education--indeed, almost everything. A future-oriented government might make decisions that support sustainability, species protection, ecosystem protection, reduction of pollutants into the environment, and conservation of non-renewable resources, with concomitant focus on using renewable resources.

Blackness

Link

AT "Destroy the Human"

Attempting to destroy the category of the human prevents an effective critique of anti-blackness

Nissim-Sabat 9 (Professor Emeritus and Adjunct Professor, Department of Philosophy, Lewis University) (Marilyn, *Neither victim nor survivor: thinking toward a new humanity*, pg. 102)

The difference between this Fanonian critique of the modus operandi of universals in antiblack racist thought on one hand, and postmodern thought's discarding of universals on the other hand, is clear. Gordon's statement that the "European practice of science . . . denied the existence of the black in its construction of the human being" is a critique of the failure of Eurocentrism in its exclusion of the black from the universal: "human being." Just so, the critique is not of the universal "human being' qua universal, but of the attempt to pass off a particular, the white human being, as the universal. From this point of view, discarding universality in toto does not advance the critique of antiblack racism; on the contrary, it obstructs that critique: "Philosophy that fails to account for existence is, therefore, trapped in a bad-faith claim to universality. In Fanon's critique, then, there is a perspective beyond particularity and universality, a perspective that sees multiple worlds" (44). The bad faith universality of which Gordon speaks is that of the racist; however, it applies just as well to the postmodern perspective. First, those who discard universality believe that just invoking it entails bad faith—tlierefore, from this perspective, all uses of universality arc in bad faith, and arc equally complicit. In other words, neither the racist nor the postmodern critic of the racist acknowledge that the category "human being' encompasses all human beings, past, present, and future, and therefore that racism artificially limits its scope to some. So, how then can the racist be held accountable as a racist? What then would be a notion of universality that is not complicit in one form or another of oppression? It seems to me that when Gordon refers to Fanon's critique as a "perspective bevond particularity and universality" that sees multiple worlds" he suggests something akin to, or better an existential recasting of, Hegel's concrete universal or individuality as the unity of the universal and particular.' Such a notion is also expressed by Alice Cherki in her recent biography of Fanon.

AT Futurism

Humanism requires a positive orientation towards the future and our responsibilities towards others

Gordon 9 (Professor of Philosophy and African American Studies at UConn and one of the premier Fanon scholars in the world)
(Lewis R., Introduction to *Neither victim nor survivor: thinking toward a new humanity*, pg. viii)

This book is aptly entitled Neither Victim nor Survivor: Thinking toward a New Humanity. <u>Nissim-Sabat's commitments</u>, as a philosopher, therapist, and activist, a<u>re against the stultifying social forces and interpretations of reality that</u>, as Fanon once observed, <u>make life "brittle" and block the path of action and imagination</u>, <u>which led to her struggle for thinking about the future, of future thinking, of responsibilities faced each generation for those who succeed them</u>. In the course of such thought, the constitutional paradox comes to the fore, where we in effect make that which we are trying to find. This effort, <u>in which our humanity haunts our failings, demands our not collapsing into a state of permanent ruin</u>. There is a sense in which ruin is unavoidable, since, at least in psychoanalytical terms, the separation from the womb is a loss for which we seek external reconciliation in our cultivation of a home. History, however, reveals that although such a journey is shared by all, the obstacles placed on the majority of humankind renders its prize, not only coming home but also having a home, available to few. <u>The human condition reveals a common goal that's an uncommon achievement.</u>

To remain only tied to the past an exclude the future prevents any transformative action and destroys the radical potential of humanism

Nissim-Sabat 9 (Professor Emeritus and Adjunct Professor, Department of Philosophy, Lewis University)
(Marilyn, *Neither victim nor survivor: thinking toward a new humanity*, pg. 188-89)

It is true, as Morrison tells us, that the past is disremembered. It is also tragic that this forgetting of immense human suffering seems to be hereto- fore concomitant with our need to move forward and integrate or reintegrate ourselves. To this extent, <u>we are all</u> compromised, all <u>condemned to repeat history</u>. Far, <u>far better it would be to remember, and in remembering be, not traumatized, but rather empowered to create the conditions for the possibility of a future for humanity such that there will be no more victims, no more holocausts, and thus no more survivors</u>. The paralysis <u>and total devastation brought about by surviving</u> in a perpetual state of trauma-that is, <u>by not forgetting, is</u>, of course<u>, not a solution either for in such a state</u> constructive or <u>transformative action is impossible</u>. This should not be taken as a critique of the traumatized, for that would indeed be to blame the victims, and doing so is both incorrect and ethically anathema. Rather, it is meant as a critique of those who think that traumatized persons have no resources within that can enable them to move beyond survival toward personal wholeness, even in conjunction with "forgetting." To deny this is to blame the victims by seulng them apart as a special category-those condemned perpetually to relive their trauma and survival of it. If the "fairy tale" ending of Beloved is ambiguous, and I believe it is, it is not because it is marked by trauma denying implausi-bility, but precisely becauseit is not a "fairy tale" in the pejorative senseor an act of "willful optimism." Sethe can achieve subject status. She can be- come a self through her Own struggles and with the intervention of Beloved, Beloved's baby, and Paul D. For Sethe, life can now, after living for eighteen years in a free stale, be more than mere survival for she has reconnected with her self before her most devastating traumas, and this enables her to recon nec~w.ith .the people whom she loves and who love her. Moreover, there is no IOdlc~tlon whatsoever in the novel that Sethe and Paul D's future in this world will be a blissful happi ly-cver-after, even if it is much, much happier than what really happened 10 Margaret Garner and Ihe Sixty-Million victims of the Middle Passage'. What really would be a "fairy tale" in the pejorative sense,a fairy tale thai IS not at all represented in Beloved. is the notion that we, any and all of us, can fully realize our humanity, can become whole, no ~at1er how favorable our circumstances, in

a world of continued, pervasive inhumanity, The ending of Beloved shows, therefore, that Paul D and Sethe are enabled to live a meaningful life together becausethey understood from all of their struggles to survive that they survived partly in virtue of their implicit realization that just surviving was not enough; they were implicitly aware that they are not the animals that slavery held them to be, but human beings. For, they might have survived in slavery, but not living human lives. Just so, Frederick Douglass asserted himself and turned on his overseer Covey when he realized that not his survival but his humanity, his dignity as a human being, was at stake.

"I am not the slave of the Slavery that dehumanized my ancestors," wrote Panon.? How can we throw off this slavery? Fanon has his own ideas about this, ideas that are not very different from Toni Morrison's in Beloved. We must abandon the abstract, reined victim-survivor binary, the dialectic of false consciousness. We, as both individual persons and as the human community, must trace the line of fusion that connects our best things-our personhood before victimization and our human future beyond mere survival.

AT Freedom

Freedom is a necessary goal and tactic of human liberation that must be practiced in the now

Gibson 10 (Professor in postcolonial and African/a studies at Emerson, one of the leading figures in Fanon scholarship)
(Nigel C., Fanonian Presences in South Africa: From Theory and from Practice, in *Fanon and the Decolonization of Philosophy*, Pg. 236-7)

Whatever challenges the movement faces in the future, <u>the strength of the shack dwellers movement must be judged by its commitment to freedom and liberation</u>. The idea of freedom is central to "Living Learning." How could it not be, ~Jnce fifteen years after freedom was won there is no freedom for the poor? An Idea of freedom becomes necessary because of the daily situation<u>. The quest for freedom is the human response to the situation, the daily emergency, of millions of shack dwellers and rural dwellers in South Africa; it is a situation that de- mands freedom</u>. <u>This is</u> uncomplicated and <u>absolute</u>, in Fanon's sense, <u>a situation of life and death</u>. This world is un viable and therefore people must rebel: "Our world is burning and so we need another world.,,136 This absoluteness is expressed in the movement's uncompromising language of change: "There is a difference when the poor say another world is necessary and when civi I society says that another world is possible. We conclude to say that it is the formations of the poor and the grassroots that are the agency to make this other world come-not civil society."!" The emphasis on the concrete condition of the shack dwellers highlights the fact that the fundamental difference between pos- sibility and necessity turns on the importance of their own agency, In other words, <u>the necessity of another world in the here-and-now is something demanded by conscious agency, their thought and their action</u>. There is another philosophical point about necessity and freedom that Marx makes in Capital that has a resonance with the Living Learning discussion. Marx argues that freedom is not about imagining the possible but freedom only begins where necessity ends: "[t]he true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as an end in itself, begins beyond it, though it can only flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis.

The nature of freedom is also a complicated question. The answer devel- oped here is that it is the self-organization of the shack dwellers and the insis- tence on their own agency and intelligence-as force and reason for ~he recon- struction of societi39-that gives content to freedom. <u>Freedom</u> is not an abstraction. Its content <u>is generated out of the reality of "unfreedom."</u> In other words Abahlali do not need to hear a philosophic discourse on Freedom because 'they are already "professors of our own poverty." <u>Freedom "will come from becoming masters of our own history ... and from makmg our own paths Out of unfreedom</u>.,, <u>It is this vision of freedom as collective empowerment that transforms the struggle into one for a whole new society</u>. The struggle does. not demand greater technical efficiency from the state nor a change in the relationship between a community and the state, but rejects the states logic of freedom" which is limited to voting in exchange for "bits and pieces of service dell very" and argues instead that the state become subservient to poor people's needs. The participants are clear that:

We also see that our ideas about freedom go much further and deeper than the way our struggles arc presented when they arc described as "service delivery protest." If the heart of our struggle was just for houses and services to be deli- vered, we would be just like beggars with our hands out, waiting someone to help us- No, what we are struggling for, a real freedom, goes much further than that! 141

They insist, against the stunted and antipolitical language of the NGOs and hu- man rights organizations, that <u>freedom is not only the goal but must also be something that is practiced now in the day-to-day critical, democratic, open- ended</u>. <u>and praxis-based vision</u> that Fanon envisioned <u>would be needed to counter the degeneration of liberation</u>: "[w]e don't say that we in the movements are perfect, but at least we are opening these gates; at least we are on a right path to search for the truth. We have a deep responsibility to make sure that no-one can shut the gates." They stress that collective reflection on the experience of oppression and resistance is essential to that praxis: "[o]ur experience in life and in the movement means that we must always remain open to debate, question and new learning from and with the people." The point is not to tell the people what to think but

to create spaces that can enable people to discuss how and why they are not free. The notion is dialogic rather than hierarchical and relies on the "damned of the earth" speaking for themselves. As Fanon reminds us, the strug- gle for freedom aims for a fundamental change in social relations. After the con- flict, there is not only the disappearance of the unfreedom but also the unfree person.I'" It is praxis that enables the transcendence of unfreedom, transforming the system and individuals. That transcendence depends on breaking the mind forged manacles of unfreedom. 143

Fanon's visionary critique of postcolonial elite politics mapped out a "living politics" based on a decentralized and democratic form of self-governing which opens up new spaces for the politics of the excluded from the ground up is being practiced in "living learning." It is only a small beginning toward building coun- ter- hegemony from below that opens up spaces that fundamentally change the political status quo and contest the moral and intellectual narcissism of the rul- ing elites. Recently Fanon's conclusions to The Wretched of the Earth- with its challenge to Europe and its call to work out a "new humanism" based on the inclusion, indeed centrality, of the "enlightening and fruitful work" of nation building has been concretely rearticulated by S'bu Zikode of Abahlali: "[it] is one thing if we are beneficiaries who need delivery. It is another thing if we are citizens who want to shape the future of our cities even our country. It is another thing if we are human beings who have decided that it is our duty to humanize the world."!"

AT Humanism

[Insert after the Yancy card]

The human is contingent, rather than ontologically fixed

Lewis R. **Gordon** (Professor of Philosophy and African American Studies at UConn and one of the premier Fanon scholars in the world) **13**
(The Black Scholar, Vol. 43, No. 4, Special Issue: Role of Black Philosophy (Winter 2013), pp. 46-51)

The problem cannot be transformed, however, simply by making blacks the standard, especially since that history was not granted the opportunity to be interrogated on terms beyond conditions of white su- premacy and anti-black racism. The task, then, is to raise the standard of humanity by going through and beyond black, white, brown, yellow, and red to the conditions of standards themselves. Standards of the human, it soon becomes evident, are open and incomplete by virtue of depending for their creation on those whom they are supposed to evaluate. The human, in other words, is humanity's project, and we see that in the ever-expanding reach of culture as a condition of possibility of the materially human.

AT Humanism = Structural Violence

Adopting an ethic of revolutionary humanism is necessary to solve <u>global structural violence</u>, create an enabling language of revolutionary praxis and animate a material force for stealing hope

Pithouse (teaches politics at Rhodes University in Grahamstown, South Africa) **3**
(Richard, THAT THE TOOL NEVER POSSESS THE MAN: Taking Fanon's Humanism Seriously, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, Volume 30, Issue 1, 2003)

<u>So what if Fanon is a humanist?</u> So what if, against the positivists, we discover that that means something in the world of lived experience? So what if Fanon developed a destalinized and dehistoricized radicalism before the post-structuralists? <u>Fanon is not an end in himself</u>. <u>We do no justice to his spirit by defending him while</u> Bush bombs Baghdad, <u>the World Bank reorganises the world</u> so that the poor can step up their subsidisation of the rich <u>and 600 of us die from a manageable disease every day</u>. Fanon didn't invest his energies in the defence of Toussaint l'Ouverture. He made history.

<u>Revolutionary humanism is the strongest current in the movement of movements that seek to subordinate the market, state and empire</u> to democratic control. In Seattle and Chiappas and Namada and Vrygrond ('Ons is nie fokken honde nie!') <u>humanism is the</u> spontaneous, universal and <u>enabling language of resistance</u>. And <u>it is at the core of the work</u> of the great essayists and scholars that <u>inspire</u> and are inspired in <u>this movement of movements. Humanism animates a material force that is</u> inventing and tending and <u>stealing hope</u>. This matters.

<u>Everywhere</u> – the media, the academy, trade unions, NGOs, government, business, social movements – <u>transcendent ideas</u> like The Market, The Leader, The Nation, Africa, International Norms, The Party, Economic Fundamentals, The Struggle, The Foreign Investor, uBuntu, The International Community, Competitiveness, Development and Professionalism <u>still slip in to thought</u>, so smoothly, <u>as easy justification for choices that inflict deprivation, suffering and death</u>. This matters.

We are so constrained by colonial Manicheanism that many of us think that we were born to take a side on the African potato vs. anti-retrovirals or Mugabe vs. the white farmers or Bush vs. Hussein; or that it is a crisis when white policemen set their dogs on black Mozambiqueans but that Lindela is just business. Business as usual. This matters. <u>Humanism is just a way of saying that everybody's right to self-creation matters. It isn't even a map. Its just a signpost. It only matters when we are lost</u>.

A posititve orientation towards history and the ideals of radical humanist freedom are key to global liberationist struggles. Only this can avert every major crisis of our times.

Karenga (Professor and Chair Department of Africana Studies California State University, Long Beach, activist and author, best known as the creator of Kwanzaa, was a major figure in the Black Power movement and co-founded the black nationalism organization US) **6**

(Maulana, Philosophy in the African Tradition of Resistance: Issues or Human Freedom a.nd Human Flourishing in Not Only The Master's Tools, pg. 242-5)

Surely, <u>we are at a moment of history fraught with</u> new and old fOnTIS of anxiety, <u>alienation</u>, and antagonism; <u>deepening poverty</u> in the midst of increasing wealth; proposals and practices of ethnic cleansing and <u>genocide;</u> <u>pandemic diseases</u>; increased plunder; <u>pollution and depletion of the environment; constant conflicts</u>, large and small; <u>and world-threatening delusions on the part of a superpower aspiring to a return to empire</u>, with spurious claims of the right to preemptive aggression, to openly attack and overthrow nonfavored and fragile

governments openly, and to seize the lands and resources of vulnerable peoples and establish "democracy" through military dictatorship abroad, all the while suppressing political dissent at home (Chang 2002; Cole et at. 2002). These anxieties are undergirded by racist and religious chauvinism, by the self-righteous and veiled references of these rulers to themselves as a kind of terrible and terrorizing hand of God, appointed to rid the world of evil (Ahmad 2002; Arnin 2001; Blum1995). At the same time, in this context of turmoil and terror and the use and threatened use of catastrophic weapons, there is the irrational and arrogant expectation that the oppressed will acquiesce, abandon resistance, and accept the disruptive and devastating consequences of globalization, along with the global hegemony it implies (Martin and Schumann 1997). There is great alarm among the white-supremicist rulers of these globalizing nations, given the metical resistance rising up against them, even as globalization'S technological, organizational, and economic capacity continues to expand (Barber 1996; Karenga 2002e, 2003a; Lusane 1997). There is great alarm when people who should "know" when they are defeated ridicule the assessment, re- fuse to be defeated or dispirited, and, on the contrary, intensify and diversify their struggles (Zepezauer 2002).

Certainly the battlefields of Palestine, Venezuela, long"suffering Haiti,and Chiapas, Mexico, along with other continuing emancipatory struggles everywhere, reaffirm the indomitable character of the human spirit and the durability and adaptive vitality of a people determined to be free, regardless of the odds and assessments against them. Indeed, they remind us that the motive force of history is struggle, informed by the ongoing quest for freedom, justice, power of the masses, and peace in the world. Despite "end of history" claims and single-super- power resolve and resolutions, these struggles continue. For still the oppressed want freedom, the wronged and injured want justice, the people want power over their destiny and daily lives, and tbe world wants peace. And all over the world-especially in this U.S. citadel of aging capitalism with its archaic dreams of empire-clarity in the analysis of issues, and in the critical determination of tasks and prospects, requires the deep and disciplined reflection dlaracteristic of the personal and social practice we call philosophy.

But this sense of added urgency for effective intervention is prompted not only by the critical juncture at which we stand but also by an awareness of our long history of resistance as a people, because in our collective strivings and social struggles we seek a new future for our people, our descendants, and the world. Joined also to these conditions and considerations is the compelling character of our self-understanding as a people, as a moral vanguard in this country and the world. For we have launched, fought, and won with our allies struggles that not only have expanded the realm of freedom in this country and the world but also have served as an ongoing inspiration and a model of liberation struggles for other marginalized and oppressed peoples and groups throughout the world. Indeed, they have borrowed from and built on our moral vocabularyand moral vision, sung our songs of freedom, and held up our struggle for liberation as a model to emulate. Now, self-understanding and self-assertion are dialectically linked. In other words, how we understand ourselves in the world determines how we assert ourselves in the world. Thus, an expansive concept of ourselves as Africans-continental and diasporan-and as Africana philosophers forms an essential component of our sense of mission and the urgency with which we approach it.

It is important to note that I have conceived and written this chapter within the framework of Kausaida ph.ilosoph.y (Karenga 1978, 1980, 1997)K.awaida is a philosophic initiative that was forged in the crucible ofi deological and practical struggles around issues of freedom, justice, equalitys, self-determination, conullunal power, self-defense, pan~African- ism, coalition and alliance, Black Studies, intellectual emancipation, and cultural recovery and reconstlouction. It continued to develop in the midst of these ongoing struggies within the life of the mind and stmggles iottbtn the life of the people, as well as within the context of the conditions of the world. Kawaida is defined as an ongoing synthesis of the best of African thought and practice in constant exchange tuttb tl3e 'U)()ltd. It characterizes culture as a unique, instruc- tive,a nd valuable way of being human in the world-as a foundation and framework for self-understanding and self-assertion.

As a philosophy of culture and struggle, Kawaida maintains that <u>our intellectual and social practice</u> as Nricana activist scholars <u>must be undergirded and informed by ongoing efforts to (1) ground our- selves in our own culture; (2) constantly recover, reconstruct, .and bring forth from our culture the best of what it means to be African and human in the fullest sense</u>; (3) speak this special cultural truth to the world and (4) <u>use our culture to constantly make our own unique contribution to the reconception and reconstruction of this country, and to the forward flow of human history</u>.

AT Humanism Kills Resistance

Black resistance is a profoundly positive and human act
Yancy (Prof of Philosophy at Duqesne) **8**

(George, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Contining Significance of Race, Pg. 111-2) [**Italics original** – DQ]

The significant point here is that the needed slippage did occur; indeed, <u>the Black body's history in the "New World" has been a history of resistance</u>. This history does not deny the Black body's history of self-hatred, its passing for white, and its history of accommodation, In other words, "resistance is cardinal and crucial to any description, definition, and interpretation of African American culture,,,. [That culture] in its full substance and scope is more complex than a singular thrust in the monodirection of resistance,"'
<u>Despite the power of white discursive disciplinary control and physical brutality, the Black body has historically disrupted the reduction of its being to that of a **thing**</u>, To comprehend the Black body as a site of resistance, <u>it is important to understand that the body "is not what it is and it is not yet what it will become,"</u>[10] In short, <u>the Black body (as with the white body) is a **process**</u>, It might be argued that the Black body/embodied Black existence in relation to the white gaze is ontologically excessive, something more than the white gaze is capable of nullifying through its power, Of course, <u>to refer to the Black body as a site of resistance, I am referring to Black **embodied** existence as **socially situated**, that perspective from which the embodied self is capable of recognizing the possibility of reconfiguring or overcoming a set of circumstances</u>. Resistance is linked to a level of comprehension of one's social conditions and not simply a question of psychological renewal. Resistance involves seeing through the "impersonal" discursive practices of whites, rejecting the "naturelike" constructions of social reality that threaten Blacks' lives, and transforming the debilitating psyche and the physical conditions in terms of which they have been imprisoned," As Paget Henry notes, "Agency against these normative and institutional structures requirefs] the decoding of their impersonal, nature-like appearance and their rewriting in codes that reveal their roots in ordinary communication and social action," Indeed, Black resistance is a form of decoding of the ideological prison house of racist discourse, a discourse that "operates in the name of values" that valorize whiteness and dehumanize Black people.[13] Of course, such values assume the status of neutrality so as to appear natural.

> I argue that <u>Black resistance</u>, as a mode of decoding, <u>is simultaneously a process of recoding Black embodied existence through processes of opposition and **affirmation**</u>. According to bell hooks, "<u>Opposition is not enough, In that vacant space after one has resisted there is still the necessity to become-to make oneself anew</u>."[14] While I agree with hooks's claim that opposition is certainly not enough, I question her thesis that there is a "vacant space after one has resisted," Indeed, I argue that resistance can occupy that "vacant space" and that the process of becoming and making oneself anew has already been enacted, though time is certainly needed to nourish and further develop the process of becoming and remaking the self anew, Rather than asking what exists on the other side of resistance, one might explore the affirmative dimensions of what is already embedded within resistance itself, The moment of *resistance,* in other words, *is* the moment of *becoming,* of being made *anew.* And while "human transcendence always involves becoming.,,, self-creation for an oppressed people whose transcendence is denied often finds its founding moments in resistance,"[15]
> Within a context where Black bodies are constantly under discursive and physical erasure, to resist *{re-sistere),* "to take a stand," is linked, existentially, to taking up a different *project,* that is, not settling for an antiblack project superimposed by the white other, <u>Resisting is not simply limited to saying "No, I refuse!" It is not simply a negative process</u>. <u>Resistance is an instantiation of affirmation</u>. Within the context of white mythmaking regarding the docility and subhumanity of the Black body and the refusal to grant the Black body a perspective on the world, <u>taking a stand demonstrates and affirms the existential and ontological force of having a perspective, a subjectivity.</u> Indeed, the moment of Black resistance calls into question the philosophical anthropological assumptions of white racism, assumptions that deny the reality and complexity of Black self-determination, self-reflexivity, and

interiority. <u>Black resistance, then, is a profoundly embodied **human** act of epistemological re-</u><u>cognition, an affirmation that carries with it an ontological repositioning of the being of Black</u> <u>embodiment as a significant site of</u> discursive (and material) <u>self-possession.</u>

AT Survival

The political significance of humanity is both terrible and terribly important. Though the concept of humanity makes us guilty, it also is a pre-requisite for a politics that can fight atrocity.

Hannah **Arendt 3** [*The Portable Hannah Arendt* p. 155]

For many years now we have met Germans who declare that they are ashamed of being Germans. I have often felt tempted to answer that I am ashamed of being human. This elemental shame, which many people of the most various nationalities share with one another today, is what finally is left of our sense of international solidarity; and it has not yet found an adequate political expression. Our fathers' enchantment with humanity was of a sort which not only light-mindedly ignored the national question; what is far worse, it did not even conceive of the terror of the idea of humanity and of the Judeo-Christian faith in the unitary origin of the human race. It was not very pleasant even when we had to bury our false illusions about "the noble savage," having discovered that men were capable of being cannibals. Since then people have learned to know one another better and have learned more and more about the evil potentialities in men. The result is that they have recoiled more and more from the idea of humanity and they become more susceptible to the doctrine of race, which denies the very possibility of a common humanity. They instinctively felt that the idea of humanity, whether it appears in a religious or humanistic form, implies the obligation of a general responsibility which they do not wish to assume. For the idea of humanity, when purged of all sentimentality, has the very serious consequence that in one form or another mean must assume responsibility for all crimes committed by men and that all nations share the onus of evil by all others. Shame at being a human being is the purely individual and still non-political expression of this thought. In political terms, the idea of humanity, excluding no people and assigning a monopoly of guilt to no one, is the only guarantee that one "superior race" after another may not feel obligated to follow the "natural law of the right of the powerful, and exterminate "inferior races unworthy of survival"' so that at the end of an "imperialistic age" we should find ourselves in a stage which would make the Nazis look like crude precursors of future political methods. To follow a non-imperialistic policy and maintain a non-racist faith becomes daily more difficult because it becomes daily clearer how great a burden mankind is for man. Perhaps those Jews, to whose forefathers we owe the first conception of the idea of humanity, knew something about the burden when each year they used to say "Our Father and King, we have sinned before you," taking not only the sins of their own community but all human offenses upon themselves. Those who today are ready to follow this road in a modern version do not content themselves with the hypocritical confession "God be thanked, I am not like that," in horror at the undreamed-of-potentialities of the German national character. Rather, in fear and trembling, have they finally realized of what man is capable—and this is indeed the precondition of any modern political thinking. Such persons will not serve very well as functionaries of vengeance. This, however, is certain: Upon them and only upon them, who are filled with a genuine fear of the inescapable guilt of the human race, can there be any reliance when it comes to fighting fearlessly, uncompromisingly, everywhere against the incalculable evil that men are capable of bringing about.

Prag

Framing

Can't separate the question of the desirability of the end of the world or that imagination from the question of how we achieve that

Glaude (Professor of Religion and African American Studies, Department of Religion, and Chair, Center for African American at Princeton) **7**
(EDDIE S. GLAUDE JR., In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America, Pg. 8-9)

Pragma is Greek for things, facts, deeds, affairs. Pragmatists hold the view that our practice is primary. Knowledge, for example, does not re- quire, in the pragmatist view, philosophical foundations in direct per- sonal awareness. Instead, it is bound up in culture, society, and history, results, in part, from our doings and sufferings, our ability or inability to secure desired aims in a somewhat hostile environment. The good pragmatist, in the end, seeks to avoid dogmas that settle matters prior to experience and calls us to see the ethical import of our actions— that what we believe about the world has ethical significance and that what we do has ethical implications for how we will live our lives. C. I. Lewis best cap- tures this view of pragmatism: "At bottom, all problems are problems of conduct; all judgments are implicitly judgments of value; that as there can be ultimately no valid distinction between the theoretical or practical, so there can be no final separation of questions of truth of any kind from questions of the justifiable ends of actions."

Ths book attempts to show that pragmatism can help to address some of the more challenging dimensions of contemporary African American politics. But I maintain that, it first ought to undergo a reconstruction of sorts. Pragmatism must be made to sing the blues. In chapter, I argue that, contrary to standard accounts, John Dewey's reconstruction of moral experience insists on the tragic dimensions of our moral lives: we are consistently confronted with competing values that often require that some good or value is butchered. I then put Deweyin conversation with one of America's greatest writers, Toni Morrison. Dewey indeed has re- sources capable of addressing what Stanley Cavell describes as the work of mourning- but my reading of Morrison aims to reconstruct those re- sources in light of the racialized experiences that haunt American life. What might it mean to think of the tragic in the contest of those black persons forced to force a self amid the absurdities of a society still fundamentally committed to racist practices? I suggest that Morrison's novel exemplifies what it means to hold a pragmatic view of the tragic that takes seriously the ofte brutal realities of white supremacy. Morrison then teaches Dewey a lesson about race, American democracy, and the often tragic choices imposed on this country's darker citizens. The chapter thus opens the way for a more sustained encounter between pragmatism as I understand it and African American political life.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examine how pragmatism might aid us in rethinking the various ways appeals to black identity, history and agency impact and form content of African American political activity. Too often such appeals settle political matters beforehand. Black history, for some, constitutes a reservoir of meaning that predetermines our orientation to problem, irrespective of their particulars and black agency is imagined from the start as bound up an emancipatory politics. When identity is determined by way of reference to a fixed racial self, the complexity of African American life is denied. Moreover, the actual moral dilemmas. African American face reduced to a crude racial calculus in which the answers are somehow genetically or culturally encoded.

No Black Only Movement

Black only movements can't generate steam – too many internal and external social cleavages

Dawson (Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture at the University of Chicago) **1**

(Michael C., BLACK VISIONS The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies, pg. 318-9)

An additional consequence of the conditions which face black activists is that most blacks still believe that Wright was bitterly prophetic when he stated (in the epigraph that opens the chapter) that America lacks commit- ment to racial equality. Remember that 65 percent of African Americans during the middle 1990s believed that racial progress in America would ei- ther not be achieved in their lifetime or would never be achieved at all. By late 2000 this percentage had climbed to 71percent (from data compiled by the author). In the face of this level of disillusionment, black activists and ideologues face three additional extremely daunting problems, First, the changes in the political economy of the black community mean that con- ditions are dramatically worsening for some black Americans but improv- ing for others, This has led not just to growing class divisions. As Cohen (1999) details, among others, these divisions are not confined to ones of class; black politics is fracturing along the many lines of social cleavage. The result, claims Marable (as I did in my earlier work), is that "many of the social, economic, and cultural linkages which previously connected various social classes and organizations began to erode" (Marable and Mullings 1995,204; see also Dawson 1994a). These bridging organizations have been undermined in many cases by having to cope with a hostile po- litical environment and occasionally by the self-interested strategies chosen by their leaders. Political unity, which has been achieved in the past even without ideological unity, will be increasingly difficult to achieve given the class, gender, and generational divisions that are becoming increasingly prominent. Second, the rest of country has moved much more profoundly to the right than the black community, leaving a political environment and establishment that is hostile even to just claims of either racial or economic redistribution and justice, Third, the growing magnitude of problems fac- ing the black community and the simultaneous dwindling of political op- portunities has led to widespread dissatisfaction with the racial status quo and significant dissatisfaction with the economic status quo, The result has been a resurgence in both nationalism and liberal disillusionment that makes it more difficult to build political movements and coalitions, both within the black community and between the black community and other communities.

Unitary Identity Fails

Movements based on unitary black ID fails

Glaude (Professor of Religion and African American Studies, Department of Religion, and Chair, Center for African American at Princeton) **7**
(EDDIE S. GLAUDE JR., In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America, Pg. 129-30)

Katrina revealed that the many challenges confronting black America require an imaginative and immediate shift in our political lexicon-that our traditional "vocabularies of struggle" require recalibration in light of the particular conditions of our current circumstances. This effort goes far beyond the narrow debate between those who would deny or accept the relevance of race to political matters. The question instead is how we address the actual problems African American communities confront, realizing that those communities fracture and fragment in varying ways and along different fault lines. What are our mobilizing tropes in light of this differentiation? How do they inspire us to respond passionately and intelligently to the problems at hand? Of course, these questons require a closer examination of what we mean by "our" and "us"; Katrina, after all, revealed the extraordinary class cleavages among African Americans.

I have tried to show on pragmatic grounds, that there are ways to imagine "us" without falling into the trap of racial essentialism or succumbing to what Adolph Reed rightly "decries as a misguided view of corporate racial interests. My aim has been to turn our the actual "doings and sufferings" of black folk. There we find richly textured experiences that trouble any reductive account of the lives of African Americans. Time and again, appeals to racial identity and unity, or to notions of black history and agency, have masked, often to the detriment of the most vulnerable, the competing interests informing the political and moral choices of African Americans. Competing interests are ignored in favor of racial politics that presumes, dangerously, that black individuals see themselves as necessarily in solidarity with other black individuals solely on the ban of race. This assumption, more often than not, results in a form of racial politics that relies heavily on a set of tropes that signal to those willing to listen that black interests, whatever they may be, are in jeopardy. We need only invoke the images of our past, or the many persons who gave their lives in the struggle for black freedom, to orient ourselves appropriately to any political matter. For some, these tropes stand in for democratic deliberation; they, in effect, do our thinking for us. But such invocations blind us to a crucial insight:
that democratic and participatory value must be the cornerstone of credibility for the notion of black politics; group consensus must be constructed through active participation. Even then, it is inmportant to realize that often there will be no universal racial consensus on key issues; that some conflicts derive from irreconcilable material differences. Unity is always on specific terms and in pursuit of specific objectives.
By my pragmatic lights, African American politics, if they are to be genuinely democratic, must, like the nation in general, embrace the full complexity of the racialized experiences of black folk and not succumb to what I termed in chapter 3 the descripdve, theoretical and existential problematic). That complexity will give the lie to any facile racial politics that fails to exemplify the black democratic energies necessary for a fundamental transformation in this nation.

These difference are real and matter as much as racial identification – other IDs can supercede Blackness

hooks (Distinguished Professor in Residence at Barea) **12**
(bell, Writing Beyond Race: Living Theory and Practice, Pg. 2-3)

Public discourses about race and gender did create new ways of thinking and knowing. Talking about class and the various ways class differences separate groups has been much harder. Class standing and status tend frequently to link us more intimately to the dominant economic system and its concomitant hierarchies, For

example: it is much more likely that a white person will bond with a black person when the two share a common class lifestyle, It is less likely that a materially prosperous person will establish a mutual bond with someone who is poor and indigent. One of the most difficult and delicate subjects to discuss among African Americans is the reality of class differences and of class difference among us. The central position race has occupied in our political discourse has often obscured the way in which class differences disrupt notions of racial unity. And yet, today, class differences coupled with racial integration have created a cultural context where the very meaning of blackness and its impact on our lives differs greatly among black people. There is no longer a common notion of shared black identity.

In other words, a sense of shared identity is no longer a platform that can draw folks together in meaningful solidarity. Along with class, gender issues and feminist awareness have served to place black folks in different camps, creating conflicts that can only be resolved through education for critical consciousness. There is also the reality of changing religious practices. There was a time in our nation when it was just assumed that every black person was a Christian or at least coming from a Christian background. This is simply no longer the case. Black children today have diverse religious practices. Some are raised in Muslim and Buddhist traditions with no understanding of Christian beliefs. And more young black people than ever before choose no religious practice at all. Hence the shared theological language that once served as a basis of communication and bonding can no longer be assumed.

Impact D

AT Ethics

Every individual has an ethical imperative to recognize not only themselves and each other as responsible <u>human agents rather than as objects</u>. Their call for an immediate inversion of our internal ethical imperatives is a destructive overreading of Fanon's pessimism that refuses to allow human freedom and responsibility as a telos for politics, especially in the tactical short term.

We are called to do battle for the creation of a human world, using all possible revolutionary tactics. Freedom and responsibility are not just an ethically neutral description of the human condition. They are also a positive ethical position

Pithouse (teaches politics at Rhodes University in Grahamstown, South Africa) **1**

(Richard, FRANTZ FANON AND THE PERSISTENCE OF HUMANISM, from Protest and Engagement: Philosophy After Apartheid at an Historically Black South African University

http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_i.htm)

Fanon's thought is clearly existentialist in that he shares, with other existentialist thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre, a belief that <u>the human condition is to be free – in the sense that existence precedes essence – and to be fully responsible for the exercise of that freedom</u>. The nature of that freedom lies in the capacity to choose and to act – to create within the context of the unchosen facts in response to which we negotiate our lives – facticity in existential discourse. So, for example, Fanon insists that: '<u>the body of history does not determine a single one of my actions. I am my own foundation.</u>" (1967:231) <u>Denial of that freedom is considered to be self-deception</u> – bad faith – <u>and is</u>, clearly<u>, considered as an ethical failure</u> by Fanon. So, for example, he argues that "Every one of my acts commits me as a man. Everyone of my silences, every one of my cowardices reveals me as a man." (1967:88-89) Two of the more important examples of bad faith mentioned by Fanon are denial of the embodied nature of existence and denial of the humanity of the Other. The embodied nature of existence is obviously important in the context of racism. And, indeed, Fanon, in the chapter from *Black Skin White Masks* titled *The Fact of Blackness* reproached Sartre on the grounds that: "Jean-Paul Sartre had forgotten that the Negro suffers in his body quite differently from the white man." (1967:138) <u>In the context of anti-black racism, blackness becomes a stark reality in the social world</u>. To deny it is bad faith.

It is also vitally important in the context of the bodily needs that must be met if the body is to survive and be healthy and so allow consciousness to survive and flourish. So, <u>while it is important to recognise that a man in prison is free to choose how to respond to the fact of his imprisonment, it is also important to acknowledge that human beings are not pure consciousness and that</u>, therefore, <u>a full understanding of freedom must include some recognition of the needs of the bod</u>y. There is a clear recognition of this throughout Fanon's work – from *Black Skin White Masks* through to *The Wretched of the Earth*. He takes somatic well-being very seriously. But the recognition of the importance of embodiment does not mean that the body is always prior to consciousness in value. Clearly, consciousness cannot survive without the body, but Biko, who would be considered a hero in existentialist terms, put his body on the line to defend the integrity of his consciousness.

There is also an important connection between embodiment and the other. As Lewis Gordon explains: "The human being is at least three perspectives of embodiment: the perspective from a standpoint in the world; the perspective seen from other standpoints in the world; and the human being is a perspective that is aware of itself being seen from other standpoints in the world." (1995:19) <u>For Fanon it is imperative that human beings recognise not only themselves but also each other as human – as agents who are free/responsible and expansive rather</u>

than as objects who are determined/not responsible and contained. "I do battle" he says "for the creation of a human world – that is, of a world reciprocal of recognition." (1967:219) Fanon's central concerns – a desire to avoid bad faith in general and a particular desire to avoid the objectification of human beings – leads to a short but clear statement of his basic (existential humanist) ethical position: "I have one right alone: That of demanding human behaviour from the other. One duty alone: that of not renouncing my freedom through my choices." (1967:229) So, for Fanon freedom and responsibility are not just an ethical neutral description of the human condition. They are also a positive ethical position. It is an ethics which takes truth as fundamental, not received truth or any form of doxa, but rather truth as an honest examination of one's self and the world. For Fanon the humanity of man is the truth and so inhumanity must either be founded on conscious lies, a failure to face up to the truth or sheer, conscious contempt for humanity. But, because even in the latter case contempt for humanity will often mask itself, an inhuman society is a society in which "everyday reality is a tissue of lies, of cowardice, of contempt for man." (1967 b:52)

This commitment to truth is not the reactionary humanism that presents some normalising orthodoxy/ideology as the essence of what it is to be human. This is a humanism that returns to the truth of the experiences of individual human beings – to immanence.

Affirming the power to make ethical prescriptions and alter the world is possible and crucial to agency and counter-hegemonic praxis. The black human is not a contradiction and its ontological position can be altered

Yancy 13

(George, Introduction: Black Philosophy and the Crucible of Lived, The Black Scholar, Vol. 43, No. 4, Special Issue: Role of Black Philosophy (Winter 2013), pp. 5-10)

Black philosophy and its role are funda- mentally linked with existential struggle. The lived experiences of struggle and resistance (etymologically, "to take a stand") speak to the fact that the social ontological structure of the world is not a metaphysical fait accompli. Black philosophy acknowledges its historical conditionality and emergence against the backdrop of white racism, vio- lence, colonialism, dehumanization, en- slavement, oppression, and objectification. It recognizes this backdrop as constituted through lived embodiment and configurations of thought and action that were not necessary, but that are predicated upon contingent sites of power and hegemony that are linked to oppressive ideologies and the possession of material power to superimpose such oppressive ideologies. Hence, relevant to black philosophy is its clarion call: "The world is not as it ought to be!"

It is the power of "ought" that points to the openness of human history, agency, and counter-hegemonic praxis. The "ought" implies slippage, excess, lacunae, and the capacity to create. The subtext here is that one can reconfigure the world, reshape its direction, undo its normative repetitions, and create new and ever freeing forms of political formation, relationality, and performance. [Italics in original article – DQ] The role of black philosophy, then, having its point of origin within a matrix of oppression, even as this oppression was/is diasporic, is antagonistic and iconoclastic; indeed, resis- tant to claims of philosophical universality that are actually forms of discourse that are predicated upon a philosophical anthropol- ogy that is, in this case, underwritten by whiteness as the transcendental norm and that valorizes its vision of the world and the meaning of humanity at the exclusion of others. Hence, to engage in black philosophy on conceptual terms set forth here is to affirm one's humanity in the face of those who deem you a sub-person, ersatz, ontologically nugatory.

AT Libidinal Econ

Their insidious targeting arg relies on the libidinal economy which is wrong and cannot be the foundation for ethics or the political

Gordon 1

(Paul, psychotherapist living and working in London **Psychoanalysis and Racism**: The politics of defeat Race & Class v. 42, n. 4)

The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with disappointment. All the tragedies of the political project of emancipation ± the evils of Stalinism in particular ± are seen as the inevitable product of men and women trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into discourse and deconstruction and representation ± as though to interpret the world is more important than to change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'.58 To justify their flight from a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals and abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case, psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers `a world-historical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human-kind to be free. At every turn for such theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners: there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; however, once we grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax.59 Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory power of his new faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always `imagined', which, in his view, means based on fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are dismissed as `fantasies of self-sufficient combination'.60 In this scenario, the idea that people might come together, think together, analyse together and act together as rational beings is impossible The idea of a genuine community of equals becomes a pure fantasy a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the first place: `Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented traditions.'61 Now, this is not only non-sense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history `always false'? Did the Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always `imagined'? Or, as Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle? Furthermore, all attempts to legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other firrm action against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded `understand- ing' or even help through psychotherapy. It is indeed a strange kind of `anti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up. In their move from politics to the academy and the world of `discourse', the postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical materialism, for another, psychoanalysis.62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed radicalism of psycho- analysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret it, need to look elsewhere.

Libidinal economy doesn't explain violence

Havi **Carel 6**, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England, "Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger", googlebooks

Secondly, the constancy principle on which these ideas are based is incompatible with observational data. Once the passive model of the nervous system has been discarded, there was no need for external excitation in order for discharge to take place, and more generally, "the behavioural picture seemed to negate the notion of drive, as a separate energizer of behaviour" {Hcbb. 1982. p.35}. According to Holt, the nervous system is not passive; it does not take in and conduct out energy from the environment, and it shows no tendency to discharge its impulses. 'The principle of constancy is quite without any biological basis" (1965, p. 109). He goes on to present the difficulties that arise from the pleasure principle as linked to a tension-reduction theory. The notion of tension is "conveniently ambiguous": it has phenomenological, physiological and abstract meaning. But empirical evidence against the theory of tension reduction has been "mounting steadily" and any further attempts to link pleasure with a reduction of physiological tension are "decisively refuted" (1965, pp. 1102). Additionally, the organism and the mental system are no longer considered closed systems. So the main arguments for the economic view collapse, as does the entropic argument for the death drive (1965, p. 114). A final, more general criticism of Freud's economic theory is sounded by Compton, who argues, "Freud fills in psychological discontinuities with neurological hypotheses" (1981, p. 195). The Nirvana principle is part and parcel of the economic view and the incomplete and erroneous assumptions about the nervous system (Hobson, 1988, p.277). It is an extension ad extremis of the pleasure principle, and as such is vulnerable to all the above criticisms. The overall contemporary view provides strong support for discarding the Nirvana principle and reconstructing the death drive as aggression.

No empirical basis for scaling up psychoanalysis

Epstein, senior lecturer in government and IR – University of Sydney, **'10**

(Charlotte, "Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics," European Journal of International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

One key advantage of the Wendtian move, granted even by his critics (see Flockhart, 2006), is that it simply does away with the level-of-analysis problem altogether. If states really are persons, then we can apply everything we know about people to understand how they behave. The study of individual identity is not only theoretically justified but it is warranted. This cohesive self borrowed from social psychology is what allows Wendt to bridge the different levels of analysis and travel between the self of the individual and that of the state, by way of a third term, 'group self', which is simply an aggregate of individual selves. Thus for Wendt (1999: 225) 'the state is simply a "group Self" capable of group level cognition'. Yet that the individual possesses a self does not logically entail that the state possesses one too. It is in this leap, from the individual to the state, that IR's fallacy of composition surfaces most clearly. Moving beyond Wendt but maintaining the psychological self as the basis for theorizing the state Wendt's bold ontological claim is far from having attracted unanimous support (see notably, Flockhart, 2006; Jackson, 2004; Neumann, 2004; Schiff, 2008; Wight, 2004). One line of critique of the states-as-persons thesis has taken shape around the resort to psychological theories, specifically, around the respective merits of Identity Theory (Wendt) and SIT (Flockhart, 2006; Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 2005) for understanding state behaviour.9 Importantly for my argument, that the state has a self, and that this self is pre-social, remains unquestioned in this further entrenching of the psychological turn. Instead questions have revolved around how this pre-social self (Wendt's 'Ego') behaves once it encounters the other (Alter): whether, at that point (and not before), it takes on roles prescribed by pre-existing cultures (whether Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian) or whether instead other, less culturally specific, dynamics rooted in more universally human characteristics better explain state interactions. SIT in particular emphasizes the individual's basic need to belong, and it highlights the dynamics of in-/out-group categorizations as a key determinant of behaviour (Billig, 2004). SIT seems to have attracted increasing interest from IR scholars, interestingly, for both critiquing (Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 1995) and rescuing constructivism (Flockhart, 2006). For Trine Flockart (2006: 89–91), SIT can provide constructivism with a different basis for developing a theory of agency that steers clear of the states-as-persons thesis while filling an important gap in the socialization literature, which has tended to focus on norms rather than the actors adopting them. She shows that a state's adherence to a new norm is best understood as the act of joining a group that shares a set of norms and values, for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What SIT draws out are the benefits that accrue to the actor from belonging to a group, namely increased self-esteem and a clear cognitive map for categorizing other states as 'in-' or 'out-group' members and, from there, for orientating states' self–other relationships. Whilst coming at it from a stance explicitly critical of constructivism, for Jonathan Mercer (2005: 1995) the use of psychology remains key to correcting the systematic evacuation of the role of emotion and other 'non-rational' phenomena in rational choice and behaviourist analyses, which has significantly impaired the understanding of international politics. SIT serves to draw out the emotional component of some of the key drivers of international politics, such as trust, reputation and even choice (Mercer, 2005: 90–95; see also Mercer, 1995). Brian Greenhill (2008) for his part uses SIT amongst a broader array of psychological theories to analyse the phenomenon of self–other recognition and, from there, to take issue with the late Wendtian assumption that mutual recognition can provide an adequate basis for the formation of a collective identity amongst states. The main problem with this psychological turn is the very utilitarian, almost mechanistic, approach to non-

rational phenomena it proposes, which tends to evacuate the role of meaning. In other words, it further shores up the pre-social dimension of the concept of self that is at issue here. Indeed norms (Flockhart, 2006), emotions (Mercer, 2005) and recognition (Greenhill, 2008) are hardly appraised as symbolic phenomena. In fact, in the dynamics of in- versus out-group categorization emphasized by SIT, language counts for very little. Significantly, in the design of the original experiments upon which this approach was founded (Tajfel, 1978), whether two group members communicate at all, let alone share the same language, is non-pertinent. It is enough that two individuals should know (say because they have been told so in their respective languages for the purposes of the experiment) that they belong to the same group for them to favour one another over a third individual. The primary determinant of individual behaviour thus emphasized is a pre-verbal, primordial desire to belong, which seems closer to pack animal behaviour than to anything distinctly human. What the group stands for, what specific set of meanings and values binds it together, is unimportant. What matters primarily is that the group is valued positively, since positive valuation is what returns accrued self-esteem to the individual. In IR Jonathan Mercer's (2005) account of the relationship between identity, emotion and behaviour reads more like a series of buttons mechanically pushed in a sequence of the sort: positive identification produces emotion (such as trust), which in turn generates specific patterns of in-/out-group discrimination. Similarly, Trine Flockhart (2006: 96) approaches the socializee's 'desire to belong' in terms of the psychological (and ultimately social) benefits and the feel-good factor that accrues from increased self-esteem. At the far opposite of Lacan, the concept of desire here is reduced to a Benthamite type of pleasure- or utility-maximization where meaning is nowhere to be seen. More telling still is the need to downplay the role of the Other in justifying her initial resort to SIT. For Flockhart (2006: 94), in a post-Cold War context, 'identities cannot be constructed purely in relation to the "Other"'. Perhaps so; but not if what 'the other' refers to is the generic, dynamic scheme undergirding the very concept of identity. At issue here is the confusion between the reference to a specific other, for which Lacan coined the concept of *le petit autre*, and the reference to *l'Autre*, or Other, which is that symbolic instance that is essential to the making of *all* selves. As such it is not clear what meaning Flockhart's (2006: 94) capitalization of the 'Other' actually holds. The individual self as a proxy for the state's self

Another way in which the concept of self has been centrally involved in circumventing the level-of-analysis problem in IR has been to treat the self of the individual as a proxy for the self of the state. The literature on norms in particular has highlighted the role of individuals in orchestrating norm shifts, in both the positions of socializer (norm entrepreneurs) and socializee. It has shown for example how some state leaders are more susceptible than others to concerns about reputation and legitimacy and thus more amenable to being convinced of the need to adopt a new norm, of human rights or democratization, for example (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2001). It is these specific psychological qualities pertaining to their selves (for example, those of Gorbachev; Risse, 2001) that ultimately enable the norm shift to occur. Once again the individual self ultimately remains the basis for explaining the change in state behaviour. To summarize the points made so far, whether the state is literally considered as a person by ontological overreach, whether so only by analogy, or whether the person stands as a proxy for the state, the 'self' of that person has been consistently taken as the reference point for studying state identities. Both in Wendt's states-as-persons thesis, and in the broader psychological turn within constructivism and beyond, the debate has consistently revolved around the need to evaluate which of the essentialist assumptions about human nature are the most useful for explaining state behaviour. **It has never questioned the validity of starting from these assumptions in the first place.** That is, what is left unexamined is this assumption is that what works for individuals will work for states too. This is IR's central fallacy of composition, by which it has persistently eschewed rather than resolved the level-of-analysis problem. Indeed, in the absence of a clear demonstration of a logical identity (of the type A=A) between states and individuals, the assumption that individual interactions will explain what states do rests on **little more than a leap of faith**, or indeed an analogy.

AT Social Death

Social death is an incorrect homogenization of the past AND reifies colonial power relations by placing European whiteness at the center of symbolic examination

Walker 12

(Tracey, Birkbeck University Masters in Psychosocial Studies, "The Future of Slavery: From Cultural Trauma to Ethical Remembrance", Graduate Journal of Social Science, 9.2, July, JSTOR)

To argue that there is more to the popular conception of slaves as victims who experienced social death within the abusive regime of transatlantic slavery is not to say that these subjectivities did not exist. When considering the institution of slavery we can quite confidently rely on the assumption that it did indeed destroy the self-hood and the lives of millions of Africans. Scholar Vincent Brown (2009) however, has criticised Orlando Patterson's (1982) seminal book Slavery and Social Death for positioning the slave as a subject without agency and maintains that those who managed to dislocate from the nightmare of plantation life 'were not in fact the living dead', but 'the mothers of gasping new societies' (Brown 2009, 1241). The Jamaican Maroons were one such disparate group of Africans who managed to band together and flee the Jamaican plantations in order to create a new mode of living under their own rule. These 'runaways' were in fact 'ferocious fighters and master strategists', building towns and military bases which enabled them to fight and successfully win the war against the British army after 200 years of battle (Gotlieb 2000,16). In addition, the story of the Windward Jamaican Maroons disrupts the phallocentricism inherent within the story of the slave 'hero' by the very revelation that their leader, 'Queen Nanny' was a woman (Gotlieb 2000). As a leader, she was often ignored by early white historians who dismissed her as an 'old hagg' or 'obeah' woman (possessor of evil magic powers) (Gotlieb 2000, xvi). Yet, despite these negative descriptors, Nanny presents an interesting image of an African woman in the time of slavery who cultivated an exceptional army and used psychological as well as military force against the English despite not owning sophisticated weapons (Gotlieb 2000). As an oral tale, her story speaks to post-slavery generations through its representation of a figure whose gender defying acts challenged the patriarchal fantasies of the Eurocentric imaginary and as such 'the study of her experiences might change the lives of people living under paternalistic, racist, classist and gender based oppression' (Gotlieb 2000, 84). The label of 'social death' is rejected here on the grounds that it is a narrative which is positioned from the vantage point of a European hegemonic ideology. Against the social symbolic and its gaze, black slaves were indeed regarded as non-humans since their lives were stunted, diminished and deemed less valuable in comparison to the Europeans. However, Fanon's (1967) assertion that 'not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man' (Fanon 1967, 110) helps us to understand that this classification can only have meaning relative to the symbolic which represents the aliveness of whiteness against the backdrop of the dead black slave (Dyer 1997). Butler (2005) makes it clear that the 'death' one suffers relative to the social symbolic is imbued with the fantasy that having constructed the Other and interpellated her into 'life', one now holds the sovereignty of determining the subject's right to live or die: this death, if it is a death, is only the death of a certain kind of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of the fantasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had, in other words it is a necessary grief (Butler 2005, 65). The point to make here is that although the concept of social death has proved useful for theorists to describe the metaphysical experience of those who live antagonistically in relation to the social symbolic, it is nevertheless a colonial narrative within which the slaves are confined to a one dimensional story of terror. In keeping with Gilroy's (1993b) argument that the memory of slavery must be constructed from the slaves' point of view, we might instead concentrate, not on the way in which the slaves are figured within the European social imaginary, but on how they negotiated their own ideas about self and identity. We might therefore find some value in studying a group like the Maroons who not only managed to create an autonomous world outside of the hegemonic discourse which negated them, but also, due to their unique circumstances, were forced to create new modes of communication which would include a myriad of African cultures, languages and creeds (Gottlieb 2000). This creative and resistive energy of slave subjectivity not only disrupts the colonial paradigm of socially dead slaves, but also implies the ethical tropes of creation, renewal and mutual recognition. In contrast, the passive slave proved to feature heavily in the 2007 bicentenary commemorations causing journalist Toyin Agbetu to interrupt the official speeches and exclaim that it had turned into a discourse of freedom engineered mostly by whites with stories of black agency excluded8. Young's argument that 'one of the damaging side effects of the focus on white people's role in abolition is that Africans are represented as being passive in the face of oppression', appears to echo the behaviour in the UK today given that a recent research poll reveals that the black vote turnout is significantly lower than for the white majority electorate and that forty percent of second generation 'immigrants' believe that voting 'doesn't matter'.9 Yet, Gilroy (1993a) argues that this political passivity may not simply be a self fulfilling prophecy, but might allude to the 'lived contradiction' of being black and English which affects one's confidence about whether opinions will be validated in a society that, at its core, still holds on to the fantasy of European

superiority (Gilroy 1993a). ==Without considering the slaves' capacity for survival and their fundamental role in overthrowing the European regime of slavery, we limit the use–value of the memory and risk becoming overly attached to singular slave subjectivities seeped in death and passivity.== The Maroons story however, enables slave consciousness to rise above the mire of slavery's abject victims and establishes an ethical relation with our ancestors who lived and survived in the time of slavery.

The Black body should be understood as active subject – refuse to allow their notion of a monolithic white civil society control all description of the world

Yancy (Prof of Philosophy at Duqesne) **8**

(George, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Contining Significance of Race, Pg. 122)

As agential, Black people confront the world and construct the world from unique perspectives. They take up their ex-istence within the framework of a given set of circumstances.42 Despite the horrible conditions that came with being forced to live and to work on plantations, many Blacks were able to reconfigure what was given, They were able to take a stand against dehuman-ization and negotiate ways of achieving a sense of dignity. Moreover, this had to be done while making whites think that they had succeeded in producing the most obedient and docile slaves around. In short, Blacks had to "conform" to white myths while undermining those myths simultaneously. The negotiation between myth and reality took place within a variety of work activities, For example, as stated, many Blacks would break tools and destroy crops, As stated, whites rationalized such behaviors as the result of clumsiness and stupidity, Apparently, these same tools were not broken when Blacks worked their own meager areas for planting. In fact, "one slaveholder felt aggrieved when he saw that the small patches which his Negroes cultivated for themselves were better cared for and more productive than his own field."43 This suggests a process of selective valuing. To be selective, of course, involves deliberation, which is indicative of having a perspective on the world. Hence, contrary to the myth that Black people were devoid of agency, they cultivated these small patches of their own in order to exercise a measure of economic independence and agency. Blacks would grow their own food, as well as steal food from the plantation, selling it through a complex network of trade with passing ships.
Breaking tools was one way that enslaved Black people were able to exercise control over their work. To break a tool (or destroy a patch of land) requires the establishment of a different/alternative way of relating to a given object (the tool or the land). To engage in this type of alternative engagement involves the telic dimensions of embodied subjectivity. In short, Blacks assumed a position of transcendence in relationship to a field of objects, Deborah White notes, "While some Southern whites called such behavior [breaking tools, for example] 'rascality,' slaves [or the ensltma) understood it to be an effective form of resistance,"

Hudson/Ontic DA

2AC

Now we'll answer their descriptive claims about the world

First, blackness is not an unchanging ontological void – it is political, contingent and able to be changed. If we win this claim then every one of their framing issues is disproven.

Hudson 13 (Political Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg)

(Peter, Social Dynamics (2013): The state and the colonial unconscious, Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies, DOI: 10.1080/02533952.2013.802867)

[BEGIN FOOTNOTE]
My foil here is the ontological fatalism of Frank Wilderson's argument. See Wilderson (2008), according to which "the only way Humanity can maintain both its corporeal and libidinal integrity is through the various strategies through which Blackness is the abyss into which humanness can never fall" (105). And "were there to be a place and time for blacks cartography and temporality would be impossible" (111). Here then, the closure of colonialism is absolute.
[END FOOTNOTE]

"Whiteness" as whiteness – the meaning of whiteness and that of "blackness" – is carried via "a constellation of postulates, a series of propositions that slowly and subtly work their way into one's mind and shape one's view of the world of the group to which one belongs" – "a thousand details, anecdote stories" which are "woven" into "prejudices, myths, the collective attitudes of a given group" (Fanon 1968, 78, 133). This is how the "subject positions" of both whites and blacks are constituted. We can call this constellation the Colonial Big Other (symbolic) in and through which the colonial relation is constituted and reproduced. This Big Other is white, in that whiteness is its master signifier and therefore all identities are "white" under colonialism.

Everyone is white in the colonial symbolic – including blacks; it is just that they are "less white" than "whites" to the point of not being at all – Fanon says again and again that "the black man desires to be white" – but, when he looks at himself through the eyes he has adopted, the "eyes" that are "his" – what he (qua white eyes) sees is something that doesn't exist – "inequality, no non-existence" (Fanon 1968, 98, original emphasis). He "subsists at the level of non-being" (131) – just as the white, when it sees the black, sees an other that is, as Fanon says "absolutely not self," so does the black see himself – "as absolutely not self" (114). This is the depth of the fissure in the black colonial subject position, caught between two impossibles: "whiteness," which he desires but which is barred to him, and "black- ness," which is "non-existence."

Colonialism, anxiety and emancipation3

Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is desig- nated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn't excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered "ontological"), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled. Put differ- ently, the "curvature of intersubjective space" (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific modes of the "othering" of "otherness" are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The social does not have to be divided into white and black, and the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because they are signifiers.

To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side of the ontic – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn't exist, the black man doesn't exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division.

"Whiteness" may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the "ontological difference" (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not follow that the "void" of "black being" functions as the ultimate substance, the transcendental signified on which all possible forms of sociality are said to rest. What gets lost here, then, is the specificity of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its "ontological" differential.

And this is an impact turn to the alt – their dualistic description of the world is incorrect but makes challenging white supremacy impossible

hooks 12 (Distinguished Professor in Residence at Barea)
(bell, Writing Beyond Race: Living Theory and Practice, 177)

Religion is important because it is there that many folks learn the western metaphysical dualism—the notion of world divided between the good and the bad, the chosen and the unchosen, the worthy and the unworthy, the blacks and the whites—that is the philosophical foundation for white supremacy and other forms of domination. As long as this thinking serves as the foundation for how most people think about life (in neat binaries) then it will be impossible to eradicate racism. White supremacist capitalist patriarchy thrives on the core dualistic thinking that is the foundation of all systems of domination.

Second, accepting their impact framing makes any specific action impossible and locks in structural violence. The public sphere is not absolutely determined by anti-blackness and can be altered by political action

Yancy 13
(George, Introduction: Black Philosophy and the Crucible of Lived, The Black Scholar, Vol. 43, No. 4, Special Issue: Role of Black Philosophy (Winter 2013), pp. 5-10)

Black philosophy and its role are funda- mentally linked with existential struggle. The lived experiences of struggle and resistance (etymologically, "to take a stand") speak to the fact that the social ontological structure of the world is not a metaphysical fait accompli. Black philosophy acknowledges its historical conditionality and emergence against the backdrop of white racism, vio- lence, colonialism, dehumanization, enslavement, oppression, and objectification. It recognizes this backdrop as constituted through lived embodiment and configurations of thought and action that were not necessary, but that are predicated upon contingent sites of power and hegemony that are linked to oppressive ideologies and the possession of material power to superimpose such oppressive ideologies. Hence, relevant to black philosophy is its clarion call: "The world is not as it ought to be!"
It is the power of "ought" that points to the openness of human history, agency, and counter-hegemonic praxis. The "ought" implies slippage, excess, lacunae, and the capacity to create. The subtext here is that one **can** reconfigure the world, reshape its direction, undo its normative repetitions, and create new and

==ever freeing forms of political formation==, relationality, and performance. [Italics in original article – DQ] The role of black philosophy, then, having its point of origin within a matrix of oppression, even as this oppression was/is diasporic, is antagonistic and iconoclastic; indeed, resis- tant to claims of philosophical universality that are actually forms of discourse that are predicated upon a philosophical anthropol- ogy that is, in this case, underwritten by whiteness as the transcendental norm and that valorizes its vision of the world and the meaning of humanity at the exclusion of others. Hence, to engage in black philosophy on conceptual terms set forth here is to affirm one's humanity in the face of those who deem you a sub-person, ersatz, ontologically nugatory.

Blackness = Contingent Ext

Ext. Hudson

The Black body is not ontologically closed or devoid of relationality – they can't account for Black resistance as subjectivity

Yancy (Prof of Philosophy at Duqesne) **8**

(George, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Contining Significance of Race, Pg. 109-10)

The history of Black resistance is a complex narrative, particularly as this history is tied to the context of a white racist episteme. After all, it is the dominant white culture's view that Black people have no role to play in "the world of meaning as meaning-makers,"[1] Frantz Fanon was painfully aware of the hegemony and misanthropy of white racist ideology with regard to the denial of Black peoples' subjectivity and humanity, "All 1 wanted was to be a man among other men," he noted, "I wanted to come lithe and young into the world that was ours and to help to build it together," However, within the lived or phenomenological domain of anti-Black racism, Fanon was expected to live, to think, to feel, to exist, *to be* "like a nigger."[3] Within the context of an anti-Black racist world, the lived experience of the Black is under the constant threat of being collapsed into the phenomenological or lived experience of the nigger. Once collapsed into the one-dimensional mode of niggerhood, as it were, it is easy to undergo a certain ontological resignation, a capitulation in the face of a reality whose past, present, and future seem fixed and stacked against any possibility of historical breach. For Fanon, "transformation,.. requires something like a critical resistance to the dominating [white] episteme-an active denial of the mythos that intervenes in the formation of body-images."[4]

Historically, "the imago of the [Black] in the European mind" has involved a process of discursive and material violence,[5] Whether discursive or extra-discursive, this violence was designed originally to aid in breaking the Black body's claim to dignity and humanity. As I have argued, the Black body, through the hegemony of the white gaze, undergoes a phenomenological return that leaves it distorted and fixed as a pre-existing essence. The Black body becomes a "prisoner" of an imago-an elaborate distorted image of the Black, an image whose reality is held together through white bad faith and projection— that is ideologically orchestrated to leave no trace of its social and historical construction, The aim is to foreclose any possibility of slippage between the historically imposed imago and how the Black body lives its reality as fixed. But like the white body, the Black body is never simply pregiven. While "history has been terribly unkind to the African body," the Black body has, within the context of its tortuous sojourn through the crucible of American and European history, been a site of discursive, symbolic, ontological, and existential battle. If the Black body's metastability had reached a point of ontological closure as a result of the power of the distorted imago projected from the white imaginary, there would have been no history of the Black body engaged in struggle and transformation. Blacks have struggled mightily to disrupt, redefine, and transcend white fictions. They have struggled with profound issues around identity and place. Yet Blacks have always struggled to make a way out of no way, using the resources they had available. Although I will return to a discussion of the Middle Passage in chapter 5, one might look at the movement through the Middle Passage to the so-called New World as a medium through which an especially dynamic and difficult challenge to define and redefine a narrative of Black identity emerged, This narrative tells a complex story of the Black experience, one that is shaped through syncretism, bricolage, the blending of cultural, epistemological, and ontological retentions with ever-new horrific and challenging experiences, There is no aim here to celebrate or recuperate an "authentic" identity qua essence or to ground a sense of identity in fixed meta-narratives, There is the effort, however, to make sense of one's existence within the context of lived history, one that recognizes and acknowledges the reality of fissures in collective and individual identity formation and refuses to romanticize origins or points of historical continuity. Nevertheless, it is my sense that Black identity-talk within the context of North America must begin from below, that is, one must begin with the existential terror of whiteness faced by Black people, and realize that Black people continue to define and redefine themselves through the deployment of conceptual and affective

resources that are themselves *historical*.

***And the White subject position is also contingent. Some limited change and progress is possible.

Yancy (Prof of Philosophy at Duqesne) **8**

(George, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race, Pg. 150) [Italics original – DQ]

The process of becoming a white racist is linked to larger racially embedded sociohistorical practices of intelligibility. Yet, within the context of America's racist history, there was always already the counter-white racist position, the counter-anti-Black voice, to be taken up, and pursued, even as various social forces militated against the taking up of such a counter-white racist position/ voice. <u>Whites were not **determined** by the fixity of a racist axiological framework</u>. <u>There was still the freedom to challenge the "rigid training,</u> long persisted _{ien} in<u>" that reinforces the fixity of values</u>. Hence, <u>there is always the possibility of troubling one subject position and "leaning" into another</u>. Along with heteronomy, then, there is autonomy. <u>Without the concept of autonomy, we would be forced to claim that the self is no more than the plaything of external forces</u>, a constantly shifting "voice" with absolutely no agency. There is thus the sense that <u>the human subject is not a plenum, but always already incomplete, capable of claiming a counter-racist voice</u>, though not one created ex nihilo, For the white racist to admit that one is always already becoming what one is not yet calls into question whiteness as an essential category of identity and mode of being, The consequence of this admittance is coming face-to-face with a profound sense of anguish. <u>Even as whites are interpellated within a racist social structure</u>, there is the reality of a reflective apprehension of themselves as freedom and the realization that <u>they can continually engage in the action of choosing themselves as antiracists over and over again</u>**.**

Black subject position is contingent and alterable

Yancy (Prof of Philosophy at Duqesne) **8**

(George, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Contining Significance of Race, Pg. xxii) [Italics original – DQ]

Given the above, it is clear that part of <u>the meaning of Black embodiment</u> is disclosed within the context of an anti-Black racist world, <u>The disclosure of its meaning, while inextricably and</u> <u>relational tied to the history of anti-Black racism, is not **reduced** to that history</u>. The point here is that <u>the meaning of the Black body **is** historical</u>. <u>And as historical, the Black body and the white body are explored not in terms of an ontology of essences, but in terms of a historical ontology that appreciates the fluidity of the historical formation of the meaning of</u>, in is case<u>, the Black body and the white body</u>, even as the white body engages in bad-faith practices of stipulating its modes of being as sacrosanct, reified, and independent of meaning-bestowing human beings. <u>As **historical**, the Black body does not have its meaning ontologically (qua essence) given or sealed in advance. The Black body is a historical project and as such is capable of taking up new historical meanings through struggle and affirmation</u>. As affirmative, <u>the Black body is not simply defined in its opposition to a racist episteme</u>, but engages its meaning beyond the horizon of the Black imago in the white imaginary while always keeping track of whiteness's recuperative efforts, its institutional rigidity, material power, and various complex forms of insidious manifestation.

Contingency Good Ext

Ext hooks

This prevents the ability to affirm the beauty of Black life and modify the conditions of living

Glaude (Professor of Religion and African American Studies, Department of Religion, and Chair, Center for African American at Princeton) **7**
(EDDIE S. GLAUDE JR., In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America, Pg. 110)

My general aim in this chapter has been to insist on the complexity of African American religious life and to resist naive attempts to reduce that complexity to an easily manageable political reality—a tendency that is, I believe, typical of this country's melodramatic approach to the problem of race. I am of the firm belief that <u>appeals to a fixed and stable notion of black identity</u>, to a conception of history as a storehouse stocked with answers to all our problems, or appeals to an idea of black agency that presumes our inclination to resist <u>limit our imaginations and in various ways blunt our capacity to modify our conditions of living</u>, precisely because each denies the active work e do in the face of problematic situations. Such appeals too often direct our attention to antecedent and not consequent phenomena. <u>They seek to tame the</u> potential <u>chaos of contingency but end up obscuring the moral imperative that we act</u> intelligently and earn our deaths <u>by passionately embracing the conundrum of life</u>. In short, <u>bad thinking about African American history, identity, and agency compromises</u> what James Baldwin referred to as all of that beauty—<u>those</u> funded <u>experiences</u>, colored in a dark shade of blue, <u>that enable us to invade the future with a bit more than luck.</u>

AT Middle Passage/Bill of Sale

Blackness is dynamic and contingent – structuring it on the Middle Passage is flawed and functions monolithically to conceal the diversity of Black life

Yancy 13

(George, Introduction: Black Philosophy and the Crucible of Lived, The Black Scholar, Vol. 43, No. 4, Special Issue: Role of Black Philosophy (Winter 2013), pp. 5-10)

Consistent with the idea of an open- ended perspective and a diversity of voices, I conceptualize black philosophy within the crucible of *lived* history. This raises the in- terrelated themes of context, situation, and philosophical thought. Indeed, this dynamic interrelation points to the dialectical rela- tionship between philosophical thought and socio-existential setting. On this score, and as philosopher William R. Jones's epigraph implies, black philosophy is protean and historically contextual. To refer to "black" philosophy is not to imply a chromosomal matrix out of which philosophical thought *causally* proceeds. There is no genetic sub- stratum (or biological *telos*) that inexorably dictates the existence of black philosophy r the diverse philosophical content and tra- jectories of black philosophy, though the process of racialization is central to thinking about the meaning of black philosophy and its role. And since <u>"blackness" is itself an identity category that has its origins within history</u>, the idea of a <u>black philosophy and its role must be couched within a hermeneutic lens that takes seriously the</u> dimension of black *Erlebnis,* through a form <u>of lived experience that is not homogenous for all of those who identify as black people even as there are shared dimensions of historical and contemporary forms of black oppression</u>, marginalization, and dehumanization.

In my book *Black Bodies, White Gazes,* I point to the middle passage as the crucible in terms of which black identity is marked and the black body is ontologically truncated and returned to itself as distorted and mon- strous, thus locating the black body within a context of anti-black racism. Theorizing the black body from this location critiques an ontogenic perspective and raises the is- sue of the sociogenic. <u>The middle passage</u>, I argue, <u>functions as that space of death</u>, do- cility, amalgamation, and resistance that is important for comprehending black people in North America. So, it becomes a central existential and social ontological motif through which I theorize what it means to be black and how I understand black philosophy and its role. <u>Yet, it is important to note that those black bodies were scattered and not confined to North America</u>. So, I think that it is important to theorize the ways in which that oceanic experience shaped other black bodies that were dispersed throughout the world. As such, then, <u>one must be attentive to and examine the different genealogies and phenomenological configurations that speak not only to those bodies that were not enslaved in North America, but also speak to those black bodies that did not arrive at their "destinies" through the transatlantic slave trade at all</u>. <u>This raises important questions regarding the lived meaning of "blackness" and how blackness is differentially defined diachronically and in terms of points of geo- graphical origin, suggesting that blackness is dynamically protean</u>.

<u>Although above I point to the middle pas- sage as the matrix in terms of which black identity is shaped, we must be cognizant of how black identity and black subjectivity can be</u> erroneously tethered <u>to that moment in time and physical space,</u>[3] <u>which then raises the issue of how a specific black historical narrative can function monolithically and thus exclude those black bodies that don't narrativize the middle passage in the same way or even at all</u>. While I will not pursue this issue here, I want to be clear that <u>there is a diverse "terrain of blackness"</u> in terms of the changing landscape and mean- ing of blackness and that this change im- pacts <u>differential experiences for those who consider themselves black people</u>. Indeed, such differential experiences <u>have an impact on how we think about the dynamics of black identity and black philosophizing, and the latter's key normative assumptions,</u> mo- dalities, and different morphologies of ques- tions and responses that emerge. My point is to remain critically cognizant of the ways in which I privilege the middle passage and how that privileging might function as a his- torical gap for black people who neverthe- less see themselves as black and yet whose experiences are shaped differently, though not incommensurably vis-à-vis other black people

who contend with anti-black racism.

AT Blackness = Negativity

Defining Blackness as a purely negative erases the joy of black life and prevents action to solve suffering

Glaude (Professor of Religion and African American Studies, Department of Religion, and Chair, Center for African American at Princeton) **7**
(EDDIE S. GLAUDE JR., In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America, Pg. 78-9)

Metaphysical claims are collapsed here into ontological claims and the re- sult, despite Cone's protestations, is a reification of blackness. Tradition and History, far wiser than we will ever be, have settled the problems of our living in advance of our experience. The meanings of African American historical experiences are thus oversimplified. The complexity of in- dividual African American lives denied. Such a view of history can deny us the power of reflexive thought about ourselves and our interactions with the world, the exercise of which informs daily, sometimes tragic, choice sand recognizes the contingency and indeterminacy at the heart of action.
In my view, three difficulties – descriptive, theoretical and existential- attend such accounts. The descriptive problematic involves the plotline of the story. I am reminded here of James Baldwin and Ralph Ellison's critique of Richard Wright. Both worried that Wright's representations of black life betrayed the complexity of African American existence. The same can be said of stories of African American experience that are mainly about liberation and presuppose a subject in constant struggle. There is much more to our living than simply resisting white supremacy. Moreover, the singular focus often results in a relatively coherent account in which internal fissures of black communities are obscured. Suffering and resistance then subordinate all other considerations—even the differential experience of that suffering and the different aims of resistance.
The theoretical problematic refers to the Christian dimension of the problem of being both black and Christian. Like Anderson, I worry that God talk among black theologians, at least in their worst moments, functions merely as a source of the strenuous mood, serving simply to justify and sanctify a particular political orientation—even though it is precisely in our relation to God and His relation that we resist oppression.24
Lastly, the existential problematic again entails a simplification of the complexity of African American lives. The existential involves how to live, how to hope, and how to love. But if our lives are reduced simply to struggle and our stories presume an understanding of black agency as always already political, then the various ways we have come to love and hope are cast into the shadows as we obsess about politics, narrowly understood, and as History orients us retrospectively, instead of prospectively. We end up, despite our best intentions, ignoring the sheer joy of black life and unwittingly reducing our capacity to reflect and act in light of the hardships of our actual lives. Perhaps, more importantly, "our ability to make delicate distinctions" is lost as History settles beforehand the difficult existential questions "Who am I?" "How should I live?" and "What should I do?"

And it is a false description and ignores the messy realities of African American life

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(EDDIE S. GLAUDE JR., In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America, Pg. 112)

I do hold the view, however, that much of the politics of the black power era was premised on, problematic conceptions of black identity, history and agency such as I have addressed in the previous chapters. In chapter 4, for example, I sought to trouble conceptions of black agency that presuppose a teleology of emancipatory politics. My aim was not to deny the notion of black agency but to insist, given my pragmatic commitments, that agency be viewed as an emergent property of particular situations. We ought not to offer a phenomenology of black

agency as inclined, in advance of the contexts within which it is exercised, to resist oppression and to seek freedom. To do so narrows, often in the name of unspecified ideological commitments, our descriptions of what African Americans actually do. This is particularly relevant for characterizations of African American religious life.

I made this point about description explicit in my earlier discussions of black identity and history. In each instance, I invoked specific political formulations associated with some variant of black nationalist politics as examples of bad ways of thinking about political and moral matters. Black identity, I argued, should not be thought of as the findings of an archeological project aimed at discovering, once and for all, who we really are.   And African American history should not be viewed as a reservoir meaning that singularly and prior to individual experience determines who we are and provides us with the tools to become who we are destined to be. These formulations, I maintained, amount to what can be called black quests for certainty detached from the messy realities of African Americans' actual beliefs, choices, and actions. Such seeming certainty often entails a crude reduction of the moral complexity of the moral lives of African Americans and an attachment to one value to the exclusion of others. In other words, black quests for certainty too often deny the lessons of tragedy and produce melodramatic politics.

AT Excluded from Civil Society

"Civil society" does not exist as a unitary object. There are multiple overlapping Black and white public sphere and their presumption that the Black body is permanently excluded from civil society centers a White bourgeois unitary civil society

Dawson (Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture at the University of Chicago) **1**

(Michael C., BLACK VISIONS The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies, pg. 24-5) [Italics original –DQ]

Black political thought evolves and develops through the clash of ideologies which typifies political debate among African Americans. The discursive site for these debates has historically been the black public sphere, or more precisely, the black counterpublic. The concept of a black counterpublic sphere that interacts with other spheres within American society is useful for understanding how the ideologies contained within black political thought both develop semi-autonomously and interact with the political debates coursing throughout the polity.

The idea of a black counterpublic is needed because for most of Amer- ican political history, blacks were excluded from the "American" bourgeois public sphere. Just as feminist critics have pointed out that Habermas's c o n c e p t o f t h e b o u r g e o i s p u b l i c s p h e r e i s b o t h e x c l u s i o n a r y a n d h e g e mo n i c , there are several aspects of Habermas's formulation which render it in- appropriate as a model for black politics (Fraser 1989; Ryan 1989). First, Habermas consistently presented a romanticized version of Western Eu- ropean history (Eley 1989; Fraser 1989). A number of scholars have dem- onstrated that historically existing bourgeois public spheres were always exclusionary. Gender was a prime basis for exclusion, and spheres were formed in some circumstances as a patriarchal alternative to already existing spheres in which women's voices were prominent (Fraser 1989; Ryan

10 1989). What emerged in these and other Western polities were a variety of alternatives to the bourgeois and post-bourgeois public spheres that facilitated women's and other excluded groups' access to public life. Several scholars explicidy connect the stratification of a society and the creation of alternative subaltern counterpublics (Fraser 1989; Ryan 1989), We can re- state the thesis of Fraser and others as follows; Alternative public spheres have developed in Western democracies, at least in keeping with the fun- damental constitutive stratification lines of a given society.

By fundamental constitutive stratification lines I mean that, histori- cally, societies of which we have records have been organized systemati- cally to provide favorable outcomes for privileged groups. Favorable out- comes include material goods, life chances (including the ability to capture resources), status, individual autonomy (consider the role of women in many societies, or of slaves), and ideological privileging/degradation of a *pap)* place in the social order. Most, perhaps all, societies on record which reach a certain stage of development have at least two such organizing principles. These are gender and how economic activity (including the distribution of 11 resources) is organized.

These systems of stratification produce social groups which are systematically excluded from the **bourgeois** public sphere. However, I agree with Fraser (1989) that the claim that these groups are excluded from **the** public sphere is an **ideological** claim, since it privileges the bourgeois sphere as being *the only sphere* of consequence for discourse that is capable of critiquing the state and its policies. [Italics original –DQ]

Anti-Ethics

Ethics 2AC

Anti-ethics is not a desirable frame for the debate

<u>Begs the question</u> of both the prag and method debates above – they have to win the entire weight of their framing claims in order to win this as a relation to the ballot

Err Aff on late breaking explanations of what this means – their evidence does not support this as a ethical d-rule to vote for them or against rationality. If the block has a new explanation of what anti-ethics means we get new 1AR answers

Ethics are good – the Aff's project of survival of others, allowing the agency to work, play, struggle and desire free from the destruction of their biological life is ethical

[can read a different card if desired, like a different exn first card]

Fassin 10 (James D. Wolfensohn Professor in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, as well as directeur d'études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris.)

(Didier, ETHICS OF SURVIVAL: A DEMOCRATIC APPROACH TO THE POLITICS OF LIFE, http://www.humanityjournal.org/humanity-volume-1-issue-1/ethics-survival-democratic-approach-politics-life)

"Long before the experience of survival that I am presently facing, I wrote that <u>survival is an original concept which constitutes the very structure of what we call existence</u>. <u>We are, structurally speaking, survivors, marked by this structure of the trace</u>, of the testament. That said, I would not endorse the view according to which survival is more on the side of death and the past than of life and the future. No, deconstruction is always on the side of the affirmation of life."[3] A few weeks before his death, Jacques Derrida gave his last interview in which he developed at length his conception of life as survival. Suffering from a terminal disease, he confided: "Since certain health problems are becoming more pressing, the question of survival and reprieve, which has always haunted me, literally, every moment of my life, in a concrete and tireless way, takes on a different color today." In reference to a sentence he had used in one of his books ("I would finally like to know how to live") he commented with a penetrating irony: "No, I never learned to live. Definitely not! Learning to live should mean learning to die. I never learned to accept death. I remain impervious to being educated in the wisdom of knowing how to die."

However, beyond the emergency of this "shrinking time of reprieve" (which he rejected with humor, saying, "we are not here for a health bulletin"), it is the more general problem of survival on which the philosopher wanted to meditate: "I have always been interested in the question of survival, the meaning of which does not add to life and death. It is originary: life is survival." In fact, both dimensions were for him intimately related, the personal experience repeating the existential experience, the circumstantial ordeal making the structural reality more evident and more painful. How else to understand that on the verge of death, thinking about survival could become so insistent in this interview, until the final profession of faith? "<u>Everything I say about survival as a complication of the opposition between life and death proceeds from an unconditional affirmation of life</u>. Survival is life beyond life, life more than life, and the discourse I undertake is not about death. On the contrary, <u>it is the affirmation of a living being who prefers life and therefore survival to death</u>, because survival is not simply what remains; it is the most intense life possible."

I want to show that Derrida's conception of life as survival, in its polysemy and even its ambiguity, may offer an alternative to conceptions of life which, from Benjamin to Agamben, and in a quite different perspective, from Lamarck to Canguilhem, have presented a seductive dualistic framework for the humanities and social sciences. Both visions are inherited from Aristotle. On the one hand, life is presented as biopolitical fact: "Behind the long strife-ridden process that leads to the recognition of rights and formal liberties stands the body of the sacred man with his

double sovereign, his life that cannot be sacrificed yet may be killed," affirms Giorgio Agamben in Homo Sacer, where he develops his theory of "bare life."4 From the "politicization of life" in totalitarian systems to the "isolation of the sacred life" in contemporary democracies, he therefore establishes a continuum of the power over life. On the other hand, life is conceived as a biological phenomenon: "any datum of experience possible to trace as a history comprised between its birth and its death is living, is the object of biological knowledge," writes Georges Canguilhem for the entry "Life" in theEncyclopedia Universalis.5 He presents life successively as "animation," "mechanism," "organization," and "information," in a chronological review of biological theories extending from ancient conceptions to contemporary genetics—and everyone knows that the genome is often said to be the "code of life." In other words, these two readings present life as what can be put to death (for Agamben), and as what is comprised from birth to death (for Canguilhem). The social sciences have largely drawn from these two repertoires: the former has been used to comprehend the government of populations and human beings; the latter has nourished the sociology and anthropology of sciences and techniques. However different they may be, these two models rest on the same premises. Both treat life as a physical phenomenon, whether it is "bare life" or "biological life" (both philosophers insisting that it is the dimension shared with the entire animal kingdom). And both assume that life can be separated, for scientific or political reasons, from life as an existential phenomenon, whether it is called "qualified life" or "lived experience" (by Agamben and Canguilhem respectively).[6] It seems to me that Derrida's reflection shatters this distinction: "survival" mixes inextricably physical life, threatened by his cancer, and existential experience, expressed in his work. To survive is to be still fully alive and to live beyond death. It is the "unconditional affirmation" of life and the pleasure of living, and it is the hope of "surviving" through the traces left for the living.

There is, I believe, in this revelation much more than the last testimony of a philosopher who did not accustom us to such clarity and simplicity. I see it as an ethical gesture through which life is rehabilitated in its most obvious and most ordinary dimension—life which has death for horizon but which is not separated from life as a social form, inscribed in a history, a culture, an experience. I consider the consequences of this gesture to be decisive for the humanities and social sciences: or so I want to argue here.

Their prioritization of social death plays into dominant forms of politics and papers over the inevitable resistance of bodies to domination

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(Didier, ETHICS OF SURVIVAL: A DEMOCRATIC APPROACH TO THE POLITICS OF LIFE, http://www.humanityjournal.org/humanity-volume-1-issue-1/ethics-survival-democratic-approach-politics-life)

Survival, in the sense Jacques Derrida attributed to the concept in his last interview, not only shifts lines that are too often hardened between biological and political lives: it opens an ethical space for reflection and action. Critical thinking in the past decade has often taken biopolitics and the politics of life as its objects. It has thus unveiled the way in which individuals and groups, even entire nations, have been treated by powers, the market, or the state, during the colonial period as well as in the contemporary era.

However, through indiscriminate extension, this powerful instrument has lost some of its analytical sharpness and heuristic potentiality. On the one hand, the binary reduction of life to the opposition between nature and history, bare life and qualified life, when systematically applied from philosophical inquiry in sociological or anthropological study, erases much of the complexity and richness of life in society as it is in fact observed. On the other hand, the normative prejudices which underlie the evaluation of the forms of life and of the politics of life, when generalized to an undifferentiated collection of social facts, end up by depriving social agents of legitimacy, voice, and action. The risk is therefore both scholarly and political. It calls for ethical attention.

In fact, the genealogy of this intellectual lineage reminds us that the main founders of these theories expressed tensions and hesitations in their work, which was often more complex, if even sometimes more obscure, than in its

reduced and translated form in the humanities and social sciences today. And also biographies, here limited to fragments from South African lives that I have described and analyzed in more detail elsewhere, suggest the necessity of complicating the dualistic models that oppose biological and political lives. Certainly, powers like the market and the state do act sometimes as if human beings could be reduced to "mere life," but democratic forces, including from within the structure of power, tend to produce alternative strategies that escape this reduction. And people themselves, even under conditions of domination, manage subtle tactics that transform their physical life into a political instrument or a moral resource or an affective expression.

But let us go one step further: ethnography invites us to reconsider what life is or rather what human beings make of their lives, and reciprocally how their lives permanently question what it is to be human. "The blurring between what is human and what is not human shades into the blurring over what is life and what is not life," writes Veena Das. In the tracks of Wittgenstein and Cavell, she underscores that the usual manner in which we think of forms of life "not only obscures the mutual absorption of the natural and the social but also emphasizes form at the expense of life."[22] It should be the incessant effort of social scientists to return to this inquiry about life in its multiple forms but also in its everyday expression of the human.

Alt Fails

2AC

<u>The alternative cannot solve</u> – they do not have evidence or explanation for how they can undo all of social relations up until this point. The huge structural claims that they have had to advance in order to get their framing claims doom their alt solvency. They will say that you should just imagine it or somehow invoke it with your ballot but this all begs the question of what this means for practical politics

The Neg should have to defend the material implementation of their alternative and how they would produce large scale social change. The Neg has no explanation for how they could galvanize large scale social movements let alone end America or the world.

Results matters – failure to have a course of action for mobilizing populations dooms the alt. EVEN if they win their ethics claims, you have to evaluate the question of alt solvency first.
Day 9

(Christopher, The Historical Failure of Anarchism: Implications for the Future of the Revolutionary Project,
http://mikeely.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/historical_failure_of_aanarchism_chris_day_kasama.pdf)

The strength of anarchism is its moral insistence   on the primacy of human freedom over political expediency. But human freedom exists in a political context.   It is not sufficient, however, to simply take the most uncompromising position in defense of freedom. It is neccesary to actually win freedom. Anti-capitalism doesn't do the victims of capitalism any good if you   don't actually destroy capitalism. Anti-statism doesn't   do the victims of the state any good if you don't actually smash the state. Anarchism has been very good at putting forth visions of a free society and that is for the   good. But it is worthless if we don't develop an actual strategy for realizing those visions. It is not enough to   be right, we must also win. Continues… Finally revolutionaries have a responsibility to   have a plausible plan for making revolution. Obviously   there are not enough revolutionaries to make a revolution at this moment. We can reasonably anticipate that   the future will bring upsurges in popular opposition to   the existing system. Without being any more specific   about where those upsurges might occur it seems clear   that it is from the ranks of such upsurges that the numbers of the revolutionary movement will be increased,   eventually leading to a revolutionary situation (which   is distinguished from the normal crises of the current   order only by the existence of a revolutionary movement ready to push things further). People who are   fed up with the existing system and who are willing to   commit themselves to its overthrow will look around   for likeminded people who have an idea of what to do. If we don't have a plausible plan for making revolution we can be sure that there will be somebody else   there who will. There is no guarantee that revolutionary-minded people will be spontaneously drawn to   anti-authoritarian politics. The plan doesn't have to be an exact blueprint. It   shouldn't be treated as something sacred. It should be   subject to constant revision in light of experience and   debate. But at the very least it needs to be able to answer questions that have been posed concretely in the   past. We know that we will never confront the exact   same circumstances as previous revolutions. But we   should also know that certain problems are persistent   ones and that if we can't say what we would have done   in the past we should not expect people to think much   of our ability to face the future.

We win even if its a debate of competing methodologies – deliberative spaces like political discussions between college students are valuable but we need to tie our advocacies to addressing particular problems in the world. This is crucially effective in the context of Black politics. The democratic public sphere <u>is not structurally closed</u> to Black bodies

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(EDDIE S. GLAUDE JR., In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America, pg. x-xii)

Another young man stood up and offered a slight correction to his colleague's impassioned remarks. He said, "I agree with what has just been said, but we should know that ==knowledge without action is useless==. We must *do* something with that knowledge." The conversation that followed was instructive. Students weighed in on the matter. West and Smiley of- fered their views. I asked, "What if we understand knowledge not as sepa- rate from doing, but rather as a *consequence* of it? What if knowledge is s simply the fruit of our undertaking? To use one of Tavis Smiley's favorite words, we proceeded to "marinate" for a while on the implications of the relation between how we think and how we act. At one level, my questions had been aimed simply at countering an implicit anti-intellectualism. But what I had also done was to invoke, verbatim, John Dewey's definition of knowledge as the "fruit of our undertakings." <u>In a room full of young people with varied backgrounds and challenges in their lives, we found ourselves thinking with distinctly pragmatic tools about epistemology and how our thoughts about the subject could affect how we seek to change the world.</u>

Why John Dewey in this context? Because I believe that the tradition of American pragmatism exemplified by Dewey offers powerful resources for redefining African American leadership and politics. This book seeks to make that case. I argue that ==pragmatism, when attentive to the darker dimensions of human living== (what we often speak of as the blues), ==can address many of the conceptual problems that plague contemporary African American political life==. <u>How we think about black identity</u>, how we imagine black history, <u>and</u> ==how we conceive of black agency can be rendered in ways that escape bad racial reasoning - reasoning that assumes a tendentious unity among African Americans simply because they are black==, ==or that short- circuits imaginative responses to problems confronting **actual** black people==.

The relationship I propose between pragmatism and African American politics is mutually beneficial. Pragmatism must reckon with the blues or remain a stale academic exercise. The blues, of course, are much more than a musical idiom. They constitute, as Albert Murray notes in his classic book on the subject, "a statement about confronting the complexities inherent in the human situation and about improvising or experiment- ing or riffing or otherwise playing with (or even gambling with) such posibiliteis as are inherent in the obstacles, the disjunctures, and the jeopardy." Murray goes on to say, in words that I hope will resonate through the pages that follow, that the blues are "a statement about perseverance and .about resilience and thus also about the maintenance"of equilibrium despite precarious circumstances and about achieving elegance in the very process of coping with the rudiments of subsistence." In one sense, to take up the subject of African American politics is inevitably to take up the blues. That is to say, the subject cannot but account for the incredible efforts of ordinary black folk to persevere with elegance and a smile as they confront a world fraught with danger and tragedy. ==To embrace pragmatism is to hold close a fundamental faith in the capacities of ordinary people to transform their circumstances== while rejecting hidden and not- so-hidden <u>assumptions that would deny them that capacity</u>**.** ==To bind pragmatism and African American politics together==, I hope to show, ==is to open up new avenues for thinking about both.==

My book does not offer a political blueprint nor is it concerned with putting forwad concrete solution to specific political problems, <u>it seeks instead to open up deliberative space within African American communities and throughout the country for reflection on how we think about the pressing matters confronting black communities and our nation</u>. Reflection is not opposed to action. I hope to make clear how the theoretical and

the practical are intimately connected.

To be sure, the bleak realities of our country constitute the backdrop of my efforts. Our democratic way of life is in jeopardy. Fear and our clamoring need for security have revealed the more unsavory features of American culture. The foundational elements of a free and open society are being eroded, and our political leaders lie to justify their destruction. The corrosive effects of corporate greed on the form and content of our democ- racy are also apparent: the top 1 percent of the population is getting richer while the vast majority of Americans, of whatever color, struggle to make ends meet. In many African American communities in particular, we see the signs of crisis: deteriorating health, alarming rates of incarceration, the devastating effects of drug economies, and the hypercon- centration of poverty because work has simply disappeared. Political fac- tions stay the course, exploiting faith communities, stoking the fires of homophobia (while denying the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in black commu- nities), and appealing to uncritical views of black solidarity that often blind our fellow citizens to the destructive policies that, ultimately, undermine the values of democratic life. All the while, established African American leaders seem caught in a time warp in which the black revolu- tion of the 1960s is the only frame of reference, obscuring their ability to see clearly the distinctive challenges of our current moment.

In dark and trying times, particularly in democracies, it is incumbent upon citizens to engage one another in order to imagine possibilities and to see beyond the recalcitrance of their condition. Participatory democracies are always fragile, and moments of crisis serve as easy excuses to discard the values that sustain them. When we stop talking with and provoking our fellows we in effect cede our democratic forms of life to those forces that would destroy it. In a Shade of Blue seeks, among other things, to make explicit the values and commitments that inform my own think- ing about African American politics and democratic life. The book continuously asserts the primacy of participatory democracy the necessity for responsibility and accountability, and the pressing need for more imaginative thinking about African American conditions of living.

For me, these are not abstract concerns. I have been blessed over the last couple of years to be able to speak all around the country and talk with fel- low citizens about the challenges confronting African American commu- nities specifically and our democratic form of life generally. On college campuses from New Haven to Denver to Urbana, and in town-hall meet- ings from Oakland to Houston, I have invoked my pragmatic commitments as a basis for reimagining African American politics-to reject specious conceptions of black identity, facile formulations of black history, and easy appeals to black agency. I have insisted that we hold one another accountable and responsible in light of an understanding that democracy is a way of life and not merely a set of procedures—that it involves a certain moral and ethical stance and requires a particular kind of disposition committed to the cognitive virtues of free and open debate. I have urged young African Americans to take up the challenge to forge a politics that speaks to the particular problems of this moment and not simply to mimic the strategies and approaches of the black freedom struggle of the 1960s. I have done so because of my philosophical commitment to the idea that publics come into and out of existence all the time and that our challenge is to find the requisite tools to respond to the shifts and transformations that call new publics into being.

This book emerged out of these encounters. It carries the burden of making the case that pragmatism, rightly understood, offers resources for thinking about African American politics in the twenty-first century. As such, In a Shade of Blue isn't for the philosophically faint of heart. Chapter 1 is perhaps the most challenging, as it seeks to make clear the significance of John Dewey's moral and political philosophy. I hope that the gen- eral reader will find it worthwhile to persevere through the book's more difficult passages. My argument ends with the call for a "post-soul politics"—a form of political engagement that steps out of the shadows of the black freedom struggles of the sixties and rises to the challenges of our current moment with new voices, innovative thinking, and an unshakable commitment to the values of participatory democracy.

AND engaging in public sphere debates over issues like nuclear weapons is crucial to the success of Black movements. An Aff ballot can affirm multiple overlapping counter-publics simultaneously and even if we lose our framework arguments about materiality this evidence is an impact turn to rejecting optimism and democratic deliberation

Dawson (Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture at the University of Chicago) **1**

(Michael C., BLACK VISIONS The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies, pg. 321-3)

But building a mass base is not sufficient. One of the planks from the BRC "Principles of Unity" included the following language: "We must be democratic and inclusive in our dealings with one another" (Black Radical Congress 1998). To do so, however, means rebuilding a black counterpublic that allows people to air differences of opinion honestly and vigorously without worrying about having their "blackness" questioned. To build a successful political movement requires more. It means building overlapping counterpublics and public spheres which reach across the racial and other divisions that plague the American political landscape. It will also take considerably more than black willingness to engage in democratic debate about the nature and future of the country. It will require two components that have been sadly lacking from the political landscape. First, po- litical leaders must be willing to engage in a dialogue concerning race with- out either ducking and not engaging or resorting to race-baiting in order to gain votes, Second, white Americans in particular must be willing both to engage in such a debate and to seriously question the sources of their privilege as well as the legacy ofwhite supremacy, As Martin Luther King Jr. remarked thirty years ago, black nationalist resurgence is a reaction to the lack of active goodwill on the part of white America when it comes to matters of race and economics.
We must finally ask whether African Americans can rely on a totalizing ideology to shape our visions of black justice and our future in America. My answer is no. I believe we need a more flexible approach than ideologies such as black Marxism, black nationalism, and at least the Cold War version of liberalism have allowed. We need a black critical theory that draws on and combines liberalism's concern with individual rights and autonomy, republican concerns with community, socialist concern with an egalitarian society and economic justice for all, feminist traditions such as resistance to suppressing intragroup differences in the name of a false and oppressive unity, and blends these with recognition of the need for autonomous organization and cultural pride. No single world view or ideology comfortably accommodates all of these, But a critical theory can—and such a theory must be political. We've had a black aesthetic, black power, and a plethora of black public policy pronouncements. But a black *political* theory has to embody a theory of the state, power, human nature, and the good life. And such a theory must be based on the hope for and potential of the improvement of human nature while recognizing the wickedness of the world. Kantian pronouncements about systems that can be governed by devils have led us to a world where ethnic strife and nuclear and other horrors proliferate. We must strive for something better, something democratic, something cosmopolitan, not in the elite sense but in the sense that, since homogeneity is a thing of the past, even within states, we must fall back on our basic humanness. It is no coincidence that within American political thought this perspective appears most often in the black traditions and in black political thought, at least in the contemporary period—most often in the black feminist tradition, Thus the best legacy of black political ideologies for America is a tough, activist, inclusive democracy willing to challenge privileges of power and resources in the name of a grander vision which asserts that we are more than the mere aggregation of our individual preferences, Its morality, while democratic, would not be based on the latest consumer fad nor use the return to stockholders as the final arbiter of the public good, That we often fail in living up to our standards of justice within black activism as well as within America—that we are imperfect as individuals and as communities—does not mean, as King so eloquently demonstrated, that the vision itself is not a worthy goal. What black critical theory and e a c h b l a c k i d e o l o g y h a v e d e mo n s t r a t e d i s t h a t t h e d o a b l e , t h e

mu n d a n e , i n – c r è m e n t a l r e f o r m of the workings of American society is not enough; only the full promise of America has the potential to be truly liberating, Any other solution is not only unsatisfactory—it is likely to provoke the ldnd of deadly conflict most clearly seen in the Civil War but also seen today in the rapid upward spiral of political and personal violence which results as people measure their circumstances against what they see as the lies that fester at the center of the American Dream. Anew, black, critical theory needs to retain one aspect of black ideological visions, At the heart of all of the black visions is a sense of pragmatic optimism combined with a stead- fast determination to gain black justice. Both the optimism and the determination are needed now as ever to sustain the political projects and new visions of African Americans.

Death

Framing

Extinction O/W Generic

Life is a pre-requisite to death's symbolic value---fearing death doesn't preclude recognizing life's finitude and its inevitability---we can still create provisional value in life---individuals should have the option to live

Kalnow 9

(Cara Kalnow 9 A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil at the University of St. Andrews "WHY DEATH CAN BE BAD AND IMMORTALITY IS WORSE" https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/724/3/Cara%20Kalnow%20MPhil%20thesis.PDF)

(PA) also provided us with good reason to reject the Epicurean claim that the finitude of life cannot be bad for us. With (PA), we saw that our lives could accumulate value through the satisfaction of our desires beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But Chapter Four determined that the finitude of life is a necessary condition for the value of life as such and that many of our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life. I therefore argued that an indefinite life cannot present a desirable alternative to our finite life, because life as such would not be recognized as valuable. In this chapter, I have argued that the finitude of life is instrumentally good as it provides the recognition that life itself is valuable. Although I ultimately agree with the Epicureans that the finitude of life cannot be an evil, this conclusion was not reached from the Epicurean arguments against the badness of death, and I maintain that (HA) and (EA) are insufficient to justify changing our attitudes towards our future deaths and the finitude of life. Nonetheless, the instrumental good of the finitude of life that we arrived at through the consideration of immortality should make us realize that the finitude of life cannot be an evil; it is a necessary condition for the recognition that life as such is valuable. Although my arguments pertaining to the nature of death and its moral implications have yielded several of the Epicurean conclusions, my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams, as (PA) accounts for the intuition that it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided. I have therefore reached three of the Epicurean conclusions pertaining to the moral worth of the nature of death: (1) that the state of being dead is nothing to us, (2) death simpliciter is nothing to us, and (3) the finitude of life is a matter for contentment. But against the Epicureans, I have argued that we can rationally fear our future deaths, as categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect of death is rationally held as an evil to be avoided. Finally, I also claimed against the Epicureans, that the prospect of death can rationally be regarded as morally good for one if one no longer desires to continue living. 5.3 Conclusion I began this thesis with the suggestion that in part, the Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us. I went on to defend the Epicurean position against the objections raised by the deprivation theorists and Williams. I argued that the state of being dead, and death simpliciter, cannot be an evil of deprivation or prevention for the person who dies because (once dead), the person—and the grounds for any misfortune—cease to exist. I accounted for the anti-Epicurean intuition 115 that it is rational to fear death and to regard death as an evil to be avoided, not because death simpliciter is bad, but rather because the prospect of our deaths may be presented to us as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable. In this chapter, I concluded that even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, we can attach two distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect of our own individual deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. How to decide on the balance of those values is a matter for psychological judgment.

Extinction O/W - Nietzsche

Global extinction risks require a revision of the politics of compassion – survival is still paramount. New risks dictate embracing our ethic DEPSITE their impacts

Winchester 94

(James J. Winchester teaches Philosophy at Spelman College

Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn)

As uninformed as it is to assume that there is an easy connec- tion between his thought and National Socialism, it is neither diffi- cult nor misguided to consider his lack of social concern. Nietzsche saw one danger in our century, but failed to see a second. His critique of herd mentality reads like a prophetic warning against the dictatorships that have plagued and continue to haunt the twentieth cen- tury. But the context of our world has changed in ways that Nietzsche never imagined. We now have, as never before, the ability to destroy-the planet. The threat of the destruction of a society is not new. From the beginnings of Western literature in the Iliad and the Odyssey, the Western mind has contemplated the destruction that, for example, warfare has wrought. Although the Trojan war destroyed almost everyone involved, both the victors and the van- quished, it did not destroy the entire world. In the twentieth century, what has changed is the scale of destruction. If a few countries destroy the ozone layer, the whole world perishes, or if two countries fight a nuclear or biological war, the whole planet is threatened. This is something new in the history of the world/ The intercon- nectedness of the entire world has grown dramatically. We live, as never before, in a global community where our actions effect ever- larger numbers of the world's population. The earth's limits have become more apparent. Our survival depends on working together to solve problems like global pollution. **Granted** mass movements have instituted reigns of terror, **but** our survival as a planet is becoming ever-more predicated on community efforts of the sort that Nietzsche's thought seems to denigrate if not preclude. I do not criticize Nietzsche for failing to predict the rise of problems requiring communal efforts such as the disintegration of the ozone layer, acid rain, and the destruction of South American rain forests. Noting his lack of foresight and his occasional extrem- ism, I propose, in a Nietzschean spirit, to reconsider his particular tastes, without abandoning his aesthetic turn. Statements like "com- mon good is a self-contradiction" are extreme, even for Nietzsche. He was not always so radical. Yet there is little room in Nietzsche's egoism for the kind of cooperation and sense of community that is today so important for our survival. I am suggesting that the time for Nietzsche's radical individualism is past. There are compelling prag- matic and aesthetic reasons why we should now be more open to the positive possibilities of living in a community. There is nothing new about society's need to work together. What has changed is the level of interconnectedness that the technological age has pressed upon us.

AT Extinction Inev

Extinction does not make our efforts worthless.
Trisel 4

[Brooke Alan Trisel, Medical Facilities Consultant with the Ohio Department of Health, "Human Extinction and the Value of Our Efforts," *The Philosophical Forum*, Volume XXXV, Number 3, Fall, 2004, p. 390-391]

Although our works will not last forever, this should not matter if we accomplished what we set out to do when we created these works. Wanting our [end page 390] creations to endure forever was not likely part of our goal when we created them. If we accomplish our goals and then later in life conclude that these accomplishments were of no significance, then this is a sign that a desire for long-lastingness has crept into the standards that we use to judge significance. Escalating desires can lead to escalating standards since the standards that we establish reflect our goals and desires. Including long-lastingness as a criterion for judging the significance of our efforts is unreasonable. If one includes long-lastingness as part of the standard, then one will feel that it is necessary for humanity to persist forever. There is no need for humanity to live forever for our lives and works to be significant. If the standard that we adopt for judging significance does not include long-lastingness as part of the standard, then it will not matter whether humanity will endure for a long time. Like Tolstoy, we may be unable to keep from wanting to have our achievements remembered forever. We may also be unable to keep from wanting our works to be appreciated forever. But we can refrain from turning these desires into standards for judging whether our efforts and accomplishments are significant. If we can keep from doing this, it will be to our advantage. Then, during those times when we look back on life from an imagined perspective that encompasses times after humanity has become extinct, we will not conclude that our efforts amounted to nothing. Rather, we will conclude that many people made remarkable accomplishments that made their lives, and possibly the lives of others, better than they would have been if these goals had never been pursued. And if we expand our evaluation, as we should, to take into account all experiences associated with living, not just goal-related experiences, we will conclude not that life was empty, but that living was worthwhile.

AT Ressentiment

Ressentiment doesn't come first – extinction and material impacts do

Torbjörn **Tännsjö 11**, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, "Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing," online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one's genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide "survivors" confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

AT VTL

Preventing death is the first ethical priority – it's the only impact you can't recover from.

Bauman 95 Zygmunt Bauman, University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71

The **being-for is** like **living towards-the-future**: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other,as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The self stretches towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching-toward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not-yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly an-other Other, that life can be lived - not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all-too-familiar unsure-of-itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' - both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of *being fu filled,* but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its *unfu filment.* One may say that the paradox *of hope* (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being-for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self-defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a *mystery.* And being-for-the-Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view - makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place - but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being-for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is *unspoken,* the responsibility undertaken is *unconditional;* it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery - noted Max Frisch - (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed - soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. **Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to** the musical-chairs game of **the real and the potential** - it **once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before** invitingly **open** and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the *must* of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of being-for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition - an end to itself. Without knowing - without being capable of knowing - that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness (the being-for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre-empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place. **The togetherness of being-for is always in the future**, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The being-for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted. **This is the tragedy of being-for - the reason why it cannot but be death-bound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction**. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. **Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities**, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love. **The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end,** and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. **Morality, like the future itself, is forever not-yet.** (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being-with) that we turn into moral selves. And **it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally**, and sometimes even of being good, **in the present**.

Link

AT Nietzsche Link

Resentment of particular aspects of the world is inevitable and necessary to spur action – acting to change the world is life affirming
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

By "belief in this world:' neither Deleuze nor I, again, means that the established distribution of power, exploitation, and inequality now in place is to be protected, though some critics love to jump to this conclusion. Such arrangements make people suffer too much, and they rest upon the repression of essential features of the contemporary condition, including the minoritization of the world occurring at a more rapid pace. Exploitation and domination are things to contest and oppose, as Deleuze did actively while embracing the points reviewed above. The restoration of belief in this world provides an existential resource to draw upon as those struggles are fought energetically and creatively. Nor do we mean that it is always illegitimate to resent your place in the world. Resentment is often a needed impetus to action, even if it carries the danger of becoming transfigured into ressontimont. It is existential resentment we worry about most, the kind that is apparent today in practices of capitalist greed, religious exclusivity; media bellicosity, authoritarian strategies, sexual narrowness, and military aggression. We mean, first, positive affirmation of the cosmos in which human beings are set, as you yourself understand that cosmos, second, coming to terms in a positive way with the enduring modem fact of interruptions in experience and the faster pace at which minorithation occurs, and third, accepting the contestability of your existential creed without profound resentment of that condition.

AT Excess of Language

***The part of language that always exceeds control or intention is not the end of the possibility of communication or subjectivity, it is the beginning**
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

Affect consists of relatively mobile energies with powers that flow into conscious, cultural feeling and emotion; yet these affective energies also exceed the formations they help to foment. Affect has an element of wildness in it. The human being thus absorbs pressures from the world that both help to compose its subjectivity and exceed it. There is no transcendental subject, but rather an emergent, layered subject. Emotion with no affect would be dead, merely a pile of words as empty containers; emotion and mood filled with affect often brim over with energy-potentials that exceed ready-made articulations. The outside, affect, and the politics of becoming are thus interinvolved. Seers make more of such a network of inter-involvements than most of us do.

We must constantly hold intention the incompleteness of communication and its necessity for acting in the world
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

The powers of the nutty professor limit him from another direction: the unruly mass of incipiencies pressing urgently upon him inhibit his efficacy in everyday life; they can even stop an incipient thought from being consolidated enough to pose a challenge to this or that cliché -that is, to disturb something in settled understandings of God, identity, morality, tolerance, causality, justice, finance, reason, or scientific method. The unruly swarm of incipiencies consists of half-formed tendencies, while the operational world of well formed judgments and resolute action unavoidably blocks, diverts, or absorbs some things on the way in order to attain coherence and stability. This is the paradox residing in the human experience of temporality as such. Everyone, including the most creative thinker, is thus doomed to be less than they could be. This may explain why many viewers of The Nutty Professor tacitly include themselves among the objects of friendly disparagement, as they laugh good naturedly at the hapless teacher. Such laughter may express a paradox of being in the world: the persistent discrepancy between the stereotypes appropriate to action-oriented perception and communication on the one side and the loss of bearings needed to think experimentally under new conditions on the other. Both modalities are part of being in the world; each interferes with the efficacy of the other. This, again, is the paradoxical condition of being in the world that Henri Bergson understood so well and that theorists need to negotiate sensitively in the contemporary world of becoming in which things often move faster than heretofore. The need is to negotiate a new balance between action-oriented perception and dwelling in fecund moments of temporal disequilibrium.

The acceleration of certain facets of technology and lived experience do not end the possibility of acting positively in the world nor do they eliminate the possibility of agency. Affirming a world constantly in a state of becoming is a founding condition for agency that their strives towards mastery nor gives up on the possibility of making a little bit better
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

You may initially connect the temper I commend to "optimism" or "romanticism" rather than to the pessimism, coolness, realism, or abiding sense of the negative that you respect. I don't see it that way, though. My sense is that those who jump to such a conclusion have too limited an arsenal of ontological alternatives available. To appreciate two registers of experience in a world of becoming can also help us come to. terms with tragic possibility. Such an appreciation encourages us to embrace the world as we act and intervene resolutely in it, even though it is replete with neither divine providence nor ready susceptibility to human mastery. Indeed, I doer read the absence of providence or mastery as a "lack;' finding the use of that term by some to express a hangover of previous views inadequately overcome in the view officially adopted. I also know that shared experiences of grief or loss can help to consolidate connections with others, and that collective anger, resentment, and indignation are often indispensable spurs to critical action. So there is no sense here that "thinking it is so makes it so" or that "optimism is always healthy?' These orientations are attached to a different take on existence than that advanced here, though there are people who confuse the two. I do suspect that when inordinate drives for individual self-sufficiency, unity, community, consensus, or divine redemption are severely disappointed, things can become dangerous. These disappointed drives -I am sure there• are others as wellreadily cross over into entrenched dispositions to take revenge on the most fundamental terms of human existence, as a person, a constituency, or a putative nation grasps those terms. If and when that happens, an exclusionary, punitive, scandal-ridden, bitter politics is aprto result, regardless of how the carriers represent themselves to others. Here actions speak louder than words . . . .

 A world of becoming has considerable evidence on its side, as we shall. see; and affirmation of this condition without existential taut provides one way to act resolutely in the world while warding off individual and collective drives to existential resentment. There are others, as we. shall also see. Given the human predicament (explored in chapter 4), no theological or nontheological perspective at this level carries iron-clad guarantees. A crack or fissure running through every final perspective is part of the human predicament as I construe it . .. . H

On my rendering, the course of time is neither governed solely by a pattern of efficient causation -where each event is determined to occur by some prior event in linear temporal order - nor expressive of an inherent purpose revolving around the human animal as such. Neither/nor. To put it indifferent terms, time is neither mechanical nor organic, and its human apprehension is neither susceptible to the method of "individualism" nor that of "holism? We participate, rather, in a world of becoming in a universe set on multiple zones of temporality, with each temporal force-field periodically encountering others as outside forces, and the whole universe open to an uncertain degree. From this perspective, tragic possibility-not inevitability but possibility- is real: tragic possibility as seen from the vantage point of your time or country or species; tragic possibility sometimes actualized through the combination of hubris and an unlikely conjunction of events. Or by some other combination. I even suspect that differential degrees of agency in other force-fields, with which we enter into encounters of many types, increases the risk of that possibility. The universe is not only open; there is an "outside" to every temporal force-field. We are not only limited as agents, but part of our limitation comes from the different degrees of agency in other force-fields

with which we interact. The operation of multiple tiers of becoming in a world without a higher purpose amplifies the need to act with dispatch, and sometimes with militancy, in particular situations of stress. The fact that we are not consummate agents in such a world, combined with the human tendency to hubris, means that we must work to cultivate wisdom under these very circumstances. These two dictates, engendering each other while remaining in tension, constitute the problematic of political action in a world of becoming.

William James, Henri Bergson, Ptiedrich Nietzsche, Alfred North Whitehead, and Glues Deleuze all advance different versions of time as becoming. Perhaps Merleau-Ponty and Marcel Proust do too, with qualifications. I draw from several of them the idea that it takes both philosophical speculation linked to scientific experiment and dwelling in uncanny experiences of duration to vindicate such an adventure. Both. Luckily, as we shall see, some strains of complexity theory in the natural sciences also support the theme of time as becoming as they compose new experiments and rework classical conceptions of causality. Moreover, in everyday life fugitive glimmers of becoming are available to more people more of the time, as we experience the acceleration of many zones of life, the enhanced visibility of natural disasters across the globe, the numerous pressures to minoritize the entire world along several dimensions at a more rapid pace, the globalization of capital and contingency together, the previously unexpected ingress of capital into climate change, the growing number of film experiments with the uncanniness of time, and the enlarged human grasp of the intelligence and differential degrees of agency in other plant and animal species. Such experiences and experiments together call into question early modem conceptions of time. Many. respond to such experiences by intensifying religious and secular drives to protect an established image, as either linear and progres-. sive or infused with divine providence. I suspect, however, that such responses - unless their proponents actively engage the comparative contestsbility of them without deep existential resentment-can amplify the dangers and destructiveness facing our time Or, at least, they need to be put into more active competition with a conception that speaks to an array of contemporary experiences otherwise pushed into the shadows.

To amplify the experience of becoming is one affirmative way to belong to time today. Active exploration and support of such a perspective can make a positive contribution to the late-modem period by drawing more people• toward such a perspective or by showing others how much work they need to do to vindicate their own perspective. I belong to a growing contingent who think that a perspective defined by active examination of becoming can make positive contributions to explorations of spirituality, economics, political action, poetic experience, and ethics.

As already indicated, periodic sensitivity to a rich drop of time merely sets a threshold condition to, entertain the themes advanced here. More is needed to endow them with plausibility. The threshold condition, nonetheless, may be important, for it opens a window to place the theme of a world of becoming in relation to other conceptions of time and it may increase the possibility of positive engagement between bearers of alternative ontotheological images of time. I wish you had been at that party with me.

Impact D

AT Biopower

No impact – democratic norms and civil society check totalitarianism and genocide
Dickinson, associate professor of history – UC Davis, **'4**

(Edward, Central European History, 37.1)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. **But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading**, because it obfuscates the **profoundly different** strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively **quite different from totalitarianism.** Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is **functionally incompatible** with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly **narrow limits on coercive policies**, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufé cient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic coné guration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "liberty," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point** for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. **This notion is not** at all **at odds with the core of Foucauldian** (and Peukertian) **theory.** Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not "opposites," in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept "power" should not be read as a universal stiè ing night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively "the same." Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, "tactically polyvalent." Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create "multiple modernities," modern societies with quite **radically differing potentials.**91

Their internal link is terrible causality and empirically denied
Amy 7, professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke College

(Douglas, "More Government Does Not Mean Less Freedom," Government is Good, http://governmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=18&print=1)

The minimal-government crowd uses this "more government = less freedom" formula to make all sorts of alarmist claims. For example, **some suggest that every increase in government power is a step down the road to totalitarianism and repression.** This is a favorite argument of many conservatives and they use it to oppose even small and seemingly reasonable increases in government programs or regulations. For example, they argue is that if we allow the government to insist on background checks to buy guns, this will lead to mandatory gun registration, which will eventually lead to confiscation of guns, and this will put the government in a position to repress a disarmed and helpless citizenry. Or they suggest that legalizing assisted-suicide for terminally ill patients will only set the stage for government euthanasia programs aimed at the handicapped and others. Or they fear that mandating non-smoking areas is merely a step toward outlawing cigarettes altogether. Or they contend that if we allow environmental regulations to restrict how an owner deals with wetlands on their property, we are going down a road in which property rights will eventually be meaningless because the state will control all property. This seems to be the view of the conservative judge Janice Rogers – one of George W. Bush's appointees to the federal judiciary. In one of her opinions, she railed against local restrictions on the rights of real estate developers in California and concluded that "Private property, already an endangered species in California, is now entirely extinct in San Francisco."6 In his book, Defending Government, Max Nieman has labeled this argument the "Big Brother Road to Dictatorship." It suggests that the expansion of government powers in the U.S. during the last 75 years has been inevitably leading us down the path toward totalitarianism. But as he has noted, **there is** really **no** valid **evidence for this theory**. If we look at how **modern dictatorships** have come about, they **have not been the product of gradually increasing social programs and regulations** over property and business. As Neiman explains: It is common among conservative critics of public sector activism to characterize government growth in the arena of social welfare, environment, consumer and worker protection, and income security as steps toward the loss of liberty and even totalitarianism. Many critics of the emergence of the modern social welfare state … have tried to convey the sense that the road to totalitarian hell is paved with the good intentions of the social democratic program. …There is no record, however, of any oppressive regime having taken power by advancing on the social welfare front. Lenin and Stalin, Mussolini, Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro, and Chile's Pinochet did not consolidate power by gradually increasing social welfare programs, taxes, and regulation of the environment or workplace. **Rather, these assaults on personal freedom and democratic governance** involved **limitation on civil rights and political rights, the legitimization of oppression and discrimination against disfavored or unpopular groups,** and the centralization and expansion of military and policy forces. **Hitler did not become the supreme ruler of the Nazi state by first taking over the health department.**7

AT Endless War

No risk of endless warfare
GRAY 7

(Colin, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, [July 2007, "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration," http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy's military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention's critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.

No endless war

Rodwell 5

(Jonathan Rodwell is a PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy of the late 70's / rise of 'neo-cons' and Second Cold War, "Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson," http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through 'othering' it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn't produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the 'Evil Empire'. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive 'othering' of an 'alien' people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it's own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980's? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell's original work on which Jackson's approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that 'always results in an other being marginalized' or has the potential for 'demonisation'[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 "is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as 'evil', 'inhuman' and 'faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated"[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940's and 50's even subjected to the language of the 'Red Scare' it's obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an 'other' of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of 'evil' and 'inhumanity' does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an 'other'. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model

Endless violence is not a thing

Chandler 9

(David, Westminster IR professor, "War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of `Global War'", Security Dialogue, 40.3, SAGE)

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to 'motorized partisans', in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of 'global war' have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with

'global war' thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. **This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines 'global' war today.** Very few studies of the 'war on terror' start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the 'war on terror' (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are 'scaled up' from the international to the global. Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire. The alternative reading of 'global war' rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the **lack of political stakes** and strategic structuring of the international sphere **rather than frameworks for asserting global domination**. We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the 'war on terror' campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. There would appear to be a **direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping and structuring interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome.** In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the **lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat** or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and **arbitrary interventions** as states and international institutions use the **lack of strategic imperatives** to **construct their own meaning through intervention**. As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains: war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz's classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. …. War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most 'efficient' way of finding one. **The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to 'war'.** In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are **freed from strategic necessities** and **whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against 'real enemies'**. The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the **strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests**.

No global war impact

Teschke 11

(Benno Gerhard, IR prof at the University of Sussex, "Fatal attraction: a critique of Carl Schmitt's international political and legal theory", International Theory (2011), 3 : pp 179-227)

For at the centre of the heterodox – partly post-structuralist, partly realist – neo-Schmittian analysis stands the conclusion of The Nomos: the thesis of a structural and continuous relation between liberalism and violence (Mouffe 2005, 2007; Odysseos 2007). It suggests that, in sharp contrast to the liberal-cosmopolitan programme of 'perpetual peace', the geographical expansion of liberal modernity was accompanied by the intensification and de-formalization of war in the international construction of liberal-constitutional states of law and the production of liberal subjectivities as rights-bearing individuals. Liberal world-ordering proceeds via the conduit of wars for humanity, leading to Schmitt's 'spaceless universalism'. In this perspective, a straight line is drawn from WWI to the War on Terror to verify Schmitt's long-term prognostic of the 20th century as the age of 'neutralizations and de-politicizations' (Schmitt 1993). But this attempt to read the history of 20th century international relations in terms of a succession of confrontations between the carrier-nations of liberal modernity and the criminalized foes at its outer margins seems unable to comprehend the complexities and specificities of 'liberal' world-ordering, then and now. For in the cases of Wilhelmine, Weimar and fascist Germany, the assumption that their conflicts with the Anglo-American liberal-capitalist heartland were grounded in an antagonism between liberal modernity and a recalcitrant Germany outside its geographical and conceptual lines runs counter to the historical evidence. For this reading presupposes that late-Wilhelmine Germany was not already substantially penetrated by capitalism and fully incorporated into the capitalist world economy, posing the question of whether the causes of WWI lay in the capitalist dynamics of inter-imperial rivalry (Blackbourn and Eley 1984), or in processes of belated and incomplete liberal-capitalist development, due to the survival of 're-feudalized' elites in the German state classes and the marriage between 'rye and iron' (Wehler 1997). It also assumes that the late-Weimar and early Nazi turn towards the construction of an autarchic German regionalism – Mitteleuropa or Großraum – was not deeply influenced by the international ramifications of the 1929 Great Depression, but premised on a purely political–existentialist assertion of German national identity. Against a reading of the early 20th century conflicts between 'the liberal West' and Germany as 'wars for humanity' between an expanding liberal modernity and its political exterior, there is more evidence to suggest that these confrontations were interstate conflicts within the crisis-ridden and nationally uneven capitalist project of modernity. Similar objections and caveats to the binary opposition between the Western discourse of liberal humanity against non-liberal foes apply to the more recent period. For how can this optic explain that the 'liberal West' coexisted (and keeps coexisting) with a large number of pliant authoritarian client-regimes (Mubarak's Egypt, Suharto's Indonesia, Pahlavi's Iran, Fahd's Saudi-Arabia, even Gaddafi's pre-intervention Libya, to name but a few), which were and are actively managed and supported by the West as anti-liberal Schmittian states of emergency, with concerns for liberal subjectivities and Human Rights secondary to the strategic interests of political and geopolitical stability and economic access? Even in the more obvious cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and, now, Libya, the idea that Western intervention has to be conceived as an encounter between the liberal project and a series of foes outside its sphere seems to rely on a denial of their antecedent histories as geopolitically and socially contested state-building projects in pro-Western fashion, deeply co-determined by long histories of Western anti-liberal colonial and post-colonial legacies. If these states (or social forces within them) turn against their imperial masters, the conventional policy expression is 'blowback'. And as the Schmittian analytical vocabulary does not include a conception of human agency and social forces – only friend/enemy groupings and collective political entities governed by executive decision – it also lacks the categories of analysis to comprehend the social dynamics that drive the struggles around sovereign power and the eventual overcoming, for example, of Tunisian and Egyptian states of emergency without US-led wars for humanity. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the generic idea of liberal world-ordering and the production of liberal subjectivities can actually explain why Western intervention seems improbable in some cases (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen or Syria) and more likely in others (e.g. Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya). Liberal world-ordering consists of differential strategies of building, coordinating, and drawing liberal and anti-liberal states into the Western orbit, and overtly or covertly intervening and refashioning them once they step out of line. These are conflicts within a world, which seem to push the term liberalism beyond its original meaning. The generic Schmittian idea of a liberal 'spaceless universalism' sits uncomfortably with the realities of maintaining an America-supervised 'informal empire', which has to manage a persisting interstate system in diverse and case-specific ways. But it is this persistence of a worldwide system of states, which encase national particularities, which renders challenges to American supremacy possible in the first place.

AT Lashout

No internal link to their lash out impact – It is only when the desire for revenge and redemptive justice is allowed to take precedence is action against suffering resentful and dangerous
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

It is perhaps salient to point out again how my attention to the rolling and roiling interactions between hubris and existential resentment does not carry with it a denial of the positive role that anger, resentment, indignation, and the like can and do play in politics. ==There is no politics without passion.== ==It is when the trials of life== /==or the hubris of mastery slide into institutionally== ==embedded drives to existential revenge that things become most dangerous.== ==That is a risk accompanying any and every positive social movement==. As we saw in chapter 3, it is also a risk that we should engage self-critically as we respond to new configurations of struggle.

AT Ressentiment/Victimization

Resentment of particular aspects of the world is inevitable and necessary – it is only Loyola's resentment of the very terms of human experience that is truly dangerous. We must begin with an affirmation of belief in the world
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

By "belief in this world:' neither Deleuze nor I, again, means that the established distribution of power, exploitation, and inequality now in place is to be protected, though some critics love to jump to this conclusion. Such arrangements make people suffer too much, and they rest upon the repression of essential features of the contemporary condition, including the minoritization of the world occurring at a more rapid pace. Exploitation and domination are things to contest and oppose, as Deleuze did actively while embracing the points reviewed above. The restoration of belief in this world provides an existential resource to draw upon as those struggles are fought energetically and creatively. Nor do we mean that it is always illegitimate to resent your place in the world. Resentment is often a needed impetus to action, even if it carries the danger of becoming transfigured into ressontimont. It is existential resentment we worry about most, the kind that is apparent today in practices of capitalist greed, religious exclusivity; media bellicosity, authoritarian strategies, sexual narrowness, and military aggression. We mean, first, positive affirmation of the cosmos in which human beings are set, as you yourself understand that cosmos, second, coming to terms in a positive way with the enduring modem fact of interruptions in experience and the faster pace at which minorithation occurs, and third, accepting the contestability of your existential creed without profound resentment of that condition.

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AT VTL

Life has intrinsic and objective value achieved through subjective pleasures---its preservation should be an a priori goal

Kacou 8

(Amien WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of "Life", Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008)
cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184)

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without "life," as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of "pleasure," in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to "mediate" all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that "good" is absolutely synonymous with "pleasant"—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, "living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living," and saying, "I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living," whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, "life gives me pleasure," says little more than, "I like life." Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

Life is always valuable

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Ultimately, Aquinas' theory of personhood requires a metaphysical explanation that is rooted in an understanding of the primacy of the existence or esse of the human person. For humans beings, the upshot of this position is clear: while human personhood is intimately connected with a broad range of actions (including consciousness of oneself and others), the definition of personhood is not based upon any specific activity or capacity for action, but upon the primacy of esse. Indeed, human actions would have neither a cause nor any referent in the absence of a stable, abiding self that is rooted in the person's very being. A commitment to the primacy of esse, then, allows for an adequate recognition of the importance of actions in human life, while providing a principle for the unification and stabilizing of these behavioral features. In this respect, the human person is defined as a dynamic being which actualizes the potentiality for certain behavior or operations unique to his or her own existence. Esse thereby embraces all that the person is and is capable of doing. In the final analysis, **any attempt to define the person in terms of a single attribute, activity, or capability** (e.g., consciousness) flies in the face of the depth and multi-dimensionality which is part and parcel of personhood itself. To do so **would abdicate the ontological core of the person and the very center which renders human activities intelligible.** And Aquinas' anthropology, I submit, provides an effective philosophical lens through which the depth and profundity of the human reality comes into sharp focus. In this respect, Kenneth Schmitz draws an illuminating distinction between "person" (a term which conveys such hidden depth and profundity) and "personality" (a term which pertains to surface impressions and one's public image).40 The preoccupation with the latter term, he shows, is very much an outgrowth of the eighteenth century emphasis upon a human individuality that is understood in terms of autonomy and privacy. This notion of the isolated, atomistic individual was closely linked with a subjective focus whereby the "self" became the ultimate referent for judging reality. By extension, such a presupposition led to the conviction that only self-consciousness provides a means of validating any claims to personhood and membership in a community of free moral agents capable of responsibilities and worthy of rights. In contrast to such an isolated and enclosed conception (i.e., whereby one is a person by virtue of being "set apart" from others as a privatized entity), Schmitz focuses upon an intimacy which presupposes a certain relation between persons. From this standpoint, intimacy is only possible through genuine self-disclosure, and the sharing of self-disclosure that allows for an intimate knowledge of the other.41 For Schmitz, such a revelation of one's inner self transcends any specific attributes or any overt capacity the individual might possess.42 Ultimately, Schmitz argues, intimacy is rooted in the unique act of presencing, whereby the person reveals his or her personal existence. But such a mystery only admits of a metphysical explanation, rather than an epistemological theory of meaning which confines itself to what is observable on the basis of perception or sense experience. Intimacy, then, discloses a level of being that transcends any distinctive properties. Because intimacy has a unique capacity to disclose being, it places us in touch with the very core of personhood. Metaphysically speaking, intimacy is not grounded in the recognition of this or that characteristic a person has, but rather in the simple unqualified presence the person is.43

Alt/Perm

Perm – 2AC Ressentiment NB

The force of communication/capital/whatever is not a reason to turn away from the world – their fear of the fundamental terms of human existence is ressentiment
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

During a time when the expansion of capital, inter-territory media communication, and population migration generate a more rapid minoridzation of the world, part of the contemporary predicament is how to respond to the obdurate plurality of being in positive ways. The pluralization of the world, in conjunction with bellicose movements that turn militantly against it, forms a critical part of the contemporary predicament. Today, it is important, first, to articulate comparative readings of the human predicament, second, to affirm the reading that makes the most sense of evidence, argument, and experience to you, third, to cultivate a presumption of agonistic respect for other readings, and fourth, to find ways to embrace without existential resentment the most fundamental character of being as you yourself confess it to be. The "you" refers to intra-individual, micro- and macro-assemblages of desire.

Calls for Change Good

Calls for change are the best means to celebrate life – inaction breeds resentment

May, Lemon Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University, '5

(Todd, "To change the world, to celebrate life" Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol 31 No 5-6, p 517-531, SagePub)

To change the world and to celebrate life. This as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, is the struggle within us.1 It is a struggle in which one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the sake of the other can lead only to disaster or callousness. Forsaking the celebration of life for the sake of changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary. In his preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to be revolutionary. The matter is more urgent than that, however. One cannot be both sad and revolutionary. Lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is focused only on the future; the present is what is to be overcome. The vision of what is not but must come to be overwhelms all else, and the point of change itself becomes lost. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now. The alternative is surely not to shift one's allegiance to the pure celebration of life, although there are many who have chosen this path. It is at best blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many of our fellow humans, to say nothing of what happens to sentient non-human creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an uncritical assent to the world as it is requires a self-deception that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, it is anathema for all of us who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is matched only by an equally expansive disregard for those we place in harm's way This is the struggle, then. The one between the desire for life-celebration and the desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. The question then becomes one of how to choose both sides at once. III Maybe it happens this way. You walk into a small meeting room at the back of a local bookstore. There are eight or ten people milling about. They're dressed in dark clothes, nothing fancy, and one or two of them have earrings or dreadlocks. They're young in age. You don't know any of them. You've never seen them before. Several of them seem to know one another. They are affectionate, hugging, letting a hand linger on a shoulder or an elbow. A younger man, tall and thin, with an open face and a blue baseball cap bearing no logo, glides into the room. Two others, a man and a woman, shout, 'Tim!' and he glides over to them and hugs them, one at a time. They tell him how glad they are that he could make it, and he says that he just got back into town and heard about the meeting. You stand a little off to the side. Nobody has taken a seat at the rectangle of folding tables yet. You don't want to be the first to sit down. Tim looks around the room and smiles. Several other people filter in. You're not quite sure where to put your hands so you slide them into your jean pockets. You hunch your shoulders. Tim's arrival has made you feel more of an outsider. But then he sees you. He edges his way around several others and walks up to you and introduces himself. You respond. Tim asks and you tell him that this is your first time at a meeting like this. He doesn't ask about politics but about where you're from. He tells you he has a friend in that neighborhood and do you know . . . ? Then several things happen that you only vaguely notice because you're talking with Tim. People start to sit down at the rectangle of tables. One of them pulls out a legal pad with notes on it. She sits at the head of the rectangle; or rather, when she sits down there, it becomes the head. And there's something you don't notice at all. You are more relaxed, your shoulders have stopped hunching, and when you sit down the seat feels familiar. The woman at the head of the table looks around. She smiles; her eyes linger over you and a couple of others that you take to be new faces, like yours. She says, 'Maybe we should begin.' IV I can offer only a suggestion of an answer here today. It is a suggestion that brings together some thoughts from the late writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with those of Foucault, in order to sketch not even a framework for thought, but the mere outlines of a framework. It is not a framework that would seek to find the unconscious of each in the writings of the other. Neither thinker finishes or accomplishes the other. (Often, for example regarding methodology, they do not even agree.) Rather, it is a framework that requires both of them, from their very different angles, in order to be able to think it. My goal in constructing the outlines of this framework is largely philosophical. That is to say, the suggestion I would like to make here is not one for resolving for each of us the struggle of life-celebration and world-changing, but of offering a way to conceive ourselves that allows us to embrace both sides of this battle at the same time. Given the thinkers I have chosen as reference points, it will be no surprise when I say that that conception runs through the body. Let me start with Merleau-Ponty. In his last writings, particularly in The Visible and the Invisible, he offers a conception of the body that is neither at odds nor even entangled with the world, but is of the very world itself. His concept of the flesh introduces a point of contact that is also a point of undifferentiation. The flesh, Merleau-Ponty writes, 'is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things, such that, as tangible it descends among them'.2 We must recall this economy of the flesh before we turn to Foucault. There is, for Merleau-Ponty, a single Being. Our world is of that Being, and we are of our world. We are not something that confronts the world from outside, but are born into it and do not leave it. This does not mean that we cannot remove ourselves from the immediacy of its grasp. What it means is that to remove ourselves from that immediacy is neither the abandonment of a bond nor the discovery of an original dichotomy or dualism. What is remarkable about human beings is precisely our capacity to confront the world, to reflect upon it, understand it, and change it, while still being of a piece with it. To grasp this remarkable character, it is perhaps worth recalling Gilles Deleuze's concept of the fold. The world is not composed of different parts; there is no transcendent, whether of God or of subjectivity. The world is one. As Deleuze sometimes says, being is univocal. This oneness is not, however, inert or inanimate. Among other things, it can fold over on itself, creating spaces that are at once insides and outsides, at once different from and continuous with one another. The flesh is a fold of Being in this sense. It is of the world, and yet encounters it as if from a perceptual or cognitive distance. It is a visibility that sees, a tangible that touches, an audible that hears. Merleau-Ponty writes: There is vision, touch when a certain visible, a certain tangible, turns back upon the whole of the visible, the whole of the tangible, of which it is a part, or when suddenly it finds itself surrounded by them, or when between it and them, and through their commerce, is formed a Visibility, a Tangible in itself, which belong properly neither to the body qua fact nor to the world qua fact . . . and which therefore form a couple, a couple more real than either of them.3 For Merleau-Ponty, thought and reflection do not attach themselves to this flesh from beyond it, but arise through it. As our body is of this world, our thought is of our bodies, its language of a piece with the world it addresses. '[I]f we were to make completely explicit the architectonics of the human body, its ontological framework, and how it sees itself and hears itself, we would see the possibilities of language already given in it.'4 This conception of the body as flesh of the world is not foreign to Foucault, although of course the terms Merleau-Ponty uses are not his. We might read Foucault's politics as starting from here, inaugurated at the point of undifferentiation between body and world. The crucial addition he would make is that that point of undifferentiation is not historically inert. The body/world nexus is inscribed in a history that leaves its traces on both at the same time, and that crosses the border of the flesh and reaches the language that arises from it, and the thought that language expresses. How does this work? V Maybe it doesn't happen that way. Maybe it happens another way. Maybe you walk into a room at a local community center. The room is large, but there aren't many people, at least yet. There's a rectangular table in the center, and everyone is sitting around it. A couple of people look up as you walk in. They nod slightly. You nod back, even more slightly. At the head of the table is someone with a legal pad. She is reading the notes on the pad, making occasional marks with the pen in her right hand. Other people come in and take places at the table. One or two of them open laptop computers and look for an outlet. Eventually, the table fills up and people start sitting in chairs behind the table. Your feel as though you're in an inner circle where you don't belong. You wonder whether you should give up your chair and go sit on the outside with the others who are just coming in now. Maybe people notice you, think you don't belong there. At this moment you'd like to leave. You begin to feel at once large and small, visually intrusive and an object of scrutiny. You don't move because maybe this is OK after all. You just don't know. The room is quiet. A couple of people cough. Then the woman seated at the head of the table looks up. She scans the room as if taking attendance. She says, 'Maybe we should begin.' VI Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the body as flesh is an ontological one. Although he does not see the body as remote from its historical inscription, his discussion does not incorporate the role such inscription plays. For a body to be of the world is also for it to be temporal, to be encrusted in the continuous emerging of the world over time. And this emerging is not abstract; rather, it is concrete. The body/world nexus evolves during particular historical periods. This fold of the flesh, this body, is not nowhere and at any time. It is there, then; or it is here, now. A body is entangled within a web of specific events and relations that, precisely because it is of this world, are inescapably a part of that body's destiny. As Merleau-Ponty tells us in Phenomenology of Perception, 'our open and personal existence rests on an initial foundation of acquired and stabilized existence. But it could not be otherwise, if we are temporality, since the dialectic of acquisition and future is what constitutes time.'5 The medium for the body's insertion into a particular net of events and relations is that of social practices. Our bodies are not first and foremost creatures of the state or the economy, no more than they are atomized wholes distinct from the world they inhabit. Or better, they are creatures of the state and the economy inasmuch as those appear through social practices, through the everyday practices that are the ether of our lives. Social practices are the sedimentation of history at the level of the body. When I teach, when I write this article, when I run a race or teach one of my children how to ride a bicycle, my body is oriented in particular ways, conforming to or rejecting particular norms, responding to the constraints and restraints of those practices as they have evolved in interaction with other practices over time. Through its engagement in these practices, my body has taken on a history that is not of my making but is nevertheless part of my inheritance. It is precisely because, as Merleau-Ponty has written, the body and the world are not separate things but rather in a chiasmic relation that we can think this inheritance. And it is because of Foucault's histories that we can recognize that this inheritance is granted through specific social practices. And of course, as Foucault has taught us, social practices are where the power is. It is not, or not simply, at the level of the state or the modes of production where power arises. It is, as he sometimes puts it, at the capillaries. One of the lessons of Discipline and Punish is that, if the soul is the prison of the body, this is because the body is inserted into a set of practices that create for it a soul. These practices are not merely the choices of an individual whose thought surveys the world from above, but instead the fate of a body that is of a particular world at a particular time and place. Moreover, these practices are not merely in service to a power that exists outside of them; they are mechanisms of power in their own right. It is not because Jeremy Bentham disliked the prison population that the Panopticon became a grid for thinking about penal institutions. It is instead because the evolution of penal practices at that time created an opening for the economy of visibility that the Panopticon represented. When Foucault writes that. . . the soul has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished - and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives6 his claim is informed by four other ones that lie behind it: that bodies are of a piece with the world, that the body/world nexus is a temporal one, that the medium of that corporeal temporality is the practices a body is engaged in, and that that medium is political as well as social. The last three claims are, of course, of the framework of Foucault's thought. The first one is the ontological scaffolding provided by Merleau-Ponty. And it is by means of all four that we can begin to conceive things so as to be able to choose both world-changing

and life-celebrating at the same time. VII It could happen yet another way. Increasingly, it does. There is no meeting. There are no tables and no legal pads. Nobody sits down in a room together, at least nobody sits down at a place you know about. There may not even be a leaflet. Maybe you just got an email that was forwarded by someone you know slightly and who thought you might be interested. At the bottom there's a link, in case you want to unsubscribe. If you don't unsubscribe you get more notices, with petitions to sign or times and places for rallies or teach-ins or marches. Maybe there's also a link for feedback or a list for virtual conversations or suggestions. If you show up, it's not to something you put together but to something that was already in place before you arrived. How did you decide on this rally or teach-in? You sat in front of your computer screen, stared at it, pondering. Maybe you emailed somebody you know, asking for their advice. Is it worth going? If it's on campus you probably did. It matters who will see you, whether you have tenure, how much you've published. There are no Tims here. You've decided to go. If it's a teach-in, you've got plausible denia-bility; you're just there as an observer. If it's a rally, you can stand to the side. But maybe you won't do that. The issue is too important. You don't know the people who will be there, but you will stand among them, walk among them. You will be with them, in some way. Bodies at the same time and place. You agree on the issue, but it's a virtual agreement, one that does not come through gestures or words but through sharing the same values and the same internet connections. As you march, as you stand there, nearly shoulder to shoulder with others of like mind, you're already somewhere else, telling this story to someone you know, trying to get them to understand the feeling of solidarity that you felt coursing back into this moment. You say to yourself that maybe you should have brought a friend along. VIII There are many ways to conceive the bond between world-changing and life-celebrating. Let me isolate two: one that runs from Merleau-Ponty to Foucault, from the body's chiasmic relation with the world to the politics of its practices; and the other one running back in the opposite direction. The ontology Merleau-Ponty offers in his late work is one of wonder. Abandoning the sterile philosophical debates about the relation of mind and body, subject and object, about the relation of reason to that which is not reason, or the problem of other minds, his ontology forges a unity of body and world that puts us in immediate contact with all of its aspects. No longer are we to be thought the self-enclosed creatures of the philosophical tradition. We are now in touch with the world, because we are of it. Art, for example, does not appeal solely to our minds; its beauty is not merely a matter of the convergence of our faculties. We are moved by art, often literally moved, because our bodies and the work of art share the same world. As Merleau-Ponty says, 'I would be at great pains to say where is the painting I am looking at. For I do not look at it as I do a thing; I do not fix it in its place. My gaze wanders in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or with it, than that I see it.'7 It is only because my body is a fold of this world that art can affect me so. But this affection is also a vulnerability. As my look can happen according to a work of art, so it can happen according to a social practice. And even more so in proportion as that social practice and its effects are suffused through the world in which I carry on my life, the world my body navigates throughout the day, every day. I do not have a chance to look according to a painting by Cezanne very often; but I do encounter the effects of normalization as it has filtered through the practices of my employment, of my students' upbringing, and of my family's expectations of themselves and one another. The vulnerability of the body, then, is at once its exposure to beauty and its opening to what is intolerable. We might also see things from the other end, starting from politics and ending at the body. I take it that this is what Foucault suggests when he talks about bodies and pleasures at the end of the first volume of the History of Sexuality. If we are a product of our practices and the conception of ourselves and the world that those practices have fostered, so to change our practices is to experiment in new possibilities both for living and, inseparably, for conceiving the world. To experiment in sexuality is not to see where the desire that lies at the core of our being may lead us; that is simply the continuation of our oppression by other means. Rather, it is to construct practices where what is at issue is no longer desire but something else, something that might go by the name of bodies and pleasures. In doing so, we not only act differently, we think differently, both about ourselves and about the world those selves are inseparable from. And because these experiments are practices of our bodies, and because our bodies are encrusted in the world, these experiments become not merely acts of political resistance but new folds in the body/ world nexus. To construct new practices is to appeal to aspects or possibilities of the world that have been previously closed to us. It is to offer novel and perhaps more tolerable, engagements in the chiasm of body and world. Thus we might say of politics what Merleau-Ponty has said of painting, that we see according to it. Here, I take it, is where the idea of freedom in Foucault lies. For Foucault, freedom is not a metaphysical condition. It does not lie in the nature of being human, nor is it a warping, an atomic swerve, in the web of causal relations in which we find ourselves. To seek our freedom in a space apart from our encrustation in the world is not so much to liberate ourselves from its influence as to build our own private prison. Foucault once said: There's an optimism that consists in saying that things couldn't be better. My optimism would consist rather in saying that so many things can be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than with necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constraints . . . .8 That is where to discover our freedom. IX And what happens from there? From the meetings, from the rallies, from the petitions and the teach-ins? After all, always a next. If you win this time - end aid to the contras, divest from apartheid South Africa, force debt-forgiveness by technologically advanced countries - there is always more to do. There is the de-unionization of workers, there are gay rights, there is Burma, there are the Palestinians, the Tibetans. There will always be Tibetans, even if they aren't in Tibet, even if they aren't Asian. But is that the only question: Next? Or is that just the question we focus on? What's the next move in this campaign, what's the next campaign? Isn't there more going on than that? After all, engaging in political organizing is a practice, or a group of practices. It contributes to making you who you are. It's where the power is, and where your life is, and where the intersection of your life and those of others (many of whom you will never meet, even if it's for their sake that you're involved) and the buildings and streets of your town is. This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don't exist. It's not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. You've made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. X Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take Merleau-Ponty's Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings. Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . .10 What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault's work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other - life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration - is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the well-spring of both. If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it. XI So how might you be a political body, woven into the fabric of the world as a celebrator and as a changer? You went to the meeting, and then to the demonstration. How was it there? Were the bodies in harmony or in counterpoint? Did you sing with your feet, did your voice soar? Did your mind come alive? Did you see possibilities you had not seen before? Were there people whose words or clothes, or even the way they walked hand in hand (how long has it been since you've walked hand in hand with someone out in public?) offer you a possibility, or make you feel alive as well as righteous? And how about those people off to the side, the ones on the sidewalk watching? Maybe they just stared, or maybe nodded as you went past. Or maybe some of them shouted at you to stop blocking the streets with your nonsense. The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. Did you recoil within yourself, see yourself as in a mirror, or as the person at Sartre's keyhole who's just been caught? Did you feel superior to them, smug in your knowledge? Or did they, too, show you something you might learn from? Are they you at another moment, a moment in the past or in the future? Are they your parents that you have not explained to, sat down beside, or just shared a meal with? That one over there, the old man slightly stooped in the long overcoat: whom does he remind you of? What message might he have unwittingly brought for you? And why does it have to be a demonstration? You go to a few meetings, a few more demonstrations. You write some letters to legislators. You send an email to the President. And then more meetings. The next thing you know, you're involved in a political campaign. By then you may have stopped asking why. This is how it goes: demonstrations, meetings with legislators, internet contacts. Does it have to be like this? Are demonstrations and meetings your only means? Do they become, sooner or later, not only means but ends? And what kinds of ends? In some sense they should always be ends: a meeting is a celebration, after all. But there are other ends as well. You go to the meeting because that fulfills your obligation to your political conscience. Does it come to that? There are other means, other ends. Other means/ends. Some people ride bicycles, en masse, slowly through crowded urban streets. You want environmentalism? Then have it. The streets are beautiful with their tall corniced buildings and wide avenues. To ride a bike through these streets instead of hiding in the armor of a car would be exhilarating. If enough of you do it together it would make for a pleasant ride, as well as a little lived environmentalism. Would you want to call it a demonstration? Would it matter? There are others as well who do other things with their bodies, more dangerous things. Some people have gone to Palestine in order to put their bodies between the Palestinians and the Israeli soldiers and settlers who attack them. They lie down next to Palestinians in front of the bulldozers that would destroy homes or build a wall through a family's olive orchard. They feel the bodies of those they are in solidarity with. They smell the soil of Palestine as they lay there. Sometimes, they are harmed by it. A young woman, Rachel Corrie, was deliberately crushed by a US bulldozer operated by an Israeli soldier as she kneeled in front of a Palestinian home, hoping to stop its demolition. To do politics with one's body can be like this. To resist, to celebrate, is also to be vulnerable. The world that you embrace, the world of which you are a part, can kill you too. And so you experiment. You try this and you try that. You are a phenomenologist and a genealogist. You sense what is around you, attend to the way your body is encrusted in your political involvements. And you know that that sensing has its own history, a

history that often escapes you even as it envelops you. There is always more to what you are, and to what you are involved in, than you can know. So you try to keep vigilant, seeking the possibilities without scorning the realities. It's a difficult balance. You can neglect it if you like. Many do. But your body is there, woven into the fabric of all the other bodies, animate and inanimate. Whether you like it or not, whether you recognize it or not. The only question is whether you will take up the world that you are of, or leave it to others, to those others who would be more than willing to take your world up for you.

Positive Action Good

Taking particular action against wrong you perceive in the world is necessary to overcome ressentiment
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

A set of pertinent skills and dispositions to the enterprise of theory can be distilled from leading philosophers of time as becoming, particularly if you allow each to be adjusted in the light of considerations advanced by the others. I refer to Priedrich Nietzsche, William James, Alfred North Whitehead, Henri Bergson, and Gilles Deleuze, though, as we have seen, others such as Ilya Prigogine, Smart Kauffman, Marcel Proust, Merleau-Ponty, and Catherine Keller could be added to the list. I will concentrate here, however, on the first group. Taken together, at least four commendations can be distilled from them: i. To work upon the self and the culture to which you belong, amplifying the feeling of attachment to the most fundamental character of existence as such, as you yourself confess those terms in a theistic or nontheistic vein. 2. To cultivate the capacity to dwell sensitively in historically significant, forking moments. 3. To seek periodically to usher new concepts and experimental actions into the world that show promise of negotiating unexpected situations.. To recoil on those interventions periodically to improve the chance that they do not pose more dangers or losses than the maxims they seek to correct. The first task, to amplify attachment to this world, is important to all five thinkers, but it finds perhaps its most fervent expression in the work of Nietzsche and Deleuze. To them, life in a world of becoming carries the obdurate risk of fomenting cultural formations infused with drives to existential revenge seeking available outlets. Both those who embrace and those who deny this image of time face this risk, however. So it is imperative to overcome resentment of the fundamental terms of existence as such, as you understand them, in order to marshal the energy and drive to address the specific dangers and injustices you perceive. Otherwise what starts as a fight in favor of something positive can all too easily be twisted into a crushing demand to punish others for faults you secretly resent about the most fundamental order of being itself (as you understand it). Bergson, James, and Whitehead concur on this point too, though it may find less dramatic expression in their work. Bergson and James embrace a limited God as they cultivate gratitude for being, while Nietzsche and Deleuze, at theft best, exude gratitude for an abundant world of becoming without divinity. Whitehead, whose thought is still relatively new to me, seems to support the idea of an impersonal divinity that absorbs "external objects" and sets limits of the possible in a world of becoming. His stance is perhaps tied to a more beneficent view of the outer reaches of possibility tinn that advanced by Nietzsche, Deleuze, and me. We seek to amplify attachment to the most fundamental character of this world, amidst the tragic possibilities that inhabit a world neither providential in the last instance nor susceptible to consummate human mastery.

***Acting in a world of becoming is life affirming – taking on the role of the seer is powerful
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

Today, however, it is important for more people to hone some of the capacities of a seer and to exercise them periodically. When a period of turbulence arises in a zone that had been relatively quiescent, you revisit a habitual pattern of thought by slipping into a creative suspension of actionoriented perception, doing so to allow a new insight or tactic to bubble forth if it will, as if from nowhere. You may then intervene in politics on the basis

of that insight, ready to recoil back on the insight in the light of its actual effects. You soon launch another round as you maintain a relation of torsion between following a train of thought, dwelling in duration, and exploring a revised course that has just emerged, until your time runs out. Even those trains of thought will be punctuated by little jumps and bumps, as they ride on rough tracks more akin to those between New York and Washington than the smooth ones on the Kyoto-Tokyo line. Such are the joys, risks, and travails of thinking and action in a world of becoming -composed of multiple force-fields, and marked by small and large moments of real creativity.

We must cultivate a belief in the world that goes beyond merely negative breaks with the features of the world we abhor
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

Such a characterization, as stated, is broad and not subjected to the pertinent qualifications. But such a condensation may be needed to show how these diverse pressures affect each other. Ewe collect the pertinent shifts in contemporary experience -from altered experiences of time to the minoritization of the world -we also sense how suth pressures can accumulate for many to disconnect participation in the world from an automatic sense of belonging to the world. We can see or at least feel the exaggeration in Merleau-Ponty's sense that the layering of embodiment suffices to secure essential belonging. Today what Nietzsche called ressentiment- a resentment of the most fundamental terms of human existence as you yourself understand them - too readily becomes insinuated into the pores of experience. The distribution of such a disposition is uneven, but it is not confined to the interior souls of individuals. It can haunt entire constituencies; it can even become embedded to varying degrees in institutions of investment, consumption, electoral campaigns, governing, media reporting, church presentations, Internet debates, and military life. It is perhaps at this point that Gilles Deleu.ze can enlarge our grasp of this condition and suggest at least one way to forge the beginnings of a response to it. I refer to Deleu.ze's claim, one that touches the thought of Charles Taylor in advance in a way that may surprise some, that today we need to find ways to "restore belief in this world?' Deleuze contends that today, though not for the first time, the distance between involvement in the world and belief in it has grown. Recent developments in cinema simultaneously express these larger developments, amplify them arid may suggest preliminary strategies of response that supersede existential resentment. To put it another way, both Taylor and Deleuze think that part of our predicament today is existential, even though neither thinks that the predicament can simply be resolved at this level of being. Here area few of Deleuze's formulations about what has been happening, since at least the end of the Second World War: - It is clear from the outset that cinema had a special relationship with belief. There is a Catholic quality to cinema (there are many explicitly Catholic authors...). Cinema seems wholly within Nietzsche's formula: "How we are still pious." Or better, from the outset, Christianity and revolution, the Christian faith and revolutionary faith, were the two poles which attracted the art of the masses. - The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even believe in the events which happen to us... It is not we who make cinema; it is the world which looks to us like a bad film. - The link between man and the world is broken. Henceforth, this link must become an object of belief: it is the impossible which can only be restored within a faith.. . Man is in the world as if in a pure optical or sound situation. The reaction of which man has become dispossessed can be replaced only by belief.. . The cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link. - Because the point is to discover or restore belief in the world before or beyond words... It is only, it is simply believing in the body. - Whether we are Christians or atheists, in our universal schizophrenia, we need reasons to believe in this world. 19 Deleuze thus speaks to the element of "schizophrenia" to be addressed by both atheists and theists. He surely would not, then, endorse that group of new atheists who think that simply following the logic of traditional science will dissolve the issues involved. Let me follow Deleuze further down this trail: we will consider Taylor's response more closely in the next chapter. I am, of course, not confident that Taylor, Deleuze, or I can forge a response that is sufficient to the issue. But perhaps it is pervasive and deep enough to warrant making some preliminary attempts. How to restore belief in this world? Some writers, says Deleuze, (e.g., Artaud, Kafka, and Proust), artists (Bacon and Magritte), philosophers (Nietzsche and Kierkegaard), and film directors (Welles, Duras, and Rcantis) help us to think through this issue. They begin by first dramatizing a fugitive sense already there in life of jumps and interruptions in experience, by portraying interruptions in smooth narratives. This is very active in film, and such cinematic experience readily becomes coded into the sensitivity of experience beyond the theater. The depth-of-field shots that conjoin disso-nant elements of past and future, the irrational cuts through which sound and visual experience confound each other, the aberrant

modes of behavior in comedies that convey fugitive experiences exceeding habitual experience, the flashbacks that mark a previous point of bifurcation at which one path was pursued and another was allowed merely to fester as incipient potentiality- these cinema techniques both dramatize features of everyday life already dimly available to us and place them at the forefront of attention for further reflection. The film tactics reviewed by Deleuze anticipate new media experiments presented by Hansen earlier in this chapter. They expose us to experiences of dissonance that cannot readily be submerged again, so that attempts to do so must be more virulent than under other conditions of life. But such cinematic labors of the negative are not sufficient; they certainly do not suffice to promote positive attachment to this world. Even a "negative dialectic" does not suffice. If things are left there, the embers of ressentiment can easily become more inflamed. That is one reason Deleuze is never happy with negative critique alone: the next task is to highlight how our participation in a world of real creativity that also finds expression elsewhere in the universe depends on and draws from such fugitive interruptions. To put it too starkly (for situational nuances and adjustments are pertinent here), the more people who experience a positive connection between modes of interruption and the possibility of our modest participation as individuals, constituencies, states, and a species in creative processes extending beyond us, the more apt we are to embrace the new temporal experiences around us as valuable parts of existence as such. Certainly, absent a world catastrophe or a repressive revolution that would create worse havoc than the conditions it seeks to roll back, these consummate features of late-modem life are not apt to dissipate soon. The fastest zones of late-modem life, for instance, are not apt to slow down in the absence of a catastrophe that transforms everything. So the radical task is to find ways to strengthen the connection between the fundamental terms of late-modem existence and positive attachment to life as such. This should be accomplished not by embracing exploitation and suffering, but by challenging them as we come to terms with the larger trends.

AT Do Nothing/Negativity

Alt fails and leads to ressentiment
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

But such cinematic labors of the negative are not sufficient; they certainly do not suffice to promote positive attachment to this world. Even a "negative dialectic" does not suffice. If things are left there, the embers of ressentiment can easily become more inflamed. That is one reason Deleuze is never happy with negative critique alone: the next task is to highlight how our participation in a world of real creativity that also finds expression elsewhere in the universe depends on and draws from such fugitive interruptions. To put it too starkly (for situational nuances and adjustments are pertinent here), the more people who experience a positive connection between modes of interruption and the possibility of our modest participation as individuals, constituencies, states, and a species in creative processes extending beyond us, the more apt we are to embrace the new temporal experiences around us as valuable parts of existence as such. Certainly, absent a world catastrophe or a repressive revolution that would create worse havoc than the conditions it seeks to roll back, these consummate features of late-modem life are not apt to dissipate soon. The fastest zones of late-modem life, for instance, are not apt to slow down in the absence of a catastrophe that transforms everything. So the radical task is to find ways to strengthen the connection between the fundamental terms of late-modem existence and positive attachment to life as such. This should be accomplished not by embracing exploitation and suffering, but by challenging them as we come to terms with the larger trends.

Neolib

Topshelf

2AC from File

Frame the alternative within consequentialism – neoliberalism is most ethical because all *practical* alternatives are worse and cause violecne

-coming up with an alternative economic system *matters*

-don't take a leap of faith

-any alternative is utopian and unachievable

-capitalism can be reformed

Richards 9 – PhD in Philosophy @ Princeton

Jay Richards, PhD with honors in Philosophy and Theology from Princeton, "Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the Solution and Not the Problem," pg. 31-32

Myth no. 1: The Nirvana Myth (contrasting capitalism with an unrealizable ideal rather than with its live alternatives) But the myth can have subtle effects even if we reject utopian schemes. To avoid its dangers, we have to resist the temptation to compare our live options with an ideal that we can never realize. When we ask whether we can build a just society, we need to keep the question nailed to solid ground: just compared with what? It doesn't do anyone any good to tear down a society that is "unjust" compared with the kingdom of God if that society is more just than any of the ones that will replace it. Compared with Nirvana, no real society looks good. Compared with utopia, Stalinist Russia and America at its best will both get bad reviews. The differences between them may seem trivial compared to utopia. That's one of the grave dangers of utopian thinking: it blinds us to the important differences among the various ways of ordering society. The Nirvana Myth dazzles the eyes, to the point that the real alternatives all seem like dull and barely distinguishable shades of gray. The free exchange of wages for work in the marketplace starts to look like slavery. Tough competition for market share between companies is confused with theft and survival of the fittest. Banking is confused with usury and exploitation. This shouldn't surprise us. Of course a modern capitalist society like the United States looks terrible compared with the kingdom of God. But that's bad moral reasoning. The question isn't whether capitalism measures up to the kingdom of God. The question is whether there's a better alternative in this life. "Those who condemn the immorality of liberal capitalism do so in comparison with a society of saints that has never existed—and never will." —Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works If we're going to compare modern capitalism with an extreme, we should compare it with a real extreme—like communism in Cambodia, China, or the Soviet Union. Unlike Nirvana, these experiments are well within our power to bring about. They all reveal the terrible cost of trying to create a society in which ev- eryone is economically equal. If we insist on comparing live options with live options, modern capitalism could hardly be more different, more just, or more desirable than such an outcome. That doesn't mean we should rest on our laurels. It means we need to stay focused on reality rather than romantic ideals. So how should we answer the question that began this chap- ter: can't we build a just society? The answer: we should do everything we can to build a more just society and a more just world. And the worst way to do that is to try to create an egalitarian utopia.

Economic rationality is ethical and solves war – self-interest motivates individuals to sacrifice some autonomy to produce security and protect the rights of others
Aasland '9

(Dag, Prof. of Economics @ U of Agder, Norway, <u>Ethics and Economy: After Levinas</u>, pgs. 65-66)

<u>Business ethics</u>, in the sense of ethics *for* business, illustrates this: its <u>perspective is</u> that of an <u>'enlightened self-interest'</u> <u>where the constraints that are put on the individual, thanks to the ability to see the unfortunate</u> <u>consequences for oneself, postpone</u> the <u>'war'</u>, in a direct or metaphoric sense of the word (*ibid.*: 70-71). This <u>enlightened</u> <u>self-interest forms the base not only of</u> the <u>market economy, but also of</u> a social organization and manifestation of <u>human rights</u>, and even of some ethical theories. <u>It is a calculated</u> and voluntary <u>renunciation of one's own freedom in</u> <u>order to obtain</u> in return <u>security</u> and other common goals (*ibid.*: 72). <u>The fact that economic</u>, political and legal <u>theories</u> <u>appeal to enlightened self-interest does not imply</u>, however, <u>that we should discard them</u>. Nor should we reject proclamations of human rights, legal constraints of individual freedom and, for that matter, business ethics, even if they are based on an enlightened self-interest. <u>It is rather the opposite: such institutions and knowledge are indispensable because</u> <u>the primary quality of</u> the <u>enlightened self-interest is that it restricts egocentricity</u>. Our *practical reason* (which was Kant's words for the reason that governs our acts, where the moral law is embedded as a principle) includes the knowledge that it can be rational to lay certain restrictions on individual freedom. In this way <u>practical reason may postpone</u> (for an indefinite time) <u>violence</u> and murder <u>among people</u>. <u>This has</u> primarily <u>been the raison-d'être of</u> politics and <u>the state, but it is</u> <u>today taken over</u> more and more <u>by corporate organizations</u>, as expressed in the new term for business ethics, as *corporate social responsibility* and *corporate citizenship* (see chapter 2). <u>Thanks to this 'postponement of violence' provided by</u> politics and <u>economic rationality, people may unfold their freedom</u> within the laws and regulations set up by society (Burggraeve, 2003: 77).

Permutation do both

The permutation solves best – neoliberal institutions can be used against themselves – absolute refusal makes structural violence inevitable
Ferguson, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, 11

(James, The Uses of Neoliberalism, Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184)

<u>If we are seeking</u>, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, <u>to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded</u> <u>political struggle</u>—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—<u>then **there is much to be said for**</u> **<u>focusing</u>**, as I have here, **on mundane, real- world debates around policy and politics, even if doing so** **inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of the possible, rather than the seductive** **high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires**. But I would also insist that <u>there is more at stake</u> in the examples I have discussed here <u>than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically</u> <u>poor</u>, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims.¶ My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the "informal", help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor,¶ in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass

support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats' dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming).¶ My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a very particular (and conservative) political agenda ("neoliberalism") may be in the process of being peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest.¶ As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic "neoliberal" political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific "neoliberal" techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier's case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic "is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work", and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact "deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms" (2005:2).¶ As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do.¶ Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left's governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. "[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented". But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le'vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. If we can go beyond seeing in "neoliberalism" an evil essence or an automatic unity, and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a bit less bare than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

Neolib solves war and collapse causes it – historical evidence and studies prove
Tures '3 – Associate Professor of Political Science @ LaGrange College

John A. Tures, Associate Professor of Political Science at LaGrange College, 2003, "ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND CONFLICT REDUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1970S, 1980S, AND 1990S", Cato Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3. http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22n3/cj22n3-9.pdf

The last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of market-based reforms and the profusion of economic freedom in the international system. This shift in economic policy has sparked a debate about whether free markets are superior to state controls. Numerous studies have compared the neoliberal and statist policies on issues of production capacity, economic growth, commercial vol- umes, and egalitarianism. An overlooked research agenda, however, is the relationship between levels of economic freedom and violence within countries. Proponents of the statist approach might note that a strong gov- ernment can bend the market to its will, directing activity toward policies necessary to achieve greater levels of gross domestic product and growth. By extracting more resources for the economy, a pow- erful state can redistribute benefits to keep the populace happy. Higher taxes can also pay for an army and police force that intimidate people. Such governments range from command economies of totali- tarian systems to autocratic dictators and military juntas. Other eco- nomically unfree systems include some of the authoritarian "Asian tigers." A combination of historical evidence, modern theorists, and statis- tical findings, however, has indicated that a reduced role for the state in regulating economic transactions is associated with a decrease in internal conflicts. Countries where the government dominates the commercial realm experience an increase in the level of domestic violence. Scholars have traced the history of revolutions to explain the relationship between statism and internal upheavals. Contemporary authors also posit a relationship between economic liberty and peace. Statistical tests show a strong connection between economic freedom and conflict reduction during the past three decades.

Framework

Force the negative to explain how their alternative produces behavioral change - their alternative may sound good, but it produces no institutions for creating social change
Barnett 10

(Clive, Professor of Geography and Social Theory at the University of Exeter in the UK, "The politics of behaviour change", September 3, 2010, http://clivebarnett.wordpress.com/2010/09/03/the-politics-of-behaviour-change-2/)

Another plug, this time for a Theme Issue of the journal Environment and Planning A, on the topic of Ethical Foodscapes. I was asked to write a short commentary on the papers in this collection, and ended up using this an excuse to try to say something coherent about 'the politics of behaviour change' - the papers in the collection all engage, in different ways, with ongoing attempts to influence individual patterns of consumption by fiddling with the backgrounds of food practices. This is just one field in which <u>the issue of how and whether to influence people's conduct to achieve various 'public goods' has become central to contemporary politics</u> and governance. There is a great research project investigating this phenomenon, based at Aberystwyth, on the time-spaces of soft paternalism. **Behaviour change is all over** the place these days – in **climate change debates**, in obesity agendas, amongst the Research Councils who fund science and social science in the UK - it's all the rage in policy circles, not just in government but also amongst think-tankers and NGOs. The House of Lords Select Committee has just announced an inquiry into how ideas about behaviour change are working in government. <u>What I find most interesting</u> about all this <u>is the challenge this seems to present to styles of 'critical' social science analysis</u> – Elizabeth Shove has an interesting reflection on this issue, also in Environment and Planning A earlier this year, which focusses on how 'attitude-behaviour-change' models of governance tend to marginalise insights of social theory. It is interesting, certainly, to track the ways in which certain <u>scientific and social scientific fields are being 'sourced' for authoritative models of how to intervene to bring about social change</u> – <u>the most obvious example being</u> the <u>selective use of neuroscience</u>, along with the popularisation of behavioural economics by Thaler and Sunstein's Nudge. There is a cross-over here between academic research fields and popular discourse too; think of Malcolm Gladwell's books, the success of Freakonomics, or my favourite, Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski's Soccernomics - a book which uses simple statistical analysis to develop some interesting explanations and make some entertaining predictions about how success in national and international football is determined (interestingly, this book was published in the UK under the title Why England Lose: And other curious phenomena explained – the difference in the title between the UK and US version is indicative of the current popularity of this style of popular social science beyond any particular specialised interest).¶
<u>There is an easy default position that this style of thinking about influencing people is inherently sinister, since it explicitly seeks to get at people through less-than-fully-rational means</u> – by either <u>designing change into infrastructures, or by deploying affective styles of communication</u>. This seems to circumvent a basic principle of persuading people of the reasons to change through rational argument. <u>Behaviour change initiatives are all about 'manipulating' the contexts in which people exercise choice and discretion. They seem to be designed to confirm</u> the model of <u>'governmentality'</u> developed by Michel

Foucault, of a mode of power which works by shaping the contexts of individuals' conduct without directly intervening in that conduct. Of course, the question that Foucault doesn't necessarily help us with is how to know when it is a problem that your conduct is being configured, 'nudged', in certain ways, and when it isn't. There is a tendency of course to read Foucault as a theorist of social control, but **I think the proliferation of behaviour change initiatives is one occasion to re-visit the 'politics' of using Foucault**. The anthropologist James Ferguson has recently argued that there is a real political stake at play in seemingly arcane differences between conceptualisations of neoliberalism as a hegemonic project of class-power, informed by Marxist theorists such as David Harvey, and neoliberalization as a contingent assemblage of varied 'arts of government', informed by governmentality theory, in the work of Aihwa Ong for example. **One reason not to reconcile these approaches** – not to think that Foucault provides a nice micro-analysis of the 'how' of neoliberalism, while Marxism still holds the secrets to explaining the real interests driving the 'why' (an argument made by Bob Jessop) – is because the governmentality approach draws into view the 'critical' imperative to think through **the possibilities of alternative 'arts of government'**. Quite **a lot of sexy theory these days doesn't like to do this, preferring stylized images of contestation and disruption**. This is why the default reading of behaviour change, as a sinister way of controlling people's actions in the interests of more neoliberalism, more consumerism, more responsibilization, doesn't seem convincing to me – **it seems to close down the more difficult form of analysis which would ask about the possibility of using devices and discourses of 'behaviour change' for different purposes**, or **in more democratically accountable fashion.**

Link

AT Cyber Public Sphere K

Social media is good and key to mobilization – expands the scale of social dialogue and allows broader participation and coordination
Salanova 12

(Regina, United Nations University Institute in Barcelona, "Social media and political change: The case of the 2011 revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt," ICIP WORKING PAPERS: 2012/7, pgs. 11-12)

The use of social media tools as a means to raise awareness and mobilize the masses against the status quo of a given country or regime is certainly not new. Social and political activism has had very significant episodes throughout the twentieth century, from non-violent civil disobedience in India to civil right movements in the US among many others, yet social media have given social movements useful tools to **coordinate and to undertake collective action**. Clay Shirky's analysis on the power of social media in enhancing democracies is probably one of the best attempts at glorifying social media movements (Shirky 2011). Shirky believes that social media have a key role in echoing public opinion. To him, **access to conversation is far more important than access to information**. In the long run, he argues, social media may help increase freedoms as the printing press, postal service or the telegraph did before.¶Internet has benefited grassroots movements by providing new possibilities for citizens to organize even under authoritarian regimes. As Yochai Benkler argues, with the inclusion of Internet in the framework of social mobilization, there has been a qualitative change "represented in the experience of being **a potential speaker, as opposed to simply a listener**" (Benkler 2006). According to him, Internet has not only reduced the cost of producing and publishing media content but it has also decentralized media production, making it much harder for authoritarian regimes to control and censor media outlets.

Social media leads to public mobilization – decreases information costs and allows expanded participation in public debate and conversation
Wang et al 13

(Cheng-Jun Wang, Department of Media and Communication, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, "Discussing Occupy Wall Street on Twitter: Longitudinal Network Analysis of Equality, Emotion, and Stability of Public Discussion," CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL NETWORKING Volume 16, Number 9, 2013)

Social media is believed to play **a revolutionary role** in contentious politics (e.g., revolutions, social movements, and strike waves). The wave of Occupy Wall Street activity

that fought against income inequality swept America during the second half of 2011 and continuously stimulated wide- ranging discussions throughout American society. In particular, we observed that Twitter users actively and voluntarily participated in this movement in a variety of ways, including sharing external links and initiating conversations.

In addition to the obvious advantages of integrating information from all types of mass media, celebrities, and related organizations, online social networks have **great potential for mobilizing people**. Scholars have been interested in the effects of participation in online social networks on political participation and have found correlations with news learning, information sharing, debating, and informal interaction.[1–4] Before the emergence of social media, a similar role played by interpersonal communication and mass media in stirring people's interest was discussed.[5] However, in this era of social media, scholars can better understand how conversational ecosystems operate by tracking online users' activities.[6] For example, Twitter users mention other users using the symbol ''@,'' which indicates their motivations to draw attentions toward a particular topic.

AT Privacy K

Morozov's critique of privacy is a straw person that makes collective anti-neoliberal politics impossible – the neg's suspicion of transparency makes political corruption and inequality inevitable
Sifry 13

(Micah Sifry, Editorial Director, Personal Democracy Media, "Book Review: Evgeny Morozov Doth Protest Too Much," April 9, 2013, http://techpresident.com/news/23708/book-review-evgeny-morozov-doth-protest-too-much)

According to Evgeny Morozov, the world has gone crazy and he's one of the few sane people left. Zynga and Facebook, he writes, in his strange new book, "To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism," have "become models to think about civic engagement." Yelp and Amazon have "become models to think about criticism." People who believe the open Internet can be a tool for good and who worry about and try to oppose people who are using it to hurt others, actually treat the Internet like a "religion" and believe "it's the ultimate technology and the ultimate network." Like the proverbial engineer with a hammer, they see all of society's quirks, inefficiencies, waste, inequality, corruption and hypocrisy as nails to be smashed with smart tools and big data.¶ If it were up to their ilk, he writes, "The odds are that a perfectly efficient seat-distribution system--abetted by ubiquitous technology, sensors, and facial recognition--would have robbed us of one of the proudest moments in American history." That is, "technosolutionists," the villains of Morozov's book, would have engineered such a perfect bus-seating system balancing the seating claims of white and black riders that Rosa Parks could never have committed her history-making act of civil disobedience. Yes, he imagines that, without a word about the underlying problem of racism. I am not making this up.¶ And it gets worse. Extrapolating from the grandiose statements of people like Google's Eric Schmidt and Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg, Morozov spins up a world **that doesn't exist** and then proceeds to inveigh against it **as if it must be the end-point of** where the technosolutionists are taking **society**. To wit, by 2020, we will live in a world where:¶ "Humanity, equipped with powerful self-tracking devices, finally conquers obesity, insomnia, and global warming as everyone eats less, sleeps better, and emits more appropriately. The fallibility of human memory is conquered too, as the very same tracking devices record and store everything we do. Car keys, faces, factoids: we will never forget them again...."¶ "Politics, finally under the constant and far-reaching gaze of the electorate, is freed from all the sleazy corruption, backroom deals and inefficient horse trading. Parties are disaggregated and replaced by Groupon-like political campaigns, where users come together--once--to weigh in on issues of direct and immediate relevance to their lives, only to disband shortly afterward. Now that every word--nay, sound--ever uttered by politicians is recorded and stored for posterity, hypocrisy has become obsolete as well. Lobbyists of all stripes have gone extinct as the wealth of data about politicians--their schedules, lunch menus, travel expenses--are posted online for everyone to review. As digital media make participation easier, more and more citizens ditch bowling alone--only to take up blogging together. Even those who've never bothered to vote in the past are finally provided with the right incentives--naturally, as a part of an online game where they collect points for saving humanity--and so they rush to use their smartphones to 'check in' at the voting booth."¶ Morozov says he finds much of this future "terrifying," but it's only a nightmare of his own imagining. Sometimes his little jokes--lunch menus?--hint that he himself doesn't quite believe it's going to go down this way. But in his zeal to prop up and demolish the straw ~~man~~ [person] of technosolutionism, he contorts himself into some truly bizarre positions.¶ Take his book's discussion of politics, and the efforts of American reformers to reduce **corruption and political inequality by increasing** the availability of information about who is donating to whom, who is lobbying whom, and what they get in return--also known by the short-hand of **"transparency."**¶ For someone who grew up in dictatorial Belarus (which he wryly refers to as "an oasis of tolerance in the middle of Europe"), Morozov has a surprising dislike of political transparency. He gives us several pages of handwringing over the anti-gay-rights donors to California's Proposition 8 who found their publicly disclosed campaign contributions helpfully aggregated on a civilian-built website called Eightmaps.com, which led to some embarrassment for them. Justice Antonin Scalia's admonishment, in a related case involving the publishing of the names of petition signers, that "the fact is that running a democracy takes a certain amount of civic courage" is not for Morozov.¶ No, Morozov is so caught up in his war on "internet-centrism" and technosolutionism that **he embraces proposals to make it harder for people to know who is attempting to influence the political process**. "Campaign finance records posted online could be 'read-only' so that, while accessible on the FEC website, they would not be easy to download or reproduce elsewhere," he writes, approvingly citing a paper by Deborah

Johnson, Priscilla Regan and Kent Wayland essay on "Campaign Disclosure, Privacy and Transparency." Such data should be made "harder to find" and even posted with "self-destruct" code on it to prevent its use, say, five years after an election. So if you wanted to know just how much money Wall Street had invested in some up-and-coming politician at the beginning of his career when a decade or two later he finally enters the national spotlight decades later and runs for President--Morozov apparently thinks you should have a hard, if not impossible, time finding out.¶ What makes this line of argument even odder is that Morozov says he favors more efforts to tackle hard structural issues that deform society and produce negative personal consequences. Again and again in To Save Everything he rails against technological solutions that atomize consumers and place all the burden on their shoulders for solving their problems--criticizing, for example, people who self-track their way to better health rather than "make it harder for food companies to sell unhealthy food or target children." But while calling for solutions requiring collective political action (he's actually a "solutionist" too!), Morozov opposes uses of technology--like the ability to aggregate vital information about political influence peddlers--that might enhance popular political power against the entrenched interests that currently hold it. It makes no sense. (See John Wonderlich's rebuttal of Morozov's criticisms of the Sunlight Foundation here; and yes, I am proudly a consultant to that institution, which Morozov bashes needlessly.)

AT Knowledge Economy K

The knowledge economy is good – produces individual autonomy and forces large corporations to change business practices – ensures improvements in quality of life
Leberecht 14

(Tim Leberecht, chief marketing officer of global design and architecture firm NBBJ, "HOW THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY IS REDEFINING WORK," *Fast Company*, http://www.fastcompany.com/3026566/leadership-now/how-the-knowledge-economy-is-redefining-work)

Somewhere is emblematic of the changing nature of the workplace. Our conceptions of work have shifted from time card and job title to mindset and narrative. Millennials in particular view work as a powerful vehicle for finding meaning in their lives. McMurray is well aware of this generational shift and refers to the rapidly emerging segment of independent workers who prefer independence over permanent, full-time employment. "They definitely present a challenge for large corporations that, if unable to offer extremely **flexible, autonomous, and creative** work environments, simply won't be able to attract the best people," he told me.¶ While business-as-usual used to involve linear narratives of the CV and a more formal notion of transactional business relationships, Somewhere illustrates that we are moving further into more **contextual and nonlinear** portraits of our "selves" at work. The site redefines work as something beautiful, careers as ambiguous and ever-evolving, and a professional's identity as a fluid persona. McMurray says: "People lead such fascinating work lives, and our hope is that we can help open up the world of work, help people see behind the scenes, find inspiration, and find the people they should be working with."

The permutation solves best – a robust knowledge economy and IT innovation are key to transition to an empathetic civilization – solves all their impacts
Rifkin 10

(Jeremy Rifkin, American economic and social theorist, writer, public speaker, political advisor, and activist, "'Empathic Civilization': Is It Time To Replace The American Dream?" *Huffington Post*, May 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/empathic-civilization-is_b_469546.html)

When we consider these big picture policy issues, what becomes clear, if we bother to read between the lines, is that our long held beliefs about human nature, and by extension, the institutions we have created to express those beliefs, played no small role in precipitating the very crisis that now faces the country. In a nation that has come to think of human nature as competitive, even predatory, self serving, acquisitive and utilitarian, is it any wonder that those very values have led to a "winner take all" syndrome in the marketplace in which the rich get richer while everyone else becomes marginalized, and the well-being of the larger community, including the biosphere, becomes eroded? The US ranks 27th among industrialized countries, in income disparity -- the gap between the very rich and the very poor. Only Mexico, Turkey and Portugal, of the OECD nations, have greater disparity of income. Moreover, the US enjoys the dubious distinction of being one of the two leading contributors to global greenhouse gas emissions in the world. Could it be that the American Dream is becoming the American nightmare?¶ Interestingly, a younger generation of Americans is growing up in a very different world than the one described by the Enlightenment thinkers. Their reality is being lived out on **a digital commons** and in **social spaces on the World**

Wide Web. All across America, our nation's teens are performing hundreds of hours of community service as part of their formal educational requirements. In school, they are learning that every activity they engage in -- the food they eat, the car they drive, the clothes they wear -- comes with a carbon footprint and affects the well-being of every other human being and fellow creature on Earth.¶ Today's youth are **globally connected**. They are Skyping in real time with their cohorts and friends on the far corners of the Earth. They are sharing **information, knowledge, and mutual aid in cyberspace chat rooms**, apparently unaware of the so called "tragedy of the commons." They have little regard for traditional property rights -- especially copyrights, trademarks, and patents -- believing information should run free. They are far more concerned with sharing access than protecting ownership. They think of themselves less as autonomous agents -- an island to oneself -- and more as actors in an ever shifting set of roles and relationships. Personal wealth, while still important, is not considered an endgame, but only a baseline consideration for enjoying **a more immaterial existence**, including more meaningful experiences in diverse communities.¶ Surveys show that the millennial generation in the United States is much more likely than older generations to feel empathy for others. They are far more concerned with the planetary environment and climate change and more likely to favor sustainable economic growth. They are also more likely to believe that government has a responsibility to take care of people who can't care for themselves, and are more supportive of a bigger role of government in providing basic services. They are more supportive of globalization and immigration than older generations. They are also more racially diverse and the most tolerant of any generation in history in support of gender equality and the willingness to champion the rights of the disabled, gays, other minorities, as well as our fellow creatures. In short, they favor a world of inclusivity over exclusivity, and are more comfortable in **distributed networks** than in old fashioned centralized hierarchies that establish boundaries and restrictions separating people from one another.¶ The new sensibilities of the younger generation are beginning to usher in a different idea about human nature and the dream that accompanies it. Today's youth find little value in the Enlightenment caricature of human nature as rational, calculating, detached, and utilitarian. **They prefer to think of human nature as empathic,** mindful, engaged, and driven by the intrinsic value and interconnectedness of life. Homo sapien is being eclipsed by homo empathicus, as they shift their horizon from national markets and nation-state borders to a global economy and a planetary community. Even their preferred indicators of economic progress are shifting, from the crude calculation of gross domestic product and per-capita income to more sensitive social indicators -- like health and longevity, social equality, safe communities, clean environment, etc. -- that measure the well-being of the broader community.

AT State Bad Link

Using the state is the only way to check <u>neoliberal exploitation</u>

Connolly 13 (Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University)
(William, The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism, pg. 40-42)

6) <u>The democratic state</u>, while it certainly cannot alone tame capital or re- constitute the ethos and infrastructure of consumption<u>, must play a significant role in reconstituting our lived relations</u> to climate, weather, re- source use, ocean currents, bee survival, tectonic instability, glacier flows, species diversity, work, local life, consumption, and investment, as it also responds favorably to the public pressures we must generate to forge a new ethos. A new, new left will thus experimentally enact new intersections be- tween role performance and political activity, outgrow its old disgust with the very idea of the state, and remain alert to the dangers states can pose. It will do so because, as already suggested, the fragile ecology of late capital requires state interventions of several sorts. <u>A refusal to participate in the state today cedes too much hegemony to neoliberal markets</u>, either explicitly or by implication. Drives to fascism, remember, rose the last time in capitalist states after a total market meltdown. Most of those movements failed. But a couple became consolidated through a series of resonances (vibrations) back and forth between industrialists, the state, and vigilante groups in neighborhoods, clubs, churches, the police, the media, and pubs. <u>You do not fight the danger of a new kind of neofascism by withdrawing from </u>either micropolitics or <u>state politics</u>. <u>You do so through a multisited politics designed to infuse a new ethos into the fabric of everyday life.</u> Changes in ethos can in turn open doors to new possibilities of state and interstate action, so that an advance in one domain seeds that in the other. And vice versa. A positive dynamic of mutual amplification might be generated here. Could a series of significant shifts in the routines of state and global capital ism even press the fractured system to a point where it hovers on the edge of capitalism itself? We don't know. <u>That is one reason it is important to focus on **interim goals**</u>. Another is that in a world of becoming, replete with periodic and surprising shifts in the course of events, you cannot project far beyond an interim period. Another yet is that <u>activism needs to project concrete, interim possibilities to gain support and propel itself forward</u>. That being said, it does seem unlikely to me, at least, that a positive interim future includes either socialist productivism or the world projected by proponents of deep ecology. 7) To advance such an agenda it is also imperative to negotiate new connec- tions between nontheistic constituencies who care about the future of the Earth and numerous devotees of diverse religious traditions who fold posi- tive spiritualities into their creedal practices. <u>The new, multifaceted move- ment needed today</u>, if it emerges, <u>will take the shape of a vibrant pluralist assemblage acting at multiple sites within and across states</u>, rather than either a centered movement with a series of fellow travelers attached to it or a mere electoral constellation. Electoral victories are important, but they work best when they touch priorities already embedded in churches, uni- versities, film, music, consumption practices, media reporting, investment priorities, and the like. A related thing to keep in mind is that the capitalist modes of acceleration, expansion, and intensification that heighten the fra- gility of things today also generate pressures to *minoritize* the world along multiple dimensions at a more rapid pace than heretofore. A new pluralist constellation will build upon the latter developments as it works to reduce the former effects. I am sure that the forgoing comments will appear to some as "opti- mistic" or "utopian." But optimism and pessimism are both primarily spec- tatorial views. Neither seems sufficient to the contemporary condition. In- deed pessimism, if you dwell on it long, easily slides into cynicism, and cynicism often plays into the hands of a right wing that applies it exclu- sively to any set of state activities not designed to protect or coddle the corporate estate. That is one reason that "dysfunctional politics" redounds so readily to the advantage of cynics on the right who work to promote it. *They want to promote cynicism with respect to the state and innocence with respect to the market.* Pure critique, as already suggested, does not suffice either. Pure critique too readily carries critics and their followers to the edge of cynicism. It is also true that the above critique concentrates on neoliberal capital- ism, not capitalism writ large. That is because it seems to me that we need to specify the terms of critique as closely as possible and think first of all about interim responses. If we lived under, say, Keynesian capitalism, a somewhat different set of issues would be defined and other strategies identified. Capitalism writ large—while it sets a general context that neoliberalism inflects in specific ways—sets too large and generic a target. It can assume multiple forms, as the differences between Swedish and American capitalism suggest; the times demand a set of interim agendas targeting the hegemonic form of today, pursued with heightened militancy at sev- eral sites. The point today is not to wait for a revolution that overthrows the whole system. The "system," as we shall see further, is replete with too many loose ends, uneven edges, dicey intersections with nonhuman forces, and uncertain trajectories to make such a wholesale project plausible. Be- sides, things are too urgent and too many people on the ground are suffer- ing too much now. The need now is to activate the most promising political strategies to the contemporary condition out of a bad set. On top of assessing *probabilities* and predicting them with secret relish or despair—activities I myself pur- sue during the election season—<u>we must define the urgent **needs** of the day in relation to a set of **interim possibilities** worthy of pursuit on several fronts, even if the apparent political odds are stacked against them</u>. We then test ourselves and those possibilities by trying to enact this or that aspect of them at diverse sites, turning back to reconsider their efficacy and side effects as circumstances shift and results accrue. In so doing we may ex- perience more vibrantly how apparently closed and ossified structures are typically punctuated by jagged edges, seams, and fractures best pried open with a mix of public contestation of established interpretations, experimen- tal shifts in multiple role performances, micropolitics in churches, univer- sities, unions, the media, and corporations, state actions, and large-scale, cross-state citizen actions.

Pragmatic use of the law can be successful at fighting back against neoliberalism

Ashar 8 (Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Immigrant and Refugee Rights Clinic, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law)

(Sameer M., LAW CLINICS AND COLLECTIVE MOBILIZATION, 14 Clinical L. Rev. 355, LN)

Public interest lawyers today represent clients in a period of rapid political and economic change. Poor people are besieged by unprecedented market forces with less protection by the state than at any other time in our recent history. Multinational corporate actors and their collaborators in government have advanced an agenda in both developed and developing nations - described by some as "neoliberal globalization"-with three major tenets: (1) weakening and impoverishment of the state so that it is unable to provide basic social protections; (2) privatization of formerly public functions; and (3) free and rapid movement of capital that facilitates lowered labor and environmental standards. n9 In the United States, the advocates of neoliberalism successfully fought to remove the federal social welfare entitlement in 1996 and to condition access to subsistence relief on participation in enforced labor programs, thus expanding the class of [*361] low-wage workers in the economy. n10 The reserve wage has fallen as our clients have become more vulnerable to their employers and other market actors, including banks and landlords. Previously robust civil society organizations, such as unions and identity-based associations, have weakened n13 and increasingly depend upon corporate and governmental patrons. In response to this environment, a growing number of small groups of poor and working-class people have risen to challenge the reordering of our economy and politics. These resistance movements self-consciously act locally and think globally, allying themselves (actually or symbolically) with grassroots movements outside the United States. n14 This resistance simultaneously opposes neoliberalism and constructs a decentralized "radical democratic" program. n15 In the area in which I work, immigrant workers and organizers have banded together along ethnic, geographic, and occupational lines in "worker centers" to improve their conditions of employment through direct action, litigation, and legislation. n16 These worker centers have drawn [*362] extensively in the course of their campaigns on legal resources provided by a small number of law school clinics. n17 Similarly informed and designed law school clinics have also had highly productive collaborations with environmental justice, n18 welfare rights, n19 and community development organizations n20 that are either directly or indirectly related to global social movements.

The neg's description of a global trajectory towards neoliberalism is de-politicizing and epistemologically flawed – they ignore or subsume contrary empirical evidence, and underestimate the power of representative democracy to constrain influence of economic elites – reject their overwrought impact claims and use the permutation to deploy the state against economic inequality
Barnett 10

(Clive Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences @ The Open University, "Publics and Markets: What's wrong with Neoliberalism?", *The Handbook of Social Geography*, edited by Susan Smith, Sallie Marston, Rachel Pain, and John Paul Jones III. London and New York: Sage)

In theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalization, the theoretical preference for very high levels of abstraction is associated with a tendency to make a geographical virtue out of the consistent failure to theorize the state as anything other than a functional attribute of the reproductive requirements of capital. Particular state-formations and patterns of political contention are acknowledged only as local, territorialized, contextual factors that help to explain how the universalizing trajectory of neoliberalism, orchestrated from the centre and organised through global networks, nonetheless always generate 'hybrid' assemblages of neoliberalism.¶ This style of theorizing makes it **almost impossible** to gainsay the highly generalised claims about neoliberalism as an ideology and neoliberalization as a state-led project by referring to empirical evidence that might seem to contradict these grand concepts. For example, it is almost taken-for-granted that the hegemony of neoliberalism is manifest in the reduction of state expenditures on welfare in face of external pressures of neoliberal globalization. **Empirical evidence for welfare**

state decline is, in fact, **far from conclusive**. Welfare regimes have actually proved highly resilient in terms of both funding and provisioning (see Taylor-Gooby 2001). At the same time, the extent to which open market economies foster rather than menace high-levels of national welfare provision is also hotly debated (Taylor-Gooby 2003). In both cases, the idea of any straightforward shift from state to market seems a little simplistic (Clarke 2003). But from the perspective of geography's meta-theories of neoliberalization, all of this is so much grist to the contextualizing mill. Contrary evidence can be easily incorporated into these theories precisely because they layer **levels of conceptual abstraction** onto scales of **contextual articulation**.¶ Presenting differential state-formation as a contextual variable is related to a much broader **displacement of political action** in general to a lower level of conceptual abstraction in theories of neoliberalism. One aspect of this is the persistent treatment of a broad range of social movement activity as primarily a secondary response to processes of neoliberalization. But more fundamentally, Marxist political-economies of neoliberalism pay **almost no attention**, at a conceptual level, **to the causal significance of the institutional and organisational forms that shape political action** (Hay 2004). This is indicative of **a broader failure to think through how distinctive forms of contemporary democratic politics shape pathways of economic development** and capital accumulation. Theories of neoliberalism take for granted the capacity of states to implement particular policies in order to put in place the regulatory conditions for particular accumulation strategies. **This overlooks the degree to which** the time-space constitution of **democratic politics in liberal democracies serve as "substantial impediments to the achievement of neo-liberal goals"** (Johnston and Glasmeier 2007, 15). Given the territorialization of party support and the territorialized organization of electoral politics, liberal democracy generates strong pressures that militate against wholly flexible and open labour markets, sustain subsidies and protectionist measures, and support the promotion of investment in particular locations. In theories of neoliberalism, processes of free market reform in the USA and UK since the 1980s are considered models of more general tendential logics. **But these examples might be quite specific outcomes of the balance of political forces in those polities** when compared to the patterns of welfare reform and tax policy in European countries (Prasad 2005; see also Glyn 2007).¶ Taking into account the ways in which state action is constrained by the time-space constitution of electoral, representative democracy is particularly relevant for understanding why relatively wealthy, advanced industrial economies do not conform to the tendential logic predicted by political-economy theories of neoliberalization. These same constraints might be operative elsewhere too. It is routine to suggest that neoliberalism is 'imposed' on developing economies externally, through the Washington Consensus promulgated by the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. However, Stokes (2002) argues that patterns of neoliberalization in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s can be explained in large part **by analysis of the dynamics between electoral campaigning, party mobilisation, mandate and accountability** as they played themselves out in periods of democratic transition and consolidation. In her account of 'neoliberalism by surprise', democratic governance, party competition, electoral accountability, and responsiveness to constituents' interests all play crucial roles in explaining whether, how, and why neoliberal policies are adopted.¶ Strictly speaking, these sorts of considerations do not need to disturb the secure conceptual vantage-point offered by political-economy theorizations of neoliberalism. This paradigm is, as already suggested, internally attuned to recognize the variety and hybridity of neoliberalisms, and is able to ascribe this to the necessary articulation of generic neoliberal ideology, circulated globally, with territorialized logics operative at 'lower' geographical scales. Whether or not one finds this convincing comes down to a decision between different styles of theory. Political-economy approaches seek after high-level abstractions in order to identify fundamental features of phenomena (the logic of capital accumulation in Harvey, the capitalist state in Jessop, neoliberal ideology in Peck and Tickell). These abstract imperatives are then mapped empirically through a kind of deductive cascade, where they bump into other phenomena, like states, or racial formations, or gender relations. Because of **their distinctive ontological features** (**e.g. their institutional qualities**, their territorial qualities, their discursive qualities, and their identity-based qualities), these phenomena have never been amenable to the same sort of explanatory rationalism that allows the dynamics of capital accumulation to be defined so purely.¶ The effect of these theorizations is to **de-politicize politics**. If the dominant logic of state action can always be discerned

from understanding the logic of capital accumulation and the balance of class forces, then that is really all one ever needs to really know (Clarke 2004a). This de-politicization of politics 'out there' is an effect of **the inflation of the political force ascribed to the academic work of critique**: **analysis of politics is reduced to a matter of understanding how a logic already known in advance is differentially enacted**, so that the critical task of such analysis can be presented as a political act of exposing naturalized forms as social constructs.

Impact D – Structural Violence

UQ

The world is <u>structurally improving</u>—newest and best data

Beauchamp 13 ["5 Reasons Why 2013 Was The Best Year In Human, Zack, Reporter/Blogger for ThinkProgress.org. He previously contributed to Andrew Sullivan's The Dish at Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also written for Foreign Policy and Tablet magazines. Zack holds B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from Brown University and an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of Economics. He grew up in Washington, DC.History",http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/12/11/3036671/2013-certainly-year-human-history/#]

Between the brutal civil war in Syria, the government shutdown and all of the deadly dysfunction it represents, the NSA spying revelations, and massive inequality, it'd be easy to for you to enter 2014 thinking the last year has been an awful one. But you'd be wrong. <u>We have every reason to believe that **2013 was**</u>, in fact, **the best year on the planet** for humankind. Contrary to what you might have heard, <u>virtually all of the most important forces that determine what make people's lives good – the things that determine how long they live, and whether they live happily and freely – are trending in an extremely happy direction. While it's possible that this progress **could be reversed**</u> by something like runaway climate change, <u>the effects will have to be dramatic to overcome the extraordinary and growing progress we've made in making the world a better place.</u> Here's the five big reasons why. 1. Fewer people are dying young, and more are living longer. The greatest story in recent human history is the simplest: we're winning the fight against death. "<u>There is not a single country in the world where infant or child mortality today is not lower than it was in 1950</u>," writes Angus <u>Deaton, a Princeton economist</u> who works on global health issues. <u>The most up-to-date numbers on global health, the 2013</u> World Health Organization (<u>WHO</u>) <u>statistical compendium, confirm Deaton's estimation.</u> Between 1990 and 2010, the percentage of children who died before their fifth birthday dropped by almost half. Measles deaths declined by 71 percent, and both tuberculosis and maternal deaths by half again. HIV, that modern plague, is also being held back, with deaths from AIDS-related illnesses down by 24 percent since 2005. In short, fewer people are dying untimely deaths. <u>And that's **not only**</u> true in rich countries: life expectancy has gone up between 1990 and 2011 in every WHO income bracket. The gains are even more dramatic if you take the long view: global life expectancy was 47 in the early 1950s, but had risen to 70 — a 50 percent jump — by 2011. For even more perspective, the average Briton in 1850 — when the British Empire had reached its apex — was 40. The average person today should expect to live almost twice as long as the average citizen of the world's wealthiest and most powerful country in 1850. In real terms, this means millions of fewer dead adults and children a year, millions fewer people who spend their lives suffering the pains and unfreedoms imposed by illness, and millions more people spending their twilight years with loved ones. And the trends are all positive — "progress has accelerated in recent years in many countries with the highest rates of mortality," as the WHO rather bloodlessly put it. What's going on? Obviously, it's fairly complicated, but the most important drivers have been technological and political innovation. The Enlightenment-era advances in the scientific method got people doing high-quality research, which brought us modern medicine and the information technologies that allow us to spread medical breakthroughs around the world at increasingly faster rates. Scientific discoveries also fueled the Industrial Revolution and the birth of modern capitalism, giving us more resources to devote to large-scale application of live-saving technologies. And the global spread of liberal democracy made governments accountable to citizens, forcing them to attend to their health needs or pay the electoral price. We'll see the enormously beneficial impact of these two forces, technology and democracy, repeatedly throughout this list, which should tell you something about the foundations of human progress. But when talking about improvements in health, we shouldn't neglect foreign aid. Nations donating huge amounts of money out of an altruistic interest in the welfare of foreigners is historically unprecedented, and while not all aid has been helpful, health aid has been a huge boon. Even Deaton, who wrote one of 2013's harshest assessments of foreign aid, believes "the case for assistance to fight disease such as HIV/AIDS or smallpox is strong." That's because these programs have demonstrably saved lives — the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a 2003 program pushed by President Bush, paid for anti-retroviral treatment for over 5.1 million people in the poor countries hardest-hit by the AIDS epidemic. So <u>we're outracing the Four Horseman, extending our lives faster than pestilence, war, famine, and death can take them. That alone should be enough to say the world is getting better.</u> 2. <u>Fewer people suffer from extreme poverty</u>, and the world is getting happier. <u>There are fewer people in abject penury than at any other point in human history, and middle class people enjoy their highest standard of living ever.</u> We haven't come close to solving poverty: a number of African countries in particular have chronic problems generating growth, a nut foreign aid hasn't yet cracked. So this isn't a call for complacency about poverty any more than acknowledging victories over disease is an argument against tackling malaria. But make no mistake<u>: as a whole, the world is much richer in 2013 than it was before. 721 million fewer people lived in extreme poverty</u> ($1.25 a day) <u>in 2010 than in 1981, according to a new World Bank study from October. That's astounding – a decline from 40 to about 14 percent of the world's population suffering from abject want</u>. <u>And **poverty rates are declining in every national income bracket:**</u> even in low income countries, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty ($1.25 a day in 2005 dollars) a day gone down from 63 in 1981 to 44 in 2010. <u>We can be fairly confident that these trends are continuing</u>. For one thing, <u>they survived the Great Recession in 2008.</u> For another, the decline in poverty has been fueled by global economic growth, which looks to be continuing: global GDP grew by 2.3 percent in 2012, a number that'll rise to 2.9 percent in 2013 according to IMF projections. The bulk of the recent decline in poverty comes form India and China — about 80 percent from China *alone*. Chinese economic and social reform, a delayed reaction to the mass slaughter and starvation of Mao's Cultural

Revolution, has been the engine of poverty's global decline. If you subtract China, there are actually more poor people today than there were in 1981 (population growth trumping the percentage declines in poverty). But we shouldn't discount China. If what we care about is fewer people suffering the misery of poverty, then it shouldn't matter what nation the less-poor people call home. Chinese growth should be celebrated, not shunted aside. The poor haven't been the only people benefitting from global growth. Middle class people have access to an ever-greater stock of life-improving goods. Televisions and refrigerators, once luxury goods, are now comparatively cheap and commonplace. That's why large-percentage improvements in a nation's GDP appear to correlate strongly with higher levels of happiness among the nation's citizens; people like having things that make their lives easier and more worry-free. Global economic growth in the past five decades has dramatically reduced poverty and made people around the world happier. Once again, we're better off. 3. War is becoming rarer and less deadly.

APTOPIX Mideast Libya CREDIT: AP Photo/ Manu Brabo Another massive conflict could overturn the global progress against disease and poverty. But it appears war, too, may be losing its fangs. Steven Pinker's 2011 book The Better Angels Of Our Nature is the gold standard in this debate. Pinker brought a treasure trove of data to bear on the question of whether the world has gotten more peaceful, and found that, in the long arc of human history, both war and other forms of violence (the death penalty, for instance) are on a centuries-long downward slope. Pinker summarizes his argument here if you don't own the book. Most eye-popping are the numbers for the past 50 years; Pinker finds that "the worldwide rate of death from interstate and civil war combined has juddered downward...from almost 300 per 100,000 world population during World War II, to almost 30 during the Korean War, to the low teens during the era of the Vietnam War, to single digits in the 1970s and 1980s, to less than 1 in the twenty-first century." Here's what that looks like graphed: Pinker CREDIT: Steven Pinker/The Wall Street Journal So it looks like the smallest percentage of humans alive since World War II, and in all likelihood in human history, are living through the horrors of war. Did 2013 give us any reason to believe that Pinker and the other scholars who agree with him have been proven wrong? Probably not. The academic debate over the decline of war really exploded in 2013, but the "declinist" thesis has fared pretty well. Challenges to Pinker's conclusion that battle deaths have gone down over time have not withstood scrutiny. The most compelling critique, a new paper by Bear F. Braumoeller, argues that if you control for the larger number of countries in the last 50 years, war happens at roughly the same rates as it has historically. There are lots of things you might say about Braumoeller's argument, and I've asked Pinker for his two cents (update: Pinker's response here). But most importantly, if battle deaths per 100,000 people really has declined, then his argument doesn't mean very much. If (percentage-wise) fewer people are dying from war, then what we call "war" now is a lot less deadly than "war" used to be. Braumoeller suggests population growth and improvements in battle medicine explain the decline, but that's not convincing: tell me with a straight face that the only differences in deadliness between World War II, Vietnam, and the wars you see today is that there are more people and better doctors. There's a more rigorous way of putting that: today, we see many more civil wars than we do wars between nations. The former tend to be less deadly than the latter. That's why the other major challenge to Pinker's thesis in 2013, the deepening of the Syrian civil war, isn't likely to upset the overall trend. Syria's war is an unimaginable tragedy, one responsible for the rare, depressing increase in battle deaths from 2011 to 2012. However, the overall 2011-2012 trend "fits well with the observed long-term decline in battle deaths," according to researchers at the authoritative Uppsala Conflict Data Program, because the uptick is not enough to suggest an overall change in trend. We should expect something similar when the 2013 numbers are published. Why are smaller and smaller percentages of people being exposed to the horrors of war? There are lots of reasons one could point to, but two of the biggest ones are the spread of democracy and humans getting, for lack of a better word, better. That democracies never, or almost never, go to war with each other is not seriously in dispute: the statistical evidence is ridiculously strong. While some argue that the "democratic peace," as it's called, is caused by things other than democracy itself, there's good experimental evidence that democratic leaders and citizens just don't want to fight each other. Since 1950, democracy has spread around the world like wildfire. There were only a handful of democracies after World War II, but that grew to roughly 40 percent of all by the end of the Cold War. Today, a comfortable majority — about 60 percent — of all states are democracies. This freer world is also a safer one. Second — and this is Pinker's preferred explanation — people have developed strategies for dealing with war's causes and consequences. "Human ingenuity and experience have gradually been brought to bear," Pinker writes, "just as they have chipped away at hunger and disease." A series of human inventions, things like U.N. peacekeeping operations, which nowadays are very successful at reducing violence, have given us a set of social tools increasingly well suited to reducing the harm caused by armed conflict. War's decline isn't accidental, in other words. It's by design. 4. Rates of murder and other violent crimes are in free-fall. Britain Unrest CREDIT: Akira Suemori/AP Photos Pinker's trend against violence isn't limited just to war. It seems likes crimes, both of the sort states commit against their citizens and citizens commit against each other, are also on the decline. Take a few examples. Slavery, once commonly sanctioned by governments, is illegal everywhere on earth. The use of torture as legal punishment has gone down dramatically. The European murder rate fell 35-fold from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the 20th century (check out this amazing 2003 paper from Michael Eisner, who dredged up medieval records to estimate European homicide rates in the swords-and-chivalry era, if you don't believe me). The decline has been especially marked in recent years. Though homicide crime rates climbed back up from their historic lows between the 1970s and 1990s, reversing progress made since the late 19th century, they have collapsed worldwide in the 21st century. 557,000 people were murdered in 2001 — almost three times as many as were killed in war that year. In 2008, that number was 289,000, and the homicide rate has been declining in 75 percent of nations since then. Statistics from around the developed world, where numbers are particularly reliable, show that it's not just homicide that's on the wane: it's almost all violent crime. US government numbers show that violent crime in the United States declined from a peak of about 750 crimes per 100,000 Americans to under 450 by 2009. G7 as a whole countries show huge declines in homicide, robbery, and vehicle theft. So even in countries that aren't at poor or at war, most people's lives are getting safer and more secure. Why? We know it's not incarceration. While the United States and Britain have dramatically increased their prison populations, others, like Canada, the Netherlands, and Estonia, reduced their incarceration rates and saw similar declines in violent crime. Same thing state-to-state in the United States; New York imprisoned fewer people and saw the fastest crime decline in the country. The Economist's deep dive into the explanations for crime's collapse provides a few answers. Globally, police have gotten better at working with communities and targeting areas with the most crime. They've also gotten new toys, like DNA testing, that make it easier to catch criminals. The crack epidemic in the United States and its heroin twin in Europe have both slowed down dramatically. Rapid gentrification has made inner-city crime harder. And the increasing cheapness of "luxury" goods like iPods and DVD players has reduced incentives for crime on both the supply and demand sides: stealing a DVD player isn't as profitable, and it's easier for a would-be thief to buy one in the first place. But there's one explanation The Economist dismissed that strikes me as hugely important: the abolition of lead gasoline. Kevin Drum at Mother Jones wrote what's universally acknowledged to be the definitive argument for the lead/crime link, and it's incredibly compelling. We know for a fact that lead exposure damages people's brains and can potentially be fatal; that's why an international campaign to ban leaded gasoline started around 1970. Today, leaded gasoline is almost unheard of — it's banned in 175 countries, and there's been a decline in lead blood levels by about 90 percent. Drum marshals a wealth of evidence that the parts of the brain damaged by lead are the same ones that check people's aggressive impulses. Moreover, the timing matches up: crime shot up in the mid-to-late-20th century as cars spread around the world, and started to decline in the 70s as the anti-lead campaign was succeeding. Here's close the relationship is, using data from the United States: Lead_Crime_325 Now, non-homicide violent crime appears to have ticked up in 2012, based on U.S. government surveys of victims of crime, but it's very possible that's just a blip: the official Department of Justice report says up-front that "the apparent increase in the rate of violent crimes reported to police from 2011 to 2012 was not statistically significant." So we have no reason to believe crime is making a come back, and every reason to believe the historical decline in criminal violence is here to stay. 5. There's less racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination in the world. Nelson Mandela CREDIT: Theana Calitz/AP Images Racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination remain, without a doubt, extraordinarily powerful forces. The statistical and experimental evidence is overwhelming — this irrefutable proof of widespread discrimination against African-Americans, for instance, should put the "racism is dead" fantasy to bed. Yet the need to combat discrimination denial shouldn't blind us to the good news. Over the centuries, humanity has made extraordinary progress in taming its hate for and ill-treatment of other humans on the basis of difference alone. Indeed, it is very likely that we live in the least discriminatory era in the history of modern civilization. It's not a huge prize given how bad the past had been, but there are still gains worth celebrating. Go back 150 years in time and the point should be obvious. Take four prominent groups in 1860: African-Americans were in

chains, European Jews were routinely massacred in the ghettos and shtetls they were confined to, women around the world were denied the opportunity to work outside the home and made almost entirely subordinate to their husbands, and LGBT people were invisible. The improvements in each of these group's statuses today, both in the United States and internationally, are incontestable. On closer look, we have reason to believe the happy trends are likely to continue. Take racial discrimination. In 2000, Harvard sociologist Lawrence Bobo penned a comprehensive assessment of the data on racial attitudes in the United States. He found a "national consensus" on the ideals of racial equality and integration. "A nation once comfortable as a deliberately segregationist and racially discriminatory society has not only abandoned that view," Bobo writes, "but now overtly positively endorses the goals of racial integration and equal treatment. There is no sign whatsoever of retreat from this ideal, despite events that many thought would call it into question. The magnitude, steadiness, and breadth of this change should be lost on no one." The norm against overt racism has **gone global.** In her book on the international anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s, Syracuse's Audie Klotz says flatly that "the illegitimacy of white minority rule led to South Africa's persistent diplomatic, cultural, and economic isolation." The belief that racial discrimination could not be tolerated had become so widespread, Klotz argues, that it united the globe — including governments that had strategic interests in supporting South Africa's whites — in opposition to apartheid. In 2011, 91 percent of respondents in a sample of 21 diverse countries said that equal treatment of people of different races or ethnicities was important to them. Racism obviously survived both American and South African apartheid, albeit in more subtle, insidious forms. "The death of Jim Crow racism has left us in an uncomfortable place," Bobo writes, "a state of laissez-faire racism" where racial discrimination and disparities still exist, but support for the kind of aggressive government policies needed to address them is racially polarized. But there's reason to hope that'll change as well: two massive studies of the political views of younger Americans by my TP Ideas colleagues, John Halpin and Ruy Teixeira, found that millenials were significantly more racially tolerant and supportive of government action to address racial disparities than the generations that preceded them. Though I'm not aware of any similar research of on a global scale, it's hard not to imagine they'd find similar results, suggesting that we should have hope that the power of racial prejudice may be waning. The story about gender discrimination is very similar: after the feminist movement's enormous victories in the 20th century, structural sexism still shapes the world in profound ways, but the cause of gender equality is making progress. In 2011, 86 percent of people in a diverse 21 country sample said that equal treatment on the basis of gender was an important value. The U.N.'s Human Development Report's Gender Inequality Index — a comprehensive study of reproductive health, social empowerment, and labor market equity — saw a 20 percent decline in observable gender inequalities from 1995 to 2011. IMF data show consistent global declines in wage disparities between genders, labor force participation, and educational attainment around the world. While enormous inequality remains, 2013 is looking to be the worst year for sexism in history. Finally, we've made astonishing progress on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination — largely in the past 15 years. At the beginning of 2003, zero Americans lived in marriage equality states; by the end of 2013, 38 percent of Americans will. Article 13 of the European Community Treaty bans discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, and, in 2011, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution committing the council to documenting and exposing discrimination on orientation or identity grounds around the world. The public opinion trends are positive worldwide: all of the major shifts from 2007 to 2013 in Pew's "acceptance of homosexuality" poll were towards greater tolerance, and young people everywhere are more open to equality for LGBT individuals than their older peers. best_year_graphics-04 Once again, **these victories are** partial and **by no means inevitable**. Racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination aren't just "going away" on their own. They're losing their hold on us because people are working to change other people's minds and because governments are passing laws aimed at promoting equality. Positive trends don't mean the problems are close to solved, and certainly aren't excuses for sitting on our hands. That's true of everything on this list. The fact that fewer people are dying from war and disease doesn't lessen the moral imperative to do something about those that are; the fact that people are getting richer and safer in their homes isn't an excuse for doing more to address poverty and crime. But too often, the worst parts about the world are treated as **inevitable**, the prospect of radical victory over pain and suffering dismissed as utopian fantasy. The overwhelming force of the evidence shows that to be false. As best we can tell, the reason humanity is getting better is because humans have decided to make the world a better place. We consciously chose to develop lifesaving medicine and build freer political systems; we've passed laws against workplace discrimination and poisoning children's minds with lead. So far, these choices have more than paid off. It's up to us to make sure they continue to.

Prefer our evidence—their evidence is cognitively biased and ignores long term trends Harvey 13

Philip D., "How the World Is Getting Better" [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-d-harvey/how-the-world-is-getting-_b_2680402.html] February 20 //mtc

We humans thrive on bad news; we're pre-programmed to respond to threats, and predictions of apocalypse. Good news bores us, so we don't hear much about the remarkable improvements in the human condition in recent years. Here's a quick review of significant developments.¶ * **Life expectancy**, perhaps the most objective indicator of human wellbeing, has been rising dramatically. When people live longer it means they have more of life's necessities, and are freer from disease and fatal violence. A few hundred years ago, the average human lived less than 30 years. When I was born, my life expectancy, right here in the U.S., was 63. Babies born today can expect to reach the age of 79, a 25 percent improvement, and more than three times the average life-span in Julius Caesar's time. Worldwide, including all the poorest countries, life expectancy at birth has gone from 46 years in the 1950s to 70 years today. Adding 24 years to the longevity of our species in a mere 60 years is remarkably good news.¶ *Despite food shortages in some places, there's **more food** for everyone today than ever before. For most of human history the daily struggle for food dominated life. People rarely had enough to eat. But even as the world population climbed to 7 billion, daily food supplies per person have gone from 2,250 calories a day in 1960 to 2,800 in 2002. The English, who survived on 2068 calories a day in the late 19th century, consume 3412 today. In India, calories per capita were below 1700 as recently as 1950. Today, the figure is 2459. For comparison, consider the U.S. Department of Agriculture recommendations: 2000-3000 calories per day for adult men; 1600-2400 for adult women. In many countries, including the U.S., poverty is now characterized by too much food rather than too little.¶ * The world's wealth has increased enormously. For tens of thousands of years humans existed at bare subsistence, on the equivalent of $400 or $500 per person per year (in 1990 dollars). But wealth skyrocketed worldwide, starting around 1800 with the Industrial Revolution, and growing with the widespread use of electricity; it was $1500 per capita in 1913 and $10,700 in 2010. Deprivation has not been eradicated, of course, but this kind of economic growth is new to human history.¶ In the U.S., where income per capita zoomed from $5300 in 1913 to $48,112 today, large numbers of Americans are still classified as poor, but

everyone's living standards have improved markedly. Surveys show that 83 percent of the poor say that they have enough to eat; 63 percent have cable or satellite TV; 80 percent have air conditioning; 43 percent have Internet access. But instead of celebrating this progress, we're inclined to find things wrong with it.¶ * There is much **less violence** than there used to be. Harvard's Steven Pinker, who has researched this subject exhaustively, recently concluded that "today we are probably living in the most peaceful moment of our species' time on earth." Wars used to kill millions; now the numbers are way down. In World War II, U.S. forces wiped out hundreds of thousands of civilians as part of our military strategy. Now we pay reparations for accidentally killing civilians. Not long ago witches were burned at the stake, slavery and public hangings were commonplace. Cats were burned alive for entertainment. Those practices are gone for good.¶ What are we to make of the fact that good news is all around us, but we determinedly dwell on the not-so-cheerful? Some blame attaches to politicians, who want us to be afraid of unseen dangers so they can protect us, and some attaches to the media, which revel in violence because it draws eyeballs.¶ But we seem eager to embrace the dark side. Rather than being glad we lead more comfortable lives than our parents or our grandparents did, we tend to grouse that things are worse than they were last year, or last week.¶ It turns out that there's a built-in reason for that. Attention to trouble has been vital to our survival. In a recent essay Marian Tupy of the Cato Institute points out that the information entering the amygdala, the part of our brain responsible for emotions like rage, hate and fear, "gets our first attention because the amygdala 'is always looking for something to fear.' Our species has evolved to prioritize bad news." In the struggle for survival, those who constantly feared danger survived; optimists did not.¶ So the evening news will always lead with violence. There will always be enough bad news to go around. We even create our own bad news with deaths and injuries in many sports and other entertainment.¶ But have a look at the good news once in a while. I know it's boring, but even as we resist, things are likely to keep right on **getting better and better**.

AT Structural Violence

Their description of "structural violence" is flawed – it overdetermines a single line of causality, but lacks the specificity to describe likely scenarios – prefer our empirical impact claims
Thompson 3

William, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of International Relations at Indiana University, "A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures," International Studies Quarterly, 47(3), AD: 7-10-9

Richard Ned Lebow (2000–2001) has recently invoked what might be called a streetcar interpretation of systemic war and change. According to him, all our structural theories in world politics both overdetermine and underdetermine the explanation of the most important events such as World War I, World War II, or the end of the Cold War. Not only do structural theories tend to fixate on one cause or stream of causation, they are inherently incomplete because the influence of structural causes cannot be known without also identifying the necessary role of catalysts. As long as we ignore the precipitants that actually encourage actors to act, we cannot make accurate generalizations about the relationships between more remote causation and the outcomes that we are trying to explain. Nor can we test the accuracy of such generalizations without accompanying data on the presence or absence of catalysts. In the absence of an appropriate catalyst (or a ''streetcar'' that failed to arrive), wars might never have happened. Concrete information on their presence (''streetcars'' that did arrive) might alter our understanding of the explanatory significance of other variables. But since catalysts and contingencies are so difficult to handle theoretically and empirically, perhaps we should focus instead on probing the theoretical role of contingencies via the development of ''what if '' scenarios

Impact Turn

Impact Framing/ Ethics

Our aff is the perfect middle ground – we use public institutions to remove collective threats to individual human well-being and flourishing – that balances individual and collective concerns, and avoids both uncritical individualism and technocratic rational planning
Bird 99

(Colin Bird, Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, *The Myth of Liberal Individualism*, pgs. 209-211)

There are signs that the kind of expressivist theory I have been sketching is once again taking root. Joseph Raz's perfectionism is a case in point. Although he still describes himself as a liberal, Raz's recent writings present a view containing many of the essential features of the expressivist conception. For example, he shows little interest in any form of utilitarianism. He treats individual well-being as instantiated in the process of human activity: 'the core idea,' he says, 'is controlling one's conduct, being in charge'. For Raz, human beings have the capacity to engage 'wholeheartedly' in the 'successful pursuit' of 'valuable activities'. I take him to be claiming that public agency consists in ensuring that the institutions and practices of society which the public agent oversees and participates in are only justifiable to the extent that they allow or enable individuals to exercise that capacity. Moreover, Raz explicitly connects this claim about well-being with claims about duties to ourselves, duties which he says arise independently of our will. Raz writes, "all who can should meet the conditions which entitle them to self-respect. They should respect their own capacity for rational agency, and should endeavour to exercise it responsibly … those who are responsible agents and are therefore entitled to respect themselves should do so … A person's well-being is the successful pursuit of worthwhile goals. Self-respect is earned by the endeavour to live a life of such pursuits. Self-respect, therefore, is a condition of individual well-being. Only those who deservedly respect themselves can have a successful life. Failing to respect oneself, or to be entitled to such respect, is perhaps the most fundamental way of failing in one's life." Finally, although Raz has been called a 'communitarian liberal', it is clear that he sees principles of the kind mentioned in the above passage as valuable independently of their contribution to the preservation of particular communities or culturally valued practices: 'No one should be denied access to valuable options on the ground that to allow access would lead to the transformation or the disappearance of a much-cherished existing form of a valuable activity or relationship.' Here Raz implies that his view suggests a strong, agent-relative side-constraint against any form of activity which deprives an individual of the opportunities he needs for the successful exercise of the capacities necessary for his well-being. This is a restriction which would presumably trump claims of utility, efficiency *and* community. It is not my intention to signal agreement with Raz's views about specific political issues, nor with his account of what well-being consists in; there is, happily, plenty to dispute in the details of his argument, and a detailed (sympathetic) critique of his proposals seems to me to be already overdue. Rather, the main point is that Raz's recent work seems to me to suggest rather eloquently how the expressivist view might be brought out from under the long shadow that 'liberal individualism' has cast over recent debates in political theory. For Raz, the point of politics is not just to service individuals' values, nor indeed to uphold the values of a community or social identity blindly, but to fight for

individuals' capacity for well-being against the many threats – social, economic, ideological and political – which it faces. We may well disagree with his account of well-being, and of the human capacities that are central to it. But we can do so while agreeing that the main aim of public agency should be to identify and remedy major social threats to the legitimate and proper exercise of individuals' own capacities. And we can at the same time consider the possibility that the ideology of service liberalism, and the technocratic conception of public agency it has sponsored, might be just such a threat. If that expressivist project were to be taken seriously, some leading elements of contemporary philosophical 'liberalism' might eventually evolve into the kind of critical social theory of which liberals have sometimes been deeply suspicious. Such a theory would be free of the scruples about the public evaluation and correction of self-regarding faults; it would be a theory that dropped the idea of neutrality and abjured a static, technocratic consequentialism; it would be a theory that brought the dynamic *processes* of human development and interaction into the foreground as matters of common, public attention; it would be prepared to consider the possibility that an exclusive focus on non-interference could be inimical to, not supportive of, self-development; and it could do all of these things without any point having to invoke problematic claims about the social construction of one's moral identity. Such a theory would certainly contain many elements to which one might apply the label 'liberal'. But because it would provide a vantage-point from which we could both celebrate the undeniable achievements of liberal civilization and identify some of its most serious shortcomings, such a theory would merely tend to confirm the obsolescence of that label and of the ideal towards which it gestures. For ideals and their labels become obsolete, not merely when they fall out of fashion or are deemed *passé*, but because they no longer discriminate between success and failure, or between fulfillment and betrayal.

Neolib Solves War

Every relevant example in the last thirty years suggests that neoliberal market policies dramatically decrease violence

Tures '3

John A. Tures, Associate Professor of Political Science at LaGrange College, 2003, "ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND CONFLICT REDUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1970S, 1980S, AND 1990S", Cato Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3. http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22n3/cj22n3-9.pdf

The last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of market-based reforms and the profusion of economic freedom in the international system. This shift in economic policy has sparked a debate about whether free markets are superior to state controls. Numerous studies have compared the neoliberal and statist policies on issues of production capacity, economic growth, commercial volumes, and egalitarianism. An overlooked research agenda, however, is the relationship between levels of economic freedom and violence within countries. Proponents of the statist approach might note that a strong government can bend the market to its will, directing activity toward policies necessary to achieve greater levels of gross domestic product and growth. By extracting more resources for the economy, a powerful state can redistribute benefits to keep the populace happy. Higher taxes can also pay for an army and police force that intimidate people. Such governments range from command economies of totalitarian systems to autocratic dictators and military juntas. Other economically unfree systems include some of the authoritarian "Asian tigers." A combination of historical evidence, modern theorists, and statistical findings, however, has indicated that a reduced role for the state in regulating economic transactions is associated with a decrease in internal conflicts. Countries where the government dominates the commercial realm experience an increase in the level of domestic violence. Scholars have traced the history of revolutions to explain the relationship between statism and internal upheavals. Contemporary authors also posit a relationship between economic liberty and peace. Statistical tests show a strong connection between economic freedom and conflict reduction during the past three decades.

Neoliberalism makes war and conflict less likely.

Obhof '3

Larry J. Obhof, J.D., Yale Law School, 2003; B.A., Ohio University, 2000. "WHY GLOBALIZATION? A LOOK AT GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND ITS EFFECTS". University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy. Fall 2003. Lexis.

Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of global capitalism is based on another "externality": conflict prevention. Many have speculated that international investment may inhibit conflict by promoting economic growth and interdependence. n145 Conflict becomes relatively less attractive as a country reaches higher levels of economic development. As one [*117] scholar put it, "[F]ree trade makes nations too busy and too rich to fight." n146 Increasing economic interdependence compounds this effect. Indeed, the more a country's economy depends on foreign trade or investment, the more self-damaging it is to engage in aggression. n147 This idea is certainly not new. As Montesquieu penned in 1752: "Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent . . . and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities." n148 The wisdom of Montesquieu's statement has become even more apparent in recent years. As the now-famous "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention" by Thomas Friedman makes clear, there is a point at which the desire of a country for trade and investment restricts the capacity for war-making by its leadership. n149 Economic integration places strong constraints on countries "plugged into the system": investors may withdraw billions of dollars, not merely retarding economic growth, but in some cases dispatching it altogether. Any chance of a conflict is inhibited by the direct investments that natives have in foreign countries, and the investments that foreigners have in the home country. n150 Perhaps the simplicity of this argument makes it easy to dismiss. Its importance is not lost, however, on world leaders. In 1996, as the first fully democratic elections of Taiwan were approaching, columnist Thomas Friedman travelled Beijing to observe the growing tensions between China and Taiwan. China was threatening to invade if

Taiwan sought total independence from the mainland. When Friedman interviewed a senior economist from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, he asked if China could in fact afford to attack Taiwan. The economist answered, "No - it would stop investment in China, stop growth, stop our last chance to catch up with the rest of the world." n151 With 20% of its total annual investment [*118] coming from foreign sources, and exports to America making up 40% of the total exports of China, the Chinese economy simply could not withstand the shock that a war would cause. The economist was admitting "that China could not attack Taiwan without devastating its own economy." n152 The rest, as they say, is history. Tensions continue, but the Chinese government, eager for growth and aware of the consequences of its actions, remains in check.

Neolib Solves War/Structural Violence

Neoliberalism is key to growth and poverty reduction.

Gresser '7

Edward Gresser, Director of the Project on Trade and Global Markets @ Progressive Policy Institute. "Is 'Free Trade' Working?". Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Interstate Commerce, Trade and Tourism. April 18, 2007.
http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=108&subid=206&contentid=254256

Since then the world has opened. Policy is part of it: twelve major multilateral agreements and more recent bilateral agreements and preferences. So are powerful structural changes outside policy: geopolitical change returned Germany and Japan, then our old Cold War adversaries to the global economy; container shipping and air cargo cut the costs of goods trade; fiber-optics, satellite beams and the Internet are doing the same in services. Trade has accordingly grown five-fold relative to the US and world economies since the end of the war. Is it working? Taking Roosevelt's hopes as a guide, on the whole the answer is 'yes.' Open markets abroad let us sell $1.4 trillion in airplanes, wine, high-value commercial services and more to the world last year. Our openness to imports, often cause for anxiety and stress, also raises living standards through wider choice and better prices; and by keeping inflation low, gives us lower unemployment with higher growth. For example, since the trade agreements and the World-Wide Web launch in the early 1990s, unemployment has fallen from an average of 7.1 percent to an average of 5.2 percent. Abroad, an opening world economy helps foster development and reduce poverty. Two recent cases: the African Growth and Opportunity Act has helped create nearly 200,000 jobs in low-income African states; trade normalization with Cambodia in 1996 has helped a war-torn, almost destitute country create an urban manufacturing industry, ease the threat of rural hunger, and find jobs for 300,000 young women.

Neoliberalism leads to economic growth - especially for developing countries.

Obhof '3

Larry J. Obhof, J.D., Yale Law School, 2003; B.A., Ohio University, 2000. "WHY GLOBALIZATION? A LOOK AT GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND ITS EFFECTS". University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy. Fall 2003. Lexis.

The effects of globalization have largely been positive for both developed and developing countries. Consider, for example, the effects of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and resulted in agreements to reduce tariffs and other non-tariff barriers. Advanced countries agreed to lower their tariffs by an average of 40%, and [*99] the signatories agreed to liberalize trade in the important areas of agriculture and clothing. n32 The effects of the Uruguay Round have been both positive and large. Reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers has produced annual increases in global GDP of $ 100-300 billion. n33 This figure is five times larger than the total worldwide aid to developing countries. n34 More importantly, a significant share of this increase has gone to the poorest people. The percentage of the population in developing countries living under $ 1 per day has fallen from 30% to 24% in the past decade. n35 The recent experience of Mexico offers an excellent example of global capitalism in action. The extent of poverty in Mexico is shocking; 20 million people live on less than $ 2

per day. n36 This is so for a number of reasons, including government intervention in the market in the form of protectionist measures intended to help ailing or failing industries. Using government interventions to shape the allocation of resources traditionally led to gross inefficiencies and a low pace of innovation and adoption of new technologies. n37 Trade liberalization has helped curb such interventions - indeed, the opening of its markets has become one of the most important and far-reaching reforms in Mexico. The effects of trade liberalization on the Mexican economy have been significant. Exports in Mexico have increased sixfold since 1985, and the GDP of the country has grown at an average rate of 5.4% per year since 1996. n38 Since NAFTA created a "free trade area" among the United States, Canada, and Mexico in 1994, Mexican labor productivity has grown fast in its tradable sectors. n39 Not surprisingly, however, productivity has remained stagnant in nontradable sectors. n40 NAFTA has also improved Mexico's aggregate trade balance and helped to ameliorate the effect of the [*100] peso crisis on capital flows. n41 As most economists predicted during the NAFTA debate, the effects of the agreement have been positive and large for Mexico. n42 The effects have also been positive, although smaller, for the United States. This is also consistent with the pre-NAFTA analyses of most economists. n43 The positive effects of globalization have been consistent throughout the developing world. Dramatic increases in per capita income have accompanied the expansion of trade in countries that have become more globalized. Korea, for example, has seen average incomes increase eightfold since 1960. n44 China has experienced an average growth of 5.1% during the same period, and other countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have experienced faster growth than that in advanced countries. n45 The evidence is incredibly one-sided. "[P]romoting openness, and supporting it with sound domestic policies, leads to faster growth." n46 The most successful third of developing countries have lowered average import tariffs by 34% and increased trade relative to income by 104% since 1980. n47 Per capita income in these countries rose by a yearly average of [*101] 3.5% in the 1980s, and a yearly average of 5% in the 1990s. n48 The remaining developing countries, which have lowered tariffs by an average of only 11%, experienced "little or no growth in GDP per capita in the post-1980 period." n49 In countries that have become more open, increased growth has undoubtedly been good for the poor. "Cross-country evidence suggests that the incomes of the poorest 20 percent of the population increase roughly one-for-one with the average per capita income." n50 Some studies have found an even stronger effect: a 1% increase in the average per capita income is associated with a reduction in poverty rates by up to 3.5%. n51 Poverty rates fall, almost always, simultaneously with growth in average living standards. The evidence is clear: increasing integration leads to greater growth, and with it, greater income levels, particularly for the poorest. n52

Neolib Solves Environment

Neolib is key to solve environmental crisis – international coop and economic develop is critical.
Chen '00

Jim Chen, Professor of Law and Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, 2000-2001, University of Minnesota Law School.

"PAX MERCATORIA: GLOBALIZATION AS A SECOND CHANCE AT "PEACE FOR OUR TIME"". November/December 2000. 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 217. Lexis.

The true nature of the environmental crisis. The most serious environmental problems involve "the depletion and destruction of the global commons." n188 Climate change, ozone depletion, [*247] and the loss of species, habitats, and biodiversity are today's top environmental priorities. n189 None can be solved without substantial economic development and intense international cooperation. The systematic degradation of the biosphere respects no political boundaries. Worse, it is exacerbated by poverty. Of the myriad environmental problems in this mutually dependent world, "persistent poverty may turn out to be the most aggravating and destructive." n190 We must remember "above all else" that "human degradation and deprivation ... constitute the greatest threat not only to national, regional, and world security, but to essential life-supporting ecological systems." n191

Neolib creates conditions that allows for environmental sustainability.
Griswold '1

Daniel. Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, Masters in economics from London School of Economics. 8/2/1. http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-015b.pdf

Expanding trade is not merely compatible with high standards of environmental quality but can lead directly to their improvement. As a country sees its standard of living rise through economic liberalization and trade expansion, its industry can more readily afford to control emissions. Its citizens have more to spend, above what they need for subsistence, on the "luxury good" of improved environmental quality. And as economic growth creates an expanding, better- educated middle class, the political demand rises for pollution abatement. That explains why the most stringent environmental laws in the world today are found in developed countries that are relatively open to trade. Development by itself can have a mixed impact on the environment. All else being equal, an economy that produces more of exactly the same goods and services in exactly the same way will produce more pollution. But development changes not only the size of an economy but also its composition and its level of technology. More sophisticated technology can mean cleaner production processes and more affordable and effective pollution abatement. And as nations progress to higher stages of development, they tend to move away from more resource-intensive activities such as mining, agriculture, and heavy industry and into light manufacturing, information technology, and services. A study by the OECD on globalization and the environment found: "There is some evidence that, once a country begins to industrialize, trade liberalization helps to make the structure of its economy less pollution-intensive than in those countries whose economies remain relatively closed. In particular, freer trade seems to

promote the transition from heavy resource-processing sectors to light manufacturing ones (at least at middle income levels)."

Internals

Cap Self Correcting

Capitalism is self-correcting and sustainable

Matthews 11

(Richard Matthews, eco-entrepreneur, eco-investor, sustainable writer, "Is Capitalism Sustainable?", The Green Market, 5-12-2011, http://thegreenmarket.blogspot.com/2011/05/is-capitalism-sustainable.html)

Business has created the environmental crisis and now the same capitalist system that was behind the industrial revolution, is beginning to play a vital role in solving the problems it created. Despite the link between environmental practices and profitable, long-term business sustainability, many believe that capitalism itself is unsustainable. The Earth has finite resources, so their argument goes, but capitalism depends on ever expanding consumption. The truth is that dating back to the origins of our species, we have seen our use of resources evolve, from stone, to bronze and then iron. More recently we entered the information age which may prove to be the gateway to a more sustainable use of resources. Although we should do everything we can to preserve finite resources, human ingenuity is infinite. In this way we are slowly moving away from finite fossil fuels to infinitely renewable fuels such as wind, wave and solar. Market driven solutions can be incredibly powerful as they have the power to extend, promote and invest in sustainable innovation. Although new market based mechanisms like regulation, incentives and tradable permits are still a few years off, it is inevitable that the true cost of carbon will be made absolutely clear. As a tenant of the free market business should pay for the costs they incur. Sustainability will continue because it is an unstoppable mega-trend that is destined to keep growing at even faster rates. With the rise of the green consumer, businesses want to cash-in on the steady and growing demand for green goods and services. Various partnerships are emerging to help in the development of sustainable best practices. One such arrangement involves the new partnerships between corporations and environmental organizations.

AT Cap Collapsing Now

Cap isn't collapsing now – the economic and environmental crisis are not sufficient to dislodge the system

Castree (School of Environment and Development, Manchester University) **10**

(N., Crisis, Continuity and Change: Neoliberalism, the Left and the Future of Capitalism. Antipode, 41: 185–213)

To my mind, <u>the Left should not get its hopes up</u>—at least not yet. It's sad to say, but <u>only the most wild-eyed optimist could believe that the two perceived crises of our time are harbingers of a better future</u>. Taking two cases—one national scale, one international—I want to argue that Gramsci was right. <u>The "old" may be dying, but it's far from dead</u>. The essay comprises four parts. I begin in the heat of the moment, by describing how and why the idea of two concurrent worldwide "crises" became commonplace in a surprisingly short space of time (2007–2009). Following this, I take a theoretical detour intended to explain why these crises have arisen, and how they might play out. Marx, Karl Polanyi and James O'Connor are my guides. Focusing on Britain as an illustrative case, I then explain why <u>the present moment is not, regrettably, a propitious one for left-wing change-makers</u>. My point is to show that <u>even in neoliberalism's heartlands, in the thick of a financial crisis, there is only weak impetus for change</u>. After this examination of how crisis is playing-out at the scale of one notable nation state, I delve into the world of international emissions trading philosophy and practice—with a particular focus on the European Union's still young scheme. I suggest that the myriad practical failures of this and other market approaches to greenhouse gas mitigation belie the abstract logic of "free market environmentalism". Even so, these approaches will be with us for many years to come in all probability. A short conclusion looks to a future hopefully free of those "morbid symptoms" that Gramsci described just after the Great Crash of 1929. It's a future that will, I fear, be very hard to make. If William James were writing today, he probably would not bet on the Left making its ideals flesh any time soon. Not for the first time, some optimism of the will is required—quite a lot, in fact.

AT Monolith DA

Multiple aspects of the current economic system disprove their monolithic thesis
White and Williams (senior lecturer of economic geography at Sheffield Hallam University; professor of public policy in the Management School at the University of Sheffield) **12**
(Richard J. and Cohn C., Escaping Capitalist Hegemony: Rereading Western Economies in The Accumulation of Freedom, pg. 129-31)

Further suspicion about the legitimacy of the capitalist hegemony thesis can be found in the problematic fact that non-exchanged work is extremely prevalent in the Western world. The belief that non-monetized exchange is being systematically overcome by market-based transactions embodied in Harvey's statement that "Monetary relations have penetrated into every nook and cranny of the world and into almost every aspect of social, even private life"28 again begs the obvious question: where is the evidence?

When a concerted attempt is made to gather robust empirical data to support such a central tenet this proves extremely difficult. In many Western countries there is a significant amount of work that takes place on an unpaid basis, whether through more formal, voluntary-based groups or organizations, or through informal networks of reciprocal support, such as mutual aid or unpaid community exchange. In 2001, for example, the Home Office Active Citizenship Survey identified that within the previous twelve months around 3.7 billion hours of volunteering had taken place. Given that twentyseven million people work full-time for an average of thirty-five hours per week, this 3.7 billion hours of volunteering equates to just over two million people being in work on a full-time basis. Alternatively, it indicates that in the UK up to one hour is spent working on a non-monetized basis for every fourteen hours spent working in formal employment.

These statistics quite clearly indicate that the capitalist hegemonic belief that argues that these economic spaces are marginal, residual, and disappearing is at best grossly exaggerated. The reality is that nonmonetized exchange (that is to say unpaid community work, mutual aid, or more formal voluntary work) continues to occupy prevalent and important spaces within the contemporary economic landscapes in Western society.

Not-For-Profit Monetary Transactions

Zelizer observed that Ca power54ideology of our time Us] that money is a single, interchangeable, absolutely impersonal instrument-the very essence of our rationalizing modern civilization."29 Certainly, the assumption that monetas' exchange is principally profit-motivated cuts deep across economic discourses ranging from anarchism to neo-classicaiism.

This crude view of monetized exchange is often promoted across this range too, and is common to those who welcome such a (natural) development, and those who cite this as another reason to resist and push against any farther capitalist advances being made in society. Yet there are many "alternative economic spaces" that exist as sites where not-for-profit monetary transactions are commonplace including, but not limited to, garage sales, car boot sales, charity shops, and local currency experiments such as Local Exchange and Trading Scheme. 33 What quickly becomes apparent when looking at the complexity of monetized exchange in contemporary society is that "money is neither culturally neutral nor socially anonymous"34 and thus as Zeizer writes,

The classical economic inventory of money's functions' and attributes, based on the assumption of a single general-purpose type of money, is unsuitably narrow. By focusing exclusively on money as a market phenomenon, it fails to capture the very complex range of characteristics of money as a social medium.. certain monies can be indivisible (or divisible but not in mathematically predictab1e proportions), nonfungible, nonportable, deeply subjective and qualitatively heterogeneous."

Ft is also worthwhile reflecting on the public sector, a sector which is not oriented towards profit and still accounts for about 30-50 percent of GDP in Western economics. 36 Even if the public sector is no longer as significant as it has been in terms of being a provider of goods and services, it is important not to make the mistake of assuming that the provisions for these goods and services have been taken up by the capitalist sector. The growth of the not-for-profit sector has been seen in many Western economies, which represents around five percent

GDP. Drawing on data gathered by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP), Salamon arid Sokolowski examined the not-for-profit sector in twenty-four countries. 37 In terms of economic impact this is a "$1.1 trillion industry that employs 19.5 million frill-time equivalent (FTE) paid workers in the twenty-four countries on which data are so far available."38 As Table 3 shows, on average the nonprofit sector grew by 24 percent between 1990-1995, compared to just an 8 percent rise in employment. In the United States, the growth in employment stood at 8 percent during this time, whereas the growth in employment in the nonprofit sector was 20 percent. In Europe (UK, Netherlands, Germany, France), whereas growth in the total economy grew by 3 percent, the nonprofit sector increased by 24 percent. <u>Given such trends-far from reinforcing the link between the profit-motivated and monetary exchange-it could be more properly suggested that this relationship is diminishing</u>.

<u>Within the private sector, it is unquestioningly assumed by the supreme representation of enterprises</u> (themselves assumed to be coherent, predictable, ordered, organized sites) that any monetary transactions are always and necessarily market-like, and therefore <u>driven principally by profit-motive rationales</u>. <u>Yet this relationship has also come under the critical spotlight, with studies demonstrating that such an assumption is not entirely robust, and there are examples of private-sector enterprises that are not always driven by the necessity to make profit</u> and do retain sub-capitalist economic constructions and practices." To take one example, in seeking to open a conversation about what a corporation is, O'Neill and Gibson-Graham analyzed the Australian-based multinational BHP.4° 'The research questioned the capitalist notions of "the company" in a way that ultimately "[piroduceEd] a decentred, 'disorganized' representation of the enterprise." The researchers highlighted the unpredictable, social and open nature of the enterprise-and decoupled the essentialist arguments of these entities, including the logic that they are only driven by profit-motivated concerns. This itself was seen to be significant not only in undermining popular representations of enterprise discourses, but in the act of producing a more nuanced reading that has "the potential to liberate the political and geographical imagination, and to proliferate alternative possibilities for regional futures and corporate-community relationships.""

The result of this critique is one that argues that <u>it is simply not the case,</u> despite all the popular assumptions to the contrary,<u> to say that we live in a capitalist world</u>. When all the estimates are taken into account, <u>significantly less than half of the Western economies can be properly said to be aligned with commodity production driven by capitalist profit-motivated monetary</u>

AT Neolib Unsustainable

That economic growth will slow doesn't justify its collapse – economic rationality is the only realistic option
Barnhizer, 6

David, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, 'Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream",' Geo Int'l Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n

In a way disturbingly similar to the sudden inability of the former Soviet Union to support the safety net for its citizens, the Western system's ability to operate on the level it has achieved is in question. [n65] There should be no doubt that basic commitments to the well-being of hundreds of millions of residents are at risk. That the Western systems will decline in both relative and absolute terms in their ability to generate wealth **seems undeniable**. This phenomenon is already evident [*623] in massive job loss, spending cuts, and bankrupt pension plans. The key questions are how far we will allow the decay to go and what if anything can be done to stop it. Many American and European industries are uncompetitive with those outside competitors allowed to follow different rules, not because of the quality of management and productivity factors, but because the Western social model has imposed expensive social obligations on their domestic economic actors. Producers in China, India, and elsewhere enjoy low taxes or special tax breaks, and have lower costs for labor and raw materials. This advantage does not derive from the status of these nations as superior competitors but because their social and economic systems have lagged behind those of western Europe, North America, and Japan. Businesses in the United States, Japan, and western Europe, on the other hand, have been successful to the extent that their wealth generation capacities allowed the development and funding of expensive and fully integrated social and economic systems. The ability to continue funding those moral systems of social justice is being degraded under the rubric of "free trade" and globalization. The competitive advantage those other countries enjoy has little to do with fair competition, but rather relates to the fact that American and western European businesses carry significant social obligations and regulatory costs that the others do not. Many of the arguments extolling free trade in an "unfree" system ignore the moral implications and inherent unfairness of their claims. If it is accepted that businesses have the obligation to pay its workers fair wages in the context of what is fair in this system and to generate wealth and revenues to fund social benefit programs, then penalizing Western businesses by requiring them to compete with producers and suppliers from other regions who are not required to bear those social costs is inherently unfair. We cannot take the chance involved in slowing down our economic system through the imposition of new rules requiring the internalization of heretofore external costs, or through the "friction" that would be applied if we sought to govern economic activity through totally coherent "sustainability" institutions. It will be all we can do if we can even come close to sustaining our ability to fulfill existing social obligations and incrementally contribute to the reduction of poverty and creation of opportunity in the world. Whatever else might be said about the consequences of the Western economic model, there is a clear moral basis to the system it supports and that we now must determine how to sustain. [n66] Although proponents of economic stasis argue in favor of either slow growth that takes all the effects of our activities into account or even for full stasis, **these are not realistic options**. [n67] We are not beginning from a zero point, but one where [*624] expectations, dependency, cultures, and systems are already in place. Consider the enormous public and private deferred debt bills and unfunded obligations undertaken in the United States and Europe in the form of a series of budgetary "IOUs." [n68] In the United States we have incurred massive debt obligations that allow us to make comparatively small payments now but that will require enormous balloon payments later. We would have difficulty meeting those obligations even in a healthy economy due to the demographic shifts we are experiencing as our population ages. But there is no reason to believe that we will be able to "sustain" the health of our economic and social systems. As they come due, the balloon payments will necessitate some combination of higher taxes, abandonment of the promises themselves, or reductions in what can actually be delivered. The Western system of social support may have to change and support lessened social and economic expectations, but there is a great difference **between lessening and complete collapse**.

While a modification of the core social morality of the Western system may become necessary, it is not morally acceptable **if preventable**. We need to understand the impact of the false arguments of free trade which are in many ways veiled justifications for destroying the moral strength of Western culture by penalizing Western productive activities for carrying the social costs governments mandated they sustain, while rewarding competitors for avoiding such obligations and encouraging our productive economic activities to relocate to regions of the world that do not require them to carry the burden of expensive social choices.

Political Philosophy

Liberalism/Collectivism Binary Bad

Their critique's reliance on a binary between individualism and collectivism ensures the alt fails and reinforces the worst excesses of squo liberalism – critiques of individualism reinforce public fears of totalitarianism and collectivist takeover and cede the political to libertarians
Baer 1

(Josette Baer, Zürich University, "BOOK REVIEW Colin Bird: The Myth of Liberal Individualism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 4: 191–192, 2001)

In contrast to Grandvilliers, Bird offers a fresh and unique approach to liberal political theory: **by going beyond the limits of 'individualism'** and **'collectivism'** set by recent scholarly debates between communitarians and libertarians (chaps. 3 and 4), he questions individualism as a seemingly intrinsic value of liberalism (chap. 1). He does this by an in-depth analysis of the ideas of self-ownership and individual inviolability (chap. 5). Focusing on the presupposed alliance of individualism and liberalism promoted by liberal thinkers such as Berlin, Rawls, von Mises and Hayek, Bird's analysis reveals not only the general lack of a comprehensive non- a-priori theory of individualism (chap. 2). Furthermore, Bird's study shows how this theoretical gap provoked the negative perception of 'collectivity'. Paraphrasing Grandvilliers, Bird's core argument might be the following: 'How the word 'individualism' is **ambiguously misinterpreted**, first, by those who treat it as synonymous with liberal individualism (libertarians) and, second, by those who regard it as the theoretical fundament of society's atomism (communitarians)!'¶ Ever since the end of the second World War, liberalism was promoted as the main political opponent of totalitarianism and fascism. Due to its immanent values such as toleration, secularity and individualism liberalism granted the protection of the individual's rights from the constraints of the state. The inviolability of the private sphere enabled individuals to pursue the goals of which they conceived of as their distinct life goals. Freedom of the single person, hence, not collective safety, was the goal and basic intention of 20th Century liberalism. In the 1970s and 80s, the alliance of individualism and liberalism was reinforced by two thinkers: Berlin's concept of negative freedom as freedom from oppression and Rawls' critique of social utilitarianism effectively deepened the 'anti-collectivist' arguments of cold war liberals such as Popper and Hayek. The pursuit of collective goals like the establishment of a welfare state seemed incompatible with western type liberal democracy. With the end of the Cold War, Liberalism's distinct individualist conception, upon which the ambiguous relationship of the individual with state and society was based, represented the pièce de résistance of the communitarian-libertarian debate: liberal thought which would be capable of offering solutions against societal atomism keeping to the inviolability of the private sphere failed due to the **overly dominant suspicions of** beginning totalitarianism via **collectivism** by the adherents of libertarian positions. Thinkers promoting the communitarian standpoint, on the other hand, failed to present comprehensive suggestions of **how to combine individualism and collectivism** without infringing the individual sphere.¶ The rich theoretical material covered and the comprehensiveness of Bird's deduction make the book an excellent contribution to current political thought. By asking the crucial question, in virtue of what individuals should be treated as inviolable (p. 178), the author questions the presupposed normative connections between property rights, ownership, individual inviolability and the protection of features of this

inviolability. By doing so, he <u>targets the 'Gordian knot' of the communitarian-libertarian debate</u>. Indeed, his contribution shows us the possibility of a way out: <u>a fresh notion of individualism tames the dangers of the Scylla of libertarian individualism and the Charybdis of communitarian collectivism</u>. Bird, eventually, leads us to view the relationship of individuals, state and society in a new light. His theory could contribute to the renewal of liberalism: it could set the grounds for a theory of the liberal welfare state.

Liberal Individualism Good

Neoliberalism solves disposability and disciplinary power – it avoids categories like "good" and "bad" poor and makes determinations solely on the basis of efficiency – adjustments to the market change the terrain of individual liberty *without* disciplinary regulation of particular individuals by the welfare state
Behrent 9

(Michael C., Department of History, Appalachian State University, "Liberalism without humanism: michel foucault and the free-market creed, 1976–1979", *Modern Intellectual History*, 6, 3 (2009), pgs. 565-567)

Claiming that socialism's political relevance required that it come to terms with economic liberalism was daring enough. But Foucault, in 1979, upped the ante: far from inaugurating a new form of fascism, as some leftist intellectuals were suggesting, **neoliberalism**, he maintained, **should be seen as a distinctly nondisciplinary form of power**. To make his case, he turned to the Chicago School. No doubt surprising his listeners with his sudden interest in economic policy, Foucault explained the provisions of the so-called "negative tax," an idea explored in the early sixties by the Chicago economist Milton Friedman (a guru of the Thatcher and Reagan revolutions), which had also sparked interest in France when the liberal economist Lionel Stol´eru endorsed it in a noted essay published in 1974.100 The negative tax seeks to streamline costly social-service bureaucracies and to eliminate work disincentives created by certain welfare programs. With the negative tax, the government no longer worries about guaranteeing that only the deserving poor receive assistance. The sole criteria for defining poverty, and the only level at which the state intervenes to reduce it, is income. Rich and poor alike file tax returns; however, those whose income falls below a particular threshold receive a cash handout inversely proportional to their means, rather than paying a portion of their income in taxes. What intrigued Foucault about this idea (enacted in the United States as the "earned income tax credit" in 1975, and in France as "le prime pour l'emploi" in 2001) is that **it broke with the tendency of the modern welfare state to link payouts to behavior**. **Eliminating the longstanding distinction between** the **"good" and** the **"bad" poor**, the negative tax is supremely indifferent to the spending choices and work habits of its recipients. What matters is solely that they be guaranteed an income that allows them to be players in the economic game.101 All of which suggests, Foucault maintained, that capitalism has entered a new era. Compared to the dirigiste policies of the postwar years, **neoliberalism of the Chicago variety is "much less bureaucratic," and "much less disciplinary"** (disciplinariste)102—which, coming from Foucault, was no mean compliment. American neoliberalism's nondisciplinary implications were perhaps even more apparent in its approach to a question that had long been one of Foucault's deepest concerns: that of crime and punishment. For **neoliberalism jettisons the oppressive moral categories characteristic of discourses on crime**. The Chicago economist Gary Becker, for instance, demonstrates that to understand criminal behavior, there is no need to define crime as anything more than any individual action that incurs the risk of punishment. The criteria of good and evil, normal and abnormal, and even of legal and illegal can be happily dispensed with. Discussing models that explain how market mechanisms might regulate drug use more effectively than law enforcement, Foucault marvels that, with these approaches, **the criminal undergoes an "anthropological erasure."**103 Furthermore, rather than nursing the fantasy of a crime-proof society, the Chicago School advises that it is more useful for a society to calculate how

much crime and punishment it can afford. In his concluding remarks about the Chicago School, **Foucault presents neoliberalism as an almost providential alternative to the repressive disciplinary model of society**: <u>what appears</u> [in American neoliberalism] <u>is not at all the ideal</u> or the project <u>of an exhaustively disciplinary society</u> in which the legal network encircling individuals would be relayed and prolonged from within by mechanisms that are, let us say, normative. <u>Nor is it a society in which the mechanism of general normalization and of the exclusion of the non-normalizable would be required</u>. **One has**, on the contrary . . . **the image** or the idea or a programmatic theme **of a society in which there would be an optimization of the system of differences**, in which the field would be open to oscillating processes, in which there would be a tolerance accorded to individuals and to minority practices, and in which not the players of the game, but the rules of the game would be acted upon, **and** at last **in which there would not be an intervention of the kind that internally subjugates individuals, but an intervention of the environmental kind**.104 Openness to "differences," "tolerance" of individuals and minority practices, restraint in the practice of subjugation: these are not words that we customarily associate with Foucault's vision of political modernity. That he used them in 1979 to describe the course of power relations in modern societies reveals just how much his understanding of politics had evolved since the publication of Discipline and Punish four years earlier.

Individual Liberty Good

The aff's economic liberalism solves the impacts better than the alt – modifying the law to make the market more efficient *does not* make recourse to humanist metaphysics – our market-based approach requires *maximizing* individual liberty, using contingent claims about administrative efficiency without recourse to the law or natural rights
Behrent 9

(Michael C., Department of History, Appalachian State University, "Liberalism without humanism: michel foucault and the free-market creed, 1976–1979", *Modern Intellectual History*, 6, 3 (2009), pgs. 561-563)

Foucault's efforts to distance himself from the liberal renewal then under way are evident in a startling claim made in his 17 January 1979 lecture. Liberalism is historically significant, he asserts, because it dispenses with the notion that political authority must be founded in law. In the late 1970s this assertion presumably struck many as absurd: liberalism's appeal lay precisely in its efforts to subordinate political authority to the rule of law and the respect of human rights. In refuting law's centrality to liberalism, Foucault was challenging the project of Franc̦ois Furet and his collaborators (including Claude Lefort, Cornelius Castoriadis, Pierre Manent, Marcel Gauchet, and Pierre Rosanvallon84), who at the time were fashioning a non-Marxist account of the French Revolution, while using the categories of liberalism and democracy to build a novel theory of political modernity. According to Foucault, those who associate liberalism with law and rights fail to see that liberalism has developed along **two distinct paths**. The first, rooted in natural law, does indeed deduce the liberal state from the axiomatic assertion of inalienable individual rights. This path ultimately leads to the French Revolution. This form of liberalism rests, he notes, on the problematic assumption that where there is a law, there is a will: law is understood as the "expression of a will," particularly of a "collective will" which decrees (among other things) which rights individuals refuse to cede to the state. **Law**, in this tradition, **is thus inextricably bound up with subjectivity** (insofar as law is taken as expressing a will). The second path to liberalism is, however, grounded in **utilitarianism**: rather than deducing an ideal state from metaphysical principles, it takes the existence of government as a given, and, on the basis of **purely inductive considerations**, concludes that liberalism—that is, **the self-limitation of power**— simply makes the most administrative sense. **This type of liberalism has no truck with the anthropological principles upon which the former is dependent**— and which Foucault had always found suspect. From the utilitarian perspective, law is simply a process of "deal-making" (transaction), whereby individuals negotiate what powers belong to the state, and what freedoms they reserve for themselves. **Where revolutionary liberalism makes law the foundation of politics, utilitarian liberalism sees politics as the origin of law.** Having demonstrated how the tradition of political liberalism that emphasizes human rights and the legal basis of the state remained wedded to a problematic set of anthropological assumptions, Foucault could downplay the French Revolution's importance, dismissing its conception of politics as "retroactive"85 —a charge, presumably, that he would have just as happily leveled against Furet and his cohort.86 In addition to dispensing with unnecessary anthropological hypotheses, utilitarian liberalism—alongside economic liberalism, which he considered to be closely related—impressed Foucault for another reason: it managed to conceptualize a liberal order by relying on no other category than power itself. **For liberalism to work**, Foucault

suggested, **there is no need to hypothesize something outside** or beyond **power**, such as law, rights, or even liberty. Rather than a metaphysical entity or a human attribute, liberty, for the utilitarian, is simply a side effect of power—as Foucault put it, "the independence of the governed in relation to the governing."87 Similarly, **for economic liberals, the paradoxical imperative that power must limit itself is** essentially **a political maxim aimed at optimizing administrative efficiency, not a morally motivated recognition of an inalienable right**. Liberalism, Foucault explained, "is shot through with the principle: 'On gouverne toujours trop'"—one always governs too much.88 As we have seen, such a characterization of liberalism was, in the late 1970s, very much in the air: Foucault's definition echoes, in striking terms, Barre's pronouncement that "the State must do on its own as little as possible."89 But this assessment was also consonant with Foucault's philosophical ambition to emancipate the conceptualization of power from juridical categories—or, as he liked to put it, to cut off the king's head (by abandoning the idea that power must derive from a sovereign, legitimate source). Because utilitarian and economic liberalism attach no special importance to the question of power's origin (unlike the revolutionary and natural-rights tradition), **they effectively dispense with the need for juridical foundations**.90 Consequently, from Foucault's perspective, **they manage to chop off the king's head very ably—more so**, paradoxically, **than the revolutionaries themselves**. Contemporary economic liberalism thus epitomized power as Foucault had come to understand it. Just as for Marx the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is both class conflict's latest form and the moment at which class conflict is unveiled as history's driving force, so liberalism is, for Foucault, both one form of power among others, and the form that demonstrates most effectively how little power has to do with law. Economic and utilitarian liberalism thus suggested ways that one might be a liberal **without subscribing to philosophical humanism or to a juridical theory of power**. Economic and utilitarian liberalism thus suggested ways that one might be a liberal without subscribing to philosophical humanism or to a juridical theory of power. But if this explains how Foucault could be a liberal, what made him want to be one—or, in any event, to endorse it in a particular strategic context? The reason lies in Foucault's aversion to the stubborn archaism of the French left, particularly as it was embodied by Mitterrand's Socialist Party. As Michael Scott Christofferson has persuasively argued, the same concern drove many former leftists in these years (including Furet and the nouveaux philosophes) to undertake a public campaign designed to portray the socialists (as well as the communists, their occasional allies) as crypto-totalitarian.91 Foucault's somewhat more furtive intervention in this debate consisted in judging the left from the standpoint of economic liberalism. For if liberalism was the quintessential form of modern governmentality, it soon become clear that France's left was hopelessly antiquated. To make this point, Foucault, in 1979, took the circuitous route of considering Ordoliberalism, the German economic school that theorized the Federal Republic's "social market economy." The school owes its name to the journal Ordo, founded in 1948 by a group of liberal economists who had met at the University of Freiburg before the war. Their finest hour came when they undertook a liberal critique of the economic policies pursued by Allied occupation authorities in the immediate postwar period. Soon, they found their way to the antechambers of finance minister Ludwig Erhard, the architect of West Germany's "economic miracle."92 Despite the devastation in which Germany found itself in these years, the Ordoliberals did not back away from their liberal convictions—if anything, they became even more convinced that humanity's future depended on the renunciation of collectivism in all its forms. They were unsparing in their critique of Keynesianism; according to Foucault, Wilhelm R¨opke, one of their most prominent members, went so far as to dismiss the Beveridge Report, which paved the way for Britain's National Health Service, as warmed-over National Socialism.93 Though firmly committed to the capitalist

economy, the Ordoliberals were not, however, <u>crude free-marketeers</u>. <u>Their beliefs boil down to a single crucial insight:</u> <u>everything that neoclassical economics says about the free market's virtues is true;</u> <u>the problem,</u> however, <u>is that competition is a quasi-mathematical ideal, not an empirical reality.</u> <u>For competition to work its magic, it must first be jump-started by the state</u>. **Specifically, the state needs a robust legal framework**, one **that allows marketplace competition to approximate its ideal form** (though like the utilitarians, it should be noted, the Ordoliberals conceived of law as a political tool, not as the state's metaphysical foundation). What seems to have intrigued Foucault about Ordoliberalism is that it confirmed his intuition that economic liberalism should be thought of as a political and not merely an economic system. **As Foucault put it, it is precisely Ordoliberalism's insistence that intervention in the economy be limited** (such as refraining from economic planning and pricesetting) **that requires intervention in the legal realm**—that is, the legislation and jurisprudence that will grease the market's gears. Trying not to govern toomuch, it turns out, keeps a government rather busy.

Perm

Reform Solves

Solves better – using capitalism to fight itself is more effective

Rothkrug 90

(Paul, Founder – Environmental Rescue Fund, Monthly Review, March, 41(10), p. 38)

No institution is or ever has been a **seamless monolith**. Although the inherent mechanism of American capitalism is as you describe it, oriented solely to profit without regard to social consequences, this does not preclude significant portions of that very system from joining forces with the worldwide effort for the salvation of civilization, perhaps even to the extent of furnishing the **margin of success** for that very effort.

Hybrid strategies like cooperative are crucial to the destruction of capitalism – the alt alone fails

Gordon (PhD from Oxford, teaches environmental politics and ethics at the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies) **12**
(Uri, Anarchist Economics in Practice in The Accumulation of Freedom, pg. 205-7)

There is certainly substance; to these objections. Nevertheless, I have chosen to keep the ten as wide as possible, if only for the reason that readers new to anarchism and less familiar with its internal controversies deserge to be introduced to the entire variety of practices that broadly fall within its sphere and left to make up their own minds. More generally, however, I would like to emphasize that the entire discussion of anarchist economics in practice must take place under the lens of imperfection and experimentation. This has to do with the distinction that Terry Leahy makes between purist and hybrid strategies, that is, between strategies that completely embody anarchist ideals and ones which continue to rely on aspects of capitalism.' Hybrid strategies have always been part of the anarchist repertoire of social resistance; yet the relevant question is whether hybrid strategies are viewed as already embodying the end point of desired social change (that is, a reformed capitalist system), or as necessary but temporary compromises with the ubiquity of capitalist social relations, a stepping-stone towards more comprehensive social change. As Leahy argues, To an extent hybrid strategies are symbiotic with capitalism. They can be seen as productive for the capitalist class in ameliorating some of capitalism's excesses. Yet they are also antithetical to the culture and economy of capitalism as a system. Given enough time and enough proliferation they will replace capitalism with something completely different... For those who ultimately want nothing but the best that an anarchist utopia can offer, the thing to do is to be mobile and seize opportunities for hybrids as they arise and move on as they grow stale.2 It is in this inclusive and experimental spirit that I offer the following examples. While limitations of space mean that the discussion is necessarily cursory, I have referenced some relevant literature throughout the exposition, and the reader is invited to consult it for further information and analysis. Varieties of Anarchist Economic Practice Withdrawal Perhaps better defined as a "non-practice" than as a practice, the term "withdrawal" here indicates the various ways in which anarchists may abstain from participation in central institutions of the capitalist economy-primarily the wage system and the consumption of purchased goods. The goal of such a strategy is to weaken capitalism by sapping its energy, reducing its inputs in terms of both human labor and cultural legitimation. To be sure, the ubiquity of capitalist relations means that the options for withdrawal remain partial at best. Most of us must work for someone else to survive, and buy necessities that are not otherwise available for acquisition. Nevertheless, there are ways in which participation in capitalism can be significantly reduced, or undertaken on its qualitatively different margins. Rather than seeking full employment and aspiring to a lifelong career, anarchists can choose to work

part-time or itinerantly, earning enough to supply their basic needs but not dedicating more time to waged work than is absolutely necessary-perhaps on the way towards the abolition of work as compulsory, alienated production.3 In the area of housing, squatting a living space rather than renting one also abstains from participation in capitalism, though this option is less sustainable in most countfies since it will almost certainly end in eviction. Anarchists may also reduce their participation in the moneyed circulation of commodities by reusing and recycling durable goods, and by scavenging or growing some of their own food rather than purchasing it from the supermarket. 4 <u>Such practices can never by themselves destroy capitalism, since in the final analysis they remain confined to the level of personal lifestyle and rely on capitalism's continued existence in order to inhabit its margins and consume its surpluses</u>. Nevertheless, <u>strategies of withdrawal do complement other practices in carving out a separate space from capitalism</u>, as well as in expressing a rejection of its ideologies of dedication to the workplace and of consumption as the road to happiness.

AT Market Link

Must work with some companies within the market in order to solve transition wars

Lewis and Canaty (executive director of the Center for Community Enterprise; honorary research fellow at the University of Birmingham and a director of Common Futures) **12**
(Michael and Patrick, The Resilience Imperative: Cooperative Transitions to a Steady-state Economy, New Society Publishers, googlebooks)

The agenda of the Great Transition also encompasses three major dimensions of change. Think of them as the 3 Ps: the personal, practical, and political. Simplistic silver-bullet solutions, and sound bites spun for culturally stunted attention spans, will not do. Consciously acting to link up the three Ps with a multi-level agenda guided by the resilience imperative and cooperative transitions is complex. Balkanized movements cannot contend with the scale of the problems and challenges we face, nor the powerful forces that must be resisted and restrained. All kinds of constituencies must be engaged unions, regionally based small and medium-sized businesses, all manner of community and cooperative enterprises and intermediaries, farmers, credit unions and progressive financial institutions, arts and culture organizations, faith organizations, environmental groups, politicians, and academics. We can also work with large companies, though caution and principled shrewdness is necessary. Companies occupying the low-road/high-carbon economy have too much power, are unaccountable, and are so addicted to the capitalist logic of growth that they represent a real and present danger to all of us. However, there are other companies that are committed to building a highroad/low-carbon economy, and we need their know-how and partnership if we are to navigate the Great Transition without violence. So there we have it we are challenged to work consciously from local to global across sectors, engage creatively multiple constituencies, while all the while paying attention simultaneously to the macro and micro features of the transition challenge. Isn't life interesting? We have been acutely conscious, while writing this book, that our concentration has been on the micro side of the transition challenge, though we have attempted to keep the macro side consciously in play as a kind of counterpoint tension. We hope we have shown how crucial change at the macro policy and systems level is for facilitating and easing transition to a low-carbon, more democratic, and fair economy. Indeed, there are a number of key policy questions that we have raised directly or indicated in passing. These evident and practical possibilities can be summarized as: 100 percent debt-free money: Why not mov e step by step toward governments issuing democratic currency free of interest and, indeed, removing from banks the power to freely issue money as high-cost debt?

AT Collapse Good

Letting the system collapse on its own causes extinction – only struggle within the capitalism can end the system

Schwartzman (Professor in the Department of Biology at Howard University, PhD in Geochemistry from Brown University) **11**

(David, Green New Deal: An Ecosocialist Perspective, Capitalism Nature Socialism, Volume 22, Issue 3, 18 Aug, pages 49-56)

And unlike the New Deal, achieving the GND on a global scale in the context of a robust solar transition, by necessityaccompanied by demilitarization, will not end with a reinforcement of militarized capital, as was the case in WWII and the Cold War aftermath. Rather, <u>the GND has real potential for opening up a path out of capitalism</u> into ecosocialism. WWII and the emergence of the MIC postponed the terminal crisis of capitalism to this century. Now we face the welcome project of taking that terminal crisis on and finishing the job.

<u>We need a strategy of transition</u>. This should be a priority in theory and practice for ecosocialists. Any Left worth its label and demonization by Glenn Beck and company must not only confront the immediate needs of the great majority of those exploited and oppressed by big capital, but also be a leader in organizing to fight back. So jobs, affordable housing, health and child care, environmental quality, and environmental justice must be on the left agenda. But what kind of jobs? For unsustainable or sustainable green production? And what about the conditions for the reproduction of labor power, itself a site of multi-dimensional class struggle, as Michael Lebowitz has argued (2003). Thus, the fightback program must confront the ecological crisis and demand solutions that address climate change by embracing clean energy.

<u>We should never advocate or even think that the "worse the better" will deliver socialism by the collapse of capitalism</u>, <u>anticipating its terminal illness as hope</u>. For <u>capitalism's dead weight will kill us all</u>. <u>No slogan or propaganda alone can achieve success</u>, as important as this ideological struggle is. Rather, <u>only multidimensional and local-to-transnational class struggle within capitalism</u> (see Abramsky's illuminating volume 2010) <u>can terminate this system</u>, which unfortunately will not die a natural death on its own accord. It will have to be put to sleep forever. A critical role of the ecosocialist Left is to identify the strategic class sectors—those existing and those in formation—that will be the gravediggers of capitalism. Additionally, <u>the ecosocialist Left must</u> also, of course, <u>participate in the creation of a collective vision and its realization as embryos within capitalism</u> of the new global civilization ending the rule of capital.

We now witness or can soon anticipate ongoing struggles for social governance of production and consumption on all scales from neighborhood to global. <u>Areas of struggle in this fight should include</u> nationalization of the energy, rail, and telecommunications industries; municipalization of electric and water supplies; <u>the creation and maintenance of</u> decentralized solar power, food, <u>energy</u> and farming <u>cooperatives</u>; the encouragement of worker-owned factories (solidarity economy), the replacement of industrial and GMO agriculture with agroecologies; the creation of green cities; and of course organizing the unorganized in all sectors, especially GND workers. All of these objectives should be part of the ecosocialist agenda for struggles around a GND, which of course, must include the termination of the MIC. One outstanding example of how to begin is found in Mike Davis 2010), who argues for the potential of a radical movement for green urbanism (see my commentary, Schwartzman, 2008).

AT Green Cap Link

A Green investment now is crucial to initiate a transition away from capitalism – starting now is key to avoid extinction from warming
Schwartzman (Professor in the Department of Biology at Howard University, PhD in Geochemistry from Brown University) **11**

Indeed, imposing such <u>non-market limits is imperative, but the struggle to impose them must begin in capitalist societies now, and not be posed simply as the policies of future socialism.</u> <u>Yes, aggressive energy conservation is imperative</u>, especially in the United States and other countries of the global North. We can all live better with a sharp reduction of wasteful consumption, breathe clean air, drink clean water, and eat organic food. <u>Nevertheless, there needs to be a global increase in the power capacity, employing clean energy</u> and not fossil fuels or nuclear power, <u>to insure every child born on this planet has the material requirements for the highest quality of life</u> (Schwartzman and Schwartzman 2011).

But <u>should we anticipate that Green Capitalism, even pushed to its limits by class struggle, could indefinitely postpone the final demise of global capitalism</u> and could actually replace the present unsustainable energy base with a renewable power infrastructure fast enough to avoid catastrophic climate change (C3)? I submit <u>this prospect is highly unlikely</u>. The legacy and political economy of real existing capitalism alone makes *global* solar capitalism a delusion (Schwartzman 2009). While the Pentagon pretends to go "green," it remains the servant of the imperial system protecting fossil fuel and strategic metals flowing into the MIC, the Military Industrial (Fossil Fuel, Nuclear, State Terror) Complex. The immense power of the MIC is the biggest obstacle to implementing an effective prevention program that has a plausible chance of avoiding C3. The avoidance of C3 requires an end to coal and fossil fuel addiction, giving up the nuclear option, and a rapid conversion to a high-efficiency solar energy infrastructure.

To summarize, the MIC is at present the biggest single obstacle to preventing C3 because: It is the present core of global capital reproduction with its colossal waste of energy and material resources. The fossil fuel and nuclear industries are integrated within the MIC. The MIC has a dominant role in setting the domestic and foreign policy agenda of the United States and other leading capitalist countries. The Pentagon is the "global oil-protection service" for both the U.S. imperial agenda (Klare 2007) and the transnational capital class itself (e.g., Robinson 2004). The MIC's Imperial Agenda blocks the global cooperation and equity required to prevent C3.

Nevertheless, what <u>the struggle for a</u> GND <u>[Green New Deal] can accomplish is</u> very significant, indeed <u>critical to confronting the challenge of preventing</u> C3 <u>[Catastrophic Climate Change]</u>. **Humanity cannot afford to wait for socialism to replace capitalism to begin implementing this prevention program** [Italics Original]. And I have argued that <u>starting this prevention program under existing capitalism can open up a path toward ecosocialist transition</u>, indeed a 21st century Socialism worthy of its name.

Climate science tells us <u>we must proceed now for any plausible chance of avoiding tipping points plunging us into C3</u>. <u>Green job creation is likewise the creation of a new working-class sector committed to ending the fossil fuel addiction.</u> Such an historic shift to renewable energy supplies would be comparable to the industrial revolution that replaced plant power in the form of wood and agricultural products with coal.

Alt Fails

Reform Key

No revolution against cap possible now – the perm is crucial to avoid rightest takeover
Castree (School of Environment and Development, Manchester University) **10**

(N., Crisis, Continuity and Change: Neoliberalism, the Left and the Future of Capitalism. Antipode, 41: 185–213)

This essay had two major objectives. It sought to describe and explain the temporal coincidence of political economic and environmental crises less than a decade into the twenty-first century; and it offered some reasons for a seeming paradox, taking both a national level and international scale example—the paradox of crisis conditions leading to more of the same rather than a sharp turn away from the neoliberal path. The hopeful lessons of Marx's, Polanyi's and O'Connor's work will not (yet) be borne out: "strong reform", never mind something more radical, is still a long way off. What we call "neoliberalism" in the singular is, in reality, a variegated and uneven global formation constituted differentially at a range of scales. Its existence and multiple incarnations are overdetermined. Even so, I've suggested that this fact does not necessarily render neoliberal policies vulnerable, even at a time of perceived "crisis". If my analysis has any validity, then it calls to mind Gramsci's judgement that the "morbid symptoms" of an existing order unwilling to die may persist for some considerable time.

When might these symptoms disappear? Answers to this question are likely to be as reliable as a long-range weather forecast. NaomiKlein (2009:30), sensing the folly of detailed prophecy, offers some general speculations. Reflecting, as I have done, on the coincident political economic and ecological crisis, she argues that "Capitalism can survive this [double] crisis. But the world can't survive another capitalist comeback". I agree entirely with the first part of this statement, but not necessarily the second. Capitalism will morph and adapt as it has always done: the operating hardware will remain intact, even as the all important details will alter quite profoundly. But at what cost? Leftists have not just to hope for, but work vigorously towards, a future that can set capitalism on a path of much greater social and environmental justice. The legacy of neoliberal capitalism constitutes a sickness that can be cured sooner rather than later: but the Left, in its national and international forms, must do a lot more to administer the necessary medicine. An essential, if not sufficient, condition is to occupy the political space vacated by established political parties that claim to be on the left. Until then, the Left's case will remain marginal to public life worldwide.

No Behavioral Change

The alternative fails – their analysis of neoliberalism precludes any mechanism for behavioral change – the strength of their links overwhelms the possibility of alt solvency
Barnett 10

(Clive Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences @ The Open University, "Publics and Markets: What's wrong with Neoliberalism?", *The Handbook of Social Geography*, edited by Susan Smith, Sallie Marston, Rachel Pain, and John Paul Jones III. London and New York: Sage)

Theories of neoliberalism go hand in hand with a standard form of criticism that bemoans the decline of public life, active citizenly virtue, and values of egalitarianism and solidarity. These theories project ahead of themselves criteria of evaluation (cf. Castree 2008): neoliberalism reduces democracy, creates poverty and inequality, and is imposed either from the outside or by unaccountable elites. The conceptual analysis of neoliberalism is therefore always already critical, **but at a cost**. They are condemned to invoke their favoured positive values (e.g. the public realm, collective solidarity, equality, democracy, care, social justice) in a moralistic register without addressing normative problems of how practically to negotiate **equally compelling values**. And in so far as theories of neoliberalism dismiss considerations of rational action, motivation, and decentralised coordination as so much 'ideology', they remain **chronically constricted** in their capacity to reflect seriously on questions of **institutional design, political organisation and economic coordination** which, one might suppose, remain an important task for any critical theory.

Protectionism DA

The alternative leads to _developmentalist protectionism_ – causes US _isolationism_ – turns the K because it blocks sustainability and social justice
Hess 12

(David Hess, David J. Hess is a professor in the Sociology Department at Vanderbilt University, Associate Director of the Vanderbilt Institute for Energy and Environment, Director of Environmental and Sustainability Studies, and Director of Undergraduate Studies for the Sociology Department, "The Green Transition, Neoliberalism, and the Technosciences." In Luigi Pellizzoni and Marja Ylönen, eds. _Neoliberalism and Technoscience: Critical Assessments_, Ashgate Press, www.davidjhess.org/GreenTranNeolibEnv.pdf)

The field sociology of neoliberalism also provides new ways to think about its possible future. The fact that there was an historical change during the 1970s and 1980s from the dominance of social liberalism to neoliberalism in many political fields across the world raises the question of what type of ideology might emerge to replace neoliberalism. Historical change tends to create new contradictions and countermovements (Polanyi 2010), but much of the scholarship on a post-neoliberal order is **clouded by nostalgia**, such as belief that increasing within-nation inequality will lead to a swing of the pendulum back toward the happy days of social liberalism, or by **utopianism**, such as belief that a crisis in capitalism and global ecology will lead to a great transition to socialism or localism. I suggest that the historical condition of the relative decline of an economic superpower may be leading to resurgence of a modified form of its past of developmentalism. Developmentalist liberalism can be distinguished from neoliberalism and social liberalism on several grounds, of which the increasingly defensive position on trade and the corresponding invigoration of industrial policy are the most central. Developmentalism remains mainstream because it does not challenge the premise of restricted government intervention into an economy based on large, publicly traded corporations. In contrast with the three mainstream positions, agents in subordinate positions in the political field advance more radical visions of the global economy, such as an economy based on locally owned, independent enterprises or one based on much higher levels of public ownership. Although it is possible that ideologies currently in a subordinate position in the political field may become dominant over the long run, **the likely outcome**, albeit **not** necessarily **desirable from** either **a sustainability or social justice perspective, may be a growing tendency toward developmentalism**. The shift within the American political field in the twenty-first century is consistent with its nineteenth-century past and its **isolationist proclivities**. During the nineteenth century the United States was a secondary economic power with respect to European countries, and it pursued its successful policy of industrialization based on strong tariffs and import substitution. Only after the United States had achieved clear hegemony in the global economy did it shift to a liberalized position on trade, which at that time benefited the country by opening up foreign markets to trade on terms favorable to the United States (Chang 2008). However, as foreign competition increased, sentiment in favor of a more defensive approach to trade increased, first with respect to Japan during the 1980s and then today with respect to China. Thus, the stage is set for the political field in the United States during the twenty-first century to look more like that of the **nineteenth century** than the twentieth century. Because the United States has been the world's leading supporter of

neoliberal policies, <u>a shift toward developmentalism could have **global implications**</u> for the history of neoliberalism as well as **<u>for the global economy</u>**.

Withdrawal DA

Alt doesn't solve cap

Gordon (PhD from Oxford, teaches environmental politics and ethics at the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies) **12**
(Uri, Anarchist Economics in Practice in The Accumulation of Freedom, pg. 205-7)

Withdrawal
Perhaps better defined as a "non-practice" than as a practice, <u>the term "withdrawal" here indicates the various ways in which anarchists may abstain from participation in central institutions of the capitalist economy</u>-primarily the wage system and the consumption of purchased goods. <u>The goal of such a strategy is to weaken capitalism by sapping its energy</u>, reducing its inputs in terms of both human labor and cultural legitimation. To be sure, <u>the ubiquity of capitalist relations means that the options for withdrawal remain partial at best. Most of us must work for someone else to survive, and buy necessities that are not otherwise available for acquisition</u>. Nevertheless, there are ways in which participation in capitalism can be significantly reduced, or undertaken on its qualitatively different margins. Rather than seeking full employment and aspiring to a lifelong career, anarchists can choose to work part-time or itinerantly, earning enough to supply their basic needs but not dedicating more time to waged work than is absolutely necessary-perhaps on the way towards the abolition of work as compulsory, alienated production.3 In the area of housing, squatting a living space rather than renting one also abstains from participation in capitalism, though this option is less sustainable in most countfies since it will almost certainly end in eviction. Anarchists may also reduce their participation in the moneyed circulation of commodities by reusing and recycling durable goods, and by scavenging or growing some of their own food rather than purchasing it from the supermarket. 4 <u>Such practices can never by themselves destroy capitalism, since in the final analysis they remain confined to the level of personal lifestyle and rely on capitalism's continued existence in order to inhabit its margins and consume its surpluses</u>. Nevertheless, <u>strategies of withdrawal do complement other practices in carving out a separate space from capitalism</u>, as well as in expressing a rejection of its ideologies of dedication to the workplace and of consumption as the road to happiness.

1AR Withdrawal DA

Alt fails – movements too small, elite backlash, no material interests

Gordon (PhD from Oxford, teaches environmental politics and ethics at the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies) **12**
(Uri, Anarchist Economics in Practice in The Accumulation of Freedom, pg. 215)

On the one hand, <u>the</u> anarchist <u>movement is so small that even its most consistent and visible efforts are but a drop in the ocean</u>. On the other hand, <u>political elites have proven themselves extremely proficient at pulling the ground from under movements for social change, be it through direct repression and demonization of the activists, diversion of public attention to security and nationalist agendas,</u> or, at best, minimal concessions that ameliorate the most exploitative aspects of capitalism while contributing to the resilience of the system as a whole. It would seem that ethical commitments to social justice and the enhancement of human freedom can only serve as a motivation for a comparatively small number of people, and that <u>without the presence of genuine material interests among large sections of the population there is little hope for a mass movement to emerge that would herald the departure from existing social, economic, and political arrangements</u>.

AT Alternatives to Liberal Subject

Their alternative either ends in violent totalitarianism or doesn't solve – critiques of "liberal individualism" rely on an essentialist binary between "individualism" and "social community" that treats social constitution of identity as an unquestioned good – ensures the success of the worst form of liberalism or devolves into collectivist extermination
Bird 99

(Colin Bird, Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, *The Myth of Liberal Individualism*, pgs. 204-207)

In this last section I discuss some of the ways in which assuming the coherence and unity of 'liberal individualism' has cramped the whole effort to get a critical purchase on the liberal project. Finally, I suggest how the arguments given here might point in more fruitful directions. As I mentioned earlier, those critics who take liberalism to be essentially 'individualistic' have been led to assume that alternatives to it must appeal to various supposedly *non-individualistic* conceptions. This is what explains the continuing obsession within anti-liberal circles with notions of community, with the claim that the self is essentially *socially* constituted, with issues about our collective identities and so on. It is not part of my intention to *deny* that community is important, or that the self is always somehow socially constituted, nor do I say that our collective identities are unimportant. But I do think that if critics of liberalism are forced on to (and restricted to) this terrain by an uncritical attitude to the very idea of 'liberal individualism' their attack will be systematically weakened. Assuming that non- or anti-liberal positions must be '*non-individualistic*' has encouraged critics of liberalism to present themselves as partisans of some specific 'collective' identity or to try to define the elusive ideal of community in a broader way. Notoriously, no communitarian has yet made good on the latter project. The problem with the former approach is that it necessarily excludes those who do not belong to the relevant group, including (embarrassingly) partisans of other collective identities. These considerations seem to me to be extremely important in explaining why liberalism so often seems to end up winning by default in the now familiar debates about 'liberal individualism' and communitarianism. Consider—in this regard—the following rather revealing passage from Ludwig von Mises's *Human Action*. Von Mises writes: "all varieties of collectivist creeds are united in their implacable hostility to the fundamental political institutions of the liberal system: majority rule, tolerance of dissenting views, freedom of thought, speech and the press, equality of all men under the law. This collaboration of collectivist creeds in their attempts to destroy freedom has brought about the mistaken belief that the issue in present day political antagonisms is individualism versus collectivism. In fact it is a struggle between individualism on the one hand and a multitude of collective sects on the other hand whose mutual hatred and hostility is no less ferocious than the abomination of the liberal system…A substitution of collectivism for liberalism would result in endless bloody fighting." This passage presupposes many of the hoary myths about individualism and collectivism which have been the major target of this study. Clearly, von Mises has in mind the more spectacular and virulent Fascist, nationalist and totalitarian forms of 'collectivism' of the early and middle parts of this century. Nevertheless, it is not clear that contemporary communitarian critics of liberalism do not face the same problem. This is, of course, not to say that such critics advocate

a return to the totalitarian collectivism of the Nazi or Soviet types; normally they explicitly and rightly distances themselves from these political models. Nonetheless, I take them to be recommending their own proposal that the self is an inherently social entity as a kind of via media between liberal individualism on the one hand and an overbearing collectivism on the other – a view which, far from escaping from the individualist/collectivist dichotomy, trades upon it. The assumption that 'individualism' is the real enemy remains. As long as critics of liberalism make this assumption, they will be committed to the view that a non- or anti-liberal theory must be in some way recognizable sense *non-individualistic*. The theory must put some conception of the *community*, or group identity, first. But the next question is which community? Which social identity? It comes as no surprise that on this point the critics provide no basis for agreement. Instead they have fragmented into a number of different camps representing competitive collective 'identities', identities related to class, nation, race, gender or cultural traditions; they are united only by the claim that communal, social, group-centred values are more important than individualistic ones. That is, after all, why the reject 'liberal individualism'. But here their agreement ends. What is the basis for a *modus vivendi* among these various collective identities? Familiar liberal ideas about pluralism and toleration, suitably adapted to be sensitive to the requirements of cultural and ethnic diversity, offer the most obvious recourse. To my mind, von Mises's comment indicates that this is the completely unsurprising result of taking the notion of 'liberal individualism' for granted. If its opponents are restricted to theories of 'social identity', 'liberal individualism' is likely to end up winning out by default, much as it seems to be doing in the contemporary debate. Such a view is of course grist for my mill: it supports the idea that the construction of liberal individualism inevitably tilts the issues in a liberal direction, and that a more penetrating criticism of liberal politics starts by questioning that construction itself. I want to stress a related reason why indiscriminate attacks on 'liberal individualism' as a whole are unlikely to get very far. As I have suggested, it is the focus on liberal *individualism* that has led to the sustained onslaught on the 'atomistic' assumptions about the individual and the collectivity allegedly associated with liberalism. Instead the critics argue that we should understand that the self is not an isolated atom, free to stand apart from and make independent choices about its collective context. Instead the self is essentially constituted by the concrete social relationships in which it moves. On this view, the fundamental defect of 'liberal individualism' is that it assumes that the self is made prior to social interaction; so, clearly, any viable alternative must claim that the self is made in the context of social interaction. To quote Daniel Bell: "We ordinarily think of ourselves, Michael Sandel says, 'bearers of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons or daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic', social attachments that more often than not are involuntarily picked up during the course of our upbringing, rational choice having played no choice whatsoever. I did not choose to love my mother and father, to care about the neighbourhood in which I grew up, to have special feelings for the people of my country, and it is difficult to understand why anyone would think that I have chosen those attachments, or that I ought to have done so." So communitarians like Bell and Sandel suggest that the good life consists in making peace (war?) with our inescapable social identity: the problem with liberalism is that by emphasizing the importance of choice, it condemns citizens to a perpetual restlessness about their social identity, and so undermines the stability of genuine community on which authentic self-discovery depends. Such platitudes about the unchosen nature of our social identity and about its importance to use are apt to seem hopelessly naïve, however. What is missing is any serious acknowledgement of the elementary fact that the character of social intervention in the construction of the self is radically Janus-faced. It is one thing to say that selves are formed in and through a social

context, quite another to say that this is always a good thing. Social relations may well inevitably form the selves which move within them, but they can also deform them in various ways. No doubt Robespierre's identity was given by his being a 'son of the French Revolution'. But perhaps a reflective Robespierre would—with hindsight—deeply regret that the social forces of the revolution intervened in the formation of his identity in the way they did. He might reflect that being a son of the French Revolution turned him into a monster and made his existence shameful. The remarkable silence of communitarian critics of liberal individualism on this obvious and fundamental point has made it easy for liberals to respond that communitarians have not taken sufficient account of the potentially totalitarian implications of a communitarian conception of politics. So the argument ends up reinstating the familiar dichotomy between liberal individualism and various communal or social alternatives which threaten to disintegrate into a totalitarian collective. Stated in these terms, this is an argument which the liberal individualist seems fated to win.

AT Do Nothing/Negativity

Alt fails and leads to ressentiment
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

But such cinematic labors of the negative are not sufficient; they certainly do not suffice to promote positive attachment to this world. Even a "negative dialectic" does not suffice. If things are left there, the embers of ressentiment can easily become more inflamed. That is one reason Deleuze is never happy with negative critique alone: the next task is to highlight how our participation in a world of real creativity that also finds expression elsewhere in the universe depends on and draws from such fugitive interruptions. To put it too starkly (for situational nuances and adjustments are pertinent here), the more people who experience a positive connection between modes of interruption and the possibility of our modest participation as individuals, constituencies, states, and a species in creative processes extending beyond us, the more apt we are to embrace the new temporal experiences around us as valuable parts of existence as such. Certainly, absent a world catastrophe or a repressive revolution that would create worse havoc than the conditions it seeks to roll back, these consummate features of late-modem life are not apt to dissipate soon. The fastest zones of late-modem life, for instance, are not apt to slow down in the absence of a catastrophe that transforms everything. So the radical task is to find ways to strengthen the connection between the fundamental terms of late-modem existence and positive attachment to life as such. This should be accomplished not by embracing exploitation and suffering, but by challenging them as we come to terms with the larger trends.

AT Do Nothing/Withdraw/Burn It Down

The alt fails – withdrawing from capitalism/burning it down are incapable of producing an alternative system of governance – prefer specific, institutional alternatives
Srnicek 11

(Nick, PhD candidate in International Relations at the London School of Economics, "Economics and the Left", *The Oxford Left Review*, Issue 5 | November 2011, pgs. 39)

As Alex Andrews notes, none of these approaches is suficient on its own. Yet even¶ more worryingly, I have been present at a number of events where it is argued that leftists needn't worry about such issues right now. Instead, it is suggested that **all we need is to bring about a revolution** (as though revolutions were some clean break with the past, rather than being a complex mixture of diverse social forces). The presumption implicit in this response is that once leftists are given the opportunity to create a new society, the answers will just become clear. Perhaps consensus decisionmaking – against all evidence – will provide a sophisticated answer!¶ But the risk of relying on such unrelective 'people power' is that when the opportunity comes to effectuate change, **the actors involved fall back on habitual ideas** simply **because they can't imagine an alternative**. This is a crisis of imagination, but also – more signiicantly – of cognitive limits. Very few have done the hard work to think through **an alternative economic system**. And as a result, **we remain embedded within capitalist realism** – unable to think outside the socio-economic coordinates established by an all-encompassing capitalist imagination. Slavoj Žižek has been a popular exception here by consistently arguing for the necessity of thinking about 'the day after tomorrow'. Yet few appear to have taken up his call, and he seems to have ignored it himself.

AT Movements

Neoliberalism is resilient and the alternative fails – their optimism that the system will collapse on its own underestimates neoliberalism's ability to re-organize in response to financial crises – aftermath of 2008 recession proves
Mirowski 13

(Phillip, Prof. of Economics @ Notre Dame, *Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown*, pgs. 7-8)

Conjure, if you will, a primal sequence encountered in B-grade horror films, where the celluloid protagonist suffers a terrifying encounter with doom, yet on the cusp of <u>disaster</u> abruptly wakes to a different world, which initially seems normal, but eventually is revealed to be a second nightmare more ghastly than the first.1 Something like that <u>has become manifest in real life since the onset of the crisis</u> which started <u>in 2007</u>. From the crash onward, it was bad enough to endure house prices sinking under water, dangling defaults and foreclosures, the collapse of what remained of manufacturing employment, the reduction of whole neighborhoods to bombed-out shells, the evaporation of pensions and savings accounts, the dismay of witnessing the hope of a better life for our children shrivel up, neighbors stocking up on firearms and people confusing bankruptcy with the Rapture. It was an unnerving interlude, with Nietzschean Eternal Return reduced to an Excel graph with statistics from the Great Depression of the 1930s. <u>Fast forward to 2011</u>. Whether it was true or not, <u>people had just begun to hope</u> that <u>things were</u> finally <u>turning around</u>. Moreover, <u>journalists</u> in mainstream publications <u>bandied about the notion</u> that <u>academic economics had failed</u>, and hinted that our best minds were poised to rethink the doctrines that had led the world astray. <u>Yet, as the year grew to a close, **it**</u> slowly **dawned upon most of us that the** natural **presumption** that **we were capable of rousting ourselves from the gasping nightmare**, that **we might proceed to learn from the mistakes and fallacies of the era of Neoliberal Follies, was** itself **just one more insidious hallucination**. A dark slumber cloaked the land. <u>Not only had the sense of crisis passed without any serious attempts to rectify the flaws</u> that had nearly caused the economy to grind to a halt, but unaccountably, <u>the political right had emerged</u> from the tumult <u>stronger, unapologetic, and even less restrained</u> in its rapacity and credulity than prior to the crash. In 2010, we were ushered into a grim era of confusion and perplexity on the left. It took a rare degree of self-confidence or fortitude not to gasp dumbfounded at the roaring resurgence of the right so soon after the most dramatic catastrophic global economic collapse after the Great Depression of the 1930s. "Incongruity" seems too polite a term to describe the unfolding of events; "contradiction" seems too outmoded. <u>Austerity became the watchword in almost every country</u>; <u>governments</u> everywhere <u>became</u> the <u>scapegoats for dissatisfaction</u> of every stripe, including that provoked by austerity. In the name of probity, the working class was attacked from all sides, even by nominal "socialist" parties. **In the few instances when class mobilization was attempted** by trade unions to counterattack, as in the recall petition for Scott Walker in the state of Wisconsin, the birthplace of American progressivism, **it failed**. <u>The pervasive dominance of neoliberal doctrines</u> and right-wing parties worldwide from Europe to North America to Asia <u>has flummoxed left parties that</u>, just a few short years ago, <u>had been confident they had been</u> finally <u>making headway</u> after decades of neoliberal encroachment. Brazenly, in many cases <u>parties on the left were **unceremoniously voted out**</u> <u>because they had struggled to contain the worst fallout</u>

from the crisis. By contrast, the financial institutions that had precipitated the crisis and had been rescued by governmental action were doing just fine—nay, prospering at precrisis rates—and in a bald display of uninflected ingratitude, were intently bankrolling the resurgent right. Indeed, the astounding recovery of corporate profits practically guaranteed the luxuriant postcrisis exfoliation of Think Tank Pontification. Nationalist protofascist movements sprouted in the most unlikely places, and propounded arguments bereft of a scintilla of sense. "Nightmare" did not register as hyperbolic; it was the banjax of the vanities.

AT Radical Democracy/Commons

The alternative can't solve – critique of neoliberalism idealizes "the commons" and "radical democracy" while denouncing the procedural and institutional mechanisms necessary to realize them – either the permutation solves because legalization is a necessary step in realization of social justice, or the alternative is too vague to solve any of its own impacts

Barnett 10

(Clive Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences @ The Open University, "Publics and Markets: What's wrong with Neoliberalism?", *The Handbook of Social Geography*, edited by Susan Smith, Sallie Marston, Rachel Pain, and John Paul Jones III. London and New York: Sage)

In accepting the same simplistic opposition between individual freedom and social justice presented by Hayek, but simply reversing the evaluation of the two terms, critics of neoliberalism end up presenting **highly moralistic forms of analysis** of contemporary political processes. In resisting the idealization of the market as the embodiment of public virtue, they end up embracing **an equally idealized view** of the forum as the alternative figure of collective life (see Elster 1986). For example, while Harvey insists that neoliberalism is a process driven by the aim of restoring class power, he ends his analysis by arguing that it is the anti-democratic character of neoliberalism that should be the focal point of opposition (Harvey 2005, 205-206). But **it is far from clear** whether the theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalization developed by political economists, sometimes with the help of governmentality studies, can contribute to reconstructing a theory and practice of radical democratic justice. In Harvey's analysis, the withdrawal of the state is taken for granted, and leads to the destruction of previous solidarities, unleashing pathologies of anomie, anti-social behaviour and criminality (ibid, 81). In turn, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the state leads to social solidarities being reconstructed around other axes, of religion and morality, associationism, and nationalism. What has been described as the rise of the "movement society", expressed in the proliferation of contentious politics of rights-based struggles and identity politics, Harvey sees as one aspect of a spread of corrosive social forms triggered by the rolling-back of states. In the wake of this rolling-back "[e]verything from gangs and criminal cartels, narco- trafficking networks, mini-mafias and favela bosses, through community, grassroots and non-governmental organizations, to secular cults and religious sects proliferate" (ibid, 171). These are alternative social forms "that fill the void left behind as state powers, political parties, and other institutional forms are actively dismantled or simply wither away as centres of collective endeavour and of social bonding" (ibid.).¶ Harvey suggests his own bundle of rights as an alternative to the neoliberal regime of rights. These include 'the right to life chances', 'control over production by the direct producers', 'to a decent and healthy living environment', and 'to collective control of common property resources' (ibid. 204). He provides **little sense of how the inevitable** tensions and **trade-offs between these sorts of rights would be negotiated** and decided in practice (beyond the reiteration of Marx's comment that 'Between equal rights, force decides' as if this were both a matter of fact and of principle). Harvey's preference for 'substantive' democracy and social justice is associated with **a persistent denigration of procedural issues without which any meaningful practice of democracy is unimaginable**. Harvey casts struggles for cultural, civil, sexual or reproductive rights since the 1960s as inevitably complicit with the 'neoliberal frame' favouring 'individual freedoms' over 'social justice' (ibid., 41-43). Likewise the emergence of international human rights movements and the development of non-governmental politics is damned as complicit with the 'neoliberal frame' of individual rights and privatization (ibid. 176-177). This is a travesty of complex political movements that have pioneered struggles for social justice along diverse fronts, not least when Harvey claims that these movements have not focussed on developing "substantive and open democratic governance structures" (ibid., 176).¶

What's really wrong with neoliberalism, for critics who have constructed it as a coherent object of analysis, is the unleashing of destructive pathologies through the combined withdrawal of the state and the unfettered growth of market exchange. 'Individual freedom' is presented as a medium of uninhibited hedonism, which if given too much free reign undermines the ascetic virtues of self-denial upon which struggles for 'social justice' are supposed to depend. Underwritten by simplistic moral denunciations of 'the market', **these theories cover over a series of analytic, explanatory, and normative questions**. In the case of both the Marxist narrative of neoliberalization, and the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal governmentality, it remains unclear whether either tradition can provide adequate resources for thinking about **the practical problems of democracy**, rights and social justice. This is not helped by **the systematic denigration** in both lines of thought **of 'liberalism'**, a catch-all term used with little discrimination. There is a tendency to present neoliberalism as the natural end-point or rolling-out of a longer tradition of liberal thought – an argument only sustainable through the implicit invocation of some notion of a liberal 'episteme' covering all varieties and providing a core of meaning. One of the lessons drawn by diverse strands of radical political theory from the experience of twentieth-century history is that struggles for social justice can create new forms of domination and inequality. It is this that leads to a grudging appreciation of liberalism as a potential source for insight into **the politics of pluralistic associational life**. The cost of the careless disregard for 'actually existing liberalisms' is to remain ~~blind~~ to the **diverse strands of egalitarian thought** about the relationships between democracy, rights and social justice that one finds in, for example: post-Rawslian political philosophy; post-Habermasian theories of democracy, including their feminist variants; various postcolonial liberalisms; the flowering of agonistic liberalisms and theories of radical democracy; and the revival of republican theories of democracy, freedom, and justice. No doubt theorists of neoliberalism would see all this as hopelessly trapped within the 'neoliberal frame' of individualism, although if one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, even Marx's critique of capitalist exploitation, dependent as it is on an ideal of self- ownership, is nothing more than a variation on Lockean individual rights. Any serious consideration of democracy, rights and social justice cannot afford to ignore the fields of social science in which issues of rationality, motivation, and agency are most fully theorized. These often turn out to be fields normally considered too 'liberal' for the tastes of critical human geographers (cf. Sayer 1995). These fields can serve as **potential sources for revised understandings of the tasks of critical theory**, ones which do not fall back into ahistorical, overly sociologized criticisms of any appearance of individualism or self-interest as menacing the very grounds of public virtue and the common good. **Problems of coordination, institutional design, and justification are central** to any normatively persuasive and empirically grounded critical theory of democracy. For example, the problem central to social choice theory – the difficulty of arriving at collective preference functions by aggregating individual preferences – is a fundamental issue in democratic theory, around which contemporary theories of deliberative democracy are increasingly focussed (Goodin 2003). Likewise, Amartya Sen's (2002) critique of public choice theory's assumption that people are 'rational fools' provides the most compelling criticism of the one- dimensional understanding of rationality, motivation, and agency upon which orthodox economic and public policy depends. This critique informs the "capabilities approach" which connects key problems in welfare economics to a theory of egalitarian rights and political democracy (Sen 1999; Corbridge 2002). These are just two examples of work which takes seriously the problematization of agency, motivation and rationality in 'rational choice' social science in order to move social theory beyond the consoling idea that rampant individualism can be tamed by moral injunctions of the public good and weak claims about social construction. The ascendancy of 'neoliberalism' as a theoretical object of approbation is symptomatic of the negative interpretation of 'critical' in contemporary critical human geography. Being critical, on this view, requires that one has a clear-sighted view of an object that one is critical of. Theories of neoliberalism provide a compelling picture of such an object, by providing an account of the displacement of socially embedded practices of reciprocity and redistribution by the pathological rationalities of market exchange. This style of theorizing leads to a mode of critical analysis in which **change is always interpreted in zero-sum terms**, as the encroachment of neoliberal rationalities into realms of social solidarity. It is a style of analysis that makes it **impossible to acknowledge diverse dynamics of change**, **and in turn remains ~~blind~~ to emergent public rationalities:** "If you believe in the implacable domination of economic forces, you cannot believe in the possibility of social movements; at the very best, you will see the movement of society as an expression of the systems' internal contradictions, or as a manifestation of objective suffering and poverty" (Touraine 2001, 3). Neoliberalism as an object of analysis is certainly a critics' term. The explicit formulation of neoliberalism into an object of theoretical

analysis in critical human geography <u>has been associated with</u> **the turning-in of intellectual curiosity around a very narrow space**, bounded by Marxist political-economy on the one side and poststructuralist political ontologies on the other. <u>As long as this remains the horizon of normative reflection, critical human geographers will continue to always know in advance what they are expected to be critical of but will remain unable to articulate convincingly what they are being critical for.</u>

AT Reformism Bad/Negativity

Progressive change is possible and effective – the alt fails and leads to authoritarianism
Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

Is it not obligatory to expose and resist the system as such rather than taking cumulative actions to move it? Don't such actions necessarily fold back in on themselves, feeding the dosed system they seek to move? Some theorists on the Left say such things, but they themselves have too dosed a view of the systems they criticize. No system in a world of becoming composed of multiple, interacting systems of different types, with different capacities of self-organization, is entirely dosed. It is both more vulnerable to the outside than the carriers of hubris imagine and periodically susceptible to creative movement from within and without simultaneously. Moreover, pure negativity on the Left does not sustain either critique or militancy for long, but rather, it tends eventually to lapse into resignation or to slide toward the authoritarian practices of the Right that already express with glee the moods of negativity, hubris, or existential revenge. We have witnessed numerous examples of such disappointing transitions in the last several decades, when a negative or authoritarian mood is retained while the creed in which it was set is changed dramatically. We must therefore work on mood, belief; desire, and action together. As we do so we also amplify positive attachment to existence itself amidst the specific political resentments that help to spur us on. To ignore the existential dimension of politics is to increase the risks of converting a noble movement into an authoritarian one and to amplify the power of bellicose movements that mobilize destructive potential. To focus on the negative dimension alone is to abjure the responsibilities of political action during a dangerous time.

To review, none of the role interventions listed above nor all in concert could suffice to break such a global resonance machine. Luck and pregnant points of contact with salutary changes in state actions, other cross-state citizen movements, the policies of international organizations, creative market innovations, and religious organization are needed. But those larger constellations may not themselves move far in a positive direction unless they meet multiple constituencies primed to join them and geared to press them whenever they lapse into inertia, if a world resonance machine of revenge and counter-revenge stretches, twists, and constrains the classical image of sovereign units, regionally anchored creeds, uneven capitalist exchange, and international organizations, while drawing selective sustenance from all of them, a new counter-machine must do so too.

Legalism

Top Shelf

Perm

The permutation is an act of <u>deconstruction</u> – it acknowledges the finitude of calculability as the basis for responsibility and political action

Popke 3 (E. Jeffrey, Department of Geography, East Carolina University. "Poststructuralist ethics: subjectivity, responsibility and the space of community" (2003), Progress in Human Geography vol. 27 no. 3, pp. 298-316, http://myweb.ecu.edu/popkee/Poststructuralist%20Ethics.pdf)

VII The politics of deconstruction Within geography's increasing engagement with poststructuralist theory, there have recently been a number of discussions of deconstruction (see Barnett, 1999). Most accounts describe deconstruction as a means of exposing the paradoxes, contradictions and elisions which undermine the purported coherence of philosophical or conceptual systems (Dear, 1988; Barnes, 1994). Others have drawn on deconstruction to consider the importance of context in the creation of meaning and interpretation (Dixon and Jones, 1998; Barnett, 1999). For the most part, these authors draw upon Derrida's early works, and especially those dedicated to writing and textuality (e.g., Derrida, 1976; 1988). Taken together, <u>they suggest that deconstruction can be seen as a form of intervention, a strategy to highlight the instability of meaning, and thereby to multiply the potential for alternative understandings.</u> As Doel (1994: 1051) puts it, <u>'deconstruction affirms a movement of perturbation, turmoil, and dislocation</u> . . . [it] is <u>the affirmation of destabilization on the move'</u>. Although this destabilizing impulse is undoubtedly important, I want to suggest that <u>deconstruction can be given a more political, and hence ethical, inflection</u> than many authors do. In a series of more recent texts, Derrida has suggested that <u>deconstruction's movement of destabilization can serve as</u> both a critique of the normative foundations of international law and politics and also a <u>means of addressing our responsibility</u> for the other. Indeed, Derrida (1990: 945) has made the provocative claim that 'deconstruction is justice'. We can begin to unpack this by noting that, within the discourses of modernity, the political has become circumscribed, limited to a discrete set of institutional practices, which are themselves supported by juridical and territorial norms. <u>Deconstruction's ethico-political purchase then, like its philosophical effect, is a result of an intervention that aims to destabilize the grounds of authority for these norms, to show that law, constitution, state territorialization, human rights and so on are ultimately founded on what Derrida</u> (1990: 943) <u>terms a 'violence without ground'.</u> For this reason, Derrida notes, law, like any system of grounding or authority, is inherently deconstructible. <u>Deconstruction</u>, by destabilizing the grounds of authority for international politics, <u>opens the terrain to a new definition of the political</u>, which would move beyond the metaphysics of sovereignty. <u>What is needed</u>, Derrida (1999: 221) suggests, <u>is: a dimension of the political divested of everything which</u> – for better but especially for worse, in our modernity – <u>has welded the political to the ontological</u> (in the first place, to a certain conception of effectivity or present being of the universal cast in terms of the state, and of cosmopolitical citizenship or the International cast in terms of the Party). This 'ungrounding' of the political may appear as a form of nihilism, in which all arguments and positions have equal validity, leading to a condition of anarchy or political stasis. Yet I would suggest instead that <u>deconstruction offers the potential to recast the political on the basis of our responsibility to respect the event of the decision.</u> As Derrida puts it (1999: 240): [<u>political commitment</u>] <u>depends</u>, at every instant, <u>on new assessments of what is urgent in</u>, first and foremost, <u>singular situations</u>, and of their structural implications. For such assessment, there is, by definition, no preexisting criterion or absolute calculability; analysis must begin anew every day everywhere, without ever being guaranteed by prior knowledge. It is on this condition, on the condition constituted by this injunction, that there is, if there is, action, decision and political responsibility – repoliticization [emphasis original]. **<u>The lack of any normative grounding for the decision does not mean that we need not decide</u>**. On the contrary, political responsibility is called for only because there is no way to guarantee the justness of the decision, because its outcome remains undecidable. Far from being a foreclosure of the political, then, the ethics of deconstruction would 're- politicize' or, as Derrida says elsewhere (1996: 85), hyper-politicize, disseminating the moment of political decision across infinite contexts (Derrida, 1995: 273): if I speak so often of the incalculable and the undecidable it's not out of a simple predilection for play nor in order to neutralize decision: on the contrary, I believe there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that must not pass through the proofs of the incalculable or the undecidable. Otherwise, everything would be reducible to calculation, program, causality. This point is worth emphasizing: <u>to assert that the decision is ultimately undecidable does not mean that there can be no such thing as truth, right or</u>

good. It means, rather, that if we purport to know in advance the specific content of such notions, then the event of the decision is divested of its political content, it is simply 'deduced from an existing body of knowledge . . . [as] by a calculating machine' (Derrida, 1999: 240). Deconstruction, then, affirms the necessity to judge, to analyse, to make decisions, in the context of an event that is conditioned by our inexhaustible responsibility to the other (Derrida, 1997: 18): That is what gives deconstruction its movement, that is, **constantly to suspect, to criticize the given determinations of culture, of institutions, of legal systems, not in order to destroy them or simply to cancel them,** but to be just with justice, to respect this relation to the other as justice [emphasis added]. A deconstructive ethics would in this way incite a political responsibility that first and foremost opens us to the (face of) the other, in which we surrender our sovereignty in 'a form of vigilant passivity to the call of the other' (Levinas and Kearney, 1986: 29). This passive opening has been denounced by some as simply a form of 'patience' or 'tolerance' which justifies inaction. Thus Bridge (2000: 526) argues that, for Levinas, 'responsibility need not result in action' and Peet (1998: 242) charges that poststruc- turalism advocates 'a passive affirmation . . . [that] waits for an-Other always to come – that is, conveniently never there – so nothing ever needs doing in terms of political practice'. But I read the passivity of ethical responsibility differently, as a form of opening to limitless possibility in the absence of hubris, an orientation that derives, not from indifference, but from the recognition that 'I cannot calculate everything, predict and program all that is coming, the future in general, etc., and this limit to calculability or knowledge is also, for a finite being, **the condition of praxis, decision, action and responsibility'** (Derrida, 1999: 249). This responsibility is an exposure to the event, in its singular and incalculable context, through which the call of the other enjoins an ethics and politics of decision.

Perm solves best---totalizing rejection sacrifices immediate suffering---short-term legal strategies are not mutually exclusive with the alt

Smith 13 (Andrea, UC Riverside media and cultural studies professor, "The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement", Settler Colonial Studies, Taylor and Francis)

At the same time, violence against Native women is at epidemic rates. The 1999 Bureau of Justice Statistics report, American Indians and Crime, finds that sexual assault among Native Americans is 3.5 times higher than for all other races living in the US. Unlike other racial groupings, the majority of sexual assaults committed against Native American women are inter-racial.3 In particular, the majority of people who perpetrate sexual assault against Native women are white. Because of the complex jurisdictional issues involving tribal lands, the majority of sexual assaults against Native women are committed with impunity. Depending on the tribe, non-Native perpetrators of sexual assault on Indian reservations may fall out of state, federal and tribal jurisdiction. And tribes themselves have not developed effective means for addressing violence in their communities. The intersections of gender violence and colonialism in Native women's lives force Native anti-violence advocates to operate through numerous contradictions. First, they must work within the continued colonisation of Native nations. Second, they must work with tribal governments that often engage in gender oppressive practices. In addition, as Native studies scholar Jennifer Denetdale argues, many tribal governments act as neo-colonial formations that support tribal elites at the expense of the community.4 Third, they must also address women who need immediate services, even if those services may come from a colonising federal government or a tribal government that may perpetuate gender oppression. Given the logics of settler colonialism, it may seem to be a hopeless contradiction to work within the US legal system at all. In fact, many social justice advocates eschew engaging in legal reform for this reason. Consequently, we are often presented with two dichotomous choices: short-term legal reform that addresses immediate needs but further invests us in the current colonial system or long-term anti-colonial organising that attempts to avoid the political contradictions of short-term strategies but does not necessarily focus on immediate needs. This essay will explore possibilities for rethinking this dichotomous approach by rethinking the role of legal reform in general. The essay foregrounds alternative approaches using a Native feminist analytic towards engaging legal reform that may have a greater potential to undo the logics of settler colonialism from within. As I have argued elsewhere, Native feminism as well as Native studies is not limited in its object of analysis.5 Rather, in its interest in addressing the intersecting logics of heteropatriarchy and settler colonialism, it is free to engage with diverse materials. In looking then towards alternative strategies for undoing settler colonialism through the law, I contend that it is important to engage important work that might not seem to be directly about Native peoples or settler colonialism if this work helps provide new resources for how we could strategically engage the law. Consequently, I engage the work of legal scholars and activists that address very different areas of law as a means to challenge some of the current assumptions that undergird both reformist and revolutionary approaches to the law. DECOLONIAL REALISM Critical race theorist Derrick Bell challenged the presupposition of much racial justice legal reform strategies when he argued that racism is a permanent feature of society. While his work is generally cited as a critical race theoretical approach, I would contend that his work implicitly suggests a settler colonial framework for understanding legal reform. That is, many of the heirs of Derrick Bell do not follow the logical consequences of his work and argue for an approach to race and the law that seeks racial representation in the law.6 However, Bell's analysis points to the inherent contradictions to such an approach. Rather than seeking representation, Bell calls on Black peoples to 'acknowledge the permanence of our subordinate status'.7 Espousing the framework of 'racial realism', Bell disavows any possibility of 'transcendent change'.8 To the contrary, he argues that '[i]t is time we concede that a commitment to racial equality merely perpetuates our disempowerment'.9 The alternative he advocates is resistance for its own sake – living 'to harass white folks' – or short-term pragmatic strategies that focus less on eliminating racism and more on simply ensuring that we do not 'worsen conditions for those we are trying to help'.10 While Bell does not elaborate on what those strategies may be, he points to a different kind of reasoning that could be utilised for legal reform. In his famous story, 'Space Traders', aliens come to planet Earth promising to solve the world's problems if world leaders will simply give up Black people to the aliens. This story narratively illustrates how thin white liberal commitments to social justice are. First, the white people of course do give up Black people to the aliens without much thought. But what more dramatically illustrates this point is that the reader knows that, almost without a doubt, if this were to happen in real life, of course Black people would be given up. Within this story, however, is a little-commented scene that speaks to perhaps a different way to approach legal reform within the context of white supremacy. Gleason Golightly, a conservative black economics professor who serves as an informal cabinet member for the President, becomes embroiled in a fight with the civil rights legal establishment about the best means to oppose the proposed trade. Golightly had previously pleaded with the President and his cabinet to reject it. When his pleas are not heard, he begins to reflect on how his support for conservative racial policies in the interests of attaining greater political power had been to no avail. He realises the strategy behind his appeal to the President was doomed to fail. In retrospect, though [his] arguments were based on morality [...] []nstead of outsmarting them, Golightly had done what he so frequently criticised civil rights spokespersons for doing: he had tried to get whites to do right by black people because it was right that they do so. 'Crazy!' he commented when civil rights people did it. 'Crazy!' he mumbled to himself, at himself.11 Realising the error of his ways, Golightly interrupts this civil rights meeting in which activists are trying to organise a moral crusade to convince white Americans to reject the space traders proposal. Instead, he suggests that they should tell white people that they cannot wait to go on the ship because they have learned they are being transported to a land of milk and honey. White people, argues Golightly, so oppose policies that benefit Black people, even if they benefit white people, that they will start litigating to stop the space traders' proposed plan.12 The civil rights establishment rejects this strategy as a moral outrage and begins a racial justice campaign, ultimately to no avail. What this story troubles is social justice movements' investment in the morality of the law. Despite the US legal system's complicity in settler colonialism, patriarchy, capitalism and white supremacy since its inception, they advocate strategies for change that rest on the presupposition that the law can somehow be made to support the end of sexism, racism and classism. Historically, as more radical racial and social justice organisations were either crushed or co-opted by the US governments during the 1970s, these movements shifted from a focus on a radical restructuring of the political and economic system to a focus on articulating identity based claims that did not necessarily challenge the prevailing power structure.13 If groups were not going to directly challenge the state, they could then call on the state to recognise their claims to equality and redress from harms perpetrated by other social actors. Ironically, then, the same US government that codified slavery, segregation, anti-immigrant racism, and the genocide of indigenous peoples, now becomes the body that will protect people of colour from racism. The fact that the US itself could not exist without the past and continuing genocide of indigenous peoples in particular does not strike liberal legal reformists as a contradiction. Bell suggests that it may be possible to engage in legal reform in the midst of these contradictions if one foregoes the fantasy that the law is morally benevolent or even neutral. In doing so, more possibilities for strategic engagement emerge. For instance, in the 'Racial Preference Licensing Act', Bell suggests that rather than criminalise racial discrimination, the government should allow discrimination, but tax it. Taxes accrued from this discrimination would then go into an 'equality' fund that would support the educational and economic interests of African-Americans.14 As I have argued elsewhere, the law enforcement approach has been similarly limited in addressing the issues of gender violence when the majority of men do, or express willingness to engage in, it.15 As a result, criminalisation has not actually led to a decrease in violence against women.16 Anti-violence activists and scholars have widely critiqued the supposed efficacy of criminalisation.17 As I will discuss later in this essay, Native women in particular have struggled with the contradictions of engaging the legal system to address the legacies of colonial gender violence. While there is growing critique around criminalisation as the primary strategy for addressing gender violence, there has not been attention to what other frameworks could be utilised for addressing gender violence. In particular, what would happen if we pursued legal strategies based on their strategic effects rather than based on the moral statements they propose to make? DISTRUSTING THE LAW Aside from Derrick Bell, because racial and gender justice legal advocates are so invested in the morality of the law, there has not been sustained strategising on what other possible frameworks may be used. Bell provides some possibilities, but does not specifically engage alternative strategies in a sustained fashion. Thus, it may be helpful to look for new possibilities in an unexpected place, the work of anti-trust legal scholar Christopher Leslie. Again, the work of Leslie may seem quite remote from scholars and activists organizing against the logics of settler colonialism. But it may be the fact that Leslie is not directly engaging in social justice work that allows him to disinvest in the morality of the

<u>law</u> in a manner which is often difficult for those who are directly engaged in social justice work to do. This disinvestment, I contend is critical for those who wish to dismantle settler colonialism to rethink their legal strategies. In 'Trust, Distrust, and Anti-Trust', Christopher Leslie explains that while the economic impact of cartels is incalculable, cartels are also unstable.18 Because cartel members cannot develop formal relationships with each other, they must develop partnerships based on informal trust mechanisms in order to overcome the famous 'prisoners' dilemma'. The prisoner's dilemma, as described by Leslie, is one in which two prisoners are arrested and questioned separately with no opportunity for communication between them. There is enough evidence to convict both of minor crimes for a one year sentence but not enough for a more substantive sentence. The police offer both prisoners the following deal: if you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner does not confess, you will be set free and your partner will receive a ten-year sentence. If you confess, and he does as well, then you will both receive a five-year sentence. Similarly, Leslie argues, cartels face the prisoners' dilemma. If all cartel members agree to fix a price, and abide by this price fixing, then all will benefit. However, individual cartel members are faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should join the cartel and then cheat by lowering prices. They fear that if they do not cheat, someone else will and drive them out of business. At the same time, by cheating, they disrupt the cartel that would have enabled them to all profit with higher prices. In addition, they face a second dilemma. Should they confess in exchange for immunity or take the chance that no one else will confess and implicate them? Cartel members can develop mechanisms to circumvent pressures. Such mechanisms include the development of personal relationships, frequent communication, goodwill gestures, etc. In the absence of trust, cartels may employ trust substitutes such as informal contracts and monitoring mechanisms. When these trust and trust substitute mechanisms break down, the cartel members will start to cheat, thus causing the cartel to disintegrate. Thus, Leslie proposes, anti-trust legislation should focus on laws that will strategically disrupt trust mechanisms. Unlike racial or gender justice advocates who focus on making moral statements through the law, Leslie proposes using the law for strategic ends, even if the law makes a morally suspect statement. For instance, in his article, 'Anti-Trust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability', Leslie critiques the federal Anti-Trust's 1993 Corporate Lenience Policy that provided greater incentives for cartel partners to report on cartel activity. This policy provided 'automatic' amnesty for the first cartel member to confess, and decreasing leniency for subsequent confessors in the order to which they confessed. Leslie notes that this amnesty led to an increase of amnesty applications.19 However, Leslie notes that the effectiveness of this reform is hindered by the fact that the ringleader of the cartel is not eligible for amnesty. This policy seems morally sound. Why would we want the ringleader, the person who most profited from the cartel, to be eligible for amnesty? The problem, however, with attempting to make a moral statement through the law is that it is counter-productive if the goal is to actually break up cartels. If the ringleader is never eligible for amnesty, the ringleader becomes inherently trustworthy because he has no incentive to ever report on his partners. Through his inherent trustworthiness, the cartel can build its trust mechanisms. Thus, argues Leslie, the most effective way to destroy cartels is to render all members untrustworthy by granting all the possibility of immunity. While Leslie's analysis is directed towards policy, it also suggests an alternative framework for pursuing social justice through the law, to employ it for its strategic effects rather than through the moral statements it purports to make. It is ironic that an anti-trust scholar such as Leslie displays less 'trust' in the law than do many anti-racist/anti-colonial activists and scholars who work through legal reform.20 It also indicates that it is possible to engage legal reform more strategically if one no longer trusts it. As Beth Richie notes, the anti-violence movement's primary strategy for addressing gender violence was to articulate it as a crime.21 Because it is presumed that the best way to address a social ill is to call it a 'crime', this strategy is then deemed the correct moral strategy. When this strategy backfires and does not end violence, and in many cases increases violence against women, it becomes difficult to argue against this strategy because it has been articulated in moral terms. If, however, we were to focus on legal reforms chosen for their strategic effects, it would be easier to change the strategy should our calculus of its strategic effects suggest so. We would also be less complacent about the legal reforms we advocate as has happened with most of the laws that have been passed on gender violence. Advocates presume that because they helped pass a 'moral' law, then their job is done. If, however, the criteria for legal reforms are their strategic effects, we would then be continually monitoring the operation of these laws to see if they were having the desired effects. For instance, since the primary reason women do not leave battering relationships is because they do not have another home to go, what if our legal strategies shifted from criminalising domestic violence to advocating affordable housing? While the shift from criminalisation may seem immoral, women are often removed from public housing under one strike laws in which they lose access to public housing if a 'crime' (including domestic violence) happens in their residence, whether or not they are the perpetrator. If our goal was actually to keep women safe, we might need to creatively rethink what legal reforms would actually increase safety. REVOLUTIONARY REFORMS As mentioned previously, there has been insufficient evaluation of the strategic effects of legal strategies opposing gender violence. However, the work of Native anti-violence scholar and activist, Sarah Deer, points to possible new directions in engaging legal reform for the purpose of decolonisation. Deer notes that the issues of gender violence cannot be separated from the project of decolonisation. For instance, tribal governments are restricted to sentencing tribal members to three years in tribal prison for even major crimes such as rape. Much of the focus of the anti-violence movement has been on increasing the number of years tribal governments can incarcerate members. Because of this effort, the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 increased the length of sentences from one to three years. However, Deer notes that prior to colonisation, violence against women was virtually unheard of, even though tribes did not have prisons.22 Unlike most, tribes utilised a number of social mechanisms to ensure safety for women and children, and none of these mechanisms are prohibited by federal legislation. Because the federal government restricts the amount of prison time allowed for sexual offenders, tribes primarily call on the federal government to expand tribes' ability to incarcerate. However, as a variety of scholars have noted, expanded sentencing has not actually led to decreased violence.23 Thus, rather than focusing their attention simply on incarceration, Deer suggests that tribes look to pre-colonial measures for addressing violence and begin to adapt those for contemporary circumstances.24 At the same time, Deer notes that it is not necessarily a simple process to adapt pre-colonial measures for addressing violence. Unfortunately, many of the alternatives to incarceration that are promoted under the 'restorative justice model' have not developed sufficient safety mechanisms for survivors of domestic/sexual violence. 'Restorative justice' is an umbrella term that describes a wide range of programs that attempt to address crime from a restorative and reconciliatory rather than a punitive framework. As restorative justice frameworks involve all parties (perpetrators, victims, and community members) in determining the appropriate response to a crime in an effort to restore the community to wholeness, restorative justice is opposed to the US criminal justice system, which focuses solely on punishing the perpetrator and removing him (or her) from society through incarceration. These models are well developed in many Native communities, especially in Canada, where the legal status of Native nations allows an opportunity to develop community-based justice programs. In one program, for example, when a crime is reported, the working team that deals with sexual/domestic violence talks to the perpetrator and gives him the option of participating in the program. The perpetrator must first confess his guilt and then follow a healing contract, or go to jail. The perpetrator is free to decline to participate in the program and go through the criminal justice system. In the restorative justice model, everyone (victim, perpetrator, family, friends, and the working team) is involved in developing the healing contract. Everyone is also assigned an advocate through the process. Everyone is also responsible for holding the perpetrator accountable to his contract. One Tlingit man noted that this approach was often more difficult than going to jail: First one must deal with the shock and then the dismay on your neighbors faces. One must live with the daily humiliation, and at the same time seek forgiveness not just from victims, but from the community as a whole [...] A prison sentence] removes the offender from the daily accountability, and may not do anything towards rehabilitation, and for many may actually be an easier disposition than staying in the community.25 These models have greater potential for dealing with crime effectively because, if we want people who perpetrate violence to live in society peaceably, it makes sense to develop justice models in which the community is involved in holding him/her accountable. Under the current incarceration model, perpetrators are taken away from their community and are further hindered from developing ethical relationships within a community context. However, the problem with these models is that they work only when the community unites in holding perpetrators accountable. In cases of sexual and domestic violence, the community often sides with the perpetrator rather than the victim. As Deer argues, in many Native communities, these models are often pushed on communities by survivors in order to pressure them to reconcile with their families and 'restore' the community without sufficient concern for their personal safety.26 In addition, Native advocates have sometime critiqued the uncritical use of 'traditional' forms of governance for addressing domestic violence. They argue that Native communities have been pressured to adopt circle sentencing because it is supposed to be an indigenous traditional practice. However, some advocates contend that there is no such traditional practice in their communities. Moreover, they are concerned that the process of diverting cases outside the court system can be dangerous for survivors. In one example, Bishop Hubert O'Connor (a white man) was found guilty of multiple cases of sexual abuse but his punishment under the restorative justice model was to participate in a healing circle with his victims. Because his crimes were against Aboriginal women, he was able to opt for an 'Aboriginal approach' – an approach, many argue, that did little to provide real healing for the survivors and accountability for the perpetrator. Deer complains that there is a tendency to romanticise and homogenise 'traditional' alternatives to incarceration. First, she notes traditional practices might, in fact, be harsher than incarceration. Many Native people presume that traditional modes of justice focus on conflict resolution. In fact, Deer argues, penalties for societal infractions were not lenient – they entailed banishment, shaming, reparations, physical punishment and sometimes death. Deer notes that revising tribal codes by reincorporating traditional practices is not a simple process. It is sometimes difficult to determine what these practices were or how they could be made useful today. For example, some practices, such as banishment, would not have the same impact today. Prior to colonisation, Native communities were so close-knit and interdependent that banishment was often the equivalent of a death sentence. Today, however, banished perpetrators could simply leave home and join the dominant society. While tribes now have the opportunity to divest from the US colonial system, many Native women remain under violent attack. They may need to use the federal system until such time that more advanced decolonisation becomes possible. Thus Deer advocates a two-fold strategy: 1) The short-term strategy of holding the federal government accountable for prosecuting rape cases; and 2) encouraging tribes to hold perpetrators accountable directly so that they will eventually not need to rely on federal interference. This approach can be misread as a simple formula for reform. However, it is important to remember that the project of prison abolition is a positive rather than a negative project. The goal is not to tell survivors that they can never call the police or engage the criminal justice system. The question is not, should a survivor call the police? The question is: why have we given survivors no other option but to call the police? Deer's recommendation is not inconsistent to reform federal justice systems while at the same time building tribal infrastructures for accountability that will eventually replace the federal system. If we focus simply on community accountability without a larger critique of the state, we often fall back on framing community accountability as simply an add-on to the criminal justice system. Because anti-violence work has focused simply on advocacy, we have not developed strategies for 'due process', leaving that to the state. When our political imaginaries are captured by the state, we can then presume that the state should be left to administer 'justice' while communities will serve simply as a supplement to this regime. To do so, however, recapitulates the fundamental injustice of a settler state that is founded on slavery, genocide and the exploitation of immigrant labour. Further, we are unable to imagine new visions for liberatory nationhood that are not structured on hierarchical logics, violence and domination. We face a dilemma: on the one hand, the incarceration approach for addressing sexual/domestic violence promotes the repression of communities of colour without really providing safety for survivors. On the other hand, restorative justice models often promote community silence and denial under the rhetoric of community restoration without concern for the safety of survivors. Thus, our challenge is to develop community-based models that respond to gender violence in ways that hold perpetrators accountable. Unfortunately, in this discussion advocates often assume only two possibilities: the criminal justice system or restorative justice. When anyone finds faults with the restorative justice model, it is assumed that the traditional criminal justice approach must be the back-up strategy. Deer's approach, by contrast, is to work with the criminal justice system while continuing to develop effective strategies for addressing violence. These will eventually eliminate the need to rely on the criminal justice system. Of course, the trap of pursuing reforms is that they can create investment in the current US legal system and detract from building new systems of governance that are not based on violence, domination and control. At the same time, we are not going to go from where we are now to revolution tomorrow. Thus, it becomes important to strategise around what may be called 'revolutionary' reforms. Other abolitionists have argued that the only reform that should be supported are those that diminish the criminal justice apparatus. Other abolitionists have argued that this approach leaves people vulnerable to the 'crimes of the powerful', such as rape and domestic violence.27 It is in this context that we can understand Deer's current projects. She has focused on preventing tourists from visiting the area so that the ski resort will not be forced to develop economically viable. According to their promotional material on TrueSnow.org: For the last decade defenders of the peaks have used every legitimate way they could think of to try to stop the US Forest Service from allowing treated sewage effluent to be sprayed on the Peaks to make snow. More than 20,000 people took part in the Forest Service Environmental Impact Statement process with letters and appeals asking them not to spray treated sewage effluent on the peaks to make snow. Thousands of us went to Flagstaff City Council meetings to voice our opposition to the sale of treated sewer water for the project. Yet still they approved it – before even an environmental impact statement was done. They were the most clueless of all. Currently the Hopi tribe is seeking lawsuit against the city because of this treated sewage effluent sale. A group of tribes and environmental and social justice organizations took a lawsuit all the way to the steps of the Supreme Court. The lawsuits have only called into question the legitimacy of what is loosely termed the 'justice' system. For it seems there is no justice in this system. It is just us, IN this system. There is also yet another lawsuit in play which I have termed 'Save the Peaks Coalition vs The Snowbowl Movement' which may have the possibility of stopping this project in the long term. But if we wait for a verdict, all the trees will be cut and the pipeline installed. This has not stopped the politically connected ski area from going ahead with their project right now and they have already clear-cut 100,000 trees (or more) and have already buried a few miles of pipeline along Snowbowl road. If they lose in court they would be expected to repair the damages. How do you get back 400 year old trees? Greed and hatred seems to be Snowbowl's only motivation [...]. But isn't there some way to stop it? Well we could hit them where it hurts! In the pocketbook. If you live in the Fort Valley area of Flagstaff you must see by now how little Arizona Snowbowl really cares about the 'economic benefits' it brings our fair town. I know some of us had a good deal of trouble even going to work when the snow was good and Snowbowl was busy. The traffic jam was incredible. Stretching more than 15 miles. They took our livelihood away and hope to make that a daily occurrence by having a 'predictable' ski season using sewer water to make snow. This jam up gave us an idea! Why don't we do the same thing? Arizona Snowbowl does not own the mountain, and it is perfectly legal to drive up to the area for any permitted public lands use. This means hiking, camping, praying, skiing, sitting, loving, mushroom hunting, etc. So what do I do? It is time to stop waiting for a government entity, an environmental group, or any of the people you have come to expect to save the peaks for us. The time has come to show them how much power the people have! And believe me, you are the most powerful people in all of the world! You! Yep you! Go to it! All summer the Arizona Snowbowl is open Friday, Saturday, and Sunday for scenic skyrides, food, and alcohol. They do get a pretty good business up there and it would have an impact if the mountain was just 'too busy' with people doing all the other things our Public Forests are for. There is nothing illegal about it and it would send a clear message to the forest service that we don't need Snowbowl to 'recreate on the mountain'. Heck, we don't even need a ski area up there to ski! In essence, take a vacation. Just do it up on the peaks and don't use Snowbowl. Our government officials are forgetting what 'all power to the people' really means. You cannot wait any longer for someone else to save the peaks for you. It will take all of us together to do this. So what are you waiting for? Pack a lunch this Saturday morning and Converge on the Peaks!33 What these activists suggest is that we can challenge the US government's decision to allow this development. This will affect not only what legal reforms we may pursue, but what revolutionary strategies we might engage in.

central focus for organising.31 **Those who call for decolonisation often do not effectively engage** in **any short-term reformist strategy,** even though they may save the lives of indigenous peoples who are currently under immediate attack. **As a result, the immediate needs of people** often **get sacrificed in favour of articulating seemingly** politically-pure ideals. Conversely, those who do engage in short-term reform strategies often decry the goal of decolonisation as 'unrealistic'. In doing so, they do not critique the manner in which these strategies often retrench rather than challenge the colonial status quo. Lyons affirms the need for decolonisation, but notes that decolonization happens with pre-existing materials and institutions. He calls on Native peoples to think creatively about these institutions and about the ways in which they can be deployed not just for short-term gains but for a long-term vision of liberation. BEYOND SHAMING THE SYSTEM Legal reformists who often focus on shaping the law to reflect their moral values and those who focus on extra-legal revolutionary strategies often share the same goal. Often the presumed 'radical' strategy adopted by social justice groups is to engage in civil disobedience. While these groups ostensibly break the law, they often do so in rather ceremonial fashion; they essentially want to shame the system. People are supposed to get arrested, and those in power are supposed to be so shamed by the fact that an unjust system required people to break the law. The expectation is that they will then change the laws. Acts of civil disobedience often are not targeted toward changing a policy directly or building alternative systems to the current one. Many Native groups in the southwest US, however, have developed an alternative framework for extra-legal social change. Rather than breaking the law to change the system, they propose to make Native communities ungovernable. For instance, during the passage of SB1070, Native groups with the Taala Hooghan Infoshop, O'odham Solidarity Across Borders, and others occupied the Border Patrol Office.32 However, rather than engaging in the occupation with the expectation of getting arrested, they chained themselves to the building so that the office could not perform its work. Native groups have continued with their efforts to stop the US government's desecration of the San Francisco Peaks through the construction of a ski resort. While there have not eschewed legal strategies for stopping this desecration, they have focused on preventing tourists from visiting the area so that the ski resort will no longer be economically viable.

revolution. The reality of gender violence in Native communities highlights the untenability of these positions**. Native women's lives are at stake now – they cannot wait for the revolution** to achieve some sort of safety. At the same time, the short-term strategies often adopted to address gender violence have often increased violence in Native women's lives by buttressing the prison industrial complex and its violent logics. While this reformist versus revolutionary dichotomy suggests two radically different positions, in reality they share a common assumption: that the only way to pursue legal reform is to fight for laws that that reinforce the appropriate moral statement (for instance, that the only way to address violence against Native women is through the law and to make this violence a 'crime'). Because the US legal system is inherently immoral and colonial, however, attempts to moralise the law generally fail. It is not surprising that the response to these failures is to simply give up on pursuing legal strategies. However, the works of Derrick Bell, Christopher Leslie, and Sarah Deer, while working in completely different areas of the law, point to a different approach. **We can challenge the assumption that the law will reflect our morals and instead seek to use the law for its strategic effects**. In doing so, we might advocate for laws that might in fact contradict some of our morals because we recognize that the law cannot mirror our morals anyway. **We might then be free to engage in a relationship with the law which would free us to change our strategies as we assess its strategic effects.** At the same time, **by divesting from the morality of the law, we then will also simultaneously be free to invest in building our own forms of community accountability and justice outside the legal system.** Our extra-legal strategies would go beyond ceremonial civil disobedience tactics designed to shame a system that is not capable of shame. Rather, we might focus on actually building the political power to create an alternative system to the heteropatriarchal, white supremacist, settler colonial state.

The perm is the <u>only</u> ethical solution – our excessive responsibility to the Other compels us to risk using the law to approach justice

Buonamano 98 (Roberto, lecturer at University of Technology, Sydney. "The Economy of Violence: Derrida on Law and Justice" (June 1998), Ratio Juris vol. 11 no. 2, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9337.00083/pdf)

3. The third proposition explicates three assertions: the law as force, the silence of this force, and the self-preserving quality of the silence. Derrida remarks that the phrase "to enforce the law" or "enforceability of the law" reminds us that "law is always authorised force, a force that justifies itself or is justified in applying itself" (Derrida 1992b, 15). The auxiliary verb "is" in the quote ("law is always authorised force") is crucial: The relation is not one of law in the service of force, as Derrida makes clear, nor of force in the service of law; it is rather that of law as founding, justifying and preserving force (the force "in," "of" and "as" law, simultaneously). It is for this reason that legality and legitimacy are interdependent: The law functions to legitimise itself, and legitimacy is only meaningful in the context of, and necessarily presupposes, a system of laws. Law, in its instituting and founding moment—the origin of authority—consists of "a performative and therefore interpretative violence that is itself neither just nor unjust" (Derrida 1992b, 13). Derrida sees this as its "mystical foundation": the silence in the violent structure of the founding act. The instituting violence of law defies the justice discourse, for it is ungrounded violence, authority that rests upon itself—the legality, hence legitimacy, of itself. One cannot ground (legitimise) what is the very act of self-legitimating. This mystical silence, mystical in the sense that as silence it nonetheless reiterates and propagates law, speaks the law over and over again, exists at the origin of law and its conditions. So, and this is the beginning and very condition of justice and deconstruction, law is deconstructible, either because "it is founded, constructed on interpretable textual strata," or because "its ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded" (Derrida 1992b, 14). A deconstruction of law, Derrida explicates, does not aim at an effacement of law "before the ethico-politico-juridical question of justice"; instead, it positively **renders justice possible by adopting an excessive and incalculable responsibility to the question.** This responsibility is that of memory or recollection: a recollection of law as history, the origins and directions of laws, rights and norms, the grounds of our "conceptual, theoretical or normative apparatus surrounding justice"; hence, an understanding of **the limits of law and right and what is at stake** (what is being asked of us, what justice demands) in speaking of the just and unjust (Derrida 1992b, 19–20). This responsibility, this purposive stance towards the ethical, can only exist "with the experience and experiment of the aporia" (Derrida 1992c, 41). The aporetic experience is necessarily experimental: Where knowledge precedes the path it is illuminating, our actions are merely programmatic; one can act responsibly only because knowledge has not heralded its arrival, because we are faced with an impasse that must be tested. To do justice, therefore, is to test the aporetic experience of justice, that is, to assume a responsibility for it. To deconstruct the law is to take seriously the incestuous relation between law and justice, rather than to attempt to justify the division and thus master the opposition. Law and justice must be understood as inexorably and nonsystematically linked: "It turns out that droit claims to exercise itself in the name of justice and that justice is required to establish itself in the name of a law that must be enforced" (Derrida 1992b, 22). Derrida provides us with some of the aporias involved in this (dis-)juncture of law and justice. First, the exercise of justice presupposes freedom to act and self-willed behaviour. So, the judge, who in judging is required to follow a law or prescription, qualities inherent in the very definition of "decision" (there is a sense in which every decision is necessarily legal, though in hierarchical conflict) is nonetheless expected to create a "fresh judgment": that is, ~~he is~~ [they are] expected to both follow a law and confirm and reaffirm it by a free adoption, a "reinstituting act of interpretation" that treats each case as idiomatic and not peremptorily decidable (Derrida 1992b, 22–23). A decision cannot be considered just if it unproblematically follows rules, nor if there is no reference to particular rules or the prescience of general principles; the former amounts to mechanistic calculation, whilst the latter amounts to suspending the decision, since it is confined to the judge's interpretation. Paradoxically, at no moment can we say in the present (Derrida emphasises these words) that a decision is just, only that it is "legal or legitimate, in conformity with a state of law, with the rules and conventions that authorise calculation but whose founding origin only defers the problem of justice" (Derrida 1992b, 23). If law cannot be exercised without a decision (which necessarily "cuts" and "divides"), and if the decision is rightly understood as the multiplicitous programme of learning, reading, understanding, interpreting and calculating the rule, the decision to decide (to invoke the law in the name of justice, and **to risk a conclusion with inevitably legal and justiciable consequences)** must belong to the incalculable, the undecidable. Derrida understands this undecidable as an experience heterogeneous and independent of calculation and the rule, whilst obliged to take account of law and the rule in submitting itself to the "impossible decision" (the just decision). The free decision, that which is not merely the "application or unfolding of a calculable process," presupposes the "ordeal of the undecidable" (Derrida 1992b, 24). And so we have a second form of the aporia: This ordeal of the undecidable lurks behind every decision, impelling itself as the possibility of justice in the impossibly just decision. It is aptly represented as a "ghost" to reflect its double-binded relation to

the present: As the spectre it exists only in the present, and yet in the present it constitutes the memory of an experience that cannot fulfil itself, in the present. The just decision cannot derive from the realised or unfolded calculation process, but it also cannot derive from the suspension of the undecidable, since "only a decision is just." The moment of the undecidable cannot be "past" or "passed"—it exists, recurs, in the present but only as the presentiment of its reality. It perpetually puts in doubt the achievement of the presently just decision.

Institutional analysis key to deconstruction

Caputo 97 (John D., Thomas J. Watson Professor of Religion Emeritus at Syracuse University, "Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida" (1997), Fordham University Press, pp. 61-62)

Deconstruction is an analytic operation aimed at keeping thinking and writing alive, keeping them open to surprise, by keeping on the alert to the institutions in which they are housed. If language is the house of being, institutions are the house of language. That is why Derrida describes deconstruction as "an institutional practice for which the concept of institution remains a problem" (DP 88). Indeed, we are apt to be misled by speaking of "housing" as if the institution were merely external. Deconstruction is integrally, and not merely passingly or incidentally, devoted to an analysis of the way philosophy functions in an institutional setting, of philosophy and literature in the "institu- tion," as an institution or "establishment," as a socio-politico-juridico- institutional structure. For institutional structures tend to harden over and to protect philosophy from the restlessness and anarchic freedom of writing in which philosophy is inscribed. Instead of protecting phi- losophy, institutions can easily end up protecting us from philosophy. It has never been true that deconstruction consisted in some merely "internal" and "apolitical" analysis of texts, isolated and insulated from the institutions in which these texts are read and by which these read- ings are monitored. **For the institutional "context" belongs integrally to the "general" text**, the archi-textuality of which deconstruction is. the analysis. Institutions reach all the way down into the so-called internal structure of the text, making the very distinction between in- ternal and external questionable, turning the inside out and letting the outside in. The classical idea that institutions are merely external structures having nothing to do with philosophy itself, in its internal essence, **is a conservative illusion.** Deconstruction has always been a political and institutional analysis.

Legal reform is a crucial part of striving toward justice – we must deconstruct, then reconstruct the law

Buonamano 98 (Roberto, lecturer at University of Technology, Sydney. "The Economy of Violence: Derrida on Law and Justice" (June 1998), Ratio Juris vol. 11 no. 2, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9337.00083/pdf)

C. The Question of Revolt What are the implications of the economy of violence for the notion of law reform, taken in its broadest sense (re-formation, re-institution of laws or a legal system)? I wish to address this question in only a cursory way by merely raising the problematic relation of justice and revolt. It should not surprise that at the heart of each of Derrida's treatments of law is the question of revolt. We may interpret his reading of Kafka's Before the Law as, amongst other things, an attempt to conceptualise the impossibility of direct engagement with law in its pure form as implicating the necessary task of challenging, revolting against, its very presence. Similarly, we may consider Derrida's dedication to Nelson Mandela as a discussion of the stakes involved in bringing the premises of a political-legal system into question, in an attempt to effect a transformation which seeks to efface its foundations whilst aware of the inability to transcend the history of the existing and former political-legal systems. More recently, we can read in Specters of Marx (Derrida 1994) an explicit desire to account for the legacy of Marx's philosophical revolution, seeing it as indispensable to any critique of current political, legal and moral domains, particularly in light of the

hegemonic presence of global-economic and neo-liberal discourses. However, **we should avoid the** elementary conclusion that revolt is the practice of justice. It is true that Derrida maintains a relation between justice and revolution, but this relation cannot be reduced to the dominant "theory-praxis" paradigm. It may be that the act of revolt is, in certain circumstances, a condition for the exercise of justice, perhaps even a pre-condition; nonetheless, they cannot be simplistically reconciled. Revolt exists within law, albeit at its limit, rather than beyond it. In this sense, the revolution is never anarchic, if this term is understood in its ideological connotations.2 One cannot overturn fundamental laws or overthrow a legal system from without, not because one cannot be outside a legal system, but because one cannot be outside the order of law; at least, one cannot act (speak and decide with social ramifications) from beyond legal order. We might say that revolt is at the end, not in a teleological sense but as a final act in a process of affirmation of discontent, of a certain questioning of law. That is to say, revolt is the last point of this questioning process, perhaps the final question itself. Revolution is neither the beginning nor the end of counter-violence (whether or not this counter-violence is interpreted as Benjamin's divine violence); it is rather the possibility of an event which, as possibility, mediates the violence. And so, the act of revolt attacks the violent structure of law as it surrenders itself to the violence and appropriates it for its own use. We are reminded of a statement Foucault makes on the topic of revolt: that the man who revolts is outside as well as inside history (Foucault 1981, 6). We can replace the word "history" in this proposition with the history of law as violence. Of course, the importance for Foucault of the man of revolt existing inside and outside history is that revolt introduces subjectivity into history: "A delinquent puts his life into the balance against absurd punishments; a madman can no longer accept confinement and the forfeiture of his rights; a people refuses the regime which oppresses it" (Foucault 1981, 8). The revolting person or people becomes a subject of history whilst suspending the history that oppresses it. Although Derrida doesn't explicitly treat the issue of subjectivity, one can rethink the act of deconstruction, in its concern with the adoption of responsibility towards history, as tracing the relation between a subject and the presence of law within that subject, and thereby putting into question the justness of the subject's law-making actions, and ultimately the institution of law in its subject-forming mode. The problematic of revolt is conterminous with that of justice. Just as there is no pure justice, justice purified of juridical and state (mythical) power, there is no pure revolution. This is not to deny the force of revolt in challenging law and state; in fact, it is forceful precisely because it cannot be divorced from its relation to the self-preserving violence of authority, and so is able to strike at this authority with the latter's weapons. If we accept, even tentatively, Derrida's aporias on justice, we must appreciate that to revolt is not to re-make history but to understand **the history of law that survives and is revived** in each act of revolution and reconstruction.

Alt fails

Alt fails---the Surveillance State is inevitable---logical successor to the Security State

Balkin 8 (Jack M., Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School, 1/1/08, "The Constitution in the National Surveillance State", Minnesota Law Review 93.1, Accessed 7/5/15)//LD

Late in 2005, the New York Times reported that the Bush administration had ordered the National Security Agency (NSA) to eavesdrop on telephone conversations by persons in the United States in order to obtain information that might help combat terrorist attacks.1 The secret NSA program operated outside of the restrictions on government surveillance imposed by the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)2 and is thought to be only one of several such programs. 3 In 2007, Congress temporarily amended FISA to increase the President's power to listen in on conversations where at least one party is reasonably believed to be outside the United States. 4 In June 2008, Congress passed a new set of amendments to FISA, which allow the President to engage in a broad range of electronic surveillance without seeking warrants against particular individual targets of surveillance.5 At the same time, Congress effectively immunized telecommunications companies that had participated in the secret NSA program. 6 In July 2007, New York City announced that it planned to mount thousands of cameras throughout Lower Manhattan to monitor vehicles and individuals. 7 Some cameras will be able to photograph and read license plates and send out alerts for suspicious cars.8 The system of cameras will link to a series of pivoting gates installed at critical intersections, giving government officials the ability to block off traffic through electronic commands. 9 New York's new plan-called the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative-is based on London's "Ring of Steel," a security and surveillance system around London's central core that features thousands of surveillance cameras. 10 New York is hardly alone;11 the Department of Homeland Security has been quietly channeling millions of dollars to local governments around the country to create hi-tech camera networks that can be linked with private surveillance systems. 12 Security Initiative reflect a larger trend in how governments do their jobs that predates the September 11, 2001 attacks and the Bush administration's declaration of a "war on terror."13 During the last part of the twentieth century, the United States began developing a new form of governance that features the collection, collation, and analysis of information about populations both in the United States and around the world. This new form of governance is the National Surveillance State. In the National Surveillance State, the government uses surveillance, data collection, collation, and analysis to identify problems, to head off potential threats, to govern populations, and to deliver valuable social services. The National Surveillance State is a special case of the Information State-a state that tries to identify and solve problems of governance through the collection, collation, analysis, and production of information. The war on terror may be the most familiar justification for the rise of the National Surveillance State,14 but it is hardly the sole or even the most important cause. Government's increasing use of surveillance and data mining is a predictable result of accelerating developments in information technology. 15 As technologies that let us discover and analyze what is happening in the world become ever more powerful, both governments and private parties will seek to use them. 16 The question is not whether we will have a surveillance state in the years to come, but what sort of surveillance state we will have. Will we have a government without sufficient controls over public and private surveillance, or will we have a government that protects individual dignity and conforms both public and private surveillance to the rule of law? The National Surveillance State is a way of governing. It is neither the product of emergency nor the product of war. War and emergency are temporary conditions. **The National Surveillance State is a permanent feature of governance**, and will become as ubiquitous in time as the familiar devices of the regulatory and welfare states. 17 Governments will use surveillance, data collection, and data mining technologies not only to keep Americans safe from terrorist attacks but also to prevent ordinary crime and deliver social services.' 8 In fact, even today, providing basic social services-like welfare benefits-and protecting key rights-like rights against employment discrimination-are difficult, if not impossible, without extensive data collection and analysis. 19 Moreover, much of the surveillance in the National Surveillance State will be conducted and analyzed by private parties. 20 The increased demand for-and the in- creased use of-public and private surveillance cannot be explained or justified solely in terms of war or emergency. 21 The National Surveillance State **grows naturally** out of the Welfare State and the National Security State; it is their logical successor. The Welfare State governs domestic affairs by spending and transferring money and by creating government entitlements, licenses, and public works. 22 The National Security State 23 promotes foreign policy

through investments in defense industries and defense-related technologies, through creating and expanding national intelligence agencies like the CIA and the NSA, and through the placement of American military forces and weapons systems around the globe to counter military threats and project national power.

Alt can't solve---technological and bureaucratic imperatives make the Surveillance State inevitable

Balkin 8 (Jack M., Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School, 1/1/08, "The Constitution in the National Surveillance State", Minnesota Law Review 93.1, Accessed 7/5/15)//LD

One of the most important developments in American constitutionalism is the gradual transformation of the United States into a National Surveillance State. This National Surveillance State is characterized by a significant increase in government investments in technology and government bureaucracies devoted to promoting domestic security and (as its name implies) gathering intelligence and surveillance using all of the devices that the digital revolution allows. Government agencies like the NSA can collect, collate, and analyze vast amounts of conversations, e-mails, and Internet traffic between individuals within the United States and foreign countries, and, it now appears, substantial amounts of such communications within the United States. 114 A series of technological developments have made this data collection and data mining possible. High-speed computers, lower costs of telecommunication and computer storage, and complex mathematical algorithms allow computers to "recognize" patterns in speech, telephone contact information, e-mail messages, and Internet traffic that might indicate possible terrorist or criminal activity. Government officials can combine all of this information with vast amounts of consumer data collected by the government and the private sector. Various private companies now employ business models based on collecting, collating, and analyzing consumer data from a wide variety of sources; they then sell this data and analysis to other private parties and to the government. The National Surveillance State arose from a number of different features whose effects are mutually reinforcing. The most obvious causes are changes in how nations conduct war and promote their national security. As Philip Bobbitt has eloquently explained, the geopolitical demands of war and foreign policy often provide the impetus for changes in domestic political arrangements, because the way that the state faces the world outside is often reflected in the way that it faces its citizens., 15 With the United States a likely target for future terrorist attacks, electronic surveillance, data mining, and the construction of what Daniel Solove has called "digital dossiers,"' 16 have become increasingly important. Terrorist organizations can form loosely connected, geographically amorphous collectivities that present formidable threats to the United States; they can employ weapons of mass destruction or, as in the case of the September 11 attacks, relatively low-tech weaponry with suicidal zeal. New digital communications technologies allow terrorist organizations to band and disband at will, hide their identities, encrypt their communications, transfer funds and resources, and gather allies in many different places around the world. Traditional, geographically organized adversaries in the form of nation-states have fixed locations that the United States can threaten in order to deter attacks. Terrorist organizations, because they lack such fixed addresses, cannot be similarly deterred. They must be stopped as soon as their activities and plans can be identified. This necessitates constant surveillance and processing of vast amounts of information because of the expected costs of making even a single mistake in failing to identify a threat. We caution, however, that the National Surveillance State is not simply a product of the September 11 attacks. Nor is it necessarily a product of war. To begin with, it is by no means clear that the "War on Terror" is a war in the traditional sense. It is not even a long-term engagement with a small group of identifiable adversaries as in the Cold War. Rather, what people now call the "War on Terror" is a sustained set of interlocking strategies for dealing with new forms of global threats and new technologies of attack by a host of different organizations, some sponsored by nation-states, and others acting more or less on their own. 117 Equally important to the rise of the National Surveillance State are new technologies of surveillance, data storage, and computation that arrived on the scene in the latter part of the twentieth century. These would have been produced whether or not the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001. As soon as these technologies became widely available, it was **inevitable** that governments would seek to employ them, both to enjoy their advantages and to counter the dangers of the same tools in private hands. In particular, the Internet and digital information technologies have created new opportunities for crime and new vulnerabilities for the general public, for financial institutions, and for government itself. The digitally networked environment makes possible new types of crimes, like breaches of electronic security and electronic identity theft, while facilitating more traditional crimes like embezzlement, theft, and conspiracy. The digital age has altered the technologies of crime and, concomitantly, the way that the state can respond to crime. Focusing on war as the primary cause of the National Surveillance State overlooks the fact that surveillance technologies that help the state track down terrorists can also be used to track and prevent domestic crime. Once the state has these technologies in place for collecting foreign intelligence, it can use the same technologies to protect its people from crime, attacks on the information infrastructure, and virtually any other domestic problem. After the state compiles data on its citizenry-or purchases it from the private sector-it can use the information to promote a wide range of governmental policies, ranging from the delivery of health care services to tracking down deadbeat dads and people who have failed to pay their license renewal fees and state property taxes. Increased use of information in governance makes governments and those who control information flows more powerful, which makes

the information ever more valuable to governments; this causes governments to invest even more heavily in the collection, storage, and collation of data. These tendencies are spurred on by technological advances that increasingly lower the cost of telecommunications, surveillance technology, data storage, and computation power. Thus, although the transition to the National Surveillance State has been accelerated by the September 11 attacks and the Bush Administration's proclaimed War on Terror, its rise is overdetermined by a host of different **technological and bureaucratic imperatives**.

Link Turn

Only reducing surveillance can reverse the tide of biopower permeating status quo governmentality

Douglas 9 (Jeremy, peer-reviewed independent researcher, "Disappearing Citizenship: surveillance and the state of exception", Surveillance & Society 6.1 (2009), pp. 32-42, Accessed 7/6/15)//LD

There are a few sections of the Patriot Act that are worth discussing in order to demonstrate the modern state of exception, as well as its link to surveillance and the camp. Under Section 412 of the Act, entitled "Mandatory detention of suspected terrorists", the Attorney General has the power "to certify that an alien meets the criteria of the terrorism grounds of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the United States, upon a 'reasonable grounds to believe' standard, and take such aliens into custody". The Attorney General must review the detention every six months and determine if the alien is to remain in detention because of a continued risk to security. But what remains ambiguous, and allows for the indistinction between law and violence and between police and sovereignty, is this "reasonable grounds to believe standard". Suffice it to say, without going into greater depth, this 'standard' is grounds for racial profiling and the detention of political opponents. Also, the detention of aliens on a 'belief' is the production of bare life, since it is the stripping of rights without reference to a violation under 'normal' law; in other words, these "suspected terrorists" are detained without having done anything wrong, but must be situated in the state of exception camp for those who may threaten the 'normal' force of the law – this is the aforementioned void, or 'nonplace', of the law. Since these aliens cannot be detained under the normal law, a camp of suspects must emerge in a national security emergency. What is also telling about this Act is that the ten Titles may be seen as different governmental tactics, networked in one state of emergency act; Titles include, "Enhancing Domestic Security against Terrorism", "Protecting the Border", "Strengthening the Criminal Laws against Terrorism", and "Increased Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection". Foucault would be quick to point out that this Act characterizes the population conducting tactics that define governmentality: policing, disciplining, and security. However, Title II, "Enhanced Surveillance Procedures", not only becomes implicit in many of the other areas of the act that discuss "intelligence" and "security", but also allows the Act to go beyond the protection of the 'norm' in a sovereign nation-state through foreign surveillance provisions. Section 214 functions in collaboration with and amends several parts of the Foreign Intelligence Service Act 1978 (FISA) in order to allow for international surveillance activities in order identify suspected terrorists: during periods of emergency (i.e. state of exception), the US invests itself with the power to collect "foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or information to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities" (Sec. 214(b) (1)). The detention and surveillance of aliens continues though other mechanisms of jurisprudence, which, as mentioned, are becoming normalised through bills, acts, etc. that are not designed as state of emergency 'law' per se. On 13th November 2001, George W. Bush issued a military order for the "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism"; by 'certain' this order means anyone "believed" to be associated with al Qaida (PoTUS, 2001). Like with Section 412 of the Patriot Act, suspected terrorists are to be detained without a court order. Similarly, under the Terrorism Act 2000 in the UK, "A constable may arrest without a warrant a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist" (Section 41(1)). As with the US, any person detained under this Act can remain in detainment following and pending a review (Schedule 8, Part II). The Disappearance of Citizenship4 What we have been discussing thus far applies to the "indefinite" and "mandatory" detention of aliens, but the Patriot Act and the Terrorism Act contain various sections on increased surveillance measures that target aliens and native citizens alike. These surveillance activities include the collection of DNA from anyone detained for any offence or suspected of terrorism, phone taps, wiretaps for electronic communications, the collection of individual library records (Section 215; this Section in particular has received heavy criticism and debate), the collection of banking and financial records, and other indirect surveillance methods, such as the collection of biometric data at US borders (as Agamben experienced). However, these universal surveillance methods become much more significant when we consider the proposed increased governmental powers outlined in the Domestic Security Enhancement Act 2003 (alias, Patriot Act II). Under Section 501 of Patriot Act II the "mandatory dentition" of aliens suspected of terrorism extends to include Americans, who can also be stripped of their citizenship and made stateless detainees. As Gore Vidal remarks, "under Patriot Act I only foreigners were denied due process of law as well as subject to arbitrary deportation... Patriot Act II now includes American citizens in the same category, thus eliminating in one great erasure the Bill of Rights" (Vidal 2003). Section 501, "Expatriation of Terrorists", of the Act states: This provision (i.e. Section 501) would amend 8 U.S.C. § 1481 to make clear that, just as an American can relinquish his citizenship by serving in a hostile foreign army, so can he relinquish his citizenship by serving in a hostile terrorist organization. Specifically, an American could be expatriated if, with the intent to relinquish nationality, he becomes a member of, or provides material support to, a group that the United States has designated as a "terrorist organization," if that group is engaged in hostilities against the United States. With the power proposed in this section of the Patriot Act II, the government would be able to produce bare life with both aliens and American citizens – "a process leading to the disappearance of citizenship by transforming the residents into 'foreigners within', a new sort of untouchable [homo sacer], in the transpolitical and anational state where the living are nothing more than the 'living dead'" (Virilio 2005, 165). We have seen how a permanent state of emergency creates a situation in which foreign residents or visitors can be detained without a court order for an indefinite period of time;

even greater governmental powers are now aiming at expanding this exposure to the pure power of the juridical-political system to citizens as well. Citizenship and political significance are becoming less fundamental and inalienable rights and more categorizations that are only maintained though **blind adherence to so-called democratic polices**, which look more and more like a dictatorial structure (see: Arendt 1973).

Surveillance is key to modern governmentality---curtailment ruptures the state of exception

Douglas 9 (Jeremy, peer-reviewed independent researcher, "Disappearing Citizenship: surveillance and the state of exception", Surveillance & Society 6.1 (2009), pp. 32-42, Accessed 7/6/15)//LD

Before we can even ask why a state uses surveillance mechanisms, we need to define what state structure we are talking about. Following Foucault, governmentality best describes our current political situation, as it is above all concerned with managing the internal structure of the state according to a biopoliticization of the population, rather than maintaining the power over life and death, as is characteristic of sovereign politics. Governmentality is literally an 'art' of governing, in which the population is 'conducted' through various relations and tactics employed by the state, such as institutions, security, statistics, and surveillance. So, governmentality is the structure in which surveillance can operate as one of the arms of state power. When we move towards the juridical-political situation of the state of exception, we see another area in which surveillance plays a crucial biopolitical role. The use of exceptional legal measures in order to protect the 'normal' force of law is what defines the state of exception. The 'normal' law that is suspended is often that which guarantees the rights and the citizenship of foreign and national citizens; thus, under an exceptional juridical situation, individuals with no political significance are produced: bare life. The USA Patriot Act (among other documents) embodies this loss of rights, production of bare life, and increased surveillance based on a perceived national threat. The state of exception, Agamben argues, is becoming more and more the normal course of politics – this is nowhere more exemplary than in the camp. The camp is the place where bare life is produced and the exception becomes the rule. Yet, the Roman camp in Judea shows us that the emersion of surveillance in a camp-'state of exception'- territory structure is nothing new. What is primarily 'modern' is not biopolitics (Foucault) or the camp (Agamben), but the governmental control of the disappearance of citizenship. With digital technology, the erasure of a definite 'here' or 'there' means that the localised camp is no longer a paradigmatic 'place' where the limit of the state of exception is realised; rather, the non-place of a population in constant movement is what defines the new non-place of the city camp. Thus, **surveillance is deeply imbedded in and necessary for** the governmental system that seeks to be instantly aware of any potential threats to the state so that it can quash those threats by depoliticizing 'dangerous' portions of the population and exposing them to the pure potentiality of the 'management' of life.

Surveillance allows management of life---reducing surveillance closes the potentiality for universalization of bare life

Douglas 9 (Jeremy, peer-reviewed independent researcher, "Disappearing Citizenship: surveillance and the state of exception", Surveillance & Society 6.1 (2009), pp. 32-42, Accessed 7/6/15)//LD

One particular Jewish work camp in the Judea Desert, occupied and run by the Romans, was actually a complex of pre-existing structures from the Hellenistic and Islamic periods. The site consists of one large watchtower structure and two smaller structures downhill from the watchtower. The layout of this Hellenistic site functioned as an ideal work camp quarry for the Romans, although it had originally been constructed as an Islamic burial ground and temporary shelter for travellers. A recent excavation of the camp (Yekutieli et al. 2006) revealed a number of potsherds and heaths that were carbon-dated to the first and second century CE. Some of these remains were found along the slope of the tower, which contained a number of small (1x2m) rock shelters, while other remains were discovered on the summit of the tower, which, through a crevice, looks down over the slope and the other structures; these findings reveal that people were living in the shelters as well as at the summit. What is unique about this camp is the way in which the territory is manipulated in order to allow for the surveillance of the

workers. From the lookout crevice at the top of the tower, one can see the entire landscape, including the quarry, workers' shelters, cooking areas, etc., without being seen by anyone in those locations. Further, the layout of the shelters on the slope allowed one to see no more than two other shelters at a time (ibid, 76). From these observations, we can see that the architecture of the camp was designed so as to allow for a panoptic power structure in which the Romans could achieve the subjectivization of the detainees through their awareness of a potential observer. This type of structure, which allows for an unseen seer to watch over individuals occupying a given territory, is nothing new – in fact, such surveillance structures have been recorded from as far back as the Early Bronze Age (3000-2650 BC) (ibid, 78-85). However, these earlier surveillance systems were used in order to guard a territory against an attack, as with the lookout towers constructed at the top of castles. What distinguishes the Roman work camp from other ancient surveillance mechanisms is the way in which is it integrated into, and in many ways the precondition for, the political structure that creates the camp. The encampment of rebellious Jews characterizes the state of emergency, in which 'normal' law is suspended in order to use any means necessary to protect the interest of the sovereign. Thus, the Jews in the camp must be removed from the political realm and treated as bare life that must be constantly monitored and exposed to the potentiality of violence. As we shall see, this camp serves a paradigmatic example of affects of surveillance, insofar as it is the amalgamation of the state of exception, bare life, violence, law, biopolitics, territory, and governmentality; not to mention that evidence of surveillance and camp structures that existed thousands of years ago demonstrates that none of these concepts are new and modern phenomena. Governmentality is able to function as the control of the population and the creation of bare life because it employs **surveillance as a crucial tactic in the management of life** – this is clearly presented in the Roman camp example. However, although many of the concepts and techniques we see at work in the camp are not fundamentally different today, not everything has remained the same. The importance of a juridical political system that acts according to the state of exception, or suspension of the law, is evident in the emergence of recent totalitarian and 'democratic' permanent states of emergency; for example, the UK and the US have normalised the exception through the passing of 'laws' (Terrorism Act, Patriot Act, etc.) that essentially nullify the application of normal laws protecting human rights, while still holding them technically 'in force'. We see also that these 'exceptional' laws go **hand in hand with increased surveillance**, both of which are tactics that establish control of the population. Yet what remains to be analysed is the relation(s) between surveillance, territory, and the state of exception – how does surveillance allow for the rise of the state of exception and the camp? And, more broadly, how are all there concepts integrated in an art of government? Surveillance must be regarded as the point at which the camp and the bare of the state of exception intersect in the governmental control of the population. Defining the Terms: Foucault and Agamben Although Michel Foucault wrote a book (Discipline and Punish) that dealt extensively with one method of surveillance, the panoptic, his more useful contribution to the theory of surveillance comes from his study of 'governmentality', or the 'art' of governing. In the course of his 1970s lectures at the College de France, Foucault underwent a significant shift in the emphasis of his theory, moving from the power-territory relationship of sovereignty to the politico-economic governmentality of population; the concept of sovereignty concerned with maintaining power and territory is a dated pre-modern concept, and what needs to be analysed now is the governing of a population though various circulatory (that is, relational) mechanisms: "it is not expanse of land that contributes to the greatness of the state, but fertility and the number of men" (Fleury quoted in Foucault 2007, 323). In other words, what is emerging in Foucault's writings, beginning with The History of Sexuality Vol 1, is the concept of biopolitics: "the management of life rather than the menace of death" (Foucault 1990, 143). Broadly, what is taking place in Foucault's works and lectures in the mid to late 1970s is his description of the differences (not transitions) between "sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management" (Foucault 2007, 107). The essential goal of sovereignty is to maintain power, which is achieved when laws are obeyed and the divine right of the throne is reaffirmed. 'Power' is the essential defining component of sovereignty, while 'government' is more or less just an administrative component within the sovereign state – a component that is the function of the family; the family, oikos, in ancient Greece was the private management (government) of economic matters where the father ensured the security, health, wealth, and goods of his wife and children, while the polis was the public realm where man realised his political significance in striving for "the good life". The rise of government in the sixteenth century is marked by this family government model being "applied to the state as a whole" (ibid, 93), as well as by the rise of "mercantilism" - the former not realizing its full scope and application until the eighteenth century and the latter being a stage of rason d'état between sovereignty and governmentality. However, when the art of governing becomes the predominant 'goal' of the state in the eighteenth century, the family is relegated to the position of an "instrument" and population emerges as the "main target" (ibid, 108) of the government (territory is the main target of sovereignty insofar as a sovereign defines itself according to its territory, while government defines itself in term of its population). With population as the central concern for government, other institutions and sites - such as territory, the family, security (military), police, and discipline - all become "elements" or "instruments" in the management of the population – these biopolitical tactics are what primarily distinguish governmentality from sovereignty. Conduct and Subjectivization Foucault wants to situate bio-power in the multiplicity of relations within the overarching structure of the state, and therefore not discard the notion of 'power' but instead couch it in terms of governmentality. Biopolitics is produced in the relations between biological life and political power (bio-power), which is possible when a population is confronted with and in relation to the biopoliticizing (not to be confused with disciplining) techniques of institutions, territory, police, security, and surveillance; rather than positing a sovereign-people dialectic (which Agamben tends to do), Foucault wants to complicate the notion of biopolitics by accounting for a state that "spreads it tentacles" (Virilio 1997, 12) through its various instruments and tactics. It seems as though, with the beginning of a governmentality discourse developing in the Security, Territory, Population course, Foucault feels he has said enough about biopolitics as such and can now move towards the art and techniques of governmental and subjective "conduct", in which biopolitics is implicit. Yet what emerges is, on the one hand, a theory of the **top-down management** of a population that is controlled through governmental mechanisms such as statistics-guided surveillance and police practices, and, on the other hand, the bottom-up subjectivization of population through the regulation of actions confronted with state power relations; this may also be regarded as biopolitical population control and individualizing discipline, respectively. These two streams of governmentality surface in Foucault's later writings from time to time, but he never clearly reconciles the art of government and subjectivization. This subjective 'conduct' or 'governing the self' is a self-disciplining that is made possible through the knowledge of oneself as 'the other', as the object of an unseen seer (as is discussed with the panoptic model in Discipline and Punish). This self-conduct, however, is framed in terms of the problematic of government that uses the power relation techniques of governing others to govern themselves (Foucault 2000, 340-342); but again, where do these two points converge and differ? It seems as though we must look to surveillance to answer this question. We know that surveillance is certainly a governmental 'technique' for the management and control of the population, but we also see that subjectivization is only possible via surveillance, as just mentioned with the panoptic model. However, panoptic surveillance is an ancient notion, developed at least as far back as EBII, sometime around 3000-2650BC (Yekutieli 2006, 78). The relation between the seer and the subject is no longer that of a physical perspective from a point fixe, nor is it localised in a contained space, as with Bentham's prison model. Rather, as Paul Virilio would argue, surveillance is making the traditionally confined space of the camp the very centre of the city. However, before examining the juridical-political applications of this notion, we must understand Giorgio Agamben's conception of biopolitics in terms of "bare life" and "the state of exception". Redefining Biopolitics Following and 'completing' Foucault's discussion of biopolitics, Agamben seeks to further explore the relation between state power and life, not in terms of governmentality, but rather, in terms of sovereign power. That is, what affect(s) does the state have upon the lives of citizens in relations of

power and control? In a sense, Agamben's position is formulated in accordance with what Arendt and Foucault failed to do: Agamben completes Arendt's discussion of totalitarian power, "in which a biopolitical perspective is altogether lacking" (Agamben 1998, 4), and completes Foucault's discussion of biopolitics, which fails to address the most paradigmatic examples of modern biopolitics, such totalitarianism and the camp. This revision of Arendt and Foucault is achieved through the exemplification of the state of exception and bare life, which find their ultimate realization in modern examples of the camp. But first, it is necessary to understand how Agamben arrives at this conclusion. In Politics, Aristotle distinguishes between natural, simple life1 , Zoë, and political life, bios. Zoe is private life confined to the home, oikos, while bios is life that exists in the public (political) realm of the city, the polis; the former is life regulated by the economy of the family, while the latter is "good life" regulated by the state. It appears, then, that Zoë and bios are mutually exclusive, and man moves from an animal life to a distinct political life, as Aristotle seems to argue. Foucault picks up on this Aristotelian animal/political life when he writes of the "threshold of biological modernity" (Foucault 1990, 143), in The History of Sexuality, and modifies it to reflect the transition from a politics of the power-limit of death to the politicization of biological (or, more accurately, zoological – i.e. Zoë-logical) life: "For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal [Zoë] with the additional capacity for a political existence [bios]; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question" (ibid). The distinction between Zoë and bios is called into question; what were once two distinct forms of life are now indistinguishable – biology has become political and politics has become biological, giving rise to biopolitics. Agamben's claim, however, is that Foucault, Arendt, and others have misread Aristotle; in interpreting Aristotle, they believe that "the human capacity for political organization is not only different from but stands in direct opposition to that natural association whose center is the home (oikia) and the family" (Arendt 1998, 24, author's italics). On the contrary, the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of life in politics – that is, the production of a biopolitcal life - is the "original activity of sovereign power" (Agamben 1998, 6). Although Aristotle appears to present zoe and bios as polar forms of life – animal versus political – he provides indications that the supposed exclusion of natural life from the political realm is at the same time its inclusion, and therefore the originary biopolitical act: "we may say that while [the polis] grows for the sake of mere life, it exists for the sake of a good life" (Aristotle quoted in Politics, Metaphysics, and Death, 3). This implies, as Agamben notes, that natural life had to "transform" itself into political life; political life is not "in direct opposition" to natural life, then, but is born of it. The very notion of bios is itself only possible through its inclusion of zoe – "Nation-state means a state that makes nativity or birth (that is, naked human life) the foundation of its own sovereignty" (Agamben 1998, 20); biopolitics is this indistinction between private life and public life, an "undecidability…between life and law" (Agamben 2005, 86). Bare Life and the State of Exception This conception of biopolitics as an ancient and founding notion of sovereignty needs to be distinguished from what Agamben terms "bare life" or "homo sacer" (life that may be killed but not sacrificed). Biopolitical life, as mentioned above, is still within the juridical-political realm, but bare life is that which is banished from the polis. It is not pure political life as such, but a life that exists at the threshold between zoe and bios. Bare life is the indistinguishability between natural life and political life – a life that exists neither for the sake of politics nor for the sake of life: "bare life…dwells in the no-man's-land between the home and the city" (Agamben 1998, 90). It is a life that is banished from politics – outside of law – but included in its exclusion – still within the 'force of law': The ban is essentially the power of delivering something over to itself, which is to say, the power of maintaining itself in relation to something presupposed as nonrelational [i.e. bare life]. What has been banned is delivered over to its own separateness and, at the same time, consigned to the mercy of the one who abandons it – at once excluded and included, removed and at the same time captured. (ibid, 110) How is this possible? How can bare life be excluded and included? What implications would this have? In order to understand how bare life is produced and how it can exists both within and outside of the polis, it is necessary to introduce another concept: state of exception. This notion is derived, by in large, from Carl Schmitt's book Political Theology, as well as from a fairly extensive debate between Walter Benjamin and Schmitt concerning the nature of the state of exception. The state of exception is a "suspension of law", which is usually instituted during a period of war or another state of emergency: "The exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like" (Schmitt 1922, 6). Under the state of exception there becomes a 'threshold' between law that is in the norm but is suspended and law that is not the norm – i.e. not necessarily part of the juridical order – but is in force; so, in the state of exception there appears this "ambiguous and uncertain zone in which de facto proceedings, which are themselves extra- or antijuridical, pass over into law, and juridical norms blur with the mere fact – that is, a threshold where fact and law seem to become undecidable" (Agamben 2005, 29). What needs to be underlined here is the relation between the state of exception and bare life. This point is absolutely crucial for Agamben and for understanding the role of governmental surveillance: **the state of exception opens up the possibility of bare life** and of the camp, where bare life is outside law but constantly exposed to violence and "unsanctionable killing" (Agamben 1994, 82). Agamben's position can be understood in the triadic relation 'state of exception-camp-bare life'; the ultimate power of the sovereign, and the complete dissolution of democracy into totalitarianism – two political systems that, according to Agamben, already have an "inner solidarity" (ibid, 10) – happens at the point when the state of exception becomes the rule and the camp emerges as the permanent realization of the indistinguishability between violence and law, to which we all, as homines sacri, are exposed. The paradigmatic example is, of course, Nazi Germany; but what remains to be seen is how this triad can be applied to our current political milieu. The Potentiality of/for Violence Perhaps the closest Agamben comes to discussing the relations between the state of exception and surveillance is his 11th January 2004 article in Le Monde, entitled, "No to Bio-Political Tattooing" (Agamben, 2004). This article comes as a result of Agamben's cancellation of a course he was scheduled to teach at New York University that March. The reason he cancelled the course was because he was denied entry to the US as a result of his refusal to provide biometric data as part of post-9/11 US security measures. The resulting article is mostly a brief, simplistic version of his book Homo Sacer, but Agamben does imply that modern security and surveillance techniques are emerging as the new paradigm (though not to the extent of the camp) of the state of exception, in which the exception has become the rule: There has been an attempt the last few years to convince us to accept as the humane and normal dimensions of our existence, practices of control that had always been properly considered inhumane and exceptional. Thus, no one is unaware that the control exercised by the state through the usage of electronic devices, such as credit cards or cell phones, has reached previously unimaginable levels. (Agamben 2004) Electronic and biometric surveillance are the tactics through which the government is creating a space in which the exception is routine practice. **The biopolitical implication of surveillance is the universalization of bare life**: "History teaches us how practices first reserved for foreigners find themselves applied later to the rest of the citizenry" (ibid). These new control measures have created a situation in which not only is there no clear distinction between private and political life, but there is no fundamental claim, or right, to a political life as such – not even for citizens from birth; thus, the originary biopolitical act that inscribes life as political from birth is more and more a potential depoliticization and ban from the political realm. We are all exposed to the stateless potentiality of a bare life excluded from the political realm, but not outside the violence of the law (and therefore still included): "states, which should constitute the precise space of political life, have made the person the ideal suspect, to the point that it's humanity itself that has become the dangerous class" (ibid). Making people suspects is equivalent to making people bare life – it is the governmental (a Foucauldian governmentality rather than an Agambenian sovereignty I would argue) production of a life exposed to the pure potentiality of the state of exception: "the sovereign ban, which applies to the exception in no longer applying, corresponds to the structure of potentiality, which maintains itself in relation to actuality precisely through its ability not to be" (Agamben 1994, 46). **Surveillance is the technique that opens up this potentiality**, which allows for the normalization of the exception. In this particular instance – i.e. biometric data collection and surveillance in the US – **the state of exception as a permanent form of governmentality** and the universalization of homines sacri has been brought into existence though the USA Patriot Act2 and the Patriot Act II3. I have used the term 'potentiality' a number of times precisely to point to the state in which the citizens (or, more broadly, the population) of a

number of countries find themselves. The potentiality I want to analyse can follow two directions: it is the potentiality to be stripped of citizenship, to be banned, to be abandoned to the law, and to be subjected to political violence, or it is the potentiality for the government to exercise violence and exceptional law upon the population. So, this potentiality can be both negative and positive. Although violence becomes indistinguishable from law – or, more specifically, indistinguishable from surveillance and control in the state of exception, what needs to be emphasised is that it is not a power relation of pure violence, but rather, of potential violence. It is important, as Benjamin notes in "Critique of Violence", to understand that violence is a function of the power mechanisms of the government (although Benjamin would probably say 'sovereign'): "the law's interest in a monopoly of violence vis-à-vis individuals is not explained by the intention of preserving legal ends but, rather, by that of preserving the law itself; that violence, when not in the hands of the law, threatens it not by the ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law" (Benjamin 1933, 136). The state of exception arises when the population threatens to take violence away from the law – the population (rather than individuals per se) are regulated by surveillance methods, in order to ensure that the 'norm' of the law is not threatened; and for this norm to remain 'in force' an indefinite period of state of exception is often exercised, as we see with the example of the USA Patriot Act. The American State of Exception Surveillance and the External 'Threat' This politics of potentiality is created through the de facto 'laws' of state of exception legislation like the Patriot Act. Looking at actual parts of the Act, we can see that it exemplifies the state of emergency referred to by Agamben et al.; the 'normal' law of the state is not abolished but its "application is suspended" so that it still technically "remains in force" (Agamben 2003, 31). As such, the suspension of the normal application of the law is done "on the basis of its right of self-preservation" (Schmitt 1985, 12), so that the exception is that which must produce and guarantee the norm. Obviously then the state of exception is not intended to be anything more than a temporary safeguarding of normal law. In fact, there can be no 'normal' law without the state of exception: "the state of exception allows for the foundation and definition of the normal legal order" (Agamben 1999, 48). The use of the state of emergency to protect the normality of the legal order dates back at least as far as the Roman Empire. Whenever the Senate believed the state to be in danger, they could implement the iustitium, which allowed for the consuls "to take whatever measures they considered necessary for the salvation of the state" (Agamben 2005, 41).

AT: Law Bad

Law Good

Reforms are possible and desirable---tangible change outweighs the risk of cooption and is still a better strategy than the alt

Omi 13 (Michael, Berkeley ethnic studies professor, "Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias", Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36.6, Taylor and Francis)

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the 'white racial frame' evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss **important rearrangements and reforms** as merely 'a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society' (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call 'surface flexibility' to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase 'racial democracy' is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial democracy, **capable of being influenced** towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we 'overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities' (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about 'racial reaction' in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because **they are in substantial agreement with us**. While we argue that the right wing was able to 'rearticulate' race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his 'interest convergence hypothesis' effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – 'We have lost the South for a generation' – count as 'convergence'? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls 'passive revolutions' – **cannot be merely symbolic** if they are to be effective: **oppositions must win real gains in the process.** Once again, **we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule.** So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the **broad terrain of the state** and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily

interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined 'others' and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other 'new social movements': second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others. By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same 'rearticulation' (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of 'colourblindness' and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various 'backlash' phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of 'colourblindness', reveal the transformative character of the 'politicization of the social'. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today.

Commitment to objective legal reasoning is the only way to constrain violence – any alternative paints the law as indeterminate which justifies illegality

Ristroph 9 (Alice, Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, "Is Law? Constitutional Crisis and Existential Anxiety," Constitutional Commentary Vol. 25, 431-459. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1457&context=facpub)

One reason to care whether law is in "crisis" concerns our own expectations of the function of law. A possible achievement is to offer an alternative to violence —as we saw in Levinson and Balkin's account of the Constitution as enabling nonviolent dispute resolution.66 This might be called the anti-Thrasymachus view of law. Early in Plato's Republic (before Socrates has tamed him), a young man called Thrasymachus describes justice as "the advantage of the stronger."67 The claim is that might makes right, and Western political and legal thought has produced many efforts to prove Thrasymachus and his heirs wrong. If law distinguishes right from might, then it becomes important to say what law is, and to show that it exists. Hence, many ongoing jurisprudential debates about the criteria for a valid and functional system of law (including worries about legal indeterminacy) are motivated by worries about arbitrary power and violence.68 To show Thrasymachus to be mistaken, we want to show that the rule of law is really different from the rule of (the strongest) men. In legal theory, we could view John Austin's positivism— law as commands backed by threats of punishment—as a descendant of Thrasymachus's claim.69 Here, I want to examine briefly one of the most influential, and most plausible, efforts to show that law is something more and different from the commands of a gunman: H. L. A. Hart's response to Austin. Hart framed his discussion around the question, "What is law?".70 But perhaps, as the Stoppard passage that opened this essay suggests, beginning with this question led us to conjure an image of law with various predicates that do not, as it turns out, include existence. A second form of existential anxiety, one that I suspect shapes present talk of crisis, is the anxiety that Thrasymachus and Austin were right and law, if it is anything more than command and force, does not exist. For my purposes here, the critical features of Hart's account are the rule of recognition and the internal point of view. Since, in most of The Concept of Law, Hart takes law's existence for granted, it is helpful to look at the passages where law's existence, or at least the existence of a particular form of law, is up for grabs. In his classic discussion of the question, "Is international law really law?", H. L. A. Hart deployed the concepts of a rule of recognition and the internal point of view to conclude that international law was at most in a state of transition toward fully legal law, moving toward law properly so called but certainly not yet there.71 At the time he wrote The Concept of Law, Hart believed that international law departed from domestic (or "municipal") law in that it lacked a widely accepted rule of recognition and in that states could not be said to take the internal point of view toward international obligations. (Hart's argument has been challenged by many contemporary scholars of international law, but that particular dispute need not occupy us here.72) For law qua law to exist, Hart argued, there must be a rule of recognition under which the authoritative status of other rules was accepted or denied, and the officials who would apply the rule of recognition must themselves take the internal point of view toward it. That is, the officials needed to view the rule of recognition as a binding, authoritative guide to their own decisions. Suppose Hart was right and the rule of recognition and the internal point of view are conditions for the existence of law. Two questions arise: what is the rule of recognition for constitutional law, and who must hold the internal standpoint toward that rule? The Constitution itself initially seems a candidate for the rule of recognition, though the fact that the Constitution must itself be interpreted leads some theorists to amend this account and say that the rule of recognition must include authoritative statements of the meaning of the Constitution, under prevailing interpretive standards.73 As for the internal point of view, we might hope that all state officials would take this point of view toward constitutional rules.74 In other words, we might hope that every state actor would comply with the U.S. Constitution because it is the Constitution, not simply to avoid injunctions, or judicial invalidation of legislative action, or liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But Hart's theory does not demand universal adherence to an internal point of view. Even if legislators and other public officials complied with First or Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment doctrine only to avoid invalidation or § 1983 liability —even if these public officials were the equivalent of Holmes's bad man— Hart might find that constitutional law still existed in a meaningful sense so long as the judges applying constitutional rules believed themselves to be bound by a constitutional rule of recognition.75 Here is a possibility, one I believe we must take seriously and one that prompts anxiety about the existence of constitutional law itself: there is no common rule of recognition toward which judges and other officials take an internal point of view.76 Individual judges may adhere to their particular understandings of the rule of recognition and the Constitution as interpreted by proper originalist methods, for example, or the Constitution as elucidated by popular understandings. But the fact that individual state actors follow their own rules of recognition in good faith does not satisfy Hart's account of law, and it does not provide a satisfying alternative to Thrasymachus. (There is no reason, on the might-makes-right account, that the mighty cannot hold the good faith belief that they are pursuing a common good or acting pursuant to rule-governed authority. What matters is that their power is in fact traceable to their superior strength.) There is reason for academic observers to doubt the existence of a single rule of recognition in American constitutional law. There are too many core interpretive disputes, as discussed in Part I, and it is now widely accepted that constitutional rules are at least underdeterminatc. Should there be doubt about this claim, consider this feature of constitutional law textbooks: they include majority and dissenting opinions, and questions after each case frequently ask the reader which opinion was more persuasive. Those questions are not posed as rhetorical. For most constitutional decisions, we can say, it could have been otherwise. With a few votes switched, with a different line-up of Justices, the same precedents (and in some cases, the same interpretive methodology) could have produced a different outcome. Moreover, these suspicions of indeterminancy or underdetermi-nancy are not the unique province of the academy. Think of the discussions of Supreme Court appointments in presidential elections. Many voters, law professors or not, understand their vote for president to be also a vote for a certain kind of Justice and for certain kinds of constitutional outcomes. Discussions of Supreme Court appointments are often framed in terms of judicial methodology —"I will appoint judges who are faithful to the text of the Constitution" —but that language may be more a matter of decorum than of real constitutional faith. Judges, of course, are not ignorant of the charges of indeterminancy or of the politicization of judicial appointments. And it seems possible that the erosion of constitutional faith has reached the judiciary itself.771 claim no special insight into judicial psychology, but it seems implausible that the reasons for constitutional skepticism—the discussions of underdetermined rules, the contingency of outcomes based on 5-4 votes, and the great attention to swing justices such as Sandra Day O'Connor or Anthony Kennedy—have not influenced judges themselves. Here again it seems worthwhile to consider dissenting opinions. Justice Scalia's polemics come to mind immediately; he has often accused his colleagues of acting lawlessly.78 When he keeps his point and continues to participate in a system that treats as law the determinations of five (potentially lawless) Justices. It is possible, I suppose, that Justice Scalia's dissents express earnest outrage, that he is shocked (shocked) by decisions like Lawrence v. Texas79 and Boumediene. It is possible that he believes himself to be the last best hope of constitutional law properly so called. But it seems more likely that he shares the skepticism of academic observers of the Court. Though one can't help but wonder whether judges are still constitutionally devout, I should emphasize here that my argument does not turn on a claim that judges are acting in good or bad faith. Individual judges may well take the internal point of view, in Hart's terms, and strive faithfully to apply the principles they recognize as law. But it seems clear that American judges do not all hold the internal point of view toward a single, shared rule of recognition, given the nature of disagreements among judges themselves. If there are multiple rules of recognition, varying from judge to judge, then legal outcomes will depend on which judge is empowered to make the critical decision, and Thrasymachus is not so far off the mark. Contemporary judicial disagreement is profound, and it is not just a matter of Justice Scalia's flair for colorful rhetoric. Consider Scott v. Harris, the recent decision granting summary judgment (on the basis of qualified immunity) to a police officer who had rammed a passenger car during a high-speed chase, causing an accident that left the driver a quadriplegic.80 Like most use-of-force opinions, the decision applies a deferential Fourth Amendment standard that gives police officers wide leeway. What is unusual about Harris is that, because the case arose as a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the critical question (whether the driver, Victor Harris, posed a sufficient threat to others' bodily safety such that the use of deadly force was

reasonable) was nominally a jury question, and at summary judgment, the court should have taken the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—the injured driver. Thus, in earlier use-of-force cases that reached the Court as § 1983 claims, the Court articulated the Fourth Amendment standard and then remanded the case to the trial court.81 But in Harris, the Court had access to videotapes of the chase recorded by cameras on the dashboards of the police vehicles involved.82 In the view of the eight-Justice majority, the videotape "spoke for itself": it made Harris's threat to the public so clear that no reasonable juror could conclude that the officer's use of force was unreasonable.83 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found the officer to be entitled to summary judgment.84 Doubtless there are many instances in which a court grants summary judgment to one party though non-judicial observers believe a reasonable juror could find for the other party. Harris is of particular interest, though, because the "reasonable juror" who might have found in favor of Victor Harris was clearly visible to the majority—in fact, this juror had a spokesman on the Court. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in Scott v. Harris, viewed the same videotape and found it to confirm the factual findings of the district court (which had denied the police offic-er's motion for summary judgment).85 Though Justice Stevens was careful not to base his argument on an actual determination of the substantive Fourth Amendment question (chiding his colleagues for doing just that and thereby acting as "jurors" rather than judges),86 he viewed the video evidence and explained how one might conclude, perfectly reasonably, that Scott had used excessive force.87 In order for the eight Justices in the Harris majority to believe their own opinion, they would have to conclude that Justice Stevens lived outside the realm of reason. Harris is nominally a dispute about what reasonable jurors could conclude, rather than a direct argument about the meaning of a particular constitutional provision. But the two reactions to the videotape should call to mind Larry Tribe's worry that American constitutional law is plagued by "deep and thus far intractable divisions between wholly different ways of assessing truth and experiencing reality."88 It is not just abortion and assisted suicide that reveal profound disagreement about what is true and real. A videotape that "speaks for itself" in the eyes of eight Justices says something entirely different to the ninth. Looking beyond the judiciary, consider the consequences of constitutional disagreement and constitutional indeterminacy for other government officials and for would-be critics of those officials. Earlier I noted that with sufficient constitutional indeterminacy, there's no such thing as an unconstitutional president. A more extreme version of this argument is that **with sufficient legal indeterminancy, there's no such thing as illegality**. When John Yoo wrote the Office of Legal Counsel memos that defend practices formerly known as torture, he was simply doing to bans on torture what critics had long argued it was possible to do for any law: he was trashing them.89 This was the spawn of CLS put to work in the OLC; **deconstructions on the left are now deconstructions on the right**.90 And that, of course, is cause for anxiety among those who would like to argue that George W. Bush or members of his administration acted illegally. As I suggested in the Introduction, **this may be the Pyrrhic victory of critical legal studies: If the crits were correct, then there is no distinctively legal form of critique. About torture, indefinite detention, warrantless wiretapping, and so on, we can say I don't like it or it doesn't correspond to my vision of the good, but we cannot say it's illegal.** To argue that the Bush administration violated the rule of law, we need to believe that the rule of law exists. But for 30 years or more, we have found reasons to doubt that it does.91 Perhaps it will seem that I am overstating the influence of legal realism and critical legal studies, or the doubts about law's existence. I'm willing to entertain those possibilities, but I do want to emphasize that the focus is on constitutional law. It's easy enough to believe in law when we see it applied and enforced by figures of authority in a recognized hierarchy. That is, the sentencing judge or the prison warden can believe in law—he has applied it himself. And the criminal should believe in law—he has felt its force. But these examples illustrate Austinian law: commands backed by force. What remains elusive, on my account, are laws that are truly laws given to oneself, and especially law given by a state to itself.92 That is why, in Part I of this essay, I suggested that brute force is a poor candidate to distinguish ordinary politics, or ordinary legal decisions, from extraordinary moments of crisis. What would be truly extraordinary is not the use of force, but its absence: a system of law truly based on consent and independent of sanction. The Constitution, in theory, is a law given unto oneself. By this I mean not simply that the Founders gave the Constitution to future generations, but that each successive generation must give the Constitution to itself: each generation must adopt the internal point of view toward the Constitution in order for it to be effective. Even once we have accepted the written text as authoritative, all but the strictest constructionists acknowledge that many meanings can plausibly be extracted from that text. (And even the strict constructionists must acknowledge that as a factual matter many meanings have been extracted; they deny only the plausibility of those varied readings.) Any law given unto oneself requires what Hart called the internal point of view, and what one more cynical might describe as self-delusion: it requires a belief that one is bound though one could at any minute walk away. It is possible, I think, that we have outwitted the Constitution: that we have become too clever, too quick to notice indeterminancy, even too post-modern to believe ourselves bound. A third possible explanation for contemporary references to crisis is professional malaise. It could be, as I suggested earlier, that after too many years of chewing what judges had for breakfast, professors have lost their appetites. It could be that the problems of originalists and historicists and popular constitutionalists don't amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world. And if these possibilities have not crossed the law professor's mind, they probably should. We might consider again Larry Tribe's explanation of his decision to stop work on his treatise of American constitutional law. There are two questions of meaning there, one of which Tribe confronts directly and the other which he brushes off quickly. Most obviously, there is the search for constitutional meaning, as Tribe acknowledges, a search that cannot be concluded within the Constitution's own text. "I see no escape from adopting some perspective… external to the constitution itself from which to decide questions not indisputably resolved one way or the other by the text and structure-------"9* Tribe goes on to wonder where these extra-constitutional criteria come from, and "who ratified the meta-constitution that such external criteria would comprise?".94 Supreme Court Justices (and other judges) must struggle with these questions, given "the public authority that they have the enormous responsibility and privilege to wield."95 But Tribe need not. He can simply decline to finish the treatise. If he declines to finish the treatise, though, we can't help asking ourselves what was at stake, and what remains at stake. If the law professor lacks the responsibility of a judge, is his constitutional theory just an amusing hobby? What was the point of the constitutional law treatise, or of other efforts to discern coherent principles of constitutional law? The significance of a treatise is the question of meaning that Tribe brushes off quickly: he says a treatise is an "attempt at a synthesis of some enduring value" and insists that his decision is not based on doubts about whether constitutional treatises are ever worthwhile.96 But Tribe's letter leaves the "enduring value" of a treatise rather underspecified, and it is possible that current references to constitutional crisis in the academy stem from uncertainty about such questions of value. Is constitutional theory good for absolutely nothing? Only if we believe that the effort to resist Thrasymachus is futile or pointless. Constitutional theory is a species of legal and political theory, and the most intriguing forms of such theory are produced by worries that law and violence are too closely intertwined.97 Thus I suggested at the outset of this essay that existential anxiety is not always to be regretted, cured, or mocked. Such anxiety may be an important indication that we have noticed the ways in which Thrasymachus seems right, and we still care enough to try to prove him wrong.98 After so much talk of crisis and anxiety, consider an illustration from the dramatic genre. Tom Stoppard's play Jumpers features a troupe of philosophy professors who double as acrobats: "Logical positivists, mainly, with a linguistic analyst or two, a couple of Benthamite utilitarians … lapsed Kantians and empiricists generally… and of course the usual Behaviorists… a mixture of the more philosophical members of the university gymnastics team and the more gymnastic members of the Philosophy School."99 The Jumpers seem to practice what we would now identify as post-modern nihilism. One shoots and kills another, then conceals the murder with cheerful aplomb. Against these intellectually and physically adroit colleagues, the clumsy and old-fashioned Professor George Moore struggles to defend "the irreducible fact of goodness,"100 the possibility of a "moral conscience," and the claim that "there is more in me than meets the microscope."101 "Is God?" Moore wonders. **He can neither shake nor defend his faith.** Law schools, I think, are filled with moral sympathizers to Professor Moore who possess the skills of modern-day Jumpers.102 The current discourse of crisis is the latest manifestation of an old struggle between faith and doubt, and it is not one that we will resolve. On one hand, we have observed too much to believe (in law) unquestioningly. And on the other hand, we are determined to have law, even if we must make it ourselves. There was at least a smidgen of truth in John Finnis's claim that scholars of critical legal studies were "disappointed … absolutists."103 But it is not just crits that are disappointed when they look for law and see nothing Few scholars of any stripe want to vindicate Thrasymachus. All of this is just to reiterate the difficulty, and perhaps the necessity, of giving a law unto oneself. If constitutional law did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.

Schlag Indict

Schlag is wrong about normativity – his theory recreates the norms it criticizes

Carlson 99 (David Gray, Professor of Law at the Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. "Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence" (November 1999), Columbia Law Review vol. 99, no. 7)

F. Law is Normative Perhaps Pierre Schlag's most famous point is his imperative, "Don't be normative." The values of the legal academy are little better than advertising purveyors--hypocrites who try "to achieve strategic advantages largely (if not entirely) unrelated to the observance or realization of those professed values."193 Values are used as totems or tools to induce guilt or shame.194 Stifling and narrow,195 normativity is not even a thought--only an unthinking habit.196 Normativity argues that, if it does not hold sway, terrible social consequences would follow.197 Normative thought is designed to shut down critical inquiry into the nothingness of law.198 Not only are values deceitfully strategic, but they are ineffective.199 They are too vague to be self-determining.200 "Normative legal thought's only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students-- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect."201 Judges are not listening.202 Even if judges had the time to read and study all of academia's suggestions, they would be unlikely to implement any which would require radical changes in the status quo, since, Schlag notes, "[o]nly those kinds of norms that already conform to the audience's belief are likely to meet with any sort of wide-scale approval."203 Thus, Schlag concedes, sometimes normativity is empirically effective after all--but not because of intrinsic authenticity. Normativity is effective because it tracks and incorporates "folk-ontologies," such as order, salvation, or progress.204 Like Antony, norms tell the people only what they already know. Norms and values are lies, Schlag says, when proffered by legal academics, but it was otherwise with Sophocles205 or the Warren court,206 who were authentically in touch with real pain. By implication, values are authentic when immediately connected to feelings.207 Values, properly used, are worthy of commendation.208 But the mere invocation of values does not guarantee their authenticity. The proof of values is in context.209 At first impression, Schlag's imperative against normativity seems startlingly contradictory. Is it not a norm that one should not be normative? If so, how is it that the norms of the legal academy are lies, while Schlag's **very meta-norm is legitimate**? Schlag's view is not at all contradictory within the context of romantic psychology. Norms and values are defined by Schlag as concepts which are severed from what Schlag likes to call "context"--understood as nature, or the state that precedes the introduction of legal distortion.210 In fact, norms and values are the same non-thing or non-sense as law. They are the corruptions and mutilations that destroy context. They are castration itself.211 If, however, context could speak directly, what it would say would not be a norm.212 When context says, "Don't be normative," then context is not itself normative. Rather, context would be speaking a natural, wellgrounded, immediate truth?not a mere norm.213 This is, I think, what organizes Schlag's critique of norms. The norms offered by legal academics are inauthentic because they are universals, standing apart from context. Schlag, Sophocles, and Chief Justice Earl Warren, however, are in touch with context (through sensecertainty or immediate feeling), and what they speak is the concrete truth, not a norm. In short, Schlag appeals to a natural law which is, while other legal academics appeal to mere "ontological identities," which merely ought to be. This is precisely the claim of the romantic, who, "exempt from public haunt, Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, Sermons in stones, and good in every thing."214 In the world of the romantic, things speak directly. Thus, when Schlag reports what natural context says, no thought or "norm" enters to distort the message sent by nature itself. Schlag thus puts himself forth as what has been called a "rational observer" of natural law215?a vanishing mediator, in Zizekian terms.216 Schlag complains that positive lawyers are empty vessels. Thus, Dworkin's Hercules is said to be a "vacuous fellow."217 Ironically, it turns out that Schlag himself is just as vacuous. In order for context to speak, Schlag must erase himself and be the vanishing mediator between nature (i.e., context) and legal audience. In short, Schlag, who vociferously opposes the Kantian subject,218 puts himself forth as the perfect Kantian.219 Although Schlag accuses legal academics of being anti-intellectual, it appears as if their thoughts and norms--intellectual products--are the very scalpels by which law castrates the natural self. It is possible, then, to turn the charge around on Schlag and accuse him of being the anti-intellectual. I will, however, let Hegel do the dirty work: Those who speak philosophically of right, morality, and ethics and at the same time seek to exclude thought, appealing instead to feeling . . . bear witness to the profound contempt into which thought and science have fallen; for in their case, science itself, having sunk into despair and total lassitude, even adopts barbarism and thoughtlessness as its principle and does everything it can to rob mankind of all truth, worth, and dignity.220

Schlag's theory of the bureaucratic subject denies the existence of personality

Carlson 99 (David Gray, Professor of Law at the Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. "Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence" (November 1999), Columbia Law Review vol. 99, no. 7)

B. The Free Self Can Choose to Be Bound Schlag criticizes legal academics for unwitting indulgence in a contradiction. The self is supposed to be sovereign. Yet the self bows down to the rule of law.244 The choice to be bound is supposed to be a contradiction in terms.245 From what has been said, it should be clear that there is no contradiction here. The self that stands against the natural world, and the animal inclinations that afflict its body, is a negative entity. At heart, the subject is nothing at all.246 Yet, if it is to "exist," it must have externally observable properties. It must do something, and the things it does be? come an attribute of the self. We are what we do.247 The subject that lawfully follows its passion achieves existence and so perpetuates itself.248 This is the positive freedom of the self. Any self choosing to conform to the law has put forth its moral character in the world. It was the free choice of the self to do this.249 Hence, the free self can choose to be bound, without contradiction.250 This concrete subject is likewise free to violate the law and to perpetuate itself by crime. This is the negative freedom of the concrete subject. It is not properly freedom at all, but slavery to inclination. Crime consti? tutes inclination speaking in defiance of the moral side, thereby committing a crime on the subject's own self. The particularity of the criminal is therefore not freedom but slavery.251 In fact, tied into the very idea of following the law is the idea of a free will that might choose not to follow the law. The free will that aspires to follow the law never truly binds itself. A subject that puts itself forward as lawful could give into impulse tomorrow and is therefore "free" (in the negative sense) to violate the law. Lawfulness is therefore a constant struggle?the ongoing achievement of the concrete self. Furthermore, it is a struggle in which the subject must fail: [F]reedom realizes itself through a series of failures: every par? ticular attempt to realize freedom may fail; from its point of view, freedom remains an empty possibility; but the very contin- uous striving of freedom to realize itself bears witness to its "actuality."252 Freedom is thus "powerful." It exhibits the "primacy of possibility over actuality."253 Forever potential, it is nevertheless a possibility that transforms the world. In contrast to this view, Professor Schlag wants to say that freedom means the concrete self can do what it feels like. But he should know better than to exalt the authenticity of the **pre-legal natural self,** and he has on occasion **chastised others for doing just that.**254 To exalt the sovereignty of such a self (that may be in the thrall of criminal passion) instead of the liberal self is to permit the contingent side of the self to govern in its moral arbitrariness.255 In other words, the essence of personality is the rationality of the liberal self. Negative freedom denies the essence of personality and therefore ends up destroying its own self.256 To summarize, Schlag's work is based on a romantic psychology. If only the concrete self were freed from law, Schlag implies, it would know what to do. Law offers mere "norms" and presents the subject with empty choices. Such a theory of the self ignores the fact that human nature has two sides--the natural and the moral. One side cannot be privileged at the expense of the other. To be sure, many of Schlag's criticisms of liberal psychology257 are well taken. Liberal psychology absolutely denies a place for the unconscious and irrational. His accusation that liberal philosophy does not consider the challenge of deconstruction to liberal psychology is an excellent contribution. Liberal philosophy in recent times deserves criticism for not peering very deeply into the soul of the legal subject.258 But liberal philosophy is also on to something: The moral dimension of personality is constitutive and cannot be abolished **without destroying personality entirely.**

Schlag's paranoid construction of the bureaucracy creates passivity and cynicism

Carlson 99 (David Gray, Professor of Law at the Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. "Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence" (November 1999), Columbia Law Review vol. 99, no. 7)

IV. The Bureaucracy Schlag presents a dark vision of what he calls "the bureaucracy," which crushes us and controls us. It operates on "a field of pain and death."259 It deprives us of choice, speech,260 and custom.261 As bureaucracy cannot abide great minds, legal education must suppress greatness through mind numbing repetition.262 In fact, legal thought is the bureaucracy and cannot be distinguished from it.263 If legal thought tried to buck the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy would instantly crush it.264 Schlag observes that judges have taken "oaths that require subordination of truth, understanding, and insight, to the preservation of certain bureaucratic governmental institutions and certain sacred texts."265 Legal scholarship and lawyers generally266 are the craven tools of bureaucracy, and those who practice law or scholarship simply serve to justify and strengthen the bureaucracy. "[I]f there were no discipline of American law, the liberal state would have to invent it."267 "[L]egal thinkers in effect serve as a kind of P.R. firm for the bureaucratic state."268 Legal scholarship has sold out to the bureaucracy: Insofar as the expressions of the state in the form of [statutes, etc] can be expected to endure, so can the discipline that so helpfully organizes, rationalizes, and represents these expressions as intelligent knowledge. As long as the discipline shows obeisance to the authoritative legal forms, it enjoys the backing of the state. . . . [D]isciplinary knowledge of law can be true not because it is true, but because the state makes it true.269 Scholarship produces a false "conflation between what [academics] celebrate as 'law' and the ugly bureaucratic noise that grinds daily in the [ ] courts . . . ."27? Scholarship "becomes the mode of discourse by which bureaucratic institutions and practices re-present themselves as subject to the rational ethical-moral control of autonomous individuals."271 "The United States Supreme Court and its academic groupies in the law schools have succeeded in doing what

many, only a few decades ago, would have thought impossible. They have succeeded in making Kafka look naive."272 Lacanian theory allows us to interpret the meaning of this anti-Masonic vision precisely. Schlag's bureaucracy must be seen as a "paranoid construction according to which our universe is the work of art of unknown creators."273 In Schlag's view, the bureaucracy is in control of law and language and uses it exclusively for its own purposes. The bureaucracy is therefore the Other of the Other, "a hidden subject who pulls the strings of the great Other (the symbolic order)."274 The bureaucracy, in short, is the superego (i.e., absolute knowledge of the ego),275 but rendered visible and projected outward. The superego, the ego's stern master, condemns the ego and condemns what it does. Schlag has transferred this function to the bureaucracy. As is customary,276 by describing Schlag's vision as a paranoid construction, I do not mean to suggest that Professor Schlag is mentally ill or unable to function. Paranoid construction is not in fact the illness. It is an attempt at healing what the illness is?the conflation of the domains of the symbolic, imaginary, and real.277 This conflation is what Lacan calls "psychosis." Whereas the "normal" subject is split between the three domains, the psychotic is not. He is unable to keep the domains sepa? rate.278 The symbolic domain of language begins to lose place to the real domain. The psychotic raves incoherently, and things begin to talk to him directly.279 The psychotic, "immersed in jouissance,"280 loses desire itself. Paranoia is a strategy the subject adopts to ward off breakdown. The paranoid vision holds together the symbolic order itself and thereby prevents the subject from slipping into the psychotic state in which "the concrete T loses its absolute power over the entire system of its determinations."281 This of course means--and here is the deep irony of paraonia--that bureaucracy is the very savior of romantic metaphysics. If the romantic program were ever fulfilled--if the bureaucracy were to fold up shop and let the natural side of the subject have its way-- subjectivity would soon be enveloped, smothered, and killed in the night of psychosis.282 Paranoid ambivalence toward bureaucracy (or whatever other fantasy may be substituted for it) is very commonly observed. Most recently, conservatives "organized their enjoyment" by opposing communism.283 By confronting and resisting an all-encompassing, sinister power, the subject confirms his [their] existence as that which sees and resists the power.284 As long as communism existed, conservatism could be perceived. When communism disappeared, conservatives felt "anxiety"285--a lack of purpose. Although they publicly opposed communism, they secretly regretted its disappearance. Within a short time, a new enemy was found to organize conservative jouissance--the cultural left. (On the left, a similar story could be told about the organizing function of racism and sexism, which, of course, have not yet disappeared.) These humble examples show that **the romantic yearning for wholeness is always the opposite of what it appears to be.**286 We paranoids need our enemies to organize our enjoyment. Paranoid construction is, in the end, a philosophical interpretation, even in the clinical cases.287 As Schlag has perceived, the symbolic order of law is artificial. It only exists because we insist it does. We all fear that the house of cards may come crashing down. Paradoxically, it is this very "anxiety" that shores up the symbolic. The normal person knows he [they] must keep insisting that the symbolic order exists precisely because the person knows it is a fiction.288 The paranoid, however, assigns this role to the bureaucracy (**and thereby absolves** himself **[themself] from the responsibility**). Thus, paranoid delusion allows for the maintenance of a "cynical" distance between the paranoid subject and the realm of mad psychosis.289 In truth, cynicism toward bureaucracy shows nothing but the **unconfronted depth to which the cynic is actually committed** to what ought to be abolished.

CLS Bad

CLS scholarship patronizes minorities and ignores the necessity of legal reforms for the marginalized

Hardwick 91 (John, "The Schism Between Minorities and the Critical Legal Studies Movement: Requiem for a Heavyweight?" (1991), Boston College Third World Law Journal vol. 11 no. 1)

The principal Minority Scholars participating in the dialogue are Mari Matsuda, Richard Delgado, Harlon Dalton, Robert Wil- Iiams, Andrew Haines, and Kimberle Crenshaw,95 all of whom teach law at various schools across the country. Similar to the CLS proponents, these scholars do not embody exclusively all minority scholars critiquing CLS. Rather they stand out as representative spokespersons, some of whom vividly illustrate their critiques of the Movement with intensely personal experiences concerning race and society.96 The Minority Scholars are virtually uniform in their assessment of CLS: they find all three major CLS themes-the indeterminacy argument, the rights discourse critique, and the CLS egalitarian agenda-problematic. They note first, however, several positive aspects to CLS: specifically, the Movement's "descriptive"97 and "prescriptive power."98 Professor Matsuda writes that "[the] central descriptive message [of CLS]-that legal ideals are manipulable and that law serves to legitimate existing mal distributions of wealth and power-rings true for anyone who has experienced life in non-white America."99 The mechanism of trashing in particular, one Minority Scholar writes, is irreverent and incisive enough to penetrate "the apocryphal legal texts ... and myths," and various other reifications (ideology operating in statutory or common law form) that restrict choices and dialogue. lOo As Professor Matsuda further observes, "[k]nowing when doctrine sticks, when it doesn't, and why ... are major intellectual contributions of the CLS movement."101 Thus, both the Minority Scholars and CLS recognize that political motives guide the use of legal rules that are premised upon normatively incorrect doctrine to justify predetermined outcomes. The Minority Scholars find equally noteworthy the "prescriptive power" of CLS.102 The quest for an egalitarian society without oppression, hierarchy, and maldistribution of wealth in a broad sense presents an inspiring and attractive endeavor.103 This egali- tarian ideal is quintessentially the vision of the future held by many people of color and people of limited means. The origination of these descriptive and prescriptive contributions within the prestigious and exclusionary walls of mainstream legal academia, where most CLS scholars reside, lends legitimacy to ultra-leftist jurisprudence in general. Although reluctant to agree substantively with CLS, the legal community must at least acknowledge the cogent critical theories put forth by their academic peers. Arguably, this legitimacy would not exist if the CLS Movement originated from elsewhere in the legal community, such as from practicing minority lawyers. In reference to the general legitimation of critical scholarship, the Minority Scholars acknowledge that CLS has indeed even stimulated minority scholarship: "[s]ignificantly, this [commitment to ultra-leftist jurisprudence] ... underscores the liberating impact that the CLS analysis has had on the victims of racism, propelling them to explore its barriers."lo4 For the Minority Scholars, however, the realization that the composition of CLS is predominately white and male tempers the value of these descriptive and prescriptive contributions. 105 The absence of a significant minority voice integrated in the Movement's theory signals the unattractiveness of the CLS agenda. Vividly capturing this bittersweet realization, and introducing a major criticism of CLS, one Minority Scholar writes, "Like a pack of super-termites, these scholars eat away at the trees of legal doctrine and liberal ideals, leaving sawdust in their paths. That they do it so well, and so single-mindedly, is compelling; it suggests that this is what the smartest are doing. Never mind that no one knows what to do with all the sawdust."i06 Despite CLS's presentation of insightful and critical social commentary and jurisprudence, substantively its three major themes remain troubling to Minority Scholars. First, regarding the indeterminacy of law argument, the Supreme Court's recent rulings do illustrate the validity of the CLS idea that legal rules are manipulable and legal outcomes are subject to the ideology and motivations of the politically powerful. 107 But CLS fails to address the possibility that racism is the motivation underlying legal decisions which perpetuate oppressive social and institutional conditions. IOB Through recognition of the non-objective, non-formalistic forces influencing legal outcomes (which CLS generally terms "ideology"), CLS incidentally raises the possibilitya very real and intellectually compelling possibility for people of color-that racism is one of the non-objective, non-formalistic forces. As the Minority Scholars assert, the failure of CLS scholarship to pinpoint and to integrate discussion of the problem of racism as a principle reason for inconsistent and discriminatory decisions ignores the issue over which most of the exploratory energies of minorities are spent. 109 In its very few works discussing the issue of racism, CLS, because of its Marxist roots, attributes the occurrence of discriminatory and status quo-perpetuating legal outcomes primarily to classbased and economic-based discrimination. 110 Racism receives merely tangential treatment as an incidental product of class and economic strife. In contrast to the CLS view, the Minority Scholars assert that class-based and economic-based discrimination as suffered by many minorities results from race-based discrimination, not vice versa. III The phenomenon of racism manifests itself in a variety of contexts, including public housing, employment, and education and in many ways fuels the process

whereby some unfortunate citizens change in the eyes of society from people of color to people of limited means. 1J2 The Minority Scholars posit cogent theoretical support for their belief that regardless of changes made to the institutional structure of our society, racism will persist as a social-psychological phenomenon.113 It occurs in both overt and covert forms and in both micro-and macro-legal contexts. 114 Accordingly, for these scholars, any analysis of the role of law in society necessarily must consider the law not only as a means for protecting against racism, but also as a means for perpetuating racism. CLS runs afoul of minority interests by giving merely tangential treatment to a problem that historically has threatened the stability of an entire population of African-Americans. Second, the Minority Scholars find the CLS critique of liberal rights discourse problematic. II5 In short, CLS asserts that rights and rights discourse legitimate unfair distributions of wealth and power by focusing on the individual rather than the community, providing piecemeal reform, and limiting the overall possibility of reform by circumscribing the boundaries of dialogue. 116 False consciousness, the belief in the legitimacy of the existing system of liberal rights discourse, deludes minorities into accepting and reconciling their deprived status. ll7 The Minority Scholars acknowledge the plausibility of this theory, but assert that false consciousness is not the primary mechanism with which the majority culture stymies and diffuses minority reformist activity.IIB The Minority Scholars find troubling the idea that "[through] absorption of self-defeating ideologies (rights discourse) ... " minorities participate in their own oppression. 119 They argue that it "smacks" of the very paternalism that CLS purports to disdain by suggesting that minorities are unable to comprehend fully their own plight and discern who (the majority culture) and what (frequently racism) propagates that plight. 120 Other forces, they argue, combine to paralyze minority reformist efforts and to inject a sense of hopelessness into an already daunting endeavor. Forces such as political and economic "coercion by the dominant group; exclusion from clubs, networks, information, and needed help at crucial times; [and] microaggressions .... "121 CLS focuses inappropriately on minority rather than majority culture. The Minority Scholars also take issue with the rights discourse critique corollary which holds that faithfully staying within the system and engaging in rights discourse results in inadequate piecemeal reform (the patchwork quilt metaphor).122 CLS argues that "[t]hose who control the system weaken [infrasystem] resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a Black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just."123 This corollary contradicts the reality that incremental, within-the-system reforms have proven to be the most successful reforms. Even the American Civil War, the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of the 19th Century, ... the civil rights demonstrations, the urban revolutions of the 1960's, the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of the 20th Century ... demonstrate that [minorities] benefit from glacial not seismic changes in the operation of American law. 124 According to CLS, achieving reform in the area of civil rights requires endlessly litigating narrow technical issues at great cost to the plaintiff-endeavoring against the considerable inertia of the status quo. For Minority Scholars, however, the reality of these victories awarding substantive rights squarely refutes the CLS arguments that conventional liberal rights concepts and discourse are disutile for minorities. 125 Finally, the Minority Scholars attribute the problematic aspects of CLS theory to the perceived elitist,121> negative,127 and informaP28 character of the Movement. With respect to elitism and informality, the Minority Scholars argue that the trashing of rights discourse is plausible for CLS scholars because they reside in privileged positions in our society. These are positions from which theoretically disposing of rights and creating an informal community premised upon good will and sharing carries no threat of harm. 129 Implicit in this criticism is the suspicion that CLS simply does not take itself or its proposed agenda seriously. What is missing, Minority Scholars argue, is a measure of reality. 130 Turning to the issue of negativism, the Minority Scholars find that cynicism pervades the CLS Movement's writings and its agenda. 131 The process of deconstructing virtually all of society's accepted institutional and jurisprudential norms involves considerable negative energy and razes the foundations of a capitalistic and democratic society. Minority Scholars believe this process inhibits the CLS Movement's ability to generate positive enthusiasm for legal and social change. 132

Critical legal scholars' shoddy defense of the movement belies disregard for minorities

Hardwick 91 (John, "The Schism Between Minorities and the Critical Legal Studies Movement: Requiem for a Heavyweight?" (1991), Boston College Third World Law Journal vol. 11 no. 1)

B. Critical Legal Scholars' Responses to the Minority Scholar Critiques The CLS responses come principally from Alan Freeman 133 and Morton Horowitz. 134 Significantly, only two of over one hundred Critical Legal Scholars responded, despite considerable energies expended by the Minority Scholars in engaging the Critical Legal Scholars in dialogue. This small number of respondents begs the question: **"How seriously does CLS, as a movement, take the concerns of minorities?"** Perhaps many of the Critical Legal Scholars considered the two responses adequately representative of the CLS position. More likely, given that CLS members typically do not retreat from an opportunity to express their views on a controversial subject, most Critical Legal Scholars were simply not sufficiently aroused by the subject of minority concerns to respond meaningfully. Moreover, the responses fail to engage the Minority Scholars' critiques of CLS directly. Rather than give the critiques systematic and comprehensive treatment (the manner in which they were presented), the CLS responses evaded much of the substance presented by the Minority Scholars, amounting to a general defense of CLS theory. The Critical Legal Scholars defend the indeterminacy argument and the trashing of liberal rights theory, while only **subtextually incorporating the problem of racism in these defenses.** The CLS scholars also argue that they are experientially qualified to critique rights and rights discourse. Professor Freeman in particular argues that their extensive involvement in the civil rights movement in the 1960s establishes an intimate familiarity with the territory and texture of liberal rights discourse. He further argues that this intimate familiarity creates a genuinely serious, and not just intellectually curious, interest in the minority agenda. 13s

CLS represents critique without responsibility – entrenches minority tokenization, fails to decolonize law

Dhanda and Parashar 12 (Amita, Professor of Law at Nalsar University of Law, Hyderabad, and Archana, Associate Professor in Law at Macquarie University. "Decolonisation of Legal Knowledge" (April 2012), Taylor & Francis)

Most CLS scholars are explicitly or indirectly left leaning, and the implications of their critiques of law are that it falls short of being principled, general or predictable, among other things. It has been suggested that such critique seems to assume that these are achievable, and more importantly, desirable goals for legal knowledge (Fish 1993: 168-73). There is, however, another critique of CLS that they provide no alternative vision for law. 14 PM/PS critiques similarly deny the possibility of authoritative knowledge and thus of directed social change. In this regard, CLS and PM/PS legal critiques seem to have similar focus on deconstructing legal concepts, doctrine and self images. This turn to semiotics is where a lot of contemporary legal theory is, but the issue for us is whether this means that legal theorists may only 'deconstruct' an already existing legal reality, be it (the) judgments, legislation, legal doctrine or analytical concepts. Duncan Kennedy's work is an apt example of the CLS writing. In his book, A Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Siecle (1997), he elaborates how judges are denied the option of admitting the influence of ideological and non-policy factors in reaching their decisions. He calls it the practice of 'denial' of their power by the judges. The judges are in this way engaged in legitimating the status quo. The point of this meticulous deconstruction of judicial activity, however, is not so much to change the style of judicial decisions and reasoning as to encourage the recognition of the control that decision-makers actually exercise.15 We accept that such recognition of the power of decision-makers is an important step, but not enough in itself to change the practices under discussion. Peter Goodrich takes issue with Kennedy and argues that he does no more than repeat the critique of reason, that is, examine the judicial arguments for their persuasiveness and logic (Goodrich 2001: 989). He further

criticises Kennedy for not taking deconstruction seriously enough and argues that though the politics of writing is the subject matter of grammatology, while Kennedy discusses deconstruction, he `neither places it in the context of grammatology nor understands it as a Nietzschean exercise in philological disruption'(ibid.). However, even if Kennedy had done so, our concern remains that deconstruction over-emphasises the importance of academic readings of legal texts. **This emphasis on semiotics allows these thinkers to make no serious effort at exploring the alternative possibilities of what adjudication could be**. In fact, Stanley Ash's insistence that law is interpretation seems to suggest that whichever 'interpretation' finds acceptance becomes the 'law' (see Fish 1993). In a nuanced argument, Fish suggests that the doctrine of formalism does not manage to obviate the necessity of interpretation. Moreover, which interpretation is acceptable is not decided by reference to some universal moral principles, but is dependent on the rhetorical force of the argument. According to him, this `rhetoricity' is not a bad thing at all because it invokes the conventions of legal interpretation. In other works he has developed the argument that judges are not free to give any interpretation but are constrained by the conventions of the judicial process as well as other legal institutions.16 That is, whether an inter-pretation will be accepted is dependent on it conforming to the expect-ations of the relevant community rather than because it represents the truth." However, feminists have, for a long time now, argued that com-munity standards so often invoked in law are the problem for women and other disadvantaged sections of society.18 An understanding of judicial pronouncements as representing conventional beliefs leaves no room for criticising them, or for ensuring that 'progressive' inter-pretations are more acceptable than other interpretations (West 1987: 278). This PM/PS insistence on anti-foundational knowledge and against 'closure' implies that relativism can be the ally of conservatism, although it need not be (Benhabib 1996). Have we made much pro-gress through enlightenment, critical theory and PM/PS, if the point we are reaching is that knowledge can be constituted wisely or not wisely? When critical theorists take the high moral ground that it is not possible to postulate the future shape of cultural practices, that may be so (see Spann 1984). But if the implication of the critique is that one can only describe what is happening, it becomes part of the problem. Moreover, **it is contrary to the** idea that the **function of theory is to destabilise power** (see Foucault and Deleuze 1977). Proceeding with this expectation that the function of theory is to destabilise power, it is possible to ask how far contemporary critical theory has the potential to do that.° We wish to emphasise the context of choice and the cultural con-notations of making the 'right choice'. J.M. Balkin has addressed this very issue in his writings and has argued that one can be just with deconstruction (1994).20 He says that deconstruction has to be understood as a rhetorical practice that can be used for good or ill. Anyone engaging in deconstruction for a normative purpose chooses to say that there is a better way of looking at things. To the extent that deconstructive arguments are forms of rhetoric, the ethics of deconstruction also become very similar to the ethics of rhetoric. Both rhetoric and deconstruction can be used for good and bad purposes, and to that extent, each of us becomes responsible for the ways in which we use deconstruction. In this way, deconstruction can form part of the critical theory of law. Cotterrell reminds us that even despite the fact that ideology and organisational interests are closely interrelated in a formalised, seemingly closed legal system, it is nevertheless the case that the individual actors (for example, lawyers, judges, lay citizens) think and communicate (Cotterrell 1995: 107-8). Zygmunt Bauman has made a similar argument, saying that postmodern thinking takes away the certainty of universal ethics, but at the same time, it makes each individual absolutely responsible for his or her choices and actions (1993). And it is this agency of the individual that must be kept firmly in focus. The fad that ideas are thought and communicated by indi-viduals and some gain wider acceptance than others means that knowledge is forever a matter of negotiation and persuasion. The indi-viduals are, of course, not entirely free to decide how to act, what goals to pursue etc. They are constrained or at least influenced by the prevailing systems of thought, discourse and societal structures. None of this is a new insight, but our aim here is to refocus on the context for every situation and shift it away from reifying discourse. We hope to thereby make critique accountable and the critics acknowledge their role in legitimising either the status quo or change. This is an important task as we believe that contemporary critical theory has become insular from the wider concerns of those who are at the margins of society, usually without a voice, relegated to being the 'other' — in short, the disadvantaged. The markers of disadvantage vary, but include race, gender, age, ability and sexuality, among other factors. All these bases of oppression have been analysed extensively, but the advent of PM/PS legal analyses has created a peculiar situation. On the one hand, it is on the insistence of PM/PS analyses that differences be recognised that legal theory is called upon to be inclusive of those on the margins of society. At the same time, the antipathy to 'closure' of definitions and analytical concepts also results in the valorisation of 'difference'. That is, difference comes to be celebrated for its own sake, and it seems no longer imperative to ask how the celebration of difference justifies relativism of the most debilitating kind. For example, the cultural or ethnic differences maintained in the name of pluralism can, and do, create problems for gender parity.21 **These reactionary outcomes of PM/PS theory can be avoided if knowledge and responsibility are coupled together.** In legal scholarship the necessity of such a link between knowledge and responsibility must be obvious: decolonisation of knowledge entails asking what follows from conceptualising legal concepts in a certain manner or in theorising law as irrelevant to the aims of social

justice or non-oppression. For example, the violence of law analyses have shifted away the conventional focus from asking how law can regulate violence to showing how the very existence of law itself is violence (Sarat 2001). This is a very pertinent challenge to the mainstream understanding of law as the guarantor of fairness, order and even justice. However, the critiques that merely challenge the mainstream understanding but do no more, end up justifying the violence of law. For, the conclusion of such analyses that it could be no other way, itself, becomes the legitimation of all contemporary inequities perpetuated via law. We wish to challenge the determinism of this kind of analysis and to do that by invoking the PM/PS insight that all knowledge is con-stituted by discourse and practice. It is, therefore, imperative that everyone carries the responsibility of being self-reflective about their role in creating and maintaining the contemporary social structures. If they turn out to be oppressive for some, then we cannot absolve ourselves of responsibility for that either. **That is, critique must be re-sponsible critique, otherwise it is a self-serving activity of intellectuals, who can presume that they can do nothing to change the world** (Calinicos 1989: 170).

The critical legal studies movement is a bastion of whiteness – it talks about, rather than talking with, people of color

Haines 87 (Andrew W., Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. "The Critical Legal Studies Movement and Racism: Useful Analytics and Guides for Social Action or an Irrelevant Modern Legal Scepticism and Solipsism?" (1987), William Mitchell Law Review, vol. 13 no. 4)

Moreover, I note the influence of Freeman, Klare, and others in the CLSM on the analyses and writings of persons of color. One discovers traces of the CLS analyses in the state- ments" I and writings" 12 of persons of color. No one really knows how many other such influences have appeared and will appear. Significantly, this discussion underscores the liberating impact that the CLS analyses have had on the victims of racism, propelling them to explore its barriers. Focusing on the limitations and negative dimensions, I note the lingering exclusionary character of the CLSM. Despite the obvious efforts of some within the CLSM to encourage wider participation by persons of color, the movement remains a largely ethnocentric, radical intellectual movement. Perhaps the genesis' 1 3 and the constant reference 1 4 to this exclusionary beginning has some bearing on the reluctance 15 of persons of color to participate fully. Outsiders may interpret this emphasis as the unspoken message about the exclusivity of this intellectual movement; they may see it as an ethnocentric radical intellectual reification of the European radical intellectual tradition. Unwittingly, **the emphasis may result in a polarity between two important groups who need each other, radical intellectuals and persons of color,** with a fair number of the latter wondering whether this movement merely signifies the self-absorption in the other group's virtuosic intellectual displays to the exclusion of truly grappling with the pressing social problems of persons of color. Perhaps other reasons can explain the exclusionary character. Persons of color may find the ideas, the methodology, and the conduct of the participants disincentives for participation. Whatever the root causes, the CLSM maintains its exclusionary character; it continues to talk to and not dialogue with (or talk about and not talk with) persons of color.

Multivalent Oppression K

AT: Perm

Starting points matter – all of our link evidence prove they foreclose multivalent analysis of oppressions, means the perm cant solve

Perm is severance - Their 1ac made exclusive/prioritizing claims about Blackness like (examples) _____

The method of the aff doesn't take into account for violence between communities - marginalization and disavowal of agency are DAs to the perm
Alcoff 2 Linda Martín, , Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center, "Latino/as, Asian-Americans and the Black-White Binary," http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/25115747?uid=3739256&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102494840991

Critics of the black/white paradigm have argued that, although all communities of color have shared the experience of political and economic disenfranchisement in the U.S., there are **significant differences** between the **causes** and the **forms** of this disenfranchisement. Bong Hwan Kim, a Korean American community leader who has worked both as the Director of the Korean Community Center of East Bay in Oakland, CA, and as Director of the Korean Youth and Community Center in Los Angeles, blames the black/white binary for **disabling relationships among people of color** and even for creating the conditions leading to the Los Angeles **civil disaster** of April 1992, in which 2,300 small Korean owned busi nesses were destroyed by mostly Latino/a and African American looters. Kim cites the xenophobia marshaled by **African American leader Danny Bakewell** before the looting occurred, and argues that the Korean American community had been and continues to be systematically rendered **incapable of responding** to such rhetoric because they are **not recognized** in the media **as a player in racial politics.**20 Elaine Kim explains: It is difficult to describe how disempowered and frustrated many Korean Americans felt during and after the sa-i-ku p'ok-dong (the April 29 "riots"). Korean Americans across the country shared the anguish and despair of the Los Angeles tongp'o (community), which everyone seemed to have abandoned - the police and fire departments, **black and white political leaders**, the Asian and Pacific American advocates who tried to dissociate themselves from us because our tragedy **disputed** their narrow and risk-free focus on **white violence against Asians** … the Korean Americans at the center of the storm were mostly voiceless and all but invisible (except when stereotyped as hysterically inarticulate, and mostly female, ruined shopkeepers .. .).21 Similar to the **Mexicans** in Texas, the Koreans have been **denied** the legal or socially recognized category of being a **politicized group** at the same time that they are made subject to **group based scapegoating.** Moreover, as this event demonstrates, the black/white paradigm of race is **incapable** of theoretically or politically addressing **racism among communities of color**, or racism, in other words, which is not all about white people. A response to this line of reasoning might be that it is white supremacy which is at the root of the conflictual relations among communities of color, and responsible for their acceptance of stereotypes manufactured by a white dominant power structure. Thus, on this reading, what occurred in Los Angeles can be reductively analyzed as caused by white supremacy. Although I do find explanatory arguments that focus on political economy often compelling, it is far too simplistic, as I think Karl Marx himself knew, to imagine cultural conflict as the mere epiphenomenon of economic forces with no life or grounding of their own. To blame only **white supremacy** for what occurred in Los Angeles would also **deny power and agency** to any groups but the dominant, which is **increasingly untrue.** We must all accept our rightful share of the blame, whatever that turns out to be in particular instances, and resist explanations that would a priori reduce that blame to zero for communities of color. Supporting the arguments of both Elaine Kim and Bong Hwan Kim, Juan Perea argues that because of the wide acceptance of the black/white paradigm, "other racialized groups like Latino/as,

Asian Americans, and Native Americans are often **marginalized** or **ignored altogether."**22 He points out that the concerns of Asian Americans and Latino/as cannot be addressed through immigration legislation because all are not immigrants, which is one of the reasons to reject the claim of some ethnic theorists that these groups will follow the path of European immigrants in gradual assimilation and economic success (the other reason to reject this claim is their racialization).23

Turn – Permutation footnotes other oppressions, repeats inclusions/exclusions

Perea 97 (Juan , Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law, Race, Ethnicity & Nationhood: Article: The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, California Law Review, October, 1997, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1213, p. 1257-1258]

Paradigmatic descriptions and study of White racism against Blacks, with only cursory mention of "other people of color," marginalizes all people of color by grouping them, without particularity, as somehow analogous to Blacks. "Other people of color" are deemed to exist only as unexplained analogies to Blacks. Thus, **scholars encourage uncritical readers to continue to assume the paradigmatic importance of the Black/White relationship and to ignore the experiences of other Americans who also are subject to racism in profound ways**. **Critical readers are left with many important questions: Beyond the most superficial understanding of aversion to non-White skin color, in what ways is White racism against Blacks explanatory of or analogous to White racism against Latinos/as, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and others**? Given the unique historical legacy of slavery, what does a deep understanding of White-Black racism contribute to understanding rac-isms against other "Others?" **Why are "other people of color" consistently relegated to parenthetical status and near-nonexistence in treatises purporting to cover their fields comprehensively?** It is time to ask hard questions of our leading writers on race. **It is** also **time to demand better answers to these questions about inclusion, exclusion, and racial presence, than perfunctory references to "other people of color**." **In the midst of profound demographic changes, it is time to question whether the Black/White binary paradigm of race fits our highly variegated current and future population. Our "normal science" of writing on race, at odds with both history and demographic reality, needs reworking**.

AT: "No Link – we're not politics of recognition"

Aff is form of politics of recognition- demanding recognition of white or the state

Snyder 12 (Greta Fowler, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, "Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and Fluidity in Identity Politics", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January, jstor)

I will end by highlighting some additional contributions this article makes to the political theoretical literature on recognition. Too often, the encounter between dominant and marginalized groups has been rendered in overly simplistic ways: marginalized groups demand recognition from privileged groups; marginalized groups demand recognition from the state. In this article, I offer a broader conception of where and how the politics of recognition occurs. We are right to be skeptical of the argument that the Black Panthers were really demanding recognition of whites or of the state: the Panthers were primarily directing their message to black people and young, urban black men in particular. Yet the Panthers did seek to change the white authority structure and the (intentional) publicization of the Panthers' symbolic mediations of black identity (Ongiri 2009) made it a force in the struggle over what blackness meant to the American public. Instead of a unidirectional struggle for recognition, this examination of cultural politics shows that demands for recognition are part of a multidirectional struggle for influence over the dominant cultural order, a struggle that occurs in multiple mediums and multiple sites, at multiple levels and between multiple parties. While the cultural studies literature enhances political theory by encouraging political theorists to widen their vision of the politics of recognition thereby altering calculations about the possibilities and pitfalls of this politics, I also believe that greater interaction between the two disciplines can benefit cultural studies. Integrating the insights of cultural studies into the political theoretical framework of recognition enables us to specify the links between representation and power/resistance in a way that those engaged in the discipline of cultural studies often fail to do (see Alvarez et al. 1997, 6). In this article, I have developed and offered a normative argument for a standard of political cultural production—multivalent recognition—that is more nuanced than "positive imagery" (Alexander 2004) and less problematic than "representational correctness" (Shiappa 2008). Despite the United States' commitment to formal equality, racial identity continues to matter. Being identified as black means one is significantly more likely to face demeaning and constraining stereotypes, suspicion, distrust, poverty, illness, discrimination, and violence. The hegemony of colorblindness has effectively reconstituted white power by undercutting political claims made by marginalized groups even as the cultural representations that underwrite racial inequality continue to circulate (Bonilla-Silva 2009; Snyder 2011). In this context, a politics of multivalent recognition has an important role to play: challenging white dominance without incurring the significant costs of internal repression and exclusion.

AT: Coalitions Bad, Erase Blackness

Their ev on coalitions doesn't account for multivalent analysis that functions not to erase or subsume difference, but to highlight diversity within identities while maintaining ability to foreground Blackness

Snyder 12 (Greta Fowler, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, "Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and Fluidity in Identity Politics", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January, jstor)

Critics of identity politics warn that the politics of difference undermines cross-identity coalitions by emphasizing difference (Brown 1995; Gitlin 1996; Wolin 1993). Yet a politics of multivalent recognition is actually poised to "unburden groups of excessive ascribed or constructed distinctiveness" (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 47) like the universalist politics of recognition from which I distinguished it earlier. Highlighting the diversity within identities brings points of similarity across identities to light. Put otherwise, as the symbolic boundaries of identities are widened—as more and different people are accepted as "really black"—identities once seen as distinct from one another are now seen as overlapping. While a multivalent politics of recognition centers on a single collective identity, it necessarily has implications across identities. When black feminist men demand recognition, for instance, this demand has implications for the categories of black, male and female. Moreover, inasmuch as identity categories are interrelated—think, for example, of the dependence of whiteness on blackness—a multivalent politics of recognition as engaged in by one identity group will affect another. Participation by one identity group in the politics of recognition may be catalyzed by the participation of another identity group: witness the men's movement springing from the successes of feminism. But cooperation between identity groups in a politics of multivalent recognition can be secured by agreement that more capacious notions of identity can benefit members of all identity groups—including the privileged within identity groups and members of privileged identity groups.

AT: Alt Denies Blackness

Our alt is not some vague universalization or emptying of identity, but rather opens spaces for particular differences within and among Blackness

Snyder 12 (Greta Fowler, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, "Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and Fluidity in Identity Politics", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January, jstor)

Identity claims are integral to this negation of the negation. Yet these demands are neither for recognition of a universal identity (i.e., human, citizen) nor for recognition of a political identity that cuts across identity groups (i.e., "the left"). Unlike these forms of recognition politics—wherein actors deemphasize the identity that marks them as particular—those who seek multivalent recognition explicitly identify themselves as particular (i.e., as "black"). In other words, for those engaged in multivalent recognition, "it is not the existence of [identity] categories that is the problem, but rather the meaning and particular values attached to them" (Crenshaw 1991, 1297; also see Hancock 2007). Contesting the meaning and values attached to an identity category requires working with, within, and through a particular identity: it requires offering "racialized but not delimited" visions of identity.5 While black people engaged in a politics of multivalent recognition demand recognition as black, they demand recognition as not only black. They simultaneously demand recognition for other salient aspects of their identity—demanding recognition as black and…. This "and" can draw attention to the membership of black individuals other categorical identity groups (black and woman, black and gay, black and poor, etc.)6 But it also strategically links blackness with traits, values, abilities, talents, and predilections with which the collective identity has not previously been predominantly associated. In a politics of multivalent recognition, black feminist lower-class men, black gay Jews, and rural black working-class single mothers demand recognition of their embodiments of and claim to blackness, and in turn strategically de-essentialize blackness. They demand to be recognized as "black" despite the fact that they contradict stereotypes of/about blackness. If a politics of monovalent recognition aims for fixity and thus transparency (Markell 2003) in identity, then a politics of multivalent recognition is about unfixing an identity.7

Real visions of blackness come from multivalent views- not only demanding one category but define themselves

Snyder 12 (Greta Fowler, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, "Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and Fluidity in Identity Politics", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January, jstor)

Some might say that such a politics "dilutes" black identity. But those who would do well to remember that although strong visions of "real blackness" do have significant effects, they do not have an anchor in a metaphysical reality. The politics of recognition cannot achieve a "mimetic correspondence with the 'real'" in either its monovalent or in its multivalent incarnations, for, as Cornel West notes, no one has "unmediated access to the 'real Black community'" (1993, 18). Seeking to broaden public perception of an identity is not to betray it, but to recognize the diversity that was always already inherent in it. Alexander has pointed to the diversity that bubbles under the surface of anthologies that aim to present the black arts and politics of a time as unified. And as Madhavi Sunder (2001) argues, this diversity is

increasingly breaking the surface: individuals engaged in "cultural dissent" are demanding not only membership within a particular category, but the right to define it on their own terms.

AT: Alt = Vacating Identity

Alt is not deconstruction of identity

Snyder 12 (Greta Fowler, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, "Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and Fluidity in Identity Politics", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January, jstor)

The unfixing that a politics of multivalent recognition aims to accomplish, however, should be distinguished from the deconstruction that some anti-identity theorists hope to achieve. Unlike an anti-identity politics such as that recommended by Monique Wittig (1985), the ultimate purpose of a politics of multivalent recognition is not to do away with those collective identities that have been subject to oppression. Whereas Wittig envisions a world without identity (more specifically, gender) distinctions, those who engage in a politics of multivalent recognition aim for a world in which identity categories are more capacious. Highlighting the "multivalence" of the identity category—its multiple meanings, the diversity within—stretches its symbolic boundaries. Disparate individuals' demands for recognition of their claim to blackness prompt group members and members of other identity groups to broaden their understanding of black identity. In doing so, they complicate the distinctions drawn between black and white, distinctions that help reproduce inequality. A politics of multivalent recognition operates on the assumption that we need not do away with identity categories to break down hierarchical symbolic distinctions and transform identity relations. Unfixing is distinct from deconstruction that goes "all the way down." In fact, there are good reasons for sustaining particular identities as actors engaged in a politics of multivalent recognition seek to do. Certainly, the concept of race and racial identity has justified the unjust treatment of black Americans. Yet while implicated in oppression, categorical distinctions like "black" and "white" have a critical role to play in addressing oppression, enabling individuals to talk about racial injustice and to develop a sense of "we" (Crenshaw 1991, 1297). Second, even those who do not understand racial distinctions as natural may view them as inextricable (Young 1990). A politics of multivalent recognition is premised on the assumption that identities are resignifiable, but not infinitely reconstructable. Finally and perhaps most importantly, these identities are not simply sites of oppression but sources of pride and meaning (Bickford 1997; Kompridis 2007, 286). Monovalent movements insist that black Americans are talented cultural creators; multivalent movements reinforce this point, while suggesting that multiple and disparate black identities spring from the cultures created by black Americans. In light of the inherent and strategic importance of black identity, not to mention its indelibility, those engaged in a politics of multivalent recognition are not only concerned with demonstrating the contingency of identity as are those engaged in a strategy like parodic subversion (Butler 1999). A politics of multivalent recognition is equally concerned with the revaluation of an identity category as a whole. Elizabeth Alexander, for example, refrains from presenting certain poems in certain spaces due to her sense that the poems would reinforce problematic stereotypes. Those engaged in a politics of multivalent recognition seek to change blackness' valence by changing its connotative field of reference. To delegitimize a symbolic system that marginalizes black people, they must bring greater visibility to specific ways of realizing black identity.

The idea of multivalent thinking forces us to challenge assumptions of identity

Snyder 12 (Greta Fowler, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, "Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and Fluidity in Identity Politics", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January, jstor)

As I hope this argument demonstrates, <u>even those actors who agree that demands for recognition are simply a means to the end of equality can deploy these demands in different ways, with different effects: even if essentialism is deployed strategically, it invites a monovalent reading of identity and the problems associated with it. The distinction between multivalent and monovalent recognition offers a more nuanced picture of what Iris Young calls the "politics of positional difference" (2007), thereby enabling political theorists</u> and actors <u>to specify and attend to the range of problems facing those who engage in the politics of recognition.</u> Additionally, <u>the idea of a politics of multivalent recognition forces us to rethink our assumptions about recognition politics and identity politics.</u> While presenting the politics of recognition as a kind of identity politics, I have resisted Nancy Fraser's conclusion that identity politics reifies identities. <u>The concept of multivalent recognition not only distinguishes the politics of recognition from the politics of authenticity and the politics of essentialism</u>, it presents recognition as a means to address their problematic consequences. On the other hand, I present <u>multivalent recognition as distinct from deconstructive anti-identity approaches. In its multivalent form, the politics of recognition has the potential to transform identity relations while maintaining identities.</u>

AT Black white Binary Good/Necessary

Binary structure is wrong – Look through a lens of multivalent oppression Westmoreland 13'

Peter Westmoreland Doctrine Race political and social professor at the university of Miami Area of specialization in Continental Early Modern Rousseau "Racism in a Black White Binary: On the Reaction to Trayvon Martin's Death"

Can this outcome be right? Does racism require a binary structure? Let us consider three proposals. First, we may make choices to reject the binary (as Perea and Alcoff do). We can attack it in at least two ways philosophically. First, we can recognize that Foucault's argument is subject to rebuttal. One approach would question whether the texts he examines are representative of the dominant race paradigm of the time. In the philosophical discourse on the formation of the race concept, for example, we have influential thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, and de Gobineau who reject binary thinking. Rousseau, on whom Foucault relies, models the people as sovereign-subjects in an explicit attempt to subvert binaries in the state's structure. We could perhaps write a counter-history of the relationship between race and the state that eschews the binary; possibly it shows up but does not have the influence Foucault suggests. Another version of the first proposal would emphasize the black-white binary's arbitrariness and contingency. Once we diagnose the paradigm, distinguishing races outside its terms according to their own voices and concerns can mitigate the binary's force. Similarly, I would note that the binary structure is a contingent feature of our race discourse's history, even on Foucault's scheme, and we can move against binary race thinking through practical advancement of the concerns of races outside the terms of the binary. This response assumes that the binary, while powerful, is not incontrovertible and can be separated from the "us versus them" war structure. Let us now pursue a second proposal: we accept the binary structure of racism. We have seen there are positions, evidence, and arguments indicating that race discourse has a binary paradigm and that this has been the case since the origins of modern racism. If race discourse is binary and we act to destroy the binary, then, we may not be opening the door to identifying new forms of racism. Instead, we destroy the historical meaning of race altogether with the result that all oppression is detached from racialization (for better or worse). Conversely, we may rigidly circumscribe the boundaries of racism to one binary structure or another, which allows us to think some oppression outside of racialization. Either way, we may then move beyond thinking oppression predominately in racial terms. We may ask whether some forms of oppression, although taken as forms of racism, may be better addressed through nonracial discourses. (I have already indicated that nativism may not fit the concepts of racial oppression.)19 Now, though, we may uncover a new conceptual tension. The first proposal lets race remain a hegemonic concern (as it is for Perea and Alcoff), which means that forms of oppression that do not suit the race model of discourse may be covered over. The second proposal protects nonracial oppressions from racialization, but it deemphasizes race discourse and the binary so that actually racist oppression may be overlooked. I do not believe there is a resolution to this tension. However, I also do not believe that we need one. Thus, a third proposal: What we need to do is recognize that there is a tension. Rather than empowering the reduction of forms of oppression to racisms or rejecting the binary or tightly limiting its scope, we realize that there are many forms of oppression. Some will suit racial analyses completely or partly; others will not. We must actively reflect on sites and instances of oppression to determine which modes of oppression are in operation and provide the best resources we can manage. We have many possible modes of analysis for the Trayvon Martin case: anti-black racism, racism between minorities, cultural insensitivity, Stand Your Ground laws, the culture of fear, the culture of policing, the voicelessness of

children, and so on. All of these topics and others deserve our consideration if we are truly to generate justice for Trayvon Martin and other victims. <u>Some concerns may merit racialization and others may not. Reflection on such diverse concerns is not easy or failsafe, but at the least it means that we may take advantage of all available resources to identify effectively victims, modes of oppression, and options for relief</u>. <u>The third proposal is a significant advance beyond previous positions. If pursued rigorously it has the potential to delimit what counts as racial and nonracial oppression so that we may recognize and pursue proper responses</u>. <u>The racism pluralist's move to expand the concept of racism does not give nonracial oppressions focused consideration, which leaves open the problem of giving race hegemonic status; that is, pluralist analyses raise the fear that all forms of oppression may be coded as racial</u>. At least, <u>the third proposal requires us to consider strategically where race begins and ends so that we do not overlook or crush into the discourse of race nonracial oppression</u>. What proposal three does, in effect, is <u>open the air for the voices of victims to speak and be heard with more clarity</u>, which I believe is the intent of racism pluralists. What proposal three does not do is concretely demarcate racial and nonracial forms of oppression, which is both a strength and a weakness. <u>Salient details will vary case to case. Firm determinations may not be possible in many cases, but recognizing that difficulty is itself something that the third proposal helps to enable by calling our attention to the multivalent nature of oppression.</u> As thinkers have recognized that race discourse in the United States is pluralistic, the black-white binary paradigm has become both untenable and common. By taking the binary seriously, the structure of race and racism will fundamentally change. What comes is uncertain, and may not be for the better, but <u>if we are sensitive to both racial and nonracial considerations we have a chance to attend to once hidden modes of victimization</u>. We owe this to all victims, including Trayvon Martin.20

Black/white binary fails- 4 reasons
Nakagawa 13'

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With that in mind, here are four reasons to move beyond the black-white racial binary: <u>1. Ignorance of our multi-racial history is the enemy of civil rights.</u> Here's an example. In the 1990s<u>, the evangelical right rose to power in part through exploiting widespread homophobia. But, while they appeared to be narrowly targeting LGBT people, they were using those attacks on LGBT rights to simultaneously talk about civil rights more generally.</u> They did so by contrasting LGBT people with blacks who they said have a "legitimate" claim to civil rights because, they argued, blacks were able to pass a litmus test of suffering and morality without which civil rights cannot be conferred. Therefore, civil rights are special rights. The success of that argument relied upon the widespread belief among what we nowadays refer to as "low-information voters," that civil rights are black rights, not American rights that have historically been withheld from black people. Right wingers exploited this confusion and doubled down on it, inciting anti-black racism by claiming these (black) rights were being taken too far by a civil rights lobby LGBT people wanted a piece of because it had captured control of Congress. <u>2. We are all profiled differently by race, but all of the different ways in which we are profiled serve the same racial hierarchy</u>. For instance, in the 1960s, just as the civil rights movement was cresting <u>and black urban uprisings were dominating the news cycle, news stories appeared profiling Asian Americans as a model minority. That profile, which privileged Asians as a super-minority that was "out-whiting the whites," claimed that Asians in the U.S. had managed to climb to success not through protest nor by way of "riots," but</u>

through hard work and quiet cooperation with the powers that be. This story of Asian success begged the question, if Asian Americans can do it, why can't black people? The media provided the answer: blacks aren't succeeding because they're a "problem minority." Ever since, the model minority myth has been used as a lever of racial injustice on the fulcrum of anti-black racism. 3. Race is central to the struggle over citizenship in America. The contest over voting rights, for instance, is a fight about citizenship rights, who has them, and who gets to decide in the matter just as much as is the question of the right to citizenship of new immigrants, including those without documents. At the center of these fights is a struggle over nationality, power, and control that revolves around race. We will never resolve these questions until we are able to grapple broadly with the issue of race and citizenship as regards all people of color. Until then, we are all just fighting different battles in the same war, but without the common cause necessary to build a winning coalition. 4. In order to achieve racial equity, we need to complicate our understanding of race. The black-white racial binary is as much a part of the fiction of race in America as dubious science about brain size and intelligence. The truth may not, by itself, set us free, but it might at least get us headed in that direction. As we head toward a "majority-minority" future, we'd do well to acknowledge the complexity of the story of race in America. Just ignoring it might be good for ratings, but it won't make it go away.

AT: Binary is Correct

7 reasons wrong with the white/black binary
Alcoff 6'

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Just as the protection of the∂ right of property advantages the propertied, and the protection of free speech∂ ''increases the influence of those who are articulate and can afford microphones,∂ TV air time, and so on ... the Equal Protection Clause produces a social good,∂ namely equality, for those falling under its coverage—blacks and whites. These it∂ genuinely helps—at least on occasion. But it leaves everyone else unprotected∂ (1998, 370–71).∂ Put in more general terms, these arguments can be summarized as follows:∂ 1) The black/white paradigm has disempowered various racial and ethnic∂ groups from being able to define their own identity, to mark their difference and∂ specificity beyond what could be captured on this limited map. Instead of naming∂ and describing our own identity and social circumstance, we have had descriptions∂ foisted on us from outside.∂ 2) Asian Americans and Latinos (among others) have historically been ignored∂ or marginalized in the public discourse in the United States on race and racism.∂ This is a problem for two reasons, first, because it is simply unfair to be excluded∂ from what concerns one, and second, because it has considerably weakened the∂ analysis of race and racism in the mainstream discussions. To explain the social∂ situation of Asian Americans or Latinos simply in terms of their de jure and de∂ facto treatment as nonwhites is to describe our condition only on the most shallow∂ terms. We must be included in the discussions so that a more adequate account∂ can be developed.∂ 3) By eliminating specificities within the large ''black'' or nonwhite group, the∂ black/white binary has undercut the possibility of developing appropriate and effective∂ legal and political solutions for the variable forms that racial oppression can∂ take. A broad united movement for civil rights does not require that we ignore the∂ specific circumstances of different racial or ethnic identities, nor does it mandate∂ that only the similarities can figure into the formulation of protective legislation. I∂ will discuss an example of this problem, one that concerns the application of∂ affirmative action in higher education, at the end of this chapter.∂ 4) Eliminating specificities within the large ''black'' or nonwhite group also∂ makes it difficult to understand or address the real conflicts and differences within∂ this amalgam of peoples. The black/white paradigm proposes to understand all∂ conflicts between communities of color through antiblack racism and white supremacy,∂ when the reality is more complex.∂ 5) For all these reasons, the black/white paradigm seriously undermines the∂ possibility of achieving coalitions. It is obvious that keeping us in conflict with each∂ other and not in coalition is in the interests of the current power structure.∂ I would add to these arguments the following two.∂ 6) The black/white binary and the constant invocation of all race discourses∂ and conflicts as between blacks and whites has produced an imaginary of race in∂ this country in which a very large white majority confronts a relatively small black∂ Latinos, Asian Americans, and the Black-White Binary 255∂ minority. This imagery has the effect of reenforcing the sense of inevitability to∂ white domination.∂ This is not the reality of racial percentages in almost any major urban center∂ in the country today. Nonwhites outnumber whites in New York, Miami, Chicago,∂ Atlanta, and Los Angeles, and come very close in San Francisco, Dallas, and∂ Washington, D.C. There is thus a real potential for a major shift in political power,∂ but there are two main challenges before this shift can take place. The first is the∂ ability of nonwhites to unite and to also make common cause with progressive antiracist∂ whites. The second is the Electoral College. The original intent of the∂ Electoral College was to protect small states and also to create a buffer between∂ the hoi polloi and the government, but the current effect of the Electoral College,∂ given these changed demographics, has the added ''advantage'' of disenfranchising∂ the occupants of cities generally and people of color specifically from influencing∂ national electoral outcomes. The fact is that if the popular vote determined∂ elections, the cities would have the determining numbers of votes, since this is∂ where the majority of U.S. citizens now live and where the trend of movement is∂ toward. The numbers and concentrations of people of color in the United States∂ means that we are quickly moving past the politics of recognition, in which people of∂ color must clamor for recognition from the all-powerful majority, and reaching the∂ politics of power negotiation, in which we can negotiate from a position of power∂ rather than having to rely exclusively on moral appeals. The white majority will not∂ maintain its near hegemonic

political control as new configurations of alliances∂ develop.4 Moreover, the white majority is far from monolithic, splintering most∂ notably along gender and class lines: the gender gap has widened in electoral∂ politics along with the gap between union and nonunion households, with droves∂ of white women and white union members voting the same as the majority of∂ people of color.∂ Thus, thinking of race only in terms of black and white produces a sense of∂ inevitability to white domination and thus a sense of fatalism, even though the facts∂ call for the opposite. I believe this issue of imagery is very significant: it affects∂ people's choices, voting (or nonvoting) practices, and the level of energy they are∂ willing to devote to political activism. By opening up the binary imagery to rainbow∂ images and the like, as Jesse Jackson did with great effect in his presidential∂ campaign, we can more accurately and thus helpfully present the growing and∂ future conditions within which political action and contestations will occur. This∂ is in everyone's interests (or at least, the majority's).∂ 7) The next argument that I would make in regard to the black/white binary is∂ that it mistakenly configures race imagistically as exclusively having to do with∂ color, as if color alone determines racial identity and is the sole object of racism.∂ Equating race with color makes it seem as if all the races other than black and∂ white must be lined up between them since they clearly represent the polar extremes.∂ There is certainly a racist continuum of color operating in this and in∂ many countries, but my point is that this continuum is not the only axis by which∂ racism operates.∂ Some have taken the horrific hierarchy of adoption preferences in the United∂ States, that runs basically from white to Asian to Latino to black, as representative∂ 256 Latino/a Particularity∂ of a continuum of color. Related to this idea is the claim that Asian Americans and∂ Latinos are closer to white and will eventually ''become'' white. Let me address this∂ latter idea first. The claim that Asian Americans and Latinos will become white is∂ first of all premised on the assumption that we have two choices of racialized∂ identities: white and black. The assumption presupposed is then that if a group is not∂ economically and politically located at or near the bottom of the society, which the∂ black/white paradigm associates exclusively with ''blackness,'' then such a group is∂ assumed to have achieved ''whiteness.'' But class does not perfectly map onto race:∂ the poor come in all colors. Moreover, there is significant racial and class variety∂ within each of these large amalgamated groups with highly variant median incomes.∂

Binary is wrong-doesn't account for any other races other than black and white Alcoff 6'

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Wanting to avoid this outcome, however unlikely it∂ Latinos, Asian Americans, and the Black-White Binary 249∂ might be, the court decided to embellish on the arguments made in appeal. Justice∂ Charles J. Murray interpreted legal precedent to argue that the terms ''black'' and∂ ''white'' are oppositional terms, from which he concluded that black must mean∂ nonwhite and white must exclude all people of color. Thus, by the law of binary∂ logic, Chinese Americans, after having become Native American, then also became∂ black.∂ Of the many questions that one might like to go back and pose to Charles∂ Murray, perhaps the most obvious is the following: if black and white are oppositional∂ terms, then, instead of black meaning nonwhite, doesn't it just as logically∂ follow that white could mean nonblack, in which case all people of color except∂ African Americans would be white? This conclusion is no more or less fallacious or∂ absurd than Murray's conclusion that black means nonwhite. That such an idea∂ was, apparently, beyond the imagination of the court at that time begins to reveal∂ the strategy at work here. Defining whites as only those without one drop of ''other''∂ blood has been a tool to maintain a clear and distinct border around white identity.∂ On the other hand, the borders of other identities—their distinctiveness from each∂ other—are not important for the law to define and maintain. The

controlling termð here is not race but whiteness. To be black is to be nonwhite, but this equation isð not reversible if one is using the usual meaning of ''black'' today, since for Murrayð ''black'' includes virtually every Asian American, Latino, Native American, andð mixed race person as well as all those of African origin. Although this case beganð with a strategy to link the Chinese to American Indians, it ends in a ruling thatð prescribes a black/white binary. The ruling essentially allowed the state to makeð one all-purpose argument against the civil and political rights of nonwhites, thusð increasing the efficiency with which it could maintain discrimination.ð Asian Americans and Latinos have been tossed back and forth across thisð black/white binary for 150 years (see Haney Loʹpez 1996; Lee 1993; G. Martinezð 1998; Okihiro 1994; Omi and Winant 1986; C. Rodrıʹguez, 2000). To continue withð the example of Chinese Americans, in 1860 Chinese Americans were classified asð white in Louisiana. By 1870 they were classified as Chinese. But in 1900, theð children of Chinese and non-Chinese parents were reclassified as either white orð black. Other states had similarly convoluted histories of classification. In 1927 theð U.S. Supreme Court ended this confusion and defined the Chinese as nonwhite,ð thus more firmly subjecting them to all the segregationist and Jim Crow legislationð then in effect. Similar stories of variable racial classification can be told aboutð Mexicans in Texas and in New Mexico, Japanese in California, and other groups.ð Needless to say, the variable classifications tell a story of strategic reasoning inð which arguments for legal discriminations are deployed against people of color byð whatever opportune classification presents itself in the context.ð Contrary to what one might imagine, it has not always or even generally beenð to the advantage of Asian Americans and Latinos to be legally classified as white.ð An illustration of this is found in another important legal case decided by the U.S.ð Supreme Court in 1954, just two weeks before they issued the decision in Brown vs.ð Board of Education. The case of Hernandez v. Texas involved a Mexican Americanð man convicted of murder by an all-white jury and sentenced to life imprisonmentð (G. Martinez 1998; Suro 1999). His lawyer appealed the conviction by arguing thatð 250 Latino/a Particularityð the absence of Mexican Americans on the jury was discriminatory, making referenceð to the famous Scottsboro case in which the U.S. Supreme Court overturnedð (after many years) the conviction of nine African American men on the grounds ofð an absence of African Americans from the jury. But in the Hernandez case, theð Texas Supreme Court ruled that Mexicans were white people of Spanish descent,ð and therefore that there was no discrimination in the all-white makeup of the jury.ð Forty years later, Hernandez's lawyer, James DeAnda, recounted how he made hisð argument appealing this ruling:ð Right there in the Jackson County Courthouse, where no Hispanic had served onð any kind of a jury in living memory because Mexicans were white and so it wasð okay to bring them before all-white juries, they had two men's rooms. One had að nice sign that just said MEN on it. The other had a sign on it that said COLOREDð MEN and below that was a hand-scrawled sign that said HOMBRESð AQUI [men here]. In that jury pool, Mexicans may have been white, but when itð came to nature's functions, they were not. (Suro 1999, 85)ð In fact, in Texas not only were Mexicans subject to Jim Crow in public facilitiesð from restaurants to bathrooms, they were also excluded from business and communityð groups, and children of Mexican descent were required to attend a segregatedð school for the first four grades, whether they spoke fluent English or not.ð Thus, when they were classified as nonwhite, Latinos were overtly denied certainð civil rights; when they were classified as white, the de facto denial of their civil rightsð could not be appealed.ð Although the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Texas court's decision inð the Hernandez case, its final decision indicated a perplexity regarding Mexicanð American identity. The court did not want to classify Mexicans as black, and itð didn't want to alter the legal classification of Mexicans as white; since these wereð the only racial terms the justices thought were available, they ended up explainingð the discrimination Mexicans

faced as based on ''other differences,'' left undefined.ð Thus, oddly, the court upheld that there was racial discrimination against Mexicans,ð but it denied that Mexicans constituted a race (Haney Lo´pez 1998, 182–83).ð **One clear lesson to be learned from this legal history is that race is a constructionð that is variable enough to be stretched opportunistically as the need arisesð in order to maintain and expand discrimination.** Racism, in other words, moldsð racial categories to fit its design. And the legal history also shows that white supremacyð has moved Latinos and Asian Americans around the classification schemað for its own benefit. Nonetheless, one might take these legal cases to indicate thatð discrimination against African Americans was the paradigm case that U.S. courtsð stretched when they could to justify discrimination against other nonwhites, andð thus to provide support for the black/white paradigm of race.ð Modeling Argumentsð The distinguished historian John Hope Franklin made such an argument at the firstð official meeting of the Race Relations Commission, which was convened by formerð U.S. President Bill Clinton to advance his initiative for a national dialogue on race.ð Latinos, Asian Americans, and the Black-White Binary 251ð Franklin maintained that ''racism in the black/white sphere'' developed first inð North America when slavery was introduced in the Jamestown colony in 1619 andð has served as a model for the treatment of race in the United States. Attorney Angelað Oh, also serving on the commission, argued against Franklin on this point, usingð the example of the uprising of April 29, 1992, in Los Angeles to show that the specificð history and racist treatment of Asian Americans needs to be accounted for in orderð to understand the complex varieties of racism that sparked that event. ''I just want toð make sure we go beyond the black-white paradigm ... because the world is aboutð much more than that,'' she said (see Wu 2002, 32–35). Frank Wu, commenting onð this exchange, tries diplomatically to unite both Oh and Franklin's points. Heð affirms that ''African Americans bear the greatest burden of racial discrimination''ð but adds that the Los Angeles uprising needs to be understood in relation both toð African American history as well as Korean American history (and, I would add,ð Latino history, since Latinos were the largest number of persons arrested). Wuð advocates the following commonsense approach:ð Whatever any of us concludes about race relations, we should start by including allð of us. ... Our leaders should speak to all individuals, about every group, and forð the country as a whole. A unified theory of race, race relations, and racial tensionsð must have whites, African Americans, and all the rest, and even within groupsð must include Arab Americans, Jewish Americans, white ethnicities, and so forth.ð Our theory is an inadequate account otherwise. (Wu 2002, 36)ð The question Wu does not address directly is whether the continued acceptance ofð the black/white paradigm, what Oh is contesting and Franklin is defending, willð allow such a comprehensive account.ð To say that racism has been modeled on slavery might or might not entail a black/ð white binary, depending on how much is presumed in the concept of ''modeling.'' Butð the reality of race and racism in the North American continent has been moreð complicated than black/white since the initial conquest of native peoples by Europeanð Americans. Slavery was itself an idea put forward by Columbus when he suggestedð that the indigenous population could be enslaved in order to bring profits to theð Spanish crown because the amount of gold and silver here was initially found wanting.ð The concept of race itself was inspired in large measure without a doubt by theð ''discovery'' of native peoples and the subsequent debates among learned Europeansð about their nature, their humanity, and their rights. Later on, emerging legal practiceð developed typologies of rights based on typologies of peoples, such as the exclusionaryð laws concerning testimony in court, as mentioned earlier, which grouped ''blacks,ð mulattoes, and Native Americans.'' The Chinese laborers brought to the West in theð 1800s were subjected to very specific rulings restricting their rights not only to vote orð own property but even to marry other Chinese. This latter ruling outlasted slavery andð was

justified by invoking images of Asian overpopulation, another quite specific racist ideology. To control their reproduction, Chinese women were allowed to come as prostitutes but not as wives, a restriction no other group faced. The Mexicans defeated in the Mexican-American War were portrayed as cruel and cowardly barbarians, and although the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo ratified in 1848 guaranteed for the Mexicans who stayed in the United States full rights of 252 Latino/a Particularity citizenship, like the treaties with Native Americans neither local governments nor the federal courts upheld the Mexicans' right to vote or respected the land deeds they held before the treaty (see Acun˜a 1988; Shorris 1992). By the time of the Spanish-American War of 1898 the image of barbarism used against Mexicans was consistently attributed to a Latin Catholic heritage and expanded for use throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, thus subsequently affecting the immigrant populations coming from these areas as well as justifying U.S. claims of hegemony in the region (Mignolo 2000). The so-called Zoot Suit riots in Los Angeles in 1943 targeted Mexican Americans and their ethnically specific style of dress. The attempts made to geographically sequester and also to forcibly assimilate Native American groups were not experienced by any other group, and had their own ideological justifications that combined contradictory images of the Great Chain of Being with the romanticized Noble Savage.

AT: Black/White IS Origin

Even if their history lesson is correct, white supremacy is not a zero sum game, their focus makes tackling other aspects of racism impossible

Perea 97 (Juan, Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law, RACE, ETHNICITY & NATIONHOOD: ARTICLE: The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, California Law Review, October, 1997, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1213, p. 1254-1255]

One could object to my conclusions **on the grounds that White racism against Blacks has operated for a much longer time than racism against Latinos/as or Asians, and therefore the former problem needs to be studied and remedied first**. English enslavement of Blacks can be traced to the early 1600s, well before the nationhood of the United States. n207 Encounters between Anglo and Mexican people did not begin on a large scale until the 1830s, as Whites moved west into Texas and other parts of the Southwest that, at the time, were parts of Mexico. n208 To a large extent, the Black/White binary paradigm of race has developed precisely because of the historical priority in time of White racism against Blacks and because of the nature of the exploitation that slavery caused. **The question is whether the earlier deployment of White racism against Blacks in the United States justifies the binary approach in race scholarship and thinking today**. **I cannot see scholarly efforts to understand and remedy White racism in all its forms as a "zero-sum game," in which efforts to understand other forms of White racism somehow take away from efforts to understand and remedy White racism against Blacks. My goal** is not to take away anything from the study of White racism against Blacks. Rather, it **is to identify** some **limitations of this study** and to add to these studies the study of White racism against other racialized American groups. **Stated simply, we must study and understand White racism in all its forms**. Indeed, here lie some of the possibilities for coalition and for solving some of the problems that resist solution under our current scholarship. n209

AT: Panthers not Monovalent

Panthers are monovalent-Panthers reduced to a single dominant essence

Snyder 12 (Greta Fowler, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, "Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and Fluidity in Identity Politics", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January, jstor)

Critics may say that the vision of the Panthers, US, and BAM I offered above is reductive. In response, I want to revisit the Panthers. While <u>Panther leaders are</u> in part <u>responsible for</u> promulgating <u>the monovalent identity widely associated with them,</u> I agree that this characterization does not do justice to a dynamic organization. <u>The popularity of this characterization points to structural obstacles to the politics of multivalent recognition</u>. In contrast to the group's image as hypersexualized, hypermasculine aggressive revolutionaries, women constituted a significant portion of the Panthers' membership. Sacrifices by women like Ericka Huggins and Angela Davis prompted a transformation in the gender politics of the Panthers (Matthews 1998, 282); a woman—Elaine Brown—ultimately headed the Panthers. <u>The sexual politics of the Panthers also evolved over time.</u> In August 1970, Huey P. Newton preached solidarity with the Gay Liberation Movement, saying "the term 'faggot'…should be deleted from our vocabulary, and especially we should not attach names normally designed for homosexuals to men who are enemies of the people." (Newton 1970). Nor was the agenda of the Party static. Although originally styled as a paramilitary organization—the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense—over time the group became increasingly concentrated on its "survival programs." <u>Survival programs included free breakfast for children</u>, free health clinics, transport to visit relatives in prison, political education programs, and more. Unlike paramilitary operations, the types of activities involved in the survival programs have traditionally been coded as feminine. <u>Few if any would agree that the Black Panther Party achieved a feminist or queer ideal. Even when the official rhetoric of the party cut across the image of black identity initially projected by leaders, the diversity within black identity continued to be glossed over—in his 1970 speech concerning the women and gay liberation movements, for instance, Newton presented woman, gay and black as separate rather than overlapping identities. Yet at the same time, the Party was certainly more complicated—and presented a more complicated image of black identity</u>—than was widely projected. <u>In a content analysis of 163 articles about the Panthers found in major national magazines and newspapers over an 11- year time span, Edward Morgan found that the "the Panthers are reduced to a single, dominant essence" (2006, 331). The mainstream media—including some 300 journalist cooperating with COINTELPRO efforts (Morgan 2006, 329–30)—broadcast images of "brash, gun-toting, profanity-spewing blacks" (Ogbar 2004, 67). <u>By freezing the Black Panthers at their origin, the mainstream media were deeply complicit in promoting the monovalent conception of identity initially projected by the Panthers. The media itself is not monolithic and certainly alternative stories about the Panthers were told</u> through outlets like The Black Panther (the Party's community news service). Despite this, it remains the case that those engaged in the politics of multivalent recognition are likely to face significant challenges <u>not only in establishing support for and in strategizing how to promote a multivalent view of identity, but also in the dissemination process. That the mainstream media would present a predominantly monovalent view of black identity rather than a multivalent one should not be surprising</u>. Many media formats privilege the simple and the sensational over the complex and challenging. Moreover, gatekeepers and decision makers in the culture industry are often members of the hegemonic racial (gender, sexual) identity group with vested interests in maintaining their power. <u>The example of the Black Panthers is a potent reminder that the success of a</u>

politics of multivalent recognition depends not only on political actors' intentions, but also on media outlets. In other words, while cultural, this politics is not without its structural prerequisites.

AT: Snyder Only about Race

Snyder talks about recognition and feminist recognition not only about race

Snyder 12 (Greta Fowler, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, "Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and Fluidity in Identity Politics", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January, jstor)

To conclude, I want to clarify several aspects of my argument and offer some final thoughts about how it contributes to the literature on recognition and identity politics. First, though I have focused on one identity group in elaborating the distinction between monovalent and multivalent recognition politics, I believe it to be useful in the interpretation and assessment of the cultural identity politics of other groups. Shane Phelan (1989), for instance, offers a detailed description and trenchant critique of a monovalent lesbian feminist recognition politics, for instance. On the other hand, the early gay pride movement exemplifies the politics of multivalent recognition in its commitment to "unity through diversity" (Armstrong 2002, 26).

AFF Answers

Perm

Do Both: mono- and multi- valent shift over time

Snyder 12 (Greta Fowler, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, "Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and Fluidity in Identity Politics", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January, jstor)

Though the gay pride movement was committed to "unity through diversity" in theory, however, it was homogenous (overwhelmingly white, male, middle-class, etc.) in practice (Armstrong 2002, 136). While the Black Panthers initially projected a monovalent view of black identity, both the theory and the practice of the organization transformed over time -- yet these changes were not reflected in predominant representations of the Panthers. These points highlight the following considerations in the categorization and assessment of recognition politics. First, both political ideology and political practice are important in determining whether an example of recognition politics is monovalent or multivalent; both should be considered. Second, attention should be paid both to the nature of the demands for recognition as well as the way in which these demands are interpolated by the culture industry. Finally, recognition movements are not static: the nature of demands for recognition made by a group may change over time, moving nearer to or farther from the multivalent or monovalent pole.

Alt fails

Alternative fails 2 reasons- civil rights and inside outsider binary
Brooks and Widner 12'

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Furthermore, by arguing that black scholars should abandon the black/white binary (i.e., not focus on white-on-black racial problems), critical theorists, most of whom are non-black, 3 are unintentionally disrespecting a venerable tradition of black scholarship.14 African American scholars as diverse as (at times) Derrick Bell, the "father" of Critical Race Theory,' 5 Michael Eric Dyson and Cornel West, civil rights liberals,' 6 Glenn Loury, a civil rights moderate-conservative, 17 and John Hope Franklin, perhaps the greatest African American scholar of the last half of the twentieth century18 (whose public disagreement with an Asian scholar over the black/white paradigm was highly publicized), 19 not only write within this tradition but also have helped to shape it. Equally essential to this scholarly tradition are the enduring works of the late Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, the nation's first scholarly African American judge and the seminal writings of W. E. B. Du Bois, the nation's first (and still greatest) civil rights scholar. 2 ' This tradition of African American scholarship laid the foundation for the NAACP's successful litigation strategy against school segregation. 22 In addition to civil rights scholarship, criticism of the black/white binary extends to civil rights law. Delgado and Stefancic explore the following scenario: Imagine, for example, that Juan Dominguez, a Puerto Rican worker, is told by his boss, 'You're a lazy Puerto Rican just like the rest. You'll never get ahead as long as I'm supervisor.' Juan sues for discrimination under a civil rights-era statute designed with blacks in mind. He wins because he can show that an African American worker, treated in a similar fashion, would be entitled to redress. But suppose that Juan's coworkers and supervisor make fun of him because of his accent, religion, or place of birth. An African American subjected to these forms of discrimination would not be able to recover, and so Juan would go without recourse.23 Thus, the critique of the black/white binary proceeds on two levels-civil rights scholarship and civil rights law. This article considers both critiques. We consider the critique based on civil rights law in Part II. There, we contend that the critics of the binary have misread the extant law. As one of the authors has noted in a previous work, "Courts generally recognize that discrimination on the basis of a foreign trait, such as accent, is actionable under Title VII as discrimination on the basis of national origin.' 24 The point is, our most important civil rights laws apply to all racial groups, including whites, without any precondition that non-black racial groups analogize their situation to that of blacks. The Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution-the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 25-which provide the foundation for modem civil rights law,26 the 1964 Civil Rights Act,27 and modem-day case law 28 all reach far beyond the black/white binary. To the extent that asymmetrical civil rights statutes have been enacted in the decades after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, these laws have been responsive to non-blacks, including the disabled,29 women,30 and older workers. 3' Civil rights law recognizes multiple binaries rather than a single binary. We turn in Part III to the theoretical arguments regarding the black/white binary. Here, we argue that African-American scholars have not suggested that non-black racial groups should be accorded second-class civil rights

status. Rather, <u>African-American scholars of any stature embrace the multiple-binary approach reflected in civil rights law. The fact that black scholars focus on white-on-black racial problems in their scholarship is natural given their experiences as black Americans and the tradition of black scholarship.</u> Yet, critical theorists have attacked this tradition of black scholarship on anti-binary grounds. <u>We address the three most compelling anti-binary criticisms offered by critical theorists: (1) the binary ignores the histories of other racial groups, thereby distorting our understanding of civil rights history; 32 (2) it ignores interest convergence and thus threatens natural alliances among outsiders, especially people of color; 33 and, related to the latter criticism, (3) it is predicated upon a false notion of "black uniqueness."3 4 In considering each of these criticisms, we argue that the black/white binary-which, again, is most properly understood to mean the focus on white-on-black racial problems makes very good sense to African Americans based on their racial reality. Those who would reject the binary, and would have black scholars do likewise; have simply ignored this fact of life.</u> Why can 't binaries co-exist in civil rights scholarship as they do in civil rights law? We conclude with two arguments in Part IV. <u>First, contrary to what they claim, critics of the black/white binary are, in reality, not arguing for the dissolution of all binaries, but, instead, are arguing for a particular binary. They seek to replace the black/white binary in civil rights scholarship with an insider/outsider binary.</u> The latter not only reflects a monolithic view of racial identity, 5 it also subordinates African Americans by trivializing the black ethos and presuming to tell African-American scholars what to write about<u>. Second, criticism of the black/white binary is, at bottom, a claim regarding racial priority. While some critics of the black/white binary may have hoped that the priority issue could be avoided by simply moving beyond the black/white binary</u>, 36 that simply has not been the case. Among outsider groups, competing claims and conflicts have not and will not disappear. 37 Hence, <u>the questions become: Does it make moral, historical, political, or sociological sense to give priority to African Americans in the realm of civil rights when their interests clash with the interests of other civil rights groups? Have the descendants of slaves earned the right to claim priority because they have suffered the longest and still remain at "the very bottom of the well," to borrow a metaphor from critical theory?</u> Former President Bill Clinton, a liberal, and James Q. Wilson, a conservative scholar, answer these questions in the affirmative. Clinton states, <u>"If we can address the problems between black and white Americans, then we will be better equipped to deal with discrimination in other areas."</u> 38 Similarly, Wilson writes in the aftermath of Katrina that: "The main domestic concern of policy-engaged intellectuals, liberal and conservative, ought to be to think hard about how to change these social weaknesses. Lower-class blacks are numerous and fill our prisons, and among all blacks the level of financial assets is lower than it is for whites. any blacks have made rapid progress, but we are not certain how." 39 <u>While saving until another day the construction of a formula that might facilitate the ranking of civil rights claims in particular situations, we do argue here that any such formula should not necessarily favor African Americans because of the simple fact that they are not at the very bottom of the well across the board. However, such a formula should take into account the relative severity and duration of each group's deprivation of rights or equality in various situations.</u>

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The idea that African Americans should incorporate other racial histories in their scholarship so as not to ignore those histories is thinly supported. Asian and Latino/a scholars, for example, do not need African-American scholars to validate their work, which is exceptionally good. [2] Similarly, although incorporating other racial histories into African-American scholarship may enrich one's perspective on racism, this exercise is typically not a prerequisite for understanding civil rights or the black ethos-nor is it necessary for addressing black issues. To illustrate the point, we refer to Mendez v. Westminister School District of Orange County.[103] This case is often cited by LatCrits to illustrate the indispensability of Latino/a history in understanding the history of school desegregation that culminated in Brown .[104] In Mendez, the court overturned a school segregation statute applicable to Mexican-American students, a decision that predated Brown I by a few years. While interesting, the case is neither necessary nor sufficient in explaining Brown I or in understanding the NAACP's legal strategy. Mendez was a Ninth Circuit opinion, so its precedential value is low compared to that of the Supreme Court cases traditionally regarded as the predecessors of Brown 1.[105] Nor was Mendez as significant as the scholarship that informed the NAACP briefs. [06] Furthermore, even these Supreme Court cases and scholarly works have little probative valu in explaining why the Court decided Brown I the way it did.'[07] Indeed, contemporary scholarship on Brown I that omits the geopolitical and other extra-legal factors that underpin the opinion is insufficiently theorized. [08] Authors who write about their own racial experiences are not necessarily signaling ignorance about other racial experiences. These writers are merely taking advantage of their unique position to get the story out more accurately and with greater insight. In fact, Professor Delgado himself rather enthusiastically embraced this position in his influential article, "The Imperial Scholar:" [I]t is possible to compile an a priori list of reasons why we might look with concern on a situation in which the scholarship about group A [outsiders] is written by members of group B [insiders]. First, members of group B may be ineffective advocates of the rights and interests of persons in group A. They may lack information; more important, perhaps, they may lack passion, or that passion may be misdirected. B's scholarship may tend to be sentimental, diffusing passion in useless directions, or wasting time on unproductive breast-beating. Second, while the B's might advocate effectively, they might advocate the wrong things. Their agenda may differ from that of the A's, they may pull their punches with respect to remedies, especially where remedying A's situation entails uncomfortable consequences for B. Despite the best of intentions, B's may have stereotypes embedded deep in their psyches that distort their thinking, causing them to balance interests in ways inimical to A's. Finally, domination by members of group B may paralyze members of group A, causing the A's to forget how to flex their legal muscles for themselves.'

AT other race oppressions

Prefer white black binary biggest problem and has happened for the longest

Brooks and Widner 12'

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Critical theorists reject the black/white binary in large part because they reject the notion that African Americans have always been and continue to be the most racially subordinated group in America. 144 Professor Delgado, for example, argues that all racial minorities must avoid "the [s]iren [slong of [u]niqueness. ' According to Delgado, the seductive idea of uniqueness can "predispose a minority group to believe that it is uniquely victimized and entitled to special consideration from iniquitous whites.' 46 However, this argument runs contrary to history, as documented by a large body of research. Although rarely stated in public, 4 7 there is substantial empirical evidence strongly suggesting that African Americans are unique and, hence, warrant separate (but not necessarily dominant) attention. 148 We shall focus on a few pieces of this evidence: slavery and Jim Crow; the subordination of African Americans versus Native Americans; lynching; and what can be termed, "the lost American dream." To begin with, African Americans are the only group to arrive in this country not on, but under Plymouth Rock. African Americans have encountered and continue to encounter unique disadvantages that stem from the very way they were brought into American society. 1 49 Unlike most immigrants who came to the United States voluntarily, blacks were imported in huge numbers as slaves. Although slavery had existed for thousands of years, the Atlantic slave trade was not slavery as usual: Slavery in the Americas introduced the troubling element of race into the master/slave relationship. For the first time in history, dark skin became the social marker of chattel slavery. And, as a means of justifying this new face-a black face-given to an ancient practice, the slavers and their supporters created a race-specific ideology of condemnation.150 This new form of slavery was so much a part of colonial America that the founders addressed it in multiple provisions of the U.S. Constitution.' 5 1 Thus, the subjugation of African Americans was written into the fabric of our nation from the very beginning-a situation that no other group has faced. Although slavery officially ended with the Civil War and the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, the systematic economic exploitation of African Americans continued well into the twentieth century. As Douglas Blackmon chronicles in his Pulitzer Prize winning book, "Slavery by Another Name," southern states used an elaborate system of laws "specifically enacted to intimidate blacks." They also used a variety of other slave-like practices such as opportunistic arrests, sham trials, convict leasing, and coercive "contracts" to continue supplying white farms and industry with the cheap black labor on which they relied. 152 In spite of this, critical theorists often dismiss African American uniqueness by noting that other racial minorities have experienced many of the injustices blacks have faced. For example, Professor Perea asserts: Mexican Americans were also segregated in separate but unequal schools, were kept out of public parks by law, were refused service in restaurants, were prohibited from attending 'White' churches on Sundays, and were denied burial in 'White' cemeteries, among all of the other horrors of the separate but equal scheme.153 While it is true that all racial minorities, particularly Latinos/as, have been victims of white oppression, these racialized experiences are nonetheless quite different from what African Americans have experienced. 54 In our view, the differences between African Americans and other racial minorities are so great as to outweigh the similarities. As one of the authors said on a previous occasion: [Bilacks were the main target of slavery and Jim

Crow. No other American group inhabited the peculiar institution. No other American group sustained more casualties or lengthier suffering from slavery and Jim Crow... [T]his gives blacks a connection to slavery and Jim Crowboth familial and psychological-that no other racial minority has. There is a collective memory here that only blacks have.... [U]nlike Asians and Latinos, blacks did not volunteer for this tour of duty. Blacks were kidnapped from their homeland and brought to this country by brutal force, the likes of which we have not seen before or since in American history. In short, although blacks, Asians, Latinos, Native Americans, Indians, and other people of color are victims of what Joe Feagin calls 'systemic racism' (or the "white-created" paradigm of racial subordination), they do not experience and hence do not react to racial subordination in exactly the same way.... White-on-black oppression is just different from other white-oppression syndromes, whether racial or gender. Patricia Rodriguez has observed, 'White means mostly privilege and black means overcoming obstacles, a history of civil rights. As a Latina, I can't try to claim one of these.'" 55 Black Americans carry the weight of the atrocities-slavery and Jim Crow.... 1 56

A2: Delgado

Focus on blackness the problem is growing and decreasing for other races- other races have seen increases in education and success

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Professor Richard Delgado argues that binary thinking can harm the group whose interest it places at the center. It can, for example, pit one disadvantaged group against another to the detriment of both. This opposition can impair a group's ability to forge useful coalitions and to leam from other groups' successes and failures.,I I What minority groups should do instead, Delgado argues, is set up a secondary market in which they negotiate selectively with each other. This market would take the form of exchanging support for issues important to various groups, creating win-win solutions whenever possible. Thus, a non-binary framework allows for racial minorities to approach whites in full force."12 Although Professor Delgado's arguments are not without merit, they are based on an unproven assumption that identities among racial minorities are sufficiently monolithic so as to make interracial alliances natural. "The idea would be," Professor Delgado asserts, "for minority groups to assess their own preferences and make tradeoffs that will, optimistically, bring gains for all concerned."' 1 3 However, as Professor Carbado points out, "Non-Black people of color have not always been interested in identifying themselves with the Black or marginalized side of the Black/White paradigm. In fact, there are moments in American history when certain Asian Americans and Latinas/os have attempted to achieve equality by asserting that they are not Black or like Blacks, and/or that they are White." 14 There are costs as well as advantages associated with occupying both ends of the polarity-the black (or subordinated) end as well as the white (or privileged) end-and non-black racial groups have often been able to avoid the costs and exploit the advantages.' 15 Self-interest is a powerful motivating force. Thus, it may be, as Professor Delgado maintains, that all binaries, including the black/white binary, are narrow nationalisms calculated to cutting the most favorable possible deal with whites'6-a possibility that African Americans can ill-afford to ignore. Therefore it is important to explore this possibility more closely to get a sense of how risky it would be for African Americans to abandon the black/white binary-which spawned the scholarly tradition and political strategy that together have been responsible for destroying Jim Crow and forging a racial consciousness from which all racial groups have benefitted." 7 When one looks closely at the natural-alliance theory-more accurately, the presumed-alliance theory-one comes to the unhappy conclusion that the theory founders on the shoals of racial reality. In a world of limited resources, achieving progress on one group's agenda can come at the expense of another group's agenda. 1 1 8 The game is, indeed, often zero-sum. The racial dynamic between blacks and Latinos/as, the latter of whom have been the most persistent critics of the black/white binary,' 19 well illustrates this point. Let us begin with education. Blacks and Latinos/as both hope to see dramatic improvements in the quality of schools their children attend. For blacks, this means increasing educational funds to their schools and providing curricular services that address issues of racial pride, self-esteem, and the other unique needs of African-American students, especially those of young black

males. 20 Likewise, for Latinos/as, improving the quality of education for their children means focusing on the special needs of Latino/as children, including bilingual education and expanded coverage of Latin-American history, which is often tied to immigration concerns.' 21 With the nationwide crisis in public school funding, the pool of state and federal funds as well as other resources available to meet these goals is extremely limited. <u>Consequently, funds possibility more closely to get a sense of how risky it would be for African Americans to abandon the black/white binary-which spawned the scholarly tradition and political strategy that together have been responsible for destroying Jim Crow and forging a racial consciousness from which all racial groups have benefitted</u>." 7 When one looks closely at the natural-alliance theory-more accurately, the presumed-alliance theory-one comes to the unhappy conclusion that the theory founders on the shoals of racial reality. In a world of limited resources, achieving progress on one group's agenda can come at the expense of another group's agenda. 1 1 8 The game is, indeed, often zero-sum. <u>The racial dynamic between blacks and Latinos/as, the latter of whom have been the most persistent critics of the black/white binary,' 19 well illustrates this point. Let us begin with education. Blacks and Latinos/as both hope to see dramatic improvements in the quality of schools their children attend. For blacks, this means increasing educational funds to their schools and providing curricular services that address issues of racial pride, self-esteem, and the other unique needs of African-American students, especially those of young black males.</u> 20 Likewise, for Latinos/as, improving the quality of education for their children means focusing on the special needs of Latino/as children, including bilingual education and expanded coverage of Latin-American history, which is often tied to immigration concerns.' 21 With the nationwide crisis in public school funding, the pool of state and federal funds as well as other resources available to meet these goals is extremely limited. Consequently, funds Angeles have almost entirely replaced the unionized African-Americanð workforce with a non-unionized immigrant workforce.' 6 Even whenð unionization is not an issue, the results are the same. As Jack Miles observes:ð If the Latinos were not around to be [gardeners, busboys, chambermaids,ð nannies, janitors, construction workers], nonblack employers would beð forced to hire blacks-but they'd rather not. They trust Latinos. Theyð fear or disdain blacks. The result is unofficial but widespread preferentialð hiring of Latinos-the largest affirmative action program in the nation,ð and one paid for, in effect, by blacks. 127ð Because of the employment implications of undocumented immigration,ð the NAACP, as well as the AFL-CIO, supported the employer sanctionsð provision under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. As oneð NAACP official said, the sanctions were a way "to keep undocumented aliensð from taking the food from black children."1' 28 African Americans "wereð competing more directly with Latinos than with any other ethnic group."' 2 9ð In addition there have been various political struggles between Africanð Americans and Latinos/as in Los Angeles. A case in point is the 2001 mayoralð race in which blacks voted for a white candidate instead of the Latino candidateð whom they believed to be more interested in strengthening Latino/a politicalð and economic power than in improving the plight of blacks. For similarð reasons, the NAACP objected to the inclusion of Latinos/as in the 1975 Votingð Rights Extension.' 30 A black columnist positioned the matter in a broaderð context: "Though we pride ourselves on our leadership role in civil rights,ð paradoxically, we guard the success jealously. 'We're the ones who marchedð in the streets and got our heads busted. Where were they? But now they wantð to get in on the benefits."" 13ð 'ð Similar differences exist between African Americans and other racialð minorities. For example, <u>some Asians have sought to exploit the privilege poleð of the black/white binary at the expense of African Americans.</u> As Professorð Frank Wu observes, "Racial groups are conceived of as white, black, honoraryð whites, or constructive blacks."' 32 He also reminds us <u>that some Asians haveð benefited from their "honorary whiteness" and,</u>

in so doing, may haveð "perpetuat[ed] the problem of race."' Professor Wu's use of the terms "honorary whiteness" and "constructive blacks" underscores both the constructedness of race and the poles of privilege and subordination in the black/white binary within which Asians have operated. The latter racial dynamic forms the basis for the uneasy relationship that has developed between the African-American and the Asian-American civil rights agendas since the end of the 1960s. Janine Young Kim aptly describes this situation: Asian Americans have stood on unstable ground between 'black' and 'white,' falling under the honorary white category in anti-affirmative action arguments, but considered constructive blacks for the purposes of school segregation or antimiscegenation laws. To say that Asian Americans have been perceived as honorary whites or constructive blacks is, however, slightly misleading in that it tends to convey a notion of race specificity. It is important to keep in mind that although the status of honorary white does affect identity, recognition, and appellation, its more insidious function is cooptation. For example, within the economy of affirmative action policy, 'whiteness' encompasses victimization through 'reverse racism' and race-based disadvantage in certain educational or occupational opportunities. Insofar as a conservative like Newt Gingrich treats Asian Americans as honorary whites, he refers to common experience under affirmative action, not racial similarity. 34 African Americans do not have this kind of racial flexibility. Phenotype and experience prevent African Americans from benefitting as much as other racial minorities from the pole of privilege. African Americans constitute the social marker for disadvantage, stuck at the pole of subordination. Indeed, African Americans have watched as other racial and ethnic groups with whom they have aligned in the past 135 have leapfrogged past them in resources and power, often distancing themselves from African Americans (what Professor Carbado calls "interracial distancing"' 36) once they obtained a certain level of success. There is palpable concern among African Americans that Latinos/as, with their increasing numbers and desire for acceptance, are poised to repeat this process. Like Asians in the context of affirmative action,' 37 Latinos/as might find interracial distancing to be within their self-interest. To ask African Americans to put aside this racial history and risk being a stepping-stone for yet another racial group's advancement may be overly optimistic. This is not to say that African Americans and other racial groups have never successfully collaborated or can never form mutually beneficial coalitions. As Professor Perea correctly points out, Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 38 a school desegregation case, provides an example of interest convergence. 39 Likewise, Mendez v. Westminister School District of Orange County,140 a Mexican-American school desegregation discussed earlier,' 4 ' shows that African Americans can support Latino/a interests when those interests converge with African-American interests. 142 But the crucial question is what happens when the interests clash rather converge? As Latinos/as continue to gain political strength and as both Latinos/as and Asians continue to become more integrated into the mainstream culture (becoming more "white" 43), will they find it more advantageous to forge coalitions with whites, whose experiences and interests they now share, than with African Americans, whose experiences and interests have become contraposed?

Offense

Calls to "move beyond" black/white binary replicate anti-Blackness

Deilovsky and Kitossa 13 (Katerina Deliovsky, Department of Sociology. Brock University, Ontario and Tamari, "Beyond Black and White: When Going Beyond May Take Us Out of Bounds", Journal of Black Studies 44; 158, http://jbs.sagepub.eom/content/44/2/158)

At first impression, critiques of the so-called Black/White binary paradigm appear persuasive—but only if one accepts a priori that race scholarship is dominated by this paradigm and that it functions to restrict how race is understood, theorized, and addressed. What is more, many claimants of this position contend that African and European American scholars who employ the so-called Black/White binary paradigm obscure the histories and claims making of Asian, Native, and Latina/o Americans. There are problems, however, with proposing a multiracial coalition based on a critique of the so-called Black/White binary paradigm. One such problem is identified by Jared Sexton (2010), who argues that this call is premised on the belief "of an 'endemic* black-white model of racial thought" (p. 90). For Sexton, this notion is "something of a social fiction—one might say a misreading—that depends upon a reduction of the sophistication of the paradigm in question" (Sexton, 2010, p. 90). If Sexton is correct, and we believe he is, then the call to move beyond is fundamentally flawed because it is built on an inadequate understanding of power relations that structure what is, in fact, a black/white Manicheanism. A Manicheanism is a moral and symbolic framework that constructs the world as polarized by forces of good and evil, represented in the oppositions between lightness and darkness and between black and white (see Bastide, 1967; Fanon, 1967; Hoch, 1979; Stone, 1981). Contrary to moving beyond advocates' claim of a Black/White binary paradigm, the black/white Manicheanism is an incorporative racial matrix in the psychosocial world of European culture that gives meaning to a broad range of identities. Furthermore, this misreading and reduction rests on the presupposition that this call is warranted and that one can move beyond what is posited as a simple binary. This assumption and call to action needs to be interrogated and deconstructed not only because the former is erroneous but also because the latter implicitly reproduces anti-blackness as a presupposition for multiracial coalition building. We argue in this essay that a deconstruction of the move beyond discourse reveals that knowledge about racism, but more specifically, anti-black racism, is not substantively advanced and, in fact, creates two distinct problems. First, by misreading and misnaming a real historical and contemporary experience as a paradigm, the discourse creates the false dilemma of needing to move beyond. Second, the discourse sets up blackness (interestingly enough, not whiteness), and by extension, those people socially defined as "black," as an impediment to the laudable goals of a multiracial coalition and complex understanding of race relations in North America. In this way, moving beyond, in terms of praxis (action, epistemology, and politics), is a discourse based on "bad faith" (Gordon, 1994) toward African-descended peoples. As noted by Gordon (1994), bad faith is denial of the humanity of the black body and the consistent imputation of a negative value to it as a means of defining the (non-black) self.

Turn – Excludes Black from the coalition of the alt

Deilovsky and Kitossa 13 (Katerina Deliovsky, Department of Sociology. Brock University, Ontario and Tamari, "Beyond Black and White: When Going Beyond May Take Us Out of Bounds", Journal of Black Studies 44; 158, http://jbs.sagepub.eom/content/44/2/158)

In closing, moving beyond advocates argue that alternatives to the Black/ White binary paradigm are needed to account for changing experiences of race and racism (Martinez, 1993; Omi & Winant, 1994). Uncritical acceptance of the Black/White binary paradigm situates the call to move beyond as questionable and problematic and all the more urgently in need of challenge. Perhaps, in the laudable quest for multiracial alliances, the call to move beyond has been uncritically accepted as a necessary tactic in the antiracist struggle. Sexton (2008) warns against the "unexamined desire for new analyses and the often anxious drive for political alliance" (p. 252). Moreover, he calls into "question the

motive force of a nominally critical intervention on the 'black-white paradigm'" (Sexton, 2008, p. 252). If an integral part of this move beyond postulates that blackness is an epistemic obstacle to effective antiracism politics, does this not imply that multiracial alliances are "a social formation for which the exclusion of the category of racial blackness is a sine qua non" (Sexton, 2010, p. 89)? And to exclude racial blackness means, ultimately, to excise those defined as black from this coalition. In other words, the black body may be counted for more than three fifths of a person for the antiracist cause, but African people's history and narratives must be checked at the door. Not only does this (implied) excision do a gross disservice to those victimized by this Manicheanism; it erases their history and obscures how other non-African people of color are affected by it as well as contribute to it. This situates moving beyond as a faulty and politically harmful episte-mological framework for African-descended people, and what is more, it is an act of bad faith.1 Without question, there is a need for a complex reading and analysis of racial oppression; however, the refusal to grant primacy to this "visible epis-temology of black skin" suggests there is more to this call than an academic pursuit. Put another way, it is one thing to argue that we need a complex understanding of the multiracial makeup of North America; it is quite another to frame the black/white Manicheanism as the reason for this lack of scholarly work. To reiterate, pointing the finger at the black/white Manicheanism creates, in general, two fundamental errors. One, it creates a false problem by confusing and misnaming a real historical and contemporary experience and, as such, grossly simplifies its complexity. Michael Steinberg (2001) argues. Putting the wrong name on a problem is worse than having no name at all. In the latter instance, one is at least open to filling the conceptual void. In the first instance, however, words lead us down a blind alley. They divert us from the facets of the problem that should command our attention and . . . lead to remedies that are ineffectual or worse, (p. 2) As we see it, in our case, the "worse" leads us to the second fundamental problem: It sets up blackness (interestingly enough, not whiteness), and by extension those people socially defined as black, as an impediment to the laudable goals of a multiracial coalition and complex understanding of race relations in the United States. It is disconcerting how the articulation of moving beyond implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) situates blackness as an obstacle or, as Sexton (2008) argues, "[standing] in the way of future progress, silencing the expression of much needed voices on the political and intellectual scene" (p. 252). It appears that "the force of anti-blackness consistently troubles the myriad efforts at mediation and amelioration among the nonwhite" (Sexton, 2008, p. 253). It goes without saying the challenge is not to move beyond but to theorize the black/white Manicheanism through a critical inquiry that captures its complexity. This complexity must bear in mind how thoroughly saturated is the sociosymbolic structure of racial difference with the determinants of the black/white Manicheanism.9 The black/white Manicheanism "has and continues to situate every subject in U.S. culture within the panoptic vision of racial meanings" (Weigman, 1995, p. 40). These racial meanings were and are often configured in relation to and against black (and white) racial designations. Thus, rather than calling to move beyond, it would be more conceptually creative and politically advantageous to work toward analyzing the black/white Manicheanism in a way that makes clear the relationship between this Manicheanism and other racially marginalized groups. Thus, to develop an epistemologically deep understanding of race, racialization, and racism in the North America, the significance of anti-blackness must be apprehended, not as a superior form of oppression but as a form that gives shape and context to the oppression of other racially marginalized groups, while creating a qualitatively distinct oppression for African-descended peoples. As Jared Sexton (2008) cogently argues, anti-blackness is longstanding and ongoing but also . . . unlike other forms of racial oppression in qualitative ways—differences of kind, rather than degree, a structural singularity rather than an empirical anomaly. But all of this is not...to participate in the ranked determination of suffering. It is, instead, to properly locate the political dynamics and to outline the ethical stakes at hand. (p. 245)

Neoliberalism K

AFF – AT Alternative/Framework

Specific policy proposals are good and key – cyber-boosterism and glorification of the Internet are the result of a lack of concrete institutional proposals – only the state has the institutional power to overcome neoliberal cyberspace

Morozov 11

(Evgeny Morozov, contributing editor at the New Republic and the author of To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism, "Two decades of the web: a utopia no longer," *Prospect Magazine*, June 22, 2011, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/science-and-technology/morozov-web-no-utopia-twenty-years-short-history-internet)

Perhaps the mismatch between digital ideals and reality can be ascribed to the naivety of the technology pundits. But the real problem was that the internet's early visionaries never translated their aspirations for a shared cyberspace into **a set of concrete principles** on which online regulation could be constructed. It's as if they wanted to build an exemplary city on the hill, but **never bothered to spell out how** to keep it exemplary once it started growing.¶Some fundamental questions about the communal aspects of the internet were sidestepped. Who would take out the trash—that is, deal with spamming and scamming? Who would be in charge of preserving historical memorabilia: the ephemeral tweets and blog posts that tend to disappear into the digital void? Who would deal with the problem of pollution—insidious practices such as "search engine optimisation," or content farms that produce trivial content to earn advertising revenue? Who would protect the dignity of online citizens? Who would secure their privacy and protect them from defamation and libel?¶These issues were perhaps not so pressing or evident in a decade when search engines were rudimentary and tweets and blogs didn't exist. But it's not so obvious that John Perry Barlow's call on governments to exit cyberspace was a good one. **In the absence of strong public institutions with oversight, corporations felt they could do what they wanted**. In most cases, **they just pretended these problems didn't exist**.

AFF – AT Technology Focus Bad

Technology focus is good – it's a crux of anti-privacy debates – their condemnations that we should "focus on democracy instead" ignore the importance of specific technologies in shaping the content of democracy

Snowden 15

(Edward Snowden, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer and National Security Agency contractor, is a director of the Freedom of the Press Foundation, "Edward Snowden: The World Says No to Surveillance," June 4, 2015, *The New York Times*, http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/opinion/edward-snowden-the-world-says-no-to-surveillance.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region&_r=2&referrer)

Beyond the frontiers of law, progress has come even more quickly. Technologists have worked tirelessly to re-engineer the security of the devices that surround us, along with the language of the Internet itself. Secret flaws in critical infrastructure that had been exploited by governments to facilitate mass surveillance have been **detected and corrected**. **Basic technical safeguards** such as encryption — once considered esoteric and unnecessary — are now **enabled by default** in the products of pioneering companies like Apple, ensuring that even if your phone is stolen, your private life remains private. Such **structural technological changes** can ensure access to basic privacies beyond borders, insulating ordinary citizens from the arbitrary passage of anti-privacy laws, such as those now descending upon Russia.

AFF – AT Privacy Bad Link/Morozov Indict

Morozov's critique of privacy is a straw person that makes collective anti-neoliberal politics impossible – the neg's suspicion of transparency makes political corruption and inequality inevitable

Sifry 13

(Micah Sifry, Editorial Director, Personal Democracy Media, "Book Review: Evgeny Morozov Doth Protest Too Much," April 9, 2013, http://techpresident.com/news/23708/book-review-evgeny-morozov-doth-protest-too-much)

According to Evgeny Morozov, the world has gone crazy and he's one of the few sane people left. Zynga and Facebook, he writes, in his strange new book, "To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism," have "become models to think about civic engagement." Yelp and Amazon have "become models to think about criticism." People who believe the open Internet can be a tool for good and who worry about and try to oppose people who are using it to hurt others, actually treat the Internet like a "religion" and believe "it's the ultimate technology and the ultimate network." Like the proverbial engineer with a hammer, they see all of society's quirks, inefficiencies, waste, inequality, corruption and hypocrisy as nails to be smashed with smart tools and big data.¶ If it were up to their ilk, he writes, "The odds are that a perfectly efficient seat-distribution system--abetted by ubiquitous technology, sensors, and facial recognition--would have robbed us of one of the proudest moments in American history." That is, "technosolutionists," the villains of Morozov's book, would have engineered such a perfect bus-seating system balancing the seating claims of white and black riders that Rosa Parks could never have committed her history-making act of civil disobedience. Yes, he imagines that, without a word about the underlying problem of racism. I am not making this up.¶ And it gets worse. Extrapolating from the grandiose statements of people like Google's Eric Schmidt and Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg, Morozov spins up a world that doesn't exist and then proceeds to inveigh against it as if it must be the end-point of where the technosolutionists are taking society. To wit, by 2020, we will live in a world where:¶ "Humanity, equipped with powerful self-tracking devices, finally conquers obesity, insomnia, and global warming as everyone eats less, sleeps better, and emits more appropriately. The fallibility of human memory is conquered too, as the very same tracking devices record and store everything we do. Car keys, faces, factoids: we will never forget them again...."¶ "Politics, finally under the constant and far-reaching gaze of the electorate, is freed from all the sleazy corruption, backroom deals and inefficient horse trading. Parties are disaggregated and replaced by Groupon-like political campaigns, where users come together--once--to weigh in on issues of direct and immediate relevance to their lives, only to disband shortly afterward. Now that every word--nay, sound--ever uttered by politicians is recorded and stored for posterity, hypocrisy has become obsolete as well. Lobbyists of all stripes have gone extinct as the wealth of data about politicians--their schedules, lunch menus, travel expenses--are posted online for everyone to review. As digital media make participation easier, more and more citizens ditch bowling alone--only to take up blogging together. Even those who've never bothered to vote in the past are finally provided with the right incentives--naturally, as a part of an online game where they collect points for saving humanity--and so they rush to use their smartphones to 'check in' at the voting booth."¶ Morozov says he finds much of this future "terrifying," but it's only a nightmare of his own imagining. Sometimes his little jokes--lunch menus?--hint that he himself doesn't quite believe it's going to go down this way. But in his zeal to prop up and demolish the straw ~~man~~ [person] of technosolutionism, he contorts himself into some truly bizarre positions.¶ Take his book's discussion of politics, and the efforts of American reformers to reduce corruption and political inequality by increasing the availability of information about who is donating to whom, who is lobbying whom, and what they get in return--also known by the short-hand of "transparency."¶ For someone who grew up in dictatorial Belarus (which he wryly refers to as "an oasis of tolerance in the middle of Europe"), Morozov has a surprising dislike of political transparency. He gives us several pages of handwringing over the anti-gay-rights donors to California's Proposition 8 who found their publicly disclosed campaign contributions helpfully aggregated on a civilian-built website called Eightmaps.com, which led to some embarrassment for them. Justice Antonin Scalia's admonishment, in a related case involving the publishing of the names of petition signers, that "the fact is that running a democracy takes a certain amount of civic courage" is not for Morozov.¶ No, Morozov is so caught up in his war on "internet-centrism" and technosolutionism that he embraces proposals to make it harder for people to know who is attempting to influence the political process. "Campaign finance records posted online could be 'read-only' so that, while accessible on the FEC website, they would not be easy to download or reproduce elsewhere," he writes, approvingly citing a paper by Deborah Johnson, Priscilla Regan and Kent Wayland essay on "Campaign Disclosure, Privacy and Transparency." Such data should be made "harder to

find" and even posted with "self-destruct" code on it to prevent its use, say, five years after an election. So if you wanted to know just how much money Wall Street had invested in some up-and-coming politician at the beginning of his career when a decade or two later he finally enters the national spotlight decades later and runs for President--Morozov apparently thinks you should have a hard, if not impossible, time finding out.¶ What makes this line of argument even odder is that Morozov says he favors more efforts to tackle hard structural issues that deform society and produce negative personal consequences. Again and again in To Save Everything he rails against technological solutions that atomize consumers and place all the burden on their shoulders for solving their problems--criticizing, for example, people who self-track their way to better health rather than "make it harder for food companies to sell unhealthy food or target children." But while calling for solutions requiring **collective political action** (he's actually a "solutionist" too!), **Morozov opposes uses of technology**--like the ability to aggregate vital information about political influence peddlers--**that might enhance popular political power against** the **entrenched interests** that currently hold it. It makes no sense. (See John Wonderlich's rebuttal of Morozov's criticisms of the Sunlight Foundation here; and yes, I am proudly a consultant to that institution, which Morozov bashes needlessly.)

AFF – Knowledge Economy Good

The knowledge economy is good – produces individual autonomy and forces large corporations to change business practices – ensures improvements in quality of life

Leberecht 14

(Tim Leberecht, chief marketing officer of global design and architecture firm NBBJ, "HOW THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY IS REDEFINING WORK," *Fast Company*, http://www.fastcompany.com/3026566/leadership-now/how-the-knowledge-economy-is-redefining-work)

Somewhere is emblematic of the changing nature of the workplace. Our conceptions of work have shifted from time card and job title to mindset and narrative. Millennials in particular view work as a powerful vehicle for finding meaning in their lives. McMurray is well aware of this generational shift and refers to the rapidly emerging segment of independent workers who prefer independence over permanent, full-time employment. "They definitely present a challenge for large corporations that, if unable to offer extremely **flexible, autonomous, and creative** work environments, simply won't be able to attract the best people," he told me.¶While business-as-usual used to involve linear narratives of the CV and a more formal notion of transactional business relationships, Somewhere illustrates that we are moving further into more **contextual and nonlinear** portraits of our "selves" at work. The site redefines work as something beautiful, careers as ambiguous and ever-evolving, and a professional's identity as a fluid persona. McMurray says: "People lead such fascinating work lives, and our hope is that we can help open up the world of work, help people see behind the scenes, find inspiration, and find the people they should be working with."

AFF – Knowledge Economy Perm Solvency

The permutation solves best – a robust knowledge economy and IT innovation are key to transition to an empathetic civilization – solves all their impacts

Rifkin 10

(Jeremy Rifkin, American economic and social theorist, writer, public speaker, political advisor, and activist, "'Empathic Civilization': Is It Time To Replace The American Dream?" *Huffington Post*, May 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/empathic-civilization-is_b_469546.html)

When we consider these big picture policy issues, what becomes clear, if we bother to read between the lines, is that our long held beliefs about human nature, and by extension, the institutions we have created to express those beliefs, played no small role in precipitating the very crisis that now faces the country. In a nation that has come to think of human nature as competitive, even predatory, self serving, acquisitive and utilitarian, is it any wonder that those very values have led to a "winner take all" syndrome in the marketplace in which the rich get richer while everyone else becomes marginalized, and the well-being of the larger community, including the biosphere, becomes eroded? The US ranks 27th among industrialized countries, in income disparity -- the gap between the very rich and the very poor. Only Mexico, Turkey and Portugal, of the OECD nations, have greater disparity of income. Moreover, the US enjoys the dubious distinction of being one of the two leading contributors to global greenhouse gas emissions in the world. Could it be that the American Dream is becoming the American nightmare?¶ Interestingly, a younger generation of Americans is growing up in a very different world than the one described by the Enlightenment thinkers. Their reality is being lived out on **a digital commons** and in **social spaces on the World Wide Web**. All across America, our nation's teens are performing hundreds of hours of community service as part of their formal educational requirements. In school, they are learning that every activity they engage in -- the food they eat, the car they drive, the clothes they wear -- comes with a carbon footprint and affects the well-being of every other human being and fellow creature on Earth.¶ Today's youth are **globally connected**. They are Skyping in real time with their cohorts and friends on the far corners of the Earth. They are sharing **information, knowledge, and mutual aid in cyberspace chat rooms**, apparently unaware of the so called "tragedy of the commons." They have little regard for traditional property rights -- especially copyrights, trademarks, and patents -- believing information should run free. They are far more concerned with sharing access than protecting ownership. They think of themselves less as autonomous agents -- an island to oneself -- and more as actors in an ever shifting set of roles and relationships. Personal wealth, while still important, is not considered an endgame, but only a baseline consideration for enjoying **a more immaterial existence**, including more meaningful experiences in diverse communities.¶ Surveys show that the millennial generation in the United States is much more likely than older generations to feel empathy for others. They are far more concerned with the planetary environment and climate change and more likely to favor sustainable economic growth. They are also more likely to believe that government has a responsibility to take care of people who can't care for themselves, and are more supportive of a bigger role of government in providing basic services. They are more supportive of globalization and immigration than older generations. They are also more racially diverse and the most tolerant of any generation in history in support of gender equality and the willingness to champion the rights of the disabled, gays, other minorities, as well as our fellow creatures. In short, they favor a world of inclusivity over exclusivity, and are more comfortable in **distributed networks** than in old fashioned centralized hierarchies that establish boundaries and restrictions separating people from one another.¶ The new sensibilities of the younger generation are beginning to usher in a different idea about human nature and the dream that accompanies it. Today's youth find little value in the Enlightenment caricature of human nature as rational, calculating, detached, and utilitarian. **They prefer to think of human nature as empathic,** mindful, engaged, and driven by the intrinsic value and interconnectedness of life. Homo sapien is being eclipsed by homo empathicus, as they shift their horizon from national markets and nation-state borders to a global economy and a planetary community. Even their preferred indicators of economic progress are shifting, from the crude calculation of gross domestic product and per-capita income to more sensitive social indicators -- like health and longevity, social equality, safe communities, clean environment, etc. -- that measure the well-being of the broader community.

Answers: Nietzsche

Only evaluate arguments based off the plan text-any alternatives are self-serving and regressive which makes 2AC predictability and offense impossible-evaluate the consequences of the AFF and alternative because it is the only holistic way to evaluate prior questions.

Permutation do the plan and _____

Perm: do both – hyperfocus on suffering is only bad if it is at the expense of pursuit of personal projects – some empathy can be life-affirming
Conway '99

David Conway, Middlesex University. "Nietzsche's Revaluation of Schopenhauer as Educator". June 5, 1999. http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/MPsy/MPsyConw.htm

Nonetheless, Nietzsche was mistaken in supposing that it was contrary to the interests of an individual who is otherwise free from suffering to feel sympathy and pity for those who do suffer (through no fault of their own). Pity is not the baneful emotion which Nietzsche claims it to be. This verdict leaves unresolved the ultimate issue. In a world which does as a matter of fact contain the enormous amount of suffering that ours contains, is not an individual who is open through sympathetic identification to this suffering bound like Schopenhauer says to be revolted by the world to the point of revulsion with it? Nietzsche, of course, thought the strong can and should disengage their sympathies from the suffering of the weak. I think this is a mistake. **One's world is impoverished by such disengagement** of sympathies. Yet how can one continue to affirm the will when one feels with all the suffering there is? Nietzsche is correct that existence could only be tolerable if we were able to live without being constantly affected by the suffering of others. However, it was wrong to think that in order to achieve this enviable state, pity should be condemned and avoided. No, on this matter I think we are entitled to place more trust in life itself than did Nietzsche. The fact is that there are strict psychological limits on our susceptibility to feel pity. Pity is in part a function of our attention. To what we attend is a function of our will. Our sentiments very largely determine to what we attend. Consequently, it is only where people have disengaged themselves from pursuit of personal projects, like appreciating and producing art or caring for loved ones, and so on, that there can be scope for a degree of pity of the sort that alone can give rise to denial of will. Where denial of will becomes psychologically possible, therefore, it can hardly be thought of as unwarranted. Nietzsche himself spoke approvingly of taking leave of life at the time before one became a burden and life lost its point. Surely, he would not have wished to frown on Sannyasis who give up all attachments at that stage in life after they have made their way through it. In conclusion, therefore, I wish to say that their are elements of truth and error in both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the matter of greatest divide between them. Schopenhauer is right to see denial of will where it occurs in such figures as religious recluses as a legitimate response to the suffering of the world. Nietzsche is right to see denial of the will as not always a legitimate response to the world's suffering. Nietzsche is right that life need not contain suffering of the magnitude Schopenhauer claims is integral to it. Schopenhauer is right that an attitude of sympathy for all suffering creatures is a benefit and not a bane to the person who has the attitude. If my

conclusion is untidy in not coming down unambiguously in favour of one philosopher or the order, I think I can take some comfort from Nietzsche's observation that "one repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil". (9)

The alt is impossible—anxiety and fear of suffering are psychologically inevitable

Pyszczynski et al '6 (Tom, Prof. Psych. – U. Colorado, Sheldon Solomon, Prof. Psych. – Skidmore College, Jeff Greenberg, Prof. Psych. – U. Arizona, and Molly Maxfield, U. Colorado, Psychological Inquiry, "On the Unique Psychological Import of the Human Awareness of Mortality: Theme and Variations" 17:4, Ebsco)

Kirkpatrick and Navarette's (this issue) first specific complaint with TMT is that it is wedded to an outmoded assumption that human beings share with many other species a survival instinct. They argue that natural selection can only build instincts that respond to specific adaptive challenges in specific situations, and thus could not have designed an instinct for survival because staying alive is a broad and distal goal with no single clearly defined adaptive response. Our use of the term survival instinct was meant to highlight the general **orientation toward continued life** that is expressed in many of an organism's bodily systems (e.g., heart, liver, lungs, etc) and the diverse approach and avoidance **tendencies that promote its survival** and reproduction, ultimately leading to genes being passed on to fu- ture generations. Our use of this term also reflects the classic psychoanalytic, biological, and anthropological influences on TMT of theorists like Becker (1971, 1973, 1975), Freud (1976, 1991), Rank (1945, 1961, 1989), Zilborg (1943), Spengler (1999), and Darwin (1993). We concur that natural selection, at least initially, is unlikely to design a unitary survival instinct, but rather, a series of specific adaptations that have tended over evolutionary time to promote the survival of an organism's genes. However, whether one construes these adaptations as a series of discrete mechanisms or a general overarching tendency that encompasses many specific systems, we think it hard to argue with the claim that natural selection usually orients organisms to approach things that facilitate continued existence and to avoid things that would likely cut life short. This is not to say that natural selection doesn't also select for characteristics that facilitate gene survival in other ways, or that all species or even all humans, will always choose life over other valued goals in all circumstances. Our claim is simply that a general orientation toward continued life exists because staying alive is essential for reproduction in most species, as well as for child rearing and support in mammalian species and many others. Viewing an animal as a loose collection of independent modules that produce responses to specific adaptively-relevant stimuli may be useful for some purposes, but it overlooks the point that adaptation involves a variety of inter-related mechanisms working together to insure that genes responsible for these mechanisms are more numerously represented in future generations (see, e.g., Tattersall, 1998). For example, although the left ventricle of the human heart likely evolved to solve a specific adaptive problem, this mechanism would be useless unless well-integrated with other aspects of the circulatory system. We believe it useful to think in terms of the overarching function of the heart and pulmonary-circulatory system, even if specific parts of that system evolved to solve specific adaptive problems within that system. In addition to specific solutions to specific adaptive problems, over time, natural selection favors integrated systemic functioning(Dawkins, 1976; Mithen, 1997). It is the improved survival rates and reproductive success of lifeformspossessing integrated systemic characteristics that determine whether those characteristics become widespread in a population. Thus, we think it is appropriate and useful to characterize a glucose-approaching amoeba and a bear-avoiding salmon as oriented toward self-preservation and reproduction, even if neither species possesses one single genetically encoded mechanism designed to generally foster life or insure reproduction, or cognitive representations of survival and reproduction. This is the same position that Dawkins (1976) took in his classic book, The selfish gene: **The obvious first priorities of a survival machine, and of the brain that takes the decisions for it, are individual survival and reproduction**. … Animals therefore go to elaborate lengths to find and catch food; to avoid being caught and eaten themselves; to avoid disease and accident; to protect themselves from unfavourable climatic conditions; to find members of the opposite sex and persuade them to mate; and to confer on their children advantages similar to those they enjoy themselves. (pp. 62–63) All that is really essential to TMT is the proposition that humans fear death. Somewhat ironically, in the early days of the theory,we felt compelled to explain this fear by positing a very basic desire for life, because many critics adamantly insisted, for reasons that were never clear to us, that most people do not fear death. Our explanation for the fear of death is that knowledge of the inevitability of death is frightening because people know they are alive and because they want to continue living. **Do Navarrete and Fessler** (2005) **really believe that humans do not fear death**? **Although people sometimes claim that they are not afraid of death**, and on rare occasions volunteer for suicide missions and approach their death, **this requires extensive psychological work, typically a great deal of anxiety, and preparation and immersion in a belief system that makes this possible** (see TMT for an explanation of how belief systems do this). Where this desire for life comes from is an interesting question, but not essential to the logic of the theory. Even if Kirkpatrick and Navarete (this issue) were correct in their claims that a unitary self-preservation instinct was not, in and of itself, selected for, it is indisputable that many discrete and integrated mechanisms that keep organisms alive were selected for. A desire to stay alive, and a fear of anything that threatens to end one's life, are likely emergent properties of these many discrete mechanisms that

result from the <mark>evolution</mark> of sophisticated cognitive abilities for symbolic, future- oriented, and self-reflective thought. As Batson and Stocks (2004) have noted, it is because we are so intelligent, and hence so aware of our limbic reactions to threats of death and of our many systems oriented toward keeping us alive that we have a general fear of death. Here are three quotes that illustrate this point. First, for psychologists, Zilboorg (1943), an important early source of TMT: **"Such <mark>constant</mark> <mark>expenditure of psychological energy on the business of preserving life would be impossible if the fear of death were not as constant</mark>"** (p. 467). For literature buffs, acclaimed novelist Faulkner (1990) put it this way: If aught can be more painful to any intelligence above that of a child or an idiot than a slow and gradual confronting with that which over a long period of bewil- derment and dread it has been taught to regard as an irrevocable and unplumbable finality, I do not know it. (pp. 141–142) And perhaps most directly, for daytime TV fans, from The Young and the Restless (2006), after a rocky plane flight: Phyllis: I learned something up in that plane Nick: What? Phyllis: I really don't want to die. An important consequence of the emergence of this general fear of death is that **humans are susceptible to anxiety due to events or stimuli that are not <mark>immediately present</mark> and novel threats to survival that did not exist for our ancestors, <mark>such as</mark>** AIDS, guns, or **<mark>nuclear weapons</mark>**. Regardless of how this fear originates, it is abundantly clear that <mark>humans do fear death</mark>. <mark>Anyone who has ever faced a man with a gun</mark>, a doctor saying that the lump on one's neck is suspicious and requires further diagnostic tests, <mark>or a drunken driver</mark> swerving into one's lane <mark>can attest to that</mark>. If humans only feared evolved specific death-related threats like spiders and heights, then a lump on an x-ray, a gun, a crossbow, or any number of weapons pointed at one's chest would not cause panic; but obviously these things do. Of what use would the sophisticated cortical structures be if they didn't have the ability to instigate fear reactions in response to such threats?

Prioritize survival over ontology focus
Wapner '3

Paul, Associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, DISSENT, Winter, http://www.dissentmgazine.org/menutest/artiles/wi03/wapner.htm

The third response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, hut how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist <mark>must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence.</mark> As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings wc ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. <mark>We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear What doesn't exist can manifest no character</mark>. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But <mark>we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence.</mark> This in turn <mark>suggests that preserving the nonhuman world</mark>-in all its diverse embodiments-<mark>must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good.</mark> Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

Suffering is life negating
Mayerfeld '99

Jamie Mayerfeld, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington. Suffering and Moral Responsibility. P. 158-159.

If there is resistance to this claim, it may be tied to the view that suffering has an improving effect on us. It makes us wiser or more virtuous or cleanses us morally.' I have two things to say in reply. First, not all suffering makes us better. How is an abused child or a tormented animal improved by her suffering? Much suffering makes us worse. It makes us bitter or vengeful or manipulative or crazy, or renders impossible the activities and experiences that mould improve us. Second, if suffering sometimes makes us better, **that doesn't disprove the claim that suffering is bad for us in itself**. It is important, as I have mentioned, to distinguish the intrinsic evil of suffering from whatever instrumental value it may possess.

Suffering is not inevitable
Mayerfeld '99

Jamie, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington. Suffering and Moral Responsibility. P. 86.

Pessimists sometimes explain their attitude by saying that life is never free from suffering. Life is suffering, the Buddhists tell us; their view is echoed by Schopenhauer, who held that we endure pain and frustration for most of our lives, and that when we succeed in overcoming adversity we succumb instantly to boredom, which too is a form of suffering. But the claim that suffering never lets go of us is an obvious distortion; the most cursory observation reveals that a great many people are happy a great deal of the time, or at least aren't suffering. The claim may stem from the failure to separate suffering from the frustration of desire. Frustration may be close to a constant in our lives, but it need not be accompanied by suffering. We might even say that, for many people, happiness is characterized by the generation of new desires faster than they can be satisfied.

The alternative is anti-political – only engagement with politics is life affirming
May '5

(Todd, Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University, "To change the world, to celebrate life," Philosophy and Social Criticism, 31(5-6), p. 527-529)

And what happens from there? From the meetings, from the rallies, from the petitions and the teach-ins? What happens next? There is, after all, always a next. If you win this time – end aid to the contras, divest from apartheid South Africa, force debt-forgiveness by technologically advanced countries – there is always more to do. There is the de-unionization of workers, there are gay rights, there is Burma, there are the Palestinians, the Tibetans. There will always be Tibetans, even if they aren't in Tibet, even if they aren't Asian. But is that the only question: Next? Or is that just the question we focus on? What's the next move in this campaign, what's the next campaign? Isn't there

more going on than that? After all, engaging in political organizing is a practice, or a group of practices. It contributes to making you who you are. It's where the power is, and where your life is, and where the intersection of your life and those of others (many of whom you will never meet, even if it's for their sake that you're involved) and the buildings and streets of your town is. This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don't exist. It's not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. You've made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. X Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take Merleau-Ponty's Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings. Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . . What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault's work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to **offer a new form of life celebration**. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is

the wellspring of both. If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau- Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it.

Their impacts are inevitable and wrong—the ONLY way humans can deal with the terror of death is to manage it with order and denial. The alternative LITERALLY makes life unlivable.

Pyszczynski '4 (Tom, Prof. Psych. – U. Colorado, Social Research, "What are we so afraid of? A terror management theory perspective on the politics of fear", Winter, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_4_71/ai_n13807478/)

TMT starts with a consideration of how human beings are both similar to, and different from, all other animals. We start with the assumption that, ==like all other animals, humans are born with a very basic evolved proclivity to stay alive and== that ==fear, and all the biological structures of the brain that produce it, evolved==, at least initially, ==to keep the animal alive.== This, of course, is highly adaptive, in that it facilitates survival, and an animal that does not stay alive very long has little chances of reproducing and passing on its genes. But as ==our== species evolved, it developed a wide range of other adaptations that helped us survive and reproduce, the most important being a set of highly sophisticated intellectual ==abilities== that enable us ==to==: a) think and communicate with symbols, which of course is the basis for language, b) project ourselves in time and imagine a future including events that have never happened before, and c) ==reflect back on ourselves==, and take ourselves as an object of our own attention--self-awareness. These are all very adaptive abilities that play central roles in the system through which humans regulate their behavior--usually referred to as the self (cf. Carver and Scheier, 1998). These abilities made it possible for us to survive and prosper in a far wider range of environments than any other animal has ever done, and accomplish all that we humans have done that no other species ever has been capable of doing. However, these unique intellectual abilities also created a major problem: they ==made us aware== that, **although we are biologically programmed to stay alive** and avoid things that would cut our life short, the one absolute certainty in life is that ==we must die.== We are also forced to realize that death can come at any time for any number of reasons, none of which are particularly pleasant--a predator, natural disaster, another hostile human, and an incredible range of diseases and natural processes, ranging from heart attacks and cancer to AIDS. If we are "lucky" we realize that our bodies will just wear out and we will slowly fade away as we gradually lose our most basic functions. Not a very pretty picture. TMT posits that this clash of a core desire for life with awareness of the inevitability of death created the potential for paralyzing terror. Although all animals experience fear in the face of clear and present dangers to their survival, only humans know what it is that they are afraid of, and that ultimately there is no escape from this ghastly reality. We suspect that ==this potential for terror would have greatly interfered with ongoing goal-directed behavior, and **life itself**, if it were left unchecked.== It may even have made the intellectual abilities that make our species special unviable in the long run as evolutionary adaptations--and there are those who think that the fear and anxiety that results from our sophisticated intelligence may still eventually lead to the extinction of our species. So

humankind used their newly emerging intellectual abilities to manage the potential for terror that these abilities produced by calling the understandings of reality that were emerging as a result of these abilities into service as a way of controlling their anxieties. The potential for terror put a "press" on emerging explanations for reality, what we refer to as cultural worldviews, such that any belief system that was to survive and be accepted by the masses needed to manage this potential for anxiety that was inherent in the recently evolved human condition. **Cultural worldviews manage existential terror by providing a meaningful,** orderly, and **comforting conception of the world** that helps us come to grips with the problem of death. Cultural worldviews provide a meaningful explanation of life and our place in the cosmos; **a set of standards** for what is valuable behavior, **good and evil**, that give us the potential of acquiring self-esteem, the sense that we are valuable, important, and significant contributors to this meaningful reality; and the hope of transcending death and attaining immortality in either a literal or symbolic sense. Literal immortality refer to those aspects of the cultural worldview that promise that death is not the end of existence, that some part of us will live on, perhaps in an ethereal heaven, through reincarnation, a merger of our consciousness with God and all others, or the attainment of enlightenment--beliefs in literal immortality are **nearly universal**, with the specifics varying widely from culture to culture. Cultures also provide us with the hope of attaining symbolic immortality, by being part of something larger, more significant, and more enduring than ourselves, such as our families, nations, ethnic groups, professions, and the like. Because these entities will continue to exist long after our deaths, we attain symbolic immortality by being valued parts of them.

ST Pan K

A/T: Objective

Their supposedly objective portrayal of China translates threat into reality, legitimizing US power politics.
Pan 04—School of International and Political Studies @ Deakin University (Chengxin, 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political Vol. 29, No. 3, "The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics," rmf)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their **debates have been underpinned by** some common ground, especially in terms of **a positivist epistemology**. Firstly, **they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object,** whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, **Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."3** Secondly, associated with the first assumption, **it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers"** and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning **the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States**. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that **U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves** (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, **they are not value-free, objective descriptions** of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, **but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality.** In other words, **it is self-fulfilling in practice,** and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature - themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions

A/T: Authors

Be skeptical of their authors—positing China as a "real threat" is what legitimizes their claims in the first place.

Pan 04—School of International and Political Studies @ Deakin University (Chengxin, 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political Vol. 29, No. 3, "The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics," rmf)

Certainly, I do not deny China's potential for strategic misbehavior in the global context, nor do I claim the "essential peacefulness" of Chinese culture.40 Having said that, my main point here is that <u>there is no such thing as "Chinese reality" that can automatically speak for itself,</u> for example, as a "threat." Rather, **the "China threat" is essentially a specifically social meaning given to China by its U.S. observers, a meaning that cannot be disconnected from the dominant U.S. self-construction**. Thus<u>, to fully understand the U.S. "China threat" argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature. Indeed, the construction of other is not only a product of U.S. self-imagination, but often a necessary foil to it</u>. For example, **by taking this particular representation of China as Chinese reality** <u>per se, those</u> **scholars are able to assert their self-identity as "mature," "rational" realists capable of knowing the "hard facts" of international politics, in distinction from those "idealists" whose views are said to be grounded more in "an article of faith" than in "historical experience."**41 On the other hand, given that history is apparently not "progressively" linear, <u>the invocation of a certain other not only helps explain away such historical uncertainties or "anomalies" and maintain the credibility of the allegedly universal path trodden by the United States, but also serves to highlight U.S. "indispensability."</u> As Samuel Huntington puts it, "If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?"42 In this way, it seems that **the constructions of the particular U.S. self and its other are always intertwined and mutually reinforcing.** Some may suggest that there is nothing particularly wrong with this since psychologists generally agree that "individuals and groups define their identity by differentiating themselves from and placing themselves in opposition to others."43 This is perhaps true. As the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure tells us, meaning itself depends on difference and differentiation.44 Yet, **to understand the U.S. dichotomized constructions of self/other in this light is to normalize them and render them unproblematic**, <u>because it is also apparent that not all identity-defining practices necessarily perceive others in terms of either universal sameness or absolute otherness and that difference need not equate to threat.</u>

A/T: Threats real

Their impact is constructed—the fact that threat perception has changed over time and that countries with similar political and economic profiles are *not* considered threats proves.

Turner 13—Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester (Oliver, 2013, Review of International Studies, "'Threatening' China and US security: the international politics of identity," rmf)

China's military and economic strengths are far greater today than at any point in the history of Sino-US relations. Yet, the 'threat' it presents to American security is no less a social construction than in the past. The modern day proliferation of popular and academic 'China threat' literatures in particular is reflective of the increasingly widespread conviction that a 'rising' China inevitably constitutes a real or potential danger.97 Robert Kaplan explains that 'the American military contest with China in the Pacific will define the twenty first century'.98 He does not question if or even when China might become a threat. He emphasises its inevitability. Babbin and Timperlake provide a fictional narrative of future Sino-American tensions in which, among other things, China uses cyber warfare to shut down American defence systems. The hostile scenario they present, it is argued, 'could easily become fact . . . The Verdict: China means war.'99 Certainly, and as has been the case throughout history, China is not uniformly perceived in these terms. Among a significant proportion of the American population, however, the China 'threat' is an accepted and relatively unproblematic phenomenon. China now has the **world's largest population, the fastest growing economy, the largest army**, the largest middle class, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a manned space program **and a nuclear arsenal.**100 Yet, all of these things **do not necessarily make China a threat**. Countries which share variations of these, notably the possession of nuclear weapons, a permanent presence in the Security Council and significant standing armies are not perceived in this way. Indeed, and as Director Clapper revealed in the Senate in early 2011, states like Russia with far greater stockpiles of nuclear weapons and significant additional military hardware can be viewed in less threatening terms, even when capability is cited as the critical factor.101 Furthermore, the PRC has had a large population and a substantial army since its founding in 1949, nuclear weapons since 1964 and a seat on the Security Council since 1971 without consistently being interpreted as a threat. Accordingly, **forces additional to those of China's capabilities must still be implicated in understandings about the dangers it is said to present.**

Pessimism Answers

AT: Pessimism – General

Negativity as a starting point is necessary but insufficient – constructive building is necessary to create tangible changes.
Brand-Jacobsen, TRANSCEND Co-Director and Coalition for Global Solidarity and Social Development Director, 2005

[Kai Frithjof, "Peace by Peaceful Means"
https://web.archive.org/web/20050404102302/http://www.globalsolidarity.org/articles/peace_means_kai.html]

Peace by Peaceful Means Dear Friends, The discussions which have taken place over e-mail over the past few days have been extremely interesting. I have just returned from Oslo where the 100th anniversary of the Nobel Peace Prize was being celebrated. The obvious contrast between the rather elite 'suit' dominated celebrations in Oslo and the realities of what is occurring in the world today was stark. Questions of **strategy, tactics and visions** for how we work to bring about change, to transform all forms of violent conflict -- direct, structural, and cultural -- and to empower, mobilise, and involve people in a mass, broad-based movement for peace and to build the alternatives we are looking for, **are vital**. In Norway alone, to take one example, perhaps 80% of people think what is happening now in and over Afghanistan is wrong, either completely or at least in part, and yet all they hear from the media, academics and politicians is constant support and acclaim for the 'justness' of this war (or indeed, any war in which it is 'we' against 'them'). Small groups of people and 'NGOs', in Norway as in every single country, are trying to bring forward alternatives, to raise their voices, and to protest/oppose what they think is wrong. While these organisations are in every case much smaller than our governments and militaries going to war, they often represent the social majority. A major challenge they face, however, is how to reach out to people, how to involve people, and how to develop alternatives which make sense to people tired of war and violence (whether of the kind we are seeing in Afghanistan, or of a global economic system killing 100,000 a day). Negative slogans and opposition to what is wrong is not enough however. It is not enough, but it is necessary. 'Basta!', 'Enough!' was perhaps the most 'revolutionary' cry of the last decade, and still is in many parts of the world. The simple, courageous act, of standing up when we see that something is wrong, and stating that it is wrong, not cooperating with it, can be a powerful and evocative symbol. When we are having our conferences, discussions and meetings in whichever city, town or village of the world we may be found, we should always remember that the vast majority of people in our own city, town or village, as well as the entire rest of the world, have no idea that we are there, meeting. The vision, hope and ideas which bring people to these conferences are, in the vast majority of cases, kept marginalised, on the periphery. Yet that is also part of our own responsibility, technique and methods. Basta! became a cry to inspire millions, because those who said it lived it, refusing to cooperate any longer with what they know to be wrong. While Basta! may be the most revolutionary cry or word today, transforming all forms of direct, structural, and cultural violence is the greatest challenge. The two are inclusive and complementary, not exclusive. We need to state clearly our opposition to violence, war, injustice and exploitation (the 'peace movement' has often been willing to do the first two, not always as willing on the last two), and we need also to build a constructive, positive programme. It is not only a question of what we are against, but what we are for. When we criticize what we think is wrong, people will also want to know what we think could be done instead. In these cases, our answers must seem real and viable to people. The 'anti-globalisation' movement is therefore also a social justice movement; 'non-governmental organisations' should also be people's organisations or people's movements; and one of our challenges today will be to build upon the growing 'anti-war' movement, transforming it also into a peace movement. A step further, as many social and peace activists have recognised, will be to link the peace and social justice movements. Slogans and messages are important, as are practice and vision. **It will not be possible today to unite broad numbers of people around issues which they feel are too abstract and divorced from them**. The 'abolish the debt' campaign/movement was successful because people were able to see the clear linkages between debt and the effective colonisation and enslavement of countries and people across the south, as well as the incredible suffering and destruction it brought. The Jubilee 2000 'campaign' however, unlike the Jubilee South movement which continues today, did not reach its objective of having the debt cancelled. Instead, while many people around the world believe the problem has been solved, the debt-system and the burden it places upon countries has become even more extreme. Going from 'campaigns' to movements will also be important, though even here **it is not a question of 'either/or' but 'both/and'** with individual campaigns extremely useful and effective at times for involving people, raising awareness and mobilising around specific issues,

strengthening further the broader movements of which they may be a part. Today, a movement for demos kratos is necessary, and vital for any movement or work towards peace. To speak about the United States or any government in the world today as a 'democracy' is a ridiculous farce. They are highly elite dominated systems built upon massive structures and cultures of violence, and willing to use overwhelming (Powel Doctrine) violence when necessary to enforce their needs and/or interests. At best they may be demagogia's, where elites maintain power by promising the people what they will do for them (we call this 'elections'), but they are not system's or societies built upon people's power, demos kratos. Decisions to go to war are made by tiny numbers of people. Our economic and political policies are constructed for us, often to the detriment of the social majorities who are told to 'leave well enough alone' and trust in the experts. This is sometimes as true of politicians as it is of non-governmental organisations who themselves frequently prefer the conference halls and well-funded projects to actually working democratically with people as part of the people themselves. An alternative today, what Johan Galtung has called for, with 10,000 dialogues, meetings, discussions at every level, focussing not only on what is wrong, but also on what we want therapy, ideas, alternatives. In one form or another many of these dialogues are taking place. In a way they are therapy for the massive amounts of violence we are all being exposed to today, in our cultures, in our world, on our television sets or in the speeches of our 'democratically elected' rulers (the question, for those who do not support their policies, should not be 'who put them in power' -- though this is also important -- but why haven't we removed them from power yet?). They are also empowering, if we take the step beyond saying what is wrong to what could be done?, what should be done?, and then go further to discussing what I/we can do about it. Mobilising people for peace today is not simply about a slogan (though coming up with clearly expressed messages in a few words will of course help us to link people together and raise awareness). What is necessary, beyond any single issue or top-level strategy for how to change the world, is the process. The way is the goal. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the social justice/anti-globalisation movement is that it has mobilised, involved, and empowered millions of people around the world in discussing, thinking about, and acting upon the realities around them. On the streets of Seattle, Praha, Okinawa, Melbourne, Gotheburg, Washington, Quebec, Genoa, Ottawa, people, many of whom refuse to vote, have been discussing foreign policy, domestic politics, people to people movements, and all the issues which politicians and well-established NGOs are not able and often not willing to discuss with people. We have our 'manifestos', our policies and plans which we wish to put forward in the name of people, often addressing them to 'politicians' and 'elites' believing, in a fundamentally undemocratic way, that they will be the ones to bring about and implement change for us. This is not to say that that is not an important level which we also need to work at. The broader vision here is both/and, not either or, in terms of strategy as well often of vision. We also need, however, to be willing to take part in the much slower, more timely, and more empowering process, of tens of thousands of dialogues together with people, communities, and organisations at every level. Solidarity today is being built upon and carried further into alliances not just supporting people in their struggles for social justice, peace and freedom, but carrying forward those struggles ourselves in our own communities, our own towns, cities and villages. If we wish to change the injustices taking place in the world today we must of course work on a global level, but we must also work, just as importantly, within our communities. Again, both/and rather than either or. We should also be wary when we say 'we must begin here', or 'this must be done first!', even when the message is very positive and constructive. 'We must begin with the individual!'. 'We must begin by changing society'!. 'We must begin with a culture of peace!'. 'We must begin by ending the debt!'. All of these, and the many others put forward, are extremely important issues. They are also all linked together. Again, both/and. Exclusive and elitist visions will only serve to further fragment our efforts, creating division and separation where what is needed is dialogue, solidarity, cooperation and alliances between movements/organisations which often take diverse strategies and approaches to addressing deeply interlinking injustices and structures and cultures of violence. Conscientisation (raising awareness, often political awareness -- but also social, cultural, economic), organisation (we can do more together than we can apart, and it is necessary to organise -- though in many different ways -- to be able to bring about changes, both against what we think is wrong and for what we think is right), mobilisation (bringing in more and more people, involving people in dialogues, discussion, action, and work for change/transformation), and empowerment (I/we can, rather than 'I/we can't'; also important recognising the power we have to bring about change, rather than simply accepting existing, often extremely violent, power structures and believing that change can/should/must be implemented by those 'in power', whether slave owners, men, politicians, or fuhrers) are all necessary. A guide for this, and for ourselves as movements, organisations and individuals might be to be Critical -- not simply accepting what is happening but questioning it, recognising what we think is wrong, and also open to criticism of ourselves and what we are doing from others, not simply accepting things as 'given', 'natural', unchangeable ('TINA' -- there is no alternative, is one of the most deeply undemocratic and disempowering messages, frequently given by our 'democratically' elected elites/rulers); Radical -- according to the original etymology 'to go to the roots'. Often NGOs (as well as much western medicine and political strategies) are satisfied with dealing with 'effects', 'symptoms' and fail to go to the roots of the problems or structures we are dealing with. We cannot afford this today, or we will simply serve to reproduce sickness, disease, and injustice on ever broader scales. It is necessary, therefore, to go to the roots, to see what lies beneath, behind,

if we are to be able to bring about true transformation, healing; Creative -- also very important today. Not simply accepting old methods, techniques, slogans, ways of organising (though these are also all very important and should be learned from), but willing to be creative, to search for new approaches, new ideas, and also new therapies to transform direct, structural and cultural violence; Constructive -- as many have suggested, we need to go beyond what we are against, and also create what we are for. Part of being constructive is recognising our own power. It is itself an empowering act. Recognising, realising, building our ability to think, dream, create ourselves the type(s) of communities/world we want. Mobilising people for what we can do together, not simply for what we are opposed to being done by others. And; Honest -- with ourselves, with each other, to our goals, aims, vision. Unity of means and ends. People can feel when their is honesty in a movement/organisation. If it is not there, they will be sceptical and will not become involved. If we wish to be truly democratic, and truly empowering, we must also be honest, in our goals, our methods, our vision, and with ourselves and each other. Speaking all day at a conference about poverty and then eating a US$100 meal is not necessarily honest. Opposing the horrible poverty 3000 km away while ignoring the horrible poverty many live in in our own towns/cities/villages is not necessarily honest. Talking about 'democracy' but expecting people to simply join our movements and accept our slogans without dialogue, discussion, and mutual respect/empowerment, is not necessarily honest.

The challenges are great, and they are ones we must live up to. Also, for I will not say finally, **we cannot simply wait** until the end of the road for our alternatives, just as we cannot wait until wars or violence have ended before we begin peacebuilding and conflict transformation. True empowerment will come from building our alternatives, our alternative visions, social orders (or lack of order/structure), communities, and way in our lives, in our communities, in our struggles and movements, here and now. This is being done in every corner of the world. It is part of the regeneration, revitalisation, and empowerment of people -- demos kratos and peace by peaceful means.

AT: Pessimism – Race

Critique alone fails – it never puts something in its place.
Pyle, Boston College Law School JD, 1999

[Jefferey, 40 B.C.L. Rev. 787, "Race, Equality and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory's Attack on the Promises of Liberalism"
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2124&context=bclr, p.808-9]

At bottom, <u>CRT fails because of its single-mindedly "critical" character</u>. Race-crits bewail minority disadvantage, blame liberal values for "constructing" this disadvantage and dismiss any defense of them as a legitimation of white supremacy.262 But here endeth their analysis. As CLS scholar Mark Tushnet admitted: "<u>Critique is all there is</u>." 263

"<u>Critique</u>," however, <u>never built anything, and liberalism, for all its shortcomings, is at least constructive. It provides broadly-accepted, reasonably well-defined principles to which political advocates may appeal in ways that transcend sheer power,</u> with at least some hope of incremental success:26' <u>Critical race theory would "deconstruct" this imperfect tradition, but offers nothing in its place.</u>

AT: Pessimism – Afro-Pess

The absolutism of afro-pessimism fails – dogmatism reifies social death and slips into cynicism.

Marriott, University of California Santa Cruz History of Consciousness professor, 2012

[David, Years Work Crit Cult Theory (2012) 20 (1): 37-66, "Black Cultural Studies" EBSCO]

However, this is also not the entire story of Red, White, and Black, as I hope to show. For example, in Chapter One ('The Structure of Antagonisms'), written as a theoretical introduction, and which opens explicitly on the Fanonian question of why ontology cannot understand the being of the Black, Wilderson is prepared to say that black suffering is not only beyond analogy, it also refigures the whole of being: 'the essence of being for the White and non-Black position' is non-niggerness, consequently, '[b]eing can thus be thought of, in the first ontological instance, as non-niggerness, and slavery then as niggerness' (p. 37). It is not hard when reading such sentences to suspect a kind of absolutism at work here, and one that manages to be **peculiarly and dispiritingly dogmatic**: throughout Red, White, and Black, despite variations in tone and emphasis, there is always the desire to have black lived experience **named as the worst**, and the politics of such a desire inevitably collapses into a kind of **sentimental moralism**: for the claim that 'Blackness is incapacity in its most pure and unadulterated form' means merely that **the black has to embody this abjection** without reserve (p. 38). This logic—and the denial of any kind of 'ontological integrity' to the Black/Slave due to its endless traversal by force does seem **to reduce ontology to logic**, namely, a logic **of non-recuperability**—moves through the following points: (1) Black non-being is not capable of symbolic resistance and, as such, falls outside of any language of authenticity or reparation; (2) for such a subject, which Wilderson persists in calling 'death', the symbolic remains foreclosed (p. 43); (3) as such, Blackness is the record of an occlusion which remains ever present: 'White (Human) capacity, in advance of the event of discrimination or oppression, is parasitic on Black incapacity' (p. 45); (4) and, as an example of the institutions or discourses involving 'violence', 'antagonisms' and 'parasitism', Wilderson describes White (or non-Black) film theory and cultural studies as incapable of understanding the 'suffering of the Black—the Slave' (they cannot do so because they are erroneously wedded to humanism and to the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, which Wilderson takes as two examples of what the Afro-pessimist should avoid) (p. 56); as a corrective, Wilderson calls for a new language of abstraction, and one centrally concerned with exposing 'the structure of antagonisms between Blacks and Humans' (p. 68). Reading seems to stop here, at a critique of Lacanian full speech: Wilderson wants to say that Lacan's notion of the originary (imaginary) alienation of the subject is still wedded to relationality as implied by the contrast between 'empty' and 'full' speech, and so apparently cannot grasp the trauma of 'absolute Otherness' that is the Black's relation to Whites, because psychoanalysis cannot fathom the 'structural, or absolute, violence' of Black life (pp. 74; 75). 'Whereas Lacan was aware of how language ''precedes and exceeds us'', he did not have Fanon's awareness of how violence also precedes and exceeds Blacks' (p. 76). The violence of such abjection—or incapacity—is therefore that it cannot be communicated or avowed, and is always already delimited by desubjectification and dereliction (p. 77). Whence the suspicion of an ontology reduced to a logic (of abjection). Leaving aside the fact that it is quite mistaken to limit Lacan's notion of full speech to the search for communication (the unconscious cannot be confined to parole), it is clear that, according to Wilderson's own 'logic', his description of the Black is working, via analogy, to Lacan's notion of the real but, in his insistence on the Black as an absolute outside Wilderson can only duly **reify this void at the heart of universality**. The Black is 'beyond the limit of contingency'—but it is worth saying immediately that this 'beyond' is indeed a foreclosure that defines a violence whose traces can only be thought violently (that is, analogically), and whose nonbeing returns as the theme for Wilderson's political thinking of a non-recuperable abjection. The Black is nonbeing and, as such, is more real and primary than being per se: given how much is at stake, this insistence on a racial metaphysics of injury implies a fundamental irreconcilability between Blacks and Humans (there is really no debate to be had here: irreconcilability is the condition and possibility of what it means to be Black).

AT: Pessimism – AT: Ethics DA

Impossible demands fail – strategic and specific demands are more subversive than "withdraw from the system" – the alt links comparatively more to the "ethics DA."
Zizek, University of Ljubljana Institute for Sociology and Philosophy senior researcher, 2007

[Slavoj, 11-15-07, " Resistance Is Surrender" http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n22/print/zize01_.html]

The response of some critics on the postmodern Left to this predicament is to call for a new politics of resistance. Those who still insist on fighting state power, let alone seizing it, are accused of remaining stuck within the 'old paradigm': the task today, their critics say, is to resist state power by withdrawing from its terrain and creating new spaces outside its control. This is, of course, the obverse of accepting the triumph of capitalism. The politics of resistance is nothing but the moralising supplement to a Third Way Left. Simon Critchley's recent book, Infinitely Demanding, is an almost perfect embodiment of this position. * For Critchley, the liberal-democratic state is here to stay. Attempts to abolish the state failed miserably; consequently, the new politics has to be located at a distance from it: anti-war movements, ecological organisations, groups protesting against racist or sexist abuses, and other forms of local self-organisation. It must be a politics of resistance to the state, of bombarding the state with impossible demands, of denouncing the limitations of state mechanisms. The main argument for conducting the politics of resistance at a distance from the state hinges on the ethical dimension of the 'infinitely demanding' call for justice: no state can heed this call, since its ultimate goal is the 'real-political' one of ensuring its own reproduction (its economic growth, public safety, etc). 'Of course,' Critchley writes, history is habitually written by the people with the guns and sticks and one cannot expect to defeat them with mocking satire and feather dusters. Yet, as the history of ultra-leftist active nihilism eloquently shows, one is lost the moment one picks up the guns and sticks. Anarchic political resistance should not seek to mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty it opposes. So what should, say, the US Democrats do? Stop competing for state power and withdraw to the interstices of the state, leaving state power to the Republicans and start a campaign of anarchic resistance to it? And what would Critchley do if he were facing an adversary like Hitler? Surely in such a case one should 'mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty' one opposes? Shouldn't the Left draw a distinction between the circumstances in which one would resort to violence in confronting the state, and those in which all one can and should do is use 'mocking satire and feather dusters'? The ambiguity of Critchley's position resides in a strange non sequitur: if the state is here to stay, if it is impossible to abolish it (or capitalism), why retreat from it? Why not act with(in) the state? Why not accept the basic premise of the Third Way? Why limit oneself to a politics which, as Critchley puts it, 'calls the state into question and calls the established order to account, not in order to do away with the state, desirable though that might well be in some utopian sense, but in order to better it or attenuate its malicious effect'? These words simply demonstrate that today's liberal-democratic state and the dream of an 'infinitely demanding' anarchic politics exist in a relationship of mutual parasitism: anarchic agents do the ethical thinking, and the state does the work of running and regulating society.

Critchley's anarchic ethico-political agent acts like a superego, comfortably bombarding the state with demands; and the more the state tries to satisfy these demands, the more guilty it is seen to be. In compliance with this logic, the anarchic agents focus their protest not on open dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles. The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don't agree with the government's policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush's reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: 'You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!' It is striking that the course on which Hugo Chávez has embarked since 2006 is the exact opposite of the one chosen by the postmodern Left: far from resisting state power, he grabbed it (first by an attempted coup, then democratically), ruthlessly using the Venezuelan state apparatuses to promote his goals. Furthermore, he is militarising the barrios, and organising the training of

armed units there. And, the ultimate scare: now that he is feeling the economic effects of capital's 'resistance' to his rule (temporary shortages of some goods in the state-subsidised supermarkets), he has announced plans to consolidate the 24 parties that support him into a single party. Even some of his allies are sceptical about this move: will it come at the expense of the popular movements that have given the Venezuelan revolution its élan? However, this choice, though risky, should be fully endorsed: the task is to make the new party function not as a typical state socialist (or Peronist) party, but as a vehicle for the mobilisation of new forms of politics (like the grass roots slum committees). What should we say to someone like Chávez? 'No, do not grab state power, just withdraw, leave the state and the current situation in place'? Chávez is often dismissed as a clown – but wouldn't such a withdrawal just reduce him to a version of Subcomandante Marcos, whom many Mexican leftists now refer to as 'Subcomediante Marcos'? Today, it is the great capitalists – Bill Gates, corporate polluters, fox hunters – who 'resist' the state. The lesson here is that the truly subversive thing is not to insist on 'infinite' demands we know those in power cannot fulfil. Since they know that we know it, such an 'infinitely demanding' attitude presents no problem for those in power: 'So wonderful that, with your critical demands, you remind us what kind of world we would all like to live in. Unfortunately, we live in the real world, where we have to make do with what is possible.' The thing to do is, on the contrary, to bombard those in power with strategically well-selected, precise, finite demands, which can't be met with the same excuse.

AT: Pessimism – AT: Cooption DA

Fear of cooption and concerns with authenticity is ivory tower oppositionalism – it never gets off the ground.
Pyle, Boston College Law School JD, 1999

[Jefferey, 40 B.C.L. Rev. 787, "Race, Equality and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory's Attack on the Promises of Liberalism"
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2124&context=bclr, p.808-9]

For all their talk of "realism,"''' race-crits are strangely unrealistic in their proposals for reform. 1 m7 Most probably realize that radical measures like racial or ethnic reparations are not likely to be granted, especially by a court. But even unrealistic proposals are rare, because race-crits generally prefer not to suggest solutions, but to "resist" the dominant legal thought, doctrine and policy, whatever that happens to be.'" As Derrick Bell has put it, "most critical race theorists are committed to a program of scholarly resistance, and most hope scholarly resistance will lay the groundwork for wide-scale resistance."'" How this **ivory tower oppositionalism** would foment grassroots revolt is unclear, because CRT professors rarely suggest anything practical. Rather, their exhortations are meant, as Bell says, to "harass white folks" and • thereby "make life bearable in a society where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class."'"

One of the race-crits' few practical programs of "resistance" is Paul Butler's proposal that inner-city juries practice racially-based jury nullification.' 91 jurors of color, Butler argues, have the "moral responsibility" not to apply the criminal law to blacks and whites equally, but to "etnancipate some guilty black outlaws" because "the black community" would be "better off" if there were fewer black men in prison.'" If enough juries were hung or not-guilty verdicts rendered, he imagines, the white-dominated government would change its excessive reliance on incarceration.'" Butler rejects the ordinary democratic process of legal reform.' Democracy, he says, ensures a "permanent, homogenous majority" of whites that "dominat[es]" African Ainericans.w 5 Butler is probably correct that occasional acts of jury nullification might well express the resentment that many African Americans justifiably feel towards discriminatory law enforcement.'"`' As Randall Kennedy has pointed out, however, black Americans are disproportionately the victims of crimes,' 97 and therefore tend to favor more, not less, criminal prosecution and punishment. 1 "8

The race-crits' preference for "resistance"' 99 over democratic participation seems to flow from a fear of losing their status as "oppositional scholars] "200 to the game of mainstream law and politics, which they regard as "an inevitably co-optive process?"' Better to be radically opposed to the "doniinant political discourse""2 and remain an out than to work within the current system and lose one's "authenticity?" In rejecting the realistic for the "authentic," however, race-crits begin to look like academic poseurs—ideological purists striking the correct radical stance, but doing little within the confines of the real world, so sure are they that nothing much can be done."

EXTN – AT: Pessimism

It is better to have faith in incrementalism – cynicism breeds ineffectiveness. Tannenbaum, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign social psychology PhD candidate, 10-10-13

[Melanie, MA in social psychology, "Lady Gaga, You Shouldn't Be Doing It For The Applause." http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/psysociety/2013/10/10/lady-gaga-applause/]

Moving to a slightly different (yet related) domain, <u>research on goal theory also reveals that there are two broad types of goal orientations. You might have a mastery</u> (or learning) <u>goal, in which your primary focus is on mastering difficult material, learning and understanding complex topics, and truly improving at a task. Or, you might have a performance (or ego) goal, in which your primary focus is on demonstrating competence, avoiding negative evaluations, and publicly showing that you are "good" at something. In the former, your focus is internal</u> — you are presumably trying to master some kind of skill or material for your own benefit, so you can genuinely learn and grow, regardless of what others happen to think of your ability or performance. <u>In the latter, your focus is external</u> — you are presumably focused on the evaluations of others, and worrying more about what they think or say than about your actual progress. In other words, you might be doing it all for something like applause.¶ Perhaps unsurprisingly, those two different outlooks on personality & skills mentioned two paragraphs above predict how people come to form mastery or performance goal orientations. <u>People with entity views typically prioritize "looking good" over actually developing competence, leading them to focus on performance</u> (rather than mastery) <u>goals. After all, if you believe that you are born with a set ability level and it can't really be altered, it makes more sense to focus on how you appear</u> (trying to maximize your positive evaluations from others) <u>rather than wasting your time in a futile attempt to change</u> your innate ability level. Incremental theorists, on the other hand, are more likely to set goals that revolve around learning and increasing competence. Generally, **this becomes a sort of self-fulfilling prophesy: People who believe that they can improve** their abilities with hard work <u>usually end up working harder, and they **gain mastery and become better**</u> in that domain as a result.¶ <u>In fact, studies consistently link mastery</u> (or learning) <u>goals to more adaptive outcomes than performance goals</u>. For example, MBA students who set learning goals (like mastering complex course material) outperform MBA students who set performance goals (like getting a high GPA). <u>Teenagers who hold entity beliefs about athletic ability tend to be less motivated to pursue athletic goals, whereas teens with incremental beliefs are more likely to enjoy sports and genuinely want to increase their athletic abilities</u>. Holding incremental beliefs is significantly more adaptive for both learning and performance — **believing that you can improve is better for both motivation and enjoyment** than believing that you must be "born" into greatness. This is because people with mastery goals also exhibit higher levels of intrinsic motivation, self-regulation, persistence in the face of challenge or possible failure, and metacognition (an overarching term for the ways in which we plan, monitor, and evaluate our progress on important goals to help us ensure that we're always engaging in the best possible strategies).¶ <u>As Carol Dweck (one of the leading researchers on this topic) explains in the video above, all of this put together makes a lot sense. Even though you might not see the differential effects of these goals in the face of success, they certainly emerge in the face of failure. People with incremental theories believe that they are always capable of learning, growing, and improving. As a result, failing on a difficult task is not necessarily a personal threat</u>. Rather, it might just be a cue that this is a task on which he/she needs to work harder — <u>it is an opportunity to learn and grow. People with entity theories, however, do not believe that they can truly change their abilities. Thus, there is no point in responding to criticism or negative feedback</u> by working harder or persisting on a difficult task — <u>after all, if you can't improve, what's the point? As a result, any negative feedback is seen a threat. Therefore, they are more likely to seek out situations in which they are likely to excel</u> and "appear" smart or talented. <u>This can be fine for a while, but it severely limits entity theorists' capacities to grow and reach their full potential</u>. After all, if you

are terrified of negative feedback, **you are more likely to give up on a task when faced with failure and less likely to persist** in the face of a challenge.

Optimism is a prerequisite to solvency.
Levine, practicing psychologist and prominent author, 2011

[Bruce, 9-28-11, "How Anti-Authoritarians Can Transcend their Sense of Hopelessness and Fight Back" http://www.alternet.org/print/story/152565/how_anti-authoritarians_can_transcend_their_sense_of_hopelessness_and_fight_back]

Critical thinking anti-authoritarians see the enormity of the military-industrial complex, the energy-industrial complex and the financial-industrial complex. They see the overwhelming power of the U.S. ruling class. They see many Americans unaware of the true sources of their oppression or with little knowledge of the strategies and tactics necessary to overcome it. They see American society lacking the psychological and cultural building blocks necessary for democratic movements—the self-respect required to reject the role as a mere subject of power, the collective self-confidence that success is possible, courage, determination, anti-authoritarianism, and solidarity. They see how the corporatocracy pays back those few Americans who do question, challenge, and resist illegitimate authority with economic and political marginalization.¶ Critical Thinking, Depression, and Political Passivity¶ Research shows that a more accurate notion of one's powerlessness can result in a greater feeling of helplessness and is associated with depression. Several classic studies show that moderately depressed people are more critically thinking than those who are not depressed. Researchers Lauren Alloy and Lyn Abramson, studying nondepressed and depressed subjects who played a rigged game in which they had no actual control, found that nondepressed subjects overestimated their contribution to winning, while depressed subjects more accurately evaluated their lack of control.¶ If you are critical thinking enough to see the reality of just how much influence the corporatocracy has and how little power you have, then you are going to experience more pain than those who do not see these truths. To dull this pain, in addition to drugs and other diversions, human beings use depression and apathy. But these "shutdown strategies" weaken us and create passivity, immobilization and what Bob Marley called "mental slavery," which in itself can be humiliatingly painful. And in this vicious cycle, human beings use even more diversions and shutdown strategies to dull this ever-increasing pain.¶ When one is in such a debilitating vicious cycle, painful truths about the cause of one's malaise—the truths of how we are getting screwed—are not positively energizing. Instead, one may take such truths as confirmation that pessimism and hopelessness are warranted. The vicious cycle continues.¶ When one is already in pain and immobilized, there is a reflexive negative reaction to any proposed solution. Solutions demand effort, and a demand for effort is painful for those with little energy. So, it's much easier to reflexively dismiss any solution. Of course, many solutions do deserve to be dismissed, as they may well be naïve.¶ The feeling of hopelessness is a legitimate one. And hopeless people are turned off by attempts to invalidate their feelings. Is it possible to validate that feeling of hopelessness while at the same time challenging the wisdom of inactions based on hopelessness? And is it possible to challenge it in a way that doesn't insult the intelligence of critical thinkers?¶ Critical Thinking about Critical Thinking¶ The battle against the corporatocracy demands critical thinking, which results in seeing many ugly truths about reality. This critical thinking is absolutely necessary. Without it, one is more likely to engage in tactics that can make matters worse. Critical thinking also means the ability to think critically about one's pessimism—realizing that pessimism can cripple the will. Critical thinkers who reflect on their own critical thinking recognize how negativism can cause inaction, which results in maintaining the status quo.¶ Critical thinking anti-authoritarians who move into hopelessness can forget that while they may in fact be better at seeing ugly truths than are many other people, they cannot see everything. Simply put, critical thinkers

sometimes lose their humility.¶ Abraham Lincoln, considered by many historians to be our most critical thinking president, was also a major depressive. When he was a young man, he became so depressed that twice his friends had to form suicide watches for him. In the 1850s in the United States, the major battle was less over abolishing slavery than merely stopping the spread of it. Lincoln, who fought politically to stop the spread of slavery, wrote in 1856 a pessimistic analysis of the North's chances of winning this fight:¶ This immense, palpable pecuniary interest, on the question of extending slavery, unites the Southern people, as one man. But it can not be demonstrated that the North will gain a dollar by restricting it. Moral principle is all, or nearly all, that unites us of the North. Pity 'tis, it is so, but this is a looser bond, than pecuniary interest. Right here is the plain cause of their perfect union and our want of it.¶ That slavery would be abolished in the United States less than a decade after Lincoln's pessimistic analysis of the difficulty of merely stopping its spread was one of those seeming impossibilities that became possible because of unforeseen historical events. In the North, there was certainly not enough concern for African Americans to result in the end of slavery. But less than a decade after Lincoln's pessimistic analysis about merely stopping the spread of slavery, one unforeseen event after another resulted in the abolition of slavery.¶ <u>There are many examples from history of seeming impossibilities actually happening, examples that compel critical thinkers to rethink whether they are actually seeing all the possibilities</u>. One recent example is, of course, the Arab spring. Many critical thinkers from that part of the world remain amazed at the huge revolts in Egypt that toppled the Mubarak tyranny.¶ The collapse of the Soviet empire seemed impossible to most Americans up until shortly before it occurred. Most Americans saw only mass resignation within the Soviet Union and its sphere of control. But the shipyard workers in Gdansk, Poland, did not see their Soviet and Communist Party rulers as the all-powerful forces that Americans did. And so Polish workers' Solidarity, by simply refusing to go away, provided a strong dose of morale across Eastern Europe at the same time other historical events—such as the Soviet Union's Afghanistan war—weakened their empire.¶ Why Not Just Wait for the Collapse?¶ History tells us that not just the Soviet empire but all empires ultimately collapse, and so why not just wait for their fall? It is pretty safe to say that the U.S. military-industrial complex and other oppressive U.S. industrial complexes will ultimately fall. These may be transformed by our own efforts or, more likely—given Americans' current state of political passivity—they will fall owing mostly under the weight of their own stupidity. So, if it is more likely that these will fall under the weight of their own stupidity, why bother with activism?¶ One reason for democratic movements is that history tells us that not all empires and oppressive institutions fall under the weight of their own stupidity, as some are transformed by a combination of democratic movements and empire stupidity.¶ There is another reason to work each day on the democracy battlefields at our workplace, schools, the media, the marketplace, etc. Whether an empire and its oppressive institutions fall under the weight of their own stupidity or with help from a democratic movement, there must be people around in the aftermath who have what it takes to create and maintain a democratic society. There must be people who have retained their individual self-respect, collective self-confidence, courage, determination, anti-authoritarianism, and solidarity.¶ <u>The lesson from history is that tyrannical and dehumanizing institutions are often more fragile than they appear. We never really know until it happens whether or not we are living in that time when historical variables are creating opportunities for seemingly impossible change</u>. Maybe in our lifetime, or our kids' lifetime, or their kids' lifetime, the current corporatocracy will fall. It may fall because of the efforts of democratic movements or because of its own stupidity or some combination.¶ But <u>when it does fall, the likelihood that it will be replaced by an enduring democratic society rests on whether there are enough of us with practice in democracy, enough of us who took seriously the psychological and cultural building blocks of self-respect, collective self-confidence, courage, determination, anti-authoritarianism, and solidarity. And democratic movements are the best place to practice creating those psychological and cultural building blocks required for an enduring democracy</u>.¶ That's why "Occupy Wall Street" makes sense, and that's why I will be at "October 2011" at Freedom Plaza, Washington D.C. beginning next Thursday, October 6.

Even illusory agency is productive. Imagining possible changes is necessary to motivate action.
Shove, Lancaster University sociology professor, and Walker, Lancaster University geography professor, 2007

[Elizabeth and Gordon, "CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management" http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/761/2/A_cautionary_note_on_transition_managementv5.pdf, p.8]

For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of 'innovation studies', for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. <u>The</u>

more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we've suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion.¶ However, we are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an 'illusion of agency', and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues 'illusions are productive because they motivate action and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved' (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the dynamics of change: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are necessary to processes within.¶ This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

Race K Answers

2ac – No Root Cause – Whiteness

Whiteness not the root cause of the aff – it's too sweeping.

Shelby, Harvard University African and African American Studies professor, 2005

[Tommie, also a philosophy professor at Harvard, "We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity" http://books.google.com/books?id=8W7W6F3fCPkC&q=others+might+challenge#v=snippet&q=others%20might%20challenge&f=false, p.147-8]

Others might challenge the distinction between ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage, on the grounds that we are rarely, if ever, able to so neatly separate these factors, an epistemic situation that is only made worse by the fact that these causes interact in complex ways with behavioral factors. These distinctions, while perhaps straightforward in the abstract, are difficult to employ in practice. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the members of a poor black community to determine with any accuracy whether their impoverished condition is due primarily to institutional racism, the impact of past racial injustice, the increasing technological basis of the economy, shrinking state budgets, the vicissitudes of world trade, the ascendancy of conservative ideology, poorly funded schools, lack of personal initiative, a violent drug trade that deters business investment, some combination of these factors, or some other explanation altogether. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine when the formulation of putatively race-neutral policies has been motivated by racism or when such policies are unfairly applied by racially biased public officials.

There are very real empirical difficulties in determining the specific causal significance of the factors that create and perpetuate black disadvantage; nonetheless, it is clear that these factors exist and that justice will demand different practical remedies according to each factor's relative impact on blacks' life chances. We must acknowledge that our social world is complicated and not immediately transparent to common sense, and thus that systematic empirical inquiry, historical studies, and rigorous social analysis are required to reveal its systemic structure and sociocultural dynamics. There is, moreover, no mechanical or infallible procedure for determining which analyses are the soundest ones. In addition, given the inevitable bias that attends social inquiry, legislators and those they represent cannot simply defer to social-scientific experts.

We must instead rely on open public debate—among politicians, scholars, policy makers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens—with the aim of garnering rationally motivated and informed consensus. And even if our practical decision procedures rest on critical deliberative discourse and thus live up to our highest democratic ideals, some trial and error through actual practice is unavoidable. These difficulties and complications notwithstanding, a general recognition of the distinctions among the ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage could help blacks refocus their political energies and self-help strategies. Attention to these distinctions might help expose the superficiality of theories that seek to reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to contemporary forms of racism or white supremacy. A more penetrating, subtle, and empirically grounded analysis is needed to comprehend the causes of racial inequality and black disadvantage. Indeed, these distinctions highlight the necessity to probe deeper to find the causes of contemporary forms of racism, as some racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments (such as immigration policy or reduced federal funding for higher education).

AT: Race – Debates/Implementation Key

Debates about the implementation and consequences of policies are critical to fighting racism.
Bracey, Washington University law professor and African and African American studies professor, 2006

[Christopher, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, "THE CUL DE SAC OF RACE PREFERENCE DISCOURSE" http://lawreview.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/slideshow/Bracey_Christopher_79_6.pdf, p.1318]

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law."281 For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.282

Policy debates over how to fight racism are critical.
Bouie, The American Prospect, 2013

[Jamelle, "Making (and Dismantling) Racism" http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism]

Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions at all levels of government. This has led him to two conclusions: First, that anti-black racism as we understand it is a creation of explicit policy choices—the decision to exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans and their descendants has as much to do with racial prejudice as does any intrinsic tribalism. And second, that it's possible to dismantle this prejudice using public policy. Here is Coates in his own words: Last night I had the luxury of sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgan's work and actually see racism being inscribed in the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. Racism was created by policy. It will likely only be ultimately destroyed by policy.

2ac – Race Traitors Perm

Whiteness is hegemonic but not monolithic – pragmatic redeployment of some forms of whiteness can be strategic.
Winant, University of California Santa Clara sociology professor, 1997

[Howard, New Left Review, "Behind Blue Eyes: Contemporary White Racial Politics"
http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/winant/whitness.html]

On the practical level, the argument goes, whites can become "race traitors" by rejecting their privilege, by refusing to collude with white supremacy. When you hear that racist joke, confront its teller. When you see the police harassing a nonwhite youth, try to intervene or at least bear witness. In short, recognize that white supremacy depends on the thousands of minute acts that reproduce it from moment to moment; it must "deliver" to whites a sense of their own security and superiority; it must make them feel that "I am different from those "others." Single gestures of this sort, Race Traitor's editors say, ...would [not] in all likelihood be of much consequence. But if enough of those who looked white broke the rules of the club to make the cops doubt their ability to recognize a white person merely by looking at him or her, how would it affect the cops' behavior (Editorial 1993, 4-5)? Thus the point is not that all whites recognize the lie of their privilege, but that enough whites do so, and act out their rejection of that lie, to disrupt the "white club's" ability to enforce its supremacy.

It is easy to sympathize with this analysis, at least up to a point. The postwar black movement, which in the US context at least served as the point of origin for all the "new social movements" and the much-reviled "politics of identity," taught the valuable lesson that politics went "all the way down." That is, meaningful efforts to achieve greater social justice could not tolerate a public/private, or a collective/individual distinction. Trying to change society meant trying to change one's own life. The formula "the personal is political," commonly associated with feminism, had its early origins among the militants of the civil rights movement (Evans 1980).

The problems come when deeper theoretical and practical problems are raised. Despite their explicit adherence to a "social construction" model of race (one which bears a significant resemblance to my own work), theorists of the abolitionist project do not take that insight as seriously as they should. ¶ They employ it chiefly to argue against biologistic conceptions of race, which is fine; but they fail to consider the complexities and rootedness of social construction, or as we would term it, racial formation. Is the social construction of whiteness so flimsy that it can be repudiated by a mere act of political will, or even by widespread and repeated acts aimed at rejecting white privilege? I think not; whiteness may not be a legitimate cultural identity in the sense of having a discrete, "positive" content, but it is certainly an overdetermined political and cultural category, having to do with socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, ideologies of individualism, opportunity, and citizenship, nationalism, etc. Like any other complex of beliefs and practices, "whiteness" is imbedded in a highly articulated social structure and system of significations; rather than trying to repudiate it, we shall have to rearticulate it.

That sounds like a daunting task, and of course it is, but it is not nearly as impossible as erasing whiteness altogether, as the abolitionist project seeks to do. Furthermore, because whiteness is a relational concept, unintelligible without reference to nonwhiteness -- note how this is true even of Roediger's formulation about "build[ing] an identity based on what one isn't" -- that rearticulation (or reinterpretation, or deconstruction) of whiteness can begin relatively easily, in the messy present, with the recognition that whiteness already contains substantial nonwhite elements. Of course, that recognition is only the beginning of a large and arduous process of political labor, which I shall address in the concluding section of this paper.

Notwithstanding these criticisms of the abolitionist project, we consider many of its insights to be vital components in the process of reformulating, or synthesizing, a progressive approach to whiteness. Its attention is directed toward prescisely the place where the neo-liberal racial project is weak: the point at which white identity constitutes a crucial support to white supremacy, and a central obstacle to the achievement of substantive social equality and racial justice.

CONCLUDING NOTES: WHITENESS AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

In a situation of racial dualism, as Du Bois observed more than¶ 90 years ago, race operates both to assign us and to deny us our¶ identity. It both makes the social world intelligible, and¶ simultaneously renders it opaque and mysterious. Not only does¶ it allocate resources, power, and privilege; it also provides¶ means for challenging that allocation. The contradictory¶ character of race provides the context in which racial dualism --¶ or the "color-line," as Du Bois designated it, has developed as¶ "the problem of the 20th century."

So what's new? Only that, as a result of incalculable human¶ effort, suffering, and sacrifice, we now realize that these¶ truths apply across the board. Whites and whiteness can no¶ longer be exempted from the comprehensive racialization process¶ that is the hallmark of US history and social structure.

This is the present-day context for racial conflict and thus for¶ US politics in general, since race continues to play its¶ designated role of crystallizing all the fundamental issues in US¶ society. As always, we articulate our anxieties in racial terms:¶ wealth and poverty, crime and punishment, gender and sexuality,¶ nationality and citizenship, culture and power, are all¶ articulated in the US primarily through race.

So what's new? It's the problematic of whiteness that has¶ emerged as the principal source of anxiety and conflict in the¶ postwar US. Although this situation was anticipated or¶ prefigured at earlier moments in the nation's past -- for¶ example, in the "hour of eugenics" (Stepan 1991, Kevles 1985,¶ Gould 1981) -- it is far more complicated now than ever before,¶ largely due to the present unavailability of biologistic forms of¶ racism as a convenient rationale for white supremacy.[7]

Whiteness -- visible whiteness, resurgent whiteness, whiteness as¶ a color, whiteness as difference -- this is what's new, and newly¶ problematic, in contemporary US politics. The reasons for this¶ have already emerged in my discussion of the spectrum of racial¶ projects and the particular representations these projects assign¶ to whiteness. Most centrally, the problem of the meaning of¶ whiteness appears as a direct consequence of the movement¶ challenge posed in the 1960s to white supremacy. The battles of¶ that period have not been resolved; they have not been won or¶ lost; however battered and bruised, the demand for substantive¶ racial equality and general social justice still lives. And¶ while it lives, the strength of white supremacy is in doubt.

The racial projects of the right are clear efforts to resist the¶ challenge to white supremacy posed by the movements of the 1960s¶ and their contemporary inheritors. Each of these projects has a¶ particular relationship to the white supremacist legacy, ranging¶ from the far right's efforts to justify and solidify white¶ entitlements, through the new right's attempts to utilize the¶ white supremacist tradition for more immediate and expedient¶ political ends, to the neoconservative project's quixotic quest¶ to surgically separate the liberal democratic tradition from the¶ racism that traditionally underwrote it. The biologistic racism¶ of the far right, the expedient and subtextual racism of the new¶ right, and the bad-faith anti-racism of the neoconservatives have¶ many differences from each other, but they have at least one¶ thing in common. They all seek to maintain the long-standing¶ association between whiteness and US political traditions,¶ between whiteness and US nationalism, between whiteness and¶ universalism. They all seek in different ways to preserve white¶ identity from the particularity, the difference, which the 1960s¶ movement challenge assigned to it.

The racial projects of the left are the movements' successors (as¶ is neoconservatism, in a somewhat perverse sense). Both the¶ neoliberal racial project and the abolitionist project seek to¶ fulfill the movement's thwarted dreams of a genuinely (i.e.,¶ substantively) egalitarian society, one in which significant¶ redistribution of wealth and power has taken place, and race no¶ longer serves as the most significant marker between winners and¶ losers, haves and have nots, powerful and powerless. Although¶ they diverge significantly -- since the neoliberals seek to¶ accomplish their ends through a conscious diminution of the¶ significance of race, and the abolitionists hope to achieve¶ similar ends through a conscious reemphasizing of the importance¶ of race -- they also have one very important thing in common. ¶ They both seek to rupture the barrier between whites and¶ racially-defined minorities, the obstacle which prevents joint¶ political action. They both seek to associate whites and¶ nonwhites, to reinterpret the meaning of whiteness in such a way¶ that it no longer has the power to impede class alliances.

Although the differences and indeed the hostility -- between the¶ neoliberal and abolitionist projects, between the reform-oriented¶ and radical conceptions of whiteness -- are quite severe, we¶ consider it vital that adherents of each project recognize that¶ they hold part of the key to challenging white supremacy in the¶ contemporary US, and that their counterpart project holds the¶ other part of the key. Neoliberals rightfully argue that a¶ pragmatic approach to transracial politics is vital if the¶ momentum of racial reaction is to be halted or reversed. ¶ Abolitionists properly emphasize challenging the ongoing¶ commitment to white supremacy on the part of many whites.

Both of these positions need to draw on each other, not only in¶ strategic terms, but in theoretical ones as well. The¶ recognition that racial identities -- all racial identities,¶ including whiteness -- have become

implacably dualistic, could be far more liberating on the left than it has thus far been. For neoliberals, it could permit and indeed justify an acceptance of race-consciousness and even nationalism among racially-defined minorities as a necessary but partial response to disenfranchisement, disempowerment, and superexploitation. There is no inherent reason why such a political position could not coexist with a strategic awareness of the need for strong, class-conscious, transracial coalitions. We have seen many such examples in the past: in the anti-slavery movement, the communist movement of the 1930s (Kelley 1994), and in the 1988 presidential bid of Jesse Jackson, to name but a few. This is not to say that all would be peace and harmony if such alliances could come more permanently into being. But there is no excuse for not attempting to find the pragmatic "common ground" necessary to create them.

Abolitionists could also benefit from a recognition that on a pragmatic basis, whites can ally with racially-defined minorities without renouncing their whiteness. If they truly agree that race is a socially constructed concept, as they claim, abolitionists should also be able to recognize that **racial identities are not either-or matters, not closed concepts** that must be upheld in a reactionary fashion or disavowed in a comprehensive act of renunciation. To use a postmodern language I dislike: **racial identities are deeply "hybridized"**; they are not "sutured," but remain open to rearticulation. "To be white in America is to be very black. If you don't know how black you are, you don't know how American you are" (Thompson 1995, 429).

EXTN – Implementation Details Key

Vague alts fail – utopianism doesn't hit the ground.
Farber, City University of New York Brooklyn College political science professor, 9-13-12

[Samuel, "Occupy Wall Street and the Art of Demanding" http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/11507-occupy-wall-street-and-the-art-of-demanding]

The OWS reluctance to formulate demands might have been beneficial initially in that it might have created a more welcoming atmosphere to newly radicalized people. But as movements develop and mature, they need to state more clearly what they stands for and not only what they stand against. Movements need to develop some kind of theory to guide their actions, not as an obscure, technical body of thought only accessible to the select few, but as the clearest possible ideas about the nature of the enemy and of the movement. Movements must address the problems they are likely to confront as they go from point A – where they are – to point B – where they want to be.

Concrete alts are key – either the perm solves OR the alt does nothing.
Bryant, Collin College philosophy professor, 2012

[Levi, "Critique of the Academic Left" http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/]

The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we're always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an "onto-cartography"). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It's good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I'm reminded by the "underpants gnomes" depicted in South Park:¶The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶Phase 2: ?¶Phase 3: Profit!¶They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶Well this is sadly how it

often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶Phase 2: ?¶Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD's in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don't have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? **If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn't make a sound!** Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don't embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of "revolutionary" is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶But this isn't where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with

party systems (there's a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We're not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren't proposing real plans? But we haven't even gotten to that point. Instead we're like underpants gnomes, saying "revolution is the answer!" without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. **Masturbation**.¶ "Underpants gnome" deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn't important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We're intoxicated with critique because it's easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

Structures Not Individuals

The law is problematic but it is a lived reality – there is nothing outside of it - the only effective method is redeploying institutional logic against contradictions.
Crenshaw, University of California Los Angeles law professor, 1988

[Kimberle, Harvard law review, "RACE, REFORM, AND RETRENCHMENT: TRANSFORMATION AND LEGITIMATION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW"
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1341398.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true, JSTOR, p.1366-8]

<u>The Critics' product is of limited utility to Blacks in its present form</u>. The implications for Blacks of trashing liberal legal ideology are troubling, even though it may be proper to assail belief structures that obscure liberating possibilities. Trashing legal ideology seems to tell us repeatedly what has already been established -- that legal discourse is unstable and relatively indeterminate. Furthermore, <u>trashing offers no idea of how to avoid the negative consequences of engaging in reformist discourse or how to work around such consequences</u>. Even if we imagine the wrong world when we think in terms of legal discourse, **we** must nevertheless **exist in a present world where legal protection has at times been a blessing -- albeit a mixed one**. The fundamental problem is that, <u>although Critics criticize law because it functions to legitimate existing institutional arrangements, it is precisely this legitimating function that has made law receptive to certain demands in this area</u>.

The Critical emphasis on deconstruction as the vehicle for liberation leads to the conclusion that engaging in legal discourse should be avoided because it reinforces not only the discourse itself but also the society and the world that it embodies. Yet Critics offer little beyond this observation. Their focus on <u>delegitimating rights rhetoric seems to suggest that, once rights rhetoric has been discarded, there exists a more productive strategy for change, one which does not reinforce existing patterns of domination.</u>

<u>Unfortunately, no such strategy has yet been articulated, and it is difficult to imagine that racial minorities will ever be able to discover one.</u> As Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward point out in their [*1367] excellent account of the civil rights movement, popular struggles are a reflection of institutionally determined logic and a challenge to that logic. 137 **People can only demand change in ways that reflect the logic of the institutions that they are challenging. 138 Demands for change that do not reflect the institutional logic** -- that is, demands that do not engage and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology -- **will probably be ineffective**. 139

The possibility for ideological change is created through the very process of legitimation, which is triggered by crisis. <u>Powerless people can</u> sometimes <u>trigger</u> such a <u>crisis by challenging an institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it. 140 Such crisis occurs when powerless people force open and politicize a contradiction between the dominant ideology and their reality. The political consequences [*1368] of maintaining the **contradictions may sometimes force an adjustment** -- an attempt to close the gap or to make things appear fair. 141 Yet, because the adjustment is triggered by the political consequences of the contradiction, circumstances will be adjusted only to the extent necessary to close the apparent contradiction</u>.

This approach to understanding legitimation and change is applicable to the civil rights movement. Because Blacks were challenging their exclusion from political society, the only claims that were likely to achieve recognition were those that reflected American society's institutional logic: legal rights ideology. Articulating their formal demands through legal rights ideology, civil rights protestors exposed a series of contradictions -- the most important being the promised privileges of American citizenship and the practice of absolute racial subordination. <u>Rather than using the contradictions to suggest that American citizenship was itself illegitimate or false, civil rights protestors proceeded as if American citizenship were real, and demanded to exercise the "rights" that citizenship entailed. By seeking to restructure reality to reflect American mythology, Blacks</u>

relied upon and ultimately benefited from politically inspired efforts to resolve the contradictions by granting formal rights. Although it is the need to maintain legitimacy that presents powerless groups with the opportunity to wrest concessions from the dominant order, it is the very accomplishment of legitimacy that forecloses greater possibilities. In sum, **the potential for change is both created and limited by legitimation**.

Institutional macropolitical policy engagement is vital to solve – any alternative results in failure to actualize change, cooption, and moot activism
Lobel, University of San Diego assistant law professor, 2007

[Orly, Harvard law review, "THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM: CRITICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS" http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/lobel.pdf, p.983-7]

Both the **practical failures and** the **fallacy of rigid boundaries** generated by extralegal activism rhetoric permit us to broaden our inquiry to the underlying assumptions of current proposals regarding transformative politics — that is, attempts to produce meaningful changes in the political and socioeconomic landscapes. The suggested alternatives produce a new image of social and political action. This vision rejects a shared theory of social reform, rejects formal programmatic agendas, and embraces a multiplicity of forms and practices. Thus, it is described in such terms as a plan of no plan,211 "a project of pro-jects,"212 "anti-theory theory,"213 politics rather than goals,214 presence rather than power,215 "practice over theory,"216 and chaos and openness over order and formality. As a result, the contemporary message rarely includes a comprehensive vision of common social claims, but rather engages in the description of fragmented efforts. As Professor Joel Handler argues, the commonality of struggle and social vision that existed during the civil rights movement has disappeared.217 **There is no unifying discourse or set of values**, but rather an aversion to any metanarrative and a resignation from theory. Professor Handler warns that this move away from grand narratives is **self-defeating** precisely because only certain parts of the political spectrum have accepted this new stance: "[T]he opposition is not playing that game . . . . [E]veryone else is operating as if there were Grand Narratives . . . ."218 Intertwined with the resignation from law and policy, the new bromide of "neither left nor right" has become axiomatic only for some.219 The contemporary critical legal consciousness informs the scholarship of those who are interested in progressive social activism, but less so that of those who are interested, for example, in a more competitive securities market. Indeed, an interesting recent development has been the rise of "conservative public interest lawyer[ing]."220 Although "public interest law" was originally associated exclusively with liberal projects, in the past three decades conservative advocacy groups have rapidly grown both in number and in their vigorous use of traditional legal strategies to promote their causes.221 This growth in conservative ad-vocacy is particularly salient in juxtaposition to the decline of traditional progressive advocacy. Most recently, some thinkers have even suggested that there may be "something inherent in the left's conception of social change — focused as it is on participation and empowerment — that produces a unique distrust of legal expertise."222

Once again, this conclusion reveals flaws parallel to the original disenchantment with legal reform. Although the new extralegal frames present themselves as apt alternatives to legal reform models and as capable of producing significant changes to the social map, in practice they generate very limited improvement in existing social arrangements. Most strikingly, the cooptation effect here can be explained in terms of the most profound risk of the typology — that of legitimation. The common pattern of extralegal scholarship is to describe an inherent instability in dominant structures by pointing, for example, to grassroots strategies,223 and then to assume that specific instances of counterhegemonic activities translate into a more complete transformation. This celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems to rely on an aggregate approach — an idea that the

multiplication of practices will evolve into something substantial. In fact**, the myth of engagement obscures the actual lack of change being produced**, while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social reform produces a false belief in the potential of change**. There are few instances of meaningful reordering of social and economic arrangements and macro-redistribution**. Scholars write about decoding what is really happening, as though the scholarly narrative has the power to unpack more than the actual conventional experience will admit.224 Unrelated efforts become related and part of a whole through mere reframing. At the same time, **the elephant in the room** — the rising level of economic inequality — **is left unaddressed** and comes to be understood as natural and inevitable.225 This is precisely the problematic process that critical theorists decry as losers' self-mystification, through which marginalized groups come to see systemic losses as the product of their own actions and thereby begin to focus on minor achievements as representing the boundaries of their willed reality.

The explorations of micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and the prescriptive. The manifestations of extralegal activism — the law and organizing model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate nongovernmental sphere of action — all **produce a fantasy** that change can be brought about through small-scale, decentralized transformation. The emphasis is local, but the locality is described as a microcosm of the whole and the audience is national and global. In the context of the humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies from the 1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter including works on American cities and neighborhoods in trouble.226 The aspiration of these genres was that each individual story could translate into a "time of the nation" body of knowledge and motivation.227 In contemporary legal thought, a corresponding gap opens between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality, although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-state-national federations have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline.228 There is, therefore, an absence of links between the local and the national, an absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed "the missing middle" by Professor Theda Skocpol.229 New social movements have for the most part failed in sustaining coalitions or producing significant institutional change through grassroots activism. Professor Handler concludes that this failure is due in part to the ideas of contingency, pluralism, and localism that are so embedded in current activism.230 Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive debate?

It is important for next-generation progressive legal scholars, while maintaining a critical legal consciousness, to recognize that **not all extralegal associational life is transformative**. We must differentiate, for example, between inward-looking groups, which tend to be self-regarding and depoliticized, and social movements that participate in political activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge and reform existing realities.231 We must differentiate between professional associations and more inclusive forms of institutions that act as trustees for larger segments of the community.232 As described above, extralegal activism tends to operate on a more divided and hence a smaller scale than earlier social movements, which had national reform agendas. Consequently, within critical discourse there is a need to recognize the limited capacity of small-scale action. We should question the narrative that imagines consciousness-raising as directly translating into action and action as directly translating into change. **Certainly not every cultural description is political**. Indeed, it is questionable whether forms of activism that are opposed to programmatic reconstruction of a social agenda should even be understood as social movements. In fact, when groups are situated in opposition to any form of institutionalized power, they may be simply mirroring what they are fighting against and merely producing **moot activism** that settles for what seems possible within the narrow space that is left in a rising convergence of ideologies. **The original vision is consequently coopted**, and contemporary discontent is legitimated through a process of self-mystification.

Local resistance to power is not enough – a focus on structures that produce privilege is more important.
Darcy, Huron University College philosophy professor, 2014

[Steve, "The Rise of the Post-New Left Political Vocabulary" publicautonomy.org/2014/01/27/the-rise-of-the-post-new-left-political-vocabulary/]

Second, however, it is also true that <u>the series of shifts from the old vocabulary to the new one has entailed certain losses</u>. In particular, the relative de-emphasizing of system-level causation, in favour of a new <u>emphasis on the importance of individual action or inaction, tends to weaken the integration of everyday Left discourse with the theoretical analysis of systems like capitalism and colonialism</u>. It is true that, in exchange, <u>we have a vocabulary that better enables us to focus on class privilege and settler privilege. But if we are to defeat colonialism and capitalism, we cannot do so one person at a time, or one interaction or relationship at a time. The systems themselves have to be named, understood, attacked and overthrown.</u> This issue is, obviously, closely connected to the loss of a focus on liberation. <u>A liberation focus and a systems focus share a common understanding: that the purpose of the Left is to defeat systems of exploitation and oppression.</u> **Challenging immediate impacts is important, but not enough. It is necessary, but by no means sufficient.** Moreover, <u>the way we challenge everyday impacts should be informed by our understanding that they are not produced simply by individual actions, but by the operation of large-scale systems</u>. The Left needs a vocabulary, and a self-understanding, that highlights and foregrounds the importance of constructing and expanding anti-systemic movements that aim to defeat systems of oppressive and exploitative power. It is hard not to think that the older vocabulary better expresses this insight, even as it obstructs our access to other critical insights that are also indispensable. One could certainly say more about the gains and losses associated with adopting either of these two vocabularies. But perhaps it is enough, in the context of a blog post, to have sketched an approach to thinking about the question. Both vocabularies have been formed to address indispensably important concerns, so we should be reluctant to give up on either one. The most important thing, I would suggest, is to refuse to allow either of these two ways speaking, writing and thinking about Left activism to evade the challenge raised by its counterpart. Personally, I would be reluctant to give up an expression like, 'the people,' and to take up 'folks' in its place. But I hope that the way I talk about the people is disciplined by a certain amount of sensitivity to the motivation that has led some activists to drop it from their vocabulary. On the other hand, <u>I hope that people who have embraced the newer way of articulating Left politics will</u> (<u>begin to</u>, or continue to) <u>see the importance of highlighting issues of system dynamics, large-scale alliance-building, and ultimate liberation, rather than letting these urgently important matters disappear from view entirely</u>.

Structures are more important than individuals in terms of locuses of oppression.
Smith, University of California Riverside cultural studies professor, 12-13-13

[Andrea, "The Problem with Privilege" http://andrea366.wordpress.com/author/andrea366/]

<u>The politics of privilege have made the important contribution of signaling how the structures of oppression constitute who we are as persons</u>. However, <u>as the rituals of confessing privilege have evolved, they have shifted our focus from building social movements for global transformation to individual self-improvement. Furthermore, they rest on a white supremacist/colonialist notion of a subject that can constitute itself over and against others through self-reflexivity. While trying to keep the key insight made in activist/academic circles that personal and social transformation are interconnected, alternative projects have developed that focus less on privilege and more the structures that create privilege</u>. These new models do not hold the "answer," because the genealogy of the politics of privilege also demonstrates that our activist/intellectual projects of liberation must be

constantly changing. Our imaginations are limited by white supremacy, settler colonialism, etc., so all ideas we have will not be "perfect."   The ideas we develop today also do not have to be based on the complete disavowal of what we did yesterday because what we did yesterday teaches what we might do tomorrow.   Thus, as we think not only beyond privilege, but beyond the sense of self that claims privilege, we open ourselves to new possibilities that we cannot imagine now for the future.

Structures key.
Tonn, University of Maryland communication professor, 2005

[Mari Boor, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3, "Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public" Project Muse]

Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed by therapy also **enables political inaction** in two respects. First, an **open-ended process** lacking mechanisms for closure **thwarts progress toward resolution.** As Freeman writes of consciousness raising, an unstructured, informal discussion [End Page 418] "leaves people with no place to go and the lack of structure leaves them with no way of getting there."70 Second, the therapeutic impulse to emphasize the self as both problem and solution **ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency.** "Therapy," Cloud argues, "offers consolation rather than compensation, **individual adaptation rather than social change,** and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its **isolation from structural critique and collective action.**" Public discourse emphasizing healing and coping, she claims, "locates blame and responsibility for solutions **in the private sphere.**"71¶ Clinton's Conversation on Race not only exemplified the frequent wedding of public dialogue and therapeutic themes but also illustrated the **failure of a conversation-as-counseling model to achieve meaningful social reform.** In his speech inaugurating the initiative, Clinton said, "Basing our self-esteem on the ability to look down on others is not the American way . . . Honest dialogue will not be easy at first . . . Emotions may be rubbed raw, but we must begin." Tempering his stated goal of "concrete solutions" was the caveat that "power cannot compel" racial "community," which "can come only from the human spirit."72¶ Following the president's cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens chiefly aired personal experiences and perspectives during the various community dialogues. In keeping with their talk-show formats, the forums showcased what Orlando Patterson described as "performative 'race' talk," "public speech acts" of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even apology, in short, performances of "self" that **left little room for productive public argument.**73 Such **personal evidence overshadowed the "facts" and "realities"** Clinton also had promised to explore, including, for example, statistics on **discrimination patterns** in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on **cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence.**¶ Whereas Clinton had encouraged "honest dialogue" in the name of "responsibility" and "community," Burke argues that "The Cathartic Principle" often produces the reverse. "[C]onfessional," he writes, "contains in itself a kind of 'personal irresponsibility,' as we may even **relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling the public medium.**" More to the point, "a thoroughly 'confessional' art may enact a kind of **'individual salvation at the expense of the group,'** performing **a "sinister function**, from the standpoint of overall-social necessities."74 Frustrated observers of the racial dialogue—many of them African Americans—echoed Burke's concerns. Patterson, for example, noted, "when a young Euro-American woman spent nearly five minutes of our 'conversation' in Martha's Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her racial insensitivities, she was directly unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling. **There was nothing to argue about.**"75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z. Jackson invoked the game metaphor communication theorists often link to [End Page 419] skills in conversation,76 voicing suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments that included neither exhaustive **racial data nor concrete goals.** "The game," wrote Jackson, **"is to get 'rid' of responsibility for racism while doing nothing to solve it."**77

Individuals fail.

Tonn, University of Maryland communication professor, 2005

[Mari Boor, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3, "Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public" Project Muse]

Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational, personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction. Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression. As Schudson puts it, **"Conversation has no end outside itself."** 39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can **discourage** a search for political solutions to public problems by casting **cathartic talk as sufficient remedy.** As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement points out, **"[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal**, and **analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling** . . . Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only the very limited realm of therapeutic, small group interaction."40¶ Finally, and related, a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual, the "self-help" on which much therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, **provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems** such as disproportionate black [End Page 412] poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims, all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to "heal" themselves.

AT: Color-blindness

Even if they win a link, that doesn't warrant rejection.
Winant, University of California Santa Clara sociology professor, 1997

[Howard, New Left Review, "Behind Blue Eyes: Contemporary White Racial Politics" http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/winant/whitness.html]

THE NEOLIBERAL RACIAL PROJECT: Neoliberal discourse seeks to limit white advantages through denial of racial difference. The overlap with neoconservatism is, of course, hardly accidental. Yet **there are significant differences** in political orientation between the two projects.

Neoliberalism recognizes the cross-cutting and competitive dynamics of race- and class-based forms of subordination in the post-industrial, post-civil rights era. It seeks systematically to narrow the differences which divide working and middle-class people as a strategy for improving the "life-chances" of minorities, who are disproportionately poor. It thus attempts to appeal to whites with arguments about the medium- and long-term consequences upon their living standards of downward mobility and greater impoverishment of nonwhites. The neoliberal racial project can thus be described as social democratic, focused on social structure (as opposed to cultural representation a la the various right-wing racial projects), and somewhat class reductionist in its approach to race.

The most effective, as well as controversial, spokesperson for the neoliberal racial project has undoubtedly been William Julius Wilson. In a series of prominent scholarly works and political interventions, Wilson has argued for the use of class-based criteria (and consequently, against the use of racial logics) in formulating social policy aimed at achieving greater substantive equality in US society. He has contended that this reorientation of social policy priorities is both better suited to the contemporary dynamics of capitalist development, and that it is politically strategic in ways that explicit racially oriented policies are not.

While Wilson does not dismiss the effects of historical racial discrimination, he argues that since the late 1960s capital has been "color-blind," and that consequently the large-scale demographic, economic, and political changes which have negatively affected the ghettos and barrios do not have their origins in racial discrimination. Therefore, "group-specific" policies such as affirmative action in all its incarnations, cannot improve the situation experienced by the African-American "underclass." Wilson thus calls for "universal programs," rather than group-targeted ones, to halt the deterioration of inner-city communities, arguing that such measures will disproportionately help the minority poor:

The hidden agenda is to improve the life chances of groups such as the ghetto underclass by emphasizing programs to which the more advantaged groups of all races can positively relate (Wilson 1987, 120).

This "hidden agenda," of course, justifies a pragmatic attempt to woo white, middle-class voters. Their needs -- for more and better jobs, access to education and health care, and reductions in drug trafficking and crime -- can be linked to those of the minority poor if the "wedge issue" of race can be blunted. To this end Wilson has urged political actors (notably President Clinton, whom he has served as an advisor) to create "biracial coalitions" by promoting programs which unite, as opposed to divide, racial minorities (particularly blacks) and whites. [I]f the message emphasizes issues and programs that concern the families of all racial and ethnic groups, whites will see their mutual interests and join in a coalition with minorities to elect a progressive candidate (Wilson, 1992; A15).

A similar argument has been proposed by Michael Lind, who argues that ...the American elites that subsidize and staff both the Republican and the Democratic parties have steadfastly waged a generation-long class war against the middle and working classes (Lind 1995a, 35), using race, as well as other divisions, to achieve unprecedented levels of power and concentrated wealth. Affirmative action, and other race-based initiatives aimed at achieving greater substantive social equality, only contribute, according to Lind, to the effectiveness of the "overclass's" divide-and-conquer strategy:

...the overclass shores up its defense against genuinely representative democracy (i.e., a popular coalition uniting middle-class and working-class Americans of all races and regions) by adopting a strategy of divide and rule expressed in the language of multiculturalism.... Unified along the lines of economic interest, the wealthy American minority hold the fragmented majority at bay by pitting blacks against whites in

zero-sum struggles for government patronage and by bribing potential black and Hispanic leaders, who might otherwise propose something other than rhetorical rebellion, with the gifts of affirmative action (Lind 1995a, 44).

Both Wilson and Lind call for a nationalism of the left, a populist alliance of the have-nots, regardless of race, against the haves. Lind's version is perhaps more radical and certainly more explicitly nationalist: he proposes specific measures to tax corporate flight, restrict immigration, and establish a "common high-wage trading bloc." Like Wilson, he proposes to eliminate affirmative action, which he would replace with a ...transracial America..., [where] a color-blind, gender neutral regime of individual rights would be combined with government activism promoting a high degree of substantive social and economic equality (Lind 1995b, PAGE?).

Wilson's proposals, though more circumspect, conform in all their essentials to this perspective. He too identifies deindustrialization and the continuing influx of new migrants to the depressed cities as key sources of ghetto and barrio poverty; he too calls for government activism in support of a high-wage economy and tight labor market, as the recipe for achieving substantive, transracial social justice.

The neoliberal project actively promotes a pragmatic vision of greater substantive equality, linking class and race, and arguing for the necessity of transracial coalition politics. These themes **seem to us worthy of support**, and receive more discussion below in this essay's concluding section.

For the present I wish simply to register some uneasiness with the neoliberal project in respect to its treatment of race. Most specifically, I question the argument that race-specific policies should receive less attention in a progressive political agenda (Wilson 1987, 10-12). Despite protestations that the neoliberal approach is more hardheaded, more willing to face up to the difficult questions of "the rise of social pathologies in the ghetto," it is also noteworthy that the neoliberal project tends to deny, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, the ongoing relevance of white supremacy to ghetto and barrio poverty. It tends to deemphasize the "dirty little secret" of continued racial hostility, segregation, and discrimination of all sorts.

Powerful as some of Wilson's, Lind's, and others' arguments are, they do not succeed in demonstrating the demise of racism or white privilege. They largely fail to recognize the ongoing racial dualism that prevails in the contemporary period, perceiving post-civil rights era conflicts between whites and racially-defined minorities merely as strategic problems, and paying less attention to the deep-seated structural racial conflicts endemic to US society.

This weakness is more noticeable in some areas than others, for example in respect to residential segregation or criminal justice issues, which simply cannot be understood as outcomes of "color-blind" capitalist development imperatives or deindustrialization, and are certainly not the product of affirmative action. Rather, the imperviousness of these problems to political reform testifies to the continuing viability of old-fashioned white supremacy, and to the competitive advantages whiteness still has to offer.

What drops out of the neoliberal project, then, is precisely the cultural and moral dimensions of white supremacy. The neoliberal project does not challenge whites on their willingness to receive a "psychological wage," which amounts to a tangible benefit acquired at the expense of nonwhites (Du Bois 1977 [1935], Roediger 1991, Harris 1993). Indeed, the neoliberal project does not challenge whites to abjure the real wage subsidies, the artificially low unemployment rates, or the host of other material benefits they receive in virtue of their whiteness (Lipsitz 1995).

Nevertheless, the neoliberal project does undertake a crucial task: the construction of a transracial political agenda, and the articulation of white and minority interests in a viable strategic perspective. This is something which has been missing from the US political scene since the enactment of civil rights legislation thirty years ago.

AT: Reformism Fails

Sweeping reformism K is wrong. Increases oppression through isolation.
Hahnel, American University economics professor, 2005

[Robin, "Fighting For Reforms Without Becoming Reformist" http://zcomm.org/znetarticle/fighting-for-reforms-without-becoming-reformist-by-robin-hahnel/]

What To Avoid¶ ¶ We need look no further than to the history of twentieth century social democracy to see how fighting for reforms can make a movement reformist. Social democrats began the twentieth century determined to replace capitalism with socialism — which they understood to be a system of equitable cooperation based on democratic planning by workers, consumers, and citizens. Long before the century was over social democratic parties and movements throughout the world had renounced the necessity of replacing private enterprise and markets with fundamentally different economic institutions, and pledged themselves only to pursue reforms geared toward making a system based on competition and greed which they accepted as inevitable more humane. As a result social democrats were doomed to grappled with two dilemmas: (1) What to do when leaving the system intact makes it impossible to further promote economic justice and democracy, much less environmental sustainability. (2) What to do when further reforms destabilize a system one has agreed to accept while the system constantly threatens to undermine hard won gains. Social democrats struggled unsuccessfully with these dilemmas, all too often abandoning important components of economic justice and democracy and denouncing political tendencies to their left whose programs they considered politically or economically destabilizing.¶ ¶ We need look no further than to the history of twentieth century libertarian socialism to see how failing to embrace reform struggles can isolate a movement and make it irrelevant. The principle failure of libertarian socialists during the twentieth century was their inability to understand the necessity and importance of reform organizing. When it turned out that anti-capitalist uprisings were few and far between, and libertarian socialists proved incapable of sustaining the few that did occur early in the twentieth century, their reticence to throw themselves into reform campaigns, and ineptness when they did, doomed libertarian socialists to more than a half century of decline after their devastating defeat during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. What too many libertarian socialists failed to realize was that any transition to a democratic and equitable economy has no choice but to pass through reform campaigns, organizations, and institutions however tainted and corrupting they may be. The new left tried to exorcise the dilemma that reform work is necessary but corrupting with the concept of non-reformist reforms. According to this theory the solution to the dilemma was for activists to work on non-reformist reforms, i.e. reforms that improve people's lives while undermining the material, social, or ideological underpinnings of the capitalist system. There is nothing wrong with the notion of winning reforms while undermining capitalism. As a matter of fact, that is a concise description of pecisely what we must be about! What was misleading was the notion that there are particular reforms that are like silver bullets and accomplish this because of something special about the nature of those reforms themselves.¶ ¶ The Myth of the Non-Reformist Reform¶ ¶ There is no such thing as a non-reformist reform. Social democrats and libertarian socialists did not err because they somehow failed to find and campaign for this miraculous kind of reform. Nor would new leftists prove successful where others had failed before them because new leftists found a special kind of reform different from those social democrats championed and libertarian socialists shied away from. Some reforms improve peoples lives more, and some less. Some reforms are easier to win, and some are harder to win. Some reforms are easier to defend, and some are less so. And of course, different reforms benefit different groups of people. Those are ways reforms, themselves, differ. On the other hand, there are also crucial differences in how reforms are fought for. Reforms can be fought for by reformers preaching the virtues of capitalism. Or reforms can be fought for by anti-capitalists pointing out that only by replacing capitalism will it be possible to fully achieve what reformers want. Reforms can be fought for while leaving institutions of repression intact. Or a reform struggle can at least weaken repressive institutions, if not destroy them. Reforms can be fought for by hierarchical organizations that reinforce authoritarian, racist, and sexist dynamics and thereby weaken the overall movement for progressive change. Or reforms can be fought for by democratic organizations that uproot counter productive patterns of behavior and empower people to become masters and mistresses of their fates. Reforms can be fought for in ways that leave no new organizations or institutions in their aftermath. Or reforms can be fought for in ways that create new organizations and institutions that fortify progressive forces in the next battle. Reforms can be fought for through alliances that obstruct possibilities for further gains. Or the alliances forged to win a reform can establish the basis for winning more reforms. Reforms can be fought for in ways that provide tempting possibilities for participants, and particularly leaders, to take unfair personal advantage of group success. Or they can be fought for in ways that minimize

the likelihood of corrupting influences. Finally, reform organizing can be the entire program of organizations and movements. Or, recognizing that reform organizing within capitalism is prone to weaken the personal and political resolve of participants to pursue a full system of equitable cooperation, reform work can be combined with other kinds of activities, programs, and institutions that rejuvenate the battle weary and prevent burn out and sell out.¶ ¶ In sum, any reform can be fought for in ways that diminish the chances of further gains and limit progressive change in other areas, or fought for in ways that make further progress more likely and facilitate other progressive changes as well. But if reforms are successful they will make capitalism less harmful to some extent. There is no way around this, and even if there were such a thing as a non-reformist reform, it would not change this fact. However, the fact that every reform success makes capitalism less harmful does not mean successful reforms necessarily prolong the life of capitalism — although it might, and this is something anti-capitalists must simply learn to accept. But if winning a reform further empowers the reformers, and whets their appetite for more democracy, more economic justice, and more environmental protection than capitalism can provide, it can hasten the fall of capitalism.¶ ¶ In any case, it turns out we are a more cautious and social species than twentieth century libertarian socialists realized. And it turns out that capitalism is far more resilient than libertarian socialists expected it to be. More than a half century of libertarian socialist failures belie the myth that it is possible for social revolutionaries committed to democracy to eschew reform work without becoming socially isolated. Avoidance of participation in reform work is simply not a viable option and only guarantees defeat for any who opt out. Moreover, no miraculous non-reformist reform is going to come riding to our rescue. Though many twentieth century libertarian socialists failed to realize it, their only hope was to throw themselves wholeheartedly into reform struggles while searching for ways to minimize the corrupting pressures that inevitably are brought to bear on them as a result.

AT: Can't Use the Master's Tools

Working from within the system can produce change. Proves solvency and addresses K of civil society.

James, University of North Carolina Charlotte philosophy professor, 2009

[Robin, Hypatia Volume 24, Issue 2, "Autonomy, Universality, and Playing the Guitar: On the Politics and Aesthetics of Contemporary Feminist Deployments of the "Master's Tools"" Wiley]

Norma Coates expresses here an ethical and aesthetic quandary we might term a "feminist guilty pleasure": liking something one knows one just shouldn't like, since one considers its politics problematic, if not disgusting. Why would an avowed feminist like this clearly misogynistic work? How can one have an aesthetic taste for something that is politically disgusting? This is not a new question by any means, but it is still a contested one. Indeed, Audre Lorde has famously argued that the "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house," just as Laura Mulvey has equally famously called for the necessity for feminists to abandon mainstream cinematic pleasure as coercive (Mulvey 1975; Lorde 1983). I contend, however, that we should not be too quick to dismiss either the "master's tools" or some of the "pleasures" we might experience from them. Indeed, when appropriately hacked, the master's tools in certain situations and under certain criteria might even be very effective tools for feminist, anti-racist work.¶Examining two cases—one political, one aesthetic—from the perspective of non-ideal theory, I will demonstrate concrete instances in which multiply-underprivileged individuals have utilized, for liberatory ends, the concepts, rhetoric, and methodologies characteristic of what bell hooks terms "the white supremacist capitalist patriarchy."1 Judith Butler's recent appeals for "autonomy" and "universality," and indie-electro artist Peaches's use of conventionally racist and sexist art forms are all instances in which "the master's tools" have been productively reappropriated for progressive ends. I argue that non-ideal theory also helps clarify two conditions that help to distinguish a successful resignification from a hegemonic rearticulation: first, reappropriation is successful when, as Butler argues, the very process of an "outsider's" appropriation of "insider" privilege collapses the insider/outsider or master/marginalized distinction, so the procedure is itself transformative; second, success is achieved in instances where nothing else does quite what the master's tools "do," when nothing is as accessible, effective, affective—or, as in the case of Coates and the Stones, as "sexy"—as mainstream/conventional discourse.

There is no alternative to the master's tools – they are always already working in and through us – reappropriation reverses the dynamic of power.

James, University of North Carolina Charlotte philosophy professor, 2009

[Robin, Hypatia Volume 24, Issue 2, "Autonomy, Universality, and Playing the Guitar: On the Politics and Aesthetics of Contemporary Feminist Deployments of the "Master's Tools"" Wiley]

In its adoption and modification of Foucaultian–Nietzschean genealogy as the preferred philosophical methodology, Judith Butler's work can be seen as itself a form of non-ideal theory. Butler's work relies heavily on Foucault's theory of power, which is itself a non-ideal critique of classical liberal notions of power. Via an examination of historical documents on education, the military, the penal system, and

'the clinic,' Foucault argues that <u>power is not juridical</u> (as liberalism tells us power is/should be<u>), but also normative and disciplinary</u>. That is to say, Foucault examined how power actually worked in real-world institutions, and from this analysis concluded that the liberal story of power qua "repression" was a hegemonic misrepresentation. Butler picks up on this reconceptualization of power as "disciplinary" and "productive," but, more importantly, on Foucault's commitment to genealogical analysis. Asking of a concept "how it plays, what investments it bears, what aims it achieves, what alterations it undergoes" (Butler 2004, 180) does not inquire into the truth of the concept so much as ask about its consequences—that is, how it is mobilized in the real world. <u>Rather than asking what the concept "is,"</u> <u>Butler wants to know what it does, and what meaning(s) it has in a particular situation. Insofar as it</u> <u>inquires into how an idea "works</u>," this is yet another way in which Butler's notion of theory is never far from concrete engagement with praxis—and, accordingly, from a version of non-ideal theorizing. In my reading, <u>Butler utilizes this form of non-ideal theory to argue that since nothing can "do"—that is,</u> <u>function as powerfully or effectively—quite what terms such as "universality" or "autonomy" can do,</u> <u>they can, have been, and must be appropriated by progressive theory and activism.</u>7 <u>When this</u> <u>appropriation is performed by those conventionally excluded by or from that idea</u> (l), <u>Butler claims that</u> <u>the term itself is transformed in its "repetition"; when utilized by the oppressed in this fashion, the</u> <u>"master's tools" are never quite the "master's tools</u>."¶It is this commitment to real-world conditions and consequences, and, indeed, an often pragmatic framework, that leads Butler to embrace the very "ideals" of classical liberalism that her earlier work can be seen as deconstructing and critiquing.8 In Undoing Gender (2004), Butler brings this genealogical methodology to bear on the concept universality—one of those liberal ideals that have, historically, functioned to mask the marginalization of underprivileged groups. Since our present moment of both (post–Post) Modernity and feminism is marked most significantly by issues concerning the global and the multicultural, the notion of "universality" is placed under particular scrutiny. Is "universality" necessarily and inevitably monocultural (the supposedly "universal" norm can be a norm in reference to only one privileged culture); put differently, is "absolute" a necessary co-predicate of "universality," or can there be such a thing as a plural or internally polyphonous universal? Following Paul Gilroy's analysis of the limitations of postmodernism,9 <u>Butler finds the binary opposition of the postmodern privileging of plurality and the</u> <u>modern privileging of unity to be inadequate. Butler's frustration here with both "modernism" and</u> <u>"postmodernism" is that "passions for foundations</u> [in the case of the former] <u>and methods</u> [in the case of the latter] <u>sometimes get in the way of an analysis of contemporary political culture</u>" (Butler 2004, 181). <u>Her commitment is clearly to the concrete world of lived experience, in the sense that foundations</u> <u>and methods are subordinated to, in a sense, utility: "What can this do for me?" seems to be her</u> <u>underlying practical concern</u>. Thus, "[a]lthough many feminists have come to the conclusion that the universal is always a cover for a certain epistemological imperialism, insensitive to cultural texture and difference," Butler argues that "<u>the rhetorical power of claiming universality for rights of sexual</u> <u>autonomy and related rights of sexual orientation within the international human rights domain appears</u> <u>indisputable</u>" (182). <u>In real political contexts such as the United Nations' declarations on the rights of</u> <u>women, the language of "universality" might do what no other language can—thus, it would be</u> <u>advantageous to keep some form of it in play</u>. Accordingly, <u>even though standard liberal norms about</u> <u>universality and autonomy might be empirically inadequate, Butler argues that "we had better be able</u> <u>to use that language to secure legal protections and entitlements</u>" (20; emphasis mine), <u>since,</u> <u>practically, this is the only language institutions of power presently speak.</u>10 <u>Notions such as individual</u> <u>or civil rights do have a strategic value; problems arise, however, "if we take the definitions of who we</u>

are, legally, to be adequate descriptions of what we are about" (20). Political myths such as "universality" or "autonomy" are, as myths, useful, because it makes one intelligible to present structures of power; it must not be forgotten that these are useful fictions, and that problems arise when they are taken as non-fiction. Thus, while "autonomy" as commonly figured in mainstream liberalism is, for Butler, clearly a myth, its political salience therein is cause for resignifying (rather than chucking) the term.¶This is possible, for Butler, only because "universality" has no necessary or inherent function—the meaning of a term derives not from some signifier-signified referential logic, but from consensus … and people can always change their minds and rewrite agreements. Thus, Butler explains that terms such as universality"are never finally and fully tethered to a single use. The task of reappropriation is to illustrate the vulnerability of these often compromised terms to an unexpected progressive possibility" (Butler 2004, 179). Universality can do lots of different things for us, and we can give it lots of different meanings. When we include in the conversation about universality those who historically have been excluded from it, this theoretical/practical exercise itself reconfigures the scope, function, and denotation of the term. "[T]he struggle against those exclusions very often ends up reappropriating those very terms from modernity" (179) via performative resignification.¶For Butler, political and theoretical progress occurs when the master's discourse is not merely expanded to include more people, but is "rearticulated" when "the excluded speak to and from such a category" (Butler 2004, 13). This resignification is performative: in Butler's example, the fact that Fanon writes, that is, assumes a "human" task, "he is in and through the utterance opening up the category to a different future" (13). By "doing" an activity reserved for "humans," a category from which Fanon was excluded, Fanon "undoes" the hegemonic sense of the "human." As Butler puts it, "[t]hose deemed illegible, unrecognizable, or impossible nevertheless speak in the terms of the 'human,' opening up the term to a history not fully constrained by the existing differentials of power" (13–14). When those whose exclusion from the full scope of the "universal" or the "human" speak with reference to and in the name of these very ideals, these terms become something other than what they were originally. Thus, for Butler, one never uses precisely the same "tool" as the master does, for this performative resignification by those whose exclusion from the term renders it consistent doesn't "stretch" the boundaries of the term to make it more inclusive so much as it makes the term do what, in its conventional formulation, is logically impossible. While Mills argues that "it cannot be claimed that from the possibility of the extension of ideal theory to previously excluded populations that this shows the ideal theory is really not exclusionary" (Mills 2004, 177), we can see that this is not Butler's claim at all. For Butler, this reappropriation is transformative and not merely assimilative because "when the unreal lays claim to reality … the norms themselves can become rattled, display their instability, and become open to resignification" (Butler 2004, 27–28). When those excluded from the system suddenly put themselves in it, this challenges the foundations of the system, and produces an imperfect reproduction of its imperative.11¶Butler's notion of autonomy, with its emphasis on interdependence and the necessary commerce across a very unclear boundary between individual and society, has highly significant implications for her call to use the "master's tools." If, as she argues, all agency arises from one's insertion in networks of power relations, then one must be "recognizable" to the "master's" system(s) in order to participate in the working(s) of power in the first place. That is to say, in order to "do" anything, I must necessarily work with the master's tools and let them work on me. "We come into the world on the condition that the social world is already there, laying the groundwork for us. This implies," Butler argues, "that I cannot persist without norms of recognition that support my persistence" (Butler 2004, 32). I have no choice to use or not use the master's tools—they have been working on and through me

since before I was even born; they constitute the field in and through which I act. This does not, however, mean that I must use them as they were intended. Indeed, Butler argues that when one makes appeals to "rights" for a marginalized group, one is not—or should not be—seeking the extension of the same old concept to a new group (that is, the colonization of the outside, a domestication), but instead is/should be challenging the very assumptions behind that term, transforming it in the process of demanding or claiming it.¶Butler qualifies her call to use the master's tools with what she calls a "double path": "we must use this language to assert an entitlement to conditions of life in ways that affirm the constitutive role of sexuality and gender in political life, and we must also subject our very categories to critical scrutiny" (Butler 2004, 37–38). This double path sounds a lot like the more conventional notion of "critique"—a self-reflexive meta-narrative concerned with the limits of the discourse under question—but it goes beyond this traditional sense of "critique" insofar as the "limits" it scrutinizes are not only discursive, but also political. If it is the case that norms "are invoked and cited by bodily practices that also have the capacity to alter norms in the course of their citation" (52), then it is clear that Butler finds revolutionary capacity in reactionary norms. If this is the case, then, we must ask "what departures from the norm constitute something other than an excuse or rationale for the continuing authority of the norm?" (53), for not every instantiation of the norm, obviously, will be revolutionary. By what criteria do we determine reactionary from revolutionary reworkings of gender norms? Moreover, "what departures from the norm disrupt the regulatory process itself?" (53)—that is, what sorts of subversive repetitions don't just reinstall the terms of the norm, but call the norm itself and its modus operandi into question?12 In response to these questions, I turn to the case of Peaches's reappropriation of patriarchal gender norms. Her work, read alongside Butler's, fleshes out the two criteria we can use to distinguish a successful reworking of the "master's tools" from a hegemonic rearticulation of them. Because her work deals with many of the same themes (sex, sexuality, sexually empowered women) as Madonna's superficially (but not really) "feminist" work from the 1980s–90s, Peaches's oeuvre is particularly helpful in distinguishing a genuinely transformative use of the master's tools from one that, although superficially radical, in fact maintains the status quo. More importantly, if, as Deleuze and Guattari say, domination "is not an ideological problem" but "a problem of desire" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 104), then power functions, at least in part, by making us want and be satisfied by structures that are counter to our interests; as Coates demonstrates in the epigraph, structures of feeling (such as musical conventions) are often resistant to intellectual critique, even in politicized intellectuals. As a musician, Peaches is engaging the "master's tools"—the guitar, cock rock, binary gender—precisely at the level of desire and structures of feeling. Accordingly, her work helps me move my analysis beyond the more ideologically oriented work of Mills and Butler toward consideration of problems of desire and affect. Indeed, it is precisely because power functions at these levels that the second criterion (accessibility, affectivity) is so important in distinguishing a successful from an unsuccessful reappropriation.

AT: Coalitions Bad

Reforms are key – critical to mobilization – by focusing on suffering as the basis for identity, they preclude mobilization.
Bhambra, University of Warwick sociology professor, and Margree, University of Brighton cultural studies professor, 2010

[Gurminder and Victoria, "Identity Politics and the Need for a 'Tomorrow'" http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity_Politics_and_the_Need_for_a_Tomorrow_, p.64-5]

Political mobilisation around suffering engenders solidarities between those who are suffering and those who afford recognition of (and then action around) that suffering. Those who suffer generally claim their common humanity with others in asking for people to look beyond the specific circumstances of their suffer-ing, and in doing so, the request is to address those specific circumstances on the basis of a humanity not bound to the circumstances. The mistake of some forms of identity politics, then, is to associate identity with suffering. While a recognition of historical (and contemporary) suffering is an important aspect of the political process of seeking redress for the conditions of suffering, it does not constitute identity singularly. ¶ "Wounded attachments", we would argue, do not represent the general condition of politicised identities, but rather, are prob-lematic constructions of identities which fail to recognise (or accept) the processes of change associated with movements. The accumulation of different sorts of challenges around similar issues generally leads to the gradual amelioration of the condi-tions which generated the identity (and the associated move-ment) in the first instance. If the emphasis in the movement is on identity then successful reform (even partial reform) reduces the injury and thus diminishes the power of the identity claim based upon that injury. This is because reform is necessarily uneven in terms of the impact it has. This then poses a problem for those within the movement who would wish the reforms to go further and who see in the reforms a weakening of the identity that they believe is a necessary prerequisite for political action. As they can no longer mobilise the injured identity – and the associated suffering – as common to all (and thus requiring address because of its generalised effect), there is often, then, a perceived need to privilege that suffering as particular and to institute a politics of guilt with regard to addressing it – truly the politics of ressentiment. ¶ The problems arise by insisting on the necessity of political action being constituted through pre-existing identities and soli-darities (for example, those of being a woman). If, instead, it was recognised that equality for women is not separable from (or achievable separated from) wider issues of justice and equality within society then reforms could be seen as steps towards equality. A movement concerned with issues of social justice (of which gender justice is an integral aspect) would allow for provisional reforms to prevailing conditions of injustice without calling into question the basis for the movement – for there would always be more to be achieved . 8 Each achievement would itself necessitate further revision of what equality would look like. And it would also necessitate revision of the particular aims that constitute the "identity" afforded by participating in that movement. In this way, identity becomes more appropriately understood as being, in part at least, about participating in a series of dialogues about what is desired for the future in terms of understandings of social justice. ¶ Focusing on the future, on how we would like things to be tomorrow, based on an understanding of where we are today, would allow for partial reforms to be seen as gains and not threats. It is only if one believes that political action can only occur in the context of identification of past injustices as opposed to future justice that one has a problem with (partial) reforms in the present. Political identity which exists only through an enunciation of its injury and does not seek to dissolve itself as an identity can lead to the ossification of injured relations. The "wounded attachment" occurs when the politicised identity can see no future without the injury also constituting an aspect of that future. Developing on the work of Brown, we would argue that not only does a "reformed" identity politics need to be based upon desire for the future, but that that desire should actually be a desire for the dissolution (in the future) of the identity claim. The complete success of the femi-nist movement, for instance, would mean

that feminists no longer existed, as the conditions that caused people to become feminist had been addressed. Similarly, with the dalit movement, its success would be measured by the dissolution of the identity of "dalit" as a salient political category. There would be no loss here, only a gain.¶ As we have argued, following Mohanty ([1993] 2000) and Nelson (1993), it is participation in the processing of one's own and other's experiences into knowledge about the world, in the context of communities that negotiate epistemological premises, which confers a notion of politicised identity. Since it is an under-standing of "tomorrow" (what that would be, and how it is to be achieved) that establishes one as, for example, a feminist, such an identity claim does not exclude others from participation, and it does not solicit the reification of identity around the fact of historical or contemporary suffering. By removing these obstacles to progress, the "tomorrow" that is the goal, is more readily achievable. Identity politics, then, "needs a tomorrow" in this sense: that the raison d'être of any politicised identity is the bringing about of a tomorrow in which the social injustices of the present have been overcome. But identity politics also needs that tomorrow – today – in the sense that politicised identities need to inscribe that tomorrow into their self-definition in the present, in order to avoid consolidating activity around the maintenance of the identity rather than the overcoming of the conditions that generated it. That the tomorrow to be inscribed – today – in the self-definition of one's political identity, is one in which that identity will no longer be required, is not a situation to be regretted, since it is rather the promise of success for any movement for justice.

Coalitions are necessary to solve and possible – this evidence assumes their indicts – rallying around particular goals like the plan overcomes the problems with coalitions. Wing, University of Iowa law professor, 2003

[Adrien Katherine, 63 La. L. Rev. 717, "Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism" Lexis]

Because of the various problems with coalition building, several scholars do not endorse it. For example, Delgado advocates laboring within your own group for the social justice goals you support. "For some projects, justice turns out to be a solitary though heroic quest, and the road to justice is one that must be traveled alone, or with our deepest, most trusted companions." n204 Haunani-Kay Trask states that real organizing of native Hawaiians takes place outside of coalitions. n205 She supports Malcolm X's claims that whites need to tackle racism within their own communities, rather than in coalition. n206 "Work in conjunction with us-each working among our own kind." n207¶ Despite the frictions and problems between various traditional and nontraditional groups, coalition building can be a useful tool of critical race praxis in the current period. African Americans have been used to being the dominant minority in the United States, able to keep their concerns at the center of the civil rights movement. Latinos are now surpassing Blacks numerically, n208 and are the majority in California already. n209 They will be 25% of the U.S. population by 2050. n210 [*746] Blacks will have to learn to work in coalition with Latinos to ensure that Black concerns are not lost in a new dispensation of "favored minority." While the Latinos are becoming the majority minority, they are not as politically organized as the Blacks yet, with many being recent immigrants or noncitizens, who may not speak English. n211 Thus in some instances, Latinos will need to learn from African Americans, and with them, to achieve various goals.¶ Coalition is good for Asians because although they score higher on standardized tests and have a higher income level than the other minority groups, history has already shown that they remain regarded as perpetual foreigners, n212 once subject to internment. n213 Native Americans constitute only two million people, n214 and can benefit from linking with the larger groups, some of whom may resent those tribes, who now profit from gambling casino wealth. n215 Arabs and Muslims need to join in coalition with the other groups because they are too small and too recent as immigrants in comparison to the other groups to go it alone. As the current personification of evil of the moment, they need to draw upon the resources of other groups for support.¶ coalition building does not happen in a vacuum. It must coalesce around particular projects where there is commonality of interest. For instance, Frank Valdes has noted that Latinos and Asians share a common

interest in legal issues that involve "immigration, family, citizenship, nationhood, language, expression, culture, and global economic restructuring." n216¶ [*747] ¶ <u>Racial profiling is a potential issue for cooperation as it affects all the major minority groups</u>. I will use it for illustrative purposes in the remainder of this section, even though it is only one of various issues that could be the basis for coalition building. Asian scholars have noted how both the recent mistreatment of Chinese American scientist Dr. Wen Ho Lee n217 and the interning of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in World War II could both be regarded as cases of racial profiling. n218 Kevin Johnson has called for Asians and Latinos to form political coalitions to challenge arbitrary INS conduct. n219 He also wants Blacks and Latinos to form coalitions to work on issues of racial profiling, as well. n220¶ <u>In the war against terrorism, racial profiling is particularly affecting Blacks, Latinos and South Asians who look Arab, creating an ideal intersectional issue for coalition building. n221 Coalescing</u> around profiling in these times <u>will not be easy</u>. In his timely book, Justice at War: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights in a Time of Crisis, Richard Delgado, a founder of CRT, queries, "Will the establishment insist on Americanism and toeing the line in the war on terrorism, and demand that minorities demonstrate loyalty, in return for a symbolic concession or two?...Will it choose one minority group for favored [*748] treatment, in hope of keeping the others in line." n222 There are several foreseeable scenarios in this regard. For example, the Bush administration could reconfigure rather than terminate various federal affirmative action programs after an expected hostile Supreme Court decision in the upcoming Michigan cases, n223 to attempt to ensure Black support for the war efforts. The administration's rejection of the pro-affirmative action position of the University of Michigan may have attracted some Asian support. n224 The perpetuation of the forty year old blockade against Cuba despite U.S. business opposition ensures Cuban American loyalty, n225 and the rumored appointment of a Hispanic for the next U.S. Supreme Court vacancy may attract other Latinos. n226 Delgado wonders whether people of color will "be able to work together toward mutual goals- or [will] the current factionalism and distrust continue into the future, with various minority groups competing for crumbs while majoritarian rule continue[s] unabated?" n227¶ In order to ensure that issues like racial profiling do become an effective rallying point for multiethnic coalition building in the war against terrorism era, it is necessary to develop a more complete theorization of the process. <u>Critical race scholars have provided some insights that could be useful. According to Mari Matsuda, "when we work in coalition . . . . we compare our struggles and challenge one another's assumptions. We learn of the gaps and absence in our knowledge. We learn a few tentative, starting truths, the building blocks of a theory of subordination." n228 If traditional minority civil rights groups joined together with Arabs and Muslims, they would learn how little they truly understood about the other.</u> I am one of the few African Americans that I know who deals with Arab and Muslim organizations as well as African American ones. I am astounded at how little accurate information each has about the other, even though some Blacks are Muslim, and there may be some degree of overlap between groups. In dealing with Latino-based entities, for example, I find they have very little basis for understanding Arabs and Muslims. I have tried to translate Catholic or Christian principles [*749] into Muslim ones and vice versa, but my own knowledge of Christian theology is inadequate to the task. Since I teach Islamic law, I actually know more about that faith than the Christianity in which I was socialized. <u>Attempting to fill in the gaps in knowledge between Muslim and Arab groups and various organizations of color might reveal the similarities and differences in racial profiling and perhaps other issues as well. These issues might become the focus for joint action.</u>¶ Chuck Lawrence has a more elaborate position on coalition building, which requires:¶ (1) understanding the complex interrelatedness of our racial subjugation;¶ (2) confronting our own internalized racist beliefs and the ways in which we participate in the maintenance of white supremacy;¶ (3) resisting constructions of race that divide and demean us;¶ (4) learning to talk and listen to one another, to share experience, to empathize with and understand one another; and¶ (5) finding ways to sustain ourselves as we do the difficult, and often thankless work of coalition building. n229¶ <u>It is very difficult to imagine various groups agreeing on the interrelatedness of racial subjugation</u>. Some minorities still socially construct themselves as white, and would not want to characterize their position as "Black." They might view their problems through the prism of religion or culture or ideology, rather than be forced to fit into America's racial categorizations.¶ With respect to Lawrence's second point, <u>I have found many groups of color are unable to recognize that they too could be participants in maintaining white supremacy, not merely victims</u>. Demonizing another group of color may be a vain attempt to be better or more "American" than others, failing to recognize that all will be seen as perpetual permanent outsiders in a hierarchy where white is still at the top. Addressing the third issue, seeking white status may be more important than alliances with groups of color.¶ I have participated in coalitions where it would have been better for groups not to talk too much with each other, because more points of dissimilarity may come out. For example, a Black civil rights group may be able to march against racial profiling with an Asian group. Engaging in dialogue may reveal the Asian group is anti- affirmative action. Thus Lawrence's fourth point about talking together and developing empathy may not occur. As a matter of fact, [*750] coalition building can create strange bedfellows, according to Delgado. Skinheads, survivalists, and anti-gun control elements all concerned with government surveillance may not be otherwise compatible with Asian and Latino groups concerned with the government treatment of immigrants after September 11. n230¶ Sustaining ourselves as we build coalitions, Lawrence's fifth point, is critical. I have seen too many legal activists burn out in frustration or depression from the lack of positive results from both ends of coalition building. Some will merely drop out of the coalition aspect, while others will drop out of organizational work altogether, preferring to focus on individual personal, professional or family pursuits.¶ <u>Lawrence</u> also <u>emphasizes trust</u>. "Coalition work requires time and space to build trust. It requires creating methods and models for conversation, collaboration, and sharing. Engaging in collective action and

careful reflection means starting small and building on the trust that we create in the process of doing this difficult work together." n231 My attitude toward trust is the opposite of Lawrence's. Using a personal hypothetical example, I would trust my husband, until I catch him cheating, and then might forgive him and stay with him, but would not trust him again. If I would not always trust a husband to whom I have made a life commitment in such circumstances, I see no reason why trust is necessary in coalition. We may work together within my group, and I may not trust other group members to do all the work as promised. I am usually prepared with a back up plan that requires that I may have to fill in to do the work of a colleague who is inefficient, incompetent, lazy, overworked or who has a personal or medical issue or a family matter. If I do not readily trust those in my own group, especially based on long term experiences with them, I would not extend trust to others operating perhaps on even fewer points of commonality. This lack of trust does not mean being hostile to the other group, it just means being aware of the pitfalls, and that their other priorities may not make them worthy of trust on any but the most superficial level.¶ In The Miner's Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy, n232 Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres see those raced as Blacks as having the potential to lead or be at the center of coalitions of outgroups, who exemplify the notion of "political race," n233 which might include various nonblack groups. [*751] According to the authors, all U.S. society would benefit if it would notice when Blacks are hurting; they serve in the role of the miner's canary signaling problems that will ultimately affect everyone in the mine. n234 Their framework involves reconceptualizing meta-narratives, working from the bottom up, and tackling hierarchy. n235 Unfortunately, I do not think it is likely that various outgroups would accept the leadership or centrality of Black groups in the current atmosphere. An issue like racial profiling, for example, does not affect poor whites or many white-looking women to the same degree it affects Blacks, Arabs and Muslims, and those who look like them. Derrick Bell's theory of white self-interest indicates that poor whites have not historically rallied together with people of color. n236 Outgroups who are used to being dominant due to white privilege n237 or relative privilege vis-a-vis Blacks, are unlikely to take a back seat to Blacks in the war against terrorism, an issue on which they would feel Blacks have no special expertise in any event. Delgado postulates that various outgroups of color would abandon their coalition with each other if they can get concessions from white power elites. n238¶ Critical Latina/o Theory (LATCRIT), a more recent CRT offshoot, has generated an analysis of coalition across minority ethnic groups. n239 LATCRIT founder Frank Valdes calls for "'critical coalitions' . . . 'alliances based on a thoughtful and reciprocal interest in the goal(s) or purpose(s)' of a collaborative and collective project." n240 This definition would not require embracing of trust, but would be pragmatic, i.e., we will cooperate in publicizing these egregious cases in our respective communities.¶ [*752] ¶ Mary Romero posits that "the ways in which race based movements and racialized communities construct their identities has enormous implications for setting social justice agendas and for coalition building." n241 Returning to an example we have mentioned before, n242 some groups may construct themselves as white and think perhaps that they are above being in coalition with a group of color. They may unconsciously feel entitled to dominate the coalition.¶ Lisa Iglesias has stated, "we need to learn how to articulate our intergroup comparisons in ways that energize new solidarities and promote more fluid and inclusive political identities by revealing new interconnections and commonalities among the oppressed, despite and perhaps because of our differences." n243 Her plea is an optimistic one, and perhaps could help with the problem of finding out too much information about a coalition partner, leading to less desire to work together. For example, the previously mentioned Black pro-affirmative action and Asian anti-affirmative action group might be able to become closer while mutually addressing the racial profiling issue. Blacks and Asians who look like "Arabs" will both be subject to profiling as terrorists. A good working relationship on this issue might enable some members of each group to hear each other from time to time on the divisive and potentially explosive affirmative action question.¶ At the annual LATCRIT conferences, one issue is chosen that is designed to appeal to nonLatino attendees, as a means of rotating centers of emphasis. n244 In this regard, Athena Mutua has called for what she terms "shifting bottoms and rotating centers" to acknowledge the fact that Blacks and Latinos can both be at the bottom of the white power hierarchy in different ways, and there is the need for a shifting emphasis on the various groups. Whereas Blacks are at the bottom of a color hierarchy, many Latinos can be at the bottom of the language hierarchy. n245 Unfortunately, it may be difficult to rally around this theme, as the number of nonLatinos at the conferences does not constitute a big enough cohesive faction to offset the dominance of the Latinos. The dynamic manifests as one center of the universe, i.e. Latino issues, with a shooting star flashing past, i.e. other minority issues. The environment can be particularly uncomfortable for some African Americans who are used to their concerns taking center stage. While some Latinos may be at the [*753] bottom in terms of language hierarchy in the U.S., Blacks remain there as well for their failure to master standard English despite having no other first language. n246 At the LATCRIT conferences, nonspanish speakers may feel isolated as there is frequent lapsing in and out of Spanish, with accompanying joking or shaking of heads, that others who do not speak Spanish can not follow.¶ Cho and Westley provide an insight that is critically important. They call for a "structure of political organizing that unites contingent, transitory, and relationally defined individuals on the basis of interests rather than putative fixed group identities." n247 In other words, we can not essentialize the interests of various minority groups, and assume that all the Asians will have the same position, for example. n248 There are Asian groups which are against affirmative action, and groups that are for it. n249 Conservative Cuban groups may not have much in common with the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund. The NAACP rarely agrees with the positions taken by Justice Clarence Thomas or African American University of California regent, Ward Connerly, who led the call to dismantle affirmative action in the UC system. n250¶

<u>Some groups of color may resent racial profiling of their own ethnic group members, but welcome its use against Arabs and Muslims as potential terrorists</u>. n251 Catching young Black juveniles who rob convenience stores or poor Mexicans crossing the Texas border looking for work may be regarded as qualitatively different by Blacks and Latinos than catching Muslim supporters of Al Qaeda, who destroyed the World Trade Centers, damaged the Pentagon, and killed thousands in one day. They are people who have declared war on America, literally and figuratively.¶ [*754] ¶ Yamamoto posits four understandings about situated group power when we move beyond the black-white binary: simultaneity, positionality, differentiation, and dominance transformation. n252 Interpreting the points, <u>a group could simultaneously be both oppressed and an oppressor, depending on its position to other groups, which relates to how that group has been treated differently historically. If the group is dominating others, it requires the desire to transform that dynamic in a positive manner so the groups can work together in healthy coalition</u>. n253 Applying Yamamoto's concepts to Black legal groups, <u>it is necessary for some of these organizations to realize that they have been filling up a disproportionate amount of space in many coalitions of color, "acting white," so to speak. Working together effectively in the war on terror era will require an acknowledgment of this reality.</u> Given how longstanding the dominance of Black groups has been, it will not be easy for them to transform, particularly as their numerical dominance fades as well.

AT: Subversive Strategies Good

Being subversive has no intrinsic value absent pre-conceived norms – that flips subversion on its head.

Nussbaum, University of Chicago law professor, 1999

[Martha, "The Professor of Parody" http://www.akad.se/Nussbaum.pdf]

Butler departs in this regard from earlier social-constructionist feminists, all of whom used ideas such as non-hierarchy, equality, dignity, autonomy, and treating as an end rather than a means, to indicate a direction for <mark>actual politics</mark>. Still less <mark>is</mark> she <mark>willing to elaborate any positive normative notion</mark>. Indeed, it is clear that Butler, like Foucault, is adamantly opposed to normative notions such as human dignity, or treating humanity as an end, on the grounds that they are inherently dictatorial. <mark>In her view, we ought to wait to see what the political struggle itself throws up, rather than prescribe in advance</mark> to its participants. Universal normative notions, she says, "colonize under the sign of the same."¶This idea of waiting to see what we get--in a word, this <mark>moral passivity--seems plausible</mark> in Butler <mark>because she tacitly assumes an audience of like-minded readers who agree</mark> (sort of) about what the bad things are-- discrimination against gays and lesbians, the unequal and hierarchical treatment of women--and who even agree (sort of) about why they are bad (they subordinate some people to others, they deny people freedoms that they ought to have). But <mark>take that assumption away, and the absence of a normative dimension becomes a severe problem</mark>.¶Try teaching Foucault at a contemporary law school, as I have, and you will quickly find that subversion takes many forms, not all of them congenial to Butler and her allies. As a perceptive libertarian student said to me, <mark>Why can't I use these ideas to resist the tax structure, or the antidiscrimination laws, or perhaps even to join the militias?</mark> Others, less fond of liberty, might engage in the subversive performances of making fun of feminist remarks in class, or ripping down the posters of the lesbian and gay law students' association. These things happen. They are parodic and subversive. Why, then, aren't they daring and good?¶Well, there are good answers to those questions, but you won't find them in Foucault, or in Butler. Answering them requires discussing which liberties and opportunities human beings ought to have, and what it is for social institutions to treat human beings as ends rather than as means--in short, a normative theory of social justice and human dignity. <mark>It is one thing to say that we should be humble about our universal norms,</mark> and willing to learn from the experience of oppressed people. <mark>It is</mark> quite <mark>another thing to say that we don't need any norms at all</mark>. Foucault, unlike Butler, at least showed signs in his late work of grappling with this problem; and all his writing is animated by a fierce sense of the texture of social oppression and the harm that it does.¶Come to think of it, justice, understood as a personal virtue, has exactly the structure of gender in the Butlerian analysis: it is not innate or "natural," it is produced by repeated performances (or as Aristotle said, we learn it by doing it), it shapes our inclinations and forces the repression of some of them. These ritual performances, and their associated repressions, are enforced by arrangements of social power, as children who won't share on the playground quickly discover. Moreover, the parodic subversion of justice is ubiquitous in politics, as in personal life. But there is an important difference. Generally we dislike these subversive performances, and we think that young people should be strongly discouraged from seeing norms of justice in such a cynical light. Butler cannot explain in any purely structural or procedural way why the subversion of gender norms is a social good while the subversion of justice norms is a social bad. Foucault, we should remember, cheered for the Ayatollah, and why not? That, too, was resistance, and there was indeed nothing in the text to tell us that that struggle was less

worthy than a struggle for civil rights and civil liberties.¶There is a void, then, at the heart of Butler's notion of politics. This void can look liberating, because the reader fills it implicitly with a normative theory of human equality or dignity. But let there be no mistake: for Butler, as for Foucault, <mark>subversion is subversion, and it can in principle go in any direction</mark>. Indeed, Butler's <mark>naively empty politics is especially dangerous</mark> for the very causes she holds dear. For every friend of Butler, eager to engage in subversive performances that proclaim the repressiveness of heterosexual gender norms, there are dozens who would like to engage in subversive performances that flout the norms of tax compliance, of non-discrimination, of decent treatment of one's fellow students. To such people we should say, you cannot simply resist as you please, for there are norms of fairness, decency, and dignity that entail that this is bad behavior. But then we have to articulate those norms--and this Butler refuses to do.

Performative politics is a private act that doesn't challenge systemic oppression – two implications. A- all your offense on framework is solved by reading a book and B- you don't solve your impacts, your speech act is an act of nihilism.
Nussbaum, University of Chicago law professor, 1999

[Martha, "The Professor of Parody" http://www.akad.se/Nussbaum.pdf]

The idea of gender as performance is Butler's most famous idea, and so it is worth pausing to scrutinize it more closely. She introduced the notion intuitively, in Gender Trouble, without invoking theoretical precedent. Later she denied that she was referring to quasi-theatrical performance, and associated her notion instead with Austin's account of speech acts in How to Do Things with Words. Austin's linguistic category of "performatives" is a category of linguistic utterances that function, in and of themselves, as actions rather than as assertions. When (in appropriate social circumstances) I say "I bet ten dollars," or "I'm sorry," or "I do" (in a marriage ceremony), or "I name this ship...," I am not reporting on a bet or an apology or a marriage or a naming ceremony, I am conducting one.¶Butler's analogous claim about gender is not obvious, since the "performances" in question involve gesture, dress, movement, and action, as well as language. Austin's thesis, which is restricted to a rather technical analysis of a certain class of sentences, is in fact not especially helpful to Butler in developing her ideas. Indeed, though she vehemently repudiates readings of her work that associate her view with theater, thinking about the Living Theater's Austin.¶Nor is Butler's treatment of Austin very plausible. She makes the bizarre claim that the fact that the marriage ceremony is one of dozens of examples of performatives in Austin's text suggests "that the heterosexualization of the social bond is the paradigmatic form for those speech acts which bring about what they name." Hardly. Marriage is no more paradigmatic for Austin than betting or ship-naming or promising or apologizing. He is interested in a formal feature of certain utterances, and we are given no reason to suppose that their content has any significance for his argument. It is usually a mistake to read earth-shaking significance into a philosopher's pedestrian choice of examples. Should we say that Aristotle's use of a low-fat diet to illustrate the practical syllogism suggests that chicken is at the heart of Aristotelian virtue? Or that Rawls's use of travel plans to illustrate practical reasoning shows that A Theory of Justice aims at giving us all a vacation?¶Leaving these oddities to one side, Butler's point is presumably this: <mark>when we act and speak</mark> in a gendered way<mark>, we are</mark> not simply reporting on something that is already fixed in the world, we are actively <mark>constituting it</mark>, replicating it, and reinforcing it. By behaving as if there were male and female "natures," we co-create the social

fiction that these natures exist. They are never there apart from our deeds; we are always making them be there. At the same time, by carrying out these performances in a slightly different manner, a parodic manner, we can perhaps unmake them just a little.¶Thus the one place for agency in a world constrained by hierarchy is in the small opportunities we have to oppose gender roles every time they take shape. When I find myself doing femaleness, I can turn it around, poke fun at it, do it a little bit differently. Such reactive and parodic performances, in Butler's view, never destabilize the larger system. She doesn't envisage mass movements of resistance or campaigns for political reform; only personal acts carried out by a small number of knowing actors. Just as actors with a bad script can subvert it by delivering the bad lines oddly, so too with gender: the script remains bad, but the actors have a tiny bit of freedom. Thus we have the basis for what, in Excitable Speech, Butler calls "an ironic hopefulness."

Their reading of power ignores material conditions – slavery never would have been challenged if this was the abolitionist strategy.
Nussbaum, University of Chicago law professor, 1999

[Martha, "The Professor of Parody" http://www.akad.se/Nussbaum.pdf]

What precisely does Butler offer when she counsels subversion? She tells us to engage in parodic performances, but she warns us that the dream of escaping altogether from the oppressive structures is just a dream: it is within the oppressive structures that we must find little spaces for resistance, and this resistance cannot hope to change the overall situation. And here lies a dangerous quietism.¶If Butler means only to warn us against the dangers of fantasizing an idyllic world in which sex raises no serious problems, she is wise to do so. Yet frequently she goes much further. She suggests that the institutional structures that ensure the marginalization of lesbians and gay men in our society, and the continued inequality of women, will never be changed in a deep way; and so our best hope is to thumb our noses at them, and to find pockets of personal freedom within them. "Called by an injurious name, I come into social being, and because I have a certain inevitable attachment to my existence, because a certain narcissism takes hold of any term that confers existence, I am led to embrace the terms that injure me because they constitute me socially." In other words: I cannot escape the humiliating structures without ceasing to be, so the best I can do is mock, and use the language of subordination stingingly. In Butler, resistance is always imagined as personal, more or less private, involving no unironic, organized public action for legal or institutional change.¶Isn't this like saying to a slave that the institution of slavery will never change, but you can find ways of mocking it and subverting it, finding your personal freedom within those acts of carefully limited defiance? Yet it is a fact that the institution of slavery can be changed, and was changed--but not by people who took a Butler-like view of the possibilities. It was changed because people did not rest content with parodic performance: they demanded, and to some extent they got, social upheaval. It is also a fact that the institutional structures that shape women's lives have changed. The law of rape, still defective, has at least improved; the law of sexual harassment exists, where it did not exist before; marriage is no longer regarded as giving men monarchical control over women's bodies. These things were changed by feminists who would not take parodic performance as their answer, who thought that power, where bad, should, and would, yield before justice.¶Butler not only eschews such a hope, she takes pleasure in its impossibility. She finds it exciting to contemplate the alleged immovability of power, and to envisage the ritual subversions of the slave who is convinced that

she must remain such. She tells us--this is the central thesis of The Psychic Life of Power--that we all eroticize the power structures that oppress us, and can thus find sexual pleasure only within their confines. It seems to be for that reason that she prefers the sexy acts of parodic subversion to any lasting material or institutional change. Real change would so uproot our psyches that it would make sexual satisfaction impossible. Our libidos are the creation of the bad enslaving forces, and thus necessarily sadomasochistic in structure. Well, parodic performance is not so bad when you are a powerful tenured academic in a liberal university. But here is where Butler's focus on the symbolic, her proud neglect of the material side of life, becomes a fatal blindness. For women who are hungry, illiterate, disenfranchised, beaten, raped, it is not sexy or liberating to reenact, however parodically, the conditions of hunger, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, beating, and rape. Such women prefer food, schools, votes, and the integrity of their bodies. I see no reason to believe that they long sadomasochistically for a return to the bad state. If some individuals cannot live without the sexiness of domination, that seems sad, but it is not really our business. But when a major theorist tells women in desperate conditions that life offers them only bondage, she purveys a cruel lie, and a lie that flatters evil by giving it much more power than it actually has.

AT: Black Scholarship

The aff is a form of selling out – they produce black knowledge in a space they have already criticized as being white – that de-radicalizes black thought – the alternative is negation of whiteness, not an affirmation of debate.
Curry, Texas A&M African studies and philosophy professor, 2013

[Tommy, "Reflections on College Debate as a Black Man in the 1990s"
http://drtjc.tumblr.com/post/63012232390/reflections-on-college-debate-as-a-black-man-in-the]

See I was a problem. Back then, no one talked about race seriously in debate rounds. Even in a year when the topic was title seven, racism was secondary to the cases that won constantly that year on sex. I lost rounds to white people for running impacts on race, was called a token by white women, I even lost a round to a two woman white team on the neg after they dropped a counterplan and disadvantage because I ran extension evidence in the 2NC. There was a moratorium on Blackness, especially Black maleness in CEDA/NDT. When I proposed an all-Black debate tournament on the list-serv I was called hateful, despite the celebration of white women doing one. I say this to say that debate has a peculiar-pre-determined morality.¶ The UDL were just beginning in the mid to late 90's when I started college. I was involved in them around my junior year when Emory and UMKC started recruiting me, and I certainly think they have been a success, however, with the allure of progress (more Blacks, more Black judges, more conceptual debates about Blackness) comes a **de-radicalization** of what Black theory and what Black people are supposed to do and represent. Despite our pretense, debate is still a privileged world; a pretend world where Black people can have their queerness, their femaleness, their **faux radicality** recognized, for actual oppressed peoples, who are not recognized, these qualities mean death. So in debate rounds we get to act as if we are the conduit of this Black suffering. In demographic increase in the population of Black debaters, has brought about a new morality committed to fighting for inclusion, intellectual space or expanded ideas of home, but in this we miss the extent of our dependency on white recognition—that white judge—in the back of the room **comprehending and assimilating our goals** with their own liberal/progressive existence. In other words, it is through our appeal to white men and women, our need for their recognition, for their ballot, that frames the ultimate message of our pessimism, or gender critiques, or colonial analysis. We are fundamentally dependent on how the white mind situates itself conceptually to the project of diversification. We appeal to the sympathies, or worse yet intersectional empathy of whites, as the gauge of the transformative potency.¶ In these spaces, real radicality comes not from the appeal to white recognition, but the rejection of it. Of the declaration that Black knowledge, Black theory, and Black accounts of existence (in all is economic and sexual plurality) can be found in Black people thinking Black thought. It need not depend on our alliances/allegiances with white liberals rationalizing their existence as justifiable through alliances. Black debate should ultimately move to the rejection of white adjudication. If Black theory is about the liberation of Black people and a move to definitions of knowledge/selves/concepts that don't currently exist, how can we expect the dilapidated ideas of white sentimentality projected from archaic racialized whiteness to understand or comprehend the interrelatedness of propositions that are beyond their present being. The true radicality of Black people debating points to the negation of white comprehension of Black ideas of liberation, not their assimilation or recognition of them.

AT: White Feminists who Talk about Race

White feminists should not use Audre Lorde.
Smith, University of California Riverside cultural studies professor, 12-26-13

[Andrea, "Sympathy, Outrage and White Humanity: Reflections on BDS, Anti-Black Racism and Justine Sacco" http://andrea366.wordpress.com/2013/12/26/sympathy-outrage-and-white-humanity-reflections-on-bds-anti-black-racism-and-justine-sacco/]

The disappearance of Black suffering in these defenses indicates the extent to which Black peoples become marked as property within even progressive circles. The legacy of anti-Black racism is that Black struggle gets deemed the property of all other social justice struggles. The symbols and tactics of Black struggle are deemed the common property of all. Black people are required to show solidarity with other oppressed communities, without other struggles owing solidarity to Black communities. Black oppression is always analogized to other forms of oppression in a manner that disappears Black oppression itself. It is presumed we already know everything about Black oppression, so we can just use it as an empty signifier to explain other oppressions. Thus, once again, while the defenses of Sacco do not defend her remarks per se, Black suffering becomes an empty signifier to talk about the ethics of twitter outrage. We supposedly know all about anti-Black racism, so we do not need to concern ourselves further with that. We just need to concern ourselves with the plight of those who make anti-Black statements. That is why many white feminists have no trouble using quotes from Audre Lorde against women of color because they see Black feminist critique as their property. As Saidiya Hartman describes in Scenes of Subjection, Black peoples are seen either as property or as criminals when they resist their designation as property. Thus, it is not surprise that white feminists attempt to designate some forms of Black feminist critique (Audre Lorde) as their property in order to attack and criminalize other forms of Black feminist critique they deem threatening (as can be seen by recent white feminist attacks on Mikki Kendall and #solidarityisforwhitewomen)¶ As Hartman further demonstrates, the logics of slavery that render Black peoples as the property of white supremacy required the disappearance of Black outrage. Slaveowners required Black peoples to sing and dance in order to affirm the naturalness of their slave condition. Outrage by contrast, would have asserted the humanity of Black peoples by underscoring the violence needed to maintain plantation slavery, thus challenging the presumption that white supremacy should be the natural order of things.¶ Today, dissent against white supremacy and settler colonialism remains constantly policed. Black peoples are not supposed to complain, get outraged or "riot" when they are subjected to premature death. Indigenous peoples are supposed to be happy when the nation-states that continue to colonize them then issue official "apologies" for residential/boarding school abuse. As Glen Coulthard notes, Indigenous peoples become pathologized when they refuse these official apologies and choose to remain angry about settler colonialism. Palestinian peoples are supposed to forego their struggles for self-determination and even just to survive in order to support academic freedom for Israelis. We are supposed to obsess about whether Palestinians are excessively "violent" while ignoring the violence of Israeli state. Peoples subjected to colonization and white supremacy cannot be outraged because outrage would indicate they are no longer willing to accept these conditions. ¶ These calls to monitor twitter outrage mirror the admonitions made after the George Zimmerman verdict to Black peoples to be "peaceful" to ensure they wouldn't riot. Racialized and colonized peoples are supposed to be the victims of outrage. Twitter outrage is a problem only when racialized and colonized peoples express outrage against conditions of colonialism and white supremacy. Sure, it is acceptable to feel sympathy when racialized and colonized peoples are victimized – but only as long as they remain victims to be rescued by others under the terms and conditions set by those in the dominant position. However, insofar as outrage indicates a desire to fundamentally change conditions, it becomes strictly policed, even by those who claim to support racial justice. ¶ It is also telling that the reaction against Sacco gets described as a form of "lynching" or mob violence. This depiction is a legacy of the gendered racial histories of Black lynching in which the imperiled white woman becomes the justification for anti-Black violence. White women, both then and in this case, become imagined as imperiled by black violence. This transforms them into people requiring protection and obscures their role as active perpetrators of oppression and violence from which Black peoples need protection.¶ The question is not whether Sacco has been dehumanized – rather the question is how has white humanity

itself been fundamentally constructed through the transformation of Black peoples into non-persons. The question is, how has the continuing colonization of the peoples in Africa as well as trans-Atlantic slavery – and the millions of Black deaths that continue as a result - disappear as things that deserve our outrage. As the work of Denise Da Silva, Katherine McKittrick, Sylvia Wynter, Rinaldo Walcott, Alexander G. Weheliye and many others have shown us, white humanity does not need to be recovered. Rather the racial logics of who gets deemed to be human need to be dismantled.   And as Jared Sexton notes, white humanity is premised on the "obscurity of Black suffering."

AT: Domestic Racism Trade-off

To claim that domestic racism should proceed the "international" violence the US commits against foreign bodies is unethical—their overly broad focus on white supremacy cannot explain particulars of interethnic conflicts and undermines effective racial politics

Sunstrom, University of San Francisco philosophy professor, 2008

[Ronald, "The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice" http://books.google.com/books?id=W-Szh1o4CB8C&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=sundstrom,+It+would+be+odd+and+troubling+for+the+nation+to+merrily+work+toward+justice+at+%E2%80%9Chome,%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=Okube3k_gR&sig=PGTWRaNb86KhCXpxx0g1RwdNg4M&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gbAsU-ONLsaS0AHDz4BA&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=sundstrom%2C%20It%20would%20be%20odd%20and%20troubling%20for%20the%20nation%20to%20merrily%20work%20toward%20justice%20at%20%E2%80%9Chome%2C%E2%80%9D&f=false, pp. 3-4]

It would be odd and troubling for the nation to merrily work toward justice at "home," all the while neglecting the demands of those whom the nation regarded as perpetual foreigners (and not really being at "home" in the nation) and the demands of global justice. Such a vision of justice is **self-serving and morally hollow.** Long-existing civil rights claims **should not delimit the nation's moral boundaries and its conception of civil rights**, thus ipso facto severing them from internationally determined human rights. The reactions of some citizens to the browning of America, unfortunately, open up this possibility, which is yet another evasion of social justice.7 ¶ When I broach these issues, or any of the particular issues discussed in this book, the response I frequently receive is that these issues are red herrings that divert our attention away from the real enemy, that of white supremacy.8 I am dubious about this complaint; after all, focusing on "white supremacy" **does not directly address the particulars of the interethnic confl icts** that arise from the browning of America. Perhaps, though, these critics mean that we should focus on how "white supremacy," in the form of institutionalized racism or white power, divides minority groups, so as to conquer them and leave them to fi ght over a limited set of resources. Alternatively, these critiques would have us focus on how Latinos, Asian Americans, Americans who identify as multiracial, and immigrants adopt anti-black racism and the privileges of whiteness as they assimilate into American society. I think **the latter argument is bogus,** and chapter 3 is devoted in part to explaining why. As for the former, I think "white supremacy" is too broad and vague a category to be helpful, and that focusing on such a fl awed category of power **can be positively harmful**. Such moves simply sidestep the particular issues that are raised in interethnic confl icts and may even contribute to the evasions I outlined earlier. The people of the United States, as they experience and participate in the browning of America, should resist both types of evasions. The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice argues, in contrast, that the people of the United States should see in its demographic change the transformation of social justice. They should welcome that transformation and view it as an opportunity to satisfy old debts and expand in a cosmopolitan direction the very idea of social justice.

Doesn't export violence.
Chandler, University of Westminster international relations professor, 2010

[David, "The uncritical critique of 'liberal peace'"
http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/journal_articles/RIS%20Critiques%20of%20Liberal%20Peace.pdf,
p.144-9]

In the critiques of the liberal peace, this growing consensus on the problematic nature of liberalism appears to cross the political and policy spectrum. The fundamental and shared claim of the critics is that the lack of success of external interventions, designed not only to halt conflict but to help reconstruct the peace, is down to the liberalism of the interveners. If only they were not, in various ways, so liberal, then it is alleged external intervention or assistance may potentially be much less problematic. It can appear that the main academic and political matter of dispute is whether the liberal peace discourse is amenable to policy change. Here the divide seems to roughly approximate to the division highlighted above, in terms of the heuristic categories of 'power-' and 'ideas-based' liberal peace critics. The more radical, 'power-based', critics, with a more economically deterministic approach to the structural dynamics or the needs of 'neo-liberalism' are less likely to be optimistic of reform. On the 'ideas-based' side, those critics of liberal peace frameworks who tend to be more engaged in policy related work are more optimistic with regard to a shift away from the policy emphasis of liberal peace.

In a recent article, Endre Begby and Peter Burgess argue that the majority of the critics of the liberal peace seem to share two key assumptions about external intervention: firstly, that external Western intervention (of some kind) is necessary, and secondly, that the goal of this intervention should be the liberal one of human freedom and flourishing.33 They state that, in which case, the problem is not so much with the aspirations or goals of 'liberal peace' but with the practices of intervention itself. They have a valid point regarding the limited nature of much of this 'critical' discourse, but do not reflect adequately on the diminished content of the 'liberalism' of the policy interventions themselves nor the 'liberal' aspirations of those who advocate for the reform of practices of external intervention. It seems that the common ground in the broad and disparate critiques of the liberal peace, is not the critique of the external practices of intervention as much as the classical assumptions of liberalism itself.

The critique of liberalism as a set of assumptions and practices seems to be driving the approach to the study of post-Cold War interventions in ways which have tended to produce a fairly one-sided framework of analysis in which the concept of liberalism is ill-equipped to bear the analytical weight placed upon it and appears increasingly emptied of theoretical or empirical content. Liberalism appears to be used promiscuously to explain a broad range of often contradictory policy perspectives and practices across very differing circumstances and with very differing outcomes. In this sense, it appears that liberalism operates as a 'field of adversity'34 through which a coherent narrative of post-Cold War intervention has been articulated both by critical and policy orientated theorists. The promiscuous use of liberalism to explain very different policy approaches is, of course, facilitated by the ambiguous nature of the concept itself.

It is this ambiguity which enables liberalism to be critiqued from opposing directions, sometimes by the same author at the same time. Good examples of this are Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk who criticise 'liberal' peacebuilding for being both too laissez-faire and too interventionist in its approach to the regulation and management of conflict. In the peacebuilding literature today, the experience of the early and mid-1990s and the 'quick exit' policies of the 'first generation' peacebuilding operations in Nambia, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia and

Guatemala has been repackaged¶ as evidence that Western interveners had too much faith in the liberal¶ subject.35 Similarly, the ad hoc responses to the problems of the early 1990s in the¶ development of 'second generation' peacebuilding with protectorate powers in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, has been criticised as liberal hubris, on the¶ assumption that international overlords could bring democracy, development and¶ security to others. It seems that, rather than adding clarity, **the critique of the¶ 'liberalism' of intervention tells us very little**.

The mechanism through which these liberal framings have been facilitated and¶ critiqued is that of the discursive centring of the non-liberal Other; on whose behalf¶ the policy critics assert the need for different policy practices. In this way, the¶ policy critics of past policy approaches evade a direct critique of liberal¶ assumptions about equality, autonomy, and transformative capacity, instead,¶ arguing that the non-liberal Other (in various ways) invalidates, challenges or¶ resists (passively as well as actively) policy practices which may otherwise have¶ been less problematic.

Rather than a critique of liberalism for its inability to overcome social,¶ economic and cultural inequalities, both the policy, 'ideas-based', critique of the¶ liberal peace and the more radical, 'power-based', critiques argue that social,¶ economic and cultural inequalities and differences have to be central to policy¶ practices and invalidate universalising liberal attempts to reconstruct and rebuild¶ post-conflict societies. In this context – in which the dichotomy between a liberal¶ policymaking sphere and a non-liberal sphere of policy intervention comes to¶ the fore – there is an inevitable tendency towards a consensual framing of the¶ problematic of statebuilding or peacebuilding intervention as a problem of the¶ relationship between the liberal West and the non-liberal Other.

The rock on which the liberal peace expectations are held to crash is that of the¶ non-liberal Other. The non-liberal Other increasingly becomes portrayed as the¶ barrier to Western liberal aspirations of social peace and progress; either as it lacks¶ the institutional, social, economic and cultural capacities that are alleged to be¶ necessary to overcome the problems of liberal peace or as a subaltern or resisting¶ subject, for whom liberal peacebuilding frameworks threaten their economic or¶ social existence or fundamental values or identities. **The 'critique' becomes apology¶ in that this discursive focus upon the non-Western or non-liberal Other is often¶ held to explain the lack of policy success** and, through this, suggest that democracy¶ or development are somehow not 'appropriate' aspirations or that expectations¶ need to be substantially lowered or changed to account for difference.

International statebuilding and the critique of liberalism¶ It would appear that the assumptions held to be driving liberal peace approaches¶ are very much in the eye of their critical beholders. The most obvious empirical¶ difficulty is that international policy regarding intervention and statebuilding seems¶ to have little transformative aspiration: far from assumptions of liberal universalism,¶ it would appear that, with the failure of post-colonial development, especially¶ from the 1970s onwards, international policymakers have developed historically¶ low expectations about what can be achieved through external intervention and¶ assistance. The lack of transformative belief is highlighted by one of the key¶ concerns of the policy critics of the liberal peace – the focus on capacity-building¶ state institutions and intervening to construct 'civil' societies. The focus on institutional solutions (at both the formal and informal levels) to the problems of¶ conflict and transition is indicative of the narrowing down of aspirations from¶ transforming society to merely regulating or managing it – often understood¶ critically as the 'securitising' of policymaking. This is a long way from the promise¶ of liberal transformation and the discourse of 'liberating' societies economically¶ and politically.

In fact, it is the consensus of opinion on the dangers of democracy, which has informed the focus on human rights and good governance. For the policy and radical critics of liberal peace, liberal rights frameworks are often considered problematic in terms of the dangers of exclusion and extremism. Today's 'illiberal' peace approaches do not argue for the export of democracy – the freeing up of the political sphere on the basis of support for popular autonomy. The language of illiberal institutionalist approaches is that of democratisation: the problematisation of the liberal subject, held to be incapable of moral, rational choices at the ballot box, unless tutored by international experts concerned to promote civil society and pluralist values. In these frameworks, the holding of elections serves as an examination of the population and the behaviour of electoral candidates, rather than as a process for the judgement or construction of policy (which it is assumed needs external or international frameworks for its production).

The focus on institutionalism does not stem from a critique of liberal peace programmes; institutionalist approaches developed from the 1970s onwards and were rapidly mainstreamed with the end of the Cold War.36 From 1989 onwards, Western governments and donors have stressed that policy interventions cannot just rely on promoting the freedoms of the market and democracy, but need to put institutional reform and 'good governance' at the core.37 Even in relation to Central and Eastern Europe it was regularly stressed that the people and elected representatives were not ready for freedom and that it would take a number of generations before it could be said that democracy was 'consolidated'.38 The transitology literature was based on the critique of liberal assumptions – this was why a transitional period was necessary. Transition implied that markets and democracy could not work without external institutional intervention to prevent instability. While markets needed to be carefully managed through government policymaking it was held that civil society was necessary to ensure that the population learnt civic values to make democracy viable.39

It was through the engagement with 'transition' and the problematic negotiation of EU enlargement that the discursive framework of liberal institutionalism – where human rights, the 'rule of law', civil society, and anti-corruption are privileged over democracy – was programmatically cohered. It was also through the discussion of 'transition' that the concept of sovereign autonomy was increasingly problematised, initially in relation to the protections for minority rights and then increasingly expanded to cover other areas of domestic policymaking. 40 It would appear that the key concepts and values of the 'liberal peace' held to have been promoted with vigour with the 'victory of liberalism' at the end of the Cold War were never as dominant a framing as their radical and policy critics have claimed.41

Rather than attempting to transform non-Western societies into the liberal self-image of the West, it would appear that external interveners have had much more status quo aspirations, concerned with regulatory stability and regional and domestic security, rather than transformation. **Rather than imposing or 'exporting' alleged liberal Western models**, international policy making has revolved around the promotion of regulatory and administrative measures which suggest the problems are not the lack of markets or democracy but rather the culture of society or the mechanisms of governance. Rather than promoting democracy and liberal freedoms, the discussion has been how to keep the lid on or to manage the 'complexity' of non-Western societies, usually perceived in terms of fixed ethnic and regional divisions. The solution to the complexity of the non-liberal state and society has been the internationalisation of the mechanisms of governance, removing substantive autonomy rather than promoting it.

While it is true that the reconstruction or rebuilding of states is at the centre¶of external projects of intervention, it would be wrong to see the project of¶ statebuilding as one which aimed at the construction of a liberal international¶ order.42 This is not just because external statebuilding would be understood as a contradiction in liberal terms but, more importantly, because the states being¶ constructed in these projects of post-conflict and failed state intervention are not¶ liberal states in the sense of having self-determination and political autonomy. The¶ state at the centre of statebuilding is not the 'Westphalian state' of classical¶ International Relations (IR) theorising. Under the internationalised regulatory¶mechanisms of intervention and statebuilding the state is increasingly reduced to an¶ administrative level, in which sovereignty no longer marks a clear boundary line¶ between the 'inside' and the 'outside'.43 Whether we consider European Union¶(EU) statebuilding, explicitly based on a sharing of sovereignty, or consider other¶statebuilding interventions, such as those by the international financial institutions¶in sub-Saharan Africa, it is clear that the state is central as a mechanism for¶ external coordination and regulation rather than as a self-standing actor in¶ so-called 'Westphalian' terms.44

No tradeoff – perm solves.
Hardt, Duke University literature professor, and Negri, Collège International de Philosophie professor, 2000

[Michael, phd in comparative literature from the Univ Washington, and Antonio, Univ Vincennes, "Empire" p.44-5]

We are well aware that in affirming this thesis we are swimming against the current of our friends and comrades on the Left. In the long decades of the current crisis of the communist, socialist, and liberal Left that has followed the 1960s, **a large portion of ==critical thought==**, both in the dominant countries of capitalist development and in the subordinated ones, **==has sought to recompose sites of resistance== that ==founded on the identities of social subjects or national and regional groups, often grounding political analysis on the localization of struggles==**. Such arguments are sometimes constructed in terms of "place-based" movements or politics, in which the boundaries of place (conceived either as identity or as territory) are posed against the undifferentiated and homogeneous space of global networks.2 At other times such political arguments draw on the long tradition of Leftist nationalism in which (in the best cases) the nation is conceived as the primary mechanism of defense against the domination of foreign and/or global capital.3 Today the operative syllogism **at the heart of the various forms of "==local== Leftist strategy seems to be entirely reactive: ==If capitalist domination is becoming ever more global, then our resistances to it must defend the local==** and construct barriers to capital's accelerating flows. From this perspective, the real globalization of capital and the constitution of Empire must be considered signs of dispossession and defeat. We maintain, however, that today **==this localist position==**, although we admire and respect the spirit of some of its proponents, **==is both false and damaging. It== is false first of all because the problem is poorly posed.** In many characterizations the problem **==rests on a false dichotomy between the global and the local, assuming that the global entails homogenization and undifferentiated identity whereas the local preserves heterogeneity and difference==**. Often implicit in such arguments is the assumption that the differences of the local are in some sense natural, or at least that their origin remains beyond the question. Local differences preexist the present scene and

must be defended or protected against the intrusion of globalization. It should come as no surprise, given such assumptions, that many defenses of the local adopt the terminology of traditional ecology or even identify this "local" political project with the defense of nature or biodiversity. This view can easily devolve into a kind of primordialism that fixes and romanticizes social relations and identities. **What needs to be addressed, instead, is precisely the production of locality, that is, the social machines that create and recreate the identities and differences that are understood as the local**.4 The differences of locality are neither preexisting nor natural but rather effects of a regime of production. Globality similarly should not be understood in terms of cultural, political, or economic homogenization. **Globalization**, like localization, **should be understood instead as a regime of the production** of identity and difference, or really of homogenization and heterogenization. **The better framework, then, to designate the distinction between the global and local might refer to different networks of flows and obstacles in which the local moment or perspective gives priority to the reterritorializing barriers or boundaries and the global moment privileges the mobility of deterritorializing flows. It is false, in any case, to claim that we can (re)establish local identities that are in some sense outside and protected against the global flows of capital and Empire**.

The perm is black internationalism – that solves.
Bush, St. John's University sociology associate professor, No Date

[Roderick, At least written by 2004 if not later, "Reflections on Black Internationalism As Strategy" http://sdonline.org/38/reflections-on-black-internationalism-as-strategy/]

But the rising tide of decolonization in the post-World War II period was to reinforce the radical elements within the African American population who linked civil rights with liberation movements and with radical states such as China, Cuba, Algeria, and Ghana. ==The modern civil rights movement had been a product of the post-World War II world== which gave us both the American Century and decolonization. During this period, ==movements for national liberation were prominent in every part of the formerly colonized world==. The collapse of colonial empires dominated by the British, French, and Dutch gave rise to new nations composed of people of color. While the Japanese defeat of the Russians in 1905, and the Ethiopian defeat of Italy in 1896 were signals of the increasing vulnerability of white power, the postwar decline of world white supremacy seemed to presage the long dreamed "rise of the dark world." though often combined with forms of ==Black nationalism==, is central to this effort, and compromise on this position is ==a dead-end for progressive social change, pure and simple. At the same time, however, to dismiss== the ==nationalist aspirations== of those inside our borders as do some elements even among the Black Left ==is equally unacceptable,== not only because dogma is counterproductive but because it undermines the agency of those groups. At the same time the U.S. had become the new hegemonic power ironically clothing itself in the language of its anti-colonial heritage. To win the allegiance of these new nations of color required that the U.S. eliminate its official sanction of segregation and adopt a posture of support for civil rights. But the collapse of the European empires vindicated the notion of the inevitable rise of the dark world, which was a part of the folklore of the Black working class communities from which Malcolm Little had come, and thus contributed to the mobilization of these communities. So during the flowering of the civil rights movement, Malcolm X was saying that we had arrived at the end of white world supremacy. While the civil rights movement drew inspiration from the challenge to the

white world, they did not develop a position so frankly oppositional. They hoped that their movement might redeem the soul of America. **But the movements operated in a common social space, interpenetrated one another, and generated an increasingly powerful internationalist discourse that resonated with other emancipatory voices within the United States and from many parts of the earth**. Many viewed the rebellion of the inner cities and the resistance to the increasing violence of U.S. intervention in Vietnam as the onset of a sea change in power relations not only within the United States but on a world scale. **This was a remarkable evolution, with a substantial section of the movements arguing for global solidarity with those whom Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. called "the barefoot people of the earth**."   The agenda was to complete the Great American Revolution, and to transform the American Century into something more akin to a "People's Century."   The triumph of the right in the 1980s was part of a global reversal of these trends, but this was not a sign of strength requiring another retreat of the Left. It should be no mystery that this movement aimed its fire at women, people of color, the underclass, and gays and lesbians. These are precisely sites of greatest resistance and of those dreaming of a new society. Since this was also the period of the rising of the women, it should not be surprising that Black feminists have argued most forcefully for a strategy based on race, class, gender, and sexuality as interlocking forms of oppression. This contribution by Patricia Hill Collins, Angela Davis, Rose Brewer and others deepens the contribution of **Black internationalism**, which **is an uncompromising break with the U.S.-centric perspective** that the ruling class labored so hard to install across the political spectrum from the Right to the social democratic Left during the postwar period. It was **Malcolm X**'s insight which most effectively demolished the power of that consensus when he **argued that the Negro problem was not simply an American problem or a Black problem, but that it was an issue of the haves against the have-nots on a global scale** an issue not of civil rights but of human rights.

AT: Structural Violence – Omolade

There is no tradeoff in focus which means the perm solves – also understanding nuclear disarmament as a means of fighting racism is not mutually exclusive with the aff.
Omolade, City College Center for worker education worker, 1984

[Barbara, historian of black women and organizer for women's and civil rights/black power movements, Women's Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2, Teaching about Peace, War, and Women inthe Military, "Women of Color and the Nuclear Holocaust" JSTOR]

As women of color, who are warriors in continual struggle to reclaim our lands and liberate our peoples, resistance to war has been¶ our heritage. **Women of color are the survivors** of the holocausts¶ visited upon our people through the centuries.

Five hundred years ago a group of light-skinned men left their¶European homelands as they had for centuries before. This time,¶however, they left to conquer the land, the resources, and the other¶ people of the world. They described the people of the world as "colored,"¶and defined themselves as "white." They defined "whiteness"¶as pure, superior, right. They defined the "blackness" of those they¶ conquered as evil, dirty, and inferior. Their journeys changed the¶world from a diverse, autonomous group of tribes, villages, nation-states,¶feudal empires- with varying world views and practices.¶Even if we agree that all of these societies were patriarchal, we must¶also admit that the forms of patriarchy varied widely, from the almost¶non-existent variety among the Arawaks to the highly structured¶ Japanese culture. Overall, the world was not at war with¶itself, though territorial disputes and religious crusades continued¶to take place. People in areas outside of those involved in disputes¶could live largely unaffected by and in ignorance of these events.

My Indian and African ancestors were generally at peace 500¶years ago. The white men who came to conquer them were not.¶These white men were able to conquer not because they were superior¶or more intelligent or more civilized, but because they were¶armed and prepared for war. Indeed, the movement of these white¶men changed world history because the primary lines that divided¶the world henceforth became racism and the biological distinctions¶of skin color. Military terrorism became the method of world domination;¶capitalism, the method of social organization; and racism¶became the ideology and world view that held together a cohesive¶system of exploitation and oppression for the world's people and¶their lands.

A direct historical line of military terrorism can be drawn from the¶guns used during the slave trade against Africans and American Indians¶to the building of nuclear arsenals by the world's current superpowers.¶During the nineteenth century, the repeating Winchester¶rifle precipitated a holocaust against the Sioux and the Comanches,¶which massacred their people, destroyed the buffalo which had sustained¶them, and destroyed the land as they knew, protected, and¶cared for it. It was, in that sense, neither an accident of history, nor¶a surprise, when similar white men dropped atomic bombs on the¶ Japanese citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Military terror has also been used to destroy resistance to racism,¶capitalism, and militarism, for the fear of violent reprisals has taught¶people to feel powerless to attempt to change the world. Too often¶ the statistics and other information on nuclear arsenals have¶merely reinforced the military's power to

terrorize people into submission¶ or into "doomsday" protests against death. The question¶ of nuclear disarmament is not a psychological question or a technological¶ question, but rather a political question.

Nuclear arsenals and nuclear power are part of a rational and holistic system in which those in power hold power over all aspects¶ of world society. It is irrelevant whether they are called "mad" or¶ "sane" by protestors and critics of the system. The fact remains that¶ they are men, initiating and carrying out the dictates of a rational¶ system of military terror. Calling them "mad," or considering them¶ military "male chauvinists," assures only that the rational system¶ they are part of will remain obscure, and that the responsibility of¶ each man in the Pentagon will never be understood clearly enough¶ to wage an effective political struggle against it. Nuclear disarmament¶ and peace are political questions requiring political solutions of accountability and struggle around who has the power to determine¶ the destiny of the earth. The demand for unconditional U.S.¶ disarmament holds that the U.S. government is responsible for its¶ actions and should be held accountable for them.

To raise these issues effectively, the movement for nuclear disarmament must overcome its reluctance to speak in terms of power,¶ of institutional racism, and imperialist military terror. The issues of¶ nuclear disarmament and peace have been mystified because they¶ have been placed within a doomsday frame which separates these¶ issues from other ones, saying, "How can we talk about struggles¶ against racism, poverty, and exploitation when there will be no¶ world after they drop the bombs?" The struggle for peace cannot¶ be separated from, nor considered more sacrosanct than, other¶ struggles concerned with human life and change.

In April, 1979, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency released a report on the effects of nuclear war that concludes that,¶ in a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet¶ Union, 25 to 100 million people would be killed. This is approximately¶ the same number of African people who died between 1492¶ and 1890 as a result of the African slave trade to the New World.¶ The same federal report also comments on the destruction of urban¶ housing that would cause massive shortages after a nuclear war,¶ as well as on the crops that would be lost, causing massive food¶ shortages. Of course, for people of color the world over, starvation¶ is already a common problem, when, for example, a nation's crops¶ are grown for export rather than to feed its own people. And the¶ housing of people of color throughout the world's urban areas is¶ already blighted and inhumane: families live in shacks, shanty¶ towns, or on the streets; even in the urban areas of North America,¶ the poor may live without heat or running water.

For people of color, the world as we knew it ended centuries ago. Our world, with its own languages, customs and ways, ended. And¶ we are only now beginning to see with increasing clarity that our¶ task is to reclaim that world, struggle for it, and rebuld it in our, own¶ image. The "death culture" we live in has convinced many to be¶ more concerned with death than with life, more willing to demonstrate¶ for "survival at any cost" than to struggle for liberty and peace¶ with dignity. Nuclear disarmament becomes a safe issue when it is¶ not linked to the daily and historic issues of racism, to the ways in¶ which people of color continue to be murdered. Acts of war, nuclear¶ holocausts, and genocide have already been declared on our¶ jobs, our housing, our schools, our families, and our lands.

As women of color, we are warriors, not pacifists. We must fight as a people on all fronts, or we will continue to die as a people.¶ We have fought in people's wars in China, in Cuba, in Guinea-¶ Bissau, and in such struggles as the civil rights movement, the¶ women's movement, and in countless daily

encounters with landlords, welfare departments, and schools. These struggles are not abstractions, but the only means by which we have gained the ability to eat and to provide for the future of our people.

We wonder who will lead the battle for nuclear disarmament with the vigor and clarity that women of color have learned from participating in other struggles. Who will make the political links among racism, sexism, imperialism, cultural integrity, and nuclear arsenals and housing? Who will stand up?

Afro-Pessimism Answers

AT: Afro-Pess – Top Level

Optimism and solidarity are our only hope---their strategy of negativity accepts the foundational premises of racism as its starting point for politics.
Hooks, City Univeristy New York English professor, 1996

[bell, "Killing Rage: Ending Racism" http://books.google.com/books?id=3JlNFYKLheUC&q=unitary+representations#v=snippet&q=unitary%20representations&f=false, p.249-50]

269More than ever before in our history, black Americans are succumbing to and internalizing the racist assumption that there can be no meaningful bonds of intimacy between blacks and whites. It is fascinating to explore why it is that black people trapped in the worst situation of racial oppres sion—enslavement—had the foresight to see that it would be disempowering for them to lose sight of the capacity of white people to transform themselves and divest of white supremacy, even as many black folks today who in no way suffer such extreme racist oppression and exploitation are convinced that white people will not repudiate racism. Con temporary black folks, like their white counterparts, have passively accepted the internalization of white supremacist assumptions. Organized white supremacists have always taught that there can never be trust and intimacy between the superior white race and the inferior black race. **When black people internalize these sentiments, no resistance to white supremacy is taking place; rather we become complicit in spreading racist notions.** It does not matter that so many black people feel white people will never repudiate racism because of being daily assaulted by white denial and refusal of accountability. We must not allow the actions of white folks who blindly endorse racism to determine the direction of our resistance. Like our white allies in struggle we must consistently keep the faith, by always sharing the truth that 270white people can be anti-racist, that racism is not some immutable character flaw. ¶ **Of course** many white people are comfortable with a rhetoric of race that suggests racism cannot be changed, that all white people are "inherently racist" simply because they are born and raised in this society. Such misguided thinking socializes white people both to remain ignorant of the way in which white supremacist attitudes are learned and to assume a posture of learned helplessness as though they have no agency—no capacity to resist this thinking. Luckily we have many autobiographies by white folks committed to anti-racist struggle that provide documentary testimony that many of these individuals repudiated racism when they were children. Far from passively accepting It as inherent, they instinctively felt it was wrong. Many of them witnessed bizarre acts of white racist aggression towards black folks in everyday life and responded to the injustice of the situation. Sadly, in our times so many white folks are easily convinced by racist whites and bLack folks who have internalized racism that they can never be really free of racism.¶ These feelings aíso then obsc]re the reality of white privi lege. As long as white folks are taught to accept racism as 'natura]" then they do not have to see themselves as con sciously creating a racist society by their actions, by their political choices. This means as well that they do not have to face the way in which acting in a racist manner ensures the maintenance of white privilege. Indeed, denying their agency allows them to believe white privilege does not exist even as they daily exercise it. If the young white woman who had been raped had chosen to hold all black males account able for what happened, she would have been exercising white privilege and reinforcing the structure of racist thought which teaches that all black people are alike. Unfortunately,¶ 271so many white people are eager to believe racism cannot be changed because internalizing that assumption downplays the issue of accountability. No responsibility

need be taken for not changing something ¡fit is perceived as immutable. To accept racism as a system of domination that can be changed would demand that everyone who sees him- or herself as embracing a vision of radai social equality would be required to assert anti-racist habits of being. We know from histories both present and past that white people (and everyone else) who commit themselves to living in anti-racist ways need to make sacrifices, to courageously endure the uncomfortable to challenge and change.¶ Whites, people of color, and black folks are reluctant to commit themselves fully and deeply to an anti-racist struggle that is ongoing because there is such a **pervasive feeling of hopelessness—a conviction that nothing will ever change**. **How any of us can continue to hold those feelings when we study the history of racism in this society and see how much has changed makes no logical sense.** Clearly we have not gone far enough. In the late sixties, Martin Luther King posed the question "Where do we go from here." To live in anti-racist society we must **collectively** renew our commitment to a democratic vision of racial justice and equality. Pursuing that vision we create a culture where beloved community flourishes and is sustained. Those of us who know the joy of being with folks from all walks of life, all races, who are fundamentalls' anti-racist in their habits of being. need to give public testimony. Ve need to share not only what we have experienced but the conditions of change that make such an experience possible. The interracial circle of love that I know can happen because each individual present in it has made his or her own commitment to living an anti- racist life and to furthering the struggle to end white supremacy 272 will become a reality for everyone only if those of us who have created these communities share how they emerge in our lives and the strategies we use to sustain them. Our devout commitment to building diverse communities is cen tral. These commitments to anti-racist living are just one expression of who we are and what we share with one an other but they form the foundation of that sharing. Like all beloved communities we affirm our differences. It is this generous spirit of affirmation that gives us the courage to challenge one another, to work through misunderstandings, especially those that have to do with race and racism. In a beloved community solidarity and trust are grounded in profound commitment to a shared vision. Those of us who are always anti-racist long for a world in which evezyone can form a beloved community where borders can be crossed and cultural hybridity celebrated. Anyone can begin to make such a community by truly seeking to live in an anti-racist world. If that longing guides our vision and our actions, the new culture will be born and anti-racist communities of resis tance will emerge everywhere. That is where we must go from here.

AT: Modern-Day Slavery/Michelle Alexander

Claiming racial progress is impossible obfuscates class as the underlying ideology perpetuating racism.

- Specific answer to Michele Alexander.

Reed, University of Pennsylvania political science professor, 2013

[Adolph, "The Help: How "Cultural Politics" Is Worse Than No Politics at All, and Why" http://nonsite.org/feature/django-unchained-or-the-help-how-cultural-politics-is-worse-than-no-politics-at-all-and-why]

That sort of Malcolm X/blaxploitation narrative, including the insistence that Birth of a Nation and Gone With the Wind continue to shape Americans' understandings of slavery, also is of a piece with a line of anti-racist argument and mobilization that asserts powerful continuities between current racial inequalities and either slavery or the Jim Crow regime. This line of argument has been most popularly condensed recently in Michelle Alexander's The New Jim Crow, which analogizes contemporary mass incarceration to the segregationist regime. But even she, after much huffing and puffing and asserting the relation gesturally throughout the book, ultimately acknowledges that the analogy fails.37 And it would have to fail because the segregationist regime was the artifact of a particular historical and political moment in a particular social order. Moreover, the rhetorical force of the analogy with Jim Crow or slavery derives from the fact that those regimes are associated symbolically with strong negative sanctions in the general culture because they have been vanquished. In that sense all versions of the lament that "it's as if nothing has changed" **give themselves the lie.** They are effective only to the extent that **things have changed significantly**. The tendency to craft political critique by demanding that we fix our gaze in the rearview mirror appeals to an **intellectual laziness**. Marking superficial similarities with familiar images of oppression is less mentally taxing than attempting to parse the multifarious, often contradictory dynamics and relations that shape racial inequality in particular and politics in general in the current moment. Assertions that phenomena like the Jena, Louisiana, incident, the killings of James Craig Anderson and Trayvon Martin, and racial disparities in incarceration demonstrate persistence of old-school, white supremacist racism and charges that the sensibilities of Thomas Dixon and Margaret Mitchell continue to shape most Americans' understandings of slavery do important, **obfuscatory ideological work**. They lay claim to a moral urgency that, as Mahmood Mamdani argues concerning the rhetorical use of charges of genocide, enables disparaging efforts either to differentiate discrete inequalities or to generate historically specific causal accounts of them as irresponsible dodges that abet injustice by temporizing in its face.38 But more is at work here as well.

Narratives of "modern forms of slavery" are misleading and undermine the efficacy of actions against racism.

Reed, University of Pennsylvania political science professor, 2013

[Adolph, "The Help: How "Cultural Politics" Is Worse Than No Politics at All, and Why" http://nonsite.org/feature/django-unchained-or-the-help-how-cultural-politics-is-worse-than-no-politics-at-all-and-why]

Once established, stereotypes and the folk taxonomies that legitimize them may die hard, but their significance as props for a regime of class hierarchy can change along with the political-economic foundations of the class order. Persistence of familiar narratives of hierarchy can evoke the earlier

associations, but that evocation can be misleading and counterproductive for making sense of social relations in both past and present. In particular the "just like slavery" or "just like Jim Crow" proclamations that are intended as powerful criticism of current injustices are more likely to undermine understanding of injustice in the past as well as the present than to enable new insight. Another version of the trope of the damaged ex-Confederate is illustrative.

AT: Libidinal Economy/Psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis puts the cart before the horse and distracts from widescale change necessary to solve.

Rosen-Carole, Bard College philosophy professor, 2010

[Adam, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. LXXIX, No. 1, "Menu Cards in Time of Famine: On Psychoanalysis and Politics" Wiley, p.205-7]

On the other hand, though in these ways and many others,¶ psychoanalysis seems to promote the sorts of subjective dispositions¶ and habits requisite for a thriving democracy, and though¶ in a variety of ways psychoanalysis contributes to personal emancipation—¶ say, by releasing individuals from self-defeating, damaging,¶ or petrified forms action and reaction, object attachment,¶ and the like—in light of the very uniqueness of what it has to¶ offer, one cannot but wonder: to what extent, if at all, can the¶ habits and dispositions—broadly, the forms of life—cultivated by¶ psychoanalytic practice survive, let alone flourish, under modern¶ social and political conditions? If the emancipatory inclinations¶ and democratic virtues that psychoanalytic practice promotes¶ are systematically crushed or at least regularly unsupported by¶ the world in which they would be realized, then isn't psychoanalysis¶ implicitly making promises it cannot redeem? Might not¶ massive social and political transformations be the condition for¶ the efficacious practice of psychoanalysis? And so, under current¶ conditions, can we avoid experiencing the forms of life nascently¶ cultivated by psychoanalytic practice as something of a¶ tease, or even a source of deep frustration?

(2) Concerning psychoanalysis as a politically inclined theoretical¶ enterprise, the worry is whether political diagnoses and proposals¶ that proceed on the basis of psychoanalytic insights and¶ forms of attention partake of a fantasy of interpretive efficacy¶ (all the world's a couch, you might say), wherein our profound¶ alienation from the conditions for robust political agency are¶ registered and repudiated?¶

Consider, for example, Freud and Bullitt's (1967) assessment¶ of the psychosexual determinants of Woodrow Wilson's political¶ aspirations and impediments, or Reich's (1972) suggestion that¶ Marxism should appeal to psychoanalysis in order to illuminate¶ and redress neurotic phenomena that generate disturbances in working capacity, especially as this concerns religion and bourgeois¶ sexual ideology. Also relevant are Freud's, Žižek's (1993,¶ 2004), Derrida's (2002) and others' insistence that we draw the¶ juridical and political consequences of the hypothesis of an irreducible¶ death drive, as well as Marcuse's (1970) proposal that¶ we attend to the weakening of Eros and the growth of aggression¶ that results from the coercive enforcement of the reality¶ principle upon the sociopolitically weakened ego, and especially¶ to the channeling of this aggression into hatred of enemies.¶ Reich (1972) and Fromm (1932) suggest that psychoanalysis be¶ employed to explore the motivations to political irrationality, especially¶ that singular irrationality of joining the national-socialist¶ movement, while Irigaray (1985) diagnoses the desire for the¶ Same, the One, the Phallus as a desire for a sociosymbolic order¶ that assures masculine dominance.

Žižek (2004) contends that only a psychoanalytic exposition of the¶ disavowed beliefs and suppositions of the United States political elite can¶ get at the fundamental determinants of the Iraq War. Rose (1993) argues¶ that it was the paranoiac paradox of sensing both that there is every¶ reason to be frightened and that everything is under control that allowed¶ Thatcher "to make this paradox the basis of political identity so that subjects¶ could take pleasure in violence as force and legitimacy while always¶ locating 'real' violence somewhere else—illegitimate violence and illicitness¶ increasingly made subject to the law" (p. 64). Stavrakakis (1999)¶ advocates that we recognize and traverse the residues of utopian fantasy¶ in our contemporary political imagination.1 Might not the psychoanalytic interpretation of powerful figures¶ (Bush, Bin Laden, or whomever), collective subjects (nations, ethnic¶ groups, and so forth), or urgent "political" situations register an anxiety¶ regarding political impotence or "castration" that is pacified and modified¶ by the fantasmatic frame wherein the psychoanalytically inclined¶ political theorist situates him- or herself as diagnosing or interpretively intervening in the lives of political figures, collective political subjects, or complex political situations with the idealized efficacy of a successful¶ clinical intervention? If so, then the question is: are the contributions¶ of psychoanalytically inclined political theory anything more than tantalizing¶ menu cards for meals it cannot deliver?

As I said, the worry is twofold. These are two folds of a related¶ problem, which is this: might the very seductiveness of psychoanalytic¶ theory and practice—specifically, the seductiveness of its political¶ promise—register the lasting eclipse of the political and the objectivity¶ of the social, respectively? In other words, might not everything that¶ makes psychoanalytic theory and practice so politically attractive indicate¶ precisely the necessity of wide-ranging social/institutional transformations¶ that far exceed the powers of psychoanalysis?

And so, might not the politically salient transformations of subjectivity to which psychoanalysis can contribute overburden subjectivity as¶ the site of political transformation, blinding us to the necessity of largescale¶ institutional reforms? Indeed, might not massive institutional transformations¶ be necessary conditions for the efficacy of psychoanalytic¶ practice, both personally and politically? Further, might not the so-called¶ interventions and proposals of psychoanalytically inclined political¶ theory similarly sidestep the question of the institutional transformations¶ necessary for their realization, and so conspire with our blindness to the¶ enormous institutional impediments to a progressive political future?

No solvency and not falsifiable.
Bunge, McGill University philosophy professor, 2010

[Mario, "Should Psychoanalysis Be in the Science Museum?" http://stirling-westrup-tt.blogspot.com/2010/11/tt-ns-2780-robert-bud-and-mario-bunge.html]

WE SHOULD congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an¶ exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly¶ helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny¶ helps in understanding democracy.¶ Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in¶ academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular¶ culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the¶ psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and¶ the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of¶ immaterial mind over body.¶ Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not¶ do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of¶ psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They¶ claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients¶ benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a¶ control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo¶ effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International¶ Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513).¶ More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist¶ (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of¶ psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However,¶ once again, the original studies did not involve control groups.¶ In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do¶ not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers¶ to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community -¶ a marginality typical of pseudoscience.¶ This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test.¶ True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them¶ are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the¶ testable ones have been soundly refuted.¶ For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex¶ is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to¶ have sex with their mothers. The list goes on.¶ As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts¶ do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies.¶ Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and¶ untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of¶ such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has

remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

Psychoanalysis overdetermines – it's too simplistic to explain the world.
Lear, University of Chicago philosophy professor, 2000

[Jonathon, "Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life" http://www.amazon.com/Happiness-Remainder-Tanner-Lectures-Values/dp/0674006747, p.131-2]

By 1920 Freud is ready to break up what he has come to see as a fantasied unity of mental functioning. The mind can no longer be understood in terms of the pleasure principle, but instead of living with the gap, he posits a "beyond." It is in this way that Freud takes himself to be explaining aggression. Aggression is now interpreted as the death drive diverted outward.20 It is precisely this move which locks us into an inescapably negative teleology. Let us just assume (for the sake of argument, though I think it true) that humans are aggressive animals, and that dealing with human aggression is a serious psychological and social problem. The question remains: how might one deal with it? But if, as Freud does, one interprets aggression as the most obvious manifestation of one of the two primordial forces in the universe, the answer would seem to be: there is no successful way. My first inclination is to say that this leads to a pessimistic view of the human condition; but this isn't really the issue. My second inclination is to say that this leads to a limited view of the human condition; but even this doesn't get to the heart of the problem. The point here is not to endorse an ontic optimism – that if we didn't adopt that view, we could shape life in nonaggressive ways – but to confront an ontological insight: that Freud's interpretation is an instance of bad faith. The metaphysical basicness of the death drive implies a kind of metaphysical intractability to the phenomenon of human aggression. As a matter of empirical fact, humans may be aggressive animals – and the fact of human aggression may be difficult to deal with. It may even be experienced as intractable. But to raise this purported intractability to a metaphysical principle is to obliterate the question of responsibility. And it is to cover over – by precluding – what might turn out to be significant empirical possibilities.

Violence isn't monocausal.
Muro-Ruiz, London School of Economics, 2002

[Diego, Politics Volume 22, Issue 2, pages 109–117, May 2002, "The Logic of Violence" Wiley]

Violence is, most of the time, a wilful choice, especially if it is made by an organi-sation. Individuals present the scholar with a more difficult case to argue for. Scholars of violence have now a wide variety of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even biology – and should escape easy judgements. However, the fundamental difficulty for all of us is the absence of a synthetic, general theory able of integrating less complete theories of violent behaviour. In the absence of such a general theory, researchers should bear in mind that violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations. Future research on violence will have to take in account the variety of approaches, since they each offer some understanding of the logic of violence.

AT: Social/Ontological Death – Theory

No ontological antagonism---conflict is inevitable in politics, but does not have to be demarcated around whiteness and oppression---the alt's ontological fatalism recreates colonial violence.

Hudson, University of the Witwatersrand political studies professor, 2013

[Peter, Social Dynamics, "The state and the colonial unconscious" Taylor and Francis]

Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn't excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered "ontological"), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is **not determined** once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is **nowhere engraved in ontological stone** but is political and never terminally settled. Put differently, the "curvature of intersubjective space" (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific modes of the "othering" of "otherness" are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see **Wilderson** 2008). **The social does not have to be divided into white and black**, and the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side of the **ontic** – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn't exist, the black man doesn't exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. "Whiteness" may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the "ontological difference" (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not follow that the "void" of "black being" functions as the ultimate substance, the transcendental signified **on which all possible forms of sociality** are said to **rest.** What gets lost here, then, is the **specificity** of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its "ontological" differential. A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and the imaginary give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the "lived experience" (vécu) of the colonised subject. The colonised is "traversing the fantasy" (Zizek 2006a, 40–60) all the time; the void of the verb "to be" is the very content of his interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work, who is left stranded by his very interpellation.4 "Fixed" into "non-fixity," he is eternally suspended between "element" and "moment"5 – he is where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism. Be this as it may, whiteness and blackness are (sustained by) determinate and **contingent practices** of signification; the "structuring relation" of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how tight, can always be undone. **Anti-colonial** – i.e., anti-"white" – modes of struggle are not (just) "psychic" 6 but involve the "**reactivation**" (or "de-sedimentation")7 **of colonial objectivity** itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it can't totalise or make sense of, where its production of meaning falters. This is its internal limit point, its real:9 an errant "object" that has no place

of its own, isn't recognised in the categories of the system but is produced by it – its "part of no part" or "object small a."10 Correlative to this object "a" is the subject "stricto sensu" – i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an identity that pins it down.11 That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from "subject" position based on a determinate identity.

Reflexivity on history dooms present-day action.
Farber, University of Minnesota law professor, 1998

[Daniel, 15 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 361, "KRINOCK LECTURE SERIES: IS AMERICAN LAW INHERENTLY RACIST?" Lexis]

And finally, what I fear the most is the response that seemed to be implied by one of the audience questions earlier. If it is true that American society is inherently racist, doesn't that mean that it is essentially hopeless? Now this conclusion does not logically follow from that premise, any more than it logically follows that if certain character traits have a genetic basis then it is hopeless to do anything about them. But nevertheless, we all recognize that when we are talking about individuals and biology, these genetic theories tend to discourage the idea of reform, and tend to reinforce, as a matter of social reality, the view that any bad behavior that we see is just inherent. I think we can expect to see the same kind of thing when we are dealing with the sociological equivalent involving the claim that there is this inherent genetic flaw in American society. You can see this most clearly in Derrick Bell's writings, which are redolent of despair and which, in that respect, curiously resemble Robert Bork's writings, who is similarly convinced that the genetic flaws of American society will prevent it from ever achieving his vision of justice.¶It is true that we cannot afford to forget our history. It is true that much of that history is unfortunate, if not worse. But it is also true that if we remain totally obsessed with the flaws of the past, fixated on their inevitability, we are unlikely to be able to move past them and move forward. And in particular, it seems to me that if we approach today's problems primarily as an issue in finger-pointing, in blaming somebody or another, or in finding the culprit, then we are not likely to be able to unite our society in a quest toward attacking those serious problems.

They're wrong about ontological freedom – it is reductionist.
Macedo, University of Massachusetts Boston Applied Linguistics Master of Arts program graduate program director, 2000

[Donaldo, writes the new introduction to the anniversary edition to *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p.32-3]

Freire is able to do this because he operates on one basic assumption: that man's ontological vocation (as he calls it) is to be a Subject who acts upon and transforms his world, and in so doing moves toward ever new possibilities of fuller and richer life individually and collectively. This world to which he relates is not a static and closed order, a given reality which man must accept and to which he must adjust; rather, it is a problem to be worked on and solved. It is the material used by man to create history, a task which he performs as he overcomes that which is dehumanizing at any particular time and place and dares to create the qualitatively new. For Freire, the resources for that task at the

present time are provided by the advanced technology of our Western world, but the social vision which impels us to negate the present order and demonstrate that history has not ended comes primarily from the suffering and struggle of the people of the Third World. **Coupled with this is Freire's conviction (now supported by a wide background of experience) that every human being, no matter how** "ignorant" or **submerged in the "culture of silence" he or she may be, is capable of looking critically at the world in a dialogical encounter with others**. Provided with the proper tools for such encounter, **the individual can** gradually **perceive** personal and **social reality** as well as the contradictions in it, **become conscious of his or her own perception of that reality, and deal critically with it**, in this process, the old, paternalistic teacher-student relationship is overcome. A peasant can facilitate this process for a neighbor more effectively than a "teacher" brought in from outside. "People educate each other through the mediation of the world." As this happens, the word take on new power. It is no longer an abstraction or magic but a means by which people discover themselves and their potential as they give names to things around them. As Freire puts it, **each individual wins back the right to say his or her own word, to name the world.**

[We don't endorse any gender language within this card]

Social death doesn't make sense as a theory – nothing is always something, not the absence of anything.
Moten, Duke University professor, 2013

[Fred, The South Atlantic Quarterly 112:4, Fall 2013, "Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh)" EBSCO, p.774]

Nevertheless, my first impulse in reading Wilderson's long, Trane-like¶ recitation in Incognegro of his exchange with his friend and colleague Naima¶ was to ask, in a kind of Quinean rebuttal, <u>why are we something rather than¶ nothing?</u> But <u>the real task</u>, and I follow in the footsteps of Sexton in taking it¶ up, <u>is to think about the relation between something and nothing or, if you'd¶ rather, life and death.</u> Is life surrounded by death, or does each move in and¶ as the constant permeation of the other? But this is not even precise enough.¶ <u>The question is, Where would one go or how would one go about studying¶ nothing's real presence, the thingly presence, the facticity, of the nothing¶ that is? What stance, what attitude, what comportment? If pessimism allows¶ us to discern that we are nothing, then optimism is the condition of possibility¶ of the study of nothing as well as what derives from that study. We are the¶ ones who engage in and derive from that study: blackness as black study as¶ black radicalism.</u> In the end, precisely as the end of an analysis, <u>the payment¶ of a set of social costs will have coalesced into the inability properly to assess¶ the nothingness that one claims. Blackness is more than exacted cost. Nothing¶ is not absence. Blackness is more and less than one in nothing. This,¶ informal, informing, insolvent insovereignty is the real presence of the nothing¶ we come from, and bear, and make</u>.

Wilderson misreads Fanon into a Husserlian mysticism – social life is all blackness is.
Moten, Duke University professor, 2013

Insofar as I am concerned, by way of a certain example to which Sexton appeals in order to explain (away) the difference that lies between us, with what surrounds, with what the nature is of surrounding and enclosure, I am also, of necessity, concerned with the relation between the inside and the outside, the intramural and the world. The difference that is not one is, for Sexton, a matter of "ontological reach." Perhaps he thinks of that difference as set-theoretic, a matter of calculating over infinities with the understanding that the infinity of social death is larger, as it were, than that of social life;

that the world is bigger than the other world, the underworld, the outer world of the inside song, the radical extension and exteriority that animates the enclosed, imprisoned inner world of the ones, shall we say, who are not poor in world but who are, to be more precise, poor-in-the-world. Black people are poor in the world. We are deprived in, and somehow both more and less than deprived of, the world. The question is how to attend to that poverty, that damnation, that wretchedness. I invoke Martin Heidegger's formulation regarding the animal, that it is poor in world, up against the buried contour of his question concerning the way that technology tends toward the displacement of world with a world-picture, in order to make the distinction between the animal's status and our own, which some might call even more distressing. What is it to be poor in the world? What is this worldly poverty, and what is its relation to the otherworldliness that we desire and enact, precisely insofar as it is present to us and present in us? Sexton characterizes this worldly poverty as attenuated ontological reach, but to say this is tricky and requires care. Poverty in this world is manifest in a kind of poetic access to what it is of the other world that remains unheard, unnoted, unrecognized in this one. Whether you call those resources tremendous life or social life in social death or fatal life or raw life, it remains to consider precisely what it is that the ones who have nothing have. What is this nothing that they have or to which they have access? What comes from it? And how does having it operate in relation to poverty? At the same time, for Sexton, recognition of this attenuation (which marks that fact that the tone world is, as it were, surrounded by the deaf world) is already understood to indicate possession, as it were, of ontological reach. Maybe there's another implicit distinction between ontic extension and ontological grasp. But who but the transcendental subject can have that grasp or attain the position and perspective that corresponds to it? Husserl, at the end of his career, when his own attainment of it is radically called into question, speaks of this exalted hand-eye coordination as the phenomenological attitude; a few years earlier, when his career was much nearer to its fullest height and he could claim to be master of all he surveyed—modestly, on the outer edges of his work, under the breath of his work in a way that demands a more general attunement to the phenomenological whisper—Husserl spoke of it in these terms: "I can see spread out before me the endlessly open plains of true philosophy, the 'promised land,' though its thorough cultivation will come after me" (Husserl 1982: 429). Marianne Sawicki is especially helpful, here, because she so precisely teases out the implications of his imagery. "By means of this spatial, geographical metaphor of

crossing over into the 'new land,' Husserl conveys something of the adventure and pioneer courage that should accompany phenomenological work. This science is related to 'a new field of experience, exclusively its own, the field of "transcendental subjectivity,"' and it offers 'a method of access to the transcendental-phenomenological sphere.' Husserl is the 'first explorer' of this marvelous place" (Sawicki n.d.). We should be no less forthright in recognizing that such positionality is the desire that Fanon admits, if only, perhaps, to disavow, when he conducts his philosophical investigations of the

lived experience of the black. Two questions arise: Does he disavow it? Or is it, in its necessity, the very essence of what Wilderson calls "our black capacity to desire"? Certain things about the first few paragraphs of Fanon's phenomenological analysis seem clearer to me now than when I was composing "The Case of Blackness" (Moten 2008). The desire to attain transcendental subjectivity's self-regard is emphatic even if it is there primarily to mark an interdiction, an antagonism, a declivity, a fall into the deadly experiment that will have been productive of "a genuine new departure" (Fanon 2008: xii), the end of the world and the start of the general dispossession that will have been understood as cost and benefit. But that desire returns, as something like the residual self-image of the phenomenologist that he wants to but cannot be, to enunciate the (political) ontology he says is outlawed, in what he would characterize as the neurotic language of the demand, called, as he is, to be a witness in a court in which he has no standing, thereby requiring us to reconsider, by way of and beyond a certain Boalian turn, what it is to be a specta(c)tor. Elsewhere, I misleadingly assert, Fanon is saying that there is no and can be no black social life. I now believe he says that is all there can be (Moten 2008: 177). The antephenomenology of spirit that constitutes Black Skin, White Masks prepares our approach to sociological or, more precisely, sociopoetic grounding, as Du Bois, say, or later Walter Rodney would have it, by way of the description of the impossibility of political life, which is, nevertheless, at this moment and for much of his career, Fanon's chief concern. The social life of the black, or of the colonized, is, to be sure, given to us in or through Fanon, often in his case studies, sometimes in verse, or in his narrative of the career of the revolutionary cadre. It is as if Fanon is there to remind us that the lunatic, the (revolutionary) lover, and the poet are of imagination all compact. They occupy and are preoccupied with a zone of the alternative, the zone of nonbeing (antic disposition's tendency to cut and displace organic position) that asks and requires us to consider whether it is possible to differentiate a place in the sun, a promised land, a home—or merely a place and time—in this world, from the position of the

settler. Is it possible to desire the something other than transcendental subjectivity that is called nothing? What if blackness is the name that has been given to the social field and social life of an illicit alternative capacity to desire? Basically, that is precisely what I think blackness is. I want it to be my constant study. I listen for it everywhere. Or, at least, I try to. If I read Sexton correctly, after trying to get underneath the generous severity of his lesson, he objects, rightly and legitimately, to the fact that in the texts he cites I have not sufficiently looked for it in the Afro-pessimistic texts toward which I have sometimes gestured. In the gestures I have made here I hope I have shown what it is that I have been so happy to find, that projection or relay or amplification carried out by the paraontological imagination that animates and agitates Afro-pessimism's antiregulatory force. Black optimism and Afro-pessimism are asymptotic. Which one is the curve and which one is the line? Which is the kernel and which is the shell? Which one is rational, which one is mystical? It doesn't matter. Let's just say that their nonmeeting is part of an ongoing manic depressive episode called black radicalism / black social life. Is it just a minor internal conflict, this intimate nonmeeting, this impossibility of touching in mutual radiation and permeation? Can pessimists and optimists be friends? I hope so. Maybe that's what friendship is, this bipolarity, which is to say, more precisely, the commitment to it. To say that we are friends is to say that we want to be friends. I want to try to talk about the nature and importance of the friendship I want, that I would like us to have, that we are about to have, that in the deepest sense we already more than have, which is grounded in and enabled by that commitment even as it is continually rethought and replayed by way of our differences from one another, which is held within and holds together our commonness. The difference has to do with the proper calibration of this

bipolarity. Sexton is right to suggest that the far too simple opposition between pessimism and optimism is off, and that I was off in forwarding it, or off in forwarding an imprecision that made it seem as if I were, having been seduced by a certain heuristic and its sound, thereby perhaps inadvertently seducing others into mistaking an alternating current for a direct one. The bipolarity in question is, at every instance, way too complicated for that, and I really want you to hear what we've been working on, this under-riff we've been trying to play, to study, to improvise, to compose in the hyperreal time of our thinking and that thinking's desire. There is an ethics of the cut, of contestation, that I have tried to honor and illuminate because it instantiates and articulates another way of living in the world, a black way of living together in the other world we are constantly making in and out of this world, in the alternative planetarity that the intramural, internally differenti

ated presence—the (sur)real presence—of blackness serially brings online as persistent aeration, the incessant turning over of the ground beneath our feet that is the indispensable preparation for the radical overturning of the ground that we are under.

AT: Social/Ontological Death – Empirics

**Slavery doesn't prove social death – generations of data disprove their argument.
Brown, Harvard University African American studies professor, 2009**

[Vincent, American Historical Review, "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery"
http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf, p.1235-41]

1235-1241¶ Specters of the Atlantic is a compellingly sophisticated study of the relation between¶ the epistemologies underwriting both modern slavery and modern capitalism,¶ but the book's discussion of the politics of anti-slavery is fundamentally incomplete.¶ While Baucom brilliantly traces the development of "melancholy realism" as an oppositional¶ discourse that ran counter to the logic of slavery and finance capital, he¶ has very little to say about the enslaved themselves. Social death, so well suited to¶ the tragic perspective, stands in for the experience of enslavement. While this heightens¶ the reader's sense of the way Atlantic slavery haunts the present, Baucom largely fails to acknowledge that the enslaved performed melancholy acts of accounting not¶ unlike those that he shows to be a fundamental component of abolitionist and human¶ rights discourses, or that those acts could be a basic element of slaves' oppositional¶ activities. In many ways, **the effectiveness of his text depends upon the silence of¶ slaves—it is easier to describe the continuity of structures of power when one downplays¶ countervailing forces such as the political activity of the weak**. So Baucom's¶ deep insights into the structural features of Atlantic slave trading and its afterlife¶ come with a cost. Without engagement with the politics of the enslaved, slavery's¶ history serves as an effective charge leveled against modernity and capitalism, but not as an uneven and evolving process of human interaction, and certainly not as a¶ locus of conflict in which the enslaved sometimes won small but important victories.11¶ Specters of the Atlantic is self-consciously a work of theory (despite Baucom's¶ prodigious archival research), and social death may be largely unproblematic as a¶ matter of theory, or even law. In these arenas, as David Brion Davis has argued, "the¶ slave has no legitimate, independent being, no place in the cosmos except as an¶ instrument of her or his master's will."12 But the concept often becomes a general¶ description of actual social life in slavery. Vincent Carretta, for example, in his authoritative¶ biography of the abolitionist writer and former slave Olaudah Equiano,¶ agrees with Patterson that because enslaved Africans and their descendants were¶ "stripped of their personal identities and history, [they] were forced to suffer what¶ has been aptly called 'social death.' " The self-fashioning enabled by writing and print¶ "allowed Equiano to resurrect himself publicly" from the condition that had been¶ imposed by his enslavement.13 The living conditions of slavery in eighteenth-century¶ Jamaica, one slave society with which Equiano had experience, are described in rich¶ detail in Trevor Burnard's unflinching examination of the career of Thomas Thistlewood,¶ an English migrant who became an overseer and landholder in Jamaica, and¶ who kept a diary there from 1750 to 1786. Through Thistlewood's descriptions of his¶ life among slaves, Burnard glimpses a "world of uncertainty," where the enslaved¶ were always vulnerable to repeated depredations that actually led to "significant¶ slave dehumanization as masters sought, with considerable success, to obliterate¶ slaves' personal histories." Burnard consequently concurs with Patterson: "slavery¶ completely stripped slaves of their cultural heritage, brutalized them, and rendered¶ ordinary life and normal relationships extremely difficult."14 This was slavery, after¶ all, and much more than a transfer of migrants from Africa to America.15 Yet one¶ wonders, after reading Burnard's indispensable account, how slaves in Jamaica organized¶ some of British America's greatest political events during Thistlewood's¶ time and after, including the Coromantee Wars of the 1760s, the 1776 Hanover¶ conspiracy, and the Baptist War of 1831–1832. Surely they must have found some¶ way to turn the "disorganization, instability, and chaos" of slavery into collective¶ forms of belonging and striving, making connections when confronted with alienation¶ and finding dignity in the face of dishonor. Rather than pathologizing slaves¶ by allowing the condition of social death to stand for the experience of life in slavery,¶ then, **it might be more helpful to focus on what the enslaved actually made of their¶ situation**. Among the most insightful texts to explore the experiential meaning of Afro-¶ Atlantic slavery (for both the slaves and their descendants) are two recent books by¶ Saidiya Hartman and Stephanie Smallwood. Rather than eschewing the concept of¶ social death, as might be expected from writing that begins by considering the perspective¶ of the enslaved, these two authors use the idea in penetrating ways. Hartman's¶ Lose Your Mother: A Journey along the Atlantic Slave Route and Smallwood's¶ Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora extend social¶ death beyond a general description of slavery as a condition and imagine it as an¶ experience of self. Here both the promise and the problem with the concept are most¶ fully apparent.16¶ Both authors seek a deeper understanding of the experience of enslavement and¶ its consequences for the past, present, and future of black life than we generally find¶ in histories of slavery. In Hartman's account especially, slavery is not only an object¶ of study, but also the focus of a personal memoir. She travels along a slave route in¶ Ghana, from its coastal forts to the backcountry hinterlands, symbolically reversing¶ the

first stage of the trek now commonly called the Middle Passage. In searching prose, she meditates on the history of slavery in Africa to explore the precarious nature of belonging to the social category "African American." Rendering her remarkable facility with social theory in elegant and affective terms, Hartman asks the question that nags all identities, but especially those forged by the descendants of slaves: What identifications, imagined affinities, mythical narratives, and acts of remembering and forgetting hold the category together? Confronting her own alienation from any story that would yield a knowable genealogy or a comfortable identity, Hartman wrestles with what it means to be a stranger in one's putative motherland, to be denied country, kin, and identity, and to forget one's past—to be an orphan.17 Ultimately, as the title suggests, Lose Your Mother is an injunction to accept dispossession as the basis of black self-definition. Such a judgment is warranted, in Hartman's account, by the implications of social death both for the experience of enslavement and for slavery's afterlife in the present. As Patterson delineated in sociological terms the death of social personhood and the reincorporation of individuals into slavery, Hartman sets out on a personal quest to "retrace the process by which lives were destroyed and slaves born."18 When she contends with what it meant to be a slave, she frequently invokes Patterson's idiom: "Seized from home, sold in the market, and severed from kin, the slave was for all intents and purposes dead, no less so than had he been killed in combat. No less so than had she never belonged to the world." By making men, women, and children into commodities, enslavement destroyed lineages, tethering people to owners rather than families, and in this way it "annulled lives, transforming men and women into dead matter, and then resuscitated them for servitude." Admittedly, the enslaved "lived and breathed, but they were dead in the social world of men."19 As it turns out, this kind of alienation is also part of what it presently means to be African American. "The transience of the slave's existence," for example, still leaves its traces in how black people imagine and speak of home: We never tire of dreaming of a place that we can call home, a place better than here, wherever here might be . . . . We stay there, but we don't live there . . . Staying is living in a country without exercising any claims on its resources. It is the perilous condition of existing in a world in which you have no investments. It is having never resided in a place that you can say is yours. It is being "of the house" but not having a stake in it. Staying implies transient quarters, a makeshift domicile, a temporary shelter, but no attachment or affiliation. This sense of not belonging and of being an extraneous element is at the heart of slavery.20 "We may have forgotten our country," Hartman writes, "but we haven't forgotten our dispossession."21 <u>Like Baucom, Hartman sees the history of slavery as a constituent part of a tragic present. Atlantic slavery continues to be manifested in black people's skewed life chances, poor education and health, and high rates of incarceration, poverty, and premature death. Disregarding the commonplace temporalities of professional historians, whose literary conventions are generally predicated on a formal distinction between past, present, and future</u>, Hartman addresses slavery as a problem that spans all three. The afterlife of slavery inhabits the nature of belonging, which in turn guides the "freedom dreams" that shape prospects for change. "If slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black America," she writes, "it is not because of an antiquated obsession with bygone days or the burden of a too-long memory, but because black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago."22 A professor of English and comparative literature, Hartman is in many respects in a better position than most historians to understand events such as the funeral aboard the Hudibras. This is because for all of her evident erudition, her scholarship is harnessed not so much to a performance of mastery over the facts of what happened, which might substitute precision for understanding, as to an act of mourning, even yearning. She writes with a depth of introspection and personal anguish that is transgressive of professional boundaries but absolutely appropriate to the task. <u>Reading Hartman, one wonders how a historian could ever write dispassionately about slavery without feeling complicit and ashamed</u>. For dispassionate accounting—exemplified by the ledgers of slave traders—has been a great weapon of the powerful, an episteme that made the grossest violations of personhood acceptable, even necessary. This is the kind of bookkeeping that bore fruit upon the Zong. "It made it easier for a trader to countenance yet another dead black body or for a captain to dump a shipload of captives into the sea in order to collect the insurance, since it wasn't possible to kill cargo or to murder a thing already denied life. Death was simply part of the workings of the trade." The archive of slavery, then, is "a mortuary." Not content to total up the body count, Hartman offers elegy, echoing in her own way the lamentations of the women aboard the Hudibras. Like them, she is concerned with the dead and what they mean to the living. "I was desperate to reclaim the dead," she writes, "to reckon with the lives undone and obliterated in the making of human commodities."23 It is this mournful quality of Lose Your Mother that elevates it above so many histories of slavery, but the same sense of lament seems to require that Hartman overlook small but significant political victories like the one described by Butterworth. Even as Hartman seems to agree with Paul Gilroy on the "value of seeing the consciousness of the slave as involving an extended act of mourning," she remains so focused on her own commemorations that her text makes little space for a consideration of how the enslaved struggled with alienation and the fragility of belonging, or of the mourning rites they used to confront their condition.24 <u>All of the questions she raises about the meaning of slavery in the present—both highly personal and insistently political— might as well be asked about the meaning of slavery to slaves themselves, that is, if one begins by closely examining their social and political lives rather than assuming their lack of social being</u>. Here Hartman is undone by her reliance on Orlando Patterson's totalizing definition of slavery. She asserts that "no solace can be found in the death of the slave, no higher ground can be located, no perspective can be found from which death serves a greater good or becomes anything other than what it is."25 **If she is correct, the events on the Hudibras were of negligible importance. And indeed, Hartman's understandable** ==emphasis on the personal damage wrought by slavery encourages== her to ==disavow two generations of social history that have demonstrated slaves'==

remarkable capacity to forge fragile communities, preserve cultural inheritance, and resist the predations of slaveholders. This in turn precludes her from describing the ways that violence, dislocation, and death actually generate culture, politics, and consequential action by the enslaved.26

Social death isn't useful for changing material conditions for black people.
Brown, Harvard University African American studies professor, 2009

[Vincent, American Historical Review, "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery" http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf, p.1241-3]

THE PREMISE OF ORLANDO PATTERSON'S MAJOR WORK, that enslaved Africans were natally alienated and culturally isolated, was challenged even before he published his influential thesis, primarily by scholars concerned with "survivals" or "retentions" of African culture and by historians of slave resistance. In the early to mid-twentieth century, when Robert Park's view of "the Negro" predominated among scholars, it was generally assumed that the slave trade and slavery had denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa. The historians Carter G. Woodson and W. E. B. Du Bois and the anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits argued the opposite. Their research supported the conclusion that while enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions with them to the Americas, they did maintain significant aspects of their cultural backgrounds.32 Herskovits examined "Africanisms"—any practices that seemed to be identifiably African—as useful symbols of cultural survival that would help him to analyze change and continuity in African American culture.33 He engaged in one of his most heated scholarly disputes with the sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, a student of Park's, who emphasized the damage wrought by slavery on black families and folkways.34 More recently, a number of scholars have built on Herskovits's line of thought, enhancing our understanding of African history during the era of the slave trade. Their studies have evolved productively from assertions about general cultural heritage into more precise demonstrations of the continuity of worldviews, categories of belonging, and social practices from Africa to America. For these scholars, the preservation of distinctive cultural forms has served as an index both of a resilient social personhood, or identity, and of resistance to slavery itself.35 **Scholars of slave resistance have never had much use for the concept of social death**. The early efforts of writers such as Herbert Aptheker aimed to derail the popular notion that American slavery had been a civilizing institution threatened by "slave crime."36 Soon after, studies of slave revolts and conspiracies advocated the idea that resistance demonstrated the basic humanity and intractable will of the enslaved—indeed, they often equated acts of will with humanity itself. As these writers turned toward more detailed analyses of the causes, strategies, and tactics of slave revolts in the context of the social relations of slavery, they had trouble squaring abstract characterizations of "the slave" with what they were learning about the enslaved. 37 Michael Craton, who authored Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies, was an early critic of Slavery and Social Death, protesting that what was known about chattel bondage in the Americas did not confirm Patterson's definition of slavery. "If slaves were in fact 'generally dishonored,' " Craton asked, "how does he explain the degrees of rank found among all groups of slaves—that is, the scale of 'reputation' and authority accorded, or at least acknowledged, by slave and master alike?" How could they have formed the fragile families documented by social historians if they had been "natally alienated" by definition? Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, if slaves had been uniformly subjected to "permanent violent domination," they could not have revolted as often as they did or shown the "varied manifestations of their resistance" that so frustrated masters and compromised their power, sometimes "fatally."38 The dynamics of social control and slave resistance falsified Patterson's description of slavery even as the tenacity of African culture showed that enslaved men, women, and children had arrived in the Americas bearing much more than their "tropical temperament." The cultural continuity and resistance schools of thought come together powerfully in an important book by Walter C. Rucker, The River Flows On: Black Resistance, Culture, and Identity Formation in Early America. In Rucker's analysis of slave revolts, conspiracies, and daily recalcitrance, African concepts, values, and cultural metaphors play the central role. Unlike Smallwood and Hartman, for whom "the rupture was the story" of slavery, Rucker aims to

reveal the "perseverance of¶ African culture even among second, third, and fourth generation creoles."39 He looks¶ again at some familiar events in North America—New York City's 1712 Coromantee¶ revolt and 1741 conspiracy, the 1739 Stono rebellion in South Carolina, as well as¶ the plots, schemes, and insurgencies of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat¶ Turner—deftly teasing out the African origins of many of the attitudes and actions¶ of the black rebels. Rucker outlines how the transformation of a "shared cultural¶ heritage" that shaped collective action against slavery corresponded to the "various¶ steps Africans made in the process of becoming 'African American' in culture, orientation,¶ and identity."40

The alt fails – too totalizing – it makes resistance impossible and misreads history. Walker, Graduate of Psychosocial studies, 12

(Tracey, Graduate of Psychosocial Studies at Birbeck University of London, Graduate Journal of Social Science July 2012, Vol. 9, Issue 2, " The Future of Slavery: From Cultural Trauma to Ethical Remembrance" pg. 165-167, http://gjss.org/images/stories/volumes/9/2/Walker%20Article.pdf)

To argue that there is more to the popular conception of slaves as victims who experienced social death within the abusive regime of transatlantic slavery is not to say that these subjectivities did not exist. When considering the institution of slavery we can quite confidently rely on the assumption that it did indeed destroy the self-hood and the lives of millions of Africans. Scholar Vincent Brown (2009) however, has criticised Orlando Patterson's (1982) seminal book Slavery and Social Death for positioning the slave as a subject without agency and maintains that those who managed to dislocate from the nightmare of plantation life 'were not in fact the living dead', but 'the mothers of gasping new societies' (Brown 2009, 1241).¶ The Jamaican Maroons were one such disparate group of Africans who managed to band together and flee the Jamaican plantations in order to create a new mode of living under their own rule. These 'runaways' were in fact 'ferocious fighters and master strategists', building towns and military bases which enabled them to fight and successfully win the war against the British army after 200 years of battle (Gotlieb 2000,16). In addition, the story of the Windward Jamaican Maroons disrupts the phallocentricism inherent within the story of the slave 'hero' by the very revelation that their leader, 'Queen Nanny' was a woman (Gotlieb 2000). As a leader, she was often ignored by early white historians who dismissed her as an 'old hagg' or 'obeah' woman (possessor of evil magic powers) (Gotlieb 2000, xvi). Yet, despite these negative descriptors, Nanny presents an interesting image of an African woman in the time of slavery who cultivated an exceptional army and used psychological as well as military force against the English despite not owning sophisticated weapons (Gotlieb 2000). As an oral tale, her story speaks to post-slavery generations through its representation of a figure whose gender defying acts challenged the patriarchal fantasies of the Eurocentric imaginary and as such 'the study of her experiences might change the lives of people living under paternalistic, racist, classist and gender based oppression' (Gotlieb 2000, 84).¶ The label of 'social death' is rejected here on the grounds that it is a narrative which is positioned from the vantage point of a European hegemonic ideology. Against the social symbolic and its gaze, black slaves were indeed regarded as non-humans since their lives were stunted, diminished and deemed less valuable in comparison to the Europeans. However, Fanon's (1967) assertion that 'not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man' (Fanon 1967, 110) helps us to understand that this classification can only have meaning relative to the symbolic which represents the aliveness of whiteness against the backdrop of the dead black slave (Dyer 1997). Butler (2005) makes it clear that the 'death' one suffers relative to the social symbolic is imbued with the fantasy that having constructed the Other and interpellated her into 'life', one now holds the sovereignty of determining the subject's right to live or die.¶ this death, if it is a death, is only the death of a certain kind of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of the fantasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had, in other words it is a necessary grief (Butler 2005,

65).¶ The point to make here is that although the concept of <mark>social death</mark> has proved useful for theorists to describe the metaphysical experience of those who live antagonistically in relation to the social symbolic, it <mark>is nevertheless a colonial narrative within which the slaves are confined to a one dimensional story of terror</mark>. In keeping with Gilroy's (1993b) argument that the memory of slavery must be constructed from the slaves' point of view, <mark>we might instead concentrate</mark>, not on the way in which the slaves are figured within the European social imaginary, but <mark>on how they negotiated their own ideas about self and identity.</mark> We might therefore find some value in studying a group like <mark>the Maroons</mark> who not only <mark>managed to create an autonomous world</mark> outside of the hegemonic discourse which negated them, but also, due to their unique circumstances, were forced to create new modes of communication which would include a myriad of African cultures, languages and creeds (Gottlieb 2000). <mark>This creative and resistive energy</mark> of slave subjectivity not only <mark>disrupts the colonial paradigm</mark> of socially dead slaves, but also implies the ethical tropes of creation, renewal and mutual recognition.¶ In contrast, the passive slave proved to feature heavily in the 2007 bicentenary commemorations causing journalist Toyin Agbetu to interrupt the official speeches and exclaim that it had turned into a discourse of freedom engineered mostly by whites with stories of black agency excluded8. Young's argument that 'one of the damaging side effects of the focus on white people's role in abolition is that Africans are represented as being passive in the face of oppression', appears to echo the behaviour in the UK today given that a recent research poll reveals that the black vote turnout is significantly lower than for the white majority electorate and that forty percent of second generation 'immigrants' believe that voting 'doesn't matter'.9 Yet, Gilroy (1993a) argues that this political passivity may not simply be a self fulfilling prophecy, but might allude to the 'lived contradiction' of being black and English which affects one's confidence about whether opinions will be validated in a society that, at its core, still holds on to the fantasy of European superiority (Gilroy 1993a). <mark>Without considering the slaves' capacity for survival</mark> and their fundamental role in overthrowing the European regime of slavery, <mark>we limit the use–value of the memory and risk becoming overly attached to singular slave subjectivities</mark> seeped in death and passivity. The Maroons story however, enables slave consciousness to rise above the mire of slavery's abject victims and establishes an ethical relation with our ancestors who lived and survived in the time of slavery.

Social death is empirically wrong – explicit policies created racism and explicit policies can fight it.
Bouie, The American Prospect, 2013

[Jamelle, "Making (and Dismantling) Racism" http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism]

But Coates is making a more precise claim: That there's nothing natural about the black/white divide that has defined American history. White Europeans had contact with black Africans well before the trans-Atlantic slave trade without the emergence of an anti-black racism. It took particular choices made by particular people—in this case, plantation owners in colonial Virginia—to make black skin a stigma, to make the "one drop rule" a defining feature of American life for more than a hundred years. By enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would make white supremacy the ideology of America. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then justified continued enslavement—blacks are lowly, therefore we must keep them as slaves. Slavery (and later, Jim Crow) wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it. And later policy, in the late 19th and 20th centuries, further entrenched white supremacist attitudes. Block black people from owning homes, and they're forced to reside in crowded slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from

engaging in socially sanctioned behavior—owning a home, getting married—and then blame them for the adverse consequences. Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument, that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this institution." If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma, then lifting it—as we've seen over the last decade—has helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way.

Claiming racial progress is impossible is intellectual laziness.
Reed, University of Pennsylvania political science professor, 2013

[Adolph, "The Help: How "Cultural Politics" Is Worse Than No Politics at All, and Why" http://nonsite.org/feature/django-unchained-or-the-help-how-cultural-politics-is-worse-than-no-politics-at-all-and-why]

That sort of Malcolm X/blaxploitation narrative, including the insistence that Birth of a Nation and Gone With the Wind continue to shape Americans' understandings of slavery, also is of a piece with a line of anti-racist argument and mobilization that asserts powerful continuities between current racial inequalities and either slavery or the Jim Crow regime. This line of argument has been most popularly condensed recently in Michelle Alexander's The New Jim Crow, which analogizes contemporary mass incarceration to the segregationist regime. But even she, after much huffing and puffing and asserting the relation gesturally throughout the book, ultimately acknowledges that the analogy fails.37 And it would have to fail because the segregationist regime was the artifact of a particular historical and political moment in a particular social order. Moreover, the rhetorical force of the analogy with Jim Crow or slavery derives from the fact that those regimes are associated symbolically with strong negative sanctions in the general culture because they have been vanquished. In that sense all versions of the lament that "it's as if nothing has changed" give themselves the lie. They are effective only to the extent that things have changed significantly. The tendency to craft political critique by demanding that we fix our gaze in the rearview mirror appeals to an intellectual laziness. Marking superficial similarities with familiar images of oppression is less mentally taxing than attempting to parse the multifarious, often contradictory dynamics and relations that shape racial inequality in particular and politics in general in the current moment. Assertions that phenomena like the Jena, Louisiana, incident, the killings of James Craig Anderson and Trayvon Martin, and racial disparities in incarceration demonstrate persistence of old-school, white supremacist racism and charges that the sensibilities of Thomas Dixon and Margaret Mitchell continue to shape most Americans' understandings of slavery do important, obfuscatory ideological work. They lay claim to a moral urgency that, as Mahmood Mamdani argues concerning the rhetorical use of charges of genocide, enables disparaging efforts either to differentiate discrete inequalities or to generate historically specific causal accounts of them as irresponsible dodges that abet injustice by temporizing in its face.38 But more is at work here as well.

AT: Social Death – Wilderson Indict

Black social death is based on cherry-picked data that doesn't accurately explain the world.

Bâ, Race and Postcolonial theorist, 11

(Saer Maty, "The US decentered: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation," Cultural Studies Review 17(2), September p. 385-387)

And <mark>yet **Wilderson's highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the** 'Diaspora' or 'African Diaspora'</mark>, a key component in Yearwood's thesis that, crucially, neither navel-gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, **his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter-connectivity of/in black film theory**. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott's mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood's idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, **Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott's 1990s' theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson's corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance**. Here, beyond the US-centricity or 'social and political specificity of [his] filmography', (95) I am talking about Wilderson's choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge 'a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black "body", the Black "home", and the Black "community"' (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes's Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson's dubious and questionable conclusions on black film. <mark>**Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson's propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness**</mark>. In chapter nine, '"Savage" Negrophobia', he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black 'style' ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ~~'nigger'~~ [the n word] because anyone can be a ~~'nigger'~~ [n word]. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, 'A Crisis in the Commons', Wilderson addresses the issue of 'Black time'. **Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place.** In other words**, the black moment and place are not right because they are 'the ship hold of the Middle Passage': 'the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time' but also 'the "moment" of no time at all on the map of no place at all'.** (279) Not only does Pinho's more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below**), I** also <mark>**wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians' and sociologists' works on slave ships**, **shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage**,8 **or of groundbreaking jazz-studies books on cross-cultural dialogue**</mark> like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but <mark>**once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while**</mark>

dismissing jazz as 'belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking', (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti- Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film's badly planned sequel: 'How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.' (340)

AT: Social Death – Sexton Indict

Sexton's entire K is de-contextual and based on poor evidence.
Spickard, University of California Santa Barbara history and Asian American studies professor, 2009

[Paul, American Studies Volume 50, Number 1/2, Spring/Summer 2009, "Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism. Jared Sexton. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2008." Project Muse]

Sexton does point out, as do many writers, the flawed tendencies in multiracial advocacy mentioned in the second paragraph above. But he imputes them to the whole movement and to the subject of study, and that is not a fair assessment.¶ The main problem is that Sexton argues from conclusion to evidence, rather than the other way around. That is, he begins with the conclusion that the multiracial idea is bad, retrograde, and must be resisted. And then he cherry-picks his evidence to fit his conclusion. He spends much of his time on weaker writers such as Gregory Stephens and Stephen Talty who have been tangential to the multiracial literature. When he addresses stronger figures like Daniel, Root, Nash, and Kennedy, he carefully selects his quotes to fit his argument, and misrepresents their positions by doing so.¶ Sexton also makes some pretty outrageous claims. He takes the fact that people who study multiracial identities are often studying aspects of family life (such as the shaping of a child's identity), and twists that to charge them with homophobia and nuclear family-ism. That is simply not accurate for any of the main writers in the field. The same is true for his argument by innuendo that scholars of multiraciality somehow advocate mail-order bride services. And sometimes Sexton simply resorts to ad hominem attacks on the motives and personal lives of the writers themselves. **It is a pretty tawdry exercise**.

2ac – Essentialism Turn

Ontological blackness relies on whiteness – that makes liberation illusory – it is also too totalizing a view of black existence to be useful.
Pinn, Macalester College Professor of Religious Studies, 4

(Anthony, Dialog: A Journal of Theology, Volume 43, Number 1, Spring 2004, '''Black Is, Black Ain't'': Victor Anderson, African American Theological Thought, and Identity', pg.57-58, Wiley online Library)

This connection between ontological blackness and religion is natural because: ''ontological blackness signifies the totality of black existence, a binding together of black life and experience. In its root, *religio*, religion denotes tying together, fastening behind, and binding together. Ontological blackness renders black life and experience a totality.''13 According to Anderson, Black theological discussions are entangled in ontological blackness. And accordingly, discussions of black life revolve around a theological understanding of Black experience limited to suffering and survival in a racist system. The goal of this theology is to find the ''meaning of black faith'' in the merger of black cultural consciousness, icons of genius, and post-World War II Black defiance. An admirable goal to be sure, but here is the rub: Black theologians speak, according to Anderson, in opposition to ontological whiteness when they are actually dependent upon whiteness for the legitimacy of their agenda. Furthermore, ontological blackness's strong ties to suffering and survival result in blackness being dependent on suffering, and as a result social transformation brings into question what it means to be black and religious. Liberative outcomes ultimately force an identity crisis, a crisis of legitimation and utility. In Anderson's words: Talk about liberation becomes hard to justify where freedom appears as nothing more than defiant self-assertion of a revolutionary racial consciousness that requires for its legitimacy the opposition of white racism. Where there exists no possibility of transcending the blackness that whiteness created, African American theologies of liberation must be seen not only as crisis theologies; they remain theologies in a crisis of legitimation.14 This conversation becomes more ''refined'' as new cultural resources are unpacked and various religious alternatives acknowledged. Yet the bottom line remains racialization of issues and agendas, life and love. Falsehood is perpetuated through the ''hermeneutic of return,'' by which ontological blackness is the paradigm of Black existence and thereby sets the agenda of Black liberation within the ''postrevolutionary context'' of present day USA. One ever finds the traces of the Black aesthetic which pushes for a dwarfed understanding of Black life and a sacrifice of individuality for the sake of a unified Black 'faith'. Yet differing experiences of racial oppression (the stuff of ontological blackness) combined with varying experiences of class, gender and sexual oppression call into question the value of their racialized formulations. Implicit in all of this is a crisis of faith, an unwillingness to address both the glory and guts of Black existence—nihilistic tendencies that, unless held in tension with claims of transcendence, have the potential to overwhelm and to suffocate. At the heart of this dilemma is friction between ontological blackness and ''contemporary postmodern black life''—issues, for example related to ''selecting marriage partners, exercising freedom of movement, acting on gay and lesbian preferences, or choosing political parties.''15 How does one foster balance while embracing difference as positive? Anderson looks to Nietzsche.

Essentializing black identity takes out solvency.
Hooks, City Univeristy New York English professor, 1996

[bell, "Killing Rage: Ending Racism"
http://books.google.com/books?id=3JlNFYKLheUC&q=unitary+representations#v=snippet&q=unitary%2
0representations&f=false, p.249-50]

Unitary representations of black identity do not reflect the real lives of African Americans who struggle to create self and identity. Psychoanalytically, it is clear that the unitary self is sustained only by acts of coercive control and repression. Collectively African Americans fear the loss of a unitary representation of blackness because they feel we will lose a basis for organized resistance. ¶In retheorizing black subjectivity we have to also revise our understanding of the conditions that are needed for black folks to join together in a politics of solidarity that can effectively oppose white supremacy. Breaking with essentialist thinking that insists all black folks inherently realize that we have something positive to gain by resisting white supremacy allows us to collectively acknowledge that radical politiciza-tion is a process—that revolutionary black thinkers and activists are made, not born. Progressive education for critical consciousness then is automatically understood to be necessary to any construction of radical black subjectivity. Whether the issue is construction of self and identity or radical politici-zation, African-American subjectivity is always in process. Fluidity means that our black identities are constantly changing as we respond to circumstances in our families and communities of origin, and as we interact with a larger world. Only by privileging the reality of that changing black identity will we be able to engage a prophetic discourse about subjectivity that will be liberatory and transformative.

2ac – Black/White Binary Turn

Anti-blackness is <u>not the master-key</u>—the focus on it as such skews discussions of racial justice and promotes nationalistic and xenophobic forms of racism
Sunstrom, University of San Francisco philosophy professor, 2008

[Ronald, "The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice" http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/rrsundstrom/selected-articles/black-white-binary.pdf, pp. 65-6]

<u>The future of race</u> in the United States, or elsewhere, <u>will not be determined</u> solely <u>through</u> the American instinct to return to <u>black white politics</u>—as if the question of the conservation or elimination of race and racial justice is in the hands of whites and blacks who need to hash out their issues for the sake of all of us. <u>That somehow American racial problems are primarily black and white</u> problems **is the conceit** of too many Americans. ¶ This conceit is rooted in an image of an America defi ned by Protestantism, the English language, and its ties to Europe and populated by fading yet romantic "Indians," a few Mexicans, and "Orientals" but dominated by whites and blacks. In this fantasy, <u>the racial problems that we have are determined by the</u> painful yet interesting <u>history between whites and blacks.</u> From here, liberals and conservatives part company, but <u>the central vision holds</u>—both sides affirm that black-white division is the United States' core racial problem, and <u>that solving black-white confl ict is **the master key to all of its racial problems**</u>. ¶ The result of this assumption has been that the concerns, problems, and questions, specific to blacks and whites and the relationship between them, have historically dominated discourse over race in the United States. <u>The domination of this focus</u>, often <u>called the blackwhite binary, has colored the U.S. reaction toward</u>, and policies about, <u>Native Americans, Asians, Latinos, and its colonial subjects, such as Puerto Ricans and Filipinos.</u>1 <u>The color line</u>, which W. E. B. Du Bois famously claimed marked the twentieth century and spanned the globe, <u>was imagined in the cast of the black-white binary</u>. ¶ In the following sections I clarify various conceptions of the black-white binary and consider their relative merits and failings. I then turn to the host of objections against this binary. I support the primary complaint against <u>the binary</u>, that it **does not engender accurate descriptions of the United States' racial past** or present, <u>and</u> **it skews discussions of the future** of race **and racial justice** toward the <u>perspectives and interests of blacks and whites</u>. <u>Some readers</u> may <u>think that the problems with the black-white binary are so obvious and great that the subject is not worth a chapter-length study</u>. I urge such readers to momentarily suspend their incredulity about the blackwhite binary so that they can consider the demands for justice that motivate its proponents. I argue that the black-white binary should not simply be dismissed, for incautious dismissals of it end up casting off the demands of justice that frequently motivate statements that seemingly support the binary. Nonetheless, <u>there are troubling aspects of the black-white binary that go beyond the usual objections, leading</u>, fi nally, <u>to its total rejection</u>. <u>The black-white binary is **rooted in** a peculiar conception of black-white American nationalism and xenophobia</u> that is ultimately hostile to American multiculturalism. <u>Such a view is fundamentally illiberal,</u> and the **people of the United States should not capitulate to its desire that the false image of America as black and white not be upset**.

2ac – Black/White Binary Turn – Model Minority

The deployment of the 1nc reifies the black white binary – even if the Sapphire is a heuristic for understanding oppression, the presentation of the 1nc is divisive. If it is a heuristic, the perm is best.

Hutchinson 4 (Darren Lenard, JD from Yale, BA in Political Science and Economics from the University of Pennsylvania, "Critical Race Histories: In and Out", http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=aulr&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar_url%3Fhl%3Den%26q%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fdigitalcommons.wcl.american.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1102%2526context%253Daulr%26sa%3DX%26scisig%3DAAGBfm2VQ7OWExXQKB8eDDBDqMjVp-xseg%26oi%3Dscholarr#search=%22http%3A%2F%2Fdigitalcommons.wcl.american.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1102%26context%3Daulr%22)

A third area of critical race innovation involves multiracial politics. Internal critics have argued that racial discourse in the United States fixates upon black/white racial issues, thereby marginalizing Latino, Native American, and Asian American experiences.95 Empirically, this observation is indisputable. Race theorists lack a full understanding of the breadth of racial injustice. The inclusion of the experiences of Latinos, Native Americans, and Asian Americans in racial discourse can improve CRT in several ways. First, a multiracial discourse permits a full accounting of the problem of racial inequality and allows for the construction of adequate remedies for racial subordination.96 Although all people of color suffer racism, often in similar ways, racial hierarchies impact communities of color in diverse ways. A narrow focus on black/white subjugation severely limits the reach of antiracist remedies. The black/white paradigm also prevents persons of color from engaging in coalition politics.97 By treating racism as a problem that affects blacks primarily (or exclusively), racial discourse in the United States **divides persons of color** who could align to create formidable political forces in the battle for racial justice. Binary racial discourse also causes persons of color to compete for the attention of whites, as marginalized racial groups treat racial justice as a zero-sum game.98 Instead of recognizing the pervasiveness and complexity of racial injuries, binary racial discourse leads to the tyranny of oppression ranking and to competing demands for centrality in a marginalized space of racial victimization. Recently, Critical Race Theorists, responding to the multiracial critics, have attempted to contextualize binary racial discourse. Devon Carbado, for example, recognizes the existence of the so-called black/white paradigm but pushes its critics to consider that this paradigm privileges whites and subordinates blacks.99 Because blacks and whites are situated differently with respect to the black/white paradigm, their investment in binary racial discourse likely serves diverging interests.100 If whites created the paradigm, then directing multiracial critiques toward black scholars might be misguided. Furthermore, several scholars, including those who reject binary racial politics, have documented the unique experiences of blacks in the construction of racism in the United States.101 "Black exceptionalism"102 might provide a historical and sociological explanation for the predominance of black/white racial discourse. Also, resistance to multiracial discourse among blacks might exist because non-black persons of color often benefit from white supremacy. That is, non-black persons of color sometimes align themselves ideologically and culturally with whites to elevate their status in a racially hierarchical society.103 The embrace of racial hierarchy among people of color and white-supremacist privileging (even if shifting and extremely limited) of non-black communities of color impede the willingness of blacks to engage in multiracial discourse. Furthermore, black experiences are relevant to the experiences of other persons of color for two reasons. First, anti-black racism provides an institutional and historical framework for the subordination of non-black persons of color.104 Much of the racial hierarchy in the United States was concretized during slavery—though not exclusively.105 The formation of a rigid racial caste structure in the black/white context legitimizes racist practices against all persons of color.106 Second, persons of color do not exist in mutually exclusive groups. Latino communities, for example, have large populations of persons of African descent; thus, it is difficult to bifurcate Latino and black experiences.107 Abolishing the black/white paradigm, therefore, might preclude analysis of the unique experiences facing black Latinos. Ultimately, however, the exclusive deployment of a binary black/white paradigm artificially narrows racial discourse and harms racial justice efforts. In order to construct adequate antiracist theories and to develop effective remedies for racial injustice, Critical Race Theorists must excavate the multidimensional harms that racial injustice causes, including harms that are racial but not endured by blacks. Furthermore, progressive racial politics can only survive with broad political support. The most likely support for progressive racial change comes from persons of color. Yet, the deep divisions that

result from binary racial politics hinders the formation of helpful antiracist alliances. Finally, a multiracial discourse may help blacks demonstrate the pervasiveness of racial inequality. Whites tend to view racism as a relic of prior generations, and they often respond to blacks' claims of ongoing racial injustice with suspicion.108 Moreover, in a white-supremacist culture, binary racial discourse obscures the experiences of discrimination experienced by Latinos and Asian Americans.109 As a result, whites argue that blacks should emulate "model minorities," usually Asian Americans, who either do not suffer from racism or do not believe that racism injures them enough to oppose it on a political level.110 Binary racial discourse therefore allows whites to discredit blacks' claims of racism by offering Asian Americans as proof that the United States has eradicated racial injustice, or that blacks can easily overcome what "little" racism still exists. Multiracial discourse, however, offers a powerful rebuttal to this negative and deceitful discourse. By portraying the complexity of racial inequality, Critical Race Theorists can counter a white-supremacist narrative that disparages blacks' assertions of racial injustice by deploying model minority constructs.111

2ac – Black/White Binary Turn – Islamophobia

The K doesn't solve – focus on the black-white binary papers over how Arabs and Muslims are not only looked at as black BUT also foreign – the world of the alt in no way guarantees a world without Islamophobia.
Wing, University of Iowa law professor, 2003

[Adrien Katherine, 63 La. L. Rev. 717, "Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism" Lexis]

As we await the decisions in the University of Michigan affirmative action cases, n1 this symposium raises a timely and important query: is civil rights law dead? This article answers that query by asserting that there is a need for a thorough reconceptualization in the 21st century. Historically, civil rights in the United States has been synonymous with the struggle of African Americans to attain racial equality with white Americans. n2 The battles of other ethnic minorities, such as Latinos, Asians and Native Americans, not to mention the struggles of other victims of discrimination such as women, gays, the disabled or the aged, have often received secondary attention. n3 Some scholars and activists would assert that, given the unique history of Blacks as slaves [*718] in this country, the continuation of the so-called black-white binary or emphasis is still justified. n4 In my view, we must expand our civil rights efforts beyond all the above mentioned groups to include those that do not easily fit into historic racial categories: specifically Arabs and Muslims, who have faced especially increased discrimination since September 11, 2001. n5 That day clearly changed the United States, if not the world, in very profound ways. n6 Since then, the War on Terrorism has taken precedence in both U.S. foreign and domestic policy. In late 2001, the foreign policy aspect manifested itself as a literal war in Afghanistan that overthrew the globally despised Taliban regime. n7 Shortly after the symposium for which this paper was composed took place, the U.S. launched a war against Iraq to overthrow its long term leader Saddam Hussein and destroy any weapons of mass destruction. n8 On the domestic front, these wars have had profound effects on the civil liberties of both noncitizens and citizens, particularly Arabs, Muslims, and those who resemble them. n9 Part II of this article details how the civil rights of Arabs and Muslims have been restricted both before and after September 11, 2001. n10 Using a Critical Race Theory (CRT) n11 analysis, we shall see how these groups have been socially constructed as "Black," with the negative legal connotations historically attributed to that designation. For example, racial profiling, which originated as a term synonymous with Blacks and police traffic stops, n12 now equally applies to both Arabs and Muslims in many contexts. [*719] Part III draws upon CRT for answers for how to solidify a new, more inclusive civil rights movement. n13 Critical Race Praxis, combining theory and practice, will be detailed as a means to create solutions to the civil rights dilemmas facing all groups, including Arabs and Muslims. Part IV suggests a specific form of praxis, coalition building, as a problematic but appropriate means for the new and old components of the civil rights movement to intersect and perhaps join forces from time to time. n14 Part V concludes with specific proposals for coalitions that may help alleviate the bleak situation currently facing Arabs and Muslims. n15

This epistemological exclusion does more than just excluding cultural forms of racism from our discussion, it <u>actively replicates them</u>—the view of American racism as a black/white issue helped solidify xenophobic violence against Arab bodies in the war on terror as foreign issues outside the American schema
Sunstrom, University of San Francisco philosophy professor, 2008

[Ronald, "The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice" http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/rrsundstrom/selected-articles/black-white-binary.pdf, pp. 77-9]

To underline this fi nal point, <u>the critiques of the binary</u> offered by legal scholars, such as Juan Perea and Richard Delgado, <u>underscore the dangers that Alcoff's critique exposes</u>.34 Delgado in particular distinguishes three ways that <u>the binary negatively affects Latinos and Asian Americans</u>. First, <u>it has framed the legal conception of equal protection **in terms of the struggle for equal black citizenship.** That frame aids in **discrimination against nonwhite immigrants** and undermines the equal protection of Latino/a and Asian American citizens</u>. Second, <u>the binary **plays into contractarian justifications for the national self-determination of citizenship** and thus **cements past race-based (and racist) definitions of citizenship**</u>. Third, <u>the binary places Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans "**out of sight" and thus out of the discourse of racial justice**</u>. The consequence of the normative force of the binary is that African Americans, according to Delgado, are trained to pursue, and are recognized as the primary legitimate recipients of, benefi ts and protections that fl ow from antidiscrimination laws. ¶ <u>The black-white binary, as a "template" or master key, demarcates who is a proper subject of our thoughts about race, racism, and civil rights</u>. Consequently, <u>some individuals and groups, and their respective interests, are left out of public deliberations</u> of race and social justice, <u>and are typifi ed as</u>, quite literally, **foreign issues**. Legal scholar Juan Perea put it this way: ¶ <u>If Latinos/as and Asian Americans are presumed to be White</u> by both White and Black writers . . . then <u>our claims to justice will not be heard or acknowledged</u>. Our <u>claims can be ignored by Whites, since we are not Black and therefore are not subject to real racism.</u> And our claims can be ignored by Blacks, since we are presumed to be, not Black, but becoming White, and therefore not subject to real racism. Latinos/as do not fi t the boxes supplied by the paradigm.35 ¶ <u>In the wake of the reaction of the United States to the terrorist</u> strikes against the World Trade Center towers, **the black-white binary's role as principle of exclusion in the service of American nationalism took on an ugly clarity**.36 It **assuaged American worries about racism** as it targeted Arabs, Middle Easterners, and Muslims in the war against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the war against Iraq, and the everlasting war on terror.37 <u>Whatever the role of racism</u> in the rounding up, questioning, detention, and expulsion of Arabs, Muslims, and people from the Middle East, **the United States was comforted by the "United We Stand" rhetoric, and a rainbow coalition of Americans helped author and justify the United States' reactions to terrorism**. Thus <u>practices such as the racial profi ling of Arabs, Muslims,</u> and those who look like them, to our eyes, <u>met with 60 percent approval ratings</u>, while before the war 80 percent of Americans disapproved of racial profi ling, a sentiment that George Bush and even John Ashcroft supported before the war. ¶ **It is of great consequence that this exclusion is a result of a particular black-white normative vision of the American nation as being properly and primarily black and white**. The implication is that <u>the black-white binary is **a nativist idea that aids the continued exclusion** of Latinos, Asian Americans, and other nonwhite immigrant groups, **such as Arabs and Muslims, from full citizenship and equal protection**</u>.38

EXTN – Black/White Binary Turn

The 1NC and Block's argument will almost entire rely on a historical narrative of slavery—"the founding of America is tied to antiblackness and means it comes first"— even it's factually accurate, it is not a defense of their politics—their historic analysis doesn't respond to the complexities of <u>Modern America</u> which undermines effective racial politics and specifically marginalizes indigenous oppression

Sunstrom, University of San Francisco philosophy professor, 2008

[Ronald, "The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice" http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/rrsundstrom/selected-articles/black-white-binary.pdf, pp. 81-2]

<u>The</u> sixth form of the <u>binary is justifi ed</u> for some <u>because of the historical precedence of the African American experience, as well as the relative severity of the confl ict</u> between African Americans and whites. For others, such as Mary Frances Berry, Andrew Hacker, and Toni Morrison, <u>the sixth form has additional justifi cation because</u>, as Toni Morrison put it, <u>assimilation and integration into the United States happen upon the "backs of blacks."</u> My objection to the fourth form of the binary (that it names prescriptive patterns of racial organization) undermines the latter claim, and without it the fi rst claim is not as signifi cant. <u>Mainstream African American demands for justice deserve satisfaction, and those claims</u> **do not need the black-white binary as justifi cation**. Worse, <u>the black-white binary</u> in the contemporary multiethnic United States, <u>with the complexities of its history in which the confl ations of the black-white binary are invalid</u>, <u>undermines the realization of social justice</u> for all <u>because it,</u> as Alcoff argued, "**seriously undermines the possibility of achieving coalitions**."42 Therefore, <u>public deliberations</u> that <u>commence</u> by professions of the black-white binary <u>are</u> **anti-political** **and either imperil or end public communication** on race and social justice. ¶ Additionally, <u>the basic historical claim</u> of the sixth form of the binary is **suspicious when Native American claims are considered.** <u>Native Americans possess their own history</u> as a group defi ned as a national other and enemy of the United States. <u>The history of Native Americans</u>, since 1492, <u>has been interwoven with that of the descendents of Africans</u> brought to the Americas by European powers, <u>but their history is distinct</u> in terms of geography, language, culture, international political treaties, and the formation of sovereign nations within North and South America and the Caribbean. **The claims of the black-white binary are so totalizing that it would erase the importance of this history by assimilating Native Americans in the black-white system.** This is the reason <u>Native Americans scholars</u>, such as Vine Deloria and David Wilkins, <u>need to remind Americans that Native Americans are members of "sovereign nations" and are not minorities</u>; or, in the words of Will Kymlicka, indigenous Americans are "national minorities" rather than a "polyethnic" group.43 <u>The black-white binary does violence to that distinction by erasing Native Americans' claims of precedence</u> and envisioning a state of national racial harmony that is at odds with Native American sovereignty.

You make other minorities invisible which makes anti-blackness inevitable.

Espinoza, Boston College law professor, Harris, University of California Berkeley law professor, 1997

[Leslie and Angela, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1585, "AFTERWORD: Embracing the Tar-Baby - LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race" Lexis]

The argument for black exceptionalism is usually not articulated in mixed company in the interests of interracial solidarity. I have set out the argument, not because I believe it to be right, but because I believe that Perea's direct challenge to the black-white paradigm and the power and promise of LatCrit theory more generally forces it into the open. The claim of black exceptionalism presents both an intellectual and a political challenge to LatCrit theory. As an intellectual claim, black exceptionalism answers Perea's criticism of the black-white paradigm by responding that the paradigm, though wrongly making "other nonwhites" invisible, rightly places black people at the center of any analysis of American culture or American white supremacy. In its strongest form, black exceptionalism argues that what "white" people have done to "black" people is at the heart of the story of America; indeed, the story of "race" itself is the story of the construction of blackness and whiteness. In this story, Indians, Asian Americans, and Latino/as do exist. But their roles are subsidiary to, rather than undermining, the fundamental binary national drama. As a political claim, black exceptionalism exposes the deep mistrust and tension among American ethnic groups racialized as "nonwhite."

Even after having issued my disclaimers, I feel queasy writing these words. Not only does black exceptionalism present a serious threat of [*1604] political division; the fact that I write about it in a symposium on LatCrit theory is politically suspect. Trina Grillo and Stephanie Wildman have written perceptively about the ways in which people who are members of a dominant group expect always to be given center stage, and will attempt to take back the center if they are momentarily denied it. n60 In these circumstances, I am a member of the dominant group. Until very recently, African Americans have numerically dominated critical race theory. To turn the subject back to African Americans at the end of a symposium devoted to Latino/as is a perfect example of taking back the center.

Nevertheless, I think I can justify this politically suspicious move, at least to myself. First, the claim of black exceptionalism represents something larger than the narrow interests of African Americans: it is an example of the conflicts that emerge from what Eric Yamamoto calls "differential racialization" and "differential disempowerment." n61 LatCrit theory is emerging at a time when the United States is rapidly becoming more multiracial than ever before. As the preceding examples of conflict among "people of color" suggest, contemporary race theory must come to terms with tensions among "nonwhite" groups as well as the ever-present tension with "whites." Indeed, LatCrit theory's attack on the black/white paradigm itself engages the problem of developing a multidimensional race theory. On its own terms, then, LatCrit theory demands an understanding of white supremacy that goes beyond the binary of oppressed/oppressor. [*1605]

Black/white binary papers over different ways of experiencing oppression – it is not useful for countering whiteness.
Espinoza, Boston College law professor, Harris, University of California Berkeley law professor, 1997

[Leslie and Angela, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1585, "AFTERWORD: Embracing the Tar-Baby - LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race" Lexis]

What, then, of the claim to black exceptionalism? Is the LatCrit attack on the black/white paradigm, as Leslie suggests, a veiled attack on African Americans? Certainly one scenario of the decades to come is a

struggle for intellectual as well as political and economic power between African Americans and Latinos, the struggle that Jack Miles names "blacks against browns." n174₁ The message of black exceptionalism is that this struggle can have only one outcome. Consider a model of American race relations in which "whiteness" is at the top and "blackness" at the bottom. Ethnic groups lacking a stable identification with either category have a choice: [*1637] they may struggle to be accepted as white; they may proclaim themselves "black"; or they may struggle to be accepted as neither. n175 Of course, both color categories are metaphysical rather than biological: achieving whiteness may be accomplished through cultural assimilation rather than plastic surgery, and people visually identified as "black" may nevertheless strive to distance themselves from niggers [the n word]. The prize here is not physical conformity but social status.₁ The claim of black exceptionalism reveals the fear that nonwhite, nonblack people will choose not to challenge the hierarchy that places white over black but to accomodate it. Haney Lopez describes the lure of "ethnicity" for Latino/as, who, in rejecting a racial designation for themselves, are implicitly rejecting blackness, just as in earlier generations Latino/as protected their status as "white." Similarly, many African Americans suspect that Asian Americans will find the "model minority" myth a convenient way to achieve social, economic, and political power: a way to distance themselves from, indeed contrast themselves to, black people. Even if this is not the conscious intent of nonwhite, nonblack people, the power of the opposition between white and black may be such that any attempt to distinguish oneself from black people simply reinforces the degraded status of blackness. n176 Thus, whether Latino/as and Asian Americans seek to profit from the black-white paradigm by struggling to be accepted as white or simply by struggling to be accepted as not black, the result for African Americans is the same: once again, as with the Irish and other formerly "not yet white" ethnic groups, African Americans serve as the stepstool that other groups stand on as they advance in achieving social power and status.₁ What this model leaves out, however, is the complexity that LatCrit theory can bring to the analysis of blackness itself. Take, for example, LatCrit's shift in focus from viewing "race" as an immutable trait to viewing it as a conflation of biology, culture, and nation. At first glance, this shift may appear to have little relevance for African Americans. After all, white supremacy against African Americans has been based for the most part on color discrimination, supplemented by notions of "blood," rather than on cultural or national origin discrimination. Moreover, since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, African [*1638] Americans have been citizens, not subject to the sovereign exclusionary power of the United States. n177 But just as it would be a mistake for Latino/as to accept the current bifurcation of discrimination into that based on "immutable" traits versus that based on "mutable" ones - and the attendant bifurcation of racialism into "race" and "ethnicity" - it would be a mistake for African Americans as well. The move beyond color begins to acknowledge the cultural bases of African-American identity in other, more subtle ways. Not all African Americans look "black" or experience color discrimination. n178 Not all black people in the United States are African Americans; there are important, if often unacknowledged, divisions between African and Caribbean immigrants and native-born African Americans. Many African Americans feel the pressure to assimilate to white culture, a pressure that leaves them struggling to "pass" socially if not physically. n179 The project of black liberation is left incomplete if employers are prevented from refusing to hire or promote African Americans but are free to force them to look and act as "white" as possible. n180₁ Finally, the Supreme Court's increasingly vehement denial that race is anything other than skin color threatens the political strength of African-American communities. n181 As Alex Johnson has noted, for African Americans, blackness is not simply an accident of birth but the [*1639] focus of an ethnicity - a distinct way of being in the world. n182 To the extent that white supremacy maintains itself by attacking the

cultural practices that sustain blackness as an ethnicity, African Americans and Latino/as have a shared interest in questioning the bright line between mutable and immutable traits, biology and culture.¶ African Americans also have an interest in recognizing a larger geopolitical context for white supremacy. For instance, to the extent that African Americans are concerned about Africa and its relations with the West, it is necessary to understand that white supremacy is not solely a domestic phenomenon, but is inextricable from the colonial practices that gave it birth. n183 Finally, the concept of nativist racism shines a different sort of light on the claim of black exceptionalism. Focusing on the unique oppression of blacks obscures both the global and the local complexities of white supremacy. From a global perspective, the perpetuation of nativist racism puts American whites and blacks into collusion against foreign, nonwhite Others. From a local perspective, the exclusive focus on black oppression obscures the fact that African Americans are not always the ~~niggers~~ [n word]. In some areas in the Southwest where few black people live, it is Mexicans, or Indians, who are treated as ~~niggers~~[the n word].Black exceptionalism takes the part for the whole, and in so doing not only damages the material interests of African Americans but also enlists them in the project of preserving white supremacy.¶Consider, then, a different model of United States race relations: a box with the mystical Other (perhaps a ~~nigger~~ [n word]; perhaps a threatening foreigner) at the bottom and perfectly transparent, cultureless whiteness at the top. African Americans still have a unique liability in their historic association with the ~~nigger~~ [n word], but each ethnic group has ways and means, some more powerful than others, of strengthening its position within the box. People who speak unaccented Standard English, people with pale skins, round eyes, and straight hair, and people who are citizens all have the opportunity to profit by distancing themselves from the Other. Some groups have the opportunity to access white privilege through language, others through color, still others through familiarity with the [*1640] dominant culture. This model is slightly more complex than the previous one, in that it does not suggest that blacks and no others are locked into the bottom position. Which group wins the competition for power and status depends in part on local conditions.

Privilege K Answers

AT: Privilege – Reductive

Privilege theory is reductive and elitist – it collapses into idealism and recreates liberalism.
Choonara and Prasad, International Socialism Journal, 2014

[Esme and Yuri, "What's wrong with privilege theory?" http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=971]

Most privilege theorists would also agree that <u>the "privileged" should not be called on to give up their advantages</u>—though primarily <u>because</u> they believe that <u>privilege is something that cannot be got rid of</u>, not because of a need for wider solidarity. As Michael Kimmel puts it, "<u>One can no more renounce privilege than one can stop breathing</u>".40 This is a very pessimistic theory—just as someone cannot renounce their privilege, they cannot avoid being complicit in oppressing others. <u>They can only aspire to greater awareness of their "privilege"</u> and attempt to curb or legislate against the worst expressions of it. Ironically <u>the idea that we can't escape our "privileges"</u> <u>seems</u> to echo the Marxist notion that "being determines consciousness"—someone's ideas and behaviours flow directly from their position of "privilege" or "penalty". But this <u>highly reductive and deterministic</u> view <u>of how oppressive ideas are formed is</u>, as we have seen, a long way from Marxism. First, <u>someone's "being" in this sense cannot just be reduced to a sum of what oppressions they do or don't suffer. Second, there is a range of ideas across society, including among the oppressed—and there is no direct correlation between ideas and the level of oppression an individual faces. People's ideas are not fixed—otherwise why bother with argument</u>, political organisation and so on? <u>Finally people are not just passive objects—we constantly act on and interact with the world around us</u>. In particular the antagonism at the heart of capitalism compels people to fight back, creating a situation in which <u>human agency</u> <u>changes</u> not just the world around them, but also the <u>people themselves</u>. <u>Privilege theory also expresses a form of elitism—we are all seen to be inescapably bound to innate bias and oppressive ideas except the theorists themselves</u> who have been able to reach a degree of enlightened self-awareness. <u>Those who see us all as prisoners of our unearned advantages can only ever expect to persuade a minority to acknowledge their privileges. In this way, despite superficially appearing to be rooted in material reality, **privilege theory actually collapses into idealism**—seeing ideas as the crucial factor.</u> That is why for privilege theory the key focus is education and awareness. <u>This approach has a lot in common with liberalism—a focus on educating individuals and a moral imperative to strive for justice</u>, without believing that inequality can be completely overcome (presumably without wiping out men or white people or heterosexuals at least).

AT: Privilege – Structures Key

Pointing out privilege isn't useful – it distracts from structures that perpetuate privilege.
Smith, University of California Riverside cultural studies professor, 12-13-13

[Andrea, "The Problem with Privilege" http://andrea366.wordpress.com/author/andrea366/]

In my experience working with a multitude of anti-racist organizing projects over the years, I frequently found myself participating in various workshops in which participants were asked to reflect on their gender/race/sexuality/class/etc. privilege. These workshops had a bit of a self-help orientation to them: "I am so and so, and I have x privilege." It was never quite clear what the point of these confessions were. It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in question had her/his proclaimed privilege. It did not appear that these individual confessions actually led to any political projects to dismantle the structures of domination that enabled their privilege. Rather, the confessions became the political project themselves. The benefits of these confessions seemed to be ephemeral. For the instant the confession took place, those who do not have that privilege in daily life would have a temporary position of power as the hearer of the confession who could grant absolution and forgiveness. The sayer of the confession could then be granted temporary forgiveness for her/his abuses of power and relief from white/male/heterosexual/etc guilt. Because of the perceived benefits of this ritual, there was generally little critique of the fact that in the end, it primarily served to reinstantiate the structures of domination it was supposed to resist. One of the reasons there was little critique of this practice is that it bestowed cultural capital to those who seemed to be the "most oppressed." Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered. "I may be white, but my best friend was a person of color, which caused me to be oppressed when we played together." Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. And despite the cultural capital that was, at least temporarily, bestowed to those who seemed to be the most oppressed, these rituals ultimately reinstantiated the white majority subject as the subject capable of self-reflexivity and the colonized/racialized subject as the occasion for self-reflexivity.¶ These rituals around self-reflexivity in the academy and in activist circles are not without merit. They are informed by key insights into how the logics of domination that structure the world also constitute who we are as subjects. Political projects of transformation necessarily involve a fundamental reconstitution of ourselves as well. However, for this process to work, individual transformation must occur concurrently with social and political transformation. That is, the undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural forms of oppression. However, **the response to structural racism became an individual one – individual confession at the expense of collective action**. Thus the question becomes, how would one collectivize individual transformation? Many organizing projects attempt and have attempted to do precisely this, such Sisters in Action for Power, Sista II Sista, Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, and

Communities Against Rape and Abuse, among many others. Rather than focus simply on one's individual privilege, they address privilege on an organizational level. For instance, they might assess – is everyone who is invited to speak a college graduate? Are certain peoples always in the limelight? Based on this assessment, they develop structures to address how privilege is exercised collectively. For instance, anytime a person with a college degree is invited to speak, they bring with them a co-speaker who does not have that education level. They might develop mentoring and skills-sharing programs within the group. To quote one of my activist mentors, Judy Vaughn, "You don't think your way into a different way of acting; you act your way into a different way of thinking." Essentially, the current social structure conditions us to exercise what privileges we may have. If we want to undermine those privileges, we must change the structures within which we live so that we become different peoples in the process.¶ This essay will explore the structuring logics of the politics of privilege. In particular, the logics of privilege rest on an individualized self that relies on the raw material of other beings to constitute itself. Although the confessing of privilege is understood to be an anti-racist practice, it is ultimately a project premised on white supremacy. Thus, organizing and intellectual projects that are questioning these politics of privilege are shifting the question from what privileges does a particular subject have to what is the nature of the subject that claims to have privilege in the first place.

Pointing out privilege becomes an end in itself – it never challenges the structures that produce that privilege.
Choonara and Prasad, International Socialism Journal, 2014

[Esme and Yuri, "What's wrong with privilege theory?" http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=971]

In many ways privilege theory reflects much older narratives about who benefits from oppression—arguments for example that men benefit from women's oppression and that all white people gain from racism. Those who allegedly hold privilege are seen to benefit automatically from, and to be complicit in, the oppression of others. Privilege theorist and diversity consultant Frances Kendall argues, for example: "Any of us who has race privilege, which all white people do, and therefore the power to put our prejudices into law, is racist by definition, because we benefit from a racist system".5 This is a very pessimistic and disarming theory—seeing individuals as unable to escape their prejudices or their role in the oppression of others. The best that can be hoped for in such circumstances is for increased self-awareness and mitigation of the worst forms of individually oppressive behaviour in order to become suitable allies of those facing oppression, though to what end is generally not clear. Once you accept a framework of understanding inequalities in society as forms of privilege, the concept itself can become very imprecise. So, while many privilege theorists focus on clear questions of oppression such as racism, gender, sexuality or disability, some expand the concept to practically all social phenomena. The Transformative Justice Law Project of Illinois, for example, lists many forms of privilege that activists should check including education privilege, body size privilege, "life on the outside" privilege (the "privilege" of not being in prison) and "passing privilege…the privilege to be able to 'pass' as a more privileged group, such as a light skinned person of colour passing as white".6 This approach confuses symptoms with problems. Inequalities and prejudices around body size are not factors that exist independently; they are a direct consequence of sexism and concepts of gender. Similarly the vast inequalities in the likelihood of being in prison or of being able to access education are the consequence of racism and social inequality. Reeling off a list of "privileges" in this way simply states the existence of

an unequal society—**it does not help us to understand it or to challenge it**. In fact the recognition of inequalities becomes an end in itself.

Privilege theory looks at challenging individuals – this trades off with institutional focus which takes out solvency.
Choonara and Prasad, International Socialism Journal, 2014

[Esme and Yuri, "What's wrong with privilege theory?" http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=971]

Many of the core ideas of privilege theory reflect—directly or indirectly—the ideas of the post-Marxists that gave such a boost to identity politics. Post-Marxists rejected classical Marxism's concerns with class and class struggle as the central driving force of history and the working class as the agent of socialist change. Influential writers such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe explicitly argued for the left to reject Marxist notions of class as reductionist, conjuring a highly distorted version of Marxism in order to bolster their argument.11 They saw the rise of social movements based on identity as the foundation for a new radical politics that rejected attempts to explain "totality" in favour of "partial discourses" and a focus on subjectivity. Thus for Laclau and Mouffe society is divided by "various subject positions" and "diverse antagonisms and points of rupture" that "cannot be led back to a point from which they could all be embraced and explained by a single discourse".12 In other words, they were arguing that it is wrong and futile to attempt to understand how the variety of oppressions fit together into a wider picture of how society works. If Laclau and Mouffe were the theoretical backbone of the identity politics of the 1980s, it is another post-Marxist, the French theorist Michel Foucault, whose ideas have arguably had the most lasting influence on debates around power and oppression. Foucault is in many ways a more complex and contradictory theorist than Laclau or Mouffe. His writings on the social construction of sexuality, for example, are thought provoking and inform much of current theory around LGBT oppression.13 However, he shares with Laclau and Mouffe a rejection of attempts to see society as a totality. Foucault's distinctive concept of power is hugely influential on theorists and activists dealing with questions of oppression. His central argument is that "power is everywhere"—it is omnipresent. Alex Callinicos summarises Foucault's theory thus: Rather than being unitary power is a multiplicity of relations infiltrating the whole of the social body. Consequently no causal priority can be assigned as it is by Marxism, to the economic base. Moreover, power is productive: it does not operate by repressing individuals…but rather by constituting them… Finally, power necessarily evokes resistance, albeit as fragmentary and decentralised as the power-relations it contests.14 So what does this mean? It means that power is not something that some people have and some people don't have. According to Foucault, it is not concentrated in the hands of the capitalist class or the state as the classical Marxist tradition would have it, but is something that is distributed throughout society and exists therefore in all social and interpersonal relationships. Clearly, this has implications for how to understand and to challenge injustice and inequality. Foucault explicitly argues that power does not reside in the ruling class or the state: "Neither the caste which governs, nor the groups which control the state apparatus, nor those who make the most important economic decisions direct the entire network of power that functions in a society." He argues that there must be a "multiplicity of points of resistance" and therefore "there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case…by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations".15 This outlook informs the notion running throughout privilege theory that every individual is inescapably part of a multiplicity of oppressive relationships—what Patricia Hill Collins calls a "matrix of domination". Collins is best known for her writings on intersectionality and black feminism, concepts that we will return to later. While she is at times critical of postmodernist concepts of oppression, her theory of power also embraces notions of individual privilege and interpersonal domination arguing that "each one of us derives varying amounts of penalty and privilege from the multiple systems of oppression that frame our lives".16 Anyone encountering or reading material on privilege theory will be struck by the overwhelming focus on the individual—the many confessionals of the "privileged" describing how they came to terms with their privileges17 or the exhorting of others to check theirs. Yet despite the focus on individual change, most privilege theorists acknowledge that there are wider and structural inequalities behind the privileges that individuals are alleged to have bestowed upon them. Michael Kimmel, for example, argues that **individual solutions are not enough**: "Inequality is structural and systematic as well as individual and attitudinal. Eliminating inequalities involves more than changing everyone's attitudes".18

Challenging privilege fails micro and macro politically.
Choonara and Prasad, International Socialism Journal, 2014

[Esme and Yuri, "What's wrong with privilege theory?" http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=971]

Much of the privilege theory literature focuses not just on challenging others, but on challenging oneself. Even an author with such a broad historical scope as Collins argues that "change starts with self, and relationships that we have with those around us must always be the primary site for social change".41 There is, of course, nothing wrong with individuals being self-critical about their attitudes and interactions with others. And it is right to challenge all manifestations of oppressive behaviour, language and attitudes. But the struggle against huge systemic divisions such as racism, sexism and homophobia cannot rely on the individual self-reflection of a number of progressive individuals. These arguments are not new. Writing more than 20 years ago, Ambalavaner Sivanandan pointed to the dangers of an approach that focused primarily on the personal and interpersonal: "By personalising power, 'the personal is political' personalises the enemy: the enemy of the black is white as the enemy of the woman is the man. And all whites are racist like all men are sexist".42 Privilege theory tends to reduce political argument to moral appeal and personal feelings, in which who is saying something often becomes more important than what they are saying. This is one reason that the notion of privilege is potentially corrosive to debate and actually risks letting oppressive behaviour off the hook. If someone speaks or behaves in a racist or sexist way, it is surely better, and more educative for all concerned, to challenge them by explaining that what they do or say is racist or sexist, rather than attributing it to an automatic expression of their "privileged" gender, race, sexuality and so on.

Bringing privilege into conflict against structural change is the best way to challenge both interpersonal and structural oppression.
Choonara and Prasad, International Socialism Journal, 2014

[Esme and Yuri, "What's wrong with privilege theory?" http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=971]

Even when supporters of privilege theory move away from the relentless focus on individuals and involve themselves in wider campaigns they insist that the "privileged" can play at most a supporting role to the oppressed. Frances Kendall, for example, argues that the point of checking our privileges is to become "an ally", able to build "authentic relationships" with those who do not share our privileges.43 The focus on trying to change ideas in ourselves and others before a meaningful challenge to wider structural inequalities is possible is getting things the wrong way round. Most people who enter into struggle, whether for better rights at work, to stop a war, against racism, sexism or some other campaign, bring with them a **mixture of contradictory ideas**. They may accept some reactionary ideas, and reject others. It is precisely in the struggle for change that most people learn new insights into how capitalism functions, and old assumptions and prejudices can be broken down. This is because in battling for change, people's direct experiences come into the sharpest conflict with the view of the world propagated by the institutions of capitalism.

JDI Plague Reps

2NC – AT: No Racism

The outbreak of SARS proves the link- fear of disease/reps translates into the demarcation of racialized bodies
Eichelberger 07

(Laura, University of Arizona, Department of Anthropology, Social Science and Medicine, "SARS and New York's Chinatown: The politics of risk and blame during an epidemic of fear," 2007, Science Direct) //jdi-mm

During the height of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in spring 2003, stories of infection and warnings (such as the e-mail above) to avoid Asian areas circulated throughout the United States. News media speculated on the possibility of a domestic epidemic, despite the fact that only eight people nationally had laboratory evidence of SARS—and most of these had contracted the virus abroad (Schrag et al., 2004). Fourteen percent of Americans reported avoiding Asian businesses (Blendon et al., 2003), and New York City's Chinatown experienced heightened anxiety and fear of stigmatization (Chen & Tsang, 2003). The above rumor and its news coverage caused a tremendous drop in business and tourism in Chinatown. Even without a single case of SARS, the community was identified quickly as a site of contagion and risk. The American public, including Chinatown, had become infected with an epidemic of fear, not of disease. This research draws on anthropology, sociology, history, and media studies to examine the production of the dominant American risk discourses during the 2003 SARS epidemic, focusing specifically on those who blamed the disease on Chinese culture. I then use ethnographic research to investigate how these discourses played out in New York City's Chinatown. I use the term discourse in the Foucauldian sense to refer to the contested field of possible ideas, images, and metaphors that structure the ways in which people understand diseases. Many informants rejected community association with infection while simultaneously deploying dominant discourses to blame recent Chinese immigrants as potential infectors. This discursive strategy distances the self from biological and social risk, echoes discourses produced globally and disseminated by the media, and reflects local concerns related to the community's changing demography. The collected narratives illustrate that many historical, political and economic factors shape responses to an epidemic, even in places without infection.

2NC – AT: Impact Real

Be skeptical of their impacts – the medical industrial must maintain the threat of outbreak to exempt themselves from responsibility and justify ever-increasing consumption
Illich 76

Ivan, Ph.D from the University of Salzburg, *Medical Nemesis,* 1976 SJE

Advanced industrial societies have a **high stake** in maintaining the epistemological legitimacy of disease entities. As long as disease is something that takes possession of people, something they "catch" or "get," the victims of these natural processes can be exempted from responsibility for their condition. They can be pitied rather than blamed for sloppy, vile, or incompetent performance in suffering their subjective reality; **they can be turned into manageable and profitable assets** if they humbly accept their disease as the expression of "how things are"; **and** they can be **discharged from any political responsibility** for having collaborated in increasing the sickening stress of high-intensity industry. An advanced industrial society is sick-making because it disables people from coping with their environment and, when they break down, substitutes a "clinical," or therapeutic, prosthesis for the broken relationships. People would rebel against such an environment if medicine did not explain their biological disorientation as a defect in their health, rather than as a defect in the way of life which is imposed on them or which they impose on themselves.33 The assurance of personal political innocence that a diagnosis offers the patient serves as a **hygienic mask that justifies further subjection to production and consumption.**

2NC – AT: Bioterror Threat Real

Empirically bioterrorism and its potential for epidemics and disease pandemics have served as the justification to demarcate entire populations, pushing them to the margins, resulting in unending, perpetual stigma and violence- the impact has global racial impacts- SARs proves
Eichelberger 07

(Laura, University of Arizona, Department of Anthropology, Social Science and Medicine, "SARS and New York's Chinatown: The politics of risk and blame during an epidemic of fear," 2007, Science Direct) //jdi-mm

Most studies of SARS coverage document that mainstream Western media sensationalized "the world war against SARS" (US News & World Report, May 5, 2003) and painted a grim picture of a deadly disease that threatened national borders (cf. Bergeron & Sanchez, 2005; Person, Sy, Holton, Govert, & Liang, 2004; Schram, 2003; Washer, 2004; Wilson, Thomson, & Mansoor, 2004). Several noted that this sensationalization resulted in the stigmatization of Asians around the world (Person et al., 2004; Schram, 2003), and poor care for those suspected of carrying SARS (Karlberg & Lai, 2003). Wallis and Nerlich (2005) provide a detailed review of the metaphors used throughout the epidemic in British media. They conclude that the usual stigmatizing metaphors and militaristic language were largely absent, perhaps marking a shift in how the media covers disease. In contrast, Washer's study (2004), which samples only articles from March 2003, identifies many instances of othering directed toward Chinese people. My review of American media coverage throughout 2003 more closely mirrors Washer's data. As I will illustrate in the subsequent section, understanding the media's role in risk perception requires identifying the media discourses contained in individuals' explanations of risk and precautionary measures, and connecting these to the local historical and political-economic context. Though the media identified many factors that contributed to the epidemic, I argue that othering discourses that fit personal experience and local concerns have more influence on social responses during a frightening epidemic. In American mainstream media, discourses of risk and blame reflected heightened fears of foreign threats to national health and security. Indeed, since the 9/11 attacks, metaphors of the diseased immigrant "Other" have increased (Fairchild, 2004). **When the epidemic was identified in mid-March 2003, Americans were in the midst of debates over Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. News media abounded with stories of "Dr. Germ's" bio-weapons and smallpox vaccines for military and medical personnel. The public was primed for a frightening epidemic of foreign origin.** China was defined as a diseased threat to the modern healthy world. Descriptions of SARS's origin echoed those of the early 1900s that blamed the plague on the Chinese rice-centered diet (Edelson, 2003) and agricultural practices such as "the promiscuous manner in which the cattle, fowls, and domestic animals are permitted to live in close association with human beings" (Simpson, 1905, p. 177). Almost identical descriptions identified Chinese farms as culpable for SARS: Pigs, ducks, chickens and people live cheek-by-jowl on the district's primitive farms, exchanging flu and cold germs so rapidly that a single pig can easily incubate human and avian viruses simultaneously. (Newsweek 5/5/2003) The solution to infection thus becomes cultural change, as evidenced by this quote from Newsweek in December of 2003, when the world was waiting to see if the epidemic would re-emerge: One thing China hasn't learned from its SARS experience is that its eating habits—particularly the taste for freshly killed meat—might have to change. Scientists found that civets, a cat-size creature and a local delicacy, can harbor the SARS virus…This winter the battle will be shaping up between China's tradition and the world's safety. (Newsweek, 12/8/2003, pg. 79) Scientists are still debating the origin of SARS—some believe that it may have originated from horseshoe bats (Li et al., 2005). Although how the virus jumps species is unclear, the press still explained this new finding through the lens of culture: In Asia, many people eat bats or use bat feces in traditional medicine for asthma, kidney ailments and general malaise. (New York Times, 9/30/05, emphasis added.) Some cultural factors do facilitate the spread of disease. However, the focus on "tradition" obfuscates the many political and economic factors that create at-risk populations, as well as the "modern" Western practices that contribute to emerging infectious diseases and antibiotic resistance (Weiss & McMichael, 2004). At the same time, they provide a sense of security and control by identifying a responsible "primitive" Other (Joffe, 1999) **while asserting Western superiority**.

Be skeptical of their impacts – the medical industrial must maintain the threat of outbreak to exempt themselves from responsibility and justify ever-increasing consumption
Illich 76

Ivan, Ph.D from the University of Salzburg, *Medical Nemesis,* 1976 SJE

Advanced industrial societies have a **high stake** in maintaining the epistemological legitimacy of disease entities. As long as disease is something that takes possession of people, something they "catch" or "get," the victims of these natural processes can be exempted from responsibility for their condition. They can be pitied rather than blamed for sloppy, vile, or incompetent performance in suffering their subjective reality; **they can be turned into manageable and profitable assets** if they humbly accept their disease as the expression of "how things are"; **and** they can be **discharged from any political responsibility** for having collaborated in increasing the sickening stress of high-intensity industry. An advanced industrial society is sick-making because it disables people from coping with their environment and, when they break down, substitutes a "clinical," or therapeutic, prosthesis for the broken relationships. People would rebel against such an environment if medicine did not explain their biological disorientation as a defect in their health, rather than as a defect in the way of life which is imposed on them or which they impose on themselves.33 The assurance of personal political innocence that a diagnosis offers the patient serves as a **hygienic mask that justifies further subjection to production and consumption.**

2NC – AT: No Impact

The impact is empirically proven- plague reps have been used throughout history as a justification to marginalize and otherize
Washer 05

(Peter, Social Science and Medicine, Academic Centre for Medical Education, University College London, "Representations of mad cow disease," 2005, Science Direct) /jdi-mm

The motivation for the choice of existing concepts is primarily to do with identity protection, which refers simultaneously to the protection of the in-group and self-identity (and to building its cohesion by negatively identifying the 'other' from it). Notions of risk and blame are therefore used to construct boundaries between self and 'other', with misfortunes understood to be the price paid by people who are bad, dirty, bizarre, promiscuous; people who are 'not like us'. Joffe's work draws on that of the cultural anthropologist Mary Douglas. For Douglas (1992), the same blaming mechanisms are evident when we 'moderns' are faced with a new threat as there are in so-called 'primitive' societies. When a new disease appears, boundaries are constructed between 'self' and 'other' which function to apportion blame. Therefore the people in the category of 'other' are seen as responsible for the genesis of the disease; and/or for bringing it on themselves; and/or it's spread, because they are portrayed, for example, as dirty; because they eat disgusting food; have bizarre rituals and customs; or because they are sexually perverted or promiscuous (Douglas, 1992). In this risk/blame model, 'foreigners', or already marginalised out-groups from within a society, are blamed for new epidemics of diseases. The model works well to explain many different epidemics, both modern and historical. There is a large body of literature on how different groups are blamed for so-called 'emerging infectious diseases'. See, for example, Watney (1987), Sabatier (1988), Joffe and Haarhoff (2002), Ungar (1998) and Washer (2004). In this sense this risk/blame model connects with reactions to plagues stretching back through history.

2NC – AT: We =/= Misrepresent

Even if you don't misrepresent people, the media does
Green et. al 11

(Eva, Pascal Wagner-Egger, Adrian Bangerter, Ingrid Gilles, David Rigaud, Franciska Krings, Christian Staerklé and Alain, Public Understanding of Science, "Lay perceptions of collectives at the outbreak of the H1N1 epidemic: heroes, villains and victims," 2011, Sage Publications) //jdi-mm

Clémence, Lay perceptions of risks are dramatized on the stage of various mass media (Bauer et al., 2001), making them more concrete and thus more real. As a special class of risk, emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) are also subject to media dramatization, as has been documented in several studies (Ungar, 1998, 2008; Wallis and Nerlich, 2005). Who are the dramatis personae on the stage of the disease threat drama? In this article, we argue that the main actors are collectives, in other words large social systems that are constituted by demographic and cultural factors, or institutionalization based on shared values and norms (Brewer and Chen, 2007; Etzioni, 1968). These characteristics empower collectives to act as coherent units. Collectives may include nations, organizations, or even informal groups and other social categories. An analysis of the social history of disease outbreaks supports the idea of collectives as actors. For example, in many cases, nations, not individuals, are depicted as being threatened by disease. Thus, disease spreads from one nation to another, much as the Black Death plague advanced through Europe from Asia in the Middle Ages and avian influenza advanced through Europe some years ago. Nations can seal their borders to outsiders or block imports of contaminated foreign foodstuffs, as many did with British beef in the wake of the BSE scare. Many other collectives are actors. There are political authorities, who act to contain the disease, initiate public health measures or disseminate disease-relevant information. There are private corporations like pharmaceutical companies who manufacture vaccines and drugs for a profit. And there are groups defined by ethnicity, sexual orientation and other dimensions, who are often perceived as vulnerable to disease threat or as carriers of disease. For example, in the history of AIDS, gays, intravenous drug users, prostitutes and scientists have variously shared the dubious honour of being originators or propagators of the disease in the public eye (Joffe, 1999; Kalichman, 2009). Finally, all of these collectives are orchestrated through depictions in the mass media. Although the media have classically been treated as an "invisible environment" (Glessing and White, 1976), i.e., as part of the scenery, increasing evidence suggests they are perceived by the public as key characters in the drama. Such perceptions are not inconsequential epiphenomena, because the symbolism with which collectives are construed has cognitive, affective and behavioural consequences. Social psychological research shows that trust in institutions constitutes an important psychological buffer against anxiety caused by fear of death (Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski, 1991) or loss of control (Kay et al., 2009), both feelings often associated with a sudden disease outbreak. Traumatic collective events can lead individuals to increase trust in institutions (Chanley, 2002), while individuals' distrust of institutions like health authorities is associated with various forms of risky health behaviour (e.g., Bird and Bogart, 2005). Despite the importance of collectives as actors in the drama of EIDs, little systematic attention has been devoted to their study. In this article, we investigate collectives mentioned by Swiss laypersons at the outbreak of the H1N1 ("swine flu") pandemic in May 2009 and the themes associated with them. Before describing our study, we review research on lay perceptions of disease threat and on individuals' symbolic relationship to collectives in times of crisis.

2NC – AT: Simulation Good

Simulation and prediction of a viral apocalypse relies heavily on low-probability modeling that is epistemically suspect. Their policy simulation renders the entire global population to bare life

Lisa **Keränen** (Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Colorado, Denver) **2011** ["Concocting Viral Apocalypse: Catastrophic Risk and the Production of Bio(in)security" Western Journal of Communication Vol. 75, No. 5, October–December 2011, pp. 451–472, loghry]

''Readers should imagine the possibilities [of attack] for themselves, because the most serious constraint on current policy is lack of imagination,'' declared the Catastrophic Terrorism report in 1998 (Carter et al., 1998a, p. 5). This statement indexes the growing role of anticipatory imagining (Vogel, 2008) in biopreparedness efforts. As I have written elsewhere (Kera¨nen, 2008, 2011b), <u>simulation and spectacle</u> (Baudrillard, 1983, 1994=2004) <u>comprise</u> **key mechanisms** <u>that make concrete the otherwise invisible threat of biological weapons</u> across a wide swath of political, technical, and cultural texts. <u>Since the major bioterrorism event of the last century killed but five people and since few among us will ever see a manufactured biological weapon, the potential for wide-scale epidemic</u> **must be rendered in terms accessible to decision-makers** <u>through a commonly imagined</u> **vision of the future** that I call viral apocalypse (Kera¨nen, 2008, 2011b). <u>Rhetorically, viral apocalypse makes the invisible visible and</u> **the unlikely likely**. It traffics in widespread contagion anxieties, putting a postmodern spin on longstanding human concerns about epidemic. As a recurrent form, <u>viral apocalypse</u> comprises two features. First, it <u>appeals to deep-seated cultural memories about ''the plague''</u> (Alcabes, 2009) <u>by employing a grotesque rhetoric of viral abjection</u> (see Van Loon, 2002, p. 147, on the virulent abject). Second, <u>it emphasizes</u> **widespread casualties**, international market collapse, and the near-demise of the civilized world.3 As a postmodern apocalyptic rhetoric (see Brummett, 1991, and O'Leary, 1994, for canonical rhetorical treatments of apocalyptic rhetoric), one that is at once secular (Schoch-Spana, 2004) and sublime (Gunn & Beard, 2000), <u>this cultural form</u> **invigorates anxieties** <u>about globalization and its increasing contact with the Other into a vivid but distressing postpandemic future</u> (Lopez-Lavigne et al. & Fresnadillo, 2007; MacDonald & Boyle, 2002). <u>It</u> thus <u>signifies concerns that a combination of explosive population growth, ecological pressure, and biological-research-gone-awry will</u> **extinguish life as we know it**. The viral apocalyptic form further heralds the failure of the Cold War logic of containment (Wald, 2008), as germs quickly overwhelm response capabilities and infect the global citizenry. <u>Within this vision, noninfected human survivors struggle against the now unhuman-like infected;</u> <u>depictions of widespread violence and global breakdown conclude in desolated daytime streets and despairing citizens</u>. Films such as the 2003 biothriller 28 Days Later (MacDonald & Boyle, 2002) and its equally haunting sequel 28 Weeks Later (Lopez-Lavigne et al. & Fresnadillo, 2007), animate this vision as the Rage virus transforms humans into rabid, flesh-hungry mutants. In both films, governments collapsed, civilization ceased, the streets of the world's major cities stood eerily still; **humans were reduced to bare life**. The scene recurs in I Am Legend (Goldsman et al. & Lawrence, 2007), a remake of the Cold War–era Omega Man, where a beleaguered Will Smith valiantly struggles to find a cure for a deadly virus that sends flesh-hungry hoards nightly to his doorstep. It further grounds the popular zombie horror television series, The Walking Dead. In most of these depictions—and scores more like them—<u>economic and cultural life terminates, cuing audiences to the interlinking of pathogenic risk and international stability. Visions of viral apocalypse also figure widely in popular accounts of biopreparedness simulations</u> and the scripts

for the simulations themselves. In her widely cited Foreign Affairs essay, ''The Nightmare of Bioterrorism,'' Garrett (2001) drew from a Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Defense bioterrorism role-playing scenario, in which more than 15,000 people die of smallpox worldwide within two months, and epidemics rage out of control in 14 nations... the global economy teeters on the brink of collapse as nations close their borders and sink into isolation ... utter chaos Western Journal of Communication 461 reigns, and the National Guard enforces martial law over the city's two million residents. Similarly, government authority either breaks down or reverts to military-style control in cities all over the world as smallpox claims lives and pits terrified citizens against one another. (p. 81) Similarly, in 2004, in what was then the largest-ever international ministerial smallpox simulation exercise (Smith et al., 2005), the Atlantic Storm tabletop exercise employed epidemiological modeling to project 666,000 infections, global economic demise, and strife between countries that had and did not have smallpox vaccines (Drogin, 2005). According to an article in the International Herald Tribune, the exercise ''destructive and disruptive as it was—could have been much worse'' (Hamilton & O'Toole, 2005). That the outcomes of their fictional scenario could have been much worse is somewhat beside the point, for most situations could usually be worse; such rhetoric reflects the penchant for catastrophizing that characterizes so many of these exercises. However, this amplified rhetoric resonates with that of many other biopreparedness exercises, such as TOPOFFs 2, 3, and 4, the exercises initially mandated by the Clinton Administration (see Erickson & Barratt, 2004). Each TOPOFF exercise entailed at least 2 years of planning and more than 10,000 volunteers representing hundreds of international, national, state, tribal, and local agencies at a cost of up to $15 million apiece, and each predicting, according to unclassified estimates, similar portraits of widespread **death and unrest** (Erickson & Barratt, 2004; Kera¨nen, 2008, 2011b; Schoch-Spana, 2004). Thus, highly unlikely, ''low-probability'' simulated scenarios are granted **epistemic privilege** via vivid viral apocalyptic imaginations.

2NC – AT: Discourse =/= First

Discourse first – speech acts that legitimize security create the only scenario for extinction

John **Collins**, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, **and** Ross **Glover**, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 20**02**, Collateral Language, p. 6-7

The Real Effects of Language

As any university student knows, theories about the "social construction" and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruction) are "just" talking about language, as opposed to talking about the "real world." The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, immediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (including genocide), the physical destruction of human communities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the Soviet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of "manufacturing consent" and shaping people's perception of the world around them; people are more likely to support acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as "terrorists," or if the violence is presented as a defense of "freedom." Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive effects that this kind of process has on the political culture of supposedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of violence can easily be made more palatable through the use of euphemisms such as "pacification" or, to use an example discussed in this book, "targets." It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of "vital interests" and "surgical strikes" and the flattering language of "civilization" and 'just" wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

2NC – AT: Framework – Serial Policy Failure

Their framework results in serial policy failure

Biswas 7 (Shampa, Professor of Politics – Whitman College, "Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist", Millennium, 36(1), p. 117-125)

The ==**most serious threat to**== the ==**'intellectual vocation'**==, he argues, ==**is**== 'professionalism' and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of 'specializations' and **the '**==**cult of expertise' with**== **their** ==**focus on**== 'relatively narrow areas of knowledge', 'technical formalism', '==**impersonal**== theories and ==**methodologies', and**== most worrisome of all, their ability and **willingness to be seduced by power**.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as 'organic intellectuals' involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of 'intellectual articulation'.19 **This is** not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger **question of intellectual orientation**. It is not uncommon for IR ==**scholars**== to ==**feel the need to formulate**== their scholarly ==**conclusions**== in terms of its relevance for global politics, where 'relevance' is measured ==**entirely in terms of**== ==**policy wisdom**==. Edward Said's searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds **of** ==**ethical questions irreducible to formulaic**== **'for or against' and '**==**costs and benefits' analysis can**== simply ==**not be raised**==. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of '==**intellectual relevance'**== that is larger and more worthwhile, that ==**is about**== **the** ==**posing**== of ==**critical, historical, ethical**== and perhaps unanswerable ==**questions rather than**== the ==**offering**== of recipes and ==**solutions,**== that **is about politics (rather than techno-expertise**) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

2NC – AT: Language Doesn't Matter

Language creates, reaffirms and empowers hegemonic institutions while excluding other forms of knowledge.
Nimmer 11

[Livio Nimmer, Master's student in the University of Tartu,ENDC Proceedings, "DE-CONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE ¶ TERRORISM DISCOURSE:¶ A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST VIEW", ¶ Volume 14, 2011, pp. 223–240.¶ http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_14_10_livio_nimmer.pdf, \\wyo-bb]

Norms and institutions are not things existing objectively out there, but ¶ are created in and by particular communities that exist in particular contexts. ¶ And these institutions again shape those communities. There are no objective ¶ measures of good or bad, right or wrong. Rather what is considered to be good ¶ or bad, right or wrong depends on what viewpoint one takes. Our perception of reality depends on the community one identifies oneself with. Norms ¶ and institutions change with time, taking multiple forms in different contexts. ¶ What might seem right in one community might be wrong in another; what is ¶ considered normal for one community might be abnormal to another. In sum, ¶ different communities have different sets of norms, goals and aspirations.¶ Language has an important role in creating worlds that communities identify themselves with. Language functions as an instrument for creating, normalizing and reinforcing particular worldviews, affixing certain knowledge ¶ and institutions in society; at the same time alternative worldviews and ¶ knowledge are excluded and de-legitimatized. Through language identities ¶ are created and maintained, and as such, language is never neutral. Groups ¶ struggling for power and trying to reaffirm their identities use language to ¶ create and maintain a hegemonic regime of truth.18

Discourse shapes reality- Engenders solutions, problems and invoke social history
Jackson 05

[Richard Jackson, Lecturer in International Security at The University of Manchester, "Language power and politics: critical discourse analysis and the War on Terrorism", 49th Parallel, 2005, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/jackson1.htm#_edn1,\\wyo-bb]

Second, language plays an active role in creating and changing perceptions, cognition and emotions. As something particularly human, language moulds how we see the world; it is the main determinant of our perceptions and our access to concrete reality. From knowing the difference between an apple and a hand grenade, to knowing what to do with each in relevant situations, language shapes our understanding of the world around us.[9] More than affecting perceptions, language also structures cognition—it affects the way we think, and particularly how we make strategic choices. By using a restricted set of words and word formations, some choices can appear perfectly reasonable and commonsensical while others appear absurd. Expressed another way, the language we use at any given moment privileges one viewpoint over others, naturalising some understandings as rational and others as nonsensical.[10] As a consequence, language also affects our emotions. It is in an important sense, the place where our psychic and social lives intersect. Certain words or combinations of words can make us feel anxious, fearful, angry or joyful. This generates immense power for those that deploy them. Politicians, propagandists and advertisers have known this for a long time, and in fact, we see it almost every day in people's reactions to the use of certain words in the media, such as

'paedophile', 'AIDS', 'humanitarian disaster', 'murder', 'weapons of mass destruction' and 'terrorist'.¶ ¶ A third reason why words cannot be considered neutral is because words have histories. In themselves, words have no inherent meaning; rather, they have to acquire meaning in their own discursive setting.[11] The process by which words obtain meaning is often lengthy and takes place through repetition and their careful and selective use in specific contexts. For example, the use of the terms 'civilised' and 'barbarous' cannot avoid invoking the history of these words as they were applied by Christian Europe in the Middle Ages, and by imperialists and colonists in the nineteenth century. There is a history to their meaning that affects their usage in a contemporary context. In other cases, words can take on new meanings through specific forms of usage.[12] Because words have histories, the act of naming things is always a highly charged process that can have serious political and social consequences. This effect of naming is especially powerful in terms of political violence because, for example, to 'call an act of political violence terrorist is not merely to describe it but to judge it.'[13] Consider the difference between calling the killing of an abortion doctor 'a murder' and calling it 'an act of terrorism'; the two names for the same act have very contrasting meanings and would likely elicit very different responses from both the public and the authorities.¶ ¶ The methodological approach I have employed to examine the official language of the 'war on terrorism' is known broadly as critical discourse analysis. This approach is at once both a technique for analysing specific texts or speech acts, and a way of understanding the relationship between discourse and social and political phenomena. By engaging in concrete, linguistic textual analysis—that is, by doing systematic analyses of spoken and written language—critical discourse analysis aims to shed light on the links between texts and societal practices and structures, or, the linguistic-discursive dimension of social action.[14]¶ ¶ The approach is based on a number of crucial assumptions. It assumes that discourse is a form of social practice which both makes or constitutes the social world, and is at the same time constituted by other social practices. Discourses both contribute to the shaping of social structures and are also shaped by them; there is a dialectical relationship between the two. Of even greater import, critical discourse analysis assumes that discursive practices are never neutral, but rather they contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups. That is, discourses possess a clear ideological character; they are the construction and deployment of 'meaning in the service of power.'[15] Or, more specifically, discourses act as constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of domination in society.[16] Thus, a central aim of critical discourse analysis lies in revealing the means by which language is deployed to maintain power. What makes critical discourse analysis 'critical' is its normative commitment to positive social change.

Language is key when discussing disease/pandemics
Beemer 11

(Jeffrey, University of Massachusetts, Dissertation, "Social Meanings of Mortality: The Language of

Death and Disease in 19th Century Massachusetts," 2011,
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1425&context=open_access_dissertations)
//jdi-mm

Language exhibits its social significance by drawing distinctions that divide the world into manageable pieces. It reduces complexity by distinguishing one thing from another, it provides a shared framework for meaningful discourse, and it regulates our interactions in predictable and acceptable ways. We use language to identify objects and events against a backdrop of other objects and events, to coherently express ourselves under presumptions of mutual understanding, and to coordinate everyday interactions through shared expectations. Language also functions as a means for expressing difference, disagreement, and for generating conflict. But even within such divergent or oppositional modes, language never abandons its integrative role because it can never do so. Using language to mark difference or shatter boundaries can only be accomplished by conversely denoting sameness and establishing limits – to exclude on the one hand is to include on the other. Language use, whether integrative or oppositional in practice, inherently imposes order on our experiences. It is

the means by which we classify ordinary interactions, objects and events as self-evident, invisible configurations. Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 470) speaks of our "sense of limits" and "principles of division" as internalized cognitions that are forgotten but nevertheless reproduced in our everyday experiences. In whatever fashion we use language, we use it from within communities of language practitioners where meaning and identities emerge as a result of such communicative, self-evident practices. Medicine like any other profession defines itself through its communicative practices. The professionals who carry out those practices use language to distinguish their activities from other professionals and nonprofessionals alike. Professional identities depend on carving out proprietary boundaries that mark distinctions which extend beyond the practitioners themselves, e.g., teacher/student, priest/parishioner, doctor/patient, and so on. Consequently, all professions are understandably jealous of their distinctions. As Paul Starr notes, "Doctors and other professionals have a distinctive basis of legitimacy that lends strength to their authority. They claim authority, not as individuals, but as members of a community that has objectively validated their competence" (Starr 1985, 12). Competency is a feature of collective recognition and validity. I will return to this idea in more detail in a later chapter, but for now I want to highlight Starr's point that professional authority rests not on an individual's demonstrated competency per se but on the professional community's validation of competency as a collective practice. Language functions in the same manner. Its authority as a medium for communication rests not on an individual's demonstrated competency to successfully use it but on a community's validation of competency as a collective practice. Language does its work by tying individual experiences, events, and thoughts together into a broader set of collective practices.

2NC – AT: Reps =/= First

Representations are key to political coherence- makes sense of political reality

Jourde 6 – Cedric Jourde   * Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, 2002 * M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, 1996   * B.Sc., Political Science, Université de Montréal, Montréal, 1995 Hegemony or Empire?: The redefinition of US Power under George W Bush Ed. David and Grondin p. 182-3 2006

Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon representations. Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply 'insignificant', thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states' domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as 'unstable*, 'prosperous', or 'ethnically divided'. It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant'.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor's and group of actors' cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints. Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of 'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a 'terrorist network', such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum. the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'.

Our discourse is key: it shapes reality and we can't separate it from how we act. Bosworth 10

(Kai A., Macalester College, "Straws in the Wind: Race, Nature and Technoscience in Postcolonial South Dakotan Wind Power Development," 2010, http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=envi_honors&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fstart%3D40%26q%3D%2522grid%2522%2B%2522electricity%2522%2Band%2B%2B%2522PTC%2522%2B%2522bad%2522%2B%2522politics%2522%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%2C51#search=%22grid%20electricity%20PTC%20bad%20politics%22)

Academic writing is a critical node in knowledge production, and thus I am cognizant of the worlds, narratives, and objects further enacted in the performance of this paper. As John Law notes, "methods, their rules, and even more methods' practices, not only describe but also help to produce the reality that they understand" (2004, 5). There is no singular world to be solely "discovered" or "understood." There are only multiple worlds enacted and performed. I have a responsibility to the communities which I describe and discuss. For Donna Haraway, response-ability is "a relationship crafted in intra-action through which entities, subjects and objects, come into being...Responders are themselves co-constituted in the responding" (2008, 71; see also Barad 2007). In responding to the various humans and non-humans in my story, I am constituted as subject and author. Therefore, I additionally deploy a method for response-able enactment, in order that this paper can help create space for new and diverse possibilities.

Representations are key to policy making
Doty '96

(Roxanne Lynn. Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representations in North-South Relations. 1996. Pg 170-171)

The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to "get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. **Before this question can be answered – indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer – attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.**

2NC – AT: Realism

Realism has gaps that destroys its explanatory ability --- recognizing social influences <u>enriches</u> and <u>sustains</u> the theory
Niarguinen 1

(Dmitri, Professor of International Relations and European Studies – Central European University, Rubikon, December, http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/dmitri.htm)

Morgenthau's state-centric theory is clearly set, but it is not to say he envisages it as being pre-destined and unchangeable. The political, cultural and strategic environment will largely determine the forms of power a state chooses to exercise, just as the types of power which feature in human relationships change over time. In addition, Realists should not be wedded to a perennial connection between interest and the nation-state which is 'a product of history, and therefore bound to disappear'[19]. Later (in 1970) Morgenthau anticipated that the forces of globalization would render the nation-state no longer valid: "the sovereign nation-state is in the process of becoming obsolete"[20]. He stresses that a final task that a theory of international relations can and must perform is to prepare the ground for a new international order radically different from that which preceded it[21]. Kenneth Waltz's neo-realism is both a critique of traditional realism and a substantial intellectual extension of a theoretical tradition which was in danger of being outflanked by rapid changes in the contours of global politics[22]. The international system (anarchy) is treated as a separate domain which conditions the behavior of all states within it. <mark>Paradoxically, with</mark> the advent of <mark>neo-realism, the **scope** and **flexibility** of Realism have **significantly** diminished. The theory has become deterministic, linear, and culturally poor.</mark> For neo-realists, culture and identity are (at best) derivative of the distribution of capabilities and have no independent explanatory power. Actors deploy culture and identity strategically, to further their own self-interests[23]. Nevertheless, it is wrong to assert that neo-realist perspectives do not acknowledge the importance of social facts. Gilpin has developed a compelling argument about war and change[24]. While his book is built on (micro)economic premises, he does not neglect sociological insights as necessary for understanding the context of rational behavior. "Specific interests or objectives that individuals pursue and the appropriateness of the means they employ are dependent on prevailing social norms and material environment…In short, the economic and <mark>sociological approaches must be integrated to explain</mark> political <mark>change</mark>"[25]. Waltz was implicitly talking about identity when he argued that anarchic structures tend to produce "like units"[26]. He allows for what he calls 'socialization' and 'imitation' processes. Stephen Krasner suggested that regimes could change state interests[27]. Regimes are an area where knowledge should be taken seriously. If regimes matter, then <mark>cognitive understanding can matter as well</mark>[28]. Realism is not necessarily about conflict; material forces may as well lead to cooperation. However, the minimalist treatment of culture and social phenomena increasingly proved neo-realism as losing ground empirically and theoretically. It was the suspicion that the international system is transforming itself culturally faster than would have been predictable from changes in military and economic capabilities that triggered the interest in problems of identity[29]. <mark>Reconstruction of the theory was vital</mark> in order <mark>to save Realism from becoming obsolete.</mark> The realization of this fact has triggered a shift in Realist thinking and gave way to the emergence of a 'constructivist' re-incarnation of Realism. Friedrich Kratochwil has once observed that no theory of culture can substitute for a theory of politics[30]. At least, nobody has ventured to accomplish such an enterprise so far. To disregard culture in politics, it seems obvious today, is inappropriate, not to say foolish. There remain opportunity costs incurred by Realism in its asymmetric engagement with cultural phenomena. Thus, Realism, notwithstanding its concern with parsimony, should make a serious commitment to building analytical bridges which link identity- and culture-related phenomena to its explanatory apparatus (like anarchy, sovereignty, the security dilemma, self-help, and balancing)[31]. Alexander Wendt in his seminal article "Anarchy Is What States Make of It" has masterfully shown how power politics is socially constructed[32]. Salus populi supreme lex. This classical metalegal doctrine of necessity is associated with raison d'etat, the right of preservation, and self-help. Wendt is convinced that the self-help corollary to anarchy does enormous work in Realism, generating the inherently competitive dynamics of the security dilemma and collective action problem[33]. What misses the point, however, is that self-help and power politics follow either logically or causally from anarchy. They do not; rather, they are just among other institutions (albeit significant ones) possible under anarchy. Consequently, provided there is relatively stable practice, international institutions can transform state identities and interests. Let me focus on two concrete security issues - the security dilemma and nuclear deterrence - to illustrate the point. A central tenet of Realism, the security dilemma[34], arises for the situation when "one actor's quest for security through power accumulation ... exacerbates the feelings of insecurity of another actor, who in turn will respond by accumulating power"[35]. As a result of this behavior, a vicious circle or spiral of security develops, with fear and misperception exacerbating the situation[36]. Nevertheless, <mark>security dilemmas</mark>, as Wendt stresses, <mark>are not given by anarch</mark>y or nature[37]. <mark>Security dilemmas are constructed because identities</mark> and interests <mark>are **constituted by collective meanings** which are **always in**</mark>

process. This is why concepts of security may differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other. Because deterrence is based on ideas about threat systems and conditional commitments to carry out punishment, it has proved particularly congenial to the strategic studies scholarship within the Realist tradition[38]. Deterrence is a conditional commitment to retaliate, or to exact retribution if another party fails to behave in a desired, compliant manner. Thus defined, deterrence has been invoked as the primary explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear case, in contrast to chemical weapons, for example, is definitely problematic for challenging traditional deterrence theory because it is widely felt that the tremendous destructive power of thermonuclear weapons does render them qualitatively different from other weapons. Yet, the patterns of the non-use of nuclear weapons cannot be fully understood without taking into account the development of norms that shaped these weapons as unacceptable. By applying social constructivist approach, it is possible to emphasize the relationship between norms, identities, and interests and try to provide a causal explanation of how the norms affect outcomes[39]. Norms shape conceptualizations of interests through the social construction of identities. In other words, a constructivist account is necessary to get at 'what deters,' and how and why deterrence 'works' [40]. International relations theory cannot afford to ignore norms. Demonstrating the impact of norms on the interests, beliefs, and behavior of actors in international politics does not and must not invalidate Realism. Rather, it points to **analytical blind spots** and gaps in traditional accounts. In so doing, it not only **casts light into the shadows** of existing theory but raises new questions as well.[41] However, with all the 'constructivist' adjustments made (which are absolutely credible), it is important to keep in mind 'pure rationalist' tools as well. Krasner points out that whenever the cost-benefit ratio indicates that breaking its rules will bring a net benefit that is what states will do[42]. Wendt introduces a correction that instrumentalism may be the attitude when states first settle on norms, and "continue(s) to be for poorly organized states down the road"[43]. States obey the law initially because they are forced to or calculate that it is in their self-interest. Some states never get beyond this point. Some do, and then obey the law because they accept its claims on them as legitimate[44]. This is truly an excellent observation. The problem here, however, could be that even when states remove the option of breaking the law from their agenda, this already implies that benefits overweight costs. And even if this is not the case, how can we know where exactly this point is, beyond which states respect law for law's sake? Furthermore, states that supposedly have stepped over this point might break the law, when it has become least expected, if they consider this of their prime interest. Powerful illustration of this is France, which resumed its nuclear testing to the great surprise of the world[45]. Another interesting example is the case of NATO. Traditional alliance theories based on Realist thinking provide insufficient explanations of the origins, the interaction patterns, and the persistence of NATO. The 'brand new' interpretation is that the Alliance represents an institutionalized pluralistic community of liberal democracies. Democracies not only do not fight each other, they are likely to develop a collective identity facilitating the emergence of cooperative institutions for specific purposes[46]. Thus presented, old questions get revitalized. Why is NATO the strongest among the other post-Cold War security institutions – as compared to, the WEU, not even to mention the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy? Why is not the OSCE given a chance to turn into a truly pluralistic European 'Security Architecture'? Why was NATO so eager to bomb Kosovo, which was a clear breach of international law? Because it is 'an institutionalized pluralistic community of liberal democracies'? Or yet because it is a predominantly military organization? Why do public opinion polls in Russia[47] repeatedly show that NATO is an aggressive organization (and which can also be observed in official rhetoric, as in the national security conception and the military doctrine[48])? All these questions suggest that to claim that Realist explanation of NATO existence can be thrown into a dustbin at minimum inappropriate. Social sciences do not evolve via scientific revolutions, as Thomas Kuhn argues is the case for the natural sciences. Not paradigm shifts but rather style and fashion changes are what characterize social science[49]. Thus posed, paradigm development promises Realism a bright future. In this respect, recent success of constructivism has, metaphorically speaking, **breathed in a new life** into Realism. Realism is in much debt to constructivism for being revitalized. Yet, paying full credit to the contribution of constructivism, it should be noted that to a large extent constructivists take off from the Realist positions.

Aff Answers

2AC – No Link/Perm Solves

Their link is describing reactionary responses to pandemics and emergencies- Aff creates a new model of decision-making that's net better than the status quo, by create cooperation and prevention strategies- erodes uncertainty and marginalization– means perm is desirable and solves the link
Smith 06

(Richard, Health Economics Group, School of Medicine, Health Policy & Practice, Social Science and Medicine, "Responding to global infectious disease outbreaks: Lessons from SARS on the role of risk perception, communication and management," 2006, Science Direct) //jdi-mm

Serious infectious disease outbreaks need to be identified and dealt with quickly**. Adverse health and economic effects can be reduced by early detection and response**. Clearly, this will require taking action before all the facts are known and investigations are completed, and thus acting on incomplete information**. In this respect, a concrete development could be to invest in epidemiological and economic modelling**. Indeed, there has been a recent call for the development of such an integrated epidemiological and economic modelling approach, stemming directly from the SARS outbreak (Smith, Drager, & Hardimann, 2006). Key in this development will be the integration of the impact of risk perception upon actions by actors (population, government, nations and so forth), and the effect of different strategies on this perception, and hence action. At present little is known about how uncertainty concerning the outbreak in question, or its level of risk, affects behavioural response. For instance, how do people determine their own risk of exposure? How does this perceived risk affect behaviour? Assessment of these factors in modelling the likely impact of an outbreak is therefore crucial. In addition, **there is need for better understanding and managing of risk surrounding infectious disease outbreaks.** For example, **understanding the relationship between infectious disease flows and flows of goods, services and people can help decision makers assess the relative risk of and to specific countries during an outbreak**. This can contribute to more informed decisions that are taken proactively, rather than reactively, prior to and during emergencies. Risk assessment can also be used to improve public communication. Research shows that some hazards or events deemed by experts as presenting a low risk become the focus of social and political concern, or amplification (Department of Health, 2003). In other cases, where experts perceive there to be a high risk, there can sometimes be insufficient social or political concern, or attenuation (Sandman 2004). An understanding of what drives the perception of risk is therefore sorely needed.

No link- Even if the aff isn't perfect, it doesn't result in the same fear-mongering as status quo emergency-responses to disease outbreaks- trust in the healthcare industry fundamentally shifts the nature of disease outbreaks by focusing on prevention strategies first
Smith 06

(Richard, Health Economics Group, School of Medicine, Health Policy & Practice, Social Science and Medicine, "Responding to global infectious disease outbreaks: Lessons from SARS on the role of risk perception, communication and management," 2006, Science Direct) //jdi-mm

There are also several other lessons for policy concerning risk and infectious disease that may be learnt from the SARS experience. First, a change in attitude from emergency responsiveness to preventive preparedness is needed, as part of a more holistic and strategic approach to planning for infectious disease outbreaks. By definition, emergencies offer a limited timeframe for taking action, and would thus

benefit from a clear chain of command, strong coordination among relevant institutions, and strong political leadership. Clarity of responsibility, authority and accountability during outbreaks, from local to the global levels, is imperative for effective action. This includes institutions beyond the health sector, such as transportation, immigration, communications, finance, water and sanitation, defence, housing and education. When multiple sectors are involved, when there is scientific uncertainty, and when the timeframe is urgent, political leadership becomes especially important. Further, when an outbreak occurs, decisions need to be taken by a diverse range of actors, from different perspectives and at varying points in the policy making process. Given the nature of public health emergencies, in terms of timeframe, potential unknowns and geographic reach, this decision making process can be complex and highly challenging. Yet the effectiveness of the emergency response can ultimately hinge on the quality of decision-making. For example, during the SARS outbreak there were different ways of organising health controls for incoming passengers in the EU which had a negative effect on the trust placed by the public on the responsible official bodies. Such reductions in trust 'make a suspicious public sceptical of official health warnings' (Pickles & Goodwin, 2006; p. 11). Effective decision-making is characterised by such features as timeliness, accuracy, appropriateness, feasibility and clarity of purpose and message. It is therefore essential to reflect on how decision-making can best be carried out during public health emergencies. Second, as a part of this decision-making process, there is a need for understanding more fully the costs and benefits of effective responses. Economic data is currently focused on direct and immediate costs, such as drugs, other interventions, health care services, to the relevant national health sector. A fuller and wider account of macroeconomic costs will underpin a more strategic approach to decision making, and contribute to more informed decisions that are taken proactively, rather than reactively, prior to and during emergencies. Although macroeconomic modelling of health issues is very novel, with only a few applications (e.g. Lee & McKibbin, 2004; Smith et al., 2005), a current European Union Framework 6 project is developing this approach, using the case of SARS (http://icadc.cordis.lu/fep-cgi/srchidadb?CALLER=FP6_PROJ&ACTION=D&RCN=73835&DOC=5&CAT=PROJ&QUERY=1). Work such as this is required to provide the foundations for recommending how such economic information may best be assessed and best incorporated in to the decision-making process for outbreak response. Third, SARS demonstrated the importance of a worldwide surveillance and response capacity to address emerging risks through timely reporting, rapid communication and evidence-based action (Greaves, 2004). Since international infectious disease outbreaks may arise in resource poor countries, international agencies and wealthy countries must be encouraged to support policies, mechanisms and technologies that help resource poor countries to tackle these threats, whilst at the same time ensuring that national public health priorities are not distorted. One clear lesson from SARS and other outbreaks is the need for a more effective incentive system to encourage countries to notify these outbreaks. Fourth, it will be critical to ensure that interventions respect public health ethics and fundamental human rights. Many of the public health measures used during the SARS outbreaks, especially isolation and quarantine, may conflict with certain human rights. In order to plan a response to global infectious disease outbreaks it will therefore be important to consider a range of issues concerning the nexus between containment and human freedoms. For example, taking isolation and quarantine, there needs to be consideration of the level of transparency with which such policies are enacted and enforced, proportionality in the imposition of these policies compared with the benefits they offer and the assurance of a safe and habitable environment for persons subject to these measures (Gostin, Bayer, & Fairchild, 2003). Finally, SARS emphasised the importance of communications with domestic and international policy makers, financial markets, the travel industry and other key sectors. However, perhaps the most important lesson from SARS was the importance of effective communication to the public. For example, social cohesion and compliance with quarantine in Toronto may be attributed to, at least in part, clear communication and practical guidance by authorities (Health Canada, 2003). However, the constant coverage by the press, and the manner with which some of the travel advisories were handled, were linked by some to 'over reaction' (Gatehouse, 2003; Hurst, 2003; Lam & Hong, 2003). It is therefore important in the future to accompany advisories with educational messages designed to help the public understand the risks of infection, and an appropriate response. To assist this there is a need for research to identify how the public responds to such a public health threat and what may be done to better manage this.

2AC – Disease Threats Real

New emerging diseases are real and proliferating rapidly- the alternative doesn't account for new diseases. Only the affirmative takes steps towards resolving disease pandemics growing in the most marginalized populations
Singer 09

(Merill, Medical Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies in Health and Illness, "Pathogens Gone Wild? Medical Anthropology and the "Swine Flu" Pandemic," 2009, Taylor and Francis) //jdi-mm

The anthropological study of epidemics, as Lindenbaum (2001:380) observed, "provides a unique point of entry for examining the relationships among cultural assumptions, particular institutional forms, and states of mind." At the same time, it offers a window on the underlying structures of social relationship within and across group boundaries, including the mechanisms used to sustain complex social architectures of inequality over time. In this, it is clear that in addition to the existence of a microbiopolitics, in which, as Paxson (2008:16) argued, social disagreements "over how to live with microorganisms reflect disagreement about how humans ought live with one another," there is also a macrobiopolitics in which the cultural construction of infectious disease reflects structures and contestations in human social relationships. These dual and mutually influencing biopolitical processes are of particular note of late in that the enduring threat from infectious diseases creates a world very different from the one imaged 50 years ago by many health experts. As Binder et al. (1999:1311) indicated, the widespread optimism in developed countries after World War II that "good sanitation, vaccines, and antimicrobial agents would conquer infectious diseases" was followed "by ominous developments, such as the recognition of the extent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the resurgence of diseases such as tuberculosis." **Globally**, in fact, **infectious diseases remain the leading cause of death almost ten years into the 21st century, and even in highly developed nations like the United States infections rank third among causes of mortality**. Moreover, the danger posed by infectious agents has been growing. There has, for example, been a mounting concern among public health officials, health care providers, and the general public about an increasingly long list of "emerging diseases." The discovery of new pathogens, some of which are already widespread in human populations by the time they are recognized, is now occurring at a **rapid** pace. On average, three new human infectious diseases are identified every two years, with a new pathogen being reported in the health literature every week. One indicator of the level of attention now being given to the new "killer germs" is the launch by Springer Publishing Company of a book series titled Emerging Infectious Diseases of the 21st Century with ten new titles. Of historic note, the series editor is I. W. Fong, Chief of Infectious Disease at St. Michael's Hospital in Toronto, a facility that during the SARS epidemic of 2003 (which caused 43 deaths in Toronto and cost the city about 15% of its annual economy) was forced to cancel all elective surgery for three months. As a consequence of the lingering memory of this frightening experience, which "created an air of anxiety" at St. Michael's (Sullivan 2004), the hospital quickly posted on its Web site a reassuring message informing would-be patients that the current swine flu outbreak "is not SARS" and that St. Michael's is "taking every precaution to ensure the health and safety" of patients, staff, and students. Similar reassurances have been issued by many hospitals, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health Organization, state and provincial health departments, ministries of health, and the President of the United States (while asking Congress for an increase of $1.5 billion in influenza-related funding). Truly we live in a time of perplexing vulnerability and high anxiety. From a crashing global economy linked in part to the self-serving deeds of corporate criminals, to shadowy bomb-wielding terrorists, to would-be pirates on the high seas, to raging microbes, there are enemies at the gate everywhere we look. It bears asking: Are these phenomena linked together in some fashion—by underlying cultural assumptions, social practices, and particular states of mind, as Lindenbaum might suggest—or do they represent a mere temporal coincidence? From the perspective of anthropology, the current rapid appearance and spread of emerging diseases among human populations (as well as other challenges we face) appears in no small part to be a consequence of major environmental changes like deforestation and reforestation, intensification of agriculture, dam construction and irrigation, housing and road building, concentration of people in overcrowded and densely packed cities, the fast-paced movement of people around the planet, the global reorganization of food production following an industrial model, the development of pathogenic resistance to overused and misused antibiotics, unregulated and unsustainable economic activities, and global climate change. Because all of these anthropogenic global changes are expected to continue and even to accelerate in coming years, the threat of new and renewed pathogens is significant, particularly in developing nations, where comorbid old and new infectious diseases are common; immunohealth may be compromised by dietary deficiencies, prior infection, and stress; and

<u>health prevention and intervention infrastructures are weakest</u>. So too with the poor of rich countries, people who often experience a novel infection as yet another encounter with a prevailing pattern of socially produced health disparities. In short, while emergent pathogens are components of nature, their appearance among humans and their health and social impacts are mediated by microsocial processes embedded within large-scale inegalitarian social structures and their environment-shaping influences. Thus, so-called risk behaviors, <u>common targets of epidemiological response to the spread of disease, are shaped by social environments and relationships more so than they are products of individual acts, attitudes, and understandings</u>. Moreover, as seen in the HIV/AIDS pandemic, social and biomedical responses, from stigmatization to the inadequate allocation of intervention resources, reflect underlying social patterns and socially constituted attitudes. Consequently, in a world in which pathogens seemingly have gone wild (i.e., act in ways that frustrate human initiative and desire), a field like medical anthropology that brings unifying biosocial and micro-/macrobiopolitical perspectives to the on-the-ground examination of social and contextual factors in health may be of particular value. It is in this light that we can ask: What can medical anthropology bring to the (epidemiologically titled) novel strain H1N1 influenza A (popularly named "swine flu") pandemic? The answer, I suggest, involves three responses: (1) field monitoring of the pandemic as a biosocial phenomenon; (2) assessment of the biosocial origins and ongoing social influences on the pandemic; and (3) research-based and culturally informed involvement in public health applications.

2AC – Simulation Good

Bioterror simulations are good – engender new epistemologies and practices that help protect the population against any future crises

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In order for citizens to do their work to ready themselves for the catastrophe, the uncertain future threat must be brought into a space where it can be acted upon in the present. Large-scale simulations create the crisis in the present moment, not only staging a rehearsal, but teaching participants what their roles should be during the imagined future event. **These simulations have consequence**, for they will shape how future incidents are understood and managed.5 Furthermore, scenarios **change the calculation of risk**, for they produce expertise grounded in **"imaginative enactment"** rather than **statistics and probability**.6 As Collier has argued, these enactments are producing **new knowledge** about our ways of living in society, using an imagined future **instead of a calculated past** to determine what threatens our social being and how.7 The information gleaned from a scenario might be used in the same way as knowledge produced through the analysis of past events, rationalizing legislation or determining funding allocations. Unlike the insurance of risk produced through the careful study of the past, however, simulation trends towards an expansive response, one focused on increasing the capacity of the nation to respond to an ever-growing range of threats. Simulation thereby becomes a mechanism for **managing the unthinkable**. Because biological agents act upon individual bodies differently than chemical or nuclear weapons, planning the emergency response to a bioterrorist attack draws particular attention to the networks that constitute community. Unlike "duck and cover" or "shelter in place" guidelines which focus upon shielding the body during an attack of limited duration, the response to a biological event takes place over time as bodies are protected against disease by access to medical treatment. Bioterrorism preparedness plans largely focus upon medical infrastructure and access to bodies in order to provide medical care. Through rehearsal, planners seek to identify barriers that inhibit the flow of pharmaceuticals into the population, interactions that increase the transmission of disease, and weaknesses within the existing health infrastructure which would become critical if the system were stressed by the rapid onset of disease within the population. Further, because the bioterror attack may not be accompanied by explosions or other indicators of a violent event, there may be no immediate change of behavior at the onset of the event. Thus, **the everyday interactions** that define the community—the movements and meetings of individuals—must be evaluated in terms of the crisis. Not only does the scenario have the potential to identify certain behaviors as damaging to people's ability to survive an attack, as might be the case in a nuclear simulation, but the bioterror rehearsal seeks to pinpoint certain actions which constitute the event itself, revealing behaviors that spread disease and showing how citizens essentially become the weapon through those actions. Preparedness practices rationalized through bioterrorism simulation have a particular capacity to advocate changes in the daily activities that constitute community, for these are the acts that transmit disease.

2AC – Disease Reps Good

disease representation are crucial to cross-discipline collaboration, incorporating the best of activism, theory and politics shapes public policy

Nancy **Tomes** (History Prof. @ Stony Brook University) **2002**

["Disease and Popular Culture in Early-Twentieth-Century America" *American Literary History* 14.4 muse, log]

Exploiting the news and entertainment potential of deadly diseases encouraged new kinds of collaborations among scientific researchers, politicians, activists, journalists, and advertisers. Powerful synergisms grew up among these five groups, so that arguments and claims made in one arena were replicated and amplified in others. Through reading in a wide range of sources, such as popular magazines, advertising agency records, and trade journals, I have eavesdropped, so to speak, on their insider conversations about how to "sell" disease. These conversations provide revealing insights into the assumptions that publishers and advertisers used to guide their coverage of infectious diseases. Although not necessarily accurate, their beliefs about what attracted or entertained the "masses" played a crucial role in shaping the flow of information and images available in popular domains of culture.

By exploring their conceptions of what made epidemics entertaining, I hope to offer more than the historian's customary gesture of insisting that phenomena considered new and unique have important precursors in the past. **For theoretical as well as policy reasons, we need to better understand the underlying dynamics of cultural attention as they operate in modern consumer societies.** Too often critics implicitly contrast the sad state of contemporary media and entertainment industries with some mythic [End Page 628] good old days, when supposedly the dividing lines between fiction and nonfiction, information and advertising, advocacy and objectivity were sharp and clear. But a closer look at the history of disease-related journalism, advertising, and entertainment reveals that these boundaries have never been firm. Moreover, **past practices of writing about and visualizing disease risks have considerable persistence; disease templates forged at the turn of the last century continue to shape popular culture and public policy to this day. Understanding historical continuities in the selling of stories about dread disease serve to remind us how deeply the dynamics of consumer culture shape perceptions of what is—and is not—a "real problem."** With that knowledge in hand, we can better comprehend our own predilections for turning epidemics into entertainments.

Privacy K-Northwestern

AT: Perm

The perm still links – any endorsement of privacy as an individual right or freedom strengthens capitalist social relations. Relying on the rhetoric and concept of privacy co-opts and prevents alternative movements from solving

Aaron **Henry 2013**, Carleton University Sociology and Political Economy PhD candidate, Winter 2013, "Perpetual Object of Regulation: Privacy as Pacification," Socialist Studies/Études socialistes 9-2, http://socialiststudies.com/article/view/23507/17392

We have established the idea that 'privacy' has the effect of disassociating security from the fabrication of private life or, rather, privacy creates the conception that security is distinct and balanced by liberalism. What does any of this have to do with privacy and the further alienation of our collective social power? It is not enough to state that privacy is the means whereby security extends itself into social life and assures us of its own proportionality or reasonableness. Rather, privacy not only fails to challenge capital, as Neocleous has demonstrated (2002, 106) but, further still, lends itself to the reification of capitalist social relations and the further separation of the individual to their own social power and objective conditions of life. Privacy not only numbs us to the logics of security and its reasonable agreement to let certain areas of our lives occur seemingly unencumbered by security projects. Rather, it ensures, through the limits privacy sets on our experiences of collective life, the forms of political activity and social engagement that appear possible to us, that in advancing privacy we only further reinforce security and its colonization of "all aspects of human practices and thinking" (Rigakos, 2011, 62). As Marx noted "labour is, therefore, the objectification of [human] species life," reality is constructed through and mediates upon the social, economic, and biological conditions through which humans contemplate their own objectively constituted existence (Marx, 1975, 76). It follows that species being, as both the object and will of one's practical activity and as the objective reality contained and represented in the products of labour, is estranged by the condition of labour in capitalist society. Thus, in the course of making the worker's product nothing more than the "means to our physical existence" in equal measure species-life itself becomes [merely] a means" as well (Marx, 1975, 77). The estrangement of life and labour from nature and other people force both nature and other people to "appear as objects other than and differentiated from" [the labourer] (Marx, 1975, 78). As such, relations that one confronts independently of one's own particular labour, forces of 'nature' and other individuals appear "as something alien and objective, confronting [individuals] not as their relations to one another but as our subordination to relations which exist independently of [us]" developing merely from the collisions between mutually indifferent individuals (Marx, 1973, 157). To this end, with the advent of capitalist relations, the individual's understanding of themselves as part of a species life dissipates and instead the predominant social bond between individuals is that of "a spontaneous interconnection, [a] material and mental metabolism...independent of the knowing and willing individuals [which] presupposes their "reciprocal independence and indifference" (Marx, 1973, 161). Consequently, as the contemplation of social life of life-activity as a shared social product wanes and in its place individuals increasingly find themselves "ruled by abstractions" as objective relations of dependency, the reciprocal relations of production appear separate and autonomous to the individuals who constitute these very relations (Marx, 1973, 164). My point is not that 'privacy' produces these conditions; the estrangement of individuals from species-life is innate to capitalist production. My point is that privacy serves to further acclimatize us to this reification of species-life as nothing more than the atomized world of the 'individual'. Which is a way of saying that privacy is part and parcel of the process of pacification, a key mechanism in the fabrication of bourgeois order. In particular, it is only in the absence of species-life, when our relations of our social dependence take on the fantastic form of relations between things and relations between people appear as forces alien to us, that the partitioning of social life into private isolated, 'natural' individuals becomes feasible; "liberty is... the right to do everything which does not harm others" it is essentially "the right of the circumscribed individual, withdrawn into him/herself" (Marx, 1975, 42). Thus, **the demand for privacy is not merely forever circumscribed by the logics of security but it entrenches the very separations between people presupposed by capitalist social relations that security is used to enforce and maintain**. Privacy, then, promises a life apart, a mode of existence separate from others and to this end is presupposed by our appearance as individuals who are autonomous from another and can, therefore, 'choose' to be further detached and apart. Before concluding I think there is an overarching political implication from this relation between privacy, security and capital. This appearance of choice, of course, serves only to further obfuscate the social nature of human existence and our inextricable tie to unequal class, gender and race relations. By agreeing to live in the form of privacy that is carved out by security projects, we live as individuals who perceive their primary social bond with society to be nothing more than a spontaneous, indifferent and independent set of connections. Any social forces we are confronted by are, by definition, abstractions of the concrete real relations of society. As such, increasingly structural forces such as unemployment, ecological catastrophe, fears about old-age or even general depression or dissatisfaction have the appearance of existing completely suspended from our society and our mode of social (re) production. In this sense, adhering to

privacy, as a mode of resistance does not just leave one apart from society but it 'displaces' the social with the 'personal'. In this sense, it is only partially true, as Tocqueville claimed, "as the extent of political society expands, one must expect the sphere of private life to contract" (1968, [1840], 782-3). It may be true that as political society grows, it develops to include new apparatuses to consolidate and legitimate dominant relations of rule (Abrams, 1977, 58); but in capitalist society the growth of political society in any substantive sense (i.e. the common deliberation on life in its totality not merely in its forms of abstraction) is utterly antithetical to conditions of accumulation in capitalist society; after-all, the egotistical person "is [in capitalist society] the foundation and presupposition of the political state" (Marx, 1975, 45). However, the opposite holds; as political society shrinks the larger the sphere of 'private social life' looms. In particular, the less leave we are given collectively to contemplate and organize the objective conditions of social reproduction (education, labour, health-care, old-age) and the more private market relations come to dominate our social experience, the more private life becomes our only mode of contemplation and action. Indeed, although we should not conflate privacy and privatization, the latter historically presupposes the emergence of the former, privacy has increasingly become a force of further commodification. Not solely in terms of direct commodification but in eschewing one's existence as a social being, individuals are increasingly left with no other expression or mode of contemplation outside their own private milieu. As such, when confronted by social, economic and political forces the recourse of the private individual is not to confront these forces as the products of our own objective activity or even as incidents that can be challenged collectively but as personal threats or risks. Thus, each, in the scale of their own atomized sense of reality, manages these personal risks and effects through the only sphere of relations open to the private individual: commodification and correlative security projects. Thus, we purchase security against disease, security against disability, theft, unemployment, old age, etc. as these things crowd into our 'lives apart from society' as nothing more than personal concerns abstracted from the objective concrete relations that determine them. To the extent that human life becomes monadic and takes on the appearance of being assailed by alien forces, the more the demands for protection from these forces is expressed in purchases of private or individual security from these forces; which, in turn, only makes social life all the more atomized and 'apart'. Thus, **in the course of drawing on privacy as a means to confront economic and political domination, we are not only acclimatized to the existence of these relations but we are pacified, or at least deterred, from radical, collective forms of political action**. "Security is not just hegemonic, it is hegemony", says Rigakos (2011, 58). Attempts to reveal the tensions and points of incoherency within security projects simply seem to drive the greater refinement of these very projects. In many respects, it is the hegemony of security, its analytical inscrutability that has prompted the turn to pacification both as a concrete historical formation of rule and as an analytical concept, a means to reveal its contingencies, its overlaps, and points of formation (Rigakos, 2011, 61; Neocleous, 2010). The other problem posed by the hegemony of security, implicit to the first problem perhaps, is that in attaining hegemony it has colonized a number of social forms. This means that some relations that appear like sites of possible resistance, such as privacy, in fact form capillary points in the economy of relations behind security. With this problem in mind I have tried to tease out the historical relation of privacy to security in capitalist society, so as to demonstrate how the former was, from the outset, entangled with the latter. Security presupposes privacy, decides its scope of power and the facets of social life to which it applies. Furthermore, not only does security condition privacy but also privacy itself, as a mode of life, has the effect of pacifying us to the further penetration of security into social life. Thus, privacy will be in existence for as long as the logics of security remain in play; for, as I outlined earlier in this discussion, it is the private sphere of relations, the sanctity of homo-economicus, that the project of police has long since had as its object. We on 'the Left' would do well to consider these aspects of privacy. As suggested by Tyler Wall's paper in this collection, it is by making appeals to privacy, that drones in the United States have made the transition from battlefield technology to a component of the 'domestic' security apparatus. Following the insights from this paper, it can be argued that challenging drones through privacy will ostensibly experience moderate success. Drones perhaps will only be flown at certain times, in certain areas, and will contravene these rules only when vital security or safety concerns arise. The footage they capture will perhaps even be handled in a manner similar to the PNR data. Yet it is the security apparatus itself, not privacy, that will determine how these limits operate. These limits not only become our measure of freedom and autonomy but also structure our pacification. Thus, **in a society that approaches security through the right to privacy, the proliferation of the conduct of war abroad and at home, the organization of human potential into a dehumanizing economic mode of production, will continue apace**; insofar as these forces will continue to confront us as happenstance things, filtering in and out of each individual's private, insular existence. To live this pacified mode of life is no less the promise of privacy than it is the guarantee of security.

Privacy can't be made into a tool of resistance as long is tied to the idea of ownership and property.

Sebastian **Sevignani '12** Unified Theory of Information Research Group "The Problem of Privacy in Capitalism and the Alternative Social Networking Site Diaspora" tripleC 10(2): 600-617, 2012

As the privacy issue is a core issue in Diaspora*'s self-image, evaluating Diaspora*'s alternative potential must include not only evaluating its mode of production, but also a critical evaluation of privacy as a whole. In the following, I will interlink both issues. Christian Fuchs has outlined how we can analyse capital accumulation on SNSs in Marxian terms (Fuchs 2012, 143-146). Facebook's and others' capital accumulation strategy is mainly based on the targeted advertising business model, which means that they engage in exchange contracts with the advertising industry. The owner buys technical infrastructure, such as server parks and software components, as well as labour force, such as accountants, software developer, etc, and produces the SNS on which users can interact. While people use the site for different rea- sons, such as getting news, providing information, staying in touch with friends, making new rela- notion of privacy ("puts you in control of your information") and relates the promise of user control to property ("You retain full ownership of all your information"). Dominant privacy theories stress the individual's control over access to personal information and are deeply rooted in people's minds and their practical role as marketers. Privacy-aware users, who see commercial SNSs as associated with privacy invasive behaviour, are surely attracted by Diaspora*'s privacy statement. One consequence of privacy theories stressing the individual con- trol aspect is that they avoid objective constraints of the individual's power to control and decide. The public good finds no consideration here. Another alternative SNS in the making, TheGlob- alSquare, which is associated with the "occupy" movement (Roos 2011), also relates to the privacy discourse. It makes more substantial claims about what privacy is and what it is not: "Individuals have a right to privacy as part of the rights they brought from a state of nature [...]. Organizations and actions which affect the public are not protected by any such rights" (Marsh 2012). Here, indi- vidual control is not seen exclusively and this example proves that Diaspora* could also behave differently in its recourse to the value of privacy. As far as I can see, in its various self-descriptions, Diaspora* does not propose any qualification of privacy that can constrain exclusive individual con- trol and is therefore likely to fit into the dominant theories of privacy. Diaspora* mobilises the power of the individuals and their privacy – for which they think that they owe nothing to society – against economic surveillance. So, it challenges successfully the economic foundations underlying privacy threats, **but does not challenge privacy as a possessive individualistic concept**. On the contrary, Diaspora*'s focus on privacy is accompanied by stressing the relevance of ownership. Concepts of ownership or private property support the exclusive and individualistic no- tion of privacy. Here again, Diaspora* reacts to commercial SNSs. Facebook, for example, states in its terms of use that users grant Facebook "a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty- free, worldwide license to use any IP [intellectual property] content that you post on or in connec- tion with Facebook" (Facebook 2011). In the case of Diaspora*, such a license is not possible. However, in the same passage, Facebook also states that "you own all of the content and infor- mation you post on Facebook, and you can control how it is shared through your privacy and appli- cation settings" (Facebook 2011). Is the notion of ownership then so appropriate for an alternative to capitalist SNSs? I think it is not and the relationship between privacy as commodity (the Face- book license for instance) and privacy as an aspect of self-possession (Diaspora*'s notion), which has been outlined above, gives grounds for holding a sceptical view. Diaspora*'s vision of privacy protection is, as outlined in the first section, essentially based on the individual opportunity to change pods/SNS-provider. Users need ownership of their data in order to migrate them from pod to pod: "And because your information is yours, not ours, you'll have the ultimate power — the abil- ity to move your profile and all your social data from one pod to another, without sacrificing your connection to the social web" (Diaspora 2011c; emphasis in original). Assuming that Diaspora* will never be able to outdo Facebook in terms of provided features and network effects in the view of the majority of SNSs users, users may then voluntarily decide to sell their privacy on Facebook or Google+ and they are indeed able to do this as they have exclusive control and ownership of their privacy. Exactly, these premises of the privacy commodity exchange are also propagated by Dias- pora*. The dominant theoretical privacy concept cannot provide reasons why users should not be- have like this. At this point of Diaspora*'s evaluation, it may be useful to remember Marx's "leading threat" of investigation expressed in the previously quoted passage from the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, where he refers to the relation between the entire economic founda- tion of society and the more or less rapidly transforming superstructures within which humans be- come conscious of conflicts and fight them out. The focus on privacy, as it is dominant in capital- ism, may result from Diaspora*'s multi-faceted embeddedness in capitalist structures. There is capital accumulation related to copyleft. On the one hand, copyleft products can be used for free in order to produce non copyleft products. For instance, machines that produce umbrellas can be operated on behalf of free and copyleft software. The producer of umbrellas does not have to pay for that kind of software although it contributes as means of production to his or her capital accumulation. In this case, an intensive exploitation of the labour that was once spent on the copyleft product takes place. The producer of umbrellas saves the money that he or she would otherwise have to pay for the machine's operating software. On the other hand, copyleft products are attractive for users as they cheap, widely cheaply accessible and have a high quality since a huge pool of co-operative labour builds them. Copyleft products are also often more flexibly adapt- able to specific purposes. This appeal can be used for capital accumulation indirectly. Commercial firms may offer services that are related to copyleft products. For instance, a producer of umbrellas pays another firm that collects and aggregates suitable copyleft components for running umbrella-tions, or organising events, they produce a wide range of data. These data, which include for in- stance socio-

demographic information and consumer preferences deduced from users' browsing behaviour, are then sold to advertisers. Whereas traditional forms of advertising are directed to broad groups of potential buyers, targeted advertising is tailored for exactly defined and differenti- ated groups, or even single consumers. This demands more detailed, exact, and differentiated knowledge of the users' needs and (buying) behaviour, which can be provided by the owner of SNSs. The SNSs' business model is based on the secondary use of user interaction for commodi- fication and valorisation purposes (Smythe 1989; Fuchs 2011a). The economic reason why profit- oriented SNSs develop massive systems of user surveillance and store "literally everything", as a Facebook employee has admitted (Wong 2010), lies therein. Users' interests in privacy can only be considered where the need for privacy does not inhibit SNSs' profit interests. In fact, commercial SNSs commodify users' privacy. They often do it without users' explicit consent, when they hide their profit-orientation behind the social value of networking. Today, SNSs are increasingly com- pelled to respect users' privacy through legal investigations, public pressure initiated by privacy movements, and alternative SNSs such as Diaspora*, but this does not mean that commercial SNSs have to abjure the targeted advertising model. Commercial and advertising funded SNSs need users who have control over their data and are able to exchange their privacy for the usage of the platform voluntarily by agreeing to the terms of use. For them, in order to maintain newer forms of exploitation, the challenge is not to fight against privacy at all; rather, they can support privacy if it is – as an analogy to labour force - related to private property, and hence alienable or exchange- able. It seems that **simply upholding privacy is not the right move in order to challenge surveillance** (Nock 1993, 1; Lyon 2005, 27; Stalder 2002). Diaspora* breaks with this advertising model based on privacy as commodity; hence, it protects its users and their personal data from exploitation: "Yet our distributed design means no big corpo- ration will ever control Diaspora. Diaspora* will never sell your social life to advertisers, and you won't have to conform to someone's arbitrary rules or look over your shoulder before you speak" (Diaspora 2011c; emphasis in original). Gary T. Marx reminds us that "privacy for whom and sur- veillance of whom and by whom and for what reasons need to be specified in any assessment" (Marx 2012, vii). Due to its distributed infrastructure and its funding model that is not based on ad- vertising, one can argue that Diaspora* practically provides an alternative concept of privacy (Fuchs 2012, 153f.). Diaspora* sees "privacy as collective right of dominated and exploited groups that need to be protected from corporate domination that aims at gathering information about work- ers and consumers for accumulating capital, disciplining workers and consumers, and for increas- ing the productivity of capitalist production and advertising" (Fuchs 2011b, 232). While I agree that Diaspora* practically avoids commodification of privacy and the exploitation of users, I nevertheless see some constraints for an alternative non-ideological notion of privacy that follows from my preceding analysis. **Not only is treating privacy as commodity a problem but it should also be taken into account that conceptualising privacy as an aspect of self-ownership is ideological and cannot be separated from exploitation in capitalism**. In fact, although Diaspora* is directed against newer forms of exploitation of users' privacy, its recourse to privacy remains bound to exploitation in general as it confirms exploitation's ideological premises – the possessive individualistic ideology. I shall provide evidence for such a claim.

Relying on the legal system integrates potentially transformative movements into the conservative legal establishment. The permutation would prevent the alternative from solving.

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And what is this new social consciousness, this new "false social- meaning system?" In intellectual terms, I would describe it as fol- lows: given the collapse of any visible progressive social movement that could offer a concrete hope of greater happiness, people are ex- periencing an intense privatization of everyday life in which the work-world has become a meaningless milieu perceived solely as a place to "get money" and in which any genuine human contact is felt only in privatized settings like the family, bars, and relatively margi- nal organizations like church groups. This intense privatization cou- pled with the lack of any visible social alternative is producing immense frustration and anger, and this frustration and anger is be- ing directed in part at previous political illusions and their false promises of a better life. The creation of a false social-meaning sys- tem to legitimize this very situation requires transforming this nega- tive into an affirmative. And this affirmative can and should be expressed bluntly: "Unions are self-serving, rehabilitating criminals is a fraud, politicians are corrupt, and the poor can help themselves. We Americans are good law-abiding people, we know what's what, and we want you phony liberals with your phony morality to leave us alone. We can make out just fine if only we can get you off our backs." Now in fact this affirmation of the value of privatism is completely false, and deep in their hearts everyone knows it's false. But the false "we" in this quasi-populist diatribe can still provide a substitute feel- ing of community that can serve as a cover for actual suffering and isolation, particularly when a leader emerges who can institute the group's unity by embodying its ethic in public space. They do not care that Reagan can

not answer questions at press conferences be- cause at last the truth is out: press conferences are a charade. And they certainly do not care that Rehnquist substitutes slogans for analysis, as Owen Fiss says disapprovingly in citing Rehnquist's re- mark that the Constitution does not guarantee prisoners "one man, one cell.""' They know that legal analysis is just like Washington press conferences and that in some way Rehnquist is giving it to them when he makes fun of the profundity of 'constitutional doctrine and interpretation. The fact is that this reaction to the liberal social-justice attitude is absolutely valid. The fact is that "our federalism<u>," our "fundamental values"</u> that were being carried to the states through the fourteenth amendment and to private parties through the commerce clause <u>were never really intended to achieve social justice by abolishing the hierarchy-system and giving power to the large masses of people. They were intended to maintain these very hierarchies while at the same time satisfying a very genuine wish within liberal conscious- ness to "help" poor people</u>, third-world people, those most oppressed by the system. In the long run this could only produce a sense of contradiction and anger among those not helped. Collective anger is not the only force at the heart of the new "We" that the Burger Court is trying to create, although this anger is of great libidinal importance in binding the energy of the New Right to- gether. There is also a positive utopian content in the new world- view. As I have said earlier, these world-views that succeed one an- other, generation after generation, are always founded upon a polit- ical illusion, an illusion that the world is the way it is because "We" want it this way and not because it is forced upon us. What is the political illusion inhering in the deregulation of subordinate power- centers, the return to states' rights, and in the view that criminals are criminals and that's all there is to it? It seems to me that this illusion is to be located in the displacement of the mass powerlessness generated by the concrete experience of socio- economic life into an imaginary political sphere such that the feelings of powerlessness associated with isolation and privatization appear to be caused by an imaginary political oppression. This <u>oppression is then relieved in an imaginary way by the wish-fulfilling fantasy of "getting the government off our backs so that we can be free again."</u> In other words, what Jeff Blum views as an instrumental deregulation of subordinate power-centers in his realist critique of Burger Court ideology must actually be understood as what one might call a "deregulation of the world" in the realm of mass- psychological fantasy. Thus, while it may appear to be against the rational self-interest of working class people to support the striking- down of legislative restraints on corporate campaign contributions as the Burger Court has done in the name of freedom of expression,12 it is in their psychic self-interest to support such an action because it allows them simultaneously to deny an intolerable contradiction of their concrete existence - the need for power and the apparent im- possibility of realizing it - and to alleviate the contradiction in the realm of fantasy. It allows people to feel that "we are free to express ourselves again," even as their actual life conditions force precisely the opposite awareness upon them every day of their concrete existence. <u>The true role of the Court in this process of displacement of contra- diction and generation of substitute gratification is both to satisfy a need brought about by popular suffering and to control this need so as to maintain the equilibrium of the status quo</u>. As state officials who are granted prestige and high salary solely on the basis of the political legitimacy of the existing system, <u>most judges are interested in keeping things the way they are</u>. <u>This requires the ideological integration of destabilizing movements from the right as well as from the left</u>, and it is actually this attempt at ideological integration that peo-ple refer to when they say the Court is "moving to the right." The Court's aim is precisely to make the rise of the New Right constitutional, and in so doing to resolve the current legitimacy-crisis by reconstituting the existing hierarchy-system within an imaginary framework that conforms to a new "intent of the framers." For in the long run it is only by transforming the recent wave of right-wing ac- tivism into a passively-accepted legal order that the new conserva- tism can become a genuinely dominant ideology in the way that democratic liberalism has been for most of our recent history. Whether this process of re-legitimation will succeed depends upon a great many factors, among the most important of which is the self- conscious, sustained efforts of groups like ourselves to refute the New Right's vision convincingly by showing that it mystifies a world that cannot actually satisfy people's real human needs. But to do this we must be more radical rather than less radical, using whatever re- sources are available to us as teachers and practitioners to expose the myths of liberal as well as conservative world-views. Speaking to law teachers in particular, since I am a law teacher myself, this means abandoning any professionalist identification with the liberal- legalism of the Warren Court and showing how the Burger Court's ideology makes sense to a mass middle-class and working-class con- stituency faced with unliveable contradictions in their everyday lives.

The public/private distinction is unstable and analytically bankrupt. Embracing a concept of privacy shuts down alternatives to liberal political orders

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For the most part the terms "public" and "private" will be used in this Article simply as they appear in the cases and doctrinal literature. However, these terms have several distinct if related and overlapping meanings, and this Article will be primarily con- cerned with the formulation that focuses on distinguishing between the "political" and "socio-economic" domains of life.8 Part I provides an overview of some specific doctrinal examples of the public/private distinction in labor law. Part II offers

a more detailed examination of a particular problem, namely the various appearances of the public/private distinction in the theory of the collective bargaining and grievance processes. Parts I and II will attempt to establish that <u>although public/private rhetoric is perva- sive in labor doctrine, it is devoid of significant, determinate ana- lytical content</u>. Specifically, <u>the Article will demonstrate the in- coherence of the public/private distinction by showing that: (i) the distinct designations "public" and "private" are at different times, or even simultaneously, employed to characterize the same phe- nomena;</u> 9 (ii) <u>judges and other legal thinkers beginning from an identical premise about the "publicness" or "privateness" of a par- ticular phenomenon will arrive at sharply contrasting or opposed legal conclusions regarding it;</u> or, beginning from opposed premises they will arrive at identical legal conclusions; 10 and (iii) <u>most im- portant, the "borderline" dividing "public" and "private" is con- stantly being altered and redefined in the presence of new legal problems, but absent significant changes in the nature of the under- lying phenomena or social forces that the labels "public" and "private" supposedly describe</u>." Overall, the several examples contained in Part I and the ex- tended review of one issue in Part II are intended to suggest <u>that it is seriously mistaken to imagine that legal discourse or liberal political theory contains a core conception of the public/private distinction capable of being filled with determinate content or ap- plied in a determinate manner to concrete cases.</u> **There is no "public/private distinction."** <u>What does exist is a series of ways of thinking about public and private that are constantly undergoing revision, reformulation, and refinement</u>. The law contains a set of imageries and metaphors, more or less coherent, more or less prone to conscious manipulation, designed to organize judicial thinking according to recurrent, value-laden patterns. <u>The public/private distinction</u> poses as an analytical tool in labor law, but it <u>functions more as a form of political rhetoric used to justify particular results</u>. Part III explores the apologetic character of public/private discourse in labor law, discussing three particular sets of political values that are contained in and reinforced by contemporary public/private rhetoric about the workplace. It argues that the use of such rhetoric obscures rather than illuminates, and that **the social function of the public/private distinction is to repress aspirations for alternative political arrangements by predisposing us to regard comprehensive alternatives to the established order as absurd**.

AT: Law Good

Law = Violence

The law is not defined by objective reason or by logical rules – it functions only because of foundational and continuous violence

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Legal interpretation' takes place in a field of pain and death. This is true in several senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others: **A** judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life. Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence which has already occurred or which is about to occur. When interpreters have finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by these organized, social practices of violence. Neither legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly understood apart from one another. This much is obvious, though the growing literature that argues for the centrality of interpretive practices in law blithely ignores it.2 Taken **by** itself, the word "interpretation" may be misleading. "Inter- pretation" suggests a social construction of an interpersonal reality through language. But pain and death have quite other implications. In- deed, pain and death destroy the world that "interpretation" calls up. That one's ability to construct interpersonal realities is destroyed **by** death is obvious, but in this case, what is true of death is true of pain also, for pain destroys, among other things, language itself. Elaine Scarry's bril- liant analysis of pain makes this point: [F]or the person, in pain, so incontestably and unnegotiably present is it that "having pain" may come to be thought of as the most vi- brant example of what it is to "have certainty," while for the other person it is so elusive that hearing about pain may exist as the pri- mary model of what it is "to have doubt." Thus pain comes un- shareably into our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and that which cannot be confirmed. Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through its unshareability, and it ensures this unshareability in part through its resistance to language .. . .Prolonged pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned.3 The deliberate infliction of pain in order to destroy the victim's norma- tive world and capacity to create shared realities we call torture. The in- terrogation that is part of torture, Scarry points out, is rarely designed to elicit information. More commonly, the torturer's interrogation is designed to demonstrate the end of the normative world of the victim-the end of what the victim values, the end of the bonds that constitute the community in which the values are grounded. Scarry thus concludes that "in compel- ling confession, the torturers compel the prisoner to record and objectify the fact that intense pain is world-destroying."'4 That is why torturers almost always require betrayal-a demonstration that the victim's intangi- ble normative world has been crushed by the material reality of pain and its extension, fear.5 The torturer and victim do end up creating their own terrible "world," but this world derives its meaning from being imposed upon the ashes of another.' The logic of that world is complete domina- tion, though the objective may never be realized. Whenever the normative world of a community survives fear, pain, and death in their more extreme forms, that very survival is understood to be literally miraculous both by those who have experienced and by those who vividly imagine or recreate the suffering. Thus, of the suffering of sainted Catholic martyrs it was written: We must include also ...the deeds of the saints in which their triumph blazed forth through the many forms of torture that they underwent and *their marvelous confession of the faith.* For what Catholic can doubt that they suffered more than is possible for human beings to bear, and did not endure this by their own strength, but by the grace and help of God?' And Jews, each year on Yom Kippur, remember- Rabbi Akiba. **.** .chose to continue teaching in spite of the decree [of the Romans forbidding it]. When they led him to the executioner, it was time for reciting the Sh'ma. With iron combs they scraped away his skin as he recited *Sh'ma Yisrael,* freely accepting the yoke of God's Kingship. "Even now?" his disciples asked. He replied: "All my life I have been troubled by a verse: 'Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul,' which means even if He take your life. I often wondered if I would ever fulfill that obli- gation. And now I can." He left the world while uttering, "The Lord is One."" Martyrdom, for all its strangeness to the secular world of contemporary American Law, is a proper starting place for understanding the nature of legal interpretation. Precisely because it is so extreme a phenomenon, martyrdom helps us see what is present in lesser degree whenever interpretation is joined with the practice of violent domination. Martyrs insist in the face of overwhelming force that if there is to be continuing life, it will not be on the terms of the tyrant's law. Law is the projection of an imagined future upon reality. Martyrs require that any future they possess will be on the terms of the law to which they are committed (God's law). And the miracle of the suffering of the martyrs is their insistence on the law to which they are committed, even in the face of world-destroying pain.9 Their triumph-which may well be partly imaginary-is the imagined triumph of the normative universe-of Torah, Nomos,-over the material world of death and pain. 10 Martyrdom is an extreme form of resistance to domination. As such it reminds us that the normative world-building which constitutes "Law" is never just a mental or spiritual act. A legal world is built only to the extent that there are commitments that place bodies on the line. The torture of the martyr is an extreme and repulsive form of the organized violence of institutions. It reminds us that the interpretive commitments

<u>of officials are realized, indeed, in the flesh</u>. As long as that is so, the interpretive commitments of a community which resists official law must also be realized in the flesh, even if it be the flesh of its own adherents.

Law Naturalizes Oppression

The legal system and the courts are primarily institutions designed to legitimize and naturalize domination and oppressions

Although I believe Blum's approach is much the best of the three, it shares a basic error with the other two: the failure to recognize <u>that the Supreme Court is fundamentally a figment of the cultural imagination and that its true role is to be found not in the direct prac- tical consequences of the outcomes of its decisions</u> - with the poli- tics of these outcomes being mystified by ideology - <u>but rather in the ideology itself as a set of cultural images that are intended to give a false political legitimacy to the social order</u>. Let me develop this idea and then return to Blum's analysis in order to reinterpret it in accordance with the view of the Court that I am proposing. <u>Contemporary American society is a network of hierarchies</u> within which people feel profoundly isolated from one another. Although we long to overcome the isolation and mutual distrust that characterizes hierarchical life, we are also afraid to make the attempt because from the vantage point of our distance from one another, the fragility of our common desire seems no match for the alienation that contains it. The risk of a humiliating and even violent rejection by others al- ways seems very great. Faced with this conflict, our history takes on the quality of a double-movement. Because of our fear, <u>the hierarchies tend to reproduce themselves generation after generation in the form of class domination, racial and sexual oppression</u>, and in many other ways that need not be reduced to these conventional categories, such as the teacher-student relationship. Yet, because of our desire to overcome the inhumanity and powerlessness inherent in these hierarchical conditions, we are continually forming into groups that challenge the way things are, in movements like the labor movement, or the civil-rights movement, or the women's movement, or in very disorganized ways as was the case for the 60s counter-culture. <u>Sometimes direct force is used to suppress these challenges to the hierarchy-system, but it is much more effective for those who wish to maintain the status quo to get people to consent to it</u>. <u>To do this the conflict that is generated within the hierarchies must be continually mediated by people whose job it is to produce illusions about the justness of the existing order</u>.   One might describe such people as producers of false social mean-ing. In place of the painful absence of connectedness that is at the heart of people's actual experience of the hierarchical world, they convey false pictures of social life that attempt to provide people with a substitute and fantasy-based feeling of connection with others. <u>This</u>, it seems to me, <u>is where the Supreme Court comes in. The objective of the Supreme Court is to pacify conflict through the mediation of a false social-meaning system</u>, a set of ideas and images about the world which serve today as the secular equivalent of religious ideology in previous historical periods. Either a conflict is assimilated into an existing prevailing world-view, or the existing world- view accommodates itself somewhat to absorb the conflict.3 But in either case the objective is to maintain a relatively coherent, though false, sense of social-meaning and connection.

Judges are not instruments of order and logic, but distributors of pain, violence, and death

We begin, then, not with what the judges say, but with what they do. The judges deal pain and death. That is not all that they do. Perhaps that is not what they usually do. But they *do* deal death, and pain. From John Winthrop through Warren Burger they have sat atop a pyramid of violence, dealing **....** In this they are different from poets, from critics, from artists. It will not do to insist on the violence of strong poetry, and strong poets. Even the violence of weak judges is utterly real-a naive but immediate reality, in need of no interpretation, no critic to reveal it.20 Every prisoner displays its mark. Whether or not the violence of judges is justified is not now the point-only that it exists in fact and differs from the violence that exists in literature or in the metaphoric characterizations of literary critics and philosophers. I have written elsewhere that judges of the state are juris- pathic-that they kill the diverse legal traditions that compete with the State.2 ' Here, however, I am not writing of the jurispathic quality of the office, but of its homicidal potential. The dual emphasis on the *acts* of judges and on the violence of these acts leads to consideration of three characteristics of the interpretive di- mension of judicial behavior. Legal interpretation is (1) a practical activ- ity, (2) designed to generate credible threats and actual deeds of violence, (3) in an effective way. In order to explore the unseverable connection between legal interpretation and violence, each of these three elements must be examined in turn.

Law is not Rational/Objective

The law is not the product of common meaning nor can it be used to achieve progressive ends – it is violence, not shared meaning or common principles, that make legal systems effective

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There is a worthy tradition that would have us hear the judge as a voice of reason; see her as the embodiment of principle. The current academic interest in interpretation, the attention to community of meaning and commitment, is apologetic neither in its intent or effect. The trend is, by and large, an attempt to hold a worthy ideal before what all would agree is an unredeemed reality. I would not quarrel with the impulse that leads us to this form of criticism. There is, however, danger in forgetting the limits which are intrinsic to this activity of legal interpretation; in exaggerating the extent to which any interpretation rendered as part of the act of state violence can ever constitute a common and coherent meaning. I have emphasized two rather different kinds of limits to the commonality and coherence of meaning that can be achieved. One kind of limit is a practical one which follows from the social organization of legal violence. We have seen that in order to do that violence safely and effectively, responsibility for the violence must be shared; law must operate as a system of cues and signals to many actors who would otherwise be unwilling, incapable or irresponsible in their violent acts. This social organization of violence manifests itself in the secondary rules and principles which generally ensure that no single mind and no single will can generate the violent outcomes that follow from interpretive commitments. No single individual can render any interpretation operative as law-as authority for the violent act. While a convergence of understandings on the part of all relevant legal actors is not necessarily impossible, it is, in fact, very unlikely. And, of course, we can not flee from the multiplicity of minds and voices that the social organization of law-as-violence requires to some hypothetical decision process that would aggregate the many voices into one. We know that-aside from dictatorship-there is no aggregation rule that will necessarily meet elementary conditions for rationality in the relationships among the social choices made. While our social decision rules cannot guarantee coherence and rationality of meaning, they can and do generate violent action which may well have a distinct coherent meaning for at least one of the relevant actors. We are left, then, in this actual world of the organization of law-as- violence with decisions whose meaning is not likely to be coherent if it is common, and not likely to be common if it is coherent. This practical, contingent limit upon. legal interpretation is, however, the less important and less profound of the two kinds of limits I have presented. For if we truly attend to legal interpretation as it is practiced on the field of fear, pain, and death, we find that the principal impediment to the achievement of common and coherent meaning is a necessary limit, intrinsic to the activity. Judges, officials, resisters, martyrs, wardens, convicts, may or may not share common texts; they may or may not share a common vocabulary, a common cultural store of gestures and rituals; they may or may not share a common philosophical framework. There will be in the immense human panorama a continuum of degrees of commonality in all of the above. But as long as legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as well as meaning, as long as people are commit- ted to using or resisting the social organizations of violence in making their interpretations real, there will always be a tragic limit to the common meaning that can be achieved. The perpetrator and victim of organized violence will undergo achingly disparate significant experiences. For the perpetrator, the pain and fear are remote, unreal, and largely unshared. They are, therefore, almost never made a part of the interpretive artifact, such as the judicial opinion. On the other hand, for those who impose the violence the justification is important, real

and carefully cultivated. Conversely, for the victim, the justification for the violence recedes in reality and significance in proportion to the overwhelming reality of the pain and fear that is suffered. Between the idea and the reality of common meaning falls the shadow of the violence of law, itself.

Legal interpretation is never just about texts or language – legal interpretation requires a system of socially organized violence in order to be effective. The violence inherent in the law trumps any rational element.

Robert **Cover '86** Professor law at Yale, "Violence and the Word" 95 Yale L.J. 1601 1985-1986

Legal interpretation, therefore, can never be "free;" it can never be the function of an understanding of the text or word alone. Nor can it be a simple function of what the interpreter conceives to be merely a reading of the "social text," a reading of all relevant social data. Legal interpretation must be capable of transforming itself into action; it must be capable of overcoming inhibitions against violence in order to generate its requisite deeds; it must be capable of massing a sufficient degree of violence to deter reprisal and revenge. In order to maintain these critical links to effective violent behavior, legal interpretation must reflexively consider its own social organization. In so reflecting, the interpreter thereby surrenders something of his independence of mind and autonomy of judgment, since the legal meaning that some hypothetical Hercules (Hyporcules) might construct out of the sea of our legal and social texts is only one element in the institutional practice we call law. Coherent legal meaning is an element in legal interpretation. But it is an element potentially in tension with the need to generate effective action in a violent context. And neither effective action nor coherent meaning can be maintained, separately or together, without an entire structure of social cooperation. Thus, legal interpretation is a form of bonded interpretation, bound at once to practical application (to the deeds it implies) and to the ecology of jurisdictional roles (the conditions of effective domination). The bonds are reciprocal. For the deeds of social violence as we know them also require that they be rendered intelligible-that they be both subject to interpretation and to the specialized and constrained forms of behavior that are "roles." And the behavior within roles that we expect can neither exist without the interpretations which explain the otherwise meaningless patterns of strong action and inaction, nor be intelligible without understanding the deeds they are designed to effectuate. Legal interpretation may be the act of judges or citizens, legislators or presidents, draft resisters or right-to-life protesters. Each kind of interpreter speaks from a distinct institutional location. Each has a differing perspective on factual and moral implications of any given understanding of the Constitution. The understanding of each will vary as roles and moral commitments vary. But considerations of word, deed, and role will always be present in some degree. The relationships among these three considerations are created **by** the practical, violent context of the practice of legal interpretation, and therefore constitute the most significant aspect of the legal interpretive process.

The law is political – it is not rational.

Mark **Tushnet '5** Prof of Law at Harvard, formerly Georgetown. Father of Rebecca. "Critical Legal Theory" *The Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory* pp 80-90

The most general statement of critical legal theory was the slogan, ''Law is politics'' (Kairys 1982). This meant several things. First, the methods of legal reasoning were, in the end, in- distinguishable from the methods of political ar- gument: analysis would show that what legal theorists presented as distinctively legal argu- ments were reducible to

arguments commonly made in general political discourse. <u>Second, dis- putes within law were resolved in the same way that disputes within politics were resolved, by some fairly messy combination of coercion and reasoned argument, rather than by reason alone</u> (as they understood their seniors to claim). Im- portantly, the claim was not that law, like politics, was a domain of coercion pure and simple; rather, it was that both domains mixed coercion and reason. This part of the claim about law and pol- itics thus connected critical legal theory to trad- itional jurisprudential concerns about the relation between law and morality, although the connec tion was weak and never became a focus of atten- tion within the work of critical legal theorists. Third, and perhaps most obvious, <u>just as in politics we do not expect disagreement to disappear once some provisional resolution of a problem is located, so too in law we should not expect dis- agreement to disappear once an apparently authoritative decision has been rendered</u>. Critical legal theory drew from American legal realism the perception that an account of law must combine analysis of legal reasoning with social theory, loosely defined. See A M E R I C A N LEGAL REALISM. The legal realists had found themselves confronting what they, or at least their successors, described as a conceptualistic formalism, in which verbal formulations of rules were to be interpreted in ways that resolved con- crete controversies. For the legal realists, formal- ism meant that legal rules could be justified by deduction from self-evident first principles. (To the extent that those principles are moral prin- ciples, the legal realists' understanding of formal- ism is loosely related to more contemporary definitions of formalism, which assert that the legal system has an immanent moral rationality.) Critical legal theorists appreciated – and perhaps may be said to have appropriated – the legal realists' rule-skepticism as a response to formalism. <u>By examining the relation between particular rules and concrete problems, rule skeptics argued that the rules actually did not provide conclusive answers to any legal dispute</u>; the formalist prom- ise that answers could be deduced from agreed- upon premises failed, according to the legal real- ists, because alternative interpretations of agreed- upon rules, defensible by accepted methods of legal reasoning, were ordinarily available to support quite diverse outcomes. Critical legal theorists confronted versions of formalism that had arisen after the legal realists developed their rule-skepticism, notably the legal-process school and the Chicago style of law-and-economics scholarship that played a large role in the legal academy when critical legal theory began to be developed. But, the critical legal theorists believed, legal-process theory re- produced formalism. Instead of deducing substantive rules from higher-level premises, legal- process theorists argued that legal tasks should be allocated to different institutions on the basis of higher-level principles identifying each institu- tion's central characteristics. For critical legal the- orists, this simply shifted the level on which formalism occurred from substantive law to the questions of institutional design and procedure. The scientism of Chicago-style law-and-econom- ics was even more obviously formalistic; here sub- stantive legal rules were to be deduced from extremely thin assumptions about individual motivation and self-interest. Critical legal theorists also appreciated the legal realists' materialism. As the critical legal theorists read legal realism, <u>rule-skepticism implied that one could not explain the outcomes actually reached in legal disputes by referring to the rules of law alone</u>. Some social, not legal, theory would have to be invoked to explain outcomes. Again, as the critical theorists read legal realism, the rele- vant social theory for legal realists was fundamen- tally materialist in a loosely Marxist sense: <u>class interests explained why judges (and, even more obviously, legislators) reached the results they did</u>. Critical legal theory modernized rule-skepti- cism, but probably did not add strikingly new arguments to the ones the legal realists had pro- duced. The situation was different with respect to the explanatory social theory, though. Critical legal theory combined, sometimes awkwardly, a phenomenological account of social action with elements of the humanist rather than determinist Marxism that had become fashionable on the left in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Neither the law nor any system of rights are rational – they are systems of oppression that disguise their true nature under the guise of rational decision making

Peter **Gabel '84** Prof of Law, New college of california school of law "Phenomenology of Rights- Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves" 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1983-1984)

Yet this description of reification is perhaps itself somewhat reified to the degree that it places too little emphasis on the emotional strain required to believe that something unreal is real,30 and by reminding ourselves of the nature and source of this strain we can come to see the link between reification and indeterminacy. For reification is not a mere abstract characteristic of legal thought; it is lived as a difficult effort to keep out of awareness an underlying existential conflict be- tween the desire for connection and the felt need to deny this desire. One aspect of this effort involves repression: we keep the conflict out of awareness by treating existing reality as fixed and embracing this idea with passion. 3 1 But a second aspect involves substitute gratifica- tion: we keep the conflict out of awareness by anxiously "keeping up" our absorption in the fantasies of substitute connection provided by the utopian imagery of legal thought. The carrying out of this second as- pect requires that the cognitive or surface

meanings of legal concepts be infinitely malleable because they are created and "believed in" precisely in order to resist (or to keep out of awareness) the underlying meaning that desire has in mind for them. In other words, for substi ute gratifications to secure their substitute or unrealized character, the rights which embody them must be suspended in a permanent state of abstraction. They must be able to mean anything at the surface level in order that they not mean anything at the underlying level, where the desire for freedom and equality, for example, is embroiled in conflict. Thus the indeterminacy of what any right "really means concretely" results from our very intention that it should not mean anything con- crete (or to put this more precisely, that it should not mean what it means). This idea that substitutive fantasies involve a constant jug- gling act in which conflictual wishes are perpetually kept out of aware- ness through the use of displacing imagery is a common theme in psychoanalysis-a child will allow his dream-thoughts to wander over an infinite series of symbolic objects in order not to think of his mother's breast.32 If indeterminacy is therefore an existential constituent of existing legal thought, intentionally produced in order to secure the substitute connection of our withdrawn selves (as well as the anonymity or un- groundedness of our role-performances), then the value of a critique which demonstrates this indeterminacy must be limited to delegitimiz- ing the apparently determinate character that rights-thinking acquires through reification. Without negating the importance of this activity, I think it is nonetheless essential to recognize its paradoxical nature, be- cause the critique itself presupposes that rights-thinking does not actu- ally have to be determinate in order to convince those who intend to be convinced by it. In fact, just the opposite is the case if, as I believe, this thought is intentionally constructed to be both indeterminate and yet apparently determinate at the same time. The real question is how to make sense of this paradox-how does consciousness manage to play this trick on itself without being aware that it is doing so? To answer this question, we must recall that the feeling of substitute connection which makes legal thought partially gratifying is generated not by the rational or manifest content of rights, but by their latent content as unconscious fantasies. In other words, it is the fantasy of real freedom embedded in the idea of "freedom of contract" that accounts for our being attached to it (and "attached" through it), rather than any deep loyalty we have to the supposed set of "rational outcomes" that the right to freedom of contract "entails." If the reification of legal reason- ing, and thus its apparent determinacy, derives from this emotional at- tachment to its latent content, then we can see quite clearly how reification and indeterminacy not only can coexist but also work to- gether. Indeterminacy allows rights to possess an infinite number of surface meanings that serve (through a kind of perpetual flight into abstraction) to protect their fantastic nature from the call of desire to give them a realized meaning. Reification allows us to believe in the determinacy of any of these surface meanings through our very attach- ment to the fantasy of connection that each provides. As a conse- quence, the law does not have to be "really" rational for people to believe in it-in fact, this very "belief' is sustained by its nonrational or indeterminate quality.

Law is indeterminate

Legal propositions are indeterminate – arguments can be found to support any outcome or meaning

Mark **Tushnet '83** Prof of Law at Harvard, formerly Georgetown. Father of Rebecca. 16 QLR 339 (1996-1997) "Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis"

As I take the indeterminacy thesis, <u>a proposition of law</u> (or legal proposition) <u>is indeterminate if the materials</u> of legal analysis-the ac- cepted sources of law <u>and the accepted methods of working with those sources</u> such as deduction and analogy<u>-are insufficient to resolve the question</u>, "Is this proposition or its denial a correct statement of the law?" If a litigated case turns on an indeterminate legal proposition, a result favoring either the plaintiff or the defendant is equally well- supported by the legal materials.'0 The indeterminacy thesis is simple to state: <u>Across an analytically interesting range of "cases" or legal events, legal propositions are indeterminate."</u> This is not a claim about the degree of controversy over the right outcome, or about the difficulty of discerning that outcome. <u>The indeterminacy thesis asserts that no matter how hard one tries, or how skilled one is as a lawyer, legal propositions in the relevant range are in- determinate</u>. Most discussions of the indeterminacy thesis identify some com- mon ground between its proponents and its critics. Nearly everyone agrees that some legal propositions are indeterminate. Typical examples include highly contentious Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution. Where the Court persistently divides five-to-four over some proposition, it seems fair to call the proposition indeterminate. The indeterminacy thesis holds, then, within some domain. If that do- main is small enough, though, nothing interesting about the rule of law follows. To be interesting, the indeterminacy thesis must include a "fair amount" of legal propositions. Sometimes, in unguarded moments, people will assert-then quickly withdraw the assertion-that the domain of indeterminacy does not exist at all. Controversy and division within the Supreme Court, af- ter all, might not result from the Constitution's indeterminacy. The jus- tices might not have had time to work out all the difficult problems as- sociated with the relevant legal materials, for example. But, in the fullness of time (and aided by critical commentary from legal academ- ics), we will know the right answer to any constitutional question. And if we can know the answer there, surely we can know the answers any- where in the law. This is to assert that legal materials provide one right answer for every contestable legal proposition. At one point Ronald Dworkin made that claim. 2 Dworkin's argument, however, was restricted enough that, even if accepted, it does not threaten the indeterminacy thesis. To es- 3 tablish his claim, Dworkin had to posit a judge who he called Hercules.1 The name indicated that such a judge, with all the skill over the materi- als of law one could demand, could always arrive at the right answer to any legal question.'4 Put this way, Dworkin's is a claim about the on- tology of law, asserting that all legal propositions are in some sense true or false. It says nothing about whether real judges can arrive at the right answer in any case. And, because the indeterminacy thesis is connected to claims about the democratic legitimacy of law in real societies, Dworkin's conceptual point does not impair it. And, to the extent that the indeterminacy thesis deals with informal political theory, <u>what matters is what happens in law as it is practiced</u>. More threatening to the indeterminacy thesis are examples of clearly determinate legal propositions. Standard examples are: "Litigants named Tushnet always lose"; "Under the present United States Consti- tution no person may become president who is under 35 years of age"; "Under the present United States Constitution the president may not dis- approve-veto--a single item in an appropriations bill passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives." The first (hypothetical) legal proposition is determinate because we know that, were it part of the law, I would lose any case in which I was a plaintiff or defendant. The other propositions are assertions about the meaning of the present United States Constitution. Another version of this sort of criticism of indeter- minacy claims points to the large proportion of cases decided unani- mously by appellate courts and reports by judges that they find serious legal questions in only a small proportion of the cases they have to de- cide. If the propositions offered as examples are indeed determinate, or if judicial unanimity establishes determinacy, the domain of the indeter- minacy thesis might be quite small. These examples of determinacy do not actually impair the indeterminacy thesis because they do not signifi- cantly restrict the thesis's domain, when the thesis is properly under- stood. And, defining the proper domain of the thesis and explaining why indeterminacy occurs will put in question the apparent determinacy of even these propositions. <u>The indeterminacy thesis's domain is this</u> (or some roughly equivalent variant): <u>Every legal proposition that a lawyer would find professionally respectable to assert is indeterminate</u>. 5 Identifying the domain in this way points toward why <u>the indeterminacy thesis has implications for democratic legitimacy</u>. It makes the professional judg- ment of lawyers crucial to the thesis.'6 And, in ways explored in more detail later, lawyers are a "class" or social group whose judgments need not indicate that arguments lawyers do not make are frivolous in some deep sense. The fact that the profession and the social groups with which it is associated screen out some claims from professional respect- ability does not mean that those claims lack social significance.17 The undeniable fact that no one raises claims in connection with many "legal events"-stopping at a stop sign, paying the sales tax on clothing pur- chases-therefore, does not undermine the indeterminacy thesis, unless raising claims about them could not possibly fall within the range of professionally respectable argument.

Rights Bad

Rights bad – they are used for conservative ends by conservative judges, generate opposition, and rely too heavily on individualistic assumptions

Mark **Tushnet '5** Prof of Law at Harvard, formerly Georgetown. Father of Rebecca. "Critical Legal Theory" *The Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory* pp 80-90

The indeterminacy thesis and the phenomenological arguments about the ways in which people created images of legality to reconcile themselves with their social positions combined in one of early critical legal theory's most controversial claims, described as the critique of rights (Tushnet 1984). Critical legal theory was created after the US Supreme Court had begun to repudiate its earlier interventions on behalf of liberal interests in cases involving race and social welfare. Those interventions remained important in the legal academy's understanding of the possibilities of legal, and particularly judicial, action in support of progressive visions of social justice. Among those possibilities was the use of the legal system to vindicate rights – moral, constitutional, and other – on behalf of socially subordinated groups. Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the desegre- gation decision, and Roe v. Wade (1973), the abortion decision, loomed large in the minds of progressive legal scholars. The critique of rights posed a sharp challenge to the prevailing image of legal possibility. It seemed to place Brown and Roe in question, suggesting that these triumphs of liberal legal activism were somehow inconsistent with en- during achievements for progressive law and politics. The critique of rights questioned the utility of making claims of legal right on a number of grounds. First, the indeterminacy thesis suggested to critical legal scholars **that rights-claims were a double-edged sword**. There was no reason to suppose, they argued, that courts would vindi- cate only rights-claims made by subordinated groups. Seeing hints in the late 1970s and early 1980s of possibilities that came to fruition in the 1990s, the critique of rights worried that strong defenses of courts as rights-protectors would turn against progressives when the courts started to vindicate the rights of whites in affirmative action cases, and property owners in cases involving claims that government regulation amounted to a taking of primate property. Second, the critique of rights found in the slogan, ''Law is politics,'' another danger in reli- ance on rights-claims in the judicial arena. Such claims could trigger counter-claims of right- invasion by political opponents. More important, framing political claims in legal terms naturally induced activists to seek redress in courts, dimin- ishing the attention they could devote to other arenas of political action such as legislatures and the streets. But, courts were not a reliable source of rights-protection. Even when courts took the progressive side in identifying rights-violations, actually implementing the courts' decisions required a mobilized political community whose development might have been impaired by the dominance of lawyers pursuing the rights strategy. Third, the critical legal scholars' phenomenology led them to believe that, at least in the context of the United States in the late twentieth century, claims about rights were likely to re- inforce an individualism that they believed stood in the way of developing community solidarities that could generate more substantial progressive change. The dominant concepts in constitutional law in particular were strongly individualist. The rhetoric of Brown focused on the rights of each individual African American child to attend school without regard to his or her race; Roe relied on an earlier case saying, ''If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi- vidual . . . to be free from unwarranted govern- mental intrusion'' (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 1972). Critical legal theorists believed that the individu- alism of a rights-based strategy occluded the underlying social conditions, including social mobilization, that actually induced courts to recognize rights. Related to this last point was a fourth one, deriving from the phenomenological social theory. Rights-strategies on

behalf of progressive interests took advantage of, but were also infected by, the prevailing view of people as individuals with rights that resided in themselves as em- bodied persons, a view most obviously compat- ible with the claims of women in the abortion cases. But, the critique of rights argued, rights- claims were made against the state, and led people to experience rights as something conferred on them by a fantasized ''state'' rather than as a set of lived experiences arising out of social relations of a particular sort. The critique of rights elicited a strong reaction from minority legal scholars who were part of the rough social formation – leftist, non-liberal legal theorists – that included the early critical legal scholars (Williams 1987). The minority response was that the critique of rights undervalued the contribution rights-claims had made to reducing social subordination and, perhaps more import- ant, failed to take account of the ways in which judicial recognition of rights provided minority communities with a sense of full membership in the nation even if the rights were imperfectly implemented. The latter point, if not the former, was actually compatible with the indeterminacy thesis and, indeed, with the critique of rights itself, and this aspect of the minority response to early critical legal theory became an accepted part of critical legal theory generally.

Aff Answers

Permutation

The permutation solves – we can use the plan as a way to make privacy less individualistic and more collective. Privacy as a concept can be reformed very easily

Colin J. **Bennett 11**, Professor of political science at University of Victoria, British Columbia, 2011, "In Defence of Privacy: The concept and regime," Surveillance and Society 8-4, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/4184/4186

The individualistic conceptions of privacy, however, hardly constitute a paradigmatic understanding of the problem, and there have been a number of attempts to realign the issue in ways that perhaps hold more contemporary relevance. Most prominently, Priscilla Regan has argued that privacy should be seen as a common value, 'in that all individuals value some degree of privacy and have some common conceptions about privacy'. It is a public value, 'in that it has value not just to the individual...but also to the democratic political system'. And it is a collective value, 'in that technology and market forces are making it hard for any one person to have privacy without all persons having a similar minimum level of privacy' (Regan 1995, 213). Her analysis suggests that privacy, framed in individualistic terms, is always on the defensive against arguments for the social benefits of surveillance. Privacy will always be in conflict with those social and collective issues, which tend to motivate mass publics and their representatives. We must, therefore, frame the question in social terms, because society is better off if individuals have greater levels of privacy.

In a similar vein, Valerie Steeves has recently attempted to reconceptualize privacy 'as a dynamic process of negotiating personal boundaries in intersubjective relations...By placing privacy in the social context of intersubjectivity, privacy can be more fully understood as a social construction that we create as we negotiate our relations with others on a daily basis' (Steeves 2008, 193). The critique also appears in analyses of particular surveillance practices. Jane Bailey and Ian Kerr, for instance, have analyzed the continuous archival and retrieval of personal experiences (CARPE) and concluded that the 'individualistic conception of privacy that predominates western thinking, is nevertheless inadequate in terms of recognizing the effect of individual uptake of these kinds of technologies on the level of privacy we are all collectively entitled to expect' (Bailey and Kerr 2007).

Moreover, recognition of the social value of privacy is increasingly observed in the legal and policy world. One of the earliest and most influential reports on privacy protection was produced in the mid-1970s in the United States. The Privacy Protection Study Commission was established under the 1974 Privacy Act, and had some influence on setting US privacy protection policy along a different track from that followed in Europe and other countries. It began, however, by pointing out that: 'A major theme of this report is that privacy, both as a societal value and as an individual interest, does not and cannot exist in a vacuum. Indeed, 'privacy' is a poor label for many of the issues the Commission addresses because, to many people, the concept connotes isolation and secrecy, whereas the relationships the Commission is concerned with are inherently social' (United States PPSC 1977, 21, my emphasis).

The perm solves best – neoliberalism is not a monolithic evil, but a series of multiple, contradictory processes. The plan be harnassed as part of the effort to restrain the bad parts of neoliberalism

Clive **Barnett**, Faculty of Social Sciences at The Open University, PUBLICS AND MARKETS What's wrong with Neoliberalism?,
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett_publicsandmarkets.pdf

What's really wrong with neoliberalism, for critics who have constructed it as a coherent object of analysis, is the unleashing of destructive pathologies through the combined withdrawal of the state and the unfettered growth of market exchange. 'Individual freedom' is presented as a medium of uninhibited hedonism, which if given too much free reign undermines the ascetic virtues of self-denial upon which struggles for 'social justice' are supposed to depend. Underwritten by simplistic moral denunciations of 'the market', these theories cover over a series of analytic, explanatory, and normative questions. In the case of both the Marxist narrative of neoliberalization, and the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal governmentality, it remains unclear whether either tradition can provide adequate resources for thinking about the practical problems of democracy, rights and social justice. This is not helped by the systematic denigration in both lines of thought of 'liberalism', a catch-all term used with little discrimination. There is a tendency to present neoliberalism as the natural end-point or rolling-out of a longer tradition of liberal thought – an argument only sustainable through the implicit invocation of some notion of a liberal 'episteme' covering all varieties and providing a core of meaning. One of the lessons drawn by diverse strands of radical political theory from the experience of twentieth-century history is that struggles for social justice can create new forms of domination and inequality. It is this that leads to a grudging appreciation of liberalism as a potential source for insight into the politics of pluralistic associational life. The cost of the careless disregard for 'actually existing liberalisms' is to remain blind to the diverse strands of egalitarian thought about the relationships between democracy, rights and social justice that one finds in, for example: post-Rawslian political philosophy; post-Habermasian theories of democracy, including their feminist variants; various postcolonial liberalisms; the flowering of agonistic liberalisms and theories of radical democracy; and the revival of republican theories of democracy, freedom, and justice. No doubt theorists of neoliberalism would see all this as hopelessly trapped within the 'neoliberal frame' of individualism, although if one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, even Marx's critique of capitalist exploitation, dependent as it is on an ideal of selfownership, is nothing more than a variation on Lockean individual rights.

While some tradeoff between rights and safety is inevitable in civil society however only beginning by engaging with and attempting to work with the legal system can we please both sides of the discussion

Amitai **Etzioni 99**, University Professor at the George Washington University, "The Limits of Privacy", 1999, Basic Books (e-book), Pg 22-23

 "The challenge of carefully crafting a balance between the common good and individual rights, between public health, public safety, and privacy, is particularly keen if the balance sought is to be achieved not merely within the context of some abstract theory or model, but in the context of specific historical and social conditions of a real, existing society. The question I raise in practically every lecture I deliver on the subject is: How is one to determine whether the existing relationship between privacy and the common good (or between privacy as one good and other common goods) is out of kilter, and if it is, what ought to be done to correct the imbalance? In the following pages I suggest four criteria that can help to determine whether an imbalance exists, in which direction society is tilting, the scope of corrective action called for, and the specific qualities of the correctives to be

employed. They are applied to each of the five public policies under review here. Even those who do not share the approach to privacy advanced in this book may well find these criteria of interest in the study of other matters of public policy, legal doctrine ", and civic culture. (Previous presentations and applications of these criteria have been received favorably.28) Indeed, **even if the common good could somehow overnight be well protected in all the areas under study-if there were no more pedophiles, no infants born with HIV, no criminals hiding behind false IDs, and no terrorists exchanging unbreakable encrypted messages-the following analysis would still apply**. The specific studies of public policy, aside from whatever light they cast on the measures needed to improve the ways we protect public safety and health, also seek to illustrate a mode of policy analysis that encompasses ethical, legal, and practical considerations in the quest for a better society." "**Much of the discussion reflects a pivotal fact about society: Unlike ideologies, which can be centered on one core value, society cannot but serve multiple needs and wants**. This fact has an important consequence that deserves much more attention: **Societies typically cannot make perfect choices, because often they must sacrifice some measure of one good for the sake of another. Indeed, much of what is under discussion here concerns trade-offs between privacy and the common good**. I like to observe, however, that trade-offs are not always necessary. Indeed, **the discussion of most privacy issues should start with a quest for policies or laws that could enhance both goods**. One brief example: A kit that allows individuals to determine their HIV status in " "the privacy of their own home was developed in 1985. The kit entails no visit to a doctor's office or clinic, no filling out of forms or computer entries. Users can mail in a few drops of blood and a code name and then call for the results. Aside from providing more privacy than had been previously available, the kit also advances public health by offering those reluctant to be tested in a less private place an opportunity to learn their IIIV status. One notes with some sadness that the politics of privacy are such that even this very simple kit was bottled up in the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for seven years before it was finally approved.29"

Perm Solves Liberalism

Liberalism can be improved from within – focusing on individual emancipation is key

Alan **Hunt '86**, professor of Sociology and Law at Carleton University, "The Theory of Critical Legal Studies", Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1986, http://www.academia.edu/8509655/THE_THEORY_OF_CRITICAL_LEGAL_STUDIES

The critique of orthodox legal scholarship draws upon a more generalized critique of liberalism and thus constitutes one of the major points of unification of critical legal studies. The core of this critique is the contention that the claim made by liberalism to resolve the persistent and systematic conflict between individual and social interests through the mechanism of objective rules within a framework of procedural justice is inherently flawed. Mediation between conflicting interests at best offers only a pragmatic response to social conflict which can achieve nothing other than a set of results which reflects the unequal distribution of power and resources whilst claiming to act in the name of a set of universal social values. Critical legal theory thus grounds itself on the critique of₈ the historical project of the Enlightment which is perceived as offering a rationalist and consensual solution to the problem of social order." It is in this context that I suggest that we can understand the ambiguous relationship between Roberto Unger and the critical legal studies movement. Unger provides a general theoretical critique of liberalism whilst at the same time insisting upon the inadequacies of the existing alternatives, the 'secular doctrines of emancipation', of which Marxist socialism is the most important. I suggest that sense can be made of Unger's relationship with critical legal studies by recognizing that he provides a coherent critique of liberalism which is widely invoked by critical legal authors. But there is only a very limited acceptance of Unger's own prescription for transcending liberalism, His alternative is itself a 'superliberalism' which stands close to the liberal tradition and holds out the promise of realizing the prospect of individual emancipation which liberalism itself has proved incapable of delivering, Unger himself is explicit, his alternative represents a superliberalism. It pushes the liberal premises about state and society. about freedom and dependence and governance of social relations by the will, to the point at which they merge into a larger ambition: the building of a social world less alien ..,. [It] represents an effort to make social life resemble more closely what politics (narrowly and traditionally defined) are already largely like in the liberal democracies: a series of conflicts and deals among more or less transitory and fragmentary groups." It is important to emphasize that it is *liberalism* as an intellectual construct rather than as an historically grounded system of social relationships which is the subject of this critique. Unger himself recognizes that his general critique 'treats liberal doctrine as a set of interlocking conceptions whose relationship to society is disregarded. The study of the internal structure of the theory has been pursued at the cost of an awareness of theory's social significance."

Privacy Good – Human Rights

The aff's defense of a right to privacy is key to human rights—turns the K

George **Kateb 01**, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Emeritus, at Princeton University, Spring 2001, "On Being Watched and Known," Social Research 68-1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971451

Now if people, by some chance, do not complain when their rights appear, in the judgment of the observer, to be violated, or if they consider the matter insignificant, or even think that they deserve to be treated as they have been treated, the spirit of the laws - if I may reify - would admonish them. It would say that when a person is treated in certain ways, even if the harm is not felt as harm or felt at all, that person has nevertheless been harmed. A person is obliged to guard his or her rights by knowing when they are violated, or suspecting that they may have been, even in the absence of a judicial declaration to that effect. Every citizen must be extremely sensitive to actual or threatened or even arguable violations. That is the heart of democratic citizenship. By guarding one's rights, one is guarding not only one's own vital interests, but by the force of example or precedent, the vital interests of everyone else. In that sense, we are each other's keepers. Every valid assertion that my right has been infringed is simultaneously the same assertion on behalf of everyone else. Basic rights are general possessions. There is a further complication.

By guarding one's rights, one is also guarding one's own personhood or human status as well as everyone else's. (Personhood and human status are rough synonyms.) I mean to say that every violation of a basic right, just by being the suppression of a vital claim or interest, is also a failure to respect the personhood of a human being. In being improperly coerced, a person is also being held in contempt. A person is being treated, say, as if he or she were a child rather than an adult, or were a mere means to an end; or has forfeited all rights because of some offense. These forms of contempt are injuries or insults to persons and should register as an additional harm. Every basic right thus has a double meaning. The spirit of the laws - that is, the spirit of the U.S. Constitution and other comparable charters - reveres personhood, reveres the human status of every individual. Indeed, the substance of specific basic rights, such as free speech and religion, or the prohibition of self-incrimination and double jeopardy as well as, of course, the various rights clustered in the idea of the right of privacy, may be said to derive from an initial idea of personhood. Or if the practice of a given right preceded the articulation of the idea of personhood, then it is this idea that provided the rationale for the right when, for example, the codification we know as the Bill of Rights was framed, and that still provides the deepest reason for it.

Privacy Good - Democracy

Protecting privacy is key to democracy

George **Kateb 01**, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Emeritus, at Princeton University, Spring 2001, "On Being Watched and Known," Social Research 68-1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971451

The third consideration is the overall inequality or asymmetry that is inherent in the situation. The world is divided between those who watch and know and those who are watched and known. Even without sinister purposes, those who watch and know are able to objectify the rest. Knowing that one is being objectified, one should feel that an attempt has been made to diminish oneself. Before one tries to rise above objectification, one should see it for what it is. Each of us is treated like a lab animal, a creature that excites the curiosity and probably the desire for further techniques and projects of those immersed in the process of watching and knowing.

This last consideration is the most comprehensive: that the new and ever more numerous techniques of watching and knowing human beings - and they are, with a cruel irony, most advanced in constitutional democracies - can lead to a fundamental revision in a person's self-conception. The revision is sharply at odds with the self-conception that a democratic individual, a democratic citizen, should have, and has so far usually had. In a constitutional democracy, in which everyone is guaranteed certain basic individual rights, personal and political, a sense builds up of oneself as precious, as a whole world, as an end in oneself. I have already referred to the idea that rights aim at denying the state the power and authority to treat adults as if they were children or to reduce them to mere means, mere instruments or machines. Part of the built-up sense yields the thought and corresponding sentiment that one owns oneself, which means that one is not owned by the state or by some superior caste or by society as an abstract entity. One is enabled to freely treat oneself as autonomous, to an important extent and in many respects. Woven into that notion of self-ownership and in the cognate of autonomy is that one is inviolable. That means not only that a person should not be invaded by forces that try to use him for purposes not his own, but also that we should think of a person as having boundaries that should not be breached.

Privacy Good – Mass Incarceration

Valuing privacy is key to solving mass incarceration—protects against self-incrimination

George **Kateb 01**, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Emeritus, at Princeton University, Spring 2001, "On Being Watched and Known," Social Research 68-1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971451

On the specific matter of being known in accumulated detail that is instantly retrievable, and transferable to who knows how many agencies and groups and for who knows what purposes, two other consequences are worth mentioning. The first is that accumulated detail about people has the effect of defining them and locking them in that definition. The identity of each is established by imputation, and the identity is equated with an exhaustive account. A person is thought to be known through and through, and without appeal, until perhaps that person has to mount a legal or political challenge to that assumption. The second consequence is that a detailed record follows a person through life, growing old with him or her, yet not losing memory as the person does. A person will not be able to start life over again, free of some of time's filthy load. A person cannot run away or hide, unless prepared to abandon everything familiar and find some alien refuge. There is no escape from a recorded identity, no escape from deeds done long ago that, if wrong, were paid for, or were not wrong but somehow technically incorrect or forgivably careless.

There is no doubt that the storage and dissemination by police agencies of lifetime records improve the capacity of these agencies to determine the identity of criminals with greater certainty. Not so long ago, The New York Times (March 3, 1999, p. B3) published an account of how a man who was later accused of murdering three people betrayed himself when he was arrested in an unrelated misdemeanor theft case. Detectives had the man, already suspected of murder, unknowingly provide a DNA sample just by drinking from a soda bottle or glass. He was charged with murder on the basis of DNA obtained from his saliva sample.

I am happy that a murderer was caught. But the story of his self-incrimination distresses me. Not only may the spirit of the Fifth Amendment have been violated by the police technique, but the power of other new techniques that seduce an individual into giving himself away is alarming. This is being watched and known in an extended sense. I think that the greater ease of tracking down criminals through new techniques may reach the point where the struggle against crime has tilted so far in favor of the police that the very texture of life in a supposedly free society is radically altered. I hazard to say that if criminals were always caught, especially with their own cooperation, so to speak, we would no longer be living in a free society, a society where the human status is paramount. What would become of the spirit of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments - these precious and, yes, counterintuitive amendments that mean as much to personhood as any other amendments in the Bill of Rights? Such a society is not yet a police-state, but it erects so sharp a division between the innocent and the guilty that the innocent become too grateful that they are not guilty. They become too anxious to stay that way. There must be a blurred middle ground between guilt and innocence, if innocence is not to become too proud and hence censorious, and punitive or vindictive. Democracy is antithetical to moral rigor; the concept of individual human status cannot survive it. Not that there can ever be perfect deterrence: a new thrill is added to breaking the law when policing is armed with increasingly potent devices of watching and knowing. But the perfection of the apparatus signifies the willed diminishment of human beings. We can be sure that authorities in the United States are working to achieve a world where everyone at birth is fingerprinted and made to leave a DNA deposit, not only a world in which every communication is recorded and can be retrieved. What is left of respect for the human status in all this?

Privacy Good – Innovation

Privacy is key to innovation and freedom—Turns the K because innovation and freedom are prerequisites to solve

Julie E. **Cohen 12**, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, November 5, 2012, "What Privacy is For," Harvard Law Review Vol. 126,
http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=11406900900910311202802010208401410600404902008801209107307110211100811306701011002401811001706306204909711800610501812512500400804308802605207010411908009302605003501309608911107512100500411400008808900106712

When the predicate conditions for innovation are described in this way, the problem with characterizing privacy as anti-innovation becomes clear: it is modulation, not privacy, that poses the greater threat to innovative practice. Regimes of pervasively distributed surveillance and modulation seek to mold individual preferences and behavior in ways that reduce the serendipity and the freedom to tinker on which innovation thrives. The suggestion that innovative activity will persist unchilled under conditions of pervasively distributed surveillance is simply silly; it derives rhetorical force from the cultural construct of the liberal subject, who can separate the act of creation from the fact of surveillance. As we have seen, though, that is an unsustainable fiction. The real, socially-constructed subject responds to surveillance quite differently—which is, of course, exactly why government and commercial entities engage in it. Clearing the way for innovation requires clearing the way for innovative practice by real people, by preserving spaces within which critical self-determination and self-differentiation can occur and by opening physical spaces within which the everyday practice of tinkering can thrive.

Public/Private Divide Good

The Public-Private distinction is essential to check the power of the state and to maintain the right to privacy and freedom.

Gregory P. **Magarian 04**, professor of law at Villanova University, "The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate", *The George Washington Law Review*, Volume 73 No. 1, November 2004, pg. 12-13

The public rights theory's emphasis on deliberative **democracy makes the concept of personal integrity essential for expressive freedom**. In order **for the First Amendment to ensure robust democratic discourse, it must respect** a zone of **individual conscience that allows people to evaluate information, formulate ideas, and participate meaningfully in democratic processes**. This conception of personal integrity embodies a functional corollary to the public rights theory's recognition of a public-private convergence. The public-private distinction should inform First Amendment analysis only to the extent the distinction serves the core First Amendment value of participatory democracy. Respecting a zone of individual conscience shields members of the political community from any conceivable First Amendment liability while also identifying them as First Amendment rights-holders. **329 The essential role of individual conscience in collective self-government is what puts the "rights**" in the public rights First Amendment. The importance of **allowing** individuals to exercise their conscientious faculties in political processes precludes any First Amendment check on their treatment of others' speech. In contrast, nongovernmental institutions are not members of the political community, nor do they possess the similar sort of individual privacy interests predicated on the Due Process Clause, that can properly fend off constitutional claims in general.330 In fact, **the economic power of many non-governmental institutions makes them significant threats to public rights of expressive freedom**, 331 a fact that justifies courts in enjoining nongovernmental interference with political debate.332 That same economic power can transform institutions' First Amendment claims into weapons against government reforms designed to enrich and broaden political debate.333 As I disuss below, **many nongovernmental institutions make** sufficiently important **contributions to democratic discourse to warrant protecting their expressive autonomy.334 Determining when to extend such protection, however, requires a nuanced functional analysis**--not merely a reflex **to slap the label "private" on any institution outside the government.**

At: Privacy Bad - Gender

A focus entirely on the negative aspects of this dichotomy on women obscures the positives. We must consider both ends of the spectrum before consider the alternative.

KAREN **ENGLE 99**, Redford Professor in Law & Director at University of Texas at Austin, "AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION: STRATEGIZING WOMEN'S RIGHTS", *Strategizing Women's Rights Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law*, 1999, pg. 148

Just as there are advantages to the critiques, though, there are disadvantages. It is on the difficulties with the critiques that I concentrate, in an attempt to think about ways to strategize women's rights that take into account the multiple spaces (and spheres) in which women live. First, focusing so much on the ideology and on women's lives in what we see as the private realm has reified both the public and the private spheres. Even as the distinction has been collapsed, we still write and talk as though the categories mean something, and as though women really live in the "private" and need protection of international law there. Second (and at the risk of reifying the private), the critiques make us think of the unregulated private as something that is necessarily bad for women. We rarely look at the ways in which privacy (even if only because it seems the best available paradigm) is seen by at least some women to offer them protection. A number of examples immediately come to mind, each of which centers on women's bodies and, not surprisingly, on women's sexuality. The language of privacy, and sketching out zones of privacy, many would argue, is our best shot at legally theorizing women's sexuality. In United States legal jurisprudence, the First Amendment has been used to a similar end, as often seen in the debates about pornography.2"

The social provides a third sphere beyond the public and private that can help women

Karen V. **Hansen 87**, "Feminist Conceptions of Public and Private: A Critical Analysis", Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, 1987, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41035361?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

The public/private categories are ubiquitous in social science, and indeed fundamental to philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This however, insufficiently addresses the complexity of women's experience without an additional category: "the social." If we continue to ignore women's lived experience because it is "too complicated" for our conceptual categories we have failed as observers and analysts of society What is gained from examining the world through the prism of "the social" rather than the First, Arendt per- simply public/private? Deceptively characterized the modern industrial world as too complex to be captured by a simple dichotomy .In particular the, transfer of production outside the home changes the texture of family life as well as complicating the public arena. Second, these historical examples reveal "private" to be a misnomer when applied to nineteenth-century women's lives. Women did not exist in isolation nor were they concerned solely with "particular interests". Louisa Chapman was involved in a had multiple work and friend relation-community, ships, and was very concerned about her reputation. As Ryan so aptly put it, "A Sphere is nota Home." Louisa, like Martha Barrett and many others, was involved outside her home-church meetings, care for the sick, visiting , teaching Sabbath School, attending temperance lecture-in a way that could not accurately be called private. of social and alter the definitions of the other realms

structure, accordingly**". The social" is a distinct realm with its own regularities, processes and rules of behavior. "the social" allows us to reorient our and Finally, perspective, to see women's "social" activities as "work," weaving together the fabric of society, as Cott suggests**. Building on the recent work of Micaeladi Leonardo and others we can expand our of understanding the "social" work of women beyond kin networks and look at the and Women's role within "the social" neighborhood village.71 sphere consists of mediating the various forces of society-tying the church to the household, to the individual to the collectivity. The ideas raised and evidence provided in this paper challenge the and usefulness of the divide as a model accuracy public/private for social organization. Although definitive historical answers are not yet developed, it is important to ask questions about the of these and how we appropriateness sociological categories, understand what men and women do. Rather than reject categorization as Pitkin advocates, I **suggest we add a third category", the social," ascribed Arendt. Both as a reinterpret meaning by and its theoretical advance and as a concrete historical phenomenon", the social" informs our study of past and present. Since neither women nor men can be so we are bound to conduct a readily pigeonholed, careful review of lives as they were lived. The study of** these **people of 150 years ago fundamentally challenges the way we look at social structure and prompt students of contemporary social relations to re-examine our attachment to the less sophisticate dichotomy.**

Privacy supports private property

TARA J.**RADIN** and PATRICIA H**. WERBANE 07**, Doctoral Candidate and Ruffin Professor of Business Ethics at the Darden Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of Virginia, THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION AND THE POLITICAL STATUS OF EMPLOYMENT", American Business Law Journal, 22/9/2007, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1744-1714.1996.tb00699.x/full

The American economic system is based on private property, but it is often unclear where "private" property and ownership end and "public" property and ownership begin. "The process of drawing **the line between private and public is neither natural nor automatic**," asserts Alan Wolfe. "**The line is drawn differently in different times and different places, and law, including corporate** law", is one of the major mechanisms by which it is drawn. Within the workplace, ownership and control are often divided. **Corporate assets are held by an ever-changing group of individual and institutional shareholders. It is no longer always true that owners exercise any real sense of control over their property and its management. Moreover, such complex property relationships are spelled out and guaranteed by the stat**e. This has prompted at least one thinker to argue that "private property" should be defined as "certain patterns of human interaction underwritten by public power."12 **This fuzziness about the "privacy" of property is exacerbated by the way we use the term "public" in analyzing the status of businesses, and, in particular, corporations**. For example, we distinguish between privately - owned business corporations and government-owned or controlled, public institutions. **Among those companies that are not government-owned, we distinguish between regulated "public" utilities whose stock is owned by private individuals and institutions, "publicly held" corporations,** those corporations whose stock is traded publicly, who are governed by special SEC regulations and whose financial statements are public knowledge, and privately-held corporations and entrepreneurships, companies and smaller businesses that are owned by an individual or group of individuals and not available for public stock purchase.

Neoliberalism Good – Democracy

Neoliberalism promotes a democracy where a marketplace of ideas will ensure reforms in the future

Mike **Doyle 11**, Master's in Development Studies from the University of Cambridge, 4/12/11, "In Defense of Neoliberalism: Part III,"
https://cambridgedevelopmentstudies.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/in-defense-of-neoliberalism-part-iii/

We have had many discussions about one of the central tenet s of liberalism: democracy. We have debated whether it causes or is the cause of development. We talked about how efficient it is and whether it adequately addresses the needs of the very poor. However, I think we have glossed over one of the chief strengths of democracy: its ability to create a marketplace of ideas. In a democracy, new ideas have the ability to come into being, propagate, and put into practice. Just as evolution works to select the best traits to suit a given environment, so does the market place of ideas allow the best ideas to come to the fore. To be sure, this is a slow process full of trial and error, but it does allow societies to adapt effectively to an ever-changing environment. At the beginning of the paper, I talked about the dangers of an ossifying ideology. This danger takes on new heights in an intellectual environment where criticisms and views cannot be freely expressed. I believe the USSR collapsed precisely because there was not a fair exchange of ideas, it was not able to adapt until it was far to late. The following vignette is an example of what can happen when there is no marketplace for ideas:

After the reality of the devastation brought about by the Great Leap Forward came to Chairman Mao's attention, he issued a very interesting statement. To paraphrase, he said that the great Chinese famine would have never occurred in a democracy because the devastation caused by the agricultural reform would have been brought to attention much earlier. Because there was no free press and tolerance of criticism was low, Chinese bureaucrats were able to keep publishing inflated numbers about rice production even though production had been falling. The Chinese government continued to believe these inflated projections until the truth could no longer be ignored. Unfortunately, 20 million people died before this happened. What is more unfortunate is that Mao did not continue his brief flirtation with democracy.

Markets Good – Freedom

Free markets are prerequisites to political freedom

Milton **Friedman 82**, Economist at the University of Chicago, Winner of the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 1982, "Capitalism and Freedom," pp. 15-17, http://www.pdf-archive.com/2011/12/28/friedman-milton-capitalism-and-freedom/friedman-milton-capitalism-and-freedom.pdf

Economic arrangements play a dual role in the promotion of a free society. On the one hand, freedom in economic arrangements is itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so economic freedom is an end in itself. In the second place, economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom.

The first of these roles of economic freedom needs special emphasis because intellectuals in particular have a strong bias against regarding this aspect of freedom as important. They tend to express contempt for what they regard as material aspects of life, and to regard their own pursuit of allegedly higher values as on a different plane of significance and as deserving of special attention. For most citizens of the country, however, if not for the intellectual, the direct importance of economic freedom is at least comparable in significance to the indirect importance of economic freedom as a means to political freedom.

The citizen of Great Britain, who after World War II was not permitted to spend his vacation in the United States because of exchange control, was being deprived of an essential freedom no less than the citizen of the United States, who was denied the opportunity to spend his vacation in Russia because of his political views. The one was ostensibly an economic limitation on freedom and the other a political limitation, yet there is no essential difference between the two.

The citizen of the United States who is compelled by law to devote something like 10 per cent of his income to the purchase of a particular kind of retirement contract, administered by the government, is being deprived of a corresponding part of his personal freedom. How strongly this deprivation may be felt and its closeness to the deprivation of religious freedom, which all would regard as "civil" or "political" rather than "economic", were dramatized by an episode involving a group of farmers of the Amish sect. On grounds of principle, this group regarded compulsory federal old age programs as an infringement of their personal individual freedom and refused to pay taxes or accept benefits. As a result, some of their livestock were sold by auction in order to satisfy claims for social security levies. True, the number of citizens who regard compulsory old age insurance as a deprivation of freedom may be few, but the believer in freedom has never counted noses.

A citizen of the United States who under the laws of various states is not free to follow the occupation of his own choosing unless he can get a license for it, is likewise being deprived of an essential part of his freedom. So is the man who would like to exchange some of his goods with, say, a Swiss for a watch but is prevented from doing so by a quota. So also is the Californian who was thrown into jail for selling Alka Seltzer at a price below that set by the manufacturer under so-called "fair trade" laws. So also is the farmer who cannot grow the amount of wheat he wants. And so on. Clearly, economic freedom, in and of itself, is an extremely important part of total freedom.

Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion of power. The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other.

Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation between political freedom and a free market. I know of no example in time or place of a society that has been marked by a large measure of political freedom, and that has not also used something comparable to a free market to organize the bulk of economic activity.

Because we live in a largely free society, we tend to forget how limited is the span of time and the part of the globe for which there has ever been anything like political freedom: the typical state of mankind is

tyranny, servitude, and misery. The nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the Western world stand out as striking exceptions to the general trend of historical development. Political freedom in this instance clearly came along with the free market and the development of capitalist institutions. So also did political freedom in the golden age of Greece and in the early days of the Roman era.

Queer K

ATs

AT: Capitalism

Class analysis can't do anything for us – Marxism oppresses those who are not heterosexual workers

Mary Nardini gang 2009 (criminal queers from Milwaukee, Wisconsin "toward the queerest insurrection" 2009)

When we speak of social war, we do so because∂ purist class analysis is not enough for∂ us. What does a marxist economic worldview∂ mean to a survivor of bashing? To a sex worker?∂ To a homeless, teenage runaway? How∂ can class analysis, alone as paradigm for a∂ revolution, promise liberation to those of us∂ journeying beyond our assigned genders and∂ sexualities? The Proletariat as revolutionary∂ subject marginalizes all whose lives don't fit∂ in the model of heterosexual-worker. ∂ Lenin and Marx have never fucked the ways∂ we have.∂ We need something a bit more thorough∂ - something equipped to come with teethgnashing∂ to all the intricacies of our misery.∂ Simply put, we want to make ruins of domination∂ in all of its varied and interlacing forms.∂ This struggle inhabiting every social relationship∂ is what we know as social war. It is both∂ the process and the condition of a conflict with∂ this totality.

AT: Cede the political

Read: alt solvency card – it's a political strategy and does not cede the political

The political is also already ceded for queers – we are precluded from discussions about politics because we are not "normal"

AT: Cooption

Read: queers are the only ones able to access failure as a political strategy [in 2NC topshelf]

AT: Kills collective Politics

1. Alt → queer solidarity – a method for queers to envision a different future from the status quo

2. Best method for queers to have political agency – it is difficult for us to access politics normally, but the alternative allows for queers to have access to the political realm.

Realism

Realism's ethic of consequentialism checks unwise action.

Williams '05 (Michael Williams, Senior Lecturer, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, THE REALIST TRADITION AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2005, 169)

Over the course of the preceding chapters, I have attempted to show that ==questions of the construction of action, and its ethical and political evaluation, lie at the core of the willful Realist tradition.== This final chapter seeks to demonstrate how this is expressed in two key and continuingly controversial Realist concepts: the ethic of responsibility and the national interest. The relationship between these two concepts is at the heart of many understandings of Realist ethics. In its most straightforward form, ==the national interest is seen to provide the value to be pursued and defended, while a foreign policy limited to and by the pursuit of that national interest and a prudent consequentialism provides a responsible limit on state action.== While this certainly captures important aspects of the Realist position, I will suggest that it fails to capture either the complexity or the continuing significance of willful Realism's engagement with the question of responsibility and its ethic of national interest.

Realism is empirically proven to be successful and is the best way to avert war

Guzzini '98 Stefano Guzzini, Senior Researcher, research units on Danish and European foreign policy and on Defence and security, 1998, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of A Death Foretold, 30-31

==The historical context of Munich and appeasement gave realism, as opposed to the idealist approaches prevailing in the inter-war period, an enormous appeal.== Carr and Morgenthau contributed to undermining the basic principles of what was dubbed idealism (Carr's Utopianism). Morgenthau was crucial in securing the ascendancy of realism in the newly founded academic specialization of International Relations. Carr used realist scepticism to criticize a great power of his day, his native Britain. He debunked the apparently universal harmony of interests as a status quo power ideology. Yet Carr's scepticism produces a restless circle of criticism which is, as he acknowledged, self-contradicting. Moreover, Carr's scepticism is neither able to define his exact mix of realism and idealism, nor to positively propose a coherent policy. Morgenthau, in his attempt to teach the diplomatic lessons of the past, was torn between his earlier criticism (1946) of idealists who confounded politics with science, and his own attempt to replace idealism by a claim to the scientific superiority of realism (1948, 1960). The result is a theory which must find conceptual bridges starting from the eternal laws of human nature, via the state as a unitary actor, to a necessary balance of power theory. It is much more complex and contradictory than usually acknowledged. To take just one example, Kenneth Waltz (1959) proposed a famous distinction between three images for understanding the causes of war. The first image is based on human nature, the second on the nature of the political regime, and the third on the specific characteristics of the international realm (anarchy). Waltz plainly placed Morgenthau within the first category. Yet, although Morgenthau derived power, and hence the essential characteristics of all politics including war, from human nature, he could also qualify for the other two images. He argued that the typical war of the gruesome twentieth century was a result of the democratization, and hence nationalization of international politics. This was how he called the shift to mass societies whose rulers have to respond to large constituencies. This is a form of a second image explanation. And finally, although it is true that politics is about the struggle for power based on human nature, the specificity of the international realm, what he called multiplicity, explains why the warlike struggle for power, while tamed at the domestic level, is endemic to the international level. How can Carr and Morgenthau, so different in style and content, and whose approaches are filled with so many internal tensions, become major reference points for one school of thought? Obviously they were perceived mainly through what they had in common, the critique of idealism and the priority given to power and politics. Hence, this chapter should also serve as a warning: as much as idealism was often idealized to allow a realist critique, realism has often been demonized by its adversaries and misused by reactionary friends. The binary opposition of realism and idealism more often serves to provide observers and practitioners with an identity than it does to provide analytical clarity**.** The ==realist world-view wants to be pragmatic, not cynical. Its main purpose is the avoidance of great war through the management and limitation of conflicts by a working balance of power supplemented by normative arrangements.== Nevertheless, for realists, the struggle for power will always arise. Conflicts cannot be abolished. For realists, foreign policy often brings choices that nobody wants to make. Diplomats might at

times have to gamble, but not because they like doing it. On the stage of world politics where brute forces can clash unfettered, diplomats enter a theatre of tragedy. This is the fate of the statesman, who, in the writings of Morgenthau, but also Kennan and Kissinger, appears as a romanticized heroic figure. Often misunderstood also by self-proclaimed realists, realist policy is not the external projection of a military or even reactionary ideology; it is the constant adjustment to a bitter reality. For realists, Realpolitik is not a choice that can be avoided, it is a necessity which responsible actors have to moderate.

Racism-Alternative Casualties

The common default of suspicion that surrounds the black body causes racism

Higgins 15 [Eoin Higgins, Master's Degree in History from Fordham University "Just Another Instance of White Terrorism" 6/23/2015 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eoin-higgins/just-another-instance-of-_b_7618822.html Accessed 6/30/2015]

Blacks are criminalized in the news media, treated as less desirable than whites in the popular culture, and presented overwhelmingly as threatening criminal elements in film and television. Americans of all colors are inculcated to see blacks as threatening, alien, dangerous. This is terrorism. Black Americans are killed for eating skittles. Playing with toy guns as children. Listening to loud music. Selling cigarettes on the street. Running away from police officers. Hanging out at a pool party. Attending prayer meetings. There doesn't seem to be a way for black Americans to just be that doesn't involve the threat of death or violence at the hands of whites. This is terrorism. White Americans can drive without fear of being pulled over for the color of their skin and walk down the street without fear of being stopped and frisked. Black Americans cannot. White Americans can walk up to a police officer looking for help or directions. Black Americans face the chance of death if they do the same. This is terrorism. Terrorism is political and social violence and coercion that has the effect of changing the standard operating procedure of the societies it affects and striking fear into the communities it assaults. Blacks in America have no static standard operating procedure. Their behavior has to change constantly to reflect the threats and intimidation. For the black community in America, even the church is a place where one cannot feel safe. Not in 1963, not in the '90s, not in 2015.

The affirmative can solve for all alternative causes of racism

Watson 15 [Elwood Watson, Professor of History and African-American Studies at East Tennessee State University, "It Will Take More Than a Cup of Coffee to Address the Thorny Issue of Race in America" 3/27/2015 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elwood-d-watson/it-will-take-more-than-a-cup-of-coffee_b_6944958.html Accessed 6/30/2015]

For many people, race is, indeed, often the 800-pound rambunctious elephant in the room. It is permeating our current state of affairs. The supposedly post-racial society we supposedly entered several years ago. For the record, I (and probably many other people of color) never believed such a fallacy. There is no person who is attuned to the climate of the current environment who can convincingly argue otherwise and Schultz is to be commended for attempting to tackle this thorny issue. That being said, the fact is that for far too often any effort to address the issue of race in America has been a largely packaged affair; ceremonial, co-opted and controlled by well-meaning yet often alarmingly out-of-touch legislators and celebrities. To put it bluntly, far too many efforts to address the issue of racism in our contemporary culture is often misguided, distressingly adrift, naive and tone deaf to the concerns and harsh realities that many people who suffer its (racism) pernicious effects have to deal with on a daily basis. Politicians of all races, entertainers and the occasional athlete or public intellectual locking arms and singing freedom songs from the civil rights movement more than half a century ago does little if anything to confront the searing issues that are plaguing many communities of color in the 21st century. Unarmed Black men

(and some women) being routinely shot by police officers. Students of color and non-White faculty and administrators, college students and faculty routinely enduring relentless forms of microaggressions from fellow students and colleagues on their campuses. Our current African American president, since the day he was inaugurated as president, consistently being subjected to disgraceful acts of obstruction, personal slights and blatant disrespect. Black college graduates are more than likely as their White cohorts to be unemployed. Applicants with Black-sounding names are considerably less likely to be contacted by employers than applicants with more White-sounding names. Black customers being disproportionately more likely to be followed by staff and, in some cases, detained by police officers in stores for suspicion of shoplifting -- "Shopping While Black".

Lack of communication between whites and blacks perpetuates racism

Blake 14 [John Blake, honoree of the Society of Professional Journalist, journalist for CNN "The New Threat: 'Racism without Racists'" 11/27/2014 http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/26/us/ferguson-racism-or-racial-bias/ Accessed 6/30/2015]

In a classic study on race, psychologists staged an experiment with two photographs that produced a surprising result. They showed people a photograph of two white men fighting, one unarmed and another holding a knife. Then they showed another photograph, this one of a white man with a knife fighting an unarmed African-American man. When they asked people to identify the man who was armed in the first picture, most people picked the right one. Yet when they were asked the same question about the second photo, most people -- black and white -- incorrectly said the black man had the knife. Even before it was announced that a grand jury had decided not to indict a white police officer in the shooting death of an unarmed black teen in Ferguson, Missouri, leaders were calling once again for a "national conversation on race." But here's why such conversations rarely go anywhere: Whites and racial minorities speak a different language when they talk about racism, scholars and psychologists say. The knife fight experiment hints at the language gap. Some whites confine racism to intentional displays of racial hostility. It's the Ku Klux Klan, racial slurs in public, something "bad" that people do. But for many racial minorities, that type of racism doesn't matter as much anymore, some scholars say. They talk more about the racism uncovered in the knife fight photos -- it doesn't wear a hood, but it causes unsuspecting people to see the world through a racially biased lens. It's what one Duke University sociologist calls "racism without racists." Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, who's written a book by that title, says it's a new way of maintaining white domination in places like Ferguson. "The main problem nowadays is not the folks with the hoods, but the folks dressed in suits," says Bonilla-Silva. "The more we assume that the problem of racism is limited to the Klan, the birthers, the tea party or to the Republican Party, the less we understand that racial domination is a collective process and we are all in this game."

Economic racism prevents discrimination from being resolved

Blake 14 [John Blake, honoree of the Society of Professional Journalist, journalist for CNN "The New Threat: 'Racism without Racists'" 11/27/2014 http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/26/us/ferguson-racism-or-racial-bias/ Accessed 6/30/2015]

One study conducted by a Brigham Young University economics professor showed that white NBA referees call more fouls on black players, and black referees call more fouls on white players. Another study that was published in the American Journal of Sociology showed that newly released white felons experience better job hunting success than young black men with no criminal record, Ross says. "Human beings are consistently, routinely and profoundly biased," Ross says. The knife fight experiment reveals that even racial minorities are not immune to racial bias, Ross says. "The overwhelming number of people will actually experience the black man as having the knife because we're more open to the notion of the black man having a knife than a white man, " Ross says. "This is one of the most insidious things about bias. People may absorb these things without knowing them." Another famous experiment shows how racial bias can shape a person's economic prospects. Professors at the University of Chicago and MIT sent 5,000 fictitious resumes in response to 1,300 help wanted ads. Each resume listed identical qualifications except for one variation -- some applicants had Anglo-sounding names such as "Brendan," while others had black-sounding names such as "Jamal." Applicants with Anglo-sounding names were 50% more likely to get calls for interviews than their black-sounding counterparts. Most of the people

who didn't call "Jamal" were probably unaware that their decision was motivated by racial bias, says Daniel L. Ames, a UCLA researcher who has studied and written about bias. "If you ask someone on the hiring committee, none of them are going to say they're racially biased," Ames says. "They're not lying. They're just wrong." Ames says such biases are dangerous because they're often unseen. "Racial biases can in some ways be more destructive than overt racism because they're harder to spot, and therefore harder to combat," he says.

Economic inequality perpetuates racism

Blake 14 [John Blake, honoree of the Society of Professional Journalist, journalist for CNN "The New Threat: 'Racism without Racists'" 11/27/2014 http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/26/us/ferguson-racism-or-racial-bias/ Accessed 6/30/2015]

Many whites -- including many millennials -- believe discrimination against whites is more prevalent than discrimination against blacks." But as Nicholas Kristof recently pointed out in The New York Times, the U.S. has a greater wealth gap between whites and blacks than South Africa had during apartheid. Such racial inequities might seem invisible partly because segregated housing patterns mean that many middle- and upper-class whites live far from poor blacks. It's also no longer culturally acceptable to be openly racist in the United States, says Bonilla-Silva, author of "Racism Without Racists."

An unwillingness to admit to racism prevents the deconstruction of racist policies and ideologies

Blake 14 [John Blake, honoree of the Society of Professional Journalist, journalist for CNN "The New Threat: 'Racism without Racists'" 11/27/2014 http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/26/us/ferguson-racism-or-racial-bias/ Accessed 6/30/2015]

When protests erupted in Ferguson after the shooting this summer, various white and black residents tried to talk about race, but such discussions didn't bear fruit because of another reason: People refuse to admit their biases, research has consistently shown. Ross, author of "Everyday Bias," cited a Dartmouth College survey where misinformed voters were presented with factual information that contradicted their political biases. There were voters, for example, who were disappointed with President Obama's economic record and believed he hadn't added any jobs during his presidency. They were shown a graph of nonfarm employment over the prior year that included a rising line indicating about a million jobs had been added. "They were asked whether the number of people with jobs had gone up, down, or stayed about the same," Ross wrote. "Many, looking straight at the graph, said down." Ross says it's even more difficult to get smart people to admit bias. "The smarter we are, the more self-confident we are, and the more successful we are, the less likely we're going to question our own thinking," Ross says. Some of the nation's smartest legal minds aren't big believers in racial bias either, and that could complicate efforts in Ferguson to reduce racial tensions. Some say they could be eased by hiring more officers of color in Ferguson's police force. But the conservative majority on the U.S. Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice John Roberts, has been suspicious of efforts to achieve diversity in workforces, believing that they amount to reverse racism or racial preferences, legal observers say. Some fear the court is about to get rid of one of the most effective legal tools for addressing racial bias. The court recently took up a fair housing case in Texas where the conservative majority could very well rule against the concept of "disparate impact," a legal approach that doesn't try to plumb the racist intentions of individuals or businesses but looks at the racial impact of their decisions. Disparate impact

is built on the belief that most people aren't stupid enough to openly announce they're racists but instead cloak their racism in seemingly race-neutral language. It also recognizes that some ostensibly race-neutral policies could reflect unintentional bias. <u>A disparate impact lawsuit</u>, for instance, wouldn't have to prove that a police department's white leaders are racist -- it <u>would only have to show the impact of having all white officers in an almost all-black town</u>. Roberts distilled his approach to race in one of the court's most controversial cases in 2007. The court ruled 5-4 along ideological lines that a public school district in Seattle couldn't consider race when assigning students to schools, even for the purposes of integration. "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race," Roberts said in what is arguably his most famous quote. Roberts has equated affirmative action programs with Jim Crow laws, says Erwin Chemerinsky, author of "The Case Against the Supreme Court." <u>"Chief Justice Roberts has expressly said that the Constitution and the government should be colorblind,</u>" Chemerinsky says. "He sees no difference between government action that discriminates against minorities and one that benefits minorities." <u>What that means for Ferguson is that any aggressive attempt to integrate the police force could be struck down in court</u>, says Mark D. Naison, an African-American Studies professor at Fordham University in New York City. <u>Unless a lawyer can find smoking-gun evidence of some police department official saying he won't hire blacks, people won't have much legal leverage</u> to make the police department diverse, he says.

There are too many alternative causes to racism—surveillance isn't the brink
Bazian 14 [Hatem Bazian, lecturer in the Departments of Near Eastern and Ethnic Studies at University of California- Berkley "Michael Brown, racism and America's open casket" 11/24/2014 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/michael-brown-racism-america-o-2014112552418399369.html Accessed 6/30/2015]

<u>America's</u> open casket to the world is its <u>racism</u> that <u>has been institutionalised and commodified into every part of the society from the police force, political order, court system, corporate structure, media and global relations</u>. Some are quick to point to gains made by African Americans since the civil rights movement; and, indeed we can point to these noticeable advancements including the first black president in the White House. However, <u>statistical data provides a</u> different <u>picture of a nation that is separate and profoundly unequal. African American unemployment</u> and underemployment <u>is almost twice as that of whites</u>. Further, data shows that "<u>by age 17, the average black student is four years behind the average white student; black 12th graders score lower than white 8th graders</u> in reading, math, US history and geography". What is most disturbing is that <u>incarceration rates for black American men stands at</u> 4,347 per 100,000 which is <u>almost 6.5 times the national average</u> of 707 per 100,000. Often US politicians and media talking heads spend countless hours speaking on prison-related human rights abuses abroad while under their noses a prison industrial complex is humming efficiently and their 401K might be invested in parts of it and providing a healthy return. More critically, <u>African American household net worth stands at $4,995 compared to $97,000 for whites, which is slightly ahead of an adult living under occupation in Palestine, and a poverty rate of 27.4 percent twice the national average</u>. In The National Center for Victims of Crime study, a troubling picture for African American young males and crime emerges concluding that "<u>black youth are three times more likely to be victims of reported child abuse or neglect, three times more likely to be victims of robbery, and five times more likely to be</u>

victims of homicide. In fact, <u>homicide is the leading cause of death among African American youth</u> ages 15 to 24". While the data shows blacks are victims of crime nevertheless, the approach by the government to their community adds insult to injury by treating them collectively as a criminal class by deploying police force to control rather than to serve and provide protection for the trans-historically abused community. Racism is America's open casket to the world and the murder of Michael Brown is the latest episode in a too familiar story dating back to the founding of the country. Emmett Till's casket remains open today for the underlying causes that murdered him are still around and unchanged. Michael Brown's cause of death is America's racism, the police officer was the weapon and the grand jury is the clean up crew. <u>Justice for African Americans remains an illusion since America fails to account for racism, the scars and the real bullets it leaves behind.</u>

Racial discrimination is still an issue in schools
Case, 2002

(Rebecca, Fall 2002, Not Separate but Not Equal: How Should the United States Address Its International Obligations to Eradicate Racial Discrimination in the Public Education System?,
http://racism.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1167:education02-3&catid=49&Itemid=172

2. Academic Tracking **Many districts have created academic tracking programs.** These programs allow teachers and school administrators to determine a student's abilities and potential and then place that student in an academic track reflective of teacher's or administrator's personal perception<u>. The academic tracks range from remedial and special education programs to accelerated and gifted programs.</u> **Studies show that African American and Latino students are over-represented in the lower tracks and under-represented in the higher tracks.** <u>The tracking can begin very early in a child's academic career and can be extremely detrimental to the child's future. If a child is placed in a lower track because of a perceived inability to do mainstream work, it is often very difficult for the child to break into the higher track due to the very nature of the tracking system.</u> The method of determining how to put a student in a particular track is laden with racially discriminatory factors. **To determine which track to place a child in, three factors are considered: standardized test scores, teacher recommendations, and parental intervention.** <u>First, the standardized tests have frequently been criticized for being racially biased. Second, teacher recommendations are strictly subjective and can be based solely upon general impressions. Third, if parents are unaware of the system due to language barriers or because of general ignorance, the parents are unlikely to intervene on behalf of their child and push for a higher track placement.</u> 3. "Zero-Tolerance" Discipline Policies **Another area of racial disparity that leads to unequal treatment in the schools is the area of discipline. Studies show that students of color are more likely to be suspended and/or expelled from school than similarly situated white students.** This statistic has become more pronounced now that schools that receive federal funding (all public schools) must implement "zero- tolerance" policies for weapons offenses. **The policy may appear race neutral on its face, but the implementation of the policy has lead to findings of racial discrimination.** Since the consequences of bringing a weapon to school can be harsh, and can include suspension or expulsion, schools are permitted to evaluate incidents on a case-by-case basis and may deliver a less severe punishment if mitigating circumstances permit. <u>There is evidence to suggest that if a student appears to have a positive and</u>

promising future, schools will overlook relatively minor violations such as weapon possession, and will not expel the student. Instead the schools will deliver a lesser punishment in the hopes of rehabilitation, but there are inequalities in the application of this school discretion. Often, the minority students do not receive the benefit of this second chance and tend to suffer more devastating consequences. Racial discrimination affects more than disparate test scores and overall unequal treatment in the schools. One effect is addressed indirectly in CAT; however, because of the United States' limited definition of "torture," the CAT's implications are severely limited. According to the United States, the government need only deal with mental suffering caused by torturous acts in very few circumstances. These situations do not deal with any intentional racial discrimination that takes place in the schools but rather they address situations when the victim is in the custody of an official in the criminal setting or in a mental institution. The United States appears to ignore the times when children are under the control of the state during schools hours. Children are under the school's control during much of the day, for five days a week. Yet this time of responsibility is not considered time during which the United States accepts a responsibility to ensure that the children are not experiencing torture in the form of mental suffering. **When a child endures racial discrimination in the school system, the child will experience severe mental suffering that will affect him/her throughout the child's life. Students can easily feel frustrated as they are disregarded and classified in lower academic brackets, punished more harshly, and not given the financial means to succeed in school.** As the discrimination continues throughout school, the long-term effects will cause severe mental pain as the students begin to believe they are inferior to their white peers. The United States has not acknowledged the possibility that the suffering of the students under the government's control may fall squarely under its own limited definition of torture. **According to all three treaties, the unequal treatment between minority students and Caucasian students runs counter to the United States' international obligations.** In the United States' report to CERD, **the government characterizes racial discrimination problems as mainly private acts of discrimination. However, the disparities in schools are not just a result of intentional or private acts. Discrimination in school is a form of institutional racism and must be addressed by the United States.** The United States has an obligation under CERD to protect everyone from acts of racial discrimination and laws that either discriminate or have the effects of discrimination. Under CAT, the United States must prevent torture of all forms, including mental torture. Under ICCPR, the United States must protect every child, regardless of his/her race, as a minor in the society. These requirements are not currently being met.

Racial discrimination still affects minority wages
Fryer, Pager, Spenkuch, 2014

(Roland Fryer, Devah Pager, JÖrg Spenkuch, 8 January 2014, Spenkuch is an Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Fryer, Roland G., Devah Pager, and Jörg L. Spenkuch. 2013. "Racial Disparities in Job Finding and Offered Wages."Journal of Law and Economics, 56(3), 633–689. "Statistics That Hurt: Racial discrimination still affects minority wages" http://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/statistics_that_hurt

Recent research coauthored with Roland G. Fryer, Jr. of Harvard University and Devah Pager of Princeton University sets out to challenge the conventional wisdom that racial bias has a negligible effect on wage gaps between blacks and whites. Spenkuch says that his own anecdotal observations inspired the research. "I'm originally from Germany, and there, racial discrimination is essentially a nonissue because almost everyone is white," he says. "But when I came to the **United States, it just jumped into my face. It's very striking, and not just in job markets—there are racial differences in health, in life expectancy, in education. No matter where you look, race is a really important predictor of how well people do in life."** Indeed, Spenkuch and his coauthors find that black job seekers are offered—and accept—less compensation than white job seekers. In fact, **racial discrimination among employers could account for at least a third of the raw wage gap between black and white workers.** A New Lens on Racial Bias The researchers began by considering the limitations of previous economic approaches

to explaining—or explaining away—racial wage disparities. The so-called "Mincerian approach," Spenkuch explains, uses statistical regression methods to assign an impact to various observed variables affecting wages, including race. "This approach crucially relies on high-quality data in which there is no variable you could possibly think of that is correlated with race and also affects wages—which is of course never true," he says. Another approach uses structural models of the labor market, which can generate results that are highly dependent on initial assumptions used to construct the model—and if those assumptions are implausible, the results are suspect. Spenkuch and his coauthors attempted to combine the strengths of these two approaches while avoiding their shortcomings. "The strength of the structural approach is that there's a model of how people make decisions," he says, "and the strength of the first approach is that we can control simultaneously for a lot of different variables." The researchers also obtained access to a novel and uniquely rich set of data which observed the job-seeking activity of approximately 5200 recently unemployed black and white workers in New Jersey over twelve weeks in 2009—"basically 'yesterday' in economic terms," Spenkuch says. Crucially, this data also included wage offers—and not just the offers that applicants accepted, but also ones that they rejected. Spenkuch's "empirical test" became a matter of finding pairs of job-seekers—identical in every aspect except race, including the wages they received at their last job—and comparing the set of offers they each received while searching for a new job. (The researchers' model also included two initial assumptions: that whites and blacks draw job offers from a similar set of possible openings, and that blacks are not "systematically overpaid" in their previous positions compared to whites—in other words, that strong affirmative-action policies do not artificially prop up black workers' wages in spite of lower productivity.) Seeing Is Believing The findings were striking. **First, black job seekers were offered significantly less compensation than whites by potential new employers. Second, blacks were much more likely to accept these lower offers than their white counterparts.** "This is exactly what you would expect if blacks know that they're being racially discriminated against," Spenkuch adds. Finally, and surprisingly, the researchers found that wage gaps narrow over time as black workers stay at the same job. "As an employer I may discriminate against you by offering a lower wage when I first hire you," Spenkuch explains, "but over time as you work for me, I come to know how good you really are as an individual, and I adjust your wage accordingly." By taking these variables into effect alongside race, the researchers found that the "raw" wage gap between black and white workers—"which we observe at around 30 to 35 percent, if we don't adjust for anything," Spenkuch explains—narrows to between ten and twelve percent. This means that **racial discrimination must account for at least a third of the factors that contribute to black workers receiving lower wages than whites.** "It follows intuitively from the two assumptions in our model," Spenkuch says. "Those assumptions are not necessarily innocuous, but we feel confident that they are plausible." Bias by the Numbers The kind of racial bias that drives this effect, says Spenkuch, is called "statistical discrimination"— "which has nothing to do with any emotional distaste for working with minorities," he adds. "In our model, employers are purely profit-seeking. The employer says, 'I don't care why blacks are less productive on average; I know that they are, because of the lower SAT scores and other data that are observable. Therefore, if I don't know anything else about the candidate, I have to treat him as I would the average candidate in that racial group—that is, less favorably. Of course, by law employers are not allowed to do that. But the data show that it's happening." Spenkuch is quick to assert that "we haven't necessarily overturned the last twenty years of research on discrimination in the labor market with one study." After all, if a third of the wage gap between black and white workers is due to racial discrimination, that means that the majority of the gap is still being driven by other factors, such as disparities in education quality and other so-called "pre-market skill differentials." "Those factors clearly matter," Spenkuch says. "What we want to argue is that it's wrong not to pay any attention to discrimination, too. These results suggest that it's still going on—and enforcing existing legislation would substantially reduce the wage gaps we observe in the labor market. It wouldn't eliminate them. But it would narrow them.

Racial Discrimination still prevalent in law enforcement.
McKay, 2014

(John, 18 August 2014, Tom is a staff writer at Mic who covers national politics, media, policing and the war on drugs. He has previously written for The Daily Banter, Wonkette and MTV News, "One Troubling Statistic Shows Just How Racist America's Police Brutality Problem Is" http://mic.com/articles/96452/one-troubling-statistic-shows-just-how-racist-america-s-police-brutality-problem-is**)**

The statistics: **White officers kill black suspects twice a week in the United States, or an average of 96 times a year.** Those are the findings of a USA Today analysis of seven years of FBI data, which claims around a quarter of the 400 annual deaths reported to federal authorities by local police departments were white-on-black shootings. What's more, the analysis indicates that **18% of the black suspects were under the age of 21 when killed by the police, as opposed to just 8.7% of white suspects.** Throughout much if not all of America, black people are disproportionately more likely to be killed by the police. The background: Statistics like these may help explain why Pew polls have demonstrated continued low confidence among non-whites in the police and justice systems. Police in general,

and white cops in particular, have a pattern of disproportionately directing force against black people. **All too often, cases of abuse and excessive force are simply swept under the rug.** University of Nebraska criminologist Samuel Walker told USA Today that the lack of a comprehensive national repository on use of force has been a "major failure" for oversight, while USC colleague Geoff Alpert pointed out that around 98.9% of excessive force allegations are ultimately ruled as justified. In just one of many examples, NYPD almost exclusively shoots black or Hispanic suspects. <u>Protests involving black people are also more likely to attract police attention and use of force to disperse them. The ACLU has intensely documented an immensely troubling pattern of police militarization and found SWAT teams and other heavy-handed tactics are much more likely to be used against minority suspects than white ones</u>: In Ferguson, where community members are currently protesting deeply entrenched, racially discriminatory policing, **92% of all people arrested in 2013 were black.** The community as a whole, however, is 65% black. It's not just the police, either — the Urban Institute estimates that **white-on-black homicides in states with Stand Your Ground laws are 354% more likely to be ruled justifiable than white-on-white ones.** The State's Warren Boltondescribes how black men in America "endure a lifetime of suspicion," both from the authorities and people of other races. The statistics are clear. **Being the disproportionate target of violence by the police and white people in general is a systemic problem for black people across America.** Why you should care: The statistic on white-cop-on-black-suspect shootings is alarming in and of itself. But while race plays a critical role, the number of white cops shooting black people is just part of a larger problem. **Black people across the United States are more likely to face discrimination in the criminal justice system and be harassed, arrested and shot by police. Sadly, even the most extreme cases of police excess often end in little punishment.**

Racial Discrimination shows in the poverty groups of America
Vara, 2013

(Vauhini, 27 August 2013, Vauhini Vara, the former business editor of newyorker.com, lives in San Francisco and is a business and technology correspondent for the site. "Race and Poverty, Fifty Years After the March, http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/race-and-poverty-fifty-years-after-the-march)

When we talk about the historic civil-rights gathering whose fifty-year anniversary will be celebrated on Wednesday, we usually call it the March on Washington. In fact, the full name of the event was the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom; early in his speech, <u>Martin Luther King, Jr., lamented that black Americans lived "on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity." The marchers had ten demands for Congress, at least four of which were aimed at improving black people's financial circumstances and narrowing the gulf between black and white Americans' economic opportunities. Fifty years later, that gulf hasn't changed much. By some measures it has widened.</u> **In 2011, the median income for black households was about fifty-nine per cent of the median income for white households,** up slightly from fifty-five per cent in 1967, according to Census data analyzed by the Pew Research Center. But when you consider *wealth*—that is, everything a family owns, including a home and retirement savings—the difference seems to have grown. Pew found that **the median black household had about seven per cent of the wealth of its white counterpart in 2011,** down from nine per cent in 1984, when a Census survey first began tracking this sort of data. The trend is unsettling—hard to believe, even—particularly given the progress black Americans have seen on some fronts. In a 1961 poll, forty-one per cent of respondents said they wouldn't vote for a "generally well-qualified man" from their party if he happened to be black; five years ago, Americans elected a black President. In 1964, white students graduated high school at almost double the rate of their black peers; today, graduation rates for blacks are only a couple of percentage points lower than for whites. Yet black Americans have moved ahead little—and by some measures have fallen behind—with regard to the one standard that matters most to Americans: making money. How did this happen? How do we fix it? Back in 1963, the Washington marchers made these four economic demands: a higher federal minimum wage, a law barring discrimination by employers, a massive job-training program, and an increase in the areas of employment covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938—the law that established standards such as overtime pay. The policy changes brought about by the

protesters' demands, and the civil-rights movement at large, were significant, if not as numerous as King and his allies sought. In January of 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson launched the policies that became known as the War on Poverty; that July, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Through the sixties and into the seventies, the government started job-training programs and deliberately hired more black people into government jobs, among other measures. African-Americans increasingly found white-collar and skilled blue-collar work that provided decent wages—not only in northern cities like Baltimore and Detroit, which had drawn black workers earlier in the century, but also in the South. Black Americans seemed to be getting a foothold in the economy; by 1978, the black median income rose to fifty-eight per cent of the white median income, according to Pew. Then came the early nineteen-eighties, when corporations began going abroad for lower-cost labor and cutting domestic manufacturing jobs. That coincided, roughly, with a Reagan-era backlash against public spending that led to cuts in many of the earlier government programs. The gap between black and white incomes widened again. (The black-to-white income ratio would not surpass its 1978 high until the nineties.) "The people who went to Baltimore, who went to Detroit, were the go-getters of the African-American community," Dedrick Muhammad, the senior director of the economic department of the N.A.A.C.P., told me. "They were willing to work hard. These people, who have become demonized as the permanent underclass, *became* the permanent underclass when the jobs died." Because of the dearth of pre-1984 wealth information, researchers have had a hard time studying the racial wealth gap in the years immediately after the civil-rights movement. They have, however, come to better understand what has happened over the past twenty-five years. When researchers compare today's situation with that of 1984, they find that a greater share of blacks than whites have ended up in low-paying service positions—for instance, assisting in nursing homes—that don't offer benefits that help compound people's wealth, such as retirement plans. Black families are less likely to receive inheritances; black students both graduate college at lower rates and are more likely to be saddled with college debt; and blacks are incarcerated at disproportionate rates, reducing their ability to earn good wages even when those who are imprisoned become free. But the wealth gap mostly comes down to home ownership. Researchers at Brandeis University recently tracked the same group of black and white families from 1984 to 2009. During that period, a smaller proportion of black families bought homes, and those who did bought them later in life than their white peers—and that meant they benefited less as home values rose, according to Thomas Shapiro, a professor at Brandeis University. When one compares white families whose wealth grew over the years to black families whose wealth grew, Shapiro said, **twenty-seven per cent of the disparity between the two groups is related to home ownership.** Which brings us back to the March on Washington. **The marchers of 1963 sought policies that would help poor people generate wealth; back then, the government did that by helping people find good work and make decent wages, along with introducing anti-poverty programs that helped people pay for food and other essentials. Today, now that the wealth gap mostly has to do with investments— especially in housing—it would seem that the best policy solution would be to help people buy homes that they can afford and acquire other wealth-generating assets. Instead, the government's policies for poor people have emphasized consumption without also focussing on savings and investments**, as the Urban Institute, a research organization, pointed out in an April report. For instance, the government helps people pay for food with the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. Families can even lose certain benefits if they save too much. **The United States does have policies aimed at building wealth—but those policies happen to disproportionately help people who are already pretty rich.** For instance, homeowners claim the mortgage-interest tax deduction only if they itemize their deductions, which higher-income taxpayers are likelier to do, and the deduction gets bigger when you have a larger mortgage or are in a higher tax bracket. There are solutions. The government could, for instance, turn the deduction for homeowners into a flat amount—and one, Shapiro said, that could apply only to a first home and wouldn't require taxpayers to fill out an extra form. EARN, a San Francisco nonprofit, offers savings accounts in which the nonprofit adds two dollars or more for every dollar a person deposits. The government could emulate that approach to encourage people to save. Four years after the March on Washington, King became frustrated with the government's focus on the Vietnam War at the expense of the War on Poverty. He organized a kind of sequel to the 1963 march—this time called the Poor People's Campaign. "We ought to come in mule carts, in old trucks, any kind of transportation people can get their hands on," he said. "People ought to come to Washington, sit down if necessary in the middle of the street and say, 'We are here; we are poor; we don't have any money; you have made us this way … and we've come to stay until you do something about it.' " In April of 1968, King was assassinated. Given his concerns about the stagnation of the civil-rights movement soon after the March on Washington, it's hard to imagine that King would have been satisfied, had he lived, to discover that on the fiftieth anniversary of his speech, black Americans are still calling out from an island of poverty and going unheard.

Rights Malthus K

Aff Answers

Aff – AT Auth. Inevitable/Global Demo Resilient

Global democracy is resilient – the US isn't key – our evidence assumes current trends

Larry **Diamond**, January **2014**, [prof. at Stanford], Journal of Current History, vol. 99, "The Next Democratic Century," http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/LD_Current_History_Jan_14.pdf, mm

This is an odd moment to predict a bright future for democracy. Despite the unprecedented expansion of political freedom during the three decades from 1974, democratic regimes are in trouble worldwide today. The past decade has witnessed democratic breakdowns at a growing pace, and levels of freedom have receded in many places. Autocrats are cooperating and innovating to preempt movements for democratic change. The world's oldest and most esteemed democracies, beginning with the United States, have lost their luster and (it seems) their capacity to function effectively to address their most important public policy challenges. Still, no other broadly legitimate form of government exists today, and authoritarian regimes face profound challenges and contradictions that they cannot resolve without ultimately moving toward democracy. During the past century, democracy went from being a unique feature of the West (and a few Western-leaning Latin American countries) to a system incorporated by a growing number of nonWestern countries, most of them former British colonies that reached independence during the first two decades after World War II. But the rise of communism and fascism and the shock of the Great Depression during the interwar period had occasioned what the political scientist Samuel Huntington called a "reverse wave" of democratic breakdowns. From the late 1950s to the mid- 1970s, the world wrestled with a second reverse wave, during which military coups swallowed fragile and often deeply polarized democracies in Latin America, Greece, Turkey, and parts of Asia, while elsewhere in Asia and Africa one-party or personal authoritarian regimes came to dominate. A number of factors fed the authoritarian zeitgeist: the spectacular failures of some democracies to govern effectively or maintain order, the successes of East Asian developmental dictatorships, the popularity in poor countries of authoritarian socialist models and ideologies, and the US-Soviet Cold War rivalry that saw each superpower back any dictator who would offer geopolitical support. By the mid-1970s, democracy seemed to many a quaint relic of a liberal past—a model of where the world had been, not where it was headed. Then came Portugal's Revolution of the Carnations in April 1974, overturning nearly half a century of quasi-fascist dictatorship, and a new wave of democratization began. Even with the rise of democracy in Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the subsequent few years, and then the transitions from military to democratic rule in Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s, few imagined that a truly global process of transformation was under way. Even the popular protests that toppled Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, or the student demonstrations that compelled the military to hand over power in South Korea, did not suggest a global trend. The fall of the Berlin Wall, however, changed everything. Not only did it spark democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe; the end of the Cold War unfroze the African landscape and encouraged democratic openings throughout the continent. By the mid- 1990s, democracy had become a global phenomenon, accounting for about three of every five states in the world.

Global democratization is consolidating now – the US isn't key

Larry **Diamond**, January **2014**, [prof. at Stanford], Journal of Current History, vol. 99, "The Next Democratic Century," http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/LD_Current_History_Jan_14.pdf, mm

Even so, a surprising number of other emerging democracies have met a litmus test of reasonably "liberal" democracy (garnering one of the two best scores on the seven-point Freedom House scales of both political rights and civil liberties). Forty percent of the world's states and about twothirds of the world's democracies (or 79 nations in all) now meet this test. And while the number and proportion of liberal democracies have hardly changed in the last seven years, **at least they have not declined**. Moreover, a number of other emerging market countries have

consolidated a decent level of¶ democracy—in the sense that it is very difficult¶ to imagine another reversal of democracy in these¶ countries. To the extent that they find democratic¶ "consolidation" a useful concept, most scholars¶ of Brazil would put it in this category. The same¶ is true for Mexico, where democracy has survived¶ in the face of widespread violence related to drug¶ trafficking. For all its disturbing levels of corruption,¶ clientelism, paralysis, and dysfunction, it¶ is similarly difficult to imagine democracy being¶ replaced by another type of regime in India. If,¶ after a disappointing second term for President¶ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia elects a¶ reformist president in 2014 (such as the energetic,¶ progressive governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo,¶ who is now leading in the polls), Indonesian¶ democracy might also turn in a more liberal and¶ stable direction.¶ South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, India, and¶ Indonesia are among the emerging market members¶ of the Group of 20 industrialized nations Three other members of that club—Turkey,¶ Argentina, and South Africa—fall into the category¶ of more troubled or embattled democracies,¶ with ruling executives and parties that appear to¶ harbor hegemonic ambitions. Each of the three¶ will hold national elections in 2014 or 2015, during¶ which each could move either in the direction¶ of further democratic decay or toward a more liberal¶ and rooted democracy.¶ Having decimated the old power establishment¶ in suspiciously wide-ranging trials of alleged¶ coup plotters, while also continuing to intimidate¶ and constrain the press, Prime Minister Recep¶ Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development¶ Party (AKP) remain the dominant political force¶ in Turkey. After serving more than a decade as¶ prime minister, Erdogan (whose party's rules¶ bar him from seeking another term in that post) is trying to change the constitution to create a¶ muscular, French-style semi-presidential system,¶ which would enable him to remain in power for¶ a long time. Turkey will hold its first direct presidential¶ election in August 2014, but it is not at all¶ clear that Erdogan will succeed in amending the¶ constitution to give that post the strong executive¶ powers he seeks. Widespread youth protests in¶ recent months signal the beginning of a societal¶ pushback against the AKP's autocratic governing style.¶ In Argentina, President Cristina Fernández de¶ Kirchner's bid to aggrandize her power has already¶ failed. In midterm elections in late October 2013,¶ her party fell far short of the two-thirds majority¶ it would need to amend the constitution to allow¶ her a third term. Political momentum is now shifting¶ from her party due to corruption and economic¶ mismanagement, and Argentines are beginning¶ to look beyond what will be a dozen years of rule¶ by Fernández de Kirchner and her late husband,¶ Néstor Kirchner.¶ In South Africa, while there is little doubt¶ that President Jacob Zuma's African National¶ Congress will win the 2014 national elections, a¶ viable multiracial opposition is slowly beginning¶ to rise in the form of the Democratic Alliance,¶ the country's only party to have steadily and¶ significantly increased its share of the vote in¶ each of the four post-apartheid national elections.¶ Led by a savvy and effective institution¶ builder, Western Cape Premier Helen Zille, the¶ Democratic Alliance is gradually expanding from¶ its roots in South Africa's racial minorities to¶ appeal to black voters dissatisfied with corruption,¶ high unemployment, and poor service¶ delivery—long-standing problems that have only¶ grown worse under Zuma.¶ The fate of democracy outside the West will¶ be shaped disproportionately by what happens in¶ these weighty G-20 countries that could move in¶ either direction—Indonesia, Argentina, Turkey,¶ and South Africa—and by whether Brazil and¶ India can demonstrate the ability of large democracies¶ to generate vigorous, sustainable, and reasonably¶ equitable economic growth. If these countries¶ move even incrementally to entrench democracy¶ and deliver development, the G-20 will have¶ become a strong "club of democracies," with only¶ Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia holding out.

Global democracy is increasing – liberal values and civil society are trending upwards

Larry **Diamond**, January **2014**, [prof. at Stanford], Journal of Current History, vol. 99, "The Next Democratic Century," http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/LD_Current_History_Jan_14.pdf, mm

There are other reasons for optimism about the¶ future of democracy. Particularly in Asia, economic¶ development in a number of countries is having¶ the predictable effects it had in South Korea and¶ Taiwan, and before that in Spain and Portugal.¶ With rising levels of education and incomes and¶ growing access to information, values are changing.¶ People are becoming more tolerant of diversity,¶ more politically demanding and assertive, and¶ more willing to protest. As Ronald Inglehart of the¶ University of Michigan and Christian Welzel of¶ Leuphana University put it, people's value priorities¶ are shifting from material gain to "emancipation¶ from authority." Closely intertwined with this¶ psychological shift is the rise of civil society—of¶ independent organizations and flows of information,¶ opinion, and ideas.¶ These psychological and social changes undermine¶ the legitimacy of authoritarian rule and¶ generate favorable conditions for democratization¶ in Asia—not only in Malaysia and Singapore,¶ where it will probably happen within a decade,¶ but in China itself, where both the decay of communist¶ rule and the rise of a middle-class society¶ are much more advanced than has generally been¶ appreciated. Without major political reforms, it is¶ unlikely that communist rule can survive in China¶ beyond Xi Jinping's expected two five-year terms¶ as president. And in terms of the pressure for¶ political change, Vietnam is not all that far behind¶ China (particularly given South Vietnam's earlier¶ experience with more pluralistic politics and more¶ capitalist economics).¶ Factor in as well the incremental progress¶ toward reviving democracy in¶ Thailand, the efforts of reformist¶ President Benigno Aquino¶ to rein in corruption in the¶ Philippines, and a political¶ opening in Myanmar (though it¶ is still far from democracy), and¶ it becomes possible to imagine¶ that one of the most powerful emerging-market¶ trading blocs could be predominantly democratic¶ within a decade.

Aff – AT Growth Unsustainable

Growth is sustainable – innovation constantly increases our carrying capacity

Tsvi **Bisk**, **2012**, World Future Society, "No Limits to Growth,"
https://www.wfs.org/Upload/PDFWFR/WFR_Spring2012_Bisk.pdf, mm

When one factors in the growth of the proportion of GDP of services, the picture becomes even less foreboding. Services have become the major drivers of global economic growth. They constitute over 63% of global GDP and well over 70% of GDP in the developed world,6 and the proportion is increasing. While services such as translation, consulting, planning, accounting, massage therapy, legal advice, etc., also consume some natural resources, the quantity is infinitesimal in relation to the economic value produced. If I manufacture a car for $10,000 I have consumed a huge amount of natural resources and energy. But if I translate a 100,000-word book for $10,000 I have consumed merely the electricity necessary to run my computer, and the electricity used to send the translation as an email attachment, and little else that is even measurable. Consumers and the consumer society are not the problem. The problem lies in the production methods presently used by manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. And the solution lies in the revolutions that are also presently taking place in material science, water engineering, energy harvesting, and food production. We might speculate that the world economy can continue to grow **indefinitely** at 4%-5% a year while our negative footprint on the planet simultaneously declines. By the end of this century the planet will be able to carry a population of 12 billion people with an American standard of living and **one-tenth** the present negative environmental impact.

Growth is sustainable – innovation will usher in a "no limit to growth" era by 2020

Tsvi **Bisk**, **2012**, World Future Society, "No Limits to Growth,"
https://www.wfs.org/Upload/PDFWFR/WFR_Spring2012_Bisk.pdf, mm

But it is superlight materials that have the greatest potential to transform civilization and, in conjunction with the above, to usher in the "no limits to growth" era. I refer, in particular, to car- bon nanotubes—alternatively referred to as Buckyballs or Buckypaper (in honor of Buckminster Fuller). Carbon nanotubes are between 1/10,000th and 1/50,000th the width of a human hair, more flexible than rubber and 100-500 times stronger than steel per unit of weight. Imagine the energy savings if planes, cars, trucks, trains, elevators—everything that needs energy to move—were made of this material and weighed 1/100th what they weigh now. Imagine the types of alternative energy that would become practical. Imagine the positive impact on the environment: replacing many industrial processes and mining, and thus lessening air and groundwater pollution. Present costs and production methods make this impractical but that infinite resource—the human mind—has confronted and solved many problems like this before. Let us take the example of aluminum. A hundred fifty years ago, aluminum was more expensive than gold or platinum.37 When Napoleon III held a banquet, he provided his most honored guests with aluminum plates. Less-distinguished guests had to make do with gold! When the Washington Monument was completed in 1884, it was fitted with an aluminum cap—the most expensive metal in the world at the time—as a sign of respect to George Washington. It weighed 2.85 kilograms, or 2,850 grams. Aluminum at the time cost $1 a gram (or $1,000 a kilogram). A typical day laborer working on the monument was paid $1 a day for 10-12 hours a day. In other words, today's common soft-drink can, which weighs 14 grams, could have bought 14 ten-hour days of labor in 1884.38 Today's U.S. minimum wage is $7.50 an hour. Using labor as the measure of value, a soft drink can would cost $1,125 today (or $80,000 a kilogram), were it not for a new method of processing aluminum ore. The Hall-Héroult process turned aluminum into one of the cheapest commodities on earth only two years after the Wash ington Monument was capped with aluminum. Today aluminum costs $3 a kilogram, or $3000 a metric ton. The soft drink can that would have cost $1,125 today without the process now costs $0.04. Today the average cost of industrial grade carbon nanotubes is about $50-$60 a kilogram. This is already far cheaper in real cost than aluminum was in 1884. Yet revolutionary methods of production are now being developed that will drive costs down even more radically. At Cambridge University they are working on a new electrochemical production method that could produce 600 kilograms of carbon nanotubes per day at a projected cost of around $10 a kilogram, or $10,000 a metric ton.39 This will do for carbon nanotubes what the Hall-Héroult process did for aluminum. Nanotubes will become the universal raw material of choice, displacing steel, aluminum, copper and other metals and materials. Steel presently costs about $750 per metric ton. Nanotubes of equivalent strength to a metric ton of steel would cost $100 if this Cambridge process (or others being pursued in research labs around the world) proves successful. Ben Wang, director of Florida State's

HighPerformance¶ Materials Institute claims that: "If¶ you take just one gram of nanotubes, and you unfold¶ every tube into a graphite sheet, you can cover¶ about two-thirds of a football field".40 Since other¶ research has indicated that carbon nanotubes¶ would be more suitable than silicon for producing¶ photovoltaic energy, consider the implications.¶ Several grams of this material could be the¶ energy-producing skin for new generations of superlight¶ dirigibles—making these airships energy¶ autonomous. They could replace airplanes as the¶ primary means to transport air freight.¶ <u>Modern American history has shown that¶ anything human beings decide they want done¶ can be done in 20 years</u> if it does not violate the¶ laws of nature. The atom bomb was developed in four years; putting a man on the moon took eight¶ years. <u>It is a reasonable conjecture that by 2020 or¶ earlier, an industrial process for the inexpensive¶ production of carbon nanotubes will be developed,¶ **and that this would be the key to solving¶ our energy, raw materials, and environmental¶ problems all at once**</u>.

Innovation proves there are no limits to growth – advancements are being made now that will quickly reduce our impact on the environment

Tsvi **Bisk**, **2012**, World Future Society, "No Limits to Growth," https://www.wfs.org/Upload/PDFWFR/WFR_Spring2012_Bisk.pdf, mm

<u>The</u> embryonic <u>revolution in material science¶ now taking place is the key to "no limits to¶ growth</u>." I refer to "smart" and superlight materials.¶ Smart materials "are materials that have one¶ or more properties that can be significantly¶ changed in a controlled fashion by external stimuli."32¶ They can produce energy by exploiting differences¶ in temperature (thermoelectric materials)¶ or by being stressed (piezoelectric materials).¶ Other smart materials save energy in the manufacturing¶ process by changing shape or repairing¶ themselves as a consequence of various external¶ stimuli. <u>These materials have all passed the "proof¶ of concept" phase</u> (i.e., are scientifically sound)¶ and many are in the prototype phase<u>. Some are¶ already commercialized and penetrating the market</u>. For example, the Israeli company Innowattech¶ has underlain a one-kilometer stretch of local¶ highway with piezoelectric material to "harvest"¶ the wasted stress energy of vehicles passing¶ over and convert it to electricity.33 They reckon¶ that Israel has stretches of road that can efficiently¶ produce 250 megawatts. If this is verified, consider¶ the tremendous electricity potential of the¶ New Jersey Turnpike or the thruways of Los Angeles¶ and elsewhere. Consider the potential of railway¶ and subway tracks. We are talking about tens¶ of thousands of potential megawatts produced¶ without any fossil fuels.¶ Additional energy is derivable from thermoelectric¶ materials, which can transform wasted¶ heat into electricity. As Christopher Steiner notes,¶ capturing waste heat from manufacturing alone¶ in the United States would provide an additional¶ 65,000 megawatts: "enough for 50 million¶ homes."34 Smart glass is already commercialized¶ and can save significant energy in heating, airconditioning and lighting—up to 50% saving in¶ energy has been achieved in retrofitted legacy¶ buildings (such as the former Sears Tower in Chicago).¶ New buildings, designed to take maximum¶ advantage of this and other technologies could¶ save even more. Buildings consume 39% of America's¶ energy and 68% of its electricity. They emit¶ 38% of the carbon dioxide, 49% of the sulfur dioxide,¶ and 25% of the nitrogen oxides found in¶ the air.35 Even greater savings in electricity could¶ be realized by replacing incandescent and fluorescent¶ light bulbs with LEDS which use 1/10th¶ the electricity of incandescent and half the electricity¶ of fluorescents.¶ These three steps: transforming waste heat¶ into electricity, retrofitting buildings with smart¶ glass, and LED lighting, could cut America's electricity¶ consumption and its CO2¶ emissions by 50%¶ within 10 years. They would also generate hundreds¶ of thousands of jobs in construction and¶ home improvements. <u>Coal driven electricity generation would become a thing of the past</u>. The¶ coal released could be liquefied or gasified (by¶ new environmentally friendly technologies) into¶ the energy equivalent of 3.5 million barrels of oil¶ a day. This is equivalent to the amount of oil the¶ United States imports from the Persian Gulf and¶ Venezuela together.36¶ Conservation of energy and parasitic energy¶ harvesting, as well as urban agriculture would cut¶ the planet's energy consumption and air and water¶ pollution significantly. <u>Waste-to-energy technologies¶ could begin to replace fossil fuels</u>. Garbage,¶ sewage, organic trash, and agricultural and¶ food processing waste are essentially hydrocarbon¶ resources that can be transformed into ethanol,¶ methanol, and biobutanol or biodiesel.¶ These can be used for transportation, electricity¶ generation or as feedstock for plastics and other¶ materials. <u>Waste-to-energy is essentially a recycling¶ of CO2¶ from the environment instead of introducing¶ new CO2¶ into the environmen</u>t.¶ Waste-to-energy also prevents the production,¶ and release from rotting organic waste, of¶ methane—a greenhouse gas 25 times more powerful¶ than CO2¶ . Methane accounts for 18% of the¶ manmade greenhouse effect. Not as much as CO2¶ ,¶ which constitutes 72%, but still considerable¶ (landfills emit as much greenhouse gas effect, in¶ the form of methane, as the CO2¶ from all the vehicles¶ in the world). Numerous prototypes of a¶ variety of waste-to-energy technologies are already¶ in place. <u>When their declining costs meet¶ the rising costs of fossil fuels, they will become¶ commercialized and</u>, if history is any judge, <u>will¶ replace fossil fuels **very quickly**</u>—just as coal replaced¶ wood in a matter of decades and petroleum¶ replaced whale oil in a matter of years.

Momentum is building in the squo to prevent environmental destruction and warming through democratic channels – there is no need to turn to eco-fascism

Micah **White**, 9/16/**2010**, The Guardian, "an alternative to the new wave of ecofascism," http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2010/sep/16/authoritarianism-ecofascism-alternative, mm

Humanity can avert climate catastrophe without accepting ecological tyranny. However, this will take an immediate, drastic reduction of our consumption. This requires the trust that the majority of people would voluntarily reduce their standard of living once the forces that induce consumerism are overcome.¶ **The future of environmentalism is in liberating humanity from the compulsion to consume**. Rampant, earth-destroying consumption is the norm in the west largely because our imaginations are pillaged by any corporation with an advertising budget. From birth, we are assaulted by thousands of commercial messages each day whose single mantra is "buy". Silencing this refrain is the revolutionary alternative to ecological fascism. **It is a revolution which is already buddin**g and is **marked by** three synergetic campaigns: **the criminalisation of advertising, the revocation of corporate power and the downshifting of the global economy**.¶ **In São Paulo**, the seventh largest city in the world, **outdoor advertising has been banned**. Meanwhile, **artists in New York City and Toronto are launching blitzkrieg attacks on billboards**, replacing commercials with art. Their efforts have put one visual polluter out of business. Grassroots organisers in the US are pushing for an amendment to the constitution that will end corporate personhood while others are fighting to revive the possibility of death penalties for corporations. **The second international conference on degrowth** economics **met** recently **in Barcelona.** In Ithaca, New York a local, time-based currency is thriving. Buy Nothing Day campaign is celebrated in dozens of nations and now Adbusters is upping the ante with a call for seven days of carnivalesque rebellion against consumerism this November. And, most important of all, **across the world everyday people are silently, unceremoniously and intentionally spending less and living more**.¶ **Authoritarian environmentalists** fail to imagine a world without advertising, so they **dream of putting democracy "on hold**". In Linkola's dystopian vision, the resources of the state are mobilised to clamp down on individual liberty. But **there is no need to suspend democracy if it is returned to the people. Democratic, anti-fascist environmentalism means marshalling the strength of humanity to suppress corporations**. **Only by silencing the consumerist forces will both climate catastrophe and ecological tyranny be averted.** Yes, **western consumption will be substantially reduced.** But it will be done **voluntarily and joyously**.

Aff - AT Growth Unsustainable – Population

Overpopulation is overblown – global growth will peak at 10 billion and decline to 7 billion by the end of the century

Tsvi **Bisk**, **2012**, World Future Society, "No Limits to Growth,"
https://www.wfs.org/Upload/PDFWFR/WFR_Spring2012_Bisk.pdf, mm

One constant refrain of anti-growth advocates is that we are heading towards 12 billion people by the end of the century, that this is unsustainable, and thus that we must proactively reduce the human population to 3 billion-4 billion in order to "save the planet" and human civilization from catastrophe. But recent data indicates that a **demographic winter will engulf humanity by the middle of this century**. More than 60 countries (containing over half the world's population) already do not have replacement birth rates of 2.1 children per woman. This includes the entire EU, China, Russia, and half a dozen Muslim countries, including Turkey, Algeria, and Iran. If present trends continue, India, Mexico and Indonesia will join this group before 2030. The human population will peak at 9-10 billion by 2060, after which, for the first time since the Black Death, it will begin to shrink. By the end of the century, the human population might be as low as 6 billion-7 billion. The real danger is not a population explosion; but the consequences of the impending population implosion.47 This demographic process is not being driven by famine or disease as has been the case in all previous history. Instead, it is being driven by the greatest Cultural Revolution in the history of the human race: the liberation and empowerment of women. The fact is that even with present technology, we would still be able to sustain a global population of 12 billion by the end of the century if needed. The evidence for this is cited above.

Aff - AT Growth Unsustainable – Warming

Innovation will solve warming in the status quo

Tsvi **Bisk**, **2012**, World Future Society, "No Limits to Growth," https://www.wfs.org/Upload/PDFWFR/WFR_Spring2012_Bisk.pdf, mm

The goal of mitigating global warming/climate change without changing our lifestyles is not naïve. Using proven Israeli expertise, planting forests on just 12% of the world's semi-arid areas would offset the annual CO_2 output of one thousand 500-megawatt coal plants (a gigaton a year).45 A global program of foresting 60% of the world's semi-arid areas would offset five thousand 500-megawatt coal plants (five gigatons a year). Since mitigation goals for global warming include reducing our CO_2 emissions by eight gigatons by 2050, this project alone would have a tremendous ameliorating effect. Given that large swaths of semi-arid land areas contain or border on some of the poorest populations on the planet, we could put millions of the world's poorest citizens to work in forestation, thus accomplishing two positives (fighting poverty and environmental degradation) with one project. Moving agriculture from its current fieldbased paradigm to vertical urban agriculture would eliminate two gigatons of CO_2. The subsequent re-wilding of vast areas of the earth's surface could help sequester up to 50 gigatons of CO_2 a year, **completely reversing the trend**. The revolution underway in material science will help us to become "self-sufficient" in energy. It will also enable us to create superlight vehicles and structures that will produce their own energy. Over time, carbon nanotubes will replace steel, copper and aluminum in a myriad of functions. Converting waste to energy will eliminate most of the methane gas humanity releases into the atmosphere. Meanwhile, artificial photosynthesis will suck CO_2 out of the air at 1,000 times the rate of natural photosynthesis.46 This trapped CO_2 could then be combined with hydrogen to create much of the petroleum we will continue to need. As hemp and other fast-growing plants replace wood for making paper, the logging industry will largely cease to exist. Self-contained fish farms will provide a major share of our protein needs with far less environmental damage to the oceans.

Aff – AT Alt – Worse for Environment

A robust body of research proves that liberal, democratic regimes are better at managing environmental problems than authoritarian regimes

Dan **Shahar**, **2015**, Environmental Values, 24(3), "Rejecting eco-authoritarianism, again, 345-366, mm

As Eco-Authoritarianism has re-emerged into contemporary environmental discourse,¶ <u>a number of scholars have begun to pay closer attention to the environmental and political¶ performance of actual authoritarian societies</u>, primarily including but not limited to China.¶ <u>This scrutiny has revealed a largely-mixed track record</u> including some important successes¶ alongside significant shortfalls. Critics of China in particular have questioned the ability of¶ the Communist Party to successfully implement and enforce its high-minded directives,42¶ noting that sometimes "<u>being aggressive has no bearing on being effective</u>."43 Reservations¶ about the actual effectiveness of authoritarian environmental policies have been echoed in¶ discussions of other regimes in countries like Egypt,44 Iran,45 and Thailand.46 ¶ Bolstering these concerns, a recent study by Hanna Bäck and Axel Hadenius has¶ suggested the existence of a more general "J-shaped" relationship between democratization¶ and administrative efficiency across various countries and time periods. According to Bäck¶ and Hadenius, "<u>administrative quality is higher in strongly authoritarian states than in states¶ that are partially democratize</u>d; **it is highest of all**, however, <u>in states of a pronouncedly¶ democratic character</u>."47 They suggest <u>that this may be because highly democratic states can¶ rely on a well-developed civil society</u> for help in making sure that policies are well-calibrated¶ to particular contexts and for constructive feedback on policies once they are implemented.48¶ The authors note that authoritarian governments can sometimes perform better than partially democratized¶ societies with poorly-developed civil societies, but that they have thus far been¶ hard-pressed to find an effective substitute for the genuine citizen participation that enables¶ successful democracies to formulate and implement their policies successfully.49 Thus¶ <u>although authoritarian governments may be free from certain policy-making constraints faced¶ by governments in liberal regimes, administrators in even the most successful authoritarian¶ countries have historically failed to match the levels of state capacity enjoyed by citizens of¶ prosperous democratic countries</u> like Finland, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.50¶ <u>The dubious performance of</u> actually <u>existing authoritarian governments may</u> be¶ thought to <u>cast</u> some <u>doubt on the viability of Eco-Authoritarianism as a response to the¶ ecological crisis</u>. Thus Anthony Giddens has recently defended democracy against Shearman¶ and Smith by observing that "<u>Totalitarian states have generally had poor or disastrous¶ environmental records.</u> So also have most of those that have undergone processes of¶ 'authoritarian modernization,' such as China, Russia or South Korea."51 What Giddens fails¶ to appreciate, however, is the extent to which contemporary Eco-Authoritarians accept his¶ observations. Shearman and Smith, for example, begin The Climate Change Challenge and¶ the Failure of Democracy by announcing, "We agree that existing authoritarian societies,¶ largely based upon Marxist doctrines, have had an appalling environmental record. We accept¶ that there is no example of an existing authoritarian government that does not have a record¶ of environmental abuse."52

The alt would be far worse for the environment – history shows that democratic societies have better track records at protecting the environment

Jonathon **Adler**, Prof. Law and Dir. Center for Business Law and Regulation – Case Western Reserve U., New Atlantis, "Green Bridge to Nowhere", Fall, **2008**, http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/green-bridge-to-nowhere, mm

The first item on his agenda is the replacement of modern capitalism with some undefined "non-socialist" alternative. "The planet cannot sustain capitalism as we know it," he warns, calling for a fundamental transformation. But he does not understand the system he wants to reform, let alone what he would substitute in its place. According to Speth, "most environmental deterioration is a result of systemic failures of capitalism." This is an odd claim, as <u>the least capitalist nations of the world also</u> **have the worst environmental**

records. The ecological costs of economic statism are far worse than those of economic liberty. The environmental record of the various Soviet regimes amply bears this out: The West's ecological nightmares were the Soviet bloc's environmental realities. This is not due to any anomaly of the Soviet system. Nations with greater commitment to capitalist institutions experience greater environmental performance. While Speth occasionally acknowledges pockets of environmental progress, he hardly stops to consider the reasons why some environmental resources have been conserved more effectively than others. Fisheries are certainly declining throughout much of the world—some 75 percent of fisheries are fully or over-exploited—but not everywhere. It is worth asking why. Tropical forests in less-developed nations are declining even as most temperate forests in industrialized nations are rebounding. Recognizing these different trends and identifying the key variables is essential to diagnosing the real causes of environmental deterioration and prescribing a treatment that will work. Speth acknowledges that much of the world is undergoing "dematerialization," such that economic growth far outpaces increases in resource demand, but seems not to appreciate how the capitalist system he decries creates the incentives that drive this trend. Were it not for market-driven advances in technological capability and ecological efficiency, **humanity's footprint on the Earth would be far greater**. While modern civilization has developed the means to effect massive ecological transformations, it has also found ways to produce wealth while leaving more of the natural world intact. Market competition generates substantial incentives to do more with less—thus in market economies we see long and continuing improvements in productive efficiency. This can be seen everywhere from the replacement of copper with fiber optics (made from silica, the chief component in sand) and the light-weighting of packaging to the explosion of agricultural productivity and improvements in energy efficiency. Less material is used and disposed of, reducing overall environmental impacts from productive activity. The key to such improvements is the same set of institutional arrangements that Speth so decries: property rights and voluntary exchange protected by the rule of law—that is, capitalism. As research by Wheaton College economist Seth Norton and many others has shown, societies in which property rights and economic freedoms are protected experience superior economic and environmental performance than those societies subject to greater government control. Indeed, such institutions have a greater effect on environmental performance than the other factors, such as population growth, that occupy the attention of Speth and so many other environmental thinkers. Speth complains that capitalism is fundamentally biased against the future; but the marketplace does a far better job of pricing and accounting for future interests than the political alternative. "Future generations cannot participate in capitalism's markets [today]," says Speth. Fair enough, but they cannot vote or engage in the regulatory process either. Thus the relevant policy question is what set of institutions does the best—or least bad—job of accounting for such concerns, and here there is no contest. However present-oriented the marketplace may be, it is better able to look past the next election cycle than any plausibly democratic alternative.

China and Russia prove that eco-authoritarianism fails

Dan **Shahar, 2015,** Environmental Values, 24(3), "Rejecting eco-authoritarianism, again, 345-366, mm

In its own way, the early Eco-Authoritarian position made a certain amount of sense:¶ if it were true that an ecological crisis was being caused by excessive autonomy, that¶ democratic market liberal societies would systematically fail to generate the constraints¶ necessary to avoid the crisis, and that authoritarian governments would be able to keep¶ societies away from catastrophe through enlightened central planning, then the relative appeal¶ of authoritarianism would be clear.21 The problem with this position, however, was its crucial assumption that authoritarian governments would actually be able to generate better¶ outcomes through central planning.¶ This premise was quickly challenged in the academic literature by critics who argued¶ that authoritarian governments would be hard-pressed to cope successfully with their vastly increased¶ size and complexity while also navigating difficult ecological challenges.22 But the¶ biggest blows to early Eco-Authoritarianism came from the failure of real-world experiments¶ with centralized authoritarianism around the world. With the disintegration of the Soviet¶ Union and thoroughgoing economic reform of the People's Republic of China, it became¶ increasingly untenable in any area of discourse to advocate centralized authoritarianism as a¶ solution to any problem, never mind one requiring highly complex, efficient, and coordinated¶ actions by public agents.

The eco-authoritarian model can't solve – the USSR proves

Matthew **Humphrey**, **2007**, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The challenge to the deliberative ideal, p. 140, mm

For all that the problems with which eco-authoritarians struggled were and¶ remain real, the faith they placed in an authoritarian state to resolve these¶ problems was surely misguided. Whilst the inferior ecological record of nondemocratic¶ states in itself proves nothing (how many of these states actually¶ prioritised environmental goals?), the ability of a state to impose its 'green will'¶ on an unwilling and resentful public who see their taken-for-granted freedoms¶ being curtailed is questionable, in the absence of a monstrous architecture of¶ green totalitarianism. Authoritarian states have often not been good at achieving¶ those policy goals that they have prioritised, as the forlorn ambition of the Soviet¶ Union to outstrip the productive capacity of the capitalist West testifies. There is¶ no obvious reason to expect an authoritarian green state to be better than the¶ Soviet Union at overcoming the internal divisions, inefficiencies, corruption, and¶ perverse incentives that plague such states.

Aff – AT Alt – AT Benevolent Leaders

Eco-authoritarianism inevitably collapses into tyrannical despotism – that makes solving the environment impossible

Dan **Shahar**, **2015**, Environmental Values, 24(3), "Rejecting eco-authoritarianism, again, 345-366, mm

Traditionally, critics of authoritarianism have worried that unrestrained power granted to government officials could fall into the wrong hands, resulting in a serious potential for tyrannical despotism.53 Despotism is obviously problematic due to the harms it typically generates for citizens living under its rule, but in the current context we may also worry that a despotic regime would end up neglecting to prioritize environmental protection, thereby failing to ameliorate the crisis that would have motivated the shift toward authoritarianism in the first place. In order to avoid this problem, Eco-Authoritarians would need to provide reason to think that following their prescriptions would mean putting our collective futures not into the hands of injurious despots but rather into those of administrators who possess both the capacity to address an impending environmental crisis effectively and the motivation to do so. This challenge has two interrelated aspects: first, it must be shown that a capable and benevolent "eco-elite" could be generated in the first place to rule over our society; and second, it must be shown that a system of rule by "eco-elites" could be effectively perpetuated over a long period of time. To my knowledge, the only contemporary Eco-Authoritarians who have taken up this challenge are also the most extreme proponents of the view: David Shearman and Joseph Wayne Smith. In The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, Shearman and Smith contend that successful Eco-Authoritarianism would require leaders of a caliber far higher than we find in contemporary society, and that producing such leaders would require a radically different system of education. This new system would be built around superior "real universities" that would purportedly "train holistic thinkers in all of the arts and sciences necessary for tough decision making that the environmental crisis confronts us with."54 The products would be "true public intellectuals with knowledge well grounded in ecology,"55 who would be charged with preserving "remnants of our civilization when the great collapse comes" as "the new priesthood of the new dark age."56 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the authors give only sketchy details on exactly how "real universities" would achieve these felicitous results. Their main proposals in The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy seem limited to focusing scholarly research on problems that are important to human well-being,57 expanding the role of information sharing among the intellectual community,58 and accelerating the development of programs in environmental studies.59 Although many of these proposals seem reasonable and even attractive, they hardly seem like the sorts of revolutionary changes that would equip graduating students with the capacities and motivations needed to effectively rule over complex modern societies. Even if a capable and benevolent eco-elite could be produced, a further hurdle for Eco-Authoritarianism would involve demonstrating that the quality of elite rule could be maintained over time. Shearman and Smith do not take up this aspect of the issue in a substantive way, and to my knowledge neither does any other contemporary EcoAuthoritarian. But the challenge of sustaining a capable and benevolent ruling class over time is a notoriously difficult one for an authoritarian regime to overcome. As the eco-anarchist philosopher Alan Carter has quite reasonably worried: Even if a particular leader does turn out to be genuinely benevolent, even if he or she is not corrupted by the exercise of power or the need to retain power, how can it be guaranteed that those who inherit his or her position will be equally benevolent? Hierarchical structures, by their very nature, make it easy for the most competitive, most ruthless and least caring to attain power. Moreover, the centralized exercise of authoritarian rule is an ever-attractive goal for would-be usurpers, whose vision is usually less pure than those whom they usurp, as the history of many coups attests to.60 At the very least, it seems that Eco-Authoritarians owe us some account of how their proposed regimes could predictably avoid corruption over time.

Aff – Perm Solvency

The perm solves best – democracy is reflexive and can resolve environmental problems. The alt alone fails because the public will never get on board.

Bruce **Jennings**, May **2013**, [Jennings is the Director of Bioethics and Editor of Minding Nature at the Center for Humans and Nature], Center for Humans & Nature, "Governance in a Post-Growth Society: An Inquiry into the Democratic Prospect," http://www.humansandnature.org/governance-in-a-post-growth-society--an-inquiry-into-the-democratic-prospect-article-136.php, mm

<u>Ecological authoritarians are exceedingly pessimistic</u> about the current state of ordinary moral sensibility and political judgment in Western society. <u>They rest their assessment</u> and theory of governance <u>on a belief in the</u> widespread <u>cultural dominance of excessive individualism and materialism</u>, and seem to think that consumerism has thoroughly triumphed over every competing cultural or ethical value system. As an account of the logical tendencies at work in a particular form of economic system and society, <u>this argument has validity</u>, **but not as a complete empirical description** of currently existing culture and politics. <u>It underestimates the remaining moral capital in a growth-oriented society that can be channeled in future degrowth directions,</u> <u>thereby making a different form of democracy compatible with ecological requirements.</u> Many still quite powerfully held values compete with individualism and materialism in the attitudes and motivations of contemporary citizens. Furthermore, <u>it is far from clear that massive numbers of people will withdraw their allegiance from democratic governments</u> even if they fail to produce high levels of economic prosperity. Indeed, it is not at all clear that a democratic system would not be able to survive even a period of considerable austerity, if the need for such measures were clear and if the burdens and hardships were shared in a truly just and equitable way. These are large ifs. The relationship between economics and political legitimation is complex.¶ <u>As a matter of intellectual history, this equating of all forms of democracy with materialism</u> and a narrowly self-interested individualism **is overly selective**. Even in the modern period, democratic governance has rested on more than simply the ideology of growth and expansive capitalism. While <u>possessive individualism</u> has certainly been one important strand within Western democratic societies, it <u>has not been the only strand, and it has not gone unchallenged from within democratic thought itself.</u>[20] Thus it is misleading to argue that democratic governance cannot honestly appeal to any sense of public purpose larger than throwaway consumption. Believing that democratic governments could neither call for nor obtain popular support except on the basis of a promise of more economic growth, <u>ecological authoritarianism turns to non-democratic governance out of a sense of despair</u>. But, so far at least, <u>neither the sociological nor their historical arguments of this theory are sufficient to warrant that conclusion</u>.

Aff – Democratic Peace Theory

DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY IS EMPIRICAL FACT

McFaul, prof of political science @ Stanford and special assistant to Obama, **2010**

(Michael, Advancing democracy abroad: why we should and how we can)

==The== second ==concern about democracies being more prone war is also exaggerated. Democracies do not go to war with each other==. More precisely, **Bruce ==Russett, one of the closest observers of this phenomenon, writes==**, First, ==democratically organized political systems in general operate under restraints that make them more peaceful in their relations with other democracies==. . . . Second, in the modern international system, democracies are less likely to use lethal violence toward other democracies than toward autocratically governed states or than autocratically governed states are toward each other. Furthermore, there are no clearcut cases of sovereign stable democracies waging war with each other in the modern international system. ==Reflecting on a vast academic literature on the causes of war, Jack Levy concluded that the democratic peace theory is "the closest thing we have to empirical law in the study of international relations==."107 Democracies are not pacifist regimes when dealing with autocracies. But democracies are peaceful when interacting with other democracies.!

The best empirical data proves that democratic peace theory is a statistical law

Robert **Delahunty**, law professor, St. Thomas, John Yoo, law professor, Cal Berkeley, Winter **2010**, Chicago Journal of International Law, p. 463

> **Democracies settle disputes** through peaceful dispute settlement processes **more often than others**. Democracies are more likely to initiate wars against non-democracies than vice-versa. **Democracies fight shorter wars** with lower costs when they begin the wars. Transitional democracies are more likely to fight, and larger democracies are less likely to go to war than smaller ones. **Critics have questioned whether the findings are statistically robust, or have argued that omitted variables such as the stability of the Cold War are the true explanations. Yet it appears that the democratic peace is as close to a statistical law as anything will be in international politics**.

Rigorous statistical analysis supports democratic peace theory

Robert **Delahunty**, law professor, St. Thomas, John Yoo, law professor, Cal Berkeley, Winter **2010**, Chicago Journal of International Law, p. 461-2

> But before we reach any conclusion on whether American foreign policy ought to promote democracy--even to the point of using force to achieve regime change--**we need to understand the roots of** the **democratic peace.** If the peace is only a statistical regularity explained by factors other than domestic political systems, then spreading democracy will not advance American national security and could well be counter-productive. Defining democracy in a narrow way in order to fit the data might make the lessons for real world security more tenuous and even impractical. We need to understand the causal mechanism that makes democracies less warlike with each other before we can link the national security policy of individual states to Kant's larger goal of a league of democratic republics. **The "empirical regularity" of the democratic peace thesis is critical to our argument. Rigorous statistical analysis shows that democracies do not wage war with other democracies.**

Aff – Nuclear War o/w Environment

Environmental collapse can't cause extinction---nuke war outweighs---magnitude and probability

David **Schweickart 10** is Professor at Loyola University Chicago. He holds a Ph.D. in Mathematics (University of Virginia), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy (Ohio State University). "Is Sustainable Capitalism Possible?" Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 41 (2010) 6739–6752

It is not true either that the various ecological crises we are facing will bring about "the end of the world." Consider the projections of the Stern Review, the recently released report commissioned by the British Government. If nothing is done, we risk "major disruption to economic and social activity, later in this century and the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and economic depression of the first half of the 20th century." This is serious. Some sixty million people died in World War Two. The Stern Review estimates as many as 200 million people could be permanently displaced by rising sea level and drought. But this is not "the end of the world." Even if the effects are far worse, resulting in billions of deaths-- a highly unlikely scenario --there would still be lots of us left. If three-quarters of the present population perished, that would still leave us with 1.6 billion people--the population of the planet in 1900. I say this not to minimize the potentially horrific impact of relentless environmental destruction, but to caution against exaggeration. We are not talking about thermonuclear war--which could have extinguished us as a species. (It still might.) And we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that millions of people on the planet right now, caught up in savage civil wars or terrorized by U.S. bombers (which dropped some 100,000 lbs. of explosives on a Baghdad neighborhood during one ten-day period in January 2008--the amount the fascists used to level the Basque town of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War), are faced with conditions more terrible than anyone here is likely to face in his or her lifetime due to environmental degradation.

Aff – Environment Impact Defense

No impact to the environment

Easterbrook '95 (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow @ The Fullbright Foundation and Reuters Columnist, "A Moment on Earth," p. 25, 1995)

In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But <u>the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong</u>. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. <u>The environment</u> that contains them **is close to indestructible**. <u>The</u> living <u>environment</u> of Earth <u>has survived ice ages</u>; bombardments of <u>cosmic radiation</u> more deadly than atomic fallout; <u>solar radiation</u> more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of <u>intense volcanism</u> releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; <u>reversals of the</u> planet's <u>magnetic poles</u>; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of <u>asteroids and comets</u> bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. <u>Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still</u>. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. <u>Human assaults on the environment</u>, though mischievous, <u>are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting</u>.

Aff – AT Biodiversity Impact

No impact to biodiversity loss

Sagoff 97 Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, "INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT", 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge. Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

<u>Although</u> one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the <u>earth stands on</u> **the brink of** an episode of massive **extinction**, **it may not follow** from this grim fact **that human** being**s will suffer** as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," <u>Tudge declared</u> that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the **elimination of all but a** tiny **minority** of our fellow creatures **does not affect** the material well-being of **humans** one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "The **human** species **could survive** just as well **if 99.9%** of our fellow creatures **went extinct,** provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346 [*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349 Other biologists believe, however, that <u>species are so</u> fabulously <u>redundant</u> in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological <u>processes</u> in general will <u>function</u> perfectly <u>well with fewer</u> of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain **even if every threatened organism becomes extinct**. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352 [*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they? Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen. One might argue that <u>the</u> sheer <u>number and variety</u> of creatures available to any ecosystem <u>buffers that system against stress</u>. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, **the number of species has been increasing** dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the

landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon <u>Levin observed</u>, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only up to a point; above a certain level, <u>increasing biodiversity is likely to make **little difference**</u>." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for [*912] the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

Biodiversity loss won't cause extinction

Lomberg 1 (Bjorn Lomborg, associate professor of statistics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, August 9, 2001, "Environmentalists tend to believe that, ecologically speaking, things are getting worse and worse."

We are all familiar with the litany of our ever-deteriorating environment. It is the doomsday message endlessly repeated by the media, as when Time magazine tells us that "everyone knows the planet is in bad shape", and when the New Scientist calls its environmental overview "self-destruct". <u>We are defiling our Earth, we are told. Our resources are running out. The population is ever-growing, leaving less and less to eat. Our air and water is more and more polluted. The planet's species are becoming extinct in vast numbers - we kill off more than 40,000 each year. Forests are disappearing, fish stocks are collapsing, the coral reefs are dying. The fertile topsoil is vanishing. We are paving over nature, destroying the wilderness, decimating the biosphere, and will end up killing ourselves in the process. The world's ecosystem is breaking down.</u> We are fast approaching the absolute limit of viability. Global warming is probably taking place, <u>though **future projections are overly pessimistic** and the traditional cure of radical fossil-fuel cutbacks is far more damaging than the original affliction. Moreover, its total impact will not pose a devastating problem to our future. Nor will we lose 25-50% of all species in our lifetime - in fact, we are losing probably 0.7%. Acid rain does not kill the forests, and the air and water around us are becoming less and less polluted. In fact, in terms of practically every measurable indicator, mankind's lot has improved.</u> This does not, however, mean that everything is good enough. We can still do even better. Take, for example, starvation and the population explosion. In 1968, one of the leading environmentalists, Dr Paul R Erlich, predicted in his bestselling book, The Population Bomb, that "the battle to feed humanity is over. In the course of the 1970s, the world will experience starvation of tragic proportions - hundreds of millions of people will starve to death." This did not happen. Instead, according to the UN, agricultural production in the developing world has increased by 52% per person. The daily food intake in developing countries has increased from 1,932 calories in 1961 - barely enough for survival - to 2,650 calories in 1998, and is expected to rise to 3,020 by 2030. Likewise, the proportion of people going hungry in these countries has dropped from 45% in 1949 to 18% today, and is expected to fall even further, to 12% in 2010 and 6% in 2030. Food, in other words, is becoming not scarcer but ever more abundant. This is reflected in its price. Since 1800, food prices have decreased by more than 90%, and in 2000, according to the World Bank, prices were lower than ever before. Erlich's prediction echoed that made 170 years earlier by Thomas Malthus. Malthus claimed that, unchecked, human population would expand exponentially, while food production.

Aff – AT Warming Impact

Warming will be slow and the impact will be small

Ridley 6/19/14, (Matt Ridley is the author of The Rational Optimist, a columnist for the Times (London) and a member of the House of Lords. He spoke at Ideacity in Toronto on June 18., "PCC commissioned models to see if global warming would reach dangerous levels this century. Consensus is 'no'" , [http://tinyurl.com/mgyn8ln] , //hss-RJ)

The debate over climate change is horribly polarized. From the way it is conducted, you would think that only two positions are possible: that the whole thing is a hoax or that catastrophe is inevitable. In fact there is room for lots of intermediate positions, including the view I hold, which is that man-made climate change is real but not likely to do much harm, let alone prove to be the greatest crisis facing humankind this century. After more than 25 years reporting and commenting on this topic for various media organizations, and having started out alarmed, that's where I have ended up. But it is not just I that hold this view. I share it with a very large international organization, sponsored by the United Nations and supported by virtually all the world's governments: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) itself. The IPCC commissioned four different models of what might happen to the world economy, society and technology in the 21st century and what each would mean for the climate, given a certain assumption about the atmosphere's "sensitivity" to carbon dioxide. Three of the models show a moderate, slow and mild warming, the hottest of which leaves the planet just 2 degrees Centigrade warmer than today in 2081-2100. The coolest comes out just 0.8 degrees warmer. Now two degrees is the threshold at which warming starts to turn dangerous, according to the scientific consensus. That is to say, in three of the four scenarios considered by the IPCC, by the time my children's children are elderly, the earth will still not have experienced any harmful warming, let alone catastrophe. But what about the fourth scenario? This is known as RCP8.5, and it produces 3.5 degrees of warming in 2081-2100. Curious to know what assumptions lay behind this model, I decided to look up the original papers describing the creation of this scenario. Frankly, I was gobsmacked. It is a world that is very, very implausible. For a start, this is a world of "continuously increasing global population" so that there are 12 billion on the planet. This is more than a billion more than the United Nations expects, and flies in the face of the fact that the world population growth rate has been falling for 50 years and is on course to reach zero – i.e., stable population – in around 2070. More people mean more emissions. Second, the world is assumed in the RCP8.5 scenario to be burning an astonishing 10 times as much coal as today, producing 50% of its primary energy from coal, compared with about 30% today. Indeed, because oil is assumed to have become scarce, a lot of liquid fuel would then be derived from coal. Nuclear and renewable technologies contribute little, because of a "slow pace of innovation" and hence "fossil fuel technologies continue to dominate the primary energy portfolio over the entire time horizon of the RCP8.5 scenario." Energy efficiency has improved very little. These are highly unlikely assumptions. With abundant natural gas displacing coal on a huge scale in the United States today, with the price of solar power plummeting, with nuclear power experiencing a revival, with gigantic methane-hydrate gas resources being discovered on the seabed, with energy efficiency rocketing upwards, and with population growth rates continuing to fall fast in virtually every country in the world, the one thing we can say about RCP8.5 is that it is very, very implausible. Notice, however, that even so, it is not a world of catastrophic pain. The per capita income of the average human being in 2100 is three times what it is now. Poverty would be history. So it's hardly Armageddon. But there's an even more startling fact. We now have many different studies

of climate sensitivity based on observational data and they all converge on the conclusion that it is much lower than assumed by the IPCC in these models. It has to be, otherwise global temperatures would have risen much faster than they have over the past 50 years. As Ross McKitrick noted on this page earlier this week, temperatures have not risen at all now for more than 17 years. With these much more realistic estimates of sensitivity (known as "transient climate response"), even RCP8.5 cannot produce dangerous warming. It manages just 2.1C of warming by 2081-2100. That is to say, even if you pile crazy assumption upon crazy assumption till you have an edifice of vanishingly small probability, you cannot even manage to make climate change cause minor damage in the time of our grandchildren, let alone catastrophe. That's not me saying this – it's the IPCC itself. But what strikes me as truly fascinating about these scenarios is that they tell us that globalization, innovation and economic growth are unambiguously good for the environment. At the other end of the scale from RCP8.5 is a much more cheerful scenario called RCP2.6. In this happy world, climate change is not a problem at all in 2100, because carbon dioxide emissions have plummeted thanks to the rapid development of cheap nuclear and solar, plus a surge in energy efficiency. The RCP2.6 world is much, much richer. The average person has an income about 15 times today's in real terms, so that most people are far richer than Americans are today. And it achieves this by free trade, massive globalization, and lots of investment in new technology. All the things the green movement keeps saying it opposes

because they will wreck the planet. The answer to climate change is, and always has been, innovation. To <u>worry now in 2014 about a very small, highly implausible set of circumstances in 2100 that just might, if climate sensitivity is much higher than the evidence suggests, produce a marginal damage to the world economy, makes no sense</u>. Think of all the innovation that happened between 1914 and 2000. Do we really think there will be less in this century? As for how to deal with that small risk, well there are several possible options. You could encourage innovation and trade. You could put a modest but growing tax on carbon to nudge innovators in the right direction. You could offer prizes for low-carbon technologies. All of these might make a little sense. But the one thing you should not do is pour public subsidy into supporting old-fashioned existing technologies that produce more carbon dioxide per unit of energy even than coal (bio-energy), or into ones that produce expensive energy (existing solar), or that have very low energy density and so require huge areas of land (wind). The IPCC produced two reports last year. One said that the cost of climate change is likely to be less than 2% of GDP by the end of this century. The other said that the cost of decarbonizing the world economy with renewable energy is likely to be 4% of GDP. Why do something that you know will do more harm than good?

Warming is slow – no risk of an impact

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A new paper just hit the scientific literature that argues that the apparent pause in the rise in global average surface temperatures during the past 16 years was really just a slowdown. As you may imagine, this paper, by Kevin Cowtan and Robert Way is being hotly discussed in the global warming blogs, with reaction ranging from a warm embrace by the global-warming-is-going-to-be-bad-for-us crowd to revulsion from the human-activities-

have-no-effect-on-the-climate claque. The lukewarmers (a school we take some credit for establishing) seem to be taking the results in stride. <u>After all, the "pause" as curious as it is/was, is not central to the primary argument that, yes, human activities are pressuring the planet to warm, but that t</u><mark>he rate of warming is going to be much slower than is being projected by the collection of global climate models</mark> (upon which mainstream projections of future climate change—and the resulting climate alarm (i.e., calls for emission regulations, etc.)—are based). Under the adjustments to the observed global temperature history put together by Cowtan and Way, the models fare a bit better than they do with the unadjusted temperature record. That is, the observed temperature trend over the past 34 years (the period of record analyzed by Cowtan and Way) is a tiny bit closer to the average trend from the collection of climate models used in the new report from the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) than is the old temperature record. Specifically, while the trend in observed global temperatures from 1979-2012 as calculated by Cowtan and Way is 0.17°C/decade, it is 0.16°C/decade in the temperature record compiled by the U.K. Hadley Center (the record that Cowtan and Way adjusted). Because of the sampling errors associated with trend estimation, these values are not significantly different from one another. Whether the 0.17°C/decade is significantly different from the climate model average simulated trend during that period of 0.23°C/decade is discussed extensively below. But, suffice it to say that an insignificant difference of <u>0.01°C/decade in the global trend measured over more than 30 years is pretty small</u>

beer and doesn't give model apologists very much to get happy over. Instead, the attention is being deflected to "The Pause"—the leveling off of global surface temperatures during the past 16 years (give or take). Here, the new results from Cowtan and Way show that during the period 1997-2012, instead of a statistically insignificant rise at a rate of 0.05°C/decade as is contained in the "old" temperature record, the rise becomes a statistically significant 0.12°C/decade. "The Pause" is transformed into "The Slowdown" and alarmists rejoice because global warming hasn't stopped after all. (If the logic sounds backwards, it does to us as well, if you were worried about catastrophic global warming, wouldn't you rejoice at findings that indicate that future climate change was going to be only modest, more so than results to the contrary?) The science behind the new Cowtan and Way research is still being digested by the community of climate scientists and other interested parties alike. The main idea is that the existing compilations of the global average temperature are very data-sparse in the high latitudes. And since the Arctic (more so than the Antarctic) is warming faster than the global average, the lack of data there may mean that the global average temperature trend may be underestimated. Cowtan and Way developed a methodology which relied on other limited sources of temperature information from the Arctic (such as floating buoys and satellite observations) to try to make an estimate of how the surface temperature was behaving in regions lacking more traditional temperature observations (the authors released an informative video explaining their research which may better help you understand what they did). They found that the warming in the data-sparse regions was progressing faster than the global average (especially during the past couple of years) and that when they included the data that they derived for these regions in the computation of the global average temperature, they found the global trend was higher than previously reported—just how much higher depended on the period over which the trend was calculated. As we showed, the trend more than doubled over the period from 1997-2012, but barely increased at all over the longer period 1979-2012. Figure 1 shows the impact on the global average temperature trend for all trend lengths between 10 and 35 years (incorporating our educated guess as to what the 2013 temperature anomaly will be), and compares that to the distribution of climate model simulations of the same period. Statistically speaking, instead of there being a clear inconsistency (i.e., the observed trend value falls outside of the range which encompasses 95% of all modeled trends) between the observations and the climate mode simulations for lengths ranging generally from 11 to 28 years and a marginal inconsistency (i.e., the observed trend value falls outside of the range which encompasses 90% of all modeled trends) for most of the other lengths, now the observations track closely the marginal inconsistency line, although trends of length 17, 19, 20, 21 remain clearly inconsistent with the collection of modeled trends. Still, throughout the entirely of the 35-yr period (ending in 2013), the observed trend lies far below the model average simulated trend (additional information on the impact of the new Cowtan and Way adjustments on modeled/observed temperature comparison can be found here). The Cowtan and Way analysis is an attempt at using additional types of temperature information, or extracting "information" from records that have already told their stories, to fill in the missing data in the Arctic. There are concerns about the appropriateness of both the data sources and the methodologies applied to them. A major one is in the applicability of satellite data at such high latitudes. The nature of the satellite's orbit forces it to look "sideways" in order to sample polar regions. In fact, the orbit is such that the highest latitude areas cannot be seen at all. This is compounded by the fact that cold regions can develop substantial "inversions" of near-ground temperature, in which temperature actually rises with height such that there is not a straightforward relationship between the surface temperature and the temperature of the lower atmosphere where the satellites measure the temperature. If the nature of this complex relationship is not constant in time, an error is introduced into the Cowtan and Way analysis. Another unresolved problem comes up when extrapolating land-based weather station data far into the Arctic Ocean. While land temperatures can bounce around a lot, the fact that much of the ocean is partially ice-covered for many months. Under "well-mixed" conditions, this forces the near-surface temperature to be constrained to values near the freezing point of salt water, whether or not the associated land station is much warmer or colder. You can run this experiment yourself by filling a glass with a mix of ice and water and then making sure it is well mixed. The water surface temperature must hover around 33°F until all the ice melts. Given that the near-surface temperature is close to the water temperature, the limitations of land data become obvious. Considering all of the above, we advise caution with regard to Cowtan and Way's findings. While adding high arctic data should increase the

observed trend, the nature of the data means that the amount of additional rise is subject to further revision. As they themselves note, there's quite a bit more work to be done this area. In the meantime, their results have tentatively breathed a small hint of life back into the climate models, basically buying them a bit more time—time for either the observed temperatures to start rising rapidly as current models expect, or, time for the modelers to try to fix/improve cloud processes, oceanic processes, and other process of variability (both natural and anthropogenic) that lie behind what would be the clearly overheated projections. We've also taken a look at how "sensitive" the results are to the length of the ongoing pause/slowdown. Our educated guess is that the "bit" of time that the Cowtan and Way findings bought the models is only a few years long, and it is a fact, not a guess, that each additional year at the current rate of lukewarming increases the disconnection between the models and reality.

K – Security- DDI

Crisis Rhetoric

1NC Crisis Rhetoric

The aff's use of crisis rhetoric relies on taken-for-granted assumptions about social organization while mobilizing threat of catastrophe to depoliticize them, reproducing inequality
Roitman 14

(Janet Roitman, Associate Prof. in Anthropology @ Graduate Program for International Affairs at the New School for Social Research, *Anti-Crisis*, pgs. 10-14)

To do so, we embark on a trek over the anxious terrain of crisis narration. This trek is one of observation: **we observe how** academic and nonacademic **observers themselves observe economic and financial actors**, both human and technical, which they locate, define, and interpret **as having produced crisis**. We observe, then, the blind spot of second-order observation. Moreover, through this survey of the practice of crisis in contemporary narrations of "the 2007–9 financial crisis," we see how **accession to crisis engenders certain narrations and** note how the term enables and **forecloses various** kinds of **questions**. Through this review of a host of recent narratives of financial crisis, I am not seeking to establish the relative veracity of these accounts; I am not interested in whether or not certain purported ex- planations of "the crisis" are more or less tenable. Although I do explore questions relating to the production of value and risk, and the status of subprime and houses, I do so only insofar as these terms constitute the grammar of financial crisis narratives. **The point** of this grand tour of crisis narratives **is not to determine the best way to decipher the crisis** or to establish who "got it right" in recent analyses. **The point is to demonstrate how the term "crisis" establishes the conditions of possible histories and** to indicate how it **is a ~~blind~~ spot in social science narrative constructions**.¶ We thus take a journey through a wide-ranging array of interpretations, each of which claims a particular tradition: liberal economy, neo-Keynesian, neo-Marxist, cultural studies, and cultural economy. All proceed from the question, what went wrong? All search for origins, sources, roots, causes, reasons . . . none waver in their faith in crisis, a term that is posited without question or doubt. **All seek to demonstrate deviations from the proper course of history and distortions in human knowledge** and practice—**the discrepancy between the world and human knowledge of the world. Crisis signifies a purportedly observable chasm between "the real,"** on the one hand, **and what is** variously **portrayed** in the accounts reviewed below **as fictitious**, erroneous, **or** an **illogical departure** from the real, on the other. The chasm signifies a supposed dissonance between empirical his- tory and a philosophy of history—between truly grounded material value, on the one hand, and hypothetical judgments and evaluations, on the other.13 What is at issue is our alienation from history and the potential for revelation of true value and the true significance of events—of redemption, emancipation, deliverance. I ask: how can we claim to represent that chasm? What is the basis of a claim to know the locus of our alienation from underlying value, from material value, from real value, from truth value?¶ To conclude this expedition over the terrain of crisis narration, I put a set of particularly pragmatic questions to the narratives that I review herein: When does a credit (asset) become a debt (toxic asset)? How do we distinguish the former from the latter? At what point do houses figured as equity become figured as a debt? At what point do subprime mortgage bonds transform from an asset to a liability? And the ultimate question: When does the judgment of crisis obtain? We see, by putting these questions to contemporary crisis narratives, how crisis, in itself, cannot be located or observed as an object of first- order knowledge. The observation "money" is a first-order observation based on a distinction (money/not money); the statements "I lost money" or "Lost money is a crisis" are second-order observations. A first-order observation (money) does not indicate how the distinction (money/not money) was made; and the distinction (how the observation was made) is necessarily the object of a second-order observation.14 But taking note of crisis as a distinction, or as a second-order operation, does not amount to denying crisis. **The point is to take note of the effects of the claim to crisis**, to be attentive to the effects of our very accession to that judgment. **Crisis engenders certain forms of critique, which politicize interest groups. This is a politics of crisis. Would not crisis**, if it effectively obtained, **engender** not merely critique of existing relations and practices, but rather occasion **the reorganization** and transformation **of the very boundary between "the economic" and "the political," and**, more significant, **the transformation of the very intelligibility of constitutive terms, such as "debt," "liquidity," and "risk"**? **In assuming crisis as a point of departure, we remain closed off in a politics of crisis**. We can ask, echoing the Occupy Wall Street movement, who should bear the burden of fading prosperity? But **other constitutive questions**, related to the production of effective practice, **remain unarticulated, such as, how did debt come to be figured as an asset class in the first place**?¶ To answer this latter question, I turn to the few studies of the production of value through market devices and financial infrastructures that help us to account for the efficacy of economic and financial practices, which sustain the production of value—figured as debt. Here, **instead of financial crisis due to irrational speculation**, corrupt culture, erroneous policy, faulty regulation, defective models, **missed forecasting, or systemic failure** and underlying contradictions, **we have an accounting of specific practices and the production of positive**—or, better, practical—**knowledge, such that the claim to crisis becomes a particular** (political) **solution to what is declared a problem for certain domains of life**. These rare observations of the production of economic and financial value without positing crisis help us to grasp how **"crisis" is** less a claim about error in valuation than **a judgment about value**. But noncrisis accounts cannot be taken as distinct "alternative" narrations insofar as they do not provide evidence against "X account of crisis" so as to prove or affirm "Y account of crisis." In that sense, my turn to these accounts is a thought experiment: this exercise explores the grounds of narrative without crisis, but these are not alternative explanations because crisis is not their object. Doubtless, this thought experiment risks

reproducing the "problem of meaning"— or the belief that there is a discrepancy between history and representations of history—insofar as it raises the possibility of narrating history otherwise.15 But here I want to underscore that **critique and crisis are cognates, and so want to bring to our attention the forms of critique engendered by crisis narratives**. We see that **these forms of critique rest on assumptions about how categories** like "the market" or "finance" **should function and therefore generate conjecture about how deviations** from "true" market or financial value **were produced; they do not account for the ways that such value is produced in the first place**. In other words, **when crisis is posited as an a priori, it obviates accounts of positive, pragmatic spaces** of calculative possibility. I therefore raise the possibility of noncrisis narratives and explore how possible, alternative narratives about houses and their worth might be generated without recourse to a "sociology of error" (Bloor 1991, 12), without constructing a post hoc narrative of denunciation or post hoc judgments of deviation and failure.16¶ Ultimately, **I invite the reader to put less faith in crisis, which means asking what is at stake with crisis in-and-of-itself**. **"Crisis" is a term that is bound up in the predicament of signifying human history**, often **serving as a transcendental placeholder in ostensible solutions** to that problem. In that sense, **the term "crisis" serves as a primary enabling ~~blind~~ spot for the production of knowledge**. That is, **crisis is a point of view**, or an observation, **which itself is not viewed or observed**. I apprehend the concept of crisis through the metaphor of a blind spot so as to apprehend crisis as an observation that, like all observations or cognitions, does not account for the very conditions of its observation.17 Consequentially, **making that ~~blind~~ spot visible means asking questions about how we produce significance for ourselves**. At least, it means asking about how we produce "history." At most, **it means asking how we might construct accounts without discerning historical significance in terms of ethical failure**. Thus we might ask: what kind of narrative could be produced where meaning is not everywhere a problem?18 **An answer to that question**, no matter how improbable, as we will see below, **requires, as a first**, inaugural **step, consideration of the ways** in which **crisis, as an enabling ~~blind~~ spot for the production of knowledge, entails unremitting and** often **implicit judgment about latencies, or errors and failings that must be eradicated and, evidently hopefully, overcome**.

Cyber Security

1NC Cyber Security

The AFF employs a <u>militarized discourse</u> of cybersecurity --- that <u>inflates threats</u> and ignores <u>dangerous vulnerabilities</u>

Myriam Dunn **Cavelty 12**, lecturer for security studies and a senior researcher in the field of risk and resilience at the Center for Security Studies, "The militarisation of cyber security as a source of global tension," STRATEGIC TRENDS 2012: Key Developments in Global Affaris ed. by Daniel Möckli, Center for Security Studies, p. 114-21, fwang

<u>The militarisation of cyber security is first and foremost based on the belief in a massive threat of a large-scale cyber attack</u>. There are two aspects to this perception: In the first subsection, it is shown how and why the past and current level of the threat is overrated. The second subsection places the future likelihood of cyber war into perspective. It shows that now and in the future, the probability of a large-scale attack is very low. The third subsection looks at an additional reason for how widespread the fear of cyber war has become: Most countries simply follow the threat perception and reasoning of the US, even though the strategic context and disparity in power positions warrant a different threat assessment. The fourth subsection finally criticises the widespread use of vocabulary that is full of military analogies. **Such vocabulary insinuates a reality governed by the traditional logic of offense and defence – a reality that does not exist. Even worse, it is decoupled from the reality of the threat and the possibility for meaningful countermeasures and is complicit in solidifying the militarisation of cyber security**.

An overrated threat

<u>There is no denying that different political, economic, and military conflicts have had cyber(ed) components for a number of years now</u>. Furthermore, criminal and espionage activities involving the use of computers happen every day. It is a fact that **cyber incidents are continually causing minor and only occasionally major inconveniences**: These may be in the form of **lost intellectual property or other proprietary data, maintenance and repair, lost revenue, and increased security costs**. Beyond the direct impact, badly handled cyber attacks have also damaged corporate (and government) reputations and have, theoretically at least, the potential to reduce public confidence in the security of Internet transactions and e-commerce if they become more frequent.

However, in the entire history of computer networks, **there are no examples of cyber attacks that resulted in actual physical violence against persons** (nobody has ever died from a cyber incident), and only **very few had a substantial effect on property** (Stuxnet being the most prominent). So far, **cyber attacks have not caused serious long-term disruptions. They are risks that can be dealt with by individual entities using standard information security measures, and their overall costs remain low in comparison to other risk categories such as financial risk**s.

These facts tend to be almost completely disregarded in policy circles. There are several reasons why **the threat is overrated**. First, as combating cyber threats has become a highly politicised issue, **official statements about the level of threat must also be seen in the context of competition for resources and influence between various bureaucratic entities**. This is usually done **by stating an urgent need for action and describing the overall threat as big and rising**.

Second, **psychological research has shown that risk perception, including the perception of experts, is highly dependent on intuition and emotions**. **Cyber risks**, especially in their more extreme form, **fit the risk profile of so-called 'dread risks', which are perceived as catastrophic, fatal, unknown, and basically uncontrollable**. **There is a propensity to be disproportionally afraid of these risks despite their low probability**, **which translates into pressure for** regulatory **action of all sorts** and the willingness to bear high costs of uncertain benefit.

Third, **the media distorts the threat perception even further**. **There is no hard data for the assumption that the level of cyber risks is actually rising – beyond the perception of impact and fear**. Some IT security **companies have recently warned against overemphasising sophisticated attacks just because we hear more about them**. In 2010, **only about 3 per cent of all incidents were considered so sophisticated that**

they were impossible to stop. The vast majority of attackers go after low-hanging fruit, which are small to medium sized enterprises with bad defences. These types of incidents tend to remain under the radar of the media and even law enforcement.

Cyber war remains unlikely

Since the potentially devastating effects of cyber attacks are so scary, the temptation is very high not only to think about worst-case scenarios, but also to give them a lot of (often too much) weight despite their very low probability. However, most experts agree that **strategic cyber war remains highly unlikely in the foreseeable future**, mainly **due to the uncertain results such a war would bring**, **the lack of motivation on the part of the possible combatants**, and their **shared inability to defend against counterattacks**. Indeed, **it is hard to see how cyber attacks could ever become truly effective for military purposes: It is exceptionally difficult to take down multiple, specific targets and keep them down over time. The key difficulty is proper reconnaissance and targeting, as well as the need to deal with a variety of diverse systems and be ready for countermoves from your adversary**.

Furthermore, nobody can be truly interested in allowing the unfettered proliferation and use of cyber war tools, least of all the countries with the offensive lead in this domain. Quite to the contrary, strong arguments can be made that **the world's big powers have an overall strategic interest in developing and accepting internationally agreed norms on cyber war, and in creating agreements that might pertain to the development, distribution, and deployment of cyber weapons or to their use** (though the effectiveness of such norms must remain doubtful). The most obvious reason is that the **countries that are currently openly discussing the use of cyber war tools are precisely the ones that are the most vulnerable to cyber warfare attacks due to their high dependency on information infrastructure. The features of the emerging information environment make it extremely unlikely that any but the most limited and tactically oriented instances of computer attacks could be contained**. More likely, **computer attacks could 'blow back' through the interdependencies that are such an essential feature of the environment**. Even relatively harmless viruses and worms would cause considerable random disruption to businesses, governments, and consumers. **This risk would most likely weigh much heavier than the uncertain benefits to be gained from cyber war activities**.

Certainly, thinking about (and planning for) worst-case scenarios is a legitimate task of the national security apparatus. Also, it seems almost inevitable that until cyber war is proven to be ineffective or forbidden, states and non-state actors who have the ability to develop cyber weapons will try to do so, because they appear cost-effective, more stealthy, and less risky than other forms of armed conflict. However, **cyber war should not receive too much attention at the expense of more plausible and possible cyber problems**. Using too many resources for highimpact, low-probability events – and therefore having less resources for the low to middle impact and high probability events – does not make sense, neither politically, nor strategically and certainly not when applying a cost-benefit logic.

Europe is not the US

The cyber security discourse is American in origin and American in the making: At all times, **the US government shaped both the threat perception and the envisaged countermeasures**. Interestingly enough, there are almost no variations to be found in other countries' cyber threat discussions – even though the strategic contexts differ fundamentally. **Many of the assumptions at the heart of the cyber security debate are shaped by the fears of a military and political superpower. The US eyes the cyber capabilities of its traditional rivals, the rising power of China and the declining power of Russia, with particular suspicion**. This follows a conventional strategic logic: The main question is **whether the cyber dimension could suddenly tip the scales of power against the US or have a negative effect on its ability to project power anywhere and anytime**. In addition, **due to its exposure in world politics and its military engagements, the US is a prime target for asymmetric attack**.

The surely correct assumption that modern societies and their armed forces depend on the smooth functioning of information and communication technology does not automatically mean that this dependence will be exploited – **particularly not for the majority of states in Europe. The existence of**

the cyber realm seems to lead people to assume that because they have vulnerabilities, they will be exploited. But in security and defence matters, careful threat assessments need to be made. Such assessments require that the following question be carefully deliberated: 'Who has an interest in attacking us and the capability to do so, and why would they?' For many democratic states, particularly in Europe, the risk of outright war has moved far to the background and the tasks of their armies have been adapted to this. Fears of asymmetric attacks also rank low. The same logic applies to the cyber domain. The risk of a warlike cyber attack of severe proportions is minimal; there is no plausible scenario for it. Cyber crime and cyber espionage, both political and economic, are a different story: They are here now and will remain the biggest cyber risks in the future.

The limits of analogies

Even if the cyber threat were to be considered very high, the current trend conjures up wrong images. Analogies are very useful for relating non-familiar concepts or complex ideas with more simple and familiar ones. But when taken too far, or even taken for real, they begin to have detrimental effects. Military terms like 'cyber weapons', 'cyber capabilities', 'cyber offence', 'cyber defence', and 'cyber deterrence' suggest that cyberspace can and should be handled as an operational domain of warfare like land, sea, air, and outer space (cyberspace has in fact been officially recognised as a new domain in US military doctrine). Again, this assumption clashes with the reality of the threat and the possibilities for countermeasures.

First, calling offensive measures cyber weapons does not change the fact that hacker tools are not really like physical weapons. They are opportunistic and aimed at outsmarting the technical defences. As a result, their effect is usually not controllable in a military sense – they might deliver something useful or they might not. Also, even though code can be copied, the knowledge and preparation behind it cannot be easily proliferated. Each new weapon needs to be tailored to the system it is supposed to attack. Cyber weapons cannot be kept in a 'silo' for a long time, because at any time, the vulnerability in the system that it is targeted at could be patched and the weapon would be rendered useless.

Second, thinking in terms of attacks and defence creates a wrong image of immediacy of cause and effect. However, high-level cyber attacks against infrastructure targets will likely be the culmination of long-term, subtle, systematic intrusions. The preparatory phase could take place over several years. When – or rather if – an intrusion is detected, it is often impossible to determine whether it was an act of vandalism, computer crime, terrorism, foreign intelligence activity, or some form of strategic military attack. The only way to determine the source, nature, and scope of the incident is to investigate it. This again might take years, with highly uncertain results. The military notion of striking back is therefore useless in most cases.

Third, deterrence works if one party is able to successfully convey to another that it is both capable and willing to use a set of available (often military) instruments against the other side if the latter steps over the line. This requires an opponent that is clearly identifiable as an attacker and has to fear retaliation – which is not the case in cyber security because of the attribution problem. Attribution of blame on the basis of the cui bono logic is not sufficient proof for political action. Therefore, deterrence and retribution do not work in cyberspace and will not, unless its rules are changed in substantial ways, with highly uncertain benefits. Much of what is said in China and in the US about their own and the other's cyber capabilities is (old) deterrence rhetoric – and must be understood as such. The White House's new International Strategy for Cyberspace of 2011 states that the US reserves the right to retaliate to hostile acts in cyberspace with military force. This 'hack us and we might bomb you' statement is an old-fashioned declaratory policy that preserves the option of asymmetrical response as a means of deterrence, even though both sides actually know that following up on it is next to impossible.

Fourth, **cyberspace is only in parts controlled or controllable by state actors**. At least in the case of democracies, **power in this domain is in the hands of private actors**, especially the business sector. **Much of the expertise and many of the resources required for taking better protective measures are located outside governments. The military** – or any other state entity for that matter – **does not own critical (information) infrastructures and has no direct access to them. Protecting them as a military mandate is impossible, and conceiving of cyberspace as an occupation zone is an illusion**. Militaries cannot defend the **cyberspace** of their country – it **is not a space where troops and tanks can be deployed**, because **the logic of national boundaries does not apply**.

2NC Cyber Security

It's a question of sequencing – their discourse produces fear-based responses that ensure error replication – consider the link prior to evaluating the risk of their advantages

Watkin and Brito 11 – [Tate – Research Associate @ Mercatus Center @ George Mason University. Jerry –

Senior Research Fellow @ Mercatus Center @ George Mason University] [LOVING THE CYBER BOMB? THE DANGERS OF THREAT INFLATION IN CYBERSECURITY POLICY] (http://tinyurl.com/pnmhhru) (accessed 7-17-15) //MC

CONCLUSION

Cybersecurity is an important policy issue, but the **alarmist rhetoric** coming **out of Washington that focuses on worst-case scenarios is unhelpful and dangerous**. Aspects of **current cyber policy discourse parallel the run-up to the Iraq War** and pose the same dangers. Pre-war threat inflation and **conflation of threats led us into war on shaky evidence**. By **focusing on doomsday scenarios and conflating cyber threats**, government **officials threaten to legislate**, regulate, or spend in the name of **cybersecurity based largely on fear**, misplaced rhetoric, conflated threats, and credulous reporting. The public should have access to classified evidence of cyber threats, and further **examination of the risks posed by those threats**, **before sound policies can be proposed, let alone enacted**.

Furthermore, **we cannot ignore parallels between the military-industrial complex and the burgeoning cybersecurity industry**. As President Eisenhower noted, we must have checks and balances on the close relationships between parties in government, defense, and industry. **Relationships between these parties and their potential conflicts of interest must be considered when weighing cybersecurity policy** recommendations and proposals.

--Total War

Cybersecurity creates an omnipresent environment of threat that ensures total war – security measures _constitute_ the dangers they attempt to resolve
Väliaho 14

Pasi Väliaho, Senior Lecturer in Film and Screen Studies at Goldsmiths, University of London, *Biopolitical Screens: Image, Power, and the Neoliberal Brain*, MIT Press, p. 86-7, fwang

Here the correspondence between the immunitary logic of self-preserva-tion and the therapeutic logic of the virtualization of war, on the one hand, and the political and economic logic of contemporary wars, on the other, becomes apparent. Just as, in the epistemo-politics of PTSD, **virtual reality therapies** such as Virtual Iraq **see the psyche as a war zone, where defense against threats to it becomes priority number one**, and where **images are evoked for the sake of self-preservation**, **to fight against pathogenic memories and to make patients operative and flexible again**, so **Western societies see the globe as a war zone**, **where they fight to defend and expand the neoliberal way of life against threats to it, incorporating the outside under their rule**. Thus **virtual reality images**, on one level, **and current wars**, on another, **both positively promote the neoliberal way of life and its impulse to adapt and expand by incorporating the outside to the point where inside and outside become indistinguishable**. Thus, too, **"self-defense" in the age of the preemptive "war on terror" comes to mean expansion through destruction of all threats to the collective organism**.

At the same time, however, posttraumatic stress disorder reveals an inherent and fundamental paradox in this notion of life's emergence and self-protection. That **contemporary wars, in attempting to protect and pro-mote life by administering death, produce as their effective outcome the traumatic body of PTSD in constant crisis runs directly counter to immunitary logic, turning self-preservation into self-destruction**. In the traumatic body, **certain memories integral to the organism are identified as foreign to it, as something the organism can get rid of only by destroying itself: seeing itself as a foreign body**, **the species-being attacks itself**. **This persistent state of emergency**, according to Esposito, **embodies the autoimmunitary crisis of wars waged after 9/11, a crisis within the immunity system of the collective organism**, whereby **the imperative of protecting and promoting life is pursued so aggressively that it turns against itself**:

War is no longer the always possible inverse of global coexistence, but the only effective reality, where **what matters** isn't only the specular reality that **is determined between** adversaries … but … **the exponential multiplication of the same risks that would like to be avoided**, or at least reduced, **through instruments that are instead destined to reproduce them more intensely**.

Thus **the immunitary paradigm of protecting life from what threatens it is inverted**, and **the preservation of life becomes its destruction**, a suicidal project. In contemporary wars, as the problematic of PTSD demonstrates, **the promotion of the neoliberal way of life with advanced military techno-logical power produces traumatic events and endogenous simulations destructive of this very way of life**. In this respect, **the self-destructive tendencies of PTSD**, as currently understood and treated, **closely correspond to the self-destructive tendencies that emerge in the excessive pursuit of the biopolitical imperative to protect and promote life**.

The forces that define life in our current world are the very ones that seek to erase it, whence the impossibility of making clear distinctions between the active and the passive, or between the promotion of life and its destruction, that characterizes the traumatic body in particular and neoliberal subjectivity in general. Posttraumatic stress disorder and biopsychiattic efforts to treat it crystallize the logic of

contemporary biopolitics, according to which "it is no longer only death that lies in wait for life, but life itself that constitutes the most lethal instrument of death." Thus **Virtual Iraq can be seen to implement the suicidal logic of biopolitics**, **repeatedly reproducing the trauma of PTSD patients and accelerating the fears that animate it**, which is to say, **turning the organism further against itself by presenting it with constant flight-or-fight situations**, **colored by ever-growing fear that finds no relief because fear is seen as essential to the very life of the organism**.

It may well be that, in attempting to immunize the psyche by turning the world into the brain's endogenous apparition, **the images circulating on military, virtual reality, and video game screens end up triggering the psyche's potential for self-destruction**, **producing**, instead of salvation from trauma, **the world as a never-ending nightmare**.

--Turns Case

Cybersecurity is a <u>particular manifestation</u> of securitization that is <u>enhanced</u> by technical discourse --- their framing translates into <u>further surveillance measures</u>
Jin et al 14

Further cementing the influence of hegemonic power structures are cybersecurity's focus on "hypothetical futures" or estimations of risk and threat (Buzan et al., 1998), **and the reliance in security and technical fields on "experts" who are not always held accountable**. Bigo remarked on the "**lack of precision required for threats identified by the professionals who know some secrets**. Amateurs always need to prove their claims, whereas **professionals**, whether international, national, or local, corporate or public, **can evoke without demonstrating**" (2002, p. 74). Indeed, Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009, p. 1168) argue that although **cybersecurity** is not uniquely reliant on technical, expert discourse, it **is the field where "[technifications] have been able to take on a more privileged position** than in any other security sector," as **computer security often requires knowledge that is unavailable to the general public**. This is important because **the effect of "technifications," as speech acts similar to securitization, is that "they construct an issue as reliant upon technical, expert knowledge, but they also simultaneously presuppose a politically and normatively neutral agenda, that technology serves"** (ibid., p. 1167). **The simultaneous use of both securitization and technification in cybersecurity discourse is therefore significant because they "work to prevent it from being politicized in that it is precisely through rational, technical discourse that securitization may 'hide' its own political roots**" (ibid., p. 1168).

Increasingly, **security agencies and law enforcement advance the securitizing argument**. **Resultant attempts to control the development of networked computing reflect a desire to know and to secure that is central to both the security of the state and society's normalization and productive functioning**. Foucault discussed this as governmentality, a method of governance that protects, controls, and fosters economic expansion, and as such is inextricable from economic liberalism (2007). **Surveillance in response to insecurity is a way of knowing a population, rendering it calculable and thereby manageable**. It not only informs state action but also influences the way subjects think about themselves. This is evident in Foucault's illustration of the panopticon: surveillance (or the assumption of surveillance) induces in the subject "a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power" (1995, p. 201). Theoretically, this produces a disciplined, ordered, productive society without the need to enforce, punish, or necessarily carry out the surveillance in the first place. Similarly, **Neocleous addressed police as a form of governmental power for the administration of society and active fabrication of social order** (2000, p. 14).

--Link – Blackouts

Disaster planning papers over communal relationships necessary to ensure successful disaster response
Nye 10

(David Nye, Professor of American History at the University of Southern Denmark, *When the Lights Went Out: A History of Blackouts in America*, pgs. 180-184)

The sociologist Lee Clarke noted how institutions often issue such reassurances and create detailed crisis instructions, although these preparations are largely **"fantasy documents."**20 Many civil defense plans to deal with nuclear attacks are implausible, Clarke noted, including one for commandeering commercial aircraft to evacuate the entire population of New York City in three days—a comforting but impossible scenario. Many **plans narrowly focus on the point of failure and lose sight of the complexity of the problem**. If "the critical infrastructure is made up of those systems required to maintain life,"21 then it extends considerably beyond police, fire departments, and repairmen. In the influenza outbreak of 1918, hospitals, morticians, and graveyards were overwhelmed with dead bodies. As corpses literally piled up, the population became demoralized, normal life ceased, and in some communities public services collapsed. People fled, seeking to escape the disease, often leaving their dead to rot. Clarke argues that those who try to plan for "worst cases" tend to **define preparations in narrow, technical terms** and to focus on imagined "first responders" (e.g., police and firemen). Disaster plans typically **overemphasize technical repairs and maintaining public order** but overlook the centrality of actual first responders, many of whom work for schools, taxi companies, bus companies, churches, mortuaries, hospitals, and cities, but some of whom may be random passers- by. Plans seldom integrate a wide range of institutions into contingency plans or recognize that in practice the first to respond are people accidentally on the scene, who must improvise. In Clarke's view, **"social networks rather than formal organizations" are "far more likely" to save a life or evacuate an area** in time.22¶ The collapse and blackout of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (2005) shows how the definition of critical infrastructure extends beyond the technical system to include a wide range of people and institutions. After Katrina hit Louisiana and Mississippi, 1.8 million people were without power. Major hospitals and homes for the elderly had to be evacuated. The Superdome, a football stadium designated as a safe haven for those who could not escape the city, also lacked electricity. About 20,000 people sweltered there in a fetid atmosphere, many suffering from heat exhaustion. And as in the London Blitz or the 1977 New York blackout, some people took advantage of the evacuation to loot, seeking not only survival necessities but also luxuries. Even hospitals were attacked. Without electricity to light the streets, sound alarms, or run pumps and other equipment, the disaster worsened each day. The National Guard went in to restore order, but much of the city remained unlivable.¶ As with Hurricane Katrina, the official response to disaster is often slow, disorganized, and inadequate. "Worst case disasters are too unexpected and overwhelming for organizations to fold into their standard operating procedures."23 When the levees broke and the flood came, the Federal Emergency Management Agency failed to respond to the human needs of those trapped in the city. While FEMA dithered, volunteers saved thousands.24 Six months after the hurricane, some New Orleans neighbor- hoods were still without electricity and uninhabitable.¶ Without electricity, present-day life loses most of its critical infrastructure. Yet the US electrical system is hard to protect because of its sheer extent. A hurricane strikes the grid randomly, but the saboteur strikes a vulnerable point where severe damage can be done, transforming social spaces that sustain life into anti-landscapes that do not. Though American grids have not been attacked, it is not because they are impregnable. Perhaps Alfred Hitchcock's 1936 film Sabotage suggests why transmission systems are not yet a target of choice. The film begins with a blackout that darkens a whole district of central London. A saboteur has thrown sand into some powerhouse equipment, and it takes an hour to clean and restart the system. The public response to this unexpected darkness, however, is not fear but nonchalance and even considerable laughter. Like the crowds in the 1965 New York blackout three decades later, Hitchcock's Londoners take it with aplomb. Frustrated at this result, the saboteurs then decide to bomb a crowded public place. This seems more likely than a blackout to cause panic. Even in 1936 it was clear that short-lived power outages cause few or no deaths and little destruction, whereas a bomb causes both and is terrifying. A blackout, far from being demoralizing, **may strengthen the bonds of community**. Accounts of the 2003 New York black- out suggest that this is what happened. A sociologist who happened to be in Brooklyn when the blackout began spent hours walking the streets, where he found people extremely helpful and far less reserved toward strangers than usual.25¶ After the rolling blackouts of the 1990s, and especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11,

2001, the public was not likely to take blackouts lightly. Rather, **they improvised moments of solidarity**, based on the implicit belief that the power would soon come on again. Yet the public knows that prolonged system failure will not merely paralyze a city but will also threaten them with food shortages, dehydration, and the failure of essential services, while rendering office buildings and apartments uninhabitable. Nevertheless, New Yorkers' behavior during the 2003 power failure often recalled that of 1965. Once initial fears of a possible terrorist attack were dispelled, people flocked into the streets, which took on a holiday air. **The blackout became a carnival, not an apocalypse**. The Russian critic Bakhtin once wrote that during a carnival "people who in life are separated by impenetrable hierarchical barriers enter into free and familiar contact."26

Something similar occurred in New York in 2003. Even after a decade with many small power failures, a blackout could still become a moment of sociability and friendliness. As in 1965, few people could work without electricity, and all had to negotiate a city without most of its amenities. At Muldoon's Irish Pub on Third Avenue, "the loss of power meant a license to party."27 Patrons ordered extra beer, and many ambled outside, glasses in hand. As was recalled in a blog titled "The Gothamist," at first the event "made New Yorkers wonder if there was another terrorist attack" but "then they just settled in for some street parties after finally making it home." Many brought out battery-powered audio players, sat on their front stoops, and partied into the night. Afterward, The New Yorker published a cartoon that suggested both the solidarity that developed among those trapped in the city that day and also how quickly that unity dissolved again. A homeless man in ragged clothing chases after a businessman, calling out "Don't you remember me? During the blackout we slept on the same sidewalk." According to one interpreter, the "August 14 event was a bit like the medieval Feast of Fools, the Yuletide holiday when in towns around Europe class distinctions were suspended, if only for a day, and masters and servants switched places, church observances were mocked, and revelry overruled solemnity."28¶ For anyone moving about, **the city was "re-materialized."** A visiting Brazilian architect later wrote: "Forget Virilio and Baudrillard and the virtual realities, there is no compression of time and space anymore. You are left alone with the disvirtual reality of space."29 Suddenly it was not possible to mediate one's relation to the built environment, which had to be measured by the body and its ability to climb, to walk, and to adjust. "Without neon lights and electronics, space becomes what it has always been," and one "cannot hide behind a wireless phone nor dive yourself into the Internet."30 When electrified space is decompressed, the world suddenly seems populated by unavoidable others. "Others on the stairway, Others down the street, Others on the way home. It's dark, and as a result, you start to see more and more Other people."31 The sheer physicality of the world and its inhabitants had become bewilderingly near.

Blackout discourse overstates the scale of crisis – best evidence concludes the population will respond with solidarity and community solutions
Silvast 13

(Antti Silvast, PhD, University of Helsinki Department of Social Research, ANTICIPATING INTERRUPTIONS: SECURITY AND RISK IN A LIBERALIZED ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE, Academic Dissertation, https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/40138, pgs. 25-26)

If electricity is understood as a societal infrastructure vital for people's well-being, then the ways in which lay persons cope with its failures is an important research topic. The premise of my third case study is that **blackouts** – albeit their many potentially disastrous impacts for the national state and industries – **are also events of everyday life**. It analyses the systemic effects of blackouts for energy users by asking the following research question: how do lay people reconstruct blackouts and their effects as risks in households? When choosing this question, however, it is not just at issue that experts might not be interested in everyday folk. On the contrary, numerous expert measures exist that try to determine the quality "expectations" of energy consumers and their willingness to accept power cuts, cope with their effects, and possibly pay for higher-quality electricity (see, e.g., Forstén 2002; CEER 2005, 2010, 2011; Kauppa- ja teollisuusminis- teriö 2006), or purchase prepayment energy and opt-out when they cannot pay (Graham & Marvin 2001, 208-209). Indeed, these experts often assume **a particular rationality** for lay people: that of **a prepared individual who constantly reflects on financial harms and compensations** for a power cut. Such a starting point **pays virtually no attention** to more habitual forms of thinking or to whether people are interested and able, or even willing, to do such calculations in everyday life (Silvast & Virtanen, forthcoming). The habitual forms of thinking are in turn in my interest in the third case study.¶ A partiality of a different sort also figures in some disaster mitigation activities according to researchers. Anthropologists Julien Langumier and Sandrine Revet (2010; Revet 2013) have both drawn on the long tradition of sociological and anthropological disaster research (see Dynes & Drabek 1994; Perry 2007) to approach catastrophes ethnographically. One thing they and their colleagues (Langumier & Revet

2010, 6; Revet 2013, 47; 50) note is that several sources like the media, disaster relief, and simulated crisis exercises often portray people merely as **passive "victims" of a disaster**. Suggested by the Finnish Boxing Day blackout media stories, this "victimization" happens in Finland too. For instance, it is emphasized how anxious people are during a long blackout and how they simply want to go back to their normal life (see HS 31 December 2011, 1 January 2012, 2 January 2012). **This gives little consideration for how people have learned from past risks and remember them**, thus shaping what can be considered "normal" life to begin with (Langumier & Revet 2010, 6; Revet 2013, 40).¶ To address such everyday reasoning about risk, the term lay people, though also used here for brevity's sake, is indeed somewhat inappropriate. The term indicates some lay sphere of a population or victims that is completely separate from the sphere of experts. Yet, as Revet (2013, 43) points out, local people tend to be intrinsically involved with disasters and many experts know this: a natural disaster, for example, creates novel interactions among rescue workers and residents. New studies about major or recurrent infrastructure failures in Sweden (Höst et al 2010) and Russia (Alapuro 2011) suggest that such encounters in a catastrophe even have a political potential: **experiencing a failure, people may start to act collectively to communicate the harm they suffered** to expert decision makers, **or purchase community power generators**, for example. Whether they will in fact take these kinds of actions is an empirical problem. With this issue in mind, I want to pay attention to some ways in which Finnish people reconstruct blackout events and try to resume their habitual actions when the power fails (Kilpinen 2000). I shall also talk about the interactions that blackouts motivate – or could motivate – between homes, electricity experts, and authorities. The material in the third case study consists of interviews and a questionnaire on Finnish homes.

----Turns Case

"Blackout" rhetoric uses particular "risk technique" patterns that determine the plan's implementation – this structures the relationship between the public, electricity infrastructure, and government institutions and turns the case because of serial policy failure
Silvast 13

(Antti Silvast, PhD, University of Helsinki Department of Social Research, ANTICIPATING INTERRUPTIONS: SECURITY AND RISK IN A LIBERALIZED ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE, Academic Dissertation, https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/40138, pgs. 15-17)

Recently, many scholars have taken a different approach to the topic of risk than outlined above. In new studies about risk governance, its rationalities, and its concrete technologies (O'Malley 2004; Helén 2004; Collier, Lakoff & Rabinow 2004; Jauho 2007; Collier 2008; Collier & Lakoff 2008; Lehtonen & Liukko 2010, 2012; Liukko 2013), the concern is not primarily with broad and global societal transformations, with the multiple societal effects of new hazards, or with the cultural perceptions of risks. Certainly these issues remain relevant, but the research objective is different. This objective is to study those rationales and technologies which are applied when enacting hazards as objects for thought and action.¶ A key object of this tradition is called **risk techniques**, where technique has many meanings and uses. It highlights those tools – like **statistical calculations**, contracts, social and private insurance, **simulated scenarios**, **policy programmes**, **and wider political processes** – that operationalize risk government aspirations, which are hence not exclusively "mental" phenomena to begin with (O'Malley 2004, 12-13). This line of reasoning comes close to social scientific Science and Technology Studies (STS): the "technical" features of any given technology are rarely easy to separate from its "social" or "cultural" features (Pollock & Williams 2009a, 57-58). Technique also means a particular way of doing something: risk, specifically, enacts threats in a particular way by uncovering their probability and impact and signifying them as harms to be acted upon (Helén 2004, 32-33). Such techniques can be further drawn upon to found policy programmes about risk mitigation, responsible conduct, and government (Ewald 1993, 61-62; O'Malley 2004, 13). The technique of insurance in the welfare state offers a typical example (Ewald 1993; Liukko 2013).¶ A risk technique, once rationalized and used systematically by actors, can also be understood as **a style of reasoning regarding the maximization of security**. The concept, popularized by the philosopher Ian Hacking (2002, 178-199), focuses on how people explore, classify, and name the objects that they inquire. To these ends, both abstract concepts and measuring equipment are deployed by a style of reasoning to propose regularities, possibilities, explanations, and proofs – or "truths" and "falsities" – that can then, subsequently, be applied locally and also debated publicly (Lehtonen 2003, 5-8). Examples of styles of reasoning include statistical analysis, postulation, empirical experimentation, and the construction of hypotheses and models (Hacking 2002, 181-182). However, while the concept of a style often exemplifies "sweeping" and "generous" phenomena (Hacking 2002, 178-180) and emphasizes a small number of broad scientific traditions, my use of the concept is more situated corresponding with other works (Collier 2008, 2011). For instance, anthropologist Stephen Collier (2008, 230) has stressed that there are multiple styles of reasoning about risk with their own "systemicity, specificity, and rigour" and provision of "frameworks (...) for choice".¶ Styles of reasoning, like risk techniques, have **a close connection with practical deployment**. As researchers argue, "articulations of ideas and techniques (of risk government) are always practical" (O'Malley 2004, 12), while styles of reasoning are never separate from the instances where they are manifested (Lehtonen 2003, 6). What does the term "practical" mean here and what are the said instances of manifestation like? Let me suggest a final conceptual extension, which, I believe, adds colour to discussions about those situations in which people manage risks in practice.¶ By definition, risk outlines a problematic situation like a surprise, a crisis, or a disaster. Risk management then suggests ex-ante anticipatory actions, prudence, and foresight about this situation. That is, if the combination of the problematic situation's probability and harm is high, then it is rational to mitigate the problem through performative actions (Luhmann 1993). At the same time, pragmatist sociologists and philosophers would say that people generally try to solve problematic situations by drawing on their habits: their common sense about those actions that have already worked before on several occasions (Joas 1992, 190-195; Kilpinen 1998; Kilpinen 2000, 57-60; see also Rabinow 2008, 6- 11). My proposal here is that

risk techniques are placed in a similar context. From this premise, then, <u>risk techniques are deployed</u> first of all <u>in problematic situations and when people sense that the techniques work</u>. <u>If they do not work</u>, however, <u>the result can be doubt about the technique and restructuring of its practices of use</u>. Collier (2008, 239) has shown this in the disaster mitigation context in the US: unlike a strong "risk society" thesis foresees, anomalic observations and doubt are seldom a reason for abandoning technical expert reasoning more than for redeploying such thinking little by little.¶ When I say habit, I do not mean routines, mannerisms, or action that is repeated mechanically (see Kilpinen 2000, 57). Rather, like pragmatists, <u>my concern with habits is in continuous and general phenomena, or **"rules of action"**</u> (ibid, 59), <u>which people can deploy as a resource when making sense of</u> those <u>varying problematic conditions that the theme of risk suggests</u>. To me, habit is a relatively flexible concept that can refer to engineering habits and skills (Suchman 2000), to everyday habits of energy use (Shove 2003, 2010) or to acquired knowledge that is often named as tradition (Giddens 1994, 190; Hänninen & Laurila 2008). However, **all such habitual phenomena**, as I claim and illustrate later, **provide new insight into the risks of electricity infrastructures**, especially compared to the more popular assumptions in some risk-based debates: namely, that risk transforms the society and its activities as a whole or that a priori mental perceptions determine all forms of risk management (Joas 1992, 232; Kilpinen 1998).

----Blackouts Inevitable

System-wide complexity and competing decisionmaking incentives make blackouts inevitable – the aff's attempts at management fail and misunderstand the functioning of large-scale infrastructure systems
Silvast 13

(Antti Silvast, PhD, University of Helsinki Department of Social Research, ANTICIPATING INTERRUPTIONS: SECURITY AND RISK IN A LIBERALIZED ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE, Academic Dissertation, https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/40138, pgs. 40-42)

Over the past 15 years, empirical disaster and crisis studies have covered various major blackouts including Auckland, New Zealand in 1998 (Stern, Newlove & Svedin 2005), Canada in 1998 (Scanlon 1999), Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1999 (Ullberg 2005), and Sweden in 2005 and 2007 (Höst et al 2010). Blackouts, as these studies found, became urgent and threatening situations for various reasons: the complexity of the electricity infrastructure failure, its knock-on effects on other infrastructures, and the difficulty of coordinating among privatized utilities and public stakeholders on many different levels (Ullberg 2005; Höst et al 2010). In many cases, electricity utilities and decision-making bodies undermined worst-case scenarios and sought short-term operational goals at the expense of longer-term crisis management perspectives (Stern, Newlove & Svedin 2005; Ullberg 2005). In all of these cases, the blackout soon developed into a collective crisis of public credibility – even as electricity companies themselves suffered as "victims" of the power failures (Stern, Newlove & Svedin 2005; Ullberg 2005). In Canada (Scanlon 1999) and Sweden (Höst et al 2010), groups and organizations not directly concerned with electricity networks began to manage the disaster, including social services, road support staff, and regional water services, self-organized municipal resource groups, and a federation of farmers.¶ According to Bennett (2005) who studied the public response to the North American blackout in 2003, blackouts often incite blame: the question here is, who or what can be held responsible for the electric power failure? A useful illustration is given by official blackout reports: typically, their explanations centre on immediately operational contexts or relatively non-specific political-economic framings of a blackout (such as the role of private markets and their regulation) (e.g. CRE & AEEG 2004; UCTE 2004, 2007; see Silvast & Kaplinsky 2007). In this context, contrasting with simple mechanisms of blame, the above research provides an interesting and relevant vantage point to understand the emergence of a collective crisis. It details the rich and varied practices through which a blackout disaster or crisis was problematized by actors and then mitigated – or not, as sometimes was the case. These are relevant insights for my interest in risk as practical problem solving. But another question is, why had the electricity infrastructures failed: what was the system-level background to these crises of large infrastructures? It would seem that this issue, while important, is not central to the mentioned studies whose focal point is in the disaster or crisis and its decision making, not in whether the incident was caused by a technical failure, a natural disaster, human error, or other reasons (Ullberg 2005, 69). However, according to one relatively brief argument by crisis scholars (Stern, Newlove & Svedin 2005, 3; 108-110), rapidly cascading failures are "inherent" to large- scale systems and thus they might be impossible to avert.¶ The last consideration stems from a perspective which moves closer to the large technological systems and their actual functioning. In 1984, sociologist and organizational scholar Charles Perrow (1999) published Normal Accidents: Living With High Risk Tech- nologies, which concerns various human-built systems (e.g. nuclear power plants, air traffic, DNA recombination, space missions). It characterizes their two related traits: interactive complexity and tight coupling. The first trait refers to the degree of unexpected interactions among system components; the second to the pace in which effects propagate from one component to the other. When interactive complexity and tight coupling are both high in a system, accidents – damaging, unintended and disrupting events (Perrow 1999, 63-64) – become difficult to anticipate and, over time, almost inevitable. To highlight this inevitability, Perrow calls such specific disruptive events system accidents or normal accidents (see Silvast & Kelman 2013). Probably the best-known complex and tightly coupled technological case by Perrow is nuclear power plants, but electricity supply systems are also discussed briefly in the book. Perrow (1999, 97) sees the power grid as a tightly coupled, but relatively linear rather than complexly interactive system. Recently, however, studies have suggested that the complexity of energy systems is growing. In particular, when these systems are liberalized, the number of system components grows and unexpected interactions are highly likely especially when energy trading starts to happen increasingly real-time (Roe & Schulman 2008). This view also seems to be shared by Perrow (2008, Chapter 7) in his recent case study about the US liberalized

electricity transmission grid and has also been considered by Van Der Vleuten and Lagendijk (2010) while discussing the European blackout in 2006.

--Link – Critical Infrastructure

Economic collapse and critical infrastructure impact claims reproduce neoliberalism – even if cyber security threats are real, they prioritize market continuity and business interests, cementing neoliberal social relations

Cavelty 2014 [Myriam Dunn (Lecturer for security studies and a senior researcher in the field of risk and resilience @ Center for Security Studies), "Breaking the Cyber-Security Dilemma: Aligning Security Needs and Removing Vulnerabilities", Sci Eng Ethics (2014) 20:701–715, AX]

Cyber-security linked to critical infrastructures creates and **is implemented in a special type of security environment. Whereas the traditional logic of national security suggests unilateral government action and policy, the policies of cyber-security are inevitably blurred by liberalization, domestic considerations and other policy imperatives** (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006). **The management of infrastructure is** in general **not** (or no longer) **the prerogative of government; instead it is based on the logic of the market.** While it remains the essential task of a government to provide **the security of society**, it **has** simultaneously **become impossible for any government to achieve** this **by itself**. **What is at stake is not the** body of the **state** or its borders, ''**but the** conjoined body of public and **private-sector networks**'' (Der Derian and Finkelstein 2008: 102). Therefore, **the private sector becomes instrumental** in not only helping with the act of ''identification'' of critical objects, but also more directly in assuring the health of networks and the services provided by them. Whereas the methodology employed to identify critical assets is very similar in both the public and private sector, the commonalities end when it comes to the protection goals. From the public sector's perspective, criticality is linked to the loss of one or more broad national functions. That set of functions—or protection principles—has expanded over time, beginning with national defense and economic security, to include public health and safety, and then national morale (Kristensen 2008). Through definition of these national functions along the lines of general well- being of a nation and its citizens, the link between critical infrastructure protection and national security is forged. **For the state, the goal of protection is the collective well-being represented as a way of liberal life** (Anderson 2010)—but, by implication, **also the continued function of the state.** The relationship between state and infrastructure emerges as an alternative to the image of Abraham Bosse's Leviathan on the frontispiece of Hobbes famous book: Instead of being made up of its citizens, the state is regarded as consisting of the things inside its territory that make life there 'good'; assets that are not directly identified with its citizens, but material assets that give substance (and significance) to the state through being its foundation (Dunn Cavelty and Kristensen 2008). **For the private sector, the reference point varies depending on the business model**; in the abstract, however, **it is their functioning, or 'business continuity', that is the ultimate protection goal. The reference object for companies**, therefore, **is themselves. Crucial for the continued performance and effectiveness of many of today's companies that operate as traders of information/knowledge with the help of information/knowledge networks, is protection against loss of information and routine preservation of knowledge.** These techniques sever the human mind/body as '''incubator' of this knowledge'' from the knowledge itself (Der Derian and Finkelstein 2008: 102), which is given autonomous value over that which becomes replaceable as a result of these practices. In this view, **humans become reduced to nodes in the network, needed to ensure the wealth and health of the networks, but not their own health.** National Security versus Human Security in Cyberspace In cyber-security as currently understood and practised, **human beings are seen as victims**, as weakest link in the system, as direct threat—**but not** (or only very indirectly) **as beneficiaries of the type of security that states (and companies) want**. On the one hand, the neglect of the human element is a direct consequence of a focus on technical systems as targets and technology-based countermeasures in cyber-security. On the other hand, the lack of consideration for ''the human'' in this field also seems to be an effect of the issue that human security scholarship has already tackled decades ago: that too much focus on the state and national security tends to crowd out consideration for the individual citizen, with often detrimental effects for security overall (cf. Burgess and Owen 2004). I look at both aspects and their consequences for security below and then turn to the clash between this type of security and human security. Technical Systems, Political Consequences A focus on technical objects is not a bad thing per-se. In fact, the type of security that emerges directly from the wish to ensure cyber-security is one that seemingly dodges problematic issues normally associated with security, at least in the first instance. Ultimately, we are looking at the practice of protecting inanimate things; the regulation of machines and their performance. Computers, servers, and the computer-powered infrastructures are non-human objects, which are someone's legitimate property and have a certain (usually undisputed) value for societies. Cyber-security measures thus imagined have little to no bearing on citizens' lives directly. Most importantly, there are no concerns about freedom/security trade-offs,

and no civil liberty issues (Buzan et al. 1998). This security does not depend upon the invocation of a state of emergency, but is 'clean' and ultimately, 'good', since everybody seems to benefit from an interruption-free performance of vital systems. However, this view is inevitably problematized, because these **machines cannot be isolated from human life. The image of modern complex critical infrastructures is one in which it becomes futile to try and separate the human from the technological**. Technology is not simply a tool that makes life livable: rather, technologies become constitutive of novel forms of 'a complex subjectivity', which is characterized by an inseparable ensemble of material and human elements (Coward 2009: 414). Therefore, **even if technologies may appear to regulate objectively and apolitically, there is always a connection to a place, to a space, to a space of protection, to values, to life.** An even closer look at **the seemingly apolitical management of** a technical issue with **technical means reveals a deeply political nature,** because the selection of referent objects as described above always entails a larger argument **about protection**: **Endangered entities are judged to have legitimate claims to protection (while others do not).** In other words, **this type of security will only provide relief to a valued referent object—not necessarily ''the citizen'' or humans more generally. In cyber-security**, as argued above, **economic imperatives like profit maximization are decisive. It is not a given**, then, **that cyber-security is a truly public good**, understood as security for all. **Quite the opposite: the type of security that emerges mainly benefits a few and already powerful entities and has** no or even **negative effects for the rest. The** type of **referent object to be protected** and by implication, the type of life to be saved, **is represented by the uninterrupted flow of information linked to the accumulation of capital and economic growth** (Swyngedouw 2007), which in turn is linked to national security**. This is at the heart of the cyber-security dilemma, in which the dominant form of security is making large parts of the population arguably less secure.** Various security needs are not aligned; and while they do not always have to be, more awareness of the clash between them is needed.

Infrastructural development to avert catastrophe is a key securitizing move – it enables the mobilization of militarized violence

Aradau 2010 (Claudia, Senior Lecturer in International Relations & Centre for the Study of Political Community, *Security That Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection*, Oct. 14, Sage, *thw_*)

The securitization of critical infrastructure is pre-eminently about the protection of objects. Critical infrastructure protection is generally held to have emerged as a security issue in the mid-1990s and the terminology of 'critical infrastructure' itself to have been coined by Clinton administration in 1996. Critical infrastructure allegedly signifies a difference from earlier usages of 'infrastructure'. While infrastructure was part of military strategy to weaken the enemy, its transformation into a matter of national security has been variously located either during the Cold War (Collier and Lakoff 2007) or after 9/11 (Center for History and New Media 2009). If military strategy could also 9 involve the destruction of one's own infrastructure, the securitization of critical infrastructure assumes an understanding of infrastructure as foundational. Societies are 'grounded' in infrastructure, their functioning, continuity and survival are made possible by the protection of infrastructure. A 1997 report by the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was symbolically entitled 'Critical Foundations' (Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997). Definitions of critical infrastructure list heterogeneous elements, from communications, emergency services, energy, finance, food, government, health, to transport and water sectors (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2009). The general argument about the necessity to protect critical infrastructure is framed along these lines (with little variation from a report to another and from an author to another): Our modern society and day to day activities are dependent on networks of critical infrastructure – both physical networks such as energy and transportation systems and virtual networks such as the Internet. If terrorists attack a piece of critical infrastructure, they will disrupt our standard of living and cause significant physical, psychological, and financial damage to our nation (Bennett 2007: 9). The UK's Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure defines the effects of any failure in national infrastructure to lead to 'severe economic damage, grave social disruption, or even large scale loss of life' (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2009). Naming infrastructures as critical for the purposes of protecting them against terrorist attacks is a securitising move. Where critical infrastructure experts would look for the adequacy of representation to the reality of objects threatened – by drawing up lists of critical infrastructure as a result of risk assessment scenarios – a performative approach would consider the constitution of reality through the iterative speech acts that securitize infrastructure by naming as 'critical' and in need of protection against potential terrorist attacks and/or other hazards. The Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure in the UK encapsulates this double move: The most significant threat facing the UK comes from international terrorism and its stated ambitions to mount 'high impact' attacks that combine mass casualties with substantial disruption to key services such as energy, transport and communications. This is a threat that is different in scale and intent to any that the UK has faced before (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2010b). Yet, for the Copenhagen School of security studies for example, objects are also relegated to the status of external conditions of speech acts. Objects that are generally held to be threatening (for example, tanks or polluted waters) play a facilitating role in the process of securitization (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 33). Energy blackouts, transport

<u>failures and so on could also be read as facilitating conditions of the speech act.</u> In this approach, there is ontological and epistemological ambiguity about the role of   objects: as they outside speech acts or the result of speech acts? As the next section will show, this approach cannot account for different materializations of critical infrastructure – the matter of critical infrastructure is not constant and given but varies depending on   the agential cuts created.

--Link – Data Flows/Economy

The focus on protecting data flows and developing strong information networks proves our link – the imperative on protecting information companies allows neoliberal expansion to continue unimpeded
Webster 6

[Frank Webster, Professor of Sociology @ City University London, "Theories of the Information Society Third Edition", Routledge Publishing, pg. 126-128, AX]

In the writing of Herbert Schiller there are at least four arguments that are given special emphasis. I signal them here and expand on them later in this chapter. The first draws attention to the pertinence of market criteria in informational developments. In this view **it is essential to recognise that the market pressures of buying, selling and trading in order to make profit decisively influence information and communications innovations.** To Schiller (and also to his wife of fifty years, Anita, a librarian who researches informational trends) **the centrality of market principles is a powerful impulse towards** a second major concern, **the commodification of information,** which means that it is, increasingly, **made available only on condition that it is saleable.** In this respect it is being treated likeother things in a capitalist society: '**Information today is being treated as a commodity**. It is something which, like toothpaste, breakfast cereals and auto-mobiles, is increasingly bought and sold' (Schiller and Schiller, 1982, p. 461). The third argument insists that **class inequalities are a major factor in the distribution of, access to and capacity to generate information.** Bluntly, **class shapes who gets what information and what kind of information they may get.** Thereby, **depending on one's location in the stratification hierarchy, one may be a beneficiary or a loser in the 'information revolution'.** The fourth key contention of Herbert Schiller is that **the society that is under-going such momentous changes in the information and communications areas is one of corporate capitalism.** That is, **contemporary capitalism is one dominated by corporate institutions that have particular characteristics.** Nowadays **these are highly concentrated, chiefly oligopolistic** – rarely monopolistic – **organisations that command a national and generally international reach. If one wishes to picture this**, then **one has but to imagine**, say, **the clutch of oil companies which dominate our energy supply**: Shell, BP, Exxon, Texaco and a few others are huge, centralised enterprises, though they also have enormous geographical spread, linking across continents while also reaching deep into every small town and sizeable village in the advanced nations.To the Critical Theorist, **modern-day capitalism is of this kind: wherever one cares to look corporations dominate the scene with but a few hundred commanding the heights of the economy** (Trachtenberg, 1982; Barnet and Müller,1975). For this reason, in Herbert Schiller's view, **corporate capitalism's priorities are especially telling in the informational realm. At the top of its list of priori-ties is the principle that information and ICTs will be developed for private rather than for public ends.** As such **it will bear the impress of corporate capitalism more than any other potential constituency in contemporary society**. Clearly these are established features of capitalism. **Market criteria and class inequalities have been important elements of capitalism since its early days, and even corporate capitalism has a history extending well over a century** (cf.Chandler, 1977), though many of its most distinctive forms appeared in the latetwentieth century. But to Herbert Schiller this is precisely the point: **the capitalist system's long-established features**, its structural constituents **and the imperatives on which it operates are the defining elements of the so-called 'information society'**. From this perspective those who consider that informational trends signify a break with the past are incredible since, asks Schiller, how can one expect the very forces that have generated information and ICTs to be super-seded by what they have created? Far more likely to anticipate that **the 'information revolution' does what its designers intended – consolidates and extends capitalist relations.** What we have here is a two-sided insistence: **the 'information society' reflects capitalist imperatives** – i.e. **corporate and class concerns and market priorities are the decisive influences on the new computer communications facilities – and, simultaneously, these**

informational developments sustain and support capitalism. In this way Schiller accounts for the importance of information and ICTs in ways which at once identify how the history of capitalist development has affected the informational domain and how **information has become an essential foundation of that historical development.**

--Link – Public/Private

Public-private cyber security arrangements use inflated threats as a basis for outsourcing government administration and security responsibilities to private corporations

Eriksson and Giacomello 9 [Johan (Swedish Institute of International Affairs) and Giampiero (University of Bologna), "Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State", International Studies Review (2009) 11, 205–230, JSTOR, AX]

There are some difficulties for studying information age security issue from an academic perspective, mainly because the majority of books and articles on national security aspects of the Internet published over the last 10–15 years tend to be highly specific and policy-oriented, are US-centric, and do not communicate with more general international relations theory and research (prominent examples for this kind of literature include Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997; Alberts and Papp 1997; Henry and Peartree 1998. For a broader discussion of IR theory and information age security, see Eriksson and Giacomello 2007). A common feature of most of the literature on the information revolution is the particular belief that **in the ''information age,'' information is becoming the major resource of power.** One of the core arguments in this literature is that the **technological development enhances two trends that diminish the importance of the state**, both of **which have implications for security**: **increasing internationalization and increasing privatization.** Two central conflicts reveal the nature of an ongoing redistribution of power: first, the notion that the information revolution empowers new forms of international actors, such as NGOs and activists, thus challenging the state's status as the major player in the international system; and second, the idea that the emergence of a global electronic marketplace would inevitably imply a collapse of the state's economic pillar of power as companies increasingly become global citizens and economic boundaries no longer correspond to political ones. Both of these trends have particular implications for nation-states' room for maneuver when it comes to security. More recently, some scholars have focused on the construction of information-age security threats by using frameworks informed by constructivism, particularly securitization theory (Eriksson 2001; Bendrath 2003; Dunn Cavelty 2008). From this, valuable insights can be gained with regard to threat perceptions and policy reactions, but more research is warranted particularly with regard to comparative studies of threat constructions in countries other than the United States. Post-structuralism has influenced another body of literature, which focuses on so-called ''Postmodern War'' (Hables Gray 1997, 2005; Der Derian 2001), seen as a discourse on technical–military interaction that also focuses on the centrality of information. **Information becomes the ''new metaphysics of power''** (Dillon and Reid 2001:59), **with various implications of** such a **conceptualization for the military itself and society as a whole.** This kind of literature focuses less clearly on the loss of control by state actors, but, by their very nature, strongly on questions of power and control more generally (see also Franklin). How National Security and Cyberspace Became Interlinked **In order to understand the security debate surrounding the Internet** today, **we need to consider two interlinked** and at times mutually reinforcing **debates** that have largely shaped the current discussions and are also reflected in the literature as discussed above. **The first is the expansion of the threat spectrum after the Cold War**, especially **in terms of malicious actors and their capabilities.** During the ColdWar, threats were mainly perceived as arising from the aggressive intentions of states to achieve domination over other states. Among other things**, the end of the Cold War** also **heralded the end of unambiguous threat perceptions: following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a variety of ''new'' threats were moved onto the security policy agendas of most countries. The main distinguishing quality of these ''new'' challenges is the element of uncertainty that surrounds them. The notion of ''threat'' as something imminent, direct, and certain no longer accurately describes these challenges**. Rather, **they can be characterized as ''risks,'' which are** by definition **indirect, unintended, uncertain, and situated in the future, since they only materialize when they occur** in reality (Rasmussen 2001). **As a result of these diffuse risks and** due to **difficulties in locating and identifying enemies**, parts of **the focus of security policies has shifted away from actors,capabilities, and motivations towards general vulnerabilities** of entire societies. The catchphrase in this debate is ''asymmetry,'' and **the US military has been a driving force behind the shaping of this threat perception** in the early 1990s(Rattray 2001). The US, as the only remaining superpower, was seen as being pre-destined to become the target of asymmetric warfare. **Specifically**, those **adversaries who were likely to fail against the American war machine might instead plan to bring the United States to its knees by striking** against **vital points** at home that are fundamental not to the military alone, but **to the essential functioning of industrialized societies** as a whole. These points are called critical infrastructures(CI). **They are deemed critical because their**

incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the national security and the economic and social welfare of a nation (Abele-Wigert and Dunn 2006; Dunn Cavelty and Kristensen 2008). **Fear** of asymmetrical measures against such ''soft targets'' **was aggravated by** the second debate, revolving around **new kind of vulnerabilities due to modern society's dependency on** inherently **insecure information systems**. Under the heading of vital system security, **protection concepts for strategically important infrastructures and objects have been part of national defense planning for decades**, though they played a relatively minor role during the Cold War (Collierand Lakoff 2008). Around the mid-1990s, however, **the possibility of infrastructure discontinuity caused by attacks or other disruptions attracted fresh attention among security strategists**, mainly **due to the information revolution**. ''**The Internet'',** understood here **as a network of** networks linking computers to computers that share protocols for **communication, seemed to add a variety of novel aspects to the older debate about vital system security** (Eriksson 2001). Aspects of Control: The Internet as Target and Weapon Subsequently, the question of whether the Internet was becoming the new Achil-les' heel of modern societies began to be discussed in earnest. In this debate, **infor-mation infrastructures are regarded as the backbone of critical infrastructures, given that** the uninterrupted **exchange of data is essential** to the operation of infra-structures in general and the services that they provide. Centralized Supervisory,Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely employed to remotely monitor and control infrastructures. But SCADA-based systems are not secure:once-cloistered systems and networks are increasingly using off-the-shelf productsand IP-based networking equipment, and require interconnection via the Internet,which opens the door to attackers from the outside in addition to the inside. **The complex interdependence of liberal (risk) societies and their growing technological sophistication have transnationalized and technologized the types of security problems that they face.** We seem be witnessing scalar changes moving in opposite directions: the power to resist vulnerability moves outwards to international markets and international organizations while the power to cause vulnerability moves inwards, through classes and groups to the individual. Representations of this security threat are very broad and also very vague, both in terms of what or who is seen as the threat and of what or who is seen as being threatened. **Global information networks, so the argument goes, make it much easier to attack even the strongest powers, as such an attack no longer requires big, specialized weapons systems. In theory, attacks can be carried out in innumerable ways by anyone with a computer** connected to the Internet, and for pur-poses ranging from juvenile hacking to organized crime, political activism, or strategic warfare. The technology employed for attacks is simple to use, inexpen-sive, and widely available. The methods of attack have become increasingly auto-mated and more sophisticated, resulting in more damage from a single attack. In addition, Internet attacks in general are quick, easy, inexpensive, and may behard to detect or trace, especially since the globe-spanning networks grant a great deal of anonymity. In this debate, ''the Internet''—or rather the information infrastructure—plays three different roles: first, the Internet is used for controlling aspects of critical infrastructures (often remotely); second, the Internet is seen as an attractive tar-get; third, the Internet can be a weapon or at least a kind of ''delivery system''for attacks. **In an attempt to control what they consider to be ''malicious activity'' online and to increase security, states** (i) **aim to enhance the security of the control infrastructure** to ensure reliable functionality of services and (ii) strengthen national law-enforcement capacities and international cooperation. **There are also** sporadic **calls for arms control efforts or multilateral behavioral norms for the military use of computer exploitation** (Denning 2001a,b; Rathmell 2001).Due to the breadth of issues subsumed under the virtual threat, all three dimen-sions of Internet control mentioned in the introduction (access to the Internet, functionalityof the Internet, and activityon the Internet) are implied. Actors: Distributed Security Through Distributed Responsibility **Considering its framing as national security issue** or ''high politics,'' **forceful attempts by nation states to control undesirable effects** in this domain **could be expected**. What we do see, however, is that **governments fail to provide security by themselves so that policies are predicated on the concept of voluntarily sharing responsibility with private actors.** There is little consensus among a variety of **public and private actors** regarding both the nature of the problem and the approaches to be taken. Depending on their viewpoints, they **may see information infrastructures as tools for maintaining a competitive edge over business adversaries, as technical–operational systems, as facilitators of criminal activities, or as defense-relevant strategic assets.** This leads to tensions between different stakeholders when it comes to addressing necessary control and security measures. On the one hand, **turf battles among government actors are frequent**. As is the case **for every ''new'' threat that needs negotiation in the political process, different government agencies compete with each other by bringing their own perspective** to bear on the problem **and try to shape future**

policies accordingly (Bendrath 2001; Dunn Cavelty 2008). This also has specific implications for how the issue can be addressed theoretically (see below). On the other hand, **governments see themselves in need to engage with the technological community and the private sector as the main proprietor and operator of the critical information infrastructure**. In many countries, the provision of energy, communication, transport, financial services, and health care have all been, or are being, privatized as previously protected markets are deregulated. In a nonliberalized economy, the state assumes the responsibility as well as the costs of guaranteeing functioning systems and services. **In a liberalized global economy**, however, assigning responsibility for securing such systems and services is becoming a major issue (Andersson and Malm 2006). It comes as no surprise, therefore, that **governments seek to integrate the private owners** of critical infrastructure in CIP practices **by means of** so-called **public–private partnerships and information-sharing initiatives** (Suter 2007). This is, however, not an easy task: In many countries, discontent between the private sector and government is deeply rooted and **there are continuing struggles over the question of whether "security" means the security of the state as a whole, or** whether it only refers to **the security of individual users or technical systems**, and should therefore be handled by authorities other than national security bodies. We can thus argue, by re-quoting Salhi, **that state not only "allowed non state actors to take on crucial roles"—but that they actually need nonstate actors in order to provide** one of the core tasks of the nation state: **security** for their citizens.

Economy

1NC Economy

Economic securitization leads to protectionism and turns the case

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie, Director – Politics PhD Program, UC Santa Cruz, 1998. "On Security" p. 11-12 *thw_*)

The ways in which the **framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen** nowhere more clearly than **in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security."** What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how **strategic economic interdependence** --a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, **and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle** --**undermines the ability of states to control** those **technologies that**, it is often argued, **are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both** contingencies **could be threatening**. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that have been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of **the United States**, which **is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.**) What, then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as Crawford has stylized it? According to Crawford, state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. First, they can try to restore state autonomy through self-reliance although, in doing so, they are likely to undermine state strength via reduced competitiveness. Second, they can try to restrict technology transfer to potential enemies, or the trading partners of potential enemies, although this begins to include pretty much everybody. It also threatens to limit the market shares of those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies. Finally, they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances among firms. The former approach may slow down technological development; the latter places control in the hands of actors who are driven by market, and not military, forces. They are, therefore, potentially unreliable. All else being equal, **in all** three **cases, the state appears to be a net loser where its security is concerned. But this does not prevent the state from trying** to gain.

2NC Economy

Increasing economic power is an attempt for securitization

Schweller, 11 (Randall, Prof. of Poli Sci @ Ohio State University, "Rational Theory for a Bygone Era", Security Studies Vol. 20 Issue 3, 8/25/2011, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2011.599196, RM)//*thw_*

But geography and <u>policies rooted in geopolitics have become less relevant to</u> the formation of strategy and politics than they were when raw materials and land were the major prerequisites for state power. <u>We no longer live in a world</u> governed by the logic of the mercantilist age, <u>when military conquest to control territory and achieve</u> autarky (or a <u>monopoly</u> on goods) <u>was the surest route to riches and power</u>. Today, the traditional link between territory and wealth has been largely broken. The current era of high technology, instant communication, and nuclear weapons has significantly raised the benefits of peace and the costs of war. <u>What matters most today is</u> not <u>a state's</u> ability to exert direct control over resources but its <u>capacity to purchase</u> them <u>in a free global market</u>. Accordingly, <u>the foundation of modern state power has shifted</u> away from traditional military power <u>toward an emphasis on economic production</u> and a sustained capacity to generate ideas and commercial innovations that create wealth. To be perfectly clear on this point, <u>innovation and economic growth remain key building blocks of military power</u>; I am not suggesting otherwise. Rather, I am saying that military power is no longer an essential building block of economic growth and wealth creation; <u>and this has deeply changed the nature of international politics</u> and how the game is played.

--Turns Case

Securitizing against threat of economic decline and threats to technology leads to a culture of panoptic surveillance

Tuathail 96 (Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Prof. of Govt & Int'l Affairs & Director of the Public & Int'l Affairs program @ Virginia Tech, September 1996. "AT THE END OF GEOPOLITICS?." http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/papers/End.htm *thw_*)

A second cluster of postmodern geopolitics is that emerging from the efforts of intellectuals and institutions of statecraft to re-map the global strategic landscape after the Cold War. While the crude Manichean world of the Cold War may be gone for now, the preoccupation of the national security establishment with "rogue states and nuclear outlaws" is indicative of a persistent territorial conceptualization of danger in international security studies. Underwriting these territorializing specifications of danger are, of course, old-fashioned essentialist identities -- totalitarian states, Islamic fundamentalists, die-hard Communists, terrorists, criminals and devils (like Saddam Hussein) -- and a longstanding strategic commitment on the part of the Western security apparatus to pro-Western states like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The effort of NATO to extend this zone of strategic commitment and protection in Central Europe is evidence that a state-centric territorial geopolitics does persist, but increasingly it is also non-territorial "postmodern terrorist" threats in a speeding hybrid world that preoccupy the defense planners in the Pentagon, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and elsewhere. Threats from contraband flows and proliferations -- the spread of nuclear weapons, plutonium, terrorists, drugs, illegal migrants, infectious diseases, money laundering, sensitive high-tech assets, biological and chemical agents, etc. -- and threats to vital official flows and ports -- oil pipelines, subways, world trading centers, airports, teleports, secret data archives, fiber-optic lines, international financial networks, and global sporting spectacles -- have brought into being a postmodern geopolitics of security where the geographies are in fluid flowmations not fixed formations. Ostensibly preoccupied by a geography of territorial fixities during the Cold War, security discourse has expanded to encompass the protection of fundamental spaces of flows from material attack or the immaterial terrorism of computer hackers and software viruses. The creation of a Belfast-style "ring of steel" and CCTV system around the City of London -- a strategic space of financial flows -- and the militarization of U.S. airports in response to recent spectacular bombings disclose a geopolitics that mixes traditional forms of containment and detainment with new panoptic surveillance and scanning technologies. Again, media vectors are also implicated in the creation of these landscapes, one of their "strategic" functions being the simulation of security and the containment of media borne viruses of panic and hysteria.

US economic liberalism damages other countries sense of security – causes a self fulfilling cycle of securitization

Lipshutz 95 (Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Asst Prof. of Politics @ UCSC, 1995. On Security p. 15-16 *thw_*)

Consider, then, the consequences of the intersection of security policy and economics during and after the Cold War. In order to establish a "secure" global system, the United States advocated, and put into place, a global system of economic liberalism. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth of this system.[43] One consequence, of this project was the globalizations of a particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied on the re-creation, throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and preferences of the United States. That such a project cannot be accomplished under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important: the idea was that economic and political liberalism would reproduce the American self around the world.[44] This would make the world safe and secure for the Untited States inasmuch as it would all be the self, so to speak. The joker in this particular deck was that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order to make the world more secure for Americans, came to threaten the cultures and societies of the countries being transformed, making their citizens less secure. The process thereby transformed them into the very enemies we feared so greatly. In Iran, for example, the Shah's efforts to create a Westernized society engendered so much domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but so, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American Empire based on Persian Gulf oil.

Islamic "fundamentalism," now characterized by some as the enemy that will replace Communism, seems to be U.S. policymakers' worst nightmares made real,45 although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Islamic movements might never have acquired the domestic power they now have in those countries and regions that seem so essential to American "security."

Failed States/Cartels

1NC Failed States

Discourse of failed states legitimizes US imperialism, framing the underdeveloped as inferior Others to be controlled

Abrahamsen 2005 (Rita Abrahamsen, Prof. Intl Pol @ U Whales, "Blair's Africa:

The Politics of Securitization and Fear" Alternatives: Global, Local, Political January 2005 vol. 30 no. 1 70-71 *thw_*)

Rather schematically, it could be argued that the **policies that follow from securitization are formulated to** win over, contain, or **destroy the external enemy or threat. In the case of "failed"** and "underdeveloped" **states**, a strategy of containment is on its own rendered largely ineffective by Labour's understanding of the world as increasingly interconnected and borderless. **Because the "zones of chaos" cannot successfully be sectioned off from the "zones of peace,"** strategies to win over the enemy predominate and operate alongside strategies of containment. At the same time, the possibility of destruction is never ruled out. **Conquest and conversion**, as William Connolly has remarked in a different context, **remain the two authorized responses to otherness**.60

The Blair **government's main answer to the problem** of how to deal with those who do not subscribe to the values of the "international community" **is** conversion, or **strategies of assimilation and incorporation**: the dangerous areas must be included (or won over) **in order to** be **control**led **and manage**d. Hence, for Blair, "the starving, the wretched, the dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor from the desert of northern Africa to the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan: they too are our cause." And the cause is "to bring those same values of democracy and freedom to people around the world."61

This fairly aggressive liberal universalism cannot be understood without reference to security and the ambivalent relationship between freedom and security in liberal societies.62 **While liberalism seeks to free the individual** from the clutches of the state, **it is also concerned to ensure that people will exercise that freedom according to appropriate standards of civility and reason**. In other words, in order to act freely, the subject must first be shaped, guided, and molded into one capable of exercising that freedom in a responsible manner. Thus, what makes it possible for the free inhabitants of modern liberal societies to be governed via state mechanisms that appear to rest on their consent is the fact that the vast majority of those people have already been trained in the dispositions and values of responsible autonomy.63 **Security**, in other words, **is best achieved through** creating and expanding the conditions where people can enjoy the right kind of rights and liberties. At the level of international relations, development assistance can be regarded as a **government practice seeking to shape and regulate the behavior and conduct of freedom** in recipient states and societies.64

Through detailed interventions to reduce poverty, increase literacy, promote free trade, create representative institutions and 70 practices, and build capacity and institutions, development aid can be seen as a technique of government whereby Africa comes to conform to the liberal values of the "international community," such as free markets and democracy. **Development interventions also create a framework within which the West can introduce itself "as an intimate, regular presence"** in African states and in the life of their populations.65 Development, in other words, serves to guide states and their populations toward the responsible conduct of their freedom, so that "we" can continue to enjoy our freedom and way of life.66

At the same time, it is important to remember that **liberalism always contains the possibility of illiberal interventions in the lives of those who do not conform** to the accepted standards of civility or possess the attributes required to join the liberal community. In John Stuart Mill's formulation, for example, **liberty applied only to human beings "in the maturity of their faculties,"** and hence he regarded authoritarian government of the colonies as perfectly consistent with liberal values.67 **Liberalism's** principled **belief in equality can** thus be seen to **function simultaneously as a dividing practice, so that those who do not make use of the opportunities available for improvement toward civility or the "maturity of their faculties" can legitimately be excluded and treated outside conventional liberal rules of engagement. Today, states that refuse to reform** according to the rules and norms of the "international community" **face at best abandonment and** the withdrawal of development assistance, **at worst illiberal interventions to enforce compliance** and ensure the survival of the international community. In Cooper's fairly blunt terminology, this means that "[a]mongst ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle."68

2NC Failed States/Cartels [LA Specific]

Stories of cartel violence and failed states are used to justify unhindered US imperialism in Latin America

Carlos 14 (Alfredo, Q.A. Shaw McKean Jr. Fellow @ Rutgers U School of Management and Labor Relations and Doctoral Candidate in Political Science @ U California – Irvine, Mexico "Under Siege": Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 195, Vol. 41 No. 2, March 2014, p. 43-59 *thw_*)//LA ***We don't endorse gendered or ableist language.

Michel Foucault (1972–1977: 120) argues that "**discourse serves to make possible** a whole series of **interventions**, tactical **and** positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, **control** and so forth." Discourses generate knowledge and "truth," **giving those who speak this "truth" social, cultural, and even political power**. This power "produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (Foucault, 1979: 194). For Foucault (1972–1977:119), "what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse." In essence, **power produces discourse that justifies, legitimates, and increases it**. Similarly, Edward Said (1994: 14), speaking in reference to literary discourse, says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics. He says that literature supports, elaborates, and consolidates the practices of empire. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, creating cultures of "us" that differentiate us from "them" (Said, 1994: xiii). They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges.

Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons. As Kevin Dunn (2003: 6) points out, **representations have very precise political consequences. They** either **legitimize or delegitimize power**, depending on what they are and about whom (Said, 1994: 16). Said asserts that **a narrative** emerges that **separates what is nonwhite, non-Western**, and non-Judeo/Christian **from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism and** the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse **is manipulated in the struggle for dominance** (36). Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; **they tell a story that provides a justification for action**. For Said, there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful. As Roxanne Doty (1996: 2) suggests, **through repetition they become "regimes of truth and knowledge." They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such** through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth. Dominant discourses, meta-narratives (master frames that are often unquestioned [see Klotz and Lynch, 2007]), and cultural representations are important because **they construct "realities" that are taken seriously and acted upon**. Cecelia Lynch (1999: 13) asserts that "dominant narratives do 'work' even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence, to the degree that their conceptual foundations call upon or validate norms that are deemed intersubjectively legitimate." They establish unquestioned "truths" and thus provide justification for those with power to act "accordingly." **They allow the production of specific relations of power**. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don't arise out of thin air; **they must be constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed** by actual people (Lynch, 1999). Social actors with this kind of power do this by what Doty (1996) calls self-definition by the "other." Said (1994: 52) suggests that the **formation of cultural identities** can only be understood contrapuntally— that an identity **cannot exist without an array of opposites**. Western1 powers, including **the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the "other"**: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities **that have provided justifications for the white man's civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism** (Doty, 1996: 11; Said, 1994: 51). The historical construction of this "other"' identity produces current events and policies (Dunn, 2003). Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric "other" is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that "other." **Consequently, dominant discourses** and meta-narratives **provide a veil for "imperial encounters," turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests** or, in Mexico's case, economic control (Doty, 1996). Dunn (2003:174) suggests that dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions, particularly economic ones.

Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. **There is a large body of scholarly literature that describes Latin America as a "backward" region that "irrationally" resists modernization**. Seymour Martin **Lipset** (1986), drawing on Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, **portrays Latin America as having** different, "inherently" faulty and "detrimental" **value systems that lack the entrepreneurial ethic and are therefore antithetical to the systematic accumulation of capital**. A newer version of this theory is promoted by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who focus on countries that allow "self-expression" and ones that do not. Howard **Wiarda** (1986) **suggests that the religious history** of Latin America **promotes a corporatist tradition** that is **averse to democratic and liberal values**, a sentiment more recently echoed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996). Along these same lines, Jacques **Lambert** (1986) **argues that the** paternalistic latifundia (**feudal-like**) **social structure** of Latin America **provides no incentive for self-improvement** or mobility. Ultimately, **the discourse created by the modernization and development literature focuses on the "backward" values of the "other" and becomes the West's justification for the continued underdevelopment of the region. These interpretations lead to** partial, **misleading, and unsophisticated treatment of complex political and economic dynamics**, particularly in Latin America. They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism.

--US Policies → Violence

US policies strengthen cartels and directly increase poverty

Thornton & Goodman 14 [Christy Thornton, former Executive Director of NACLA, graduate student in the Department of History at NYU, and Adam Goodman, doctoral student in history at the University of Pennsylvania, "How the Mexican Drug Trade Thrives on Free Trade," 7/15/14] http://www.thenation.com/article/180587/how-mexican-drug-trade-thrives-free-trade# *nufh_*

In some places where the state has been eviscerated, **the cartels have emerged as a kind of parastate**, delivering much-needed services and the promise of economic opportunity. Some expressed shock and disbelief when hundreds of people took to the streets in Sinaloa after the arrest of Chapo Guzmán in February. But it makes sense: **El Chapo had infused millions of dollars into the economy of a poverty-stricken state and created jobs**—in security, transport and manufacturing of drugs—**that otherwise would have been nonexistent.**

Indeed, in 2008, the drug trade was Mexico's fifth-largest employer. It's likely the marchers were thinking about what El Chapo's capture will mean for them and their ability to put food on the table, rather than its impact on the drug war.

And of course, those marching in Sinaloa weren't alone in their support of the cartel. The Mexican newspaper El Universal recently uncovered evidence that **both the Mexican government and US Drug Enforcement Agency adopted a policy of supporting key parts of the Sinaloa organization in hopes of rooting out rival cartels**—from the Tijuana, Juárez and Beltrán Leyva cartels in the north, to the Familia Michoacana and Knights Templar in central-western Mexico, to the Zetas in the east and along most of the Gulf Coast. **The backing of both states helped the Sinaloa cartel defeat rival groups and reinforce its already dominant position relative to other cartels**.

Although Peña Nieto may have celebrated **the recent captures** of El Chapo and the Zetas boss Miguel Ángel Treviño, known as Z-40, and the killing of Nazario "El Chayo" Moreno González, one of the founders of La Familia Michoacana (whom the Calderón administration claimed to have already killed in 2010), they **represent only symbolic victories**. As Mexican journalist Diego Osorno commented, "The current administration relied on the old strategy of turning off the fire alarm, even though the fire is still ablaze."

Moreover, Peña Nieto's decision to extend Calderón's "kingpin" strategy is useless: the **capture of El Chapo will not dismantle the Sinaloa cartel or solve the root problems that have allowed cartels to flourish**, just as the arrest of Jamie Dimon would not take down JP Morgan nor lead to real changes to the banking industry. It's not to say that cartel leaders shouldn't be held accountable or brought to justice; it's that the problems underlying the multinational businesses they oversee are much larger than any one individual.

In his new book Campo de guerra, Mexican writer Sergio González Rodríguez notes that rampant corruption, **a "false state of law," and a "culture of a-legality" allow the legal and illegal to co-exist in Mexico. The restructuring of the country's** licit **economy** and the simultaneous and often symbiotic growth of its illicit economy **have led to unprecedented levels of economic and political inequality and insecurity**. Indeed, even **the violence of the drug war itself has been used as a pretense for** processes of "urban renewal" in cities like Ciudad Juárez, **displacing poor and working people and benefitting multinational real estate-interests**.

The quantity of capital injected into the Mexican and global economies by the drug trade is staggering—traffickers in Mexico and Colombia together make up to $39 billion each year in profit, according to a US Department of Justice report. Mexican **banks have a decades-long history of involvement in both the laundering of drug money and the support of political candidates**. As finance becomes increasingly transnational, foreign banks have become more closely tied to the drug trade, as well. As one observer put it, "the global banks are now the financial services wing of the drug cartels."

With the recent **settlements against international banks** like HSBC and Wachovia, which **protected the banks from criminal prosecutions after they were caught laundering billions of dollars for the cartels, the US**

government has signaled that the smooth functioning of the global financial system takes precedence over rooting out the cartels. Peña Nieto's reform strategy shares these priorities.

At the same time as the state and legitimate economies come to rely on illicit funds, the **cartels have diversified into** new markets—not just extortion and kidnapping, but into **formerly legitimate sectors** as well, operating in a grey area between legality and illegality. The Zetas, for example, use their dominance in the regions that produce oil and natural gas to allegedly steal and sell it to companies such as Royal Dutch Shell. In addition, the Knights Templar have made serious inroads into the mining industry, using violence, extortion and robbery, as well as simply opening new unregulated mines themselves.

The cartels' move into extractive industries has been made not just to launder money but also to seek new profit streams. Tracing shell companies set up with cartel funds to take advantage of deregulation in the petroleum sector, for example, is difficult, and the demand for heavy metals and energy sources from countries like China mirrors the demand for illegal drugs in the States. With the promise of profits to be made, **the cartels are coming more and more to resemble diversified multinational corporations**.

This reality, however, while shaped by the structural forces of international capitalism, **is also the result of policy decisions made by the Mexican and US governments**. If Mexico is going to be "saved," as a recent Time magazine cover put it, it will not be **through doubling down on the market-driven policies** that have structured the country's dual economies over the last few decades but through sustained pressure, from below and across borders, to bring to light the contradictions of capitalism and to fight for economic and social justice. Here in Mexico, that fight has put thousands in the streets of the capital in recent months, and as John Ackerman recently reported, resistance to Peña Nieto's reforms is growing.

That the rise of the cartels and the deregulation of the Mexican economy occurred together is not a coincidence: **both have used state structures to drive a relentless upward redistribution of wealth, while visiting immense physical and economic violence on the majority** of Mexicans. Reversing this trend will require recognizing the extent to which Mexico's "good" and "bad" capital are increasingly inextricable. Elite politicians, businessmen, and cartel leaders aren't strange bedfellows in Mexico—they share the billions under the mattress.

--Orientalism

Failed states discourse portray international stability and interventionism as white man's burden

Kaplan 3 [Amy, "Violent belongings and the question of empire today presidential address to the American studies Association" American Quarterly, vol. 56, no.1, march 2004, muse, pg 5-7 jf]

This is also a narrative about race. **The images of an unruly world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority from earlier colonial discourses about races who are incapable of governing themselves**, Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law," or Roosevelt's "loosening ties of civilized society," in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "The American Empire," Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle "The Burden" but insisted that "America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man's burden?" **Denial and exceptionalism are apparently alive and well. In American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized through the interplay of templates of U.S. racial codes and colonial Orientalism.**

These narratives of the origins of the current empire-that is, the neoconservative and the liberal interventionist-have much in common. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability, that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights, liberalism, and democracy, the "indispensable nation," in Madeleine Albright's words. In this logic, **the United States claims the authority to "make sovereign judgments on what is right and what is wrong"** for everyone else and "to exempt itself with an absolutely clear conscience from all the rules that it proclaims and applies to others."'-' Absolutely protective of its own sovereignty, it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus **deems the entire world a potential site of intervention.** Universalism thus can be made manifest only through the threat and use of violence. If in **these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world**, then they preempt any counter narratives that claim U.S. imperial actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world's problems. **According to this logic, resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule; rather, resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values.**

Although these narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best, they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for the British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U.S. imperialism by appropriating a progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history. As part of the "coming-out" narrative, the message is: "Hey what's the big deal. We've always been interventionist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson's 'empire for liberty.' Let's just be ourselves." A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U.S. war against the Philippines in its struggle for independence a century ago. This is a chapter of history long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration, one that American studies scholars here and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose, which gained special resonance during the U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century. As Max Boot concludes in Savage Wars of Peace, "The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign--one that was bigger and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future."" Historians of the United States have much work to do here, not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present, and in showing how U.S. interventions have worked from the perspective of comparative imperialisms, in relation to other historical changes and movements across the globe.

The struggle over history also entails a struggle over language and culture. It is not enough to expose the lies when Bush hijacks words such as freedom, democracy, and liberty. It's imperative that we draw on our knowledge of the powerful alternative meanings of these key words from both national and transnational sources. Today's reluctant imperialists are making arguments about "soft power," the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values. As Ignatieff writes, "America fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires?" The work of scholars in popular culture is more important than ever to show that the Americanization of global culture is not a one-way street, but a process of transnational exchange, conflict, and transformation, which creates new cultural forms that express dreams and desires not dictated by empire.

In this fantasy of global desire for all things American, **those whose dreams are different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself.** As **one of the authors of the Patriot Act wrote, "when you adopt a way of terror you've excused yourself from the community of human beings."'** Although I would not minimize the violence caused by specific terrorist acts, I do want to point out the violence of these definitions of who belongs to humanity. Often in our juridical system under the Patriot Act, the accusation of terrorism alone, without due process and proof, is enough to exclude persons from the category of humanity. As scholars of American studies, we should bring to the present crisis our knowledge from juridical, literary, and visual representations about the way **such exclusions from personhood and humanity have been made throughout history, from the treatment of Indians and slaves to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.**

Thus **the current discourse about the American Empire embodies fantasies of a global monolithic order extending outward from a national center.** How can we draw on our knowledge of the past to bring a sense of contingency to this idea of empire, to show that imperialism is an interconnected network of power relations, which entail engagements and encounters as well as military might and which are riddled with instability, tension, and disorder-as in Iraq today? And we must further understand how **empire doesn't just take place in faraway battlefields**, but how **it exerts its power at home**-in fact, **in the interconnections between the domestic and the foreign, words already freighted with imperial meanings**, and for which we need better vocabularies.

Hegemony

1NC Hegemony

**US militarism creates a permanent state of war against to justify its expansion
Shor 10**

[Fran Shor, History Department at Wayne State University, 2010, Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies Issue 2, "War in the Era of Declining U.S. Global Hegemony", pg 73-74 jf]

Thus, a **geopolitical strategy for global dominance becomes obsessed with any global resistance that defies imperial prerogatives.** As argued by Ira Chernus, **"changes anywhere in the world that would challenge U.S. hegemony spell chaos and constant alarm"** (2006, p. 202). According to Chernus, **part of the process of seeking global dominance results in seeing and, even, of creating monsters to slay.** Although the morphing of those monsters from communists to terrorists marks certain discursive changes, **U.S. imperial policy is remarkably consistent**, irrespective of ideological shadings. One of the last Defense Department directives to be issued by the Bush Administration found **support from President Obama with the assertion that for the "foreseeable future, winning the Long War against violent extremists will be the central objective of U.S. policy." Wedded to what can only be construed as permanent war**, U.S. imperial policy garners such consensus precisely because **empire has become an American way of life.** A variation on this theme that puts the Long War into the long trajectory of U.S. imperialism is the following formulation by Andrew Bacevich: "**the Long War genuinely qualifies as a war to** preserve the American way of life … and simultaneously as a war to **extend the American imperium** (centered on dreams of a world re-made in America's image), the former widely assumed to require the latter" (2008, pp. 11 and 79-80).

While **the Long War** builds on the deep roots of U.S. imperial militarism, it also **becomes the most recent articulation of the search for global dominance**. That global **dominance relies heavily on the forward positioning of military power** throughout the world, but especially in areas laden with oil and other precious resources essential to the perpetuation of U.S. hegemony. However, while there may be an economic connection between U.S. imperial policy and the geopolitics of the extension of U.S. military power, it is important to understand how that **imperial militarism has an inherent logic that drives its thrust for global dominance.** Certainly, if not yet recognized by the American public, others in those strategically significant parts of the world readily understand how the presence of the U.S. military, in whatever guise, embodies the search, whether illusive or not, for global dominance. According to the Indian activist and writer, Arundhati Roy, "It's become clear that the War against Terror is not really about terror, and the War on Iraq not only about oil. It's about a superpower's self-destructive impulse toward supremacy, stranglehold, global hegemony" (2004, p. 34).

--Competition

U.S. primacy is based on an epistemologically flawed view of other nations as "competitors" – ensures endless war and economic collapse
Foster, 5

(John Bellamy Foster, prof of sociology @ Oregon, *Monthly Review*, "Naked Imperialism," http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm)

The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of **nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction**. These are symbolized by the Bush administration's refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled "Apocalypse Soon" in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: "The United States has never endorsed the policy of 'no first use,' not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so." **The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit**—setting the whole world on edge. **The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other** (representing approximately a quarter of the world's total) **has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world's growing environmental problems**—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue. **The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability**. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China, that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chávez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. **With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing**. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the "nuclear club." **Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars** in the third world **is now a well-recognized reality**, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. **Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism.** The course on which U.S and world capitalism is now headed points to global barbarism—or worse. Yet it is important to remember that nothing in the development of human history is inevitable. There still remains an alternative path—the global struggle for a humane, egalitarian, democratic, and sustainable society.

--Exceptionalism

Exceptionalism and military motivations for US policy lead to imperialism and backlash
Shor 10

[Fran Shor, History Department at Wayne State University, 2010, Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies Issue 2, "War in the Era of Declining U.S. Global Hegemony", pg 65-66 jf]

Convinced that they were beyond the reproach of history and the owners of the future, postwar U.S. policymakers and their ideological advocates sought to establish U.S. pre-eminence in the world by both overt and covert means. Among the overt designs was the development of numerous international and multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such institutional arrangements reinforced and expanded U.S. hegemony. The covert means, deployed when coercion needed to trump a particular ideological consensus, focused primarily on the role of the newly created Central Intelligence Agency to foster favorable political arrangements and to underwrite cultural enterprises during the Cold War. Although U.S. interventions and regime change had predated the operationalization of U.S. global hegemony, those **foreign adventures increased in the developing world during the Cold War through what critics have called "stealth imperialism**," becoming, in turn, even more frequent, open, and brazen after the fall of the Berlin Wall.2

There can be no doubt that a more emboldened **imperialism and militarism have been the hallmarks of recent U.S. geopolitical strategy**. Carl **Boggs has traced** that 'revitalized **U.S. imperialism and militarism' to** a number of factors: **"a growing mood of American exceptionalism in international affairs, the primacy of military force in U.S. policy, arrogation of the right to intervene around the world, the spread of xenophobic patriotism, [and] further consolidation of the permanent war system"** (2005, p. x).3 However, as acknowledged by Boggs and other critics of U.S. imperialism, **such imperialism and militarism not only exacerbate and/or even create local insurgencies, but constant saber-rattling by the U.S. also produces global resistance**, such as the massive world-wide mobilization of millions that occurred on the eve of the U.S. military invasion of Iraq in February 2003. In effect, **the pursuit of imperial dominance through geopolitical militarism and war contains contradictions that further undermine hegemony abroad and legitimacy at home, reinforcing, in the process, a crisis of empire.**

Yet, in reviewing the last several decades of U.S. foreign policy, especially in Latin America and the Middle East, it is clear that the ruling elite in **Washington continue to believe in their right to determine the fate of others**. In fact, the policies enacted by the decision-makers in DC have become even more harried and brutal in light of those others who have the temerity to exercise their right of self-determination. In the aftermath of the crushing defeat in Vietnam and the crisis of legitimacy confronting ruling circles in the U.S., imperial policy suffered some setbacks, including the erosion of the prerogatives of the imperial presidency with the congressional passage in 1973 of the War Powers Act. Nonetheless, neither presidents nor the Pentagon felt constrained by the congressional restrictions, even though the pursuit of geopolitical military strategies varied to a certain degree depending on the soft or hard imperialist policy adopted by particular presidents. However, in Latin America, the bipartisan tradition of intervention often obliterated those differences.

--Overstretch

Pursuit of US hegemony leads to imperial overstretch and backlash
Shor 10

[Fran Shor, History Department at Wayne State University, 2010, Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies Issue 2, "War in the Era of Declining U.S. Global Hegemony", pg 75-76 jf]

Another very real dilemma for U.S. military imperialism and their **global strategies**, particularly as a consequence of the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan, **is imperial overstretch.** Both in terms of the eventual costs, estimated in the trillions of dollars just in the case of the war on Iraq, and the continuing drain on military personnel, these wars have further underscored the inherent contradictions of U.S. military imperialism and its war strategies. Even with active troops, counting the National Guard and Reserves, numbering over 2 million, the U.S. military has so depleted its human resources that it has resorted to extending tours in ways that have lowered morale and created even more internal dissent about deployment. Attempts to offset these problems by higher pay inducements, expansion of the numbers, and use of private contractors have only exacerbated the overall contradictions endemic in maintaining the kind of global garrison embodied by U.S. military imperialism. According to world-systems scholar Giovanni Arrighi, **besides having "jeopardized the credibility of U.S. military might," the war and occupation of Iraq may be one of the key components underlying the "terminal crisis of U.S. hegemony,"** albeit **without diminishing the U.S. role as "the world's pre-eminent military power"** (2005, p. 80). Nonetheless, as pointed out by other scholars (Johnson, 2004; Mann, 2003; Wallerstein, 2003), **imperial overstretch was central to the demise of previous empires and now threatens the death of a U.S. empire also bent on fighting debilitating and self-destructive wars.**

Clearly, **the pursuit of such wars also engenders resistance abroad and potential dissent at home**, the latter, however, contingent on some fundamental understanding of the whys and wherefores of prosecuting war. Certainly, **resistance to a militarized U.S. foreign policy is evident** in various guises, from local insurgencies to global protests. Irrespective of the form such resistance may take, **including insurgencies that engage in terror**, the U.S. will encounter resistance as long as it insists on imposing its sense of order in the world. In effect, a "system of global domination resting largely on military force, or even the threat of force, cannot in the greater scheme of things consolidate its rule on a foundation of legitimating beliefs on values" (Boggs, 2005, p. 178). On the other hand, **U.S. perception of that resistance, whether by the ruling elite, corporate media, or the public at large, is filtered through an ideological smokescreen that either labels that resistance as "terrorism"** or some primitive from of know-nothing anti-Americanism. **Part of the inability to recognize the reality** of what shapes the lives of others **is the** persistence of a **self-image of U.S. benevolence** or innocence, even in the face of the realities spawned by U.S. intervention and occupation.20 Also, what remains both contentious and difficult to face is the degree to which the United States, especially in its pursuit of global dominance through **military imperialism, has become,** to quote Walter Hixson, **a "warfare state, a nation with a propensity for initiating and institutionalizing warfare"** (2008, p. 14). For Hixson the **perpetuation of that warfare state requires** reaffirming a national identity whose cultural hegemony at home can provide **ideological cover for** "nation building, succoring vicious regimes, bombing shelling, contaminating, torturing and **killing hundreds of thousands of innocents, and destroying enemy others"** (2008, p. 304).

--Link – Homeland

Homeland discourse creates militarization, violence against the other and perceived racial purity

Kaplan 3 [Amy, "Violent belongings and the question of empire today presidential address to the American studies Association" American Quarterly, vol. 56, no.1, march 2004, muse pg, 8-10 jf]

The image of the American Empire also projects a fantasy about national identity: the war on terror, some would like to believe, **has supplanted the so-called culture wars. The notion of empire recuperates a consensus vision of America as a unitary whole, threatened only by terrorists, but no longer contested and constituted by divisions of race, class, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality. We can see this through the use of the word homeland**, a recent addition to the lexicon of U.S. nationalism, which gained currency along with empire, after 9/11, in the concept of homeland security. If empire insists on a borderless world, where the United States can exercise its power without limits, the notion of the homeland tries to shore up those boundaries. In **the idea of America as the homeland we can see the violence of belonging.**

The word homeland has many connotations." **It implies** a sense of native origins, of birthplace and **birthright. It appeals to common bloodlines, ancient loyalties, and often to notions of racial and ethnic homogeneity.** Though U.S. national identity has always been linked to geography, **these connotations represent a departure from traditional images of American nationhood as boundless and mobile.** In fact the exceptionalist notion of the New World pits images of mobility against a distinctly Old World definition of homeland. A nation of immigrants, a melting pot, the western frontier, manifest destiny, a classless society-all involve metaphors of spatial mobility rather than the spatial fixedness and rootedness that homeland implies. **Homeland also conveys a different relation to history, not a nation of futurity, but a reliance on a shared mythic past engrained in the land itself.** It resonates with the notion of the heartland.

This unitary notion of the homeland (it's always used with a definite article) **underwrites the resurgent nativism and anti-immigrant sentiment and policy.** Where is there room for immigrants in this fusion of nation and nativity? How many immigrants and their descendants may identify with America as their country or home but locate their homelands elsewhere, as a spiritual, ethnic, or historical point of origin? How many U.S. citizens see themselves as members of a diasporic community with a homeland in Ireland, Africa, Israel, or Palestine--a place to which they feel spiritual or political afilliation and belonging, whether literally a place of birth or not? Does the idea of America as the homeland make such dual identifications suspect and threatening, something akin to terrorism? Are you either a member of the homeland or with the terrorists, to paraphrase Bush? And what of the terrible irony of the United States as a homeland to Native Americans?

At a time when the rights of so-called aliens and **immigrants have been abrogated** by the Patriot Act, when they can be detained and deported in the name of homeland security, **the notion of homeland itself contributes to making their lives terribly insecure. It polices the boundaries between the domestic and the foreign** not simply by stopping aliens at the borders, but **by continually redrawing those boundaries everywhere throughout the nation, between Americans who can somehow claim the United States as their native land, their birthright, and immigrants and those who look to homelands elsewhere**, who can be rendered inexorably foreign. **This distinction takes on a decidedly racialized cast through the identification of homeland with a sense of racial purity** and ethnic homogeneity **that even** naturalization and **citizenship cannot erase.**

An odd thing about the use of the term homeland for the United States is that it refers often to a nation that lacks a state and territory, one to which a people or ethnic group aspires, such as Palestine, Kurdistan, or the Sikh. Tamil, or Basque homeland. Such groups are often viewed as underdogs whose legitimate claims to territory have been usurped by another state. In this vein, **homeland also has a connection to the discourse of diaspora and exile, to a sense of loss, longing, and nostalgia**. In this meaning, homeland may evoke a sense not of stability and security, but of deracination and desire. This also seems to be an appropriation and inversion. **The idea of**

America as aspiring to a lost homeland depends on evoking terrorism as the constant threat to sever Americans from their legitimate aspirations. Thus the idea of the homeland works by generating a profound sense of insecurity, not only because of the threat of terrorism but also because the homeland is a fundamentally uncanny place, haunted by all the unfamiliar yet strangely familiar foreign specters that threaten to turn it into its opposite.

This nostalgic notion of the homeland goes hand in hand with a modem security state, for **the concept of homeland security emerged** in the 1990s **to integrate U.S. territory as one unit of command in a global map of military departments.** Indeed, recently seven offices of home-land security have opened in different countries. Advocates for home-land security argue for more government and military coordination, for the armed forces to be involved in this country as well, and for the state through surveillance and policing to intrude into all areas of civil life. Although homeland security may strive to protect the domestic nation from foreign threats, it is actually about breaking down the boundaries between inside and outside, **about seeing the home in a state of constant emergency, besieged by internal and external threats that are indistinguishable. Thus the notion of the homeland draws on comforting images of a deeply rooted past to legitimate modem forms of imperial power.**

--AT Benevolent Hegemony

Claims of benevolent hegemony make intervention seem moral

Kaplan 3 [Amy, "Violent belongings and the question of empire today presidential address to the American studies Association" American Quarterly, vol. 56, no.1, march 2004, muse, pg 4-5 jf]

Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, **is that of the "reluctant imperialist**."10 **In this version, the United States never sought an empire** and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, **but it had the burden thrust upon it by** the fall of earlier empires and **the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The U**nited **S**tates **is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to** act as military policeman and economic manager to **bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force**, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes-not reluctantly at all-in "Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society."" This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in **the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image.**

Democracy

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Democracy today is a hollow signifier that creates projections that justify war and atrocities

Ivie and Giner 04

[ROBERT L. IVIE professor emeritus of communications and culture & American studies at Indiana University, OSCAR GINER Professor in the Theater department at Arizona State University, December 2004, "Hunting the Devil: Democracy's Rhetorical Impulse to War", Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 pg 594-595 jf]

Overall, then, the diabolical incantations of **presidential war rhetoric functioned as an inducement to evacuate the political content of democracy, leaving a largely empty signifier** in its place. Although officially promoted, a narrowly circumscribed, truncated, distorted, and otherwise substantially purged simulacrum of democracy suspended ad infinitum was the diminished extent of its troubled symbolic import. Shriveled, shrunken, and emptied of meaning, **democracy was relegated to the degraded role of a political cipher—a ready** and reliable but badly disfigured **vehicle for sublimating a heavy burden of anxious self-loathing and transferring that unwanted load to an external object of terror. Diluted democracy in the heroic guise of world liberator** and protector and under the firm control of presidential order sub**stituted for robust democratic deliberation** and a full contestation of opinions. **A failure to contain democracy implied a risk of chaos**, an outbreak of violence, a loss of civilization, a reign of terror. **Killing terrorists substituted for acknowledging and confronting the suppressed dark side of America's political identity. The primal appeal of presidential war rhetoric, its patriarchal inducement to rescue a feminized and infantilized victim from the evil savagery of faceless tyranny, was to prove the nation's virtue** and virility. This was the essence of **a rhetorical diabolism that purged democratic anxiety by channeling it into an impulse to war.**

If Americans have inherited the Christian worldview from their ancestors, they have also inherited a naïve susceptibility to believe in medieval villains, a language derived from an agonic cosmology which casts the devil as an eternal, ontological adversary, and a superstitious conviction in the power of scapegoating as a ritual means of cleansing one's sins. The length of influence of old fears and the perpetuity of mental constructs are highlighted by the fact that the nation that chased devils in **Salem** in its infancy **grows up to declare war on terror and darkness.** President Bush is not an exception or even an extreme example of war mongering. What he is, as president, is the leading voice articulating the projection of a **national shadow onto terrorist enemies**—a shadow forged by Americans and **created in the image of their fears and anxieties about democracy.** Even **the president** himself **is subject to** becoming the target of such **anxious projections**, as in the case of Newsweek's February 19, 2007, issue, which merged into a single, front-cover image the left half of Bush's face with the right half of the demonized Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's face, noting in an accompanying story that "**the two countries are now led by men who deeply mistrust the intentions and indeed doubt the sanity of the other**" (Hirsh and Bahari 2007, 30).

As long as these projections go unrecognized, they distort the nation's vision, delude it into making mistakes, and create an imaginary landscape that serves as a hideout for America's enemies: "The effect of **projection** is to **isolate the subject from his environment**, since instead of a real relation to it there is now only an illusory one" (Jung 1951, 146). **This fanciful terrain provides camouflage for the actual threat and is even a source of mistakes in battle.** At the turn of the century, arguing for a more complex understanding of the social phenomenon of Russian anarchist terrorists, George Bernard Shaw (1952, 214) warned, "If a man cannot look evil in the face without illusion, he will not know what it really is, or combat it effectively."

The true danger to the nation that is posed by unexamined projections is twofold: first, **unexamined projections leave us weak and vulnerable**. Having cast our vital energy on others, **we are left small and terrified before imagined external dragons** (like in those dreams in which we are chased by our own monsters). Second, **by branding others as evil**—cruel and inhumane though they may be—**we position ourselves as good**, leaving our "evil spirit," in the words of Robert Johnson, free to "catch a Greyhound bus and ride" (Johnson 1990, 46). **Because we are good, we believe ourselves justified** in Abu Ghraib, in Guantanamo, **in violating** the **rights** of American citizens and disregarding the Constitution. Also— somewhat inconsistently but

nevertheless devilishly captivating—**<u>we are left free to deny that these events occur</u>**, that they are wrong (How could good people perpetrate wrongful acts?), and that we are complicitous in them. Thus the practical need, as well as the moral responsibility, to remove the "beam" from the nation's collective eyes. Perhaps, if **<u>we gain the means and the moxie first to recognize and eventually to reclaim democracy's projected shadow, we might then dare to move forward toward a less dehumanizing and more democratic future with a diminishing incentive for war.</u>**

--AT Democratic Peace Theory

Democratic peace theory leads to conflict – "liberal peace" relies on accounting errors that ignore massive structural violence and ensure self-fulfilling prophecy – solutions predicated on it cause error replication
Kiely 5

[Ray Kiely, Professor of International Politics @ University of London Queen Mary] [Empire in the Age of Globalisation US Hegemony and Neoliberal Disorder] (http://tinyurl.com/qgmv49l) (accessed 7-16-15) //MC

Liberal notions of democratic peace should therefore be seen in this light. It is true that liberal democracies in the advanced capitalist countries are less likely to go to war with each other today than in the past. But this **so-called 'liberal peace' is itself a product of a history of bloody conflict**, and **the idea that such peace can be simply imposed** on 'pre-modern states' **ignores the ways in which the advanced powers have generated bloody conflict** in those parts of the world. It also **ignores ongoing processes of state formation and territorial conflict in relatively new states**. Cooper's division of the world into post-modern, modern and pre-modern states has a simplistic appeal, but it is purely descriptive, and tells us nothing about the (violent) histories of state formation that have led to such a division. **It** also **betrays a simplistic linearity in which the virtues of the advanced can quickly be imposed upon the backward**. This is a version of modernisation theory, in which **countries are** said to be **poor simply because they are insufficiently globalised** (see Chapter 5). **Quick- fix solutions** such as the illiberal imposition of liberal democracy are thus likely to **exacerbate such problems**, **no matter how wellintentioned** they may be – and we would do well to remember that past interventions have been justified by recourse to support for freedom and democracy. Indeed, these have often been based on the idea that intervention in the past was ill-intentioned or misguided, but that we have got it right 'this time'. **These points** are not made to support a blanket anti-interventionist position, but they do **warn against easy solutions**, **liberal follies and messianic rhetoric**.

Moreover, **no US administration has** really **been committed to genuinely democratic principles** of multilateral global governance. **All post-war US governments** have **upheld** the belief in **the desirability of US hegemony**, even if some have regarded multilateral negotiation as more important than others. It could of course be argued that because the US is a liberal democracy it has a greater right than others to exercise world leadership. But **if democracy is to be valued, then it cannot be selective**: it must apply to states not only in relation to their domestic populations, but also in relation to the international system of nation-states.10 In this international system, **the US has a poor record in terms of democratic principles**, as we have seen. Singer usefully makes the point:

Advocates of democracy should see something wrong with the idea of **a nation fewer than 300 million people dominating a planet with more than six billion inhabitants**. That's **less than 5 per cent of the population ruling over the remainder** – more than 95 per cent – without their consent. (Singer 2004: 191)

It may of course be utopian to espouse the cause of global democracy, even if, as cosmopolitan democrats point out, a similar argument was used in the past to argue against democracy within nation-states. But surely **it is wishful thinking to expect the world's population to acquiesce passively to** such **a patently undemocratic international system**. This is not to romanticise much of the 'anti-imperialist' resistance to current US global domination, much of which is reactionary. Terrorism should be condemned, and indeed efforts should be made to counter terrorist attacks. But it is absurd to dismiss all resistance to the US as the actions of terrorist minorities, whose actions are completely beyond explanation. Only **the most ardent wishful thinking about 'US destiny' and** the most **dangerous amnesia about history** – such as that shared by George Bush and Tony Blair – **can reduce global politics to simplistic struggles between good and evil**.11 This is hardly surprising, as it **reflects a long tradition of liberal thought justifying illiberal measures against 'illiberal people'**. John Stuart Mill argued

that 'despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement and the means justifi ed by actually effecting that end' (Mill 1974: 69). In the 'war on terror', **terrorism has been reduced to a totally inexplicable, polymorphous mass**. As a result, '[w]ithout defi ned shape or determinate roots, its mantle can be cast over any form of resistance to sovereign power' (Gregory 2004: 140)

Democratic peace theory contructs enemies that provoke conflict
Ivie and Giner 04

[ROBERT L. IVIE professor emeritus of communications and culture & American studies at Indiana University, OSCAR GINER Professor in the Theater department at Arizona State University, December 2004, "Hunting the Devil: Democracy's Rhetorical Impulse to War", Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 pg 580-581 jf]

Previous to the fall of communism, scholars had warned that a rising rhetorical presidency constituted a serious and growing threat to republican governance—that a worsening condition of presidential demagoguery, or direct appeal to the masses, bypassed responsible deliberation in Congress (Tulis 1987; Ivie 1996, 157-60). In the midst of this worry over properly containing and disciplining domestic, **the nation's political leadership endorsed a theory of democratic peace** that prescribed a thin veil of democratization as the way to global peace (Doyle 1996; Russett 1993; Weart 1998; Gilbert 1999). **This assumption legitimized an aggressive post-Cold War foreign policy and a subsequent doctrine of preemptive warfare for fighting the tyranny of terrorism** (Ivie 2005a, 92-116). George H. W. Bush's **Gulf War quickly launched** a brave new world order of "moving toward democracy through the door of freedom" and "toward free markets through the door to prosperity" (quoted in Smith 1995, 313), exuding **a distinctly crusading spirit** that Amos Perlmutter (1997, 9, 161) considered "mission oriented" and aimed at world domination. Bill Clinton, nervously following in Bush's presidential footsteps, proclaimed that America, as the one essential nation, must secure "democracy's triumph around the world" (quoted in Smith 1995, 320). O**vertones of national insecurity and vulnerability resonated throughout Clinton's rhetoric of democratic world order.** Even the extension of democracy—assuming "the ennobling burdens of democracy" to foster a "global village"—in these uncertain and tenuous times was a risky affair, it seemed, when the world's "oldest democracy" continued its "most daring experiment in forging different races, religions and cultures into a single people" (quoted in Ivie 2005a, 113-14; see 111-16). Democracy was risky business at home and abroad.

By the logic of the prevailing metaphorical construct, se**curing the demon of democratic passion inside a rational container was the symbolic equivalent to quelling the forces of savagery that threatened civilization. The inner conflict paralleled the outer struggle, and suppressing the forces of savagery was the mythic motive for America's historic mission of spreading democracy's empire.** From the beginning, as Robert Kagan (2006, 3-5) argues, America was perceived by much of the world as a dangerous nation because of its "aggressive and seemingly insatiable desire for territory and dominant influence." This abiding desire for control, along with a craving for ideological and commercial hegemony, posed the ongoing danger of "swallow[ing] up those cultures with which it came into contact." Yet, a lack of self-awareness about these expansive tendencies, "even as the United States has risen to a position of global hegemony," has left Americans perplexed when they discover that others hate and fear their powerful reach**. Empire was America's unacknowledged vocation, its mythic calling expressed as the sacred mission** of an exceptional people **to advance civilization by overcoming the evil forces of savagery and securing a lasting democratic peace.**

After 9/11, **terrorism became the threatening face of savagery in democracy's troubled empire** (Ivie 2005b, 56). Indeed, terrorism became not just democracy's mortal antagonist but also its evil counterpart, at once **an enduring cause for unlimited warfare** and a ready pretext for unruly democracy's continuous restraint and indefinite deferral. **The demon of distempered democracy was symbolically subsumed under the war on terror.** The face of the terrorist enemy was a semblance of the face of the inner savage. **The terrorist was the** dark brother, if not **offspring, of the democratic demon. Democracy thus served ambiguously as both war's purpose and provocation**, sought after in the ideal but arrested in the present while its distempered, totalitarian shadow remained dangerously at large. Such a "disowned shadow" in troubled hero myths, as Janice Rushing and Thomas Frentz (1995, 220) have observed, is readily projected onto an Other toward whom "we then relate . . . in an unconscious, undifferentiated way, usually with automatic and dogmatic hatred or fear."

Doyle McManus (2006), a staff writer for the Los Angeles Times, captured this basic ambivalence over democracy. Under the headline, "Kissinger Says Iraq Isn't Ripe for Democracy," McManus invoked the ghost of Vietnam to answer America's post-election riddle of protracted warfare in Iraq. "Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, a frequent advisor to President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney," the story began, "has concluded that **the United States must choose between stability and democracy in Iraq**—and that democracy, for now, is out of reach." Fighting against what President George W. Bush called the totalitarian ideology of global terrorism, like fighting world communism, amounted once again to something short of fighting for the enrichment of democracy at home and abroad. At best, democracy would have to be deferred rather than promoted. Kissinger, McManus reported, was a "long-declared" skeptic of the administration's avowed aim of democratization, especially as "the primary goal of U.S. foreign policy." Democracy, Kissinger averred, might be implemented overseas only over "longer historical periods." The "evolution of democracy" could not begin by holding elections and building democratic institutions "from the ground up" nor could it start before a strong Iraqi leader had stabilized the situation and a "nation [was] born." Neither total military victory nor complete withdrawal from the fighting was realistic by this measure. Moreover, Kissinger's view was now privately shared by "middle-ranking [Bush] administration officials."

Democracy remained, in Sheldon Wolin's astute term, a fugitive—a paradoxical marker of national identity at a time of increasing alienation between the people and their rulers. Its invocation in American political rhetoric and media was "a tribute, not to its vibrancy, but to its utility in supporting a myth that legitimates the very formations of power which have enfeebled it" by means of anti-democratic strategies such as appeals to efficiency, stability, emergency, and so on. In this way, **America's superpower "claim to democracy" was "a form of hypocrisy**," a shallow symbol without a substantive, participatory practice. Democracy's basic principle of collective self-rule was "fictitious" in the contemporary world that reduced "majorities" to "artifacts manufactured by money, organization, and the media" (Wolin 2004, 601). Whether **America's claim to a democratic identity was paradoxical, hypocritical, or fanciful, it was freighted with tension, distrust, and apprehension.**

The force of this chronic democratic unease—this hellhound of national self-doubt and even self-loathing in the most extreme cases—must be understood as a primal impulse to war that projects an odious self-image onto the persona of an evil, fearsome enemy. This projection of democracy's shadow is difficult to observe and acknowledge because, viewed directly, it appears too grotesque and raw to emanate from the core of the national temperament. **America sees itself as an enlightened and pacifically inclined agent of liberty** and human advancement in a dark landscape of diabolical spirits, **not as an imperial beast of prey let loose upon the world, because "we are on the side of Light, they on the side of Darkness"** (Huxley 1952, 175). The mythic shading of the repressed enemy within—a deformed representation of the people, a distempered image produced by an ingrained fear of democracy— is therefore expressed obliquely in presidential war rhetoric.

Democratic peace theory necessarily constructs non-democratic nations as threats Hayes 09

[Jarrod Hayes, PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Southern California and Assistant Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 2 DEC 2009, "Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran's Nuclear Programs", International Studies Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 4, page 982-983 jf]

The term securitization refers to the act by state leaders of choosing what issues should be considered under the security rubric (Buzan et al. 1998). Crucially, **the act of securitizing an issue involves both a securitizing actor**(s), who makes the claim that a particular object of value (referent object) is facing an existential threat requiring the suspension of normal politics**, and an audience**, which must agree both that the referent object is a thing of value and that it is (existentially) threatened in the way that the securitizing agent claims. For example, preceding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, President George Bush argued that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction could be used directly against Americans or given to terrorists who would deploy them against Americans. Here, the securitizing actor is George Bush, the referent object is the physical safety of Americans, which was threatened by Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. **The audience, the US public, agreed with the assessment and accepted the movement of the issue out of normal politics** (that is, the use of military force).

Applying securitization to the democratic peace gives us an avenue for studying the role of norms and identity in the formation of security policy in democratic states. It seats the locus of action at the domestic level, where decisions of war and peace are made. Securitization gives us

a structured way for looking at the security process and focusing on the communicative action of leaders and their audiences. It also ties norms and structure together in explanation. **To securitize successfully, leaders must use the language of security;** they must appeal to certain norms and identities in order **to communicate the idea of a threat and that the object threatened is valuable.** The nature of the audience (general public, small group of oligarchs, military officers) as well as the norms and identity language the audience responds to are linked to the political structure**. Securitizers in autocracies face a very different audience, requiring a very different language of securitization, than those in democracies.**

This paper seeks to explore the role of identity language in the securitization process. I expect that **political leaders use the language of democratic identity and norms to signal possible threats or the lack thereof to their securitizing audience.** Consider the domestic identity of a democracy. The norms that inform democratic identity are agreed to include non-violent conflict resolution, rule of law, compromise, and transparency (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Owen 1994). In order for such an identity to work, there has to be flexibility in the other delimiters of identity. Differences in religion, cultural practices, economic perspective, gender, and race all have to be tolerated if a democracy is to be successful. The criteria for recognition and respect in a democracy must be fairly open (Williams 2001). Were they not, the democracy would tear itself apart. A democracy can only operate if the population willingly buys into the program. If most people chose to identify with their religion at the expense of their democratic identity, the state would quickly turn into a theocracy. Democratic governance fundamentally rests on the democratic identity of its citizenry. Democracy, like any other ideology, distinguishes between members of the self and the other. 2 If a state is to be democratic, then democratic identity must be a significant factor in the imagined community that binds the society under the state together (Anderson 1991). Policies involving negotiation and reconciliation—democratic political behavior—are justified by appealing to democratic norms and identity. **Leaders emphasize that the external state warrants these approaches as a trustworthy member of the democratic community**, that these behaviors are expected in return, and that the situation can be approached without significant concerns over violence. Weart notes that ''**group boundaries are typically set in ways connected with political circumstances**. In particular, **democrats…normally define even foreign democrats…as in-**group, '**people like us,'** at least in terms of what kind of political relations they expect'' (1998:18). **Policies involving aggression** and violence—nondemocratic political behavior—**are justified by demonstrating that the target state is beyond reason or trust, that their behavior could result in violence against the home state** (an existential threat). **Political leaders achieve this aim by emphasizing the undemocratic identity** and unwillingness to reliably operate by democratic norms **of the other. The securitized state poses an existential threat because it is dissimilar from the democratic self, a self defined by the exclusion of violence from conflict resolution.**

The securitization dynamic is not unique to democracies. **What is unique to democracies is the audience**. In a democracy, the public plays a critical role in large foreign policy decisions like war. It is inherent to the nature of democratic governance: leaders are accountable to the public for their policy decisions. Consequently, it is to the dominant (democratic) identity of the public and the attendant set of norms that leaders in democracies must appeal if they wish to securitize an external state. Combining the work on the individual level with securitization produces a more complete picture of the mechanisms behind the democratic peace. **Democratic norms and identity shape the security policy of democratic political** leaders in two ways. First, **leaders have internalized the democratic norms and identity, shaping their personal perception of threat.** Second, **democratic political structures bind leaders to the democratic norms and identity of the electorate**. Leaders in autocracies face a very different identity and norms environment. Political structure, identity, and norms are far more personalistic, indicated by small electorates and hierarchical political structures (diZerega 1995). The governing identity(s) and the interests of the state are grounded in the particulars of the ruling group.

Pursuing security through democracy causes militarization and prompts new conflicts

Ivie 5 (Robert L Ivie, Prof. Emeritus, Dept of Comm & Culture @ Indiana U Bloomington. 2005 "Savagery in democracy's empire, Third World Quarterly, 26:1, 55-65 *thw_*)

Although the trope of savagery is not unique to American war rhetoric, it is¶ indigenous to it and deeply ingrained in the political culture. The USA was¶ born in a new world that European settlers had cleared tribe by tribe, nation¶ after nation, of its native savages. British rule was overthrown in the colonies¶ with a call to arms against English monsters that thirsted for American¶ blood.4 The War of 1812, considered by many to be America's second war of¶ independence, was justified in Congress and to the nation by increasingly intense cries of British diabolism and decivilising metaphors of force that conveyed the image of a people being trampled, trodden and bullied by an enemy portrayed variously as beast of prey,

common criminal, ruthless murderer, haughty pirate and crazed tyrant.5 Similarly, the expansionist war declared against Mexico in 1846 was portrayed by a partisan President Polk, with a disciplined majority party in Congress, as a reluctant act of national defence in response to an irrational and evil Mexican aggressor, a belligerent foe that was easily inflamed and as unstable as a violent storm.6 President McKinley's justification of commercial imperialism five decades later, as the USA was about to enter the 20th century, was that America, by God's grace, would 'uplift and civilize and Christianize' those who 'were unfit for selfgovernment'. These savages of the Philippines would be the beneficiaries of America's 'noble generosity' and 'Christian sympathy and charity'.7

The savagery of war itself, as well as the rationalisation of slaughter, was marked particularly in the modern age by the trope of the machine. War became 'the mechanical human beast', adding yet another metaphor to the heritage of 'discursive support for military conflict' and to the language of 'common sense' that legitimised its destructive reality. A 'delirium of technology' transformed the machine into a deranged and destructive monster. The national character of the evil enemy was contained in this image of mechanised madness, with expansionist Germany representing the perfectly oiled war machine, its individual citizens reduced to uniform mechanical cogs. The beast became a rampaging automaton, an anarchic machine, an abdication of individuality and human responsibility, an uncontrolled threat to democracy that transformed the savage lust of the masses into the modern menace of civilisation. Indeed, the 'broad distinction between ''civilisation'' and ''barbarism''' that was so central to the language of World War I rested heavily on the pejorative characterisation of Germany as a perversion of progress, a degeneracy of 'over-rapid development', a mechanical mentality that elevated atrocity to 'a science and a technology'. The modern primitive had become a 'murdering machine', stripping its victims of their humanity, reducing them to raw material—its mechanical ethos making war into an inevitability, into 'the Frankenstein's monster of the twentieth century'.8 Thus Woodrow Wilson called for a war against Germany to make the world safe for democracy, with 'civilization itself seeming to be in the balance' because the menace of 'autocratic governments backed by organized force' had taken control 'of the will of their people'.9

The very militarisation of America led next, under this technological shadow of war, into a second world conflagration. Franklin Roosevelt, as Michael Sherry observes, 'did not merely perceive the importance of technology in modern warfare, he seized on it as fitting the nation's strengths and he deepened the American impulse to achieve global power through technological supremacy'. Such was his 'ideological construction' of national security. Europe's war-mad barbarians were the product of a technological determinism that assaulted 'the foundations of civilization' and required the USA to adopt 'strategies of annihilation as the measure of its own security against the danger of new technologies and ideologies.10 Thus FDR called on America, as the world's arsenal of democracy, to lead a crusade against the evil Axis of fascist power, a diabolical enemy that feigned peaceful intentions even as it ravaged the world in the most shocking, brutal, and criminal acts of treachery. The Japanese aggression at Pearl Harbor on Sunday, 7 December 1941 was a cause for indignation, an affront to a God-fearing nation, and it provided an exigency for defending civilisation by vanquishing rampant evil. Roosevelt's war rhetoric condensed belligerency to its pure form for a technological age and enemy.11

War itself became, even for Americans who prided themselves on their individualism, a 'mindless, anonymous' expression of 'machine-age dehumanization and cosmic purposelessness'. The bombing of cities was portrayed 'as a process of surgical destruction administered by cool-headed Americans'. This was an image of war rendered benign and a sense of power inflated into a technological arrogance that culminated in the atomic extermination of Japanese treachery and savagery.12 The mindset of Hiroshima among the US public was 'a collective form of psychic numbing' that carried forward into a regime of cold-war nuclearism. The atomic bomb, President Truman announced in triumph, was repayment for Pearl Harbor many fold, 'a new and revolutionary increase in destruction', a 'harnessing of the basic power of the universe', which Americans were rightly 'grateful to Providence' that decent people possessed, and with which they had righteously vanquished an evil enemy.13

Democracy creates fear of authoritarianism sparking conflict
Ivie and Giner 04
[ROBERT L. IVIE professor emeritus of communications and culture & American studies at Indiana University, OSCAR GINER Professor in the Theater department at Arizona State University, December 2004, "Hunting the Devil: Democracy's Rhetorical Impulse to War", Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 pg 580-581 jf]

America's chronic impulse to war is provoked by democracy's shadow, which lurks at the far reaches of the nation's political soul. **Democracy casts** a dark veil of **anxiety over the public disposition**-so much so that **it constitutes a national phobia.** This deep distrust of the people, or "demophobia," confounds the identity and bewilders the political will of a self-proclaimed exceptional nation (Ivie 2005a, 14, 34, 43-44, 90-91). **It produces** nothing short of **a cultural tension that is resolved in presidential rhetoric as a commanding motive for war.**

There are several continuous phases in democracy's impulse to war. **We-the people-fear the enemy within**: an impassioned ogre of mob violence, a deformed Mr. Hyde who reflects the common fear and shared anxiety about democracy. This in the crucible of collective weaknesses, misshapen by national ambivalence toward the political system **Americans claim to honor-is readily projected onto external sources which are then conjured as** evil and defined as **the public enemy. A discourse of diabolism swiftly follows to paint a threatening picture of the enemy's evil savagery and goad the nation to defend its holy democratic soul** against civilization's wicked foes. The projection of a troubled identity, the displacement of the nation's own seeming vileness onto others-"in order to wipe it out with their blood" (Miller 1987, 357)-is a recurring goad to fight.

This demonic impulse to war assumes many guises in U.S. presidential rhetoric. The devil, as an essential antagonist in the nation's cosmology, has had a long and notable history in national dramas playing the part of the enemy. To **kill the foreign devil-enemy is to reaffirm the nation's special virtue** as a chosen people destined to overcome malevolence so that civilization may prevail. This heroic mask is the stuff of political myth. In the secular rituals of presidential rhetoric, **the mask pretends worldly realism in order to summon the god of war,** which is a necessary posture in a world of presumed enlightenment and a compensatory gesture in a fragmented postmodern political culture of hyper-symbolic transactions. Even as the nation dances to the drums of war, **it justifies aggression in the prosaic presidential idiom of the real**, the rational, and the practical. Herein lay the riddle of war's apparent complexity but basic simplicity; thus the extraordinary appeal of the contemporary call to arms.

Interested observers of this powerful mythos, upon detecting its presence in presidential rhetoric, need also to consider its implications for democratic culture. Recognition of the mythic forces that inform American politics is crucial to an understanding of governance in an age of imperial warfare. Can democracy, emptied of its incentive to humanize aliens by the diabolical incantations of presidential rhetoric, function as an inclusive politics of contestation? Or must it succumb, as did the first French republic (Schama 1989, 858-59), to a culture of war? To answer this question, it is important to acknowledge that George W. Bush's **presidential rhetoric is not an aberration of American political culture; it is rather a manifestation of unresolved issues of national identity being played out in a mythic ritual of redemptive violence.**

Iran

Democratic Peace Theory makes Iran seem like a threat – a securitized approach can never solve

Hayes 09 [Jarrod Hayes, PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Southern California and Assistant Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 2 DEC 2009, "Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran's Nuclear Programs", International Studies Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 4, page 979 jf]

Consistently, **the political character of Iran is the central referent point in the threat discussion. The undemocratic characteristics of Iranian governance were tied to**, and juxtaposed against, **the threat to all "free" countries.** This argument only makes sense if there is an implicit appeal to the public to accept the securitization on the basis that the nature of Iran's regime is fundamentally threatening to democracy. The argument is not a strategic one (for example, Iran having a nuclear weapon is bad for US oil supply security), it is an argument based on democratic identity. This assessment is reinforced by the call for Iran's government to change in order to eliminate the threat to the democracies of the world. If **democratic identity did not matter to the public in terms of securitizing threats, there would be no need to call for democratization as a means to resolve the threat facing it.**

Within the US Congress, **some senators and representatives contested the securitization of Iran**. Bush's 2002 "axis of evil" State of the Union speech provides a useful focal point for looking at securitization rhetoric within the Congress. Two months after the State of the Union speech, Senators Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Charles Hagel (R-NE) made an argument for keeping relations with Iran within the realm of normal politics and out of the security framework. Hagel, in introducing a speech by Biden to the American-Iranian Council into the Congressional Record, argued that differences between the US and Iran should not "close off opportunities to influence Iranian behavior and work together constructively when we may share common interests" (Senator Hagel [NE] March 21, 2002).

Biden's speech pays particular attention to the democratic aspects of Iran's unusual divided governance, noting the reformist message of Iranian elections. For Biden, the democratic aspects of Iran moderate the potential threat from the country. The reformist will of the public, according to Biden, has created a "divided government… [a]n elected branch consisting of the parliament and the presidency" aligned against an unelected "hardcore clique" from which all the policies threatening to US interests arise: "they direct the policies that pose a threat to our interests." Biden's recognition of the democratic aspects of Iranian governance forms the basis and justification for his desecuritized approach. It precedes his assessment of the threat Iran poses to US interests (not to the United States itself) as well as his policy prescriptions. When Biden discusses threatening Iranian policies, he categorically condemns all but Iran's nuclear and missile programs, which enjoy significant levels of popular support within Iran. On these points, Biden concludes, "we cannot simply dismiss Iran's security concerns." His policy prescriptions reflect Biden's unaggressive, **desecuritizing approach: permit American NGOs to support civil society organizations within Iran, cooperate with Iran on issues of mutual interest, accept Iran's bid to initiate WTO accession talks, indirectly assist Iran on issues of refugees and narcotics, and continue citizen exchanges. In his discussion of Iran, Biden, and by extension Hagel, clearly attempt to position Iran and its relationship with the US within the realm of normal politics and outside a security framework** (Senator Hagel [NE] March 21, 2002).

A counter narrative, more in line with the securitizing approach of President Bush, vied with that of Hagel and Biden. A "sense of the Senate" resolution contested Biden's partial democratization of Iran. According to the sponsoring senators, while Iran's "people aspire to democracy, civil, political, and religious rights, and the rule of law," the "ideological dictatorship presided over by an unelected Supreme Leader…an unelected Expediency Council and Council of Guardians" represses the people's will. **The senators dismiss the democratic elements of Iran's government**, pointing to "increasingly frequent anti-Khatami demonstrations" and claiming that Khatami "clearly lacks the ability and inclina- tion to change the behavior of the State of Iran…political repression, newspaper censorship, corruption, vigilante intimidation, arbitrary imprisonment of students, and public executions have increased since President Khatami's inauguration" (Senator Brownback [KS], Senator Wyden [OR], Senator Collins [ME], Senator Dorgan [ND], Senator Grassley [IO], Senator Conrad [ND], Senator Smith [NH], and Senator Boxer [CA] July 25, 2002).

As in Bush's rhetoric, the **antidemocratic characterization of Iran's government precedes, and hence is the source of, Iran's threat to the United States.** The sponsoring senators **first argue that Iran is wholly undemocratic and then outline the activities that threaten the United States. 6 While the resolution and its sponsors argue that the US should focus its efforts on "the people, and their hopes for a free**

and democratic nation'' rather than use military force, the authors are clearly constructing Iran as a security threat in the context of Iran's undemocratic governance (Senator Wyden [OR] July 25, 2002).

China/Iran

Democratic peace theory constructs nations like China and Iran as threats

Hayes 09 [Jarrod Hayes, PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Southern California and Assistant Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 2 DEC 2009, "Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran's Nuclear Programs", International Studies Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 4, page 979 jf]

What is remarkable about this quote is Specter's assessment of threat. **China poses a potential threat to the United States not because it has nuclear weapons or the largest military in the world. Instead, the Chinese threat arises from its authoritarian government. Conversely, India serves as a counterbalance against the Chinese threat simply because it is a democracy.** The implicit argument is that India's democratic governance naturally allies it with the democratic United States. Tellingly, after Specter links threat assessment (or lack thereof) to Indian democracy he goes on to discuss his change of heart on the US-India nuclear deal. **While Specter claims to have been swayed by India**'s argument that the NPT is discriminatory, **it is unlikely that he would have found these arguments compelling were they coming from nondemocratic Iran.**

It is difficult to measure public acceptance of the desecuritized construction of India and its nuclear program presented by policymakers. To a certain extent, the focus on the policymaker in securitization accepts the assumption that, as politicians, these actors are intimately aware of what policies and justifications they can, or cannot, 'sell' to the public. Public opinion polling should offer some insight on the issue, but as will become clear shortly, polling data requires at least as much interpretation as political speech and is critically dependent on both the content and the manner in which questions are asked (Moore 2004).

The Gallup organization has a long-running series of polls examining Americans' perceptions of other states. While not directly commenting on the perception of threat to the United States posed (or not) by India, Gallup did run a poll in the immediate aftermath of the May 1998 nuclear tests. In it, 61% of the public felt the development of nuclear weapons in general was a ''bad thing.'' Of these respondents, however, only 47% indicated that India's development of a nuclear weapon would be a threat to world peace. This contrasts sharply against the 66% of respondents who felt Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons posed a serious threat to world peace, and the more than 80% of respon- dents who felt that nuclear weapons development by Iran and Iraq posed a serious threat to world peace (Moore 1998). The Gallup data gives no indication as to why the threat perception of India is so far below the threat perception of Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and nuclear weapons in general, and without other polling data on the perception of India at the time, these conclusions mean little. These caveats aside, **the significantly lower level of perceived threat with respect to India seems to support the argument presented in this paper that India's democratic governance inhibits threat perception in the public.**

Long-term trends in general perception of India also seem to support this argument. Clearly, India enjoys a generally favorable perception in the public. In 2000, 76% of Americans viewed India in a positive light–15% felt India was a US ally, while 61% saw India as a friendly non-ally (Saad 2000). Differences in the question do produce significant variation in the numbers. A short year after the 2000 poll with no international incidents of note, India's 'favorability' in the eyes of the public stood at only 58% (Moore 2001). By 2005, 75% of respondents saw India favorably, possibly reflecting the consequences of the December 2004 tsunami (Moore 2005). A year later India's favorability rating had fallen back to 66%, roughly consistent with its rating of 69% as of March 2008 (Jones 2006; Saad 2008a). Despite the variation in poll ratings, India clearly maintains a broadly favorable position in the eyes of the public; the country consistently ranks among the top ten nations in terms of favorability. It is not clear what factors drive positive public perception of India, but it is telling that **democracies dominate the top of the favorability rankings. If democracy does play an important role in structuring public threat assessment, India's high rankings are consistent with what we would expect of public opinion.**

Prerequisite

Analyzation of securitization threats in relation to democracy is a prerequisite for effective policy

Hayes 09 [Jarrod Hayes, PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Southern California and Assistant Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 2 DEC 2009, "Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran's Nuclear Programs", International Studies Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 4, page 979 jf]

The securitization framework has the potential to provide significant insight into the mechanisms of the democratic peace—a considerable weakness in the literature. Muller and Wolff (2004) argue that the dominant mechanisms in the literature—political structure and political norms—are monadic mechanisms attempting to explain a dyadic phenomenon. The mechanistic ambiguity of the democratic peace leaves the theory open to legitimate counterarguments based on critiques of correlation (Gartzke 2000; Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001; Ward, Siverson, and Cao 2007) or reverse causality (Midlarsky 1995; Thompson 1996; James, Solberg, and Wolfson 1999). The lack of clear mechanistic understanding also makes it difficult for scholars and policymakers to integrate the democratic peace into a coherent foreign policy to enable democracies to take advantage of the phenomenon.

Securitization also serves to reintegrate the democratic peace back into security studies more broadly. **The democratic peace represents a regularity in how security threats are constructed,** not an exception. **Using securitization to trace that regularity and how it operates will improve our understanding of how democracies in general construct their threat environment. Securitization also reasserts the importance of politics in security policy.** While the institutions and balance of power play a role in international security, **understanding how threats and policy responses are identified and constructed by leaders both inside their heads and in public is critical for understanding international security dynamics.** Constructivist work on the democratic peace primarily focuses on the individual level of this duality. Securitization gives us a theoretical basis for examining the second—public—aspect.

Turns Case

Attempts to save democracy through securitization prevent actualizing freedom
Ivie and Giner 04

[ROBERT L. IVIE professor emeritus of communications and culture & American studies at Indiana University, OSCAR GINER Professor in the Theater department at Arizona State University, December 2004, "Hunting the Devil: Democracy's Rhetorical Impulse to War", Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 pg 592-593 jf]

Hints of a more robust democratic culture and practice, when they occasionally surfaced in presidential war rhetoric, were directed to the future rather than the present, thus deferring indefinitely a fuller realization of democracy while avoiding direct acknowledgement of a deep and abiding anxiety over actually empowering the demos. Thus, **Iraq was "making inspiring progress toward building a lasting democracy," and Afghanistan was "on the road to democracy"** (Bush 2005c, 2004b, 2004a). Likewise, **America was "advancing the rights of mankind" and standing up for "the advance of democracy" by helping countries "lay the foundations of democracy"** and showing them "the way toward democracy," which was an ongoing process, the president reminded Americans, that would test their patience because "finding the full promise of representative government takes time" and "we are now in the early hours of this struggle between tyranny and freedom" (Bush 2004c, 2005a, 2006f). This was the overall, well-removed future context in which the president occasionally gestured (and even then jokingly) to debate as the "essence of democracy" (Bush 2005c) and made passing reference to "a pluralistic, self governing society" (Bush 2004a). In the meantime, **the "difficult road ahead" required** "the determined efforts of a unified **country" that "must put aside our differences** and work together to meet the test that history has given us" in our common quest for "a shining age of human liberty" (Bush 2006f).

The reason for continuously deferring the fulfillment of democracy's larger promise was that tyranny, like the devil who tempted Jesus, is irrepressible and only "departs for a season" (Luke 4:13). The present fight was a "current expression of an ancient struggle—between those who put their faith in dictators, and those who put their faith in the people"; America faced an enemy that was "never tired, never sated, never content with yesterday's brutality" (Bush 2005c). Tyran**ny always returns, restored to its full savagery, at the first sign of civilization's weakness**. It never stays dead or remains permanently defeated. It continues "violently opposed to democracy" (Bush 2005a), forever challenging America to "back down" (Bush 2005e) and constantly requiring the nation to "fight back" in order to disprove tyranny's unshakable belief that "democracies are weak" (Bush 2005b, 2004b).

When freedom was defined foremost in opposition to totalitarianism—as a continuous fight with the dark ideological forces of tyranny spanning centuries, not just years and decades—**it lost its focus as a positive exercise** of constitutionally privileged **and protected civil rights and its immediate relationship to democratic practice.** Thus, **fighting for freedom substituted for putting freedom and democracy into practice and hindered thinking about what a robust practice of liberal democracy might actually entail.** It insinuated instead strong presidential leadership as the appropriate mode of governance—indeed, the stronger the better, given the immediacy of totalitarianism's unending threat.

War on terror impact

Attempt to protect the world for democracy created the war on terror
Ivie and Giner 04

[ROBERT L. IVIE professor emeritus of communications and culture & American studies at Indiana University, OSCAR GINER Professor in the Theater department at Arizona State University, December 2004, "Hunting the Devil: Democracy's Rhetorical Impulse to War", Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 pg 586-588

It was foundational in the sense of a base coat, or the gesso applied to a canvas before receiving the artist's painting. **The defacement of America's terrorist enemies by the president's rhetoric set the stage for a classic psychological projection.** The phenomenon of projection is defined by Carl Jung as "an unintentional transfer of a part of the psyche which belongs to the subject onto an outer object" (von Franz 1991, 14, emphasis in original). Alluding to a Christian metaphor, Marie-Louis von Franz reminds us that projections traffic in the "well-known business of the beam in our eye which we do not see" (von Franz 1991, 14).1 **Projections are "emotionally-toned**," and characteristically "the cause of the emotion appears to lie, beyond all possibility of doubt, in the other person" (Jung 1951, 146, emphasis in original). Th**e rhetorical manufacture of a blank slate allowed for the externalization of a** vague, disturbing, **shadowy persona**. "Terrorists try to operate in the shadows. They try to hide," Bush observed, but America would "rout out terrorism" no matter how long it might take. "No corner of the world will be dark enough to hide in" (Bush 2001f, 2001b). **Cast in a sinister undertone, the president's portrait of terror** depicted **America struggling in the dark to conquer its nemesis**. This was "a time of testing," a "time of adversity" that would reveal "the true character of the American people" (Bush 2001g, 2001l). It would be a difficult struggle, but the president assured Americans that "we can overcome evil. We're good" (Bush 2001k). Americans **were fighting to prove that** evildoers could not "break our spirit" or "diminish our soul" (Bush 2001c, 2001b). **America would not succumb in the darkness to its evil counterpart** and alter ego.

Jung reminds us that "**projections change the world into a replica of our unknown face**" (Jung 1951, 146**). Behind the mask of terrorist evil, the face of the distempered demon of democracy could be observed.** An observer tracking **the language of terror** through the president's public statements soon **encounters visible markers of the enemy's crazed brutality.** On the side of "chaotic violence" were the "barbaric acts" of "bands of murderers, supported by outlaw regimes" and driven by "mad intent"; these "shadowy, entrenched enemies" were the "authors of mass murder" (Bush 2001e, 2001q). **Their "mad ambitions"** and "fanaticism" constituted an "axis of evil" that **threatened "the civilized world" with "mass destruction"** (Bush 2002b). The "dim vision" of these "backwards," "barbaric," "cold-blooded killers," and "parasites" that "don't have hearts" was to "brutalize" their victims with "torture" and "beheadings" contrary to "all civilized norms" (Bush 2004a, 2004c, 2004d). The "fanatical," "murderous ideology" (Bush 2005c) and sheer "savagery" of these terrorists (**Bush** 2006a) **marked them** not only "as brutal an enemy as we've ever faced" (Bush 2005d) but especially **as "violently opposed to democracy"** (Bush 2005a) and against "the idea of progress itself" (Bush 2005c). Ultimately**, America's war on terrorism amounted to a "struggle between tyranny and freedom," a quest to "leave the desert of despotism for the fertile gardens of liberty"** (Bush 2006f).

Particularly difficult-to-acknowledge **apprehensions about democracy were expressed** by indirection and thereby attributed **to an old adversary** frequently revisited in presidential rhetoric. "The murderous

ideology of the Islamic radicals" was "like the ideology of communism," the president allowed, in that it "is elitist.... teaches that innocent individuals can be sacrificed to serve a political vision.... pursues totalitarian aims . . . [with] endless ambitions of imperial domination. . . . is dismissive of free peoples.... [and] contains inherent contradictions that doom it to failure" (Bush 2005c). This **projection of fear and distrust onto a totalitarian antagonist** (in abnegation of democracy) **was** purportedly **a display of what democratic America** precisely **was not** (elitist, authoritarian, imperialistic, aggressive, belligerent, murderous, and doomed to defeat). Yet **the dark image of this totalitarian**, Islamic, Communist-like **enemy corresponded**, perhaps too closely for comfort, **to the nation's ready compliance with presidential rule and its involvement in a wooly regimen of continuous global warfare.**

AT Pinker

Pinker's analysis is incomplete – solely framing peace as between great powers ignores mass deaths at the hands of those powers
Herman & Peterson 12

(David, independent writer & researcher based in Chicago, and Edward, prof. @ Wharton School UPenn "Reality Denial : Apologetics for Western-Imperial Violence" http://www.globalresearch.ca/reality-denial-apologetics-for-western-imperial-violence/32066 *thw_*)

Pinker's standard for an interruption of the "Long Peace" would be a war between the "great powers," and it is true that the major Axis and Allied powers that fought each other during World War II have not made war among themselves since 1945. But Pinker carries this line of thought even further: He contends not only that the "democracies avoid disputes with each other," but that they "tend to stay out of disputes across the board," (283) an idea he refers to as the "Democratic Peace."[12] (278-284) This will surely come as a surprise to the many victims of U.S. assassinations, sanctions, subversions, bombings and invasions since 1945.[13] For Pinker, no attack on a lesser power by one or more of the great democracies counts as a real war or confutes the "Democratic Peace," no matter how many people die.

"Among respectable countries," Pinker writes, "conquest is no longer a thinkable option. A politician in a democracy today who suggested conquering another country would be met not with counterarguments but with puzzlement, embarrassment, or laughter." (260) This is an extremely silly assertion. Presumably, when George Bush and Tony Blair sent U.S. and British forces to attack Iraq in 2003, ousted its government, and replaced it with one operating under laws drafted by the Coalition Provisional Authority, this did not count as "conquest," as these leaders never stated that they launched the war to "conquer" Iraq, but rather "to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger."[14] What conqueror has ever pronounced as his goal something other than self-defense and the protection of life and limb? It is on the basis of devices such as this that Pinker's "Long Peace," "New Peace," and "Democratic Peace" rest. (See "Massaging the Numbers," below.)

And it is in this kind of context Pinker throws-in his "gentle commerce" theme by advancing the so-called "Golden Arches Peace" idea—that "no two countries with a McDonald's have ever fought in a war." The "only unambiguous" exception that he can name occurred in 1999, "when NATO briefly bombed Yugoslavia." (285) In an endnote he mentions that an "earlier marginal exception was the U.S. attack on Panama in 1989," but he dismisses this U.S. war as too insignificant to make the grade—"its death count falls short of the minimum required for a war according to the standard definition,"[15] though according to the UN Charter and customary international law, there was nothing sub-standard about this unambiguous U.S. aggression against a sovereign country. Here as in many other places, Pinker selects the estimated death toll that minimizes the U.S.-inflicted casualties and fits his political agenda.[16]

Pinker mentions in passing that the post-World War II peace among the giants was possibly a result of the immense cost of wars that might involve a nuclear exchange—and it did extend to the Soviet Union during its post-World War II life—but his explanation focuses mainly on the cultural evolution and biological adaptations of the Civilized,[17] in contrast with the Uncivilized of the Third World. Why this new peaceableness of the Civilized does not stop their violent interventions abroad he fails to explain. The exclusion of wars against the Uncivilized from his definition of a "Long Peace" reflects gross political bias.

Pinker attributes the sense of increased violence to multiple "illusions," one of which he believes is caused by the development of media and other advanced forms of communication that allow a rushing to the spot of bloody events, and recording them and transmitting them to the world. As he explained in a guest appearance on CBS TV's The Early Show in mid-December 2011: "Not only can we send a helicopter with a film crew to any troubled spot in the world but now anyone with a cell phone is an instant reporter. They can broadcast color footage of bloodshed wherever it occurs and so we're very aware of it."[18] Apparently Pinker believes that the

media cover the world on a non-discriminatory basis, reporting on Guatemalan peasants slaughtered by their army, civilian victims of U.S. drone warfare in Afghanistan, Honduran protesters shot dead by their own military, and dead and injured U.S. soldiers as aggressively as they report on civilian protesters shot dead on the streets of Tehran, or the victims of the Syrian government or of the late Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.[19] The naiveté here is staggering.

Pinker's "Long Peace" and "New Peace" and their alleged declines of violence not only coincide with the numerous and ongoing attacks by the giants on the midgets, the huge expansion in arms, and the new "burgeoning" of torture,[20] but runs parallel with the increasing structural violence of a global class war that has resulted in growing inequality within and between countries, systematic dispossession of vast numbers, a widespread seizure of the commons, major migrations, growing cities of slums, increased ethnic tensions and anti-Islamic fervor, deliberately stoked in a troubled, receptive environment, mass incarceration of minority populations, and more vocal oppositional forces both here and abroad.[21] These do not constitute "violence" in Pinker's accounting system.

Privacy

1NC Privacy

Creating zones of privacy against state intrusion reinforces rather than challenges the security state

Henry 13 (PhD candidate at Carleton University reading Sociology and Political Economy)
(Aaron, Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 9 (2) Winter 2013, THE PERPETUAL OBJECT OF REGULATION: PRIVACY AS PACIFICATION)

There is a conviction today that privacy is in a state of irretrievable crisis. In addition to the collection and sale of day-to-day personal activity by telecommunications services and social networking sites, programmes of surveillance and registration have allegedly eroded what were previously understood as the firm borders between public and private spheres of relations. That this has happened or is in the process of materializing has taken on the weight and opacity of a social fact. Yet, while privacy is said to be in a state of crisis, the 'right to privacy' is often trumpeted by liberals as the counterweight to balance the intrusion of state projects into the lives of individuals. Indeed, this appears to be the general sentiment that rests behind initiatives like the 'Orwell Award' given to companies that have violated privacy, or the American Civil Liberties Union recent mobilization against Drones as a privacy concern. Thus, privacy is presented as means to make intrusions into the life of the individual proportional to the objectives of security projects, and in some instances security projects are legitimized for the forms of privacy they safeguard (Cavoukian, 1999, 13). To this end, privacy is subject to a rather peculiar positioning as both a relation threatened by security and as a regulative principle capable of ensuring the 'acceptable' limits of security projects.

What I want to demonstrate in this paper is that the relation of privacy to security as both an object threatened by security and as a means of regulating security projects is the product of a longstanding relation between privacy, security and capital. This relation is expressed in two ways. First, while privacy has been invoked as a means to resist projects of security, I argue that privacy is in fact deployed as a means to structure the fields of relations through which security interventions are made.2 In this sense, when the power of state or capital intervenes upon the individual, privacy emerges as a concept. Privacy, a retroactive concept, exists as a means to assuage individuals that the duration and scope of security projects will be 'reasonable or proportional'; thus, security presupposes and delimits privacy. Second, in the course of defending the individual's freedom and autonomy over their inner world, privacy reinforces private property and private life, the very relations projects of security safeguard. Thus, privacy acclimatizes us to a mode of existence where we are alienated from our collective social power, and so we confront relations of domination and exploitation as private individuals. This commodification of our selves is, I suggest, part of the condition of pacification.

First, I attempt to theorize how security and its relation to capital render it not only generative of privacy but structure its perimeters. I demonstrate the formation of this relationship between security and privacy through a critical reading of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan. Second, I offer a contemporary example of this relation between privacy and security through an analysis of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement between the United States and the EU. Finally, I conclude by reviewing how privacy as desirable form of existence constitutes a form of pacification insofar as it not only fails to challenge capital but has further entrenched the logics of security into social life.

Proliferation

1NC Proliferation

Fears of proliferation are based in racism and colonialism
Lutz 9

[Catherine Lutz, professor of anthropology at Brown University and the Watson Institute for International Studies, 2009, *The Bases of Empire* p. 29]

The reasons given for stationing U.S. forces overseas, though, cannot simply be called wrong. While the weight of evidence just briefly reviewed suggests that they are, **the pursuit of** the immense project of **circling the globe with soldiers** and equipment **is fueled as much by mythic structures as by reason** and rationality. **It then becomes difficult to distinguish** one from the other. While such myths may be invalidated by rational argumentation, their explanatory power often remains powerfully intact. **Support for foreign military bases hinges** first **on the idea that war is** often necessary and **ultimately inevitable. It is widely believed that humans are naturally violent and that war can be** a **glorious** and good venture. **Racism adds the notion that** the modern and not coincidentally **white nations have the responsibility, intelligence, religious ethic, and right to control more primitive** (and more chaotically violent) **others through violence if necessary. These racial ideas made it possible for people in the United States and Europe to support colonial exterminationist wars** in the nineteenth century, **but to find wars between industrialized or civilized states increasingly unthinkable** during the late nineteenth century (despite what went on to happen in the twentieth). **They also underpin the assumption that Gusterson (1999) has labeled "nuclear orientalism," which holds that only the United States and European powers can truly be trusted with nuclear weapons.** Such beliefs provide important foundation stones for support of the U.S. basing system.16

2NC Proliferation Discourse

Proliferation discourse constructs nations as out of control to justify American imperialism. This orientalist framing ends in absolute domination of the Other.
Gusterson 99 (Hugh Gusterson, Prof. Anthropology & Science & Tech Studies @ MIT, 1999, "Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination," *thw_*)

According to the literature on risk in anthropology, shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). The immoderate **reactions in the West to the nuclear tests** conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, **are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it**, in the Western imagination. This discourse, **dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back**, at least, **to the Non-Proliferation Treaty** of 1970. The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five countries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. According to the bargain**, the five official nuclear states** (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)3 **promised to assist other signatories** to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology **as long as they did not** use that technology to **produce nuclear weapons**, submitting to international inspections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, **the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament"** (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric–designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers-**the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms**. In view of recent developments in global politics-the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World-the importance of **this discourse** in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It **has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. military programs** in the post-Cold War world **since** the early 1990s, when U.S. military **leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger** just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995). Thus in Western discourse **nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not**. During the Cold War the Western **discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation"** defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage **split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals** (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) **from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem."** Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.5 However, **the United States and Russia have turned back appeals** from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers **to open discussions on** a global convention **abolishing nuclear weapons**. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). **The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system** of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology **is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial** and postcolonial **discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries**.6 **This inscription** of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations **as ineradicably different from our own** has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues

that orientalist discourse **constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions** that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: **where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated**. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, **more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics**. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in **U.S. national security** discourse. Following Anthony Giddens (1979), I define **ideology** as a way of constructing political ideas, institutions, and behavior which (1) **makes the political structures and institutions** created by dominant social groups, classes, and nations **appear to be naturally given and inescapable** rather than socially constructed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) **obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit massive, binary confrontations** (i.e., revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimates domination.

The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in all four of these senses: (1) it **makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural** and reasonable while problematizing attempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody's; (3) **it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation** in the underdeveloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers. In the following pages I examine four popular arguments against horizontal nuclear proliferation and suggest that all four are ideological and orientalist. The arguments are that (1) Third World countries are too poor to afford nuclear weapons; (2) deterrence will be unstable in the Third World; (3) Third World regimes lack the technical maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons; and (4) Third World regimes lack the political maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons. Each of these four arguments could as easily be turned backwards and used to delegitimate Western nuclear weapons, as I show in the following commentary. Sometimes, in the specialized literature of defense experts, one finds frank discussion of near accidents, weaknesses, and anomalies in deterrence as it has been practiced by the established nuclear powers, but these admissions tend to be quarantined in specialized discursive spaces where the general public has little access to them and where it is hard to connect them to the broader public discourse on nuclear proliferation.7 In this article I retrieve some of these discussions of flaws in deterrence from their quarantined spaces and juxtapose them with the dominant discourse on the dangers of proliferation in order to destabilize its foundational assumption of a secure binary distinction between "the West" and "the Third World." It is my argument that, **in the production of this binary distinction, possible fears and ambivalences about Western nuclear weapons are purged and recast as intolerable aspects of the Other. This** purging and recasting **occurs in a discourse characterized by gaps and silences in its representation of our own nuclear weapons and exaggerations in its representation of the Other's. Our discourse** on proliferation is a piece of ideological machinery that **transforms anxiety-provoking ambiguities into secure dichotomies**. I should clarify two points here. First, I am not arguing that there are, finally, no differences between countries in terms of their reliability as custodians of nuclear weapons. I am arguing that those differences are complex, ambiguous, and crosscutting in ways that are not captured by a simple binary division between, on the one hand, a few countries that have nuclear weapons and insist they are safe and, on the other hand, those countries that do not have nuclear weapons and are told they cannot safely acquire them. It is my goal here to demonstrate the ways in which **this simple binary distinction works as an ideological mechanism to impede a more nuanced and realistic assessment of the polymorphous dangers posed by nuclear weapons in all countries and to obscure recognition of the ways in which our own policies in the West have often exacerbated dangers in the Third World that**, far from being simply the problems of the Other, **are problems produced by a world system dominated by First World institutions and states**.

--Anti-nuclearism

WMD policy justifies war in the name of preservation. Coercive tactics maintain US dominance and justify nuke war

BondGraham & Parrish 2009 (Darwin BondGraham, sociologist and investigative journalist, and Will Parrish, anti-imperialist scholar. 2006 "Anti-nuclear Nuclearism", http://fpif.org/anti-nuclear_nuclearism/ *thw_*)

The Obama administration is likely to continue a policy that we call "anti-nuclear nuclearism." **Anti-nuclear nuclearism** is a foreign and military policy that **relies upon overwhelming U.S. power**, including the nuclear arsenal, **but makes rhetorical and even some substantive commitments to disarmament**, however vaguely defined. Anti-nuclear nuclearism thrives as a school of thought in several think tanks that have long influenced foreign policy choices related to global nuclear forces. Even the national nuclear weapons development labs in New Mexico and California have been avid supporters and crafters of it. As a policy, **anti-nuclear nuclearism is designed to ensure U.S. nuclear and military dominance by rhetorically calling for what has long been derided as a naïve ideal: global nuclear disarmament**. Unlike past forms of nuclearism, **it de-emphasizes the offensive nature of the U.S. arsenal**. Instead of promoting the U.S. stockpile as a strategic deterrence or umbrella for U.S. and allied forces, it prioritizes an aggressive diplomatic and military campaign of nonproliferation. **Nonproliferation efforts are aimed entirely at other states, especially non-nuclear nations with suspected weapons programs**, or states that can be coerced and attacked under the pretense that they possess nuclear weapons or a development program (e.g. Iraq in 2003). Effectively pursuing this kind of belligerent nonproliferation regime requires half-steps toward cutting the U.S. arsenal further, and at least rhetorically recommitting the United States to international treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). **It requires** a fig leaf **that the United States isn't developing new nuclear weapons**, and that it is slowly disarming and de-emphasizing its nuclear arsenal. By these means the United States has tried to avoid the charge of hypocrisy**, even though it has designed and built newly modified weapons with qualitatively new capacities over the last decade and a half**. Meanwhile, U.S. leaders have allowed for and even promoted a mass proliferation of nuclear energy and material, albeit under the firm control of the nuclear weapons states, with the United States at the top of this pile. Many disarmament proponents were elated last year when four extremely prominent cold warriors — George P. Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn — announced in a series of op-eds their commitment to "a world free of nuclear weapons." Strange bedfellows indeed for the cause. Yet the fine print of their plan, published by the Hoover Institute and others since then, represents the anti-nuclear nuclearist platform to a tee. It's a conspicuous yet merely rhetorical commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. These four elder statesmen have said what many U.S. elites have rarely uttered: that abolition is both possible and desirable. However, **the anti-nuclear posture in their policy proposal comes to bear only on preventing non-nuclear states from going nuclear**, or else preventing international criminal conspiracies from proliferating weapons technologies and nuclear materials for use as instruments of non-state terror. In other words, it's about other people's nuclear weapons, not the 99% of materials and arms possessed by the United States and other established nuclear powers. **This position emphasizes an anti-nuclear politics entirely for what it means for the rest of the world — securing nuclear materials and preventing other states from going nuclear** or further developing their existing arsenals. U.S. responsibility to disarm remains in the distant future, unaddressed as a present imperative. Exclusive Route around the CTBT **Concerns about the nuclear programs of other states** — mostly Islamic, East and South Asian nations (**i.e., Iran**, North Korea, etc.) — **conveniently work to reinforce existing power relations embodied in U.S. military supremacy and neocolonial relationships** of technological inequality and dependence. By invoking their commitment to a "world free of nuclear weapons," **the ideologues** behind the anti-nuclear nuclearist platform **justify invasions, military strikes, economic sanctions, and** perhaps **even the use of nuclear weapons** themselves against the "rogue states" and "terrorists" whose possession of weapons technologies vastly less advanced than those perpetually stockpiled by the United States is deemed by the anti-nuclear nuclearists the first and foremost problem of the nuclear age.

Orientalism → War

This causes war, genocide, and racism based off of orientalist fears of potential threats Batur 7

[Pinar Batur, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Sociology @ Vassar, 2007, "The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide," in *Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations*, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7]

At the turn of the 20th century, the "Terrible Turk" was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in **American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind** (Vander Lippe 1999). **Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the "Oriental" other**—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and **inferior** to the peaceful, rational, scientific "Occidental" Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption.

Post-Enlightenment Europe and **later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision** of **the 20th century shifted from the image of the "Terrible Turk" to** that of the **"Barbaric Russian Bear**," In this context, **orientalist thought** then, as now, **set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority.** By focusing on ideology, **orientalism recreated the superior race**, even though there was no "race." **It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the "right ideological and cultural framework." It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued** to foster and aid the recreation of **racial hatred of others** with the collapse of the Soviet "other." **Orientalism's global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims** and Islamic culture **as to the "inferior other**." Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States.

Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, "show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached." In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic "holy war," and said, "violence in the name of religion was contrary to God's nature and to reason." He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope's speech "regrettable," it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope's "ill informed and bigoted" comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, "I'm deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims" (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope's apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that "Muslim" violence had proved his point.

Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, "this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world" (Lewis 2006). He cautions that "it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind." Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don't see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as "an inducement" (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that "in a world of different civilizations, each . . . will have to learn to coexist with the others" (Huntington 1993:49).

Lewis, like Pope Benedict, **views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization** and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis's assertions run parallel with George Bush's claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, **Bush claimed, "This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation"** (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that "the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century" and he compared it to the 20th century's fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though "Islamo-fascist" has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O'Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. M**uslim Americans found this phrase "contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam** and the American Muslim community" (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate "war on terrorism" with "crusade," this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, " . . .we still aren't completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in" (CNN 2006).

Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, **is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality**, both ideologically and physically, **but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection.** Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete**, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. War and**

genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

Relations

1NC Relations (Mexico cartels)

Cartels are a product of US policies in Mexico, the affirmative only increases the widespread corruption and violence

Thornton & Goodman 14 [Christy Thornton, former Executive Director of NACLA, graduate student in the Department of History at NYU, and Adam Goodman, doctoral student in history at the University of Pennsylvania, "How the Mexican Drug Trade Thrives on Free Trade," 7/15/14] http://www.thenation.com/article/180587/how-mexican-drug-trade-thrives-free-trade# *nufh_*

Since 2006, more than 100,000 people have been disappeared or killed in Mexico, a country where more than 90 percent of crimes go unpunished. While running for president in 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto promised a new security strategy for the country, and an end to the highly militarized campaign waged by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. Since taking office, however, Peña **Nieto's strategy has focused** not on the safety of its people but **on the confidence of its international investors. To make Mexico more attractive to overseas capital, he has pursued a market-based reform agenda** that includes a technocratic overhaul of education, a move to shake up the telecommunications sector and the opening of the energy sector to foreign private investment. New narratives about the "Aztec Tiger" won't make the kidnappings, beheadings and mass graves disappear, but Peña Nieto is doing everything he can to make foreign investors forget about them.

The irony of touting market-based reforms as a means of sweeping the drug trade under the rug is that the **cartels themselves have become** some of the most ruthlessly **effective multinational capitalist enterprises** in Mexico. The **cartels are beginning to diversify, making money** not just from drugs and other criminal activities like kidnapping and human trafficking but increasingly **from control over industries like mining, logging and shipping.**

Meanwhile, **finance and real estate sectors in Mexico and the United States are awash with cartel profits**, with one United Nations analyst arguing that **drug money was the "only liquid investment capital" that kept the international economy from completely imploding in 2008.** Over the last few decades Mexican capitalism has become a tangled web of legal and illegal activity, and the distinctions between licit and illicit economies have become increasingly blurred. **The policies of the Mexican and US governments are only accelerating this trend.**

There are two separate but deeply connected histories that have created the situation in Mexico today: first, the neoliberal restructuring of the economy that began in the 1980s; and second, the rise of the drug trade and the cartels that control it. Squarely at the center of both stories has been **the Mexican state**, whose corruption, incompetence and often contradictory policy choices (in tandem with those of the United States) h**ave served to create vast sums of wealth for a few, while heightening insecurity for Mexico's working people.** When we talk about the drug trade, we are talking about a deeply entrenched part of contemporary capitalism in Mexico, not its undoing.

The restructuring of the Mexican economy in the 1980s occurred as the policy of inward-looking, state-led industrial development pursued by Mexico from the 1940s through the 1970s came to a spectacular end with the 1982 debt crisis. **A structural adjustment agreement negotiated with the I**nternational **M**onetary **F**und **required Mexico to devalue the peso, slash government subsidies, cut funding for social programs and privatize hundreds of state-owned enterprises** in return for the refinancing of Mexico's debt.¶ Then, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who came to power in a 1988 election widely regarded as fraudulent, moved Mexico from a policy of temporary austerity to one of permanent state restructuring. He amended the constitution to allow for the private sale of communal lands known as ejidos, deregulated the telecom sector, denationalized the banks and, most importantly, reoriented Mexican industry toward the export sector, negotiating of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada.¶ **Salinas promised that NAFTA would lift Mexicans out of poverty** by creating new manufacturing jobs and famously argued that the agreement would create a Mexico that exported goods rather than people. Mexico would become part of the first world, Salinas proclaimed, and to prove it, he oversaw the country's entry into the OECD, the club for the world's leading industrial nations.

Twenty years after the implementation of NAFTA, however, it's now clear that most of Salinas's promises have gone unfulfilled. **Mexican economic growth during the period was among the lowest in Latin America, and poverty and**

inequality levels remain at pre-NAFTA levels. A study from the Center for Economic and Policy Research points out that while the poverty rate remained stagnant over the last two decades (at around 52 percent), population growth has actually meant that **14.3 million more Mexicans were living in poverty in 2012 than in 1994. Unemployment also increased in Mexico during the period, and some 4.9 million jobs were lost in the family farm sector due to post-NAFTA declines in commodity prices and reductions in state protections.**

And while the exports of goods from Mexico did increase, as Salinas had promised, NAFTA didn't stem the flow of people across the border. Instead, **the flow of undocumented workers across the border increased**: according to a Pew Research report, the number of Mexicans that immigrated to the United States rose from 430,000 in 1994 to 770,000 in 2000, before tailing off because of increased border enforcement measures and the recent economic recession. (One additional result of NAFTA is an increased exposure of the Mexican economy to downturns in its northern neighbor.) This spike in migration resulted in the growth of the Mexican population in the United States from 4.5 million in 1990 to just under 12 million today.

Of course, while NAFTA forced people to migrate, concurrent policies of border militarization made that migration increasingly difficult and dangerous. **Instead of integrating** the North American labor market or adjusting the number of work visas to match demand, **the United States militarized** its border with Mexico to previously unimaginable levels.

Since 1994 the number of Border Patrol officers has increased from just over 4,200 to more than 21,000; the number of hours agents spent patrolling the border has gone from 3 million to more than 20 million; and **the Border Patrol's annual budget has increased from $400 million to more than $3.4 billion.**

At the same time, **sectors** that were privatized during structural adjustment but protected from competition under NAFTA—telephone, television and transportation among them—**are now monopolized by some of Mexico's richest men**. Mexico's new billionaires include the owners of the two largest television networks; the distributors of Coca-Cola; and Carlos Slim, who controls more than three-quarters of all telephone service. (**Recent reforms may begin to break up these monopolies, but many believe they will actually benefit** Televisa, **the media giant with close ties to the ruling party**, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, known as the PRI). **The top 10 percent in Mexico now control more than 40 percent of its national wealth.**

The policies of the last twenty years may have made a small group of Mexicans part of the global ultra-rich elite, but they **left the vast majority** and the country as a whole no better, and in some cases **much worse**, **than before**.

It was in this same period that the **drug trade intensified and cartel power expanded**. As the historian Froylán Enciso has shown, this was anything but inevitable. Instead, **the cartels' rise can be attributed to** a combination of domestic and international factors, including **US policy and involvement in Mexico**, Mexican government policy, widespread corruption and impunity, and the $100 billion-a-year market created by demand for drugs north of the border. **These factors together have fostered conditions under which the drug trade has boomed**, creating a spectacularly violent twin for Mexico's export-oriented "legitimate" economy.

--Link – EU/China/Russia

US relations with EU, Russia, and China are part of a drive to organize Empire into "spheres of influence" – reproduces the central axis of imperialism

Negri '2, (Antonio, former Prof. of Poli Sci @ U of Padua, "The Order of War", http://www.generation-online.org/t/negriwar.htm)

Preventative war is not only a military doctrine; it is **a constituent strategy of Empire**. The American administration's September 20th document explicitly states so: preventative war is a just and necessary means to defend liberty, justice, democracy and economic growth against terrorists and tyrants. It adds that **preventative war should be considered immediately relevant concerning** three "rogue states": **Iraq, Iran and North Korea**. To certain sectors of public opinion as well as to diplomats of some countries **it seemed as though** the statement about **the "Axis of Evil",** along with a succession of angry unilateralist declarations on the part of White House representatives and their watchdogs **indicated the suspension** or definitive interruption **of the nexus between military doctrine and** the **constituent strategy of Empire**. In reality such was not the case. On the contrary, **these statements represented items on the agenda** [ordine del giorno] **around which constituent discussions between the global powers emerged**. No sensible person could have ever really thought that Iraq, Iran and North Korea posed substantial problems for a power like the USA, which could claim inordinate military power after its victory against international communism. Now American military power, which is absolutely asymmetric, must also become intransitive; it must remain an absolute superpower not so much with respect to the three 'powers of Evil' but rather in respect to the other world powers: **the Axis of evil is a metaphor for the great problems the monarchic power of the U**nited **S**tates of America **faces in three strategic areas** at the end of the cold war. **Europe, Russia and China represent the problematic poles of the new global order**. Now, **Iraq is a further indication of the European problem** (and subordinately, of the Japanese one) **presented under the guise of energy supplies**: without securing them the European economy cannot exist and whoever controls energy supplies has his hands on the whole range of biopolitical functions of power in the old continent. On the other hand, **Iran** (the area around the Caspian sea) **represents the soft underbelly of Russian development**. **North Korea is in the middle of the China Sea**. **How is Empire organized in these three fundamental zones**? What is its material constitution to become, today, in the presence of an American military superpower? How is the military supremacy of the monarchic power over the new imperial order to be preventatively secured? It is well known that **in Empire the sole exercise of military power** -or rather, of the monarchical function- **is far from being sufficient to secure** centrality and **stability** for the exercise of global power. Moreover, 911 has shown (and with what dreadful evidence!) that **the U**nited **S**tates **is in no respects an island**. **The ensuing economic crisis** –not only at the level of production but also and especially at the financial and monetary level- **has demonstrated that in Empire monarchy cannot survive unless it is in agreement with the global aristocracy**. Therefore, **the war that's brewing contains** within its core **a discussion on the imperial constitution**, and particularly, as far as Europe is concerned, the dimensions and roles of the European aristocracies in it. Chirac and Schroder are neither pacifists nor warmongers: they are debating with Bush on the place of European capitalism in the imperial constitution. **The major decisions are not being made on the war on terrorism or on the conventional war against tyrants, but rather on the forms of hegemony and the relative degrees of power that** American and/or European **capitalist elites will have in the organization of the new world order**. **Preventative decisions are not simply to do with war but more with market predominance in the sub regions of the imperial organization**.

Religious Freedom

1NC Religious Freedom

Attempts to allow religious freedom perpetrate colonialism
Rao 12

[Ramesh Rao, Professor at Columbus State University and an expert in Indian politics, August 5, 2012, "Imperialist Goals Masked in the Garb of Religious Freedom" http://www.patheos.com/Hindu/Imperialist-Goals-Ramesh-Rao-08-06-2012?offset=2&max=1]

The U.S. State Department and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom **submit annual reports** evaluating conditions in the nations of the world **regarding the citizens of those countries and their ability** to profess **and practice their faiths.** Then there are myriad non-governmental organizations and activist groups, including the Hindu American Foundation, of which I am an executive council member, publishing their own reports. **Such a massive effort of looking into others' internal matters is not undertaken by any other country. The U.S. is in many ways, the world's self-proclaimed policeman, seeking to keep world order.** Whether it is right or wrong is not the focus of this essay, but instead we can argue that based on what the State Department's latest report says about religious freedom in India, the report and the exercise is flawed, myopic, and blinkered.

These exercises **minding others' businesses should be carefully evaluated and critiqued** so that we can understand why we wish to pry into others' lives and to claim for ourselves the ability and the right to do so. **A colonial, imperialist hangover, one might say, as well as the Christian's wish to be his/her brother's/sister's keeper. The White Man's Burden may indeed be heavy and self-imposed**, but how that burden is carried and is disposed of is no longer just the white man's concern but my concern too, and the concern of many like me --not Christian, not white, and not burdened with minding others' businesses.

Scholars and academics of the West have spent enormous effort at "understanding" and "describing" the other. Some have been sympathetic, some have embraced the other, but **most have been very critical.** As Rajiv Malhotra says in his recent article about Oprah Winfrey's visit to India and what she said about India, "**the history of the West is replete with assertions of supremacy over the non-West on account of religious, racial, cultural and economic factors." Those assertions and evaluations have led to the reshaping of the world to imitate and mimic the West, at tremendous cost.** Just to take the example of the ongoing Olympic games, one wonders why the rest of the world should play the sports invented and organized by Western countries, building expensive stadia, training athletes at enormous cost, and sending them to compete with others in a nationalistic rivalry replete with jingoistic slogans, and supremacist attitudes!

2NC Religious Freedom

Pursuit of religious freedom is used as a high horse to justify state violence
Hurd 10

[Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, associate professor of political science at Northwestern University, March 23rd, 2010, "The global securitization of religion", http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/03/23/global-securitization/ jf]

My first thought upon reading the Chicago Council's report "Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy" is that the title is misleading. This report is not about engaging religious communities abroad—one hears little if at all from such communities—nor does it say anything particularly new. There is, however, an imperative. This report is an attempt to create a particular kind of world, one defined by the projection of American power—a certain kind of religious power. The report, as Winni Sullivan observes in her companion piece, endorses an establishmentarian position in American foreign policy, meaning that **American policy could discriminate among religions, and fund and promote religious activities that meet with U.S. government approval.** This is a different kind of religious power than what Sullivan describes as the "periodic and not altogether successful efforts" at disestablishment that we have undertaken at home. Assuming that we agree with Sullivan, as I do, that "established religion is by definition not accepting of 'pluralism, freedom, and democracy,'" it becomes clear that this **report is not about engaging religious communities to promote either religious freedom or democracy. It is about the projection of American power through the securitization of religion.** Perhaps a more apt title, borrowing in part from the language of the report itself, would have been "'Savvy, selective, strategic, and targeted': the projection of American religious power and the global securitization of religion."

I want to point to a few moments at which the report works especially hard to achieve these objectives. The first is in its definition of "religious freedom," understood as the right to, "advance values publicly in civil society and political life." Religious freedom is to be articulated "in a way not viewed as imperialism, but as a means to support religious agency to undermine religion-based terrorism and promote stable democracy." Yet **one of the great challenges of our time is to engage with and listen to those who enact religious agency and live religious freedom in ways that may not conform to these protestant-secular understandings of religion and religious freedom.** In focusing exclusively on "values and beliefs," the report not only fails to engage with, or allow spaces for, religious practice, habits, and ways of being in the world that cannot be reduced to values and beliefs, but actively closes down such "religious agencies," save those that are deemed to be "undermining religion-based terrorism" in the eyes of the National Security Council (NSC). In tacitly sanctioning a protestant understanding of religion as the (only) legitimate way to be religious and modern, it forecloses upon a range of understandings of religion and arrogates to the NSC the authority to decide who is "civil" enough to be allowed into the public sphere, and who isn't. As Saba Mahmood has observed of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) itself, the report illustrates, "how **the exercise of sovereign power tends to subsume the secular principle of religious freedom** ."

This rather astonishing exercise of sovereign theopolitical authority brings me to a second point involving the government regulation of religion. The report states: "We know that government regulation of religion can lead to increased persecution and religious violence, forces that increasingly escape confinement within national borders." This is a striking statement. What is the Task Force calling for, if not increased government regulation through the securitization of religion? In recommending that the NSC direct, not only governmental, but also nongovernmental engagement with religious actors and communities overseas, it vests in the government the authority and institutional capacity to regulate religion both directly and through nongovernmental proxies, calling explicitly for "practical religious literacy" on the part of governmental and nongovernmental offices and institutions. Will this lead to increased persecution and religious violence?

It won't, **according to the logic of the report, because the secular state in general, and the United States in particular, is ontologically incapable of particular kinds of violence, "religious" violence, in particular. Violence undertaken by the American state is by definition** not **religious. So, religious violence is something undertaken by others,** while secular violence disappears from the picture altogether, or is quietly subsumed and c Yet, is it not the case that, like the errant "religious actors" described in the report, the United States also, at some times and in some places, "inspire(s) or legitimate(s) violent conflict by framing it as an act of justice"? How is it that the United States manages to exempt itself from the critical scrutiny that it so avidly prescribes for its (religious) others? Could it be the case that American exceptionalism and a particular notion of American religious freedom and American power are sacralized in this report, such that they are, in the words of the report, lending "a sacred aura and intensity to disputes and campaigns that also have significant secular dimensions"? As **religion is increasingly nationalized through this heady cocktail of religious freedom and American exceptionalism, should we now brace ourselves for "calls to defend that which is held sacred […] increasingly employed as a conflict escalator"? Should we not at least consider the possibility that the United States, in its new role as self-appointed theologian, might "invoke the sacred to sow violence and confusion"? It is in closing down the possibility of this kind of self-scrutiny that the report moves in dangerous directions.**

In another example of the inherent goodness of American power, failed states, in the eyes of the Task Force, are responsible for terrorism, and never the international actions of the United States (such as in the invasion of Iraq) or other actors. The United States floats above and outside the world, guided expertly by the NSC through the rocky shoals of political theology and toward safer shores, in a carefully navigated approach, "tailored so as not to overstep the bounds by intervening unwisely in theological disputes or, worse still, seeking to manipulate religion."

War on Terror

look in Critical Terrorism Studies Generic

Link – Islamophobia

Construction of terror threats and US supremacy leads to militaristic intervention

Kumar 13 (Deepa Kumar, associate professor of media studies and Middle Eastern studies at Rutgers University and the author of the book Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, "Twelve Years Post 9/11, Islamophobia Still Runs High", www.truth-out.org/video/item/18759-twelve-years-post-9-11-islamophobia-still-runs-high#, 9/11/2013, sr)

KUMAR: **Islamophobia is basically the term, the name given to anti-Muslim racism. It is a form of prejudice. And it involves making generalizations about an entire group based on the actions of a few through this mythical understanding of what Islam is supposed to be.** DESVARIEUX: Okay. And we should mention that there was a poll that was conducted by the Arab American Institute that found that American attitudes towards Arab and Muslims, specifically for Republicans and Romney voters in this last presidential election, were rated to be strongly negative. Does this mean that Islamophobia is only a problem of right-wingers or conservative voters? KUMAR: Absolutely not. **I think it is true that larger numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated within those ranks. But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact it is built into the system of U.S. foreign policy in this country. And to simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that it has larger implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would be really to have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism.** DESVARIEUX: Okay. Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the mass media has depicted Islam? KUMAR: **Well, basically, the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you know, 3,000 Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the idea that these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven by Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and so forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. And this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of things [incompr.] that it's about justifying the building of a national security state and justifying practices like torture and so on and so forth.**
DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us just how does Islamophobia play a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR: Okay. It doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the idea of humanitarianism has a long history in the United States. **The idea that there are victims all over the world, that the U.S. government has then got to make war in order to, you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of justifications given. You know, Vietnamese need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But what makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is the Bush administration projecting this idea of clash of civilizations, which is basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational, we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the East are barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and therefore we have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's burden, to go off and rescue them. And so you see some of that language, which is the idea that Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make change, and so we need to intervene. So it's a**

combination both of the victim narrative, which has a long history, combined with this language of clash of civilizations. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic policy? How do they work Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, **the comparison I make in the book and that I'm actually working on in the next book is that ==the U.S. government==, and U.S. imperialism in particular, ==always needs an enemy. That is,== when there is no humanitarian cause, ==an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars abroad==, as well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during the Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people have to be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so fort**h. So that's the logic back then, and, of course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing. ==**After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being precisely about fighting endless wars**==**. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth. It didn't work out that way. But ==the idea was to drum up this fear of this menacing terrorist enemy==, which justified wars all over the world in order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] ==particularly in the oil-rich region in the Middle East==. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat. And so what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some some of them Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled because that is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like torture, things like deportation**. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth. So, you know, ==**it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11**==. DESVARIEUX: How do you sort of categorize or interpret these votes by different states to ban sharia law? What's your take on that? KUMAR: Yes. This is actually the work of a far right wing Islamophobic network. These people have been active for the last two decades, and they get, you know, funding to the tune of $45-$50 billion over the last seven, eight years. These people hold the view that there are no moderate Muslims, all Muslims are somehow connected to Islamist organizations--Hamas or the Muslim brotherhood and so on. And even though they pretend to be moderate, right--this is the language some of these people use--in fact they are involved in a conspiracy to take over the United States and to replace the Constitution with sharia law. Of course, this is nonsense, this is complete conspiracy theory. But these are the people**. They are lawyers, they are academics, they are people in the military, they are people in the security establishment. They are responsible for this campaign where, you know, about half a dozen to a dozen states across the U.S. have adopted these laws. ==It's a process of fearmongering, and it enables the right wing to actually grow in their ranks and promote this kind of hate==**

This causes war, genocide, and racism based off of orientalist fears of potential threats Batur 7

[Pinar Batur, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Sociology @ Vassar, 2007, "The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide," in *Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations*, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7]

At the turn of the 20th century, the "Terrible Turk" was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in **American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind** (Vander Lippe 1999). ==**Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the "Oriental" other**==**—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior** to the peaceful, rational, scientific "Occidental" Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption.
Post-Enlightenment Europe and **later ==America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their==**

uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the "Terrible Turk" to that of the "Barbaric Russian Bear." In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no "race." It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the "right ideological and cultural framework." It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet "other." Orientalism's global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the "inferior other." Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States.

Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, "show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached." In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic "holy war," and said, "violence in the name of religion was contrary to God's nature and to reason." He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope's speech "regrettable," it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope's "ill informed and bigoted" comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, "I'm deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims" (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope's apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that "Muslim" violence had proved his point.

Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, "this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world" (Lewis 2006). He cautions that "it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind." Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don't see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as "an inducement" (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that "in a world of different civilizations, each . . . will have to learn to coexist with the others" (Huntington 1993:49).

Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis's assertions run parallel with George Bush's claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, "This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation" (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that "the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century" and he compared it to the 20th century's fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though "Islamo-fascist" has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O'Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase "contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim community" (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate "war on terrorism" with "crusade," this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, " . . .we still aren't completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in" (CNN 2006).

Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

Link – Lone Wolf

The perception of lone wolf attacks is used solely to justify the surveillance state

Lennard 2014 [Natasha Lennard, 10-27-2014, "'Lone Wolf' Terrorist Acts Will Be Used to Justify the Surveillance State," VICE News, https://news.vice.com/article/lone-wolf-terrorist-acts-will-be-used-to-justify-the-surveillance-state jf]

California Senator Dianne Feinstein, speaking on CNN's State of the Union on Sunday, suggested that "the Internet, as well as certain specific Muslim extremists, are really firing up this lone-wolf phenomenon." Whether intentionally or not, the Senate Intelligence Committee chair performed a lot of political work with that one comment. **Crystallizing "lone wolves" as a key threat domestically helps legitimize the US's current military operation against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.** With or without established connections, the Islamic State's far-reaching tentacles of online influence encouraging individuals worldwide cement the group as a threat to the homeland — **which is always useful for politicians struggling to legally justify another protracted war. In this way, attributing attacks to homegrown "lone wolves" is more useful for current US political interests than attributing them to madness alone.**

The assumption that terror acts were always borne of connected networks problematically buoyed domestic counter-terror efforts that saw entire communities profiled as potential threats.

Which is not to say that "lone wolf terrorist" is a flawed designation for attacks by ideologically motivated individuals. In many ways it seems apt, and any challenge is welcome to the all too basic distinction that imbues group terror with motive while dismissing individual acts as madness. **The "lone wolf" straddles the ill-conceived gap between madman and terrorist node.** It's an intersection all too complicated for the inexpert punditry of Fox News: "They are terrorist acts, to be sure," Megyn Kelly said about Canadian gunman Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, adding "but this guy was also a nutcase."

Furthermore, the assumption that terror acts were always borne of connected networks problematically buoyed domestic counter-terror efforts that saw entire communities profiled as potential threats. **Under the premise that terror networks ran like arteries through US Muslim communities enabled** an era of profile-driven **preemptive policing that has been** nothing short of racist. Entire mosques in New York were designated terrorist organizations to enable police surveillance. The NSA's meta-data collections claim justifiability on the premise that terror was locatable by tracing networks of communication.

The "lone wolf" phenomenon should at least **prompt the questioning of** the sort of **profile-based counter-terror efforts that assumed terror lurked in any network of Muslims, and that the mass hoarding of communications data was vital to national security.** However, the **rhetoric surrounding this type of domestic threat** already **bodes ill for civil liberties.** If **the hunt for terrorist networks has been plagued by ethnic profiling and overreaching spycraft, an established threat of "lone wolf" attacks gives a defensive imprimatur for unbounded NSA-style surveillance — anyone can wield a hatchet with ideological ire.**

As Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee Michael McCaul said on This Week, finding such lone actors in advance of attacks is like "finding a needle in a haystack." And as Feinstein said the same day, "You have to be able to watch it, and you have to be able to disrupt them."

As such, **the era of the "lone wolf" terrorist does not only spell the end of the bunk distinction between motivated group and deranged individual. It ushers in the dawn of a new era of justification for our totalized state of surveillance and national security paranoia.**

Link – Neoliberalism

The war on terror and fear of Islam are rhetorical strategies to preclude critique of neoliberalism – their representations shut down movements while ensuring error replication
Fasenfest 11

(David Fasenfest, American sociologist and an Associate Professor at Wayne State University, "Terrorism, Neo-Liberalism and Political Rhetoric," *Critical Sociology* 37 (4) 2011)

The second observation is over the ambivalence shown by Western governments and political parties in the USA. **Democracy is good**, the mantra goes, **but we also desire stability and** so we **are concerned about succession** and chaos that may accompany the deposition of Mubarak in Egypt. **Conservatives, long the champions of 'freedom' and 'democracy'** around the world (but perhaps not in Florida!), **find themselves critical of Obama's stance calling for change and respect for the wishes of 'the people' of Egypt**. Even these calls for change by the Administration are tempered by concerns over the transition. **After all, Mubarak was a valued ally** (translate: a willing instrument of our foreign policy) and Egypt a recipient of our foreign aid (translate: we fund their military) – they should not be abandoned so quickly. Other absolute rulers in the region are watching us to see how we respond to this 'democratic' threat. Similar themes emerge: what is this movement for change and who will assume the mantle of leadership. After all, we cannot just legitimize the aspirations of the dispossessed and the claims against tyrants we have put into place and propped up for many years, even decades – that would describe so many countries around the world and potentially herald a Jacobin moment in each. **We only wish to demonize and overthrow our enemies, not our allies**. **How best to do that if not to invoke images of** Taliban-like governments in waiting eager to seize control, thereby worrying about **the rising role of** what we call **Islamists** in the region. Images of another Iran are offered us to caution for calm and patience regarding Egypt. Nationalist forces and national liberation movements during the period from the end of World War II through the Vietnam War era and beyond were either supported by the USA if that movement called for deposing a government unfriendly to US interests – for example, funding the Contra war against Sandinista Nicaragua, or were vilified as 'communist' or worse if they opposed dictators friendly towards the USA – fostering rebellion in the Congo and the overthrow and assassination of Lumumba, and the overthrow of Mosaddeq in Iran followed by the installation of Mohammad Reza Shah come to mind (see Berberoglu, 2000 on the politics of national liberation struggles).¶ The case of the successful coup in Iran in 1953, which served as a blueprint for a successful coup in Guatemala in 1954 and the failed Bay of Pigs intervention in Cuba in 1961, is instructive in the current situation for two reasons. First, the harsh rule of the USA-supported Shah left an animosity among the Iranian people that culminated in an Islamic revolution in 1979 steeped in the hatred of the USA. So long as we were pre-occupied by our Cold War against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, and so long as Iran was kept in check by our ally Saddam Hussein in Iraq, that country was not a primary concern of the USA. Second, our memory of the Iranian situation and hostage taking after the overthrow of the Shah informs our political response and assessment of any post-Mubarak Egypt. Our government fails to see how this popular anti- American rhetoric is born out of an association with a hated regime propped up by American guns and money. The image of a group like the Moslem Brotherhood taking part in discussions of a post-Mubarak Egypt and visions of the Ayatollah led revolution in Iran and the unenlightened rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan (Langman, 2005) fuel our fears.¶ **Since** the events of **9/11 the West in general and the USA in particular have used the specter of Islam as our excuse and justification for our foreign (and domestic) policies**. **That cataclysmic event vaulted a neo-conservative world view front and center**, which lead to a willingness to use military power unilaterally and without regard to international norms in order to rectify and restore American and European interests as the US Government has defined them. Our official understanding of anti-western terrorism is that it is a direct result of Islam's rejection of western liberalism and a rejection of the freedom and conspicuous consumption of non-Islamic nations. **By framing the response as a 'war on terrorism' the US Government obscures the anti-communal nature of its position**. By anti-communal, I mean that **neo-liberalism rejects the rights of those who embody difference even as it purports to defend a system of democracy rooted in difference**. Clearly, there is no uniform definition of Arab (David, 2007) but it is clear that **there has been an attempt to both create a singular Muslim identity and then strip it of its symbols** (Byng, 2010) **in the creation and embodiment of this external threat**. Only by raising the specter of an Islamic regime, with all its implied hostility to the West, can our current political leaders rationalize a measured and hesitant response to the opposition movement in Egypt, and in so doing urge that the transition from Mubarak does not leave a power vacuum.¶ Once again we fail

to recognize or choose to ignore the fact that legitimate grievances against despotic regimes will lead, in turn, to legitimate grievances against states and governments that support and maintain those regimes in power. The anger of the Iranian people amid the memory of US involvement in installing and supporting the Shah is ignored, and in its place we identify the Islamic nature of the revolution as the root cause of the animosity against this country. **We now seem to ignore the poverty and repression sustained by US aid for a leader whose main value was to be a powerful instrument of our foreign policy** and a proxy in an important region (not to mention a willing partner through rendition and the application of torture illegal in the USA). **The signals are clear. The overthrow of the government in Tunisia, the responses to popular protest in Jordan and Yemen, and current events in Egypt all point to a growing willingness by citizens to challenge the existing order that ensures widespread poverty**, aggregates wealth and power among a very few, and in this way to resist the forces of social control in demonstrating and demanding real change. **By labeling this opposition as 'Islamist' and demonizing its goals western governments can ignore legitimate claims and dismiss popular protest.**¶ And so we return to the situation in the USA. We face persistent unemployment that promises to be devastating for a generation of workers too old to retrain and too young to partake of years of retirement – especially as the conservatives in Congress mean to strip bear the underpinning of the social supports making that retirement possible. On some level **the willingness and eagerness of** these same **conservative forces to advocate for the continuation of the Mubarak regime reveals the true nature of their domestic social political agenda**. **There are no appeals to poverty alleviation, no sense that there is a social responsibility of society to all citizens**, and no compassion for those dealt a harsh blow by the policies of its government and the working of its economy. **This is true in their response to events in Egypt, and apparently true as these politicians contemplate policies and budget cuts to social spending in the USA.**

Impacts

Democracy

Security depoliticizes issues – preventing democratic debate and deliberation

Jayasuriya 1 (Senior Research Fellow, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong) (Kanishka, 9/11 and the New 'Anti-politics' of 'Security', Social Science Research Council, http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/jayasuriya.htm)

The dramatic events of September 11, 2001 have ramifications for the nature of global governance as well as the institutions of liberal democracy. The most serious danger these events pose is their potential to usher in, under the appealing cloak of 'security', a debilitating a form of 'anti politics' that marginalises the constructive conflicts - the debate and discussion - that animate the public sphere in liberal polities. Some of these effects are already apparent in the US, where self-censorship in the media has made discussion of the politics of terrorism all but impossible. Perhaps more seriously, the language of security serves to frame facets of transnational governance in terms of 'risk', thereby occluding important issues of conflict and power. Take, for example, the pressure on the Canadian government by the United States to impose 'perimeter continental security', with the objective of establishing common entry and exit policies for visitors, immigrants, and refugees. Posing the movement of people as primarily a security risk submerges the significant questions of power and distribution raised by the proposed policy of continental integration, and constrains serious discussion of the proposal. It could well be argued that these developments presage the emergence of a new security state. Indeed, an analogy for the present crisis can be found in the anti-Communist and cold war rhetoric that dominated US domestic and international politics in the decades after 1945. The obvious parallels are to be found in the increasing importance attached to issues of 'security' in both domestic and international politics. The decisive shift in the political climate initiated by Truman, and consolidated by Eisenhower, lay not in the increasing salience of security to public policy and political language, but in how the US state apparatus came to be dominated by cold war imperatives. The pursuit of these imperatives was often at the expense of broader civil liberties, as exemplified by the infectious spread of McCarthyism. Like the cold war, the present crisis has also exposed the precarious position of civil liberty as this 'new war' gathers steam. The US Attorney General has proposed far reaching changes - including the preventive detention of immigrants on suspicion of terrorism - which would severely curtail civil liberties. Further, the US President has signed an order for special military tribunals to try those charged with terrorism. These tribunals have lower standards of proof and admissibility of evidence than ordinary judicial processes. Yet other actions such as increasing surveillance and wire-tapping powers pose serious problems for those concerned with basic rights. Similarly the British Home Secretary has proposed tough anti-terrorist legislation that includes extending the already substantial powers to detain suspected terrorists, and the extensive use of surveillance powers. In Australia, the ruling Liberal and National Coalition, with the support of the opposition Labor Party, has enacted draconian laws on border security that effectively curtail judicial review for asylum seekers and give wide discretionary powers to Ministers. In surprisingly short order, a broad set of emergency powers based on the concept of 'exceptions' has emerged to offer political leaders and other public officials a legislative framework for acting outside normal constitutional and representative institutions. Carl Schmitt, the deeply conservative jurist who was a critic of the Weimar Republic, is perhaps the most pre-eminent theorist of the exception: 'exception' is the capacity of the sovereign to make decisions in terms of its political will rather than be constrained by normative 'law'. Schmitt suggests the exception as something that is '... codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterised as a state of peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to preformed law' (1985: 6). In this context, the emergence of certain aspects of a 'state of exception' (to use a phrase of the outstanding Weimar jurist Franz Neumann) should be a cause for concern for those interested in the protection of fundamental political rights. One of Neumann's (1986) central arguments is that the development of capitalism leads to the development of non-formal instruments of law. The last century has seen a gradual acceleration of legal fragmentation and dissolution. Legal deformalization Neumann argued is rooted in a fundamental transformation of capitalist economies over the greater part of the twentieth century. It could be argued that the new language of security reflects the fact that globalisation has changed the internal architecture of the state and this is markedly apparent in the increasing emphasis placed on aspects of 'risk' and 'security' across social life. It leads both at the international and domestic level to the kind of legal deformalisation so astutely analyzed by Neumann. This process has been accelerated by the events of September 11. At this point the analogy with the cold war 'national security state' is misleading because it obscures how globalisation has transformed the very notion of security in recent years, so that it is increasingly understood in terms broader than merely as a matter of 'guns and bombs'. The language of security now permeates every sphere of life - ranging from finance to the environment. International relations boffins like to talk about 'securitisation' to describe this expansive notion of security. For example, one of the most striking elements of the policy response to this crisis is that many ethnic and minority groups are now deemed to pose a threat to national security. Many cold war warriors in the United States have given extraordinarily generous airplay to Sam Huntington's thesis of a clash of civilisation. Unlike during the cold war, these threats to national security are framed in terms of 'ethnicity' rather than 'ideology', but the outcome poses the same challenge to basic rights. Further, this shift towards a 'security state' is not confined to the US and Britain, but is evident in a number of European countries as well as Australia where members of the ruling Coalition government have implied that Afghan refugees and Muslim immigrants were 'terrorists'. But this language of security is not just confined to mainstream security agencies. It has also become an intrinsic rationale of the program of development agencies like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). For these international agencies and many other non-governmental organisations, the vacuous notion of 'human security' now includes such areas as poverty and the environment; it is the transnational analogue of 'community policing'. This new perspective embodies the more expansive understanding of security employed by establishment security agencies. The expansive definition of security - whether used by the UNDP or the Pentagon - has disturbing consequences. Security in this conception takes over the idea of risk management from penology and other related disciplines. Indeed, this is what is most striking about the new security debate: the extension of the US 'law and order state' to the transnational arena. In this respect, one of the most interesting and worrying developments is likely to be the internationalisation of the 'state of exception'. New forms of risk management apply risk profiles to a set of relationships, institutions, and even geographic sites, rather than endeavouring to manage or transform the behaviour of individuals. This emphasis on the management of risk at the level of population rather than individuals is critical. It is reflected in the high priority given to issues of border control and the use of identity documents. This approach to risk control and management strips away the social and legal context of individual behaviour as governments and other organisations

seek to manage the 'sites' of criminal activity such as terrorism, international drug trafficking, or the current panic over so-called 'people smuggling'. The effect is depoliticisation of complex problems and issues, as transnational problems are disembedded from the politics of power and interests and situated within the anti-political framework of security and risk. Within the framework of the new security language - whether it is the 'hard' security of Bush's National Security Council or the 'soft' security of some international development agencies - the conflict and debate that are raw material of politics get submerged in the search for policies of risk management. This 'politics of anti-politics' is deeply inimical to the institutions and values that sustain and animate politics in liberal democracies.

Fear

Security fears create debilitating fear

Masco 6 (Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Chicago)
(Joseph, The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico, pg. 229)

A core project for many activists is thus to register the psychosocial and cultural effects of the bomb on their lives, replacing a discourse of national security with a quotidian experience of nuclear terror. One laboratory critic, for example, declared herself to be the "potential mother of a mutant child. n She narrated to DOE officials what it was like to be six months pregnant living beside a nuclear facility and worrying if her unborn fetus was mutating inside her. Imagining a future life caring for a deformed child, she decried the DOE for allowing "nuclear projects," "toxic dumps," and "bomb tests" to be performed in northern New Mexico, concluding that "maybe a country who planned to bomb and destroy whole countries deserves to bear monsters, a karma fitting to so monstrous a mentality. Maybe I deserve to have a mutant because once I was so casually uncaring about what these bombs were made for." As her womb is made foreign and dangerous to her, she is colonized by the psychosocial consequences of the nuclear security state. This activist articulates the proliferating anxiety felt by some in Santa Fe at the end of the Cold War, as news of environmental damage around the nuclear complex changed not only how they viewed Los Alamos but also their own lived spaces. **The inability here** to **escape nuclear terror-in either the form of radioactive contamination or nuclear war---destabilizes a self that can no longer locate the boundaries between body and bomb.** When pursued through a discourse of citizenship this process also illustrates one of the core effects of radioactive nation-building, a toxic public sphere where official statements are by definition suspect and discounted as conspiracy.

Neoliberalism → Inequality & Oppression

Security discourse reproduces neoliberalism – its cover for consolidating access to resources in periphery countries – reproduces inequality and oppression
Girdner 5

[Eddie J. Girdner PhD in PoliSci from University of California, taught PoliSci for 25+ years in Cyprus, Turkey, Mississippi, and Alabama] [THE GREATER MİDDLE EAST INITIATIVE: REGİME CHANGE, NEOLIBERALISM AND US GLOBAL HEGEMONY*] (http://tinyurl.com/qcj46n7) (accessed 7-16-15) //MC

Consequently, under this rubric, **the US carried out the cold war**, **conducted counterinsurgency against potential social democratic governments**, **supported authoritarian governments** in Latin American and elsewhere, or supported more democratic states as well, **depending upon whether this was deemed to serve its interests**. **National interests** were **calculated primarily in terms of the needs and benefits to the corporate class in the pursuit of global capitalist accumulation**.3

Within this framework, the US approach to the Middle East was relatively simple and straight forward, having been essentially settled at the end of the Second World War. **Democracy was not considered to be on the charts**, under the rubric of Middle Eastern exceptionalism, **and the Unites States would support the autocratic and dictatorial regimes which were in place as long as the oil flowed through the US corporate structure**. The US would be the regional hegemon with ostensibly independent states. This arrangement was referred to as **the** "**Arab façade**." **The US would sponsor local** "co**ps on the beat**," **Israel and Turkey, to help keep order in the region**. This was part of the deal which was struck at the end of World War II. "**Security**" **referred to the preservation of the system of capitalist accumulation in the interests of the ruling classes** of the US. This "security" arrangement would be enforced by regional arrangements with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and so on. **This** often **precluded democracy**, **as with the overthro w of Mohamad Mossadegh in Iran**, **and put the US at odds with more democratic states**, such as India.

Consequently, while lip service was often paid to "democratization," in actual practice, **democratic regimes were supported only in cases in which it was clear that it would protect capital and serve the US corporate class**. In practice, **US foreign policy was** generally one of "**deterring democracy**," in which **scores of regimes were overthrown by the CIA**, which held the promise of the emergence of local democratic autonomy, which was **deemed to militate against the needs of the US corporate ruling class**.4

The history of US foreign policy since World War II **has been fairly consistent and significant shifts in the policy of support for authoritarian regimes**, such as in Latin America in the 1970s, have been **consistent with the bottom line of a rational calculus about what served the domestic ruling class, rather than any abstract ideals about freedom and democracy**. **There is no reason why one should expect any radical shift in this historical approach in the near future trajectory** of US foreign policy.

Prior to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003, and following the destruction of the Twin Towers in New Yor, some of the neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration declared that the US policy of appeasement of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East had failed and that the US must move quickly to remove these regimes and establish democracy across the region.5 Regime change emerged as a new buzz word.

Nevertheless, the Iraq war was not launched upon the rationale of establishment of democracy, but rather upon the rationale that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein had established links with al-Qaeda. When the Iraq War began to go badly and encounter stiff resistance from indigenous forces, in the fail of 2003, it became clear that the US was in for a long hard slog. The Bush Administration fell back upon the position of presenting "democratization" as the center plank in the "War on Terrorism." George W. Bush

made his famous November 6, 2003 speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is located, announcing a US "forward strategy of freedom." Bush called for $40 million for the NED budget to be targeted for the Middle East alone.6

The idea of Greater Middle East Initiative (**GMEI)**, developed by the US State Department **was** to be **another tool of imperialist control** which could be **used to secure the resources, labor and markets of the region to beef up US global hegemony and secure corporate profits in the region**, while theoretically, ending any incentives for terrorism. It is not clear if the neo-conservative ideologues took this argument seriously, but **the rational of** "**democratization**" **went forward under the same rubric as the invasion of Iraq**, that of **the** "**War on Terrorism**." In fact, as will be argued below, **both enterprises were of a piece with pushing forward the logic of serving the US ruling class in consolidation the global rule of neoliberalism and increasing global power and corporate profits**. Under sleight of hand, the same mechanisms developed and used in Latin American would be brought in, opening the channels and floodgates for a massive flow of new CIA money into the region on behalf of US capital.

Value to Life

Security destroys the value to life

Der Derian 93

(James, "The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," in The Political Subject of Violence, pp. 102-105)

The desire for **security is** manifested as **a collective resentment of** difference **that which is not** us, not certain, not **predictable**. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, **the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable**, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science Nietzsche asks of the reader: Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" **The fear of the unknown and** the **desire for certainty** combine to **produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the** highest sign of a sovereign self, the **surest protection** against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces and is sustained by the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, **the unknown becomes** identified as **evil**, and evil provokes hostility - **recycling the desire for security**. The 'influence of timidity,' as Nietzsche puts it, **creates** a **people** who are **willing to subordinate** affirmative **values to the 'necessities' of security**: 'they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences'." The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show the perilous conditions which created the security imperative - and the western metaphysics which perpetuate it - have diminished if not disappeared; yet the fear of life persists: 'Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The **security** of the sovereign, rational self and state **comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox - all that makes life worthwhile**. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions:

War

Security politics makes escalation of war inevitable

Burke 7 (Prof on Int'l Relations, University of New South Wales)
(Anthony, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Theory and Event, 10:2, MUSE)

This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy; because the **very existence of the other** constitutes an unacceptable threat, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action.

This relation to the world creates war and violence as a natural and mechanistic part of all life

Burke 7 (Prof on Int'l Relations, University of New South Wales)
(Anthony, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Theory and Event, 10:2, MUSE)

By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features.

War/Structural Violence

Their mode of security politics makes both escalation and <u>global structural violence</u> inevitable

Anthony **Burke**, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, **'7** [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 231-2]

Yet the first act <mark>in America's 'forward strategy</mark> of freedom' was to invade and attempt to subjugate Iraq, suggesting that, <u>if 'peace' is its object, i**ts means is war**</u>: the engine of history is violence, on an enormous and tragic scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning. This we can glimpse in 'Toward a Pacific Union', a deeply disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. This text divides the earth between a 'post-historical' world of affluent developed democracies where 'the old rules of power-politics have decreasing relevance', and a world still 'stuck in history' and 'riven with a variety of religious, national and ideological conflicts'. The two worlds will maintain 'parallel but separate existences' and interact only along axes of threat, disturbance and crucial strategic interest: oil, immigration, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because 'the relationship between democracies and nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust and fear', writes Fukuyama, the 'post-historical half must still make use of realist methods when dealing with the part still in history ... <u>force</u> will still be the ultima ratio in their relations'. For all the book's Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama **naturalises war and coercion as the dominant mode of dealing with billions of people** defined only through their lack of 'development' and 'freedom'. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the 'traditional moralism of American foreign policy' and his dismissal of the United Nations in favour of a NATO-style 'league of truly free states ... capable of much more forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world' we can see an early premonition of the historicist unilateralism of the Bush administration. 72 In this light, <u>we can see</u> the invasion of Iraq as continuing <mark>a long process of 'world-**historical' violence** that stretches</mark> back <u>to</u> Columbus' discovery of the Americas, and <u>the</u> subsequent politics of <mark>genocide, warfare and dispossession through which the modem U</mark>nited <u>S</u>tates <mark>was created and then expanded -</mark> initially with the colonisation of the Philippines and coercive trade relationships with China and Japan, and eventually <u>to the</u> self-declared role Luce had argued so forcefully for<u>: guarantor of global</u> economic and **strategic order** after 1945. <u>This role involved the</u> <mark>hideous destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia, 'interventions'</mark> <u>in Chile, El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan</u> (or an ever more destructive 'strategic' involvement in the Persian Gulf that saw the United States first building up Iraq as a formidable regional military power, and then punishing its people with a 14-year sanctions regime that caused the deaths of at least 200,000 people), all of <u>which we are meant to accept as proof of America's benign intentions</u>, of America putting its '<u>power at the service of princip</u>le'. They are merely history working itself out, the 'design of nature' writing its bliss on the world.73 <mark>The bliss 'freedom' offers</mark> us, however, is **the bliss of the graveyard**, <u>stretching endlessly into a world marked not by historical perfection</u> or democratic peace**, but by the eternal recurrence of tragedy**, <u>as ends</u> <u>endlessly disappear in the</u> <mark>**means of permanent war and permanent terror**</mark>. This is how we must understand both the prolonged trauma visited on the people of Iraq since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US invasion will have on the new phenomenon of global antiWestern terrorism. American exceptionalism has deluded US policymakers into believing that they are the only actors who write history, who know where it is heading, and how it will play out, and that in its service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. As a senior adviser to Bush told a journalist in 2002: 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality . . We're history's

actors."

WSDI Security K

Permutation Do Both

1. Permutation Do Both

2. Some surveillance is necessary

Macnish '10 (Kevin, Professor at the University of Leeds, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource, "Surveillance Ethics: Necessity", http://www.iep.utm.edu/surv-eth/#H7, AO)

Necessity is often cited as an important condition for justified surveillance. Article 8 of the European Union Convention on Human Rights, for example, states that "there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right [to privacy] except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" (Council of Europe 1950). We shall discuss proportionality and discrimination below. Here we shall focus on what is meant by necessity in the context of surveillance. When is surveillance necessary, though? Should surveillance, like war, be a matter of last resort? If so, when is that moment of last resort reached? The concept of necessity can limit surveillance from being undertaken arbitrarily or prematurely. An authority may not monitor anyone at any time. Surveillance must rather be required by the circumstances of the case. However, this is simply to replace "necessary" with "required" and so does not help. We are still left with the question as to when surveillance is required by the circumstances of the case. John Lango (Lango 2006) has suggested two criteria for necessity: The feasibility standard and the awfulness standard. The first occurs when there is sufficient evidence to suggest that there is no feasible alternative, the second when the alternatives are worse than the proposed course of action. When one of these criteria is met the action may be deemed necessary. Given the harms of surveillance, it should therefore be avoided if there are less harmful alternatives. However, surveillance becomes necessary when either there is no alternative, or when the alternatives such as physical intrusion or arrest are more harmful than the surveillance itself.

Net Benefits-Police Drones

Drones good for police—Laundry list

Alderton 4/30 (Matt, Writer specializing in business, design, and technology, "To the Rescue! Why Drones in Police Work Are the Future of Crime Fighting", http://lineshapespace.com/drones-in-police-work-future-crime-fighting/, AO)

Here are just a few of the areas in which drones likely will be leveraged for law enforcement when that future arrives. **Hostage Negotiation**. During the Dykes drama, the FBI's drone kept constant eyes on Dykes' bunker. In the future, however, a drone the size of an insect could keep watch inside the bunker, as well. "What we're seeing right now are 'quadcopters,' which consist of four [rotor] blades on top of a tiny robot. But in the future we're going to see biomimetic designs that mimic nature—based on a dragonfly, maybe, or a hummingbird," Scott explains. "These drones will be able to fly into a space and produce a 3D scan so that if you're dealing with a hostage situation, you can see exactly what's going on inside the building without risking lives." Drones equipped with telepresence technology will enhance hostage negotiations even further. "Instead of risking lives by sending a negotiator into the space, you could send in a drone with a screen attached to it and still have a face-to-face conversation with the hostage or hostage-taker," Scott says. **Bomb Investigation.** The same drones that provide situational awareness during a hostage crisis could do so in the event of a bomb threat. In fact, the San Jose Police Department (SJPD) in San Jose, Calif., recently acquired a drone for exactly this purpose. "SJPD intends to use the [drone] primarily to access potential explosive devices and avoid exposing police bomb squad personnel to possible hazards," the department reported in August 2014. "The [drone] can be flown over a device to obtain images that would assist the bomb technicians." **Missing Persons.** Imagine a child missing at a crowded amusement park, a hiker lost in the wilderness, an Alzheimer's patient wandering from home, or a runaway teen hitchhiking her way out of town. Drones equipped with cameras, license-plate readers, and facial-recognition software could one day soon increase the probability of locating them—not to mention the speed at which they're found. "It's 50 times quicker than you could put people on horseback, motorcycles, bikes, or on foot," John Noland, a lieutenant with the Santa Rosa Police Department in Santa Rosa, Calif., told the North Bay Business Journal in fall 2014. "It gives you real-time intelligence." **Criminal Surveillance and Pursuit**. Missing persons aren't the only ones police could find in a crowd. Criminals also could be identified. One company—Persistent Surveillance Systems of Dayton, Ohio—already is using manned aircraft to this effect, working with local law enforcement to fly manned surveillance aircrafts over cities for up to 200 hours a month. In Ciudad Juaréz, Mexico, aerial images it collected in 2009 captured 34 murders as they occurred, including a cartel killing, video analysis of which led police to the hitman, his getaway vehicle, and several accomplices. "What we essentially do is a live version of Google Earth, only with a full TiVo capability," Persistent Surveillance Systems President and CEO Ross McNutt said of his company's technology during a 2014 interview with the Center for Investigative Reporting. "It allows us to rewind time and go back and see events that we didn't know occurred at the time they occurred." It's only a matter of time before unmanned vehicles can produce similar results. **Drug Interdiction**. In February, Dutch police shut down an illegal marijuana grow house when they noticed that the home's roof was snow-free—the only one in the winter-kissed neighborhood. As it turns out, the heat lamps used inside such grow houses make them warmer than surrounding properties, making them easy to identify in wintertime. In the future, drones surveilling cities from above could make spotting such homes easier. If such drones were outfitted with special spectroscopic sensors, they might even be able to detect meth labs and drug storage sites. **Crime Scene Analysis**. Future iterations of CSI: Crime Scene Investigation might very well feature drones as prominent characters, as UAVs are poised to play a starring role at future crime scenes. "Let's say you have a case where maybe there's dust on the floor, or blood, and you don't want people tracking through," Scott says. "If you want to see the scene exactly as it was left—without any sort of footprints or fingerprints from people contaminating that space—maybe your first task will be sending a drone in to photograph and scan the crime scene without disturbing it." Drones likewise could help police **locate discarded murder weapons**, or create maps that assist with solving and prosecuting crimes. "If someone ran down our local Main Street and started shooting at people, we could fly a

drone through and map it electronically," Noland told the North Bay Business Journal. "You can get the exact curve of the street, exactly where round casings dropped."

Police drone use good, efficient

Alderton 4/30 (Matt, Writer specializing in business, design, and technology, "To the Rescue! Why Drones in Police Work Are the Future of Crime Fighting", http://lineshapespace.com/drones-in-police-work-future-crime-fighting/, AO)

For nearly a week, hostage negotiators communicated with Dykes through a narrow PVC pipe connecting the bunker with the world above. A tiny spy camera inserted into the pipe helped authorities monitor the situation inside. Outside, however, the FBI used something theretofore more characteristic of Afghanistan than Alabama: an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV—otherwise known as a drone. "UAVs have been used for surveillance to support missions related to kidnappings, search and rescue operations, drug interdictions, and fugitive investigations," the FBI revealed in a 2013 letter to Sen. Rand Paul (R-Kentucky), who had inquired about FBI use of drones. "Since late 2006, the FBI has conducted surveillance using UAVs in eight criminal cases [including the Dykes incident] and two national security cases." Ten times in seven years may not sound like much, but the drone revolution is just getting started, according to technology futurist Gray Scott. "We are right on the tip of the iceberg," Scott says. "Within the next five years I believe we're going to see a saturation of drones in the United States; they're going to be extremely common everywhere." In fact, drone sales this year are expected to balloon to $130 million, up 55 percent from 2014, and will easily exceed $1 billion within five years, according to recent research from the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA). "Unmanned vehicles have the potential to create new businesses and new jobs and give consumers unprecedented remote access to our skies. They also will improve and protect lives," CEA President and CEO Gary Shapiro said at the 2015 International Consumer Electronics Show (CES) in Las Vegas. "Drones already are helping emergency and disaster management programs, national weather service tracking and traffic management programs, among others . . . In short, drones are not just for fun, they are an economic game-changer—one that will transform the way we do business." **And drones in police work will also change the way police officers do their jobs.** "It's like having 20 officers on patrol or more," Tijuana police chief Alejandro Lares, who uses drones to patrol residential neighborhoods in the Mexican border town, told USA Today in 2014. "Even the bad guys . . . they're going to know now there's something in the air that might be watching them . . . It may be a small step in community policing, but it's huge for our future."

A2: Complexity

Frontline

Scenario planning is key to decision making—it's a reliable method for creating policies that anticipate future events

Han, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security research fellow, 11

(Dong-ho, PhD in political science from University of Nebraska, June 2011, "Scenario Construction and Its Implications for International Relations," Research Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol. 9.1, da 7-20-15, http://www.kaisnet.or.kr/resource/down/9_1_02.pdf, mee)

How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? If the problem of uncertainty in future world politics is increasing and future international relations are hard to predict, then it is necessary to devise a useful tool to effectively deal with upcoming events so that policy makers can reduce the risks of future uncertainties. In this paper, I argue that the scenario methodology is one of the most effective methods to connect theory to practice, thereby leading to a better understanding of future world events. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the scenario methodology to the field of IR in a more acceptable fashion and to explore its implications for a real policy world. To achieve this goal, I will explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future world events. More specifically, I will clarify what the scenario method is and what its core components are and explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in IR by analyzing existing IR literature with an emphasis on security studies that primarily provide the prospect of future security issues. 1. Introduction How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? Given various theoretical ideas for predicting and analyzing future events in the field of international relations (IR), to understand these events properly it is important both to cast out all plausible outcomes and to think through a relevant theory, or a combination of each major theory, in connection with those outcomes. This paper aims to explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future world events. After clarifying the scenario methodology, its core components, and its processes and purposes, I will explore other field's use of this methodology. Then I will explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in the field of IR. I will conclude with summarizing the advantage of the scenario method in a real world of policy making. 2. What is the Scenario Methodology? This section begins with one major question – what is the scenario methodology? To answer this, some history regarding the development of this method should be mentioned.1 Herman Kahn, a pioneer of the scenario method, in his famous 1962 book Thinking about the Unthinkable, argued that the decision makers in the United States should think of and prepare for all possible sequences of events with regard to nuclear war with the Soviet Union.2 Using scenarios and connecting them with various war games, Kahn showed the importance of thinking ahead in time and using the scenario method based upon imagination for the future.3 According to Kahn and his colleagues, scenarios are "attempts to describe in some detail a hypothetical sequence of events that could lead plausibly to the situation envisaged."4 Similarly, Peter Schwartz defines scenarios as "stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow, stories that can help us recognize and adapt to changing aspects of our present environment."5 Given a variety of definitions of scenarios,6 for the purpose of this research, I refer to the scenario-building methodology as a means by which people can articulate different futures with trends, uncertainties, and rules over a certain amount of time. Showing all plausible future stories and clarifying important trends, scenario thinking enables decision makers to make an important decision at the present time. Key Terms in the Scenario Methodology The core of the scenario method lies in enabling policy makers to reach a critical decision at the present time based on thinking about all plausible future possibilities. Key concepts in the scenario method include: driving forces, predetermined elements, critical uncertainties, wild cards and scenario plot lines.7 Driving forces are defined as "the causal elements that surround a problem, event or decision," which could be many factors, including those "that can be the basis, in different combinations, for diverse chains of connections and outcomes."8 Schwartz defines driving forces as "the elements that move the plot of a scenario, that determine the story's outcome."9 In a word, driving forces constitute the basic structure of each scenario plot line in the scenario-making process. Predetermined elements refer to "events that have already occurred or that almost certainly will occur but whose

consequences have not yet unfolded."10 Predetermined elements are "givens" which could be safely assumed and understood in the scenario-building process. Although predetermined elements impact outcomes, they do not have a direct causal impact on a given outcome. Critical uncertainties "describe important determinants of events whose character, magnitude or consequences are unknown."11 Exploring critical uncertainties lies at the heart of scenario construction in the sense that the most important task of scenario analysts is to discover the elements that are most uncertain and most important to a specific decision or event.12 Wild cards are "conceivable, if low probability, events or actions that might undermine or modify radically the chains of logic or narrative plot lines."13 In John Peterson's terms, wild cards are "not simple trends, nor are they byproducts of anything else. They are events on their own. They are characterized by their scope, and a speed of change that challenges the outermost capabilities of today's human capabilities."14 Wild cards might be extremely important in that in the process of scenario planning their emergence could change the entire direction of each scenario plot line. A scenario plot line is "a compelling story about how things happen" and it describes "how driving forces might plausibly behave as they interact with predetermined elements and different combinations of critical uncertainties."15 Narratives and/or stories are an essential part of the scenario method due to the identical structure of analytical narratives and scenarios: "both are sequential descriptions of a situation with the passage of time and explain the process of events from the base situation into the situation questioned."16 Process and Purpose of Scenario Analysis Scenario analysis begins with the exploration of driving forces including some uncertainties. However, scenario building is more than just organizing future uncertainties; rather, it is a thorough understanding of uncertainties, thereby distinguishing between something clear and unclear in the process of decision making.17 As Pierre Wack has pointed out, "By carefully studying some uncertainties, we gained a deeper understanding of their interplay, which, paradoxically, led us to learn what was certain and inevitable and what was not." In other words, a careful investigation of raw uncertainties helps people figure out more "critical uncertainties" by showing that "what may appear in some cases to be uncertain might actually be predetermined – that many outcomes were simply not possible."18 Exploring future uncertainties thoroughly is one of the most important factors in scenario analysis. Kees van der Heijden argues that in the process of separating "knowns" from "unknowns" analysts could clarify driving forces because the process of separation between "predetermineds" and uncertainties demands a fair amount of knowledge of causal relationships surrounding the issue at stake.19 Thus, in scenario analysis a thorough understanding of critical uncertainties leads to a well-established knowledge of driving forces and causal relations.20 Robert Lempert succinctly summarized the scenario-construction process as follows: "scenario practice begins with the challenge facing the decision-makers, ranks the most significant driving forces according to their level of uncertainty and their impact on trends seemingly relevant to that decision, and then creates a handful of scenarios that explore different manifestations of those driving forces."21

A2: Predictions Fail

We can use past events to predict future outcomes

Dekker et. al, Griffith University, 11

(Sidney Dekker, Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance at Griffith University, Paul Cilliers, Centre for Studies in Complexity, Departments of Philosophy and Biochemistry at the University of Stellenbosch, and Jan-Hendrik Hofmeyr, Centre for Studies in Complexity, Departments of Philosophy and Biochemistry at the University of Stellenbosch, 02-21-11, "The complexity of failure: Implications of complexity theory for safety investigations," Safety Science, Vol. 49, accessed Science Direct 07-20-15, mee)

In the Newtonian vision of the world, everything that happens has a definitive, identifiable cause and a definitive effect. There is symmetry between cause and effect (they are equal but opposite). The determination of the ''cause'' or ''causes'' is of course seen as the most important function of accident investigation, but assumes that physical effects can be traced back to physical causes (or a chain of causes-effects) (Leveson, 2002). The assumption that effects cannot occur without specific causes influences legal reasoning in the wake of accidents too. For example, to raise a question of negligence in an accident, harm must be caused by the negligent action (GAIN, 2004). Assumptions about cause-effect symmetry can be seen in what is known as the outcome bias (Fischhoff, 1975). The worse the consequences, the more any preceding acts are seen as blameworthy (Hugh and Dekker, 2009). Newtonian ontology is materialistic: all phenomena, whether physical, psychological or social, can be reduced to (or understood in terms of) matter, that is, the movement of physical components inside three-dimensional Euclidean space. The only property that distinguishes particles is where they are in that space. Change, evolution, and indeed accidents, can be reduced to the geometrical arrangement (or misalignment) of fundamentally equivalent pieces of matter, whose interactive movements are governed exhaustively by linear laws of motion, of cause and effect. The Newtonian model may have become so pervasive and coincident with ''scientific'' thinking that, if analytic reduction to determinate cause-effect relationships cannot be achieved, then the accident analysis method or agency isn't entirely worthy. The Chairman of the NTSB at the time, Jim Hall, raised the specter of his agency not being able to find the Eureka part in TWA 200, which would challenge its entire reputation (p. 119): ''What you're dealing with here is much more than an aviation accident... What you have at stake here is the credibility of this agency and the credibility of the government to run an investigation'' (Dekker, 2011). 2.3. The foreseeability of harm According to Newton's image of the universe, the future of any part of it can be predicted with absolute certainty if its state at any time was known in all details. With enough knowledge of the initial conditions of the particles and the laws that govern their motion, all subsequent events can be foreseen. In other words, if somebody can be shown to have known (or should have known) the initial positions and momentum of the components constituting a system, as well as the forces acting on those components (which are not only external forces but also those determined by the positions of these and other particles), then this person could, in principle, have predicted the further evolution of the system with complete certainty and accuracy. If such knowledge is in principle attainable, then harmful outcomes are foreseeable too. Where people have a duty of care to apply such knowledge in the prediction of the effects of their interventions, it is consistent with the Newtonian model to ask how they failed to foresee the effects. Did they not know the laws governing their part of the universe (i.e. were they incompetent, unknowledgeable)? Did they fail to plot out the possible effects of their actions? Indeed, legal rationality in the determination of negligence follows this feature of the Newtonian model (p. 6): ''Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which can reasonably be foreseen to be likely to cause harm. If, as a result of a failure to act in this reasonably skillful way, harm is caused, the person whose action caused the harm, is negligent'' (GAIN, 2004). In other words, people can be construed as negligent if the person did not avoid actions that could be foreseen to lead to effects— effects that would have been predictable and thereby avoidable if the person had sunk more effort into understanding the starting conditions and the laws governing the subsequent motions of the elements in that Newtonian sub-universe. Most road traffic legislation is based on this Newtonian commitment to foreseeability too. For example, a road traffic law in a typical Western country might specify how a motorist should adjust speed so as to be able stop the vehicle before colliding with some obstacle, at the same time remaining aware of the circumstances that could influence such selection of speed. Both the foreseeability of all possible hindrances and the awareness of circumstances (initial conditions) critical for determining speed are steeped in Newtonian epistemology. Both are also heavily subject to outcome bias: if an accident suggests that an obstacle or

particular circumstance was not foreseen, then speed was surely too high. The system's user, as a consequence, is always wrong (Tingvall and Lie, 2010). The trajectory of a Newtonian system is not only determined towards the future, but also towards the past. Given its present state, we can in principle reverse the evolution to reconstruct any earlier state that it has gone through. Such assumptions give accident investigators the confidence that an event sequence can be reconstructed by starting with the outcome and then tracing its causal chain back into time. The notion of reconstruction reaffirms and instantiates Newtonian physics: knowledge about past events is not original, but merely the result of uncovering a pre-existing order. The only thing between an investigator and a good reconstruction are the limits on the accuracy of the representation of what happened. It follows that accuracy can be improved by ''better'' methods of investigation (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2001).

Even if our scenarios are wrong, there is still necessary utility in attempting to plan policies for the future—only attempts to identify future problems allows us to solve preventable catastrophes

Garrett, Atlantic Council, 12

(Banning, director of the Asia Program and Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Atlantic Council, 01-23-12, "In Search of Sand Piles and Butterflies," da 7-20-15, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/careers/blogs/futuresource/in-search-of-sand-piles-and-butterflies, mee)

"Disruptive change" that produces "strategic shocks" has become an increasing concern for policymakers, shaken by momentous events of the last couple of decades that were not on their radar screens – from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the 2008 financial crisis and the "Arab Spring." These were all shocks to the international system, predictable perhaps in retrospect but predicted by very few experts or officials on the eve of their occurrence. This "failure" to predict specific strategic shocks does not mean we should abandon efforts to foresee disruptive change or look at all possible shocks as equally plausible. Most strategic shocks do not "come out of the blue." **We can understand and project long-term global trends and foresee at least some of their potential effects, including potential shocks and disruptive change**. **We can construct alternative futures scenarios to envision potential change**, including strategic shocks. Based on trends and scenarios, we can take actions to avert possible undesirable outcomes or limit the damage should they occur. **We can** also **identify** potential opportunities or at least **more desirable futures** that we seek to seize **through policy course corrections**. We should distinguish "strategic shocks" that are developments that could happen at any time and yet may never occur. This would include such plausible possibilities as use of a nuclear device by terrorists or the emergence of an airborne human-to-human virus that could kill millions. Such possible but not inevitable developments would not necessarily be the result of worsening long-term trends. Like possible terrorist attacks, governments need to try to prepare for such possible catastrophes though they may never happen. But there are other potential disruptive changes, including those that create strategic shocks to the international system, that can result from identifiable trends that make them more likely in the future—for example, growing demand for food, water, energy and other resources with supplies failing to keep pace. We need to look for the "sand piles" that the trends are building and are subject to collapse at some point with an additional but indeterminable additional "grain of sand" and identify the potential for the sudden appearance of "butterflies" that might flap their wings and set off hurricanes. Mohamed Bouazizi, who immolated himself December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, was the butterfly who flapped his wings and (with the "force multiplier" of social media) set off a hurricane that is still blowing throughout the Middle East. Perhaps the metaphors are mixed, but the butterfly's delicate flapping destabilized the sand piles (of rising food prices, unemployed students, corrupt government, etc.) that had been building in Tunisia, Egypt, and much of the region. The result was a sudden collapse and disruptive change that has created a strategic shock that is still producing tremors throughout the region. But the collapse was due to cumulative effects of identifiable and converging trends. When and what form change will take may be difficult if not impossible to foresee, but the likelihood of a tipping point being reached—that linear continuation of the present into the future is increasingly unlikely—can be foreseen. Foreseeing the direction of change and the likelihood of discontinuities, both sudden and protracted, is thus not beyond our capabilities. While efforts to understand and project long-term global trends cannot provide accurate predictions, for example, of the GDPs of China, India, and the United States in 2030, looking at economic and GDP growth trends, can provide insights into a wide range of possible outcomes. For example, it is a useful to assess the implications if the GDPs of these three countries each grew at currently projected average rates – even if one understands that there are many factors that can and likely will alter their trajectories. The projected growth trends of the three countries suggest that at some point in the next few decades, perhaps between 2015 and 2030, China's GDP will surpass that of the United States. And by adding consideration of the economic impact of demographic trends (China's aging and India's youth bulge), there is a possibility that India will surpass both China and the US, perhaps by 2040 or 2050, to become the world's largest economy. These potential shifts of economic power from the United States to China then to India would likely prove strategically disruptive on a global scale.

Although slowly developing, such disruptive change would likely have an even greater strategic impact than the Arab Spring. The "rise" of China has already proved strategically disruptive, creating a potential China-United States regional rivalry in Asia two decades after Americans fretted about an emerging US conflict with a then-rising Japan challenging American economic supremacy. Despite uncertainty surrounding projections, foreseeing the possibility (some would say high likelihood) that China and then India will replace the United States as the largest global economy has near-term policy implications for the US and Europe. The potential long-term shift in economic clout and concomitant shift in political power and strategic position away from the US and the West and toward the East has implications for near-term policy choices. Policymakers could conclude, for example, that the West should make greater efforts to bring the emerging (or re-emerging) great powers into close consultation on the "rules of the game" and global governance as the West's influence in shaping institutions and behavior is likely to significantly diminish over the next few decades. The alternative to finding such a near-term accommodation could be increasing mutual suspicions and hostility rather than trust and growing cooperation between rising and established powers—especially between China and the United States—leading to a fragmented, zero-sum world in which major global challenges like climate change and resource scarcities are not addressed and conflict over dwindling resources and markets intensifies and even bleeds into the military realm among the major actors. Neither of these scenarios may play out, of course. Other global trends suggest that sometime in the next several decades, the world could encounter a "hard ceiling" on resources availability and that climate change could throw the global economy into a tailspin, harming China and India even more than the United States. In this case, perhaps India and China would falter economically leading to internal instability and crises of governance, significantly reducing their rates of economic growth and their ability to project power and play a significant international role than might otherwise have been expected. But this scenario has other implications for policymakers, including dangers posed to Western interests from "failure" of China and/or India, which could produce huge strategic shocks to the global system, including a prolonged economic downturn in the West as well as the East. Thus, **looking at relatively slowly developing trends can provide foresight for necessary course corrections now to avert catastrophic disruptive change or prepare to be more resilient if foreseeable but unavoidable shocks occur.** Policymakers and the public will press for predictions and criticize government officials and intelligence agencies when momentous events "catch us by surprise." But unfortunately, as both Yogi Berra and Neils Bohr are credited with saying, "prediction is very hard, especially about the future." One can predict with great accuracy many natural events such as sunrise and the boiling point of water at sea level. We can rely on the infallible predictability of the laws of physics to build airplanes and automobiles and iPhones. And we can calculate with great precision the destruction footprint of a given nuclear weapon. Yet even physical systems like the weather as they become more complex, become increasingly difficult and even inherently impossible to predict with precision. With human behavior, specific predictions are not just hard, but impossible as uncertainty is inherent in the human universe. As futurist Paul Saffo wrote in the Harvard Business Review in 2007, "prediction is possible only in a world in which events are preordained and no amount of actions in the present can influence the future outcome." One cannot know for certain what actions he or she will take in the future much less the actions of another person, a group of people or a nation state. This obvious point is made to dismiss any idea of trying to "predict" what will occur in the future with accuracy, especially the outcomes of the interplay of many complex factors, including the interaction of human and natural systems. More broadly, the human future is not predetermined but rather depends on human choices at every turning point, cumulatively leading to different alternative outcomes. This uncertainty about the future also means the future is amenable to human choice and leadership. **Trends analyses**—including foreseeing trends leading to disruptive change—**are** thus **essential to provide** individuals, organizations and **political leaders with the strategic foresight to take steps mitigate the dangers ahead** and seize the opportunities for shaping the human destiny. Peter Schwartz nearly a decade ago characterized the convergence of trends and disruptive change as "inevitable surprises." He wrote in Inevitable Surprises that "in the coming decades we face many more inevitable surprises: major discontinuities in the economic, political and social spheres of our world, each one changing the 'rules of the game' as its played today. If anything, there will be more, no fewer, surprises in the future, and they will all be interconnected. Together, they will lead us into a world, ten to fifteen years hence, that is fundamentally different from the one we know today. Understanding these inevitable surprises in our future is critical for the decisions we have to make today…. We may not be able to prevent catastrophe (although sometimes we can), but we can certainly increase our ability to respond, and our ability to see opportunities that we would otherwise miss."

A2: Security

Link Defense/A2: Discourse Matters

No link – intersubjectivity means there's no monolithic understanding of security and speech acts are never singular – that means dialogue solves our bad reps

Roe 12 {Paul, Associate Professor of International Relations and European Studies (Central European University), "Is Securitization a 'Negative' Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics," Security Dialogue, 43.3, SAGE#THUR}

Is securitization always about silence and speed? For the Copenhagen School, securitization represents a panic politics: we must do something now, as our very survival is at stake. In such a scenario, it is hardly surprising that Aradau and Huysmans both see the possibilities for debate and deliberation as being minimal: normal procedures must be circumvented, otherwise it might all be too late. The speed of decisionmaking and the accompanying silence on the part of those outside the relevant elite are made all the more salient by the so-called internalist (Stritzel, 2007) or philosophical (Balzacq, 2011) view of securitization, whereby the security speech act possesses its own performative power. The internalist reading is characteristic of Wæver's (1995) earlier work on securitization and accords with the notion of performativity. Performativity corresponds to John L. Austin's illocutionary act. Here, uttering security is more than just describing something: it is performing an action that creates new realities (Balzacq, 2005: 177, 2011: 20; Stritzel, 2007: 361). The security speech act thus has the power to enable emergency measures and to (re)order sociopolitical relations (friend/enemy, us/them). In other words, security is a self-referential practice. The internalist reading of securitization closely resembles the Schmittian conception of the political inasmuch as both are decisionist: the securitizing actor, like Schmitt's sovereign, defines what is exceptional. The silence that arguably marks the internalist reading therefore reflects the lack of oversight to which the securitizing actor is subject, while, with regard to speed, there is a distinct sense of automaticity in the moment when a political issue is rapidly transformed into a matter of security by virtue of its very utterance as such.

This is **problematized,** however, **by** the so-called externalist (Stritzel, 2007) or sociological (Balzacq, 2011) view, which emphasizes instead the intersubjectivity of the securitization process. With the externalist reading, the authority to speak and the power of the speech act itself are subject to the context in which security is uttered. Most importantly, the framing of something as a security issue is not the sole preserve of the securitizing actor but **must also be accepted by a relevant audience**. As Buzan et al. (1998: 25) make clear, presenting something as an existential threat is merely a 'securitizing move', as 'the issue is [successfully] securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such'. Accordingly, with its emphasis on the intersubjective establishment of threat, the externalist rendering of securitization **makes problematic** Wæver's earlier assertion of security as a self-referential practice. And this conceptual tension is reflected in the specific debate over the nature of the speech act itself. For both Thierry Balzacq and Holger Stritzel, Wæver/the Copenhagen School thus present securitization as both an illocutionary act and a perlocutionary act – that is, they discuss what is done in saying security, as well as what is done by saying security. Perlocutionary acts are external to the performative aspect of the speech act and thereby correspond not to the utterance itself but to its effects: did the securitizing actor manage to convince the relevant audience. Balzacq (2005: 177–8) sums up the situation thus: either we argue that securitization is a self-referential practice, in which case we forsake perlocution with the related acquiescence of the audience … or we hold fast to the creed that using the conception of security also produces a perlocutionary effect, in which case we abandon self-referentiality. He goes on: I suspect instead that the CS [Copenhagen School] leans towards the first option…. [A]lthough the CS appeals to an audience, its framework ignores the audience, which suggests that the CS opts for an illocutionary view of security yielding a 'magical efficiency' rather than a fully-fledged model encompassing perlocution as well (Balzacq, 2005: 177–8).9 It is indeed the case that the Copenhagen School has **underconceptualized** the role of the audience.10 This is something of which Wæver (2003) himself is **well aware**. But, it is debatable whether the Copenhagen School favours an internalist reading of the securitization concept. Although Wæver is keen to stress the importance of the 'moment' of the speech act, and thus retain its illocutionary force, he nevertheless also leans towards the importance of the relationship between securitizing actor and audience. Wæver warns of viewing securitization as a 'unilateral performance' – that undertaken only by the sovereign – and thus its equivalence to a 'Schmittian anti-democratic decisionism'. Rather: We [members of the Copenhagen School] preserve the event-ness of the speech act and the performative moment, but locate it in-between the actors…. This might look like perlocution because it includes something after the speaker's first action, but if the speech act is viewed as a larger whole including audience, it is more appropriate to see securitization as what is done in the (collective) act, rather than dissolving the move into one component of a larger complex social explanation of processes (Wæver, 2007: 4). The important point here is how the security speech act moves away from a Schmittian to an Arendtian conception of politics, 'because the theory places power in-between humans … and insists on securityness being a quality not of threats but of their handling, that is, the theory places power not with "things" external to a community but internal to it' (Wæver, 2011: 468). For Wæver, securitization thus takes place in a context where there is space for open politics: actors and audiences together agree as to what constitutes security and what does not. This is not to say that agreement is necessarily reached on an equal basis, as actors often possess, and indeed employ, the resources to cajole and bully audiences into acquiescing to their depiction of events. But, it is to say that **some kind of agreement is nevertheless required**. Indeed, the potential for securitization to avoid its Schmittian connotations in this way **is also recognized** by Williams. For Williams, the **importance of the audience** relates to a 'discursive ethics' that goes against the decisionist account of securitization. The security speech act entails the **possibility of dialogue and thereby also the potential for the transformation of security** (Williams, 2003: 522–3). And although Williams (2003: 524) seems somewhat sceptical as to the extent to which securitizations are subject to such 'discursive legitimation' – also noting how security issues often 'operate in the realm of secrecy, of "national security", of decision' – he nonetheless **makes**

clear the **potential for securitizations to be 'pulled back'** into the public realm, 'particularly when the social consensus underlying the capacity for decision is challenged, either **by questioning the policies, or by disputing the threat,** or both'.

No Impact

Their K of security is overly essentialized – our form doesn't produce bad policy or scapegoating

-Liberal democracy provides checks vs bad policy

-Security spurs cooperation solving scapegoating (i.e. the emancipatory community)

Roe 12 {Paul, Associate Professor of International Relations and European Studies (Central European University), "Is Securitization a 'Negative' Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics," Security Dialogue, 43.3, SAGE#THUR}

In a 2004 article, Claudia Aradau (2004) set out the terms for a normatively defined debate over securitization/desecuritization as negative/positive conceptions. In the article, Aradau defines securitization as negative inasmuch as its mode of extraordinary politics necessarily both institutionalizes fast-track decisionmaking ('process') and produces categories of enemy others ('outcome'). Additionally, while desecuritization (i.e. maintaining issues in, or returning issues to, the realm of 'normal' politics)1 thereby offers the possibility of a more positive conception, Aradau argues that its transformatory potential is severely circumscribed, as the normal political mode is itself invariably subject to the same institutional sovereign authority and domination as securitization. For Aradau, the solution to this predicament was therefore to escape security and reconceptualize politics according to a different logic, one 'based on universal address and recognition. Such a logic disrupts the exclusionary logic of security and, at the same time, furnishes a principle upon which a new relationality with the other can be conceived' (Aradau, 2004: 401; see also Aradau, 2008). Aradau's critique of security/securitization, particularly her claim that the concept indeed corresponds to Carl Schmitt's notion of the political (decisionist/exclusionary), reflects an increasing concern with the notion of 'positive' security/securitization. While Aradau argues that securitization inevitably produces categories of 'haves' and 'have-nots' – those that belong to the political community and those that do not; as she succinctly puts it, 'we cannot all be equal sharers of security' (Aradau, 2008: 73) – other writers (e.g. McSweeney, 1999; Booth, 2005, 2007; McDonald, 2008) offer different formulations that are critical of an essentialization of security that reflects the Schmittian mode of politics. For Ken Booth (2007: 138), for instance, an exclusionary sense of 'us' and 'them' is brought into question by what he calls an 'emancipatory community': An emancipatory community recognizes that people have multiple identities, that a person's identity cannot be satisfactorily defined by any single attribution … and that people must be allowed to live simultaneously in a variety of communities expressing their multifaceted lives.2 On the one hand, the present article resides firmly within the context of this general debate inasmuch as it is concerned with particular understandings of 'negative' (and thus also 'positive') in attempts to define the meaning of security. On the other hand, however, it also has a more specific focus, in that its argument is set squarely against the Copenhagen School's notion of securitization. There are a couple of reasons for the adoption of such an approach. First, a focus on securitization illuminates some assumptions in a particular way. For example, Rita's Floyd's (2010) most recent work on the positiveness/negativeness of environmental security is predicated on an understanding of, and certain revisions to, the securitization concept with regard to 'outcome'. Second, a focus on securitization also brings with it other assumptions that are largely absent from the more general debate, assumptions related to 'process' and to the proposition that (successful) securitizations are bad for democracy. In other words, the normative critique of securitization has also generated more particular thinking over what is considered positive and negative. Accordingly, my intention is to make evident the terms of the debate that have served to inform securitization as a negative concept. In my attempt to do so, I make two main arguments. The first, which relates to to process, is that the extent to which securitization necessitates a lack of openness and deliberation has been overexaggerated: in the context of liberal democracies, legislation is invariably marked by a greater semblance of oversight than that assumed by Aradau and others. The second main argument, which relates to outcome, is that although securitization might indeed function in accordance with what Ole Wæver (1995) has called the 'logic of war', its mode of extraordinary politics belies an engagement with different constructions that also serve to reveal more non-divisive referents and cooperative practices. In the first part of the article, I set out the terms of the debate according to the concerns with process and outcome, before moving on in the second part to make clear the aforementioned arguments.

NO SPF – liberal demo provides sufficient checks, sometimes extraordinary politics are good, and their evidence assumes Cold War politics

Roe 12 {Paul, Associate Professor of International Relations and European Studies (Central European University), "Is Securitization a 'Negative' Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics," Security Dialogue, 43.3, SAGE}

Securitized issues indeed have the potential to disrupt the processes of open and accountable government: through its very nature, fast-tracking serves to limit the proper functioning of normal politics. But, extraordinary politics (in the form of the expedition of legislation) **does not mean an abandonment of legislative mechanisms**: while the legislative process is surely accelerated, a degree of **scrutiny and oversight nevertheless remains**. As a result, in the context of liberal democracies, securitization rarely resembles Schmittian decisionism. Rather, the commitment to maintaining openness and deliberation in the relationship between the executive and the legislature equates the concept far more with Wæver's own preferred Arendtian politics. Indeed (Paris School contentions aside),25 as Olav Knudsen makes clear, the speed and silence of securitization is largely characteristic of the military sector, particularly during the Cold War period. However, things 'just aren't so any more. In the post-Cold War period, **agenda-setting has been much easier to influence** than the securitization approach assumes' (Knudsen, 2001: 359). Besides which, in certain circumstances there are also dangers involved in not expediting legislation. In highlighting how securitization can give the necessary prominence to some problems, for example, Booth (2007: 168) warns against the general recourse to desecuritization (politicization): **Desecuritisation can disempower.** Having issues settled by 'ordinary' politics is a nice idea: who would not prefer it to the threat of political violence? But 'ordinary' politics **might not help in extraordinary circumstances**; indeed, treating extraordinary issues as ordinary politics is a problem, not a solution.

Security Inevitable

Security inevitable – their approach is overly reductionist

Ling '97 (et al – LL.H.M. Ling is Associate Professor on the Graduate Program in International Affairs at The New School. She graduated from Wellesley College, and from Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a Ph.D.; along with Anna M. Agathangelou and , Director of the Global Change Institute in Nicosia and Former Assistant Professor of Women's Studies and Politics at Oberlin; Studies in Political Economy, v54, Fall, p. 7-8)

Given these concerns with political transformation, post-colonialism exposes several internal ironies in dissident IR. Sankaran Krishna summarizes them accordingly:46 *A Fixation on the West Dissident IR claims to recognize all identities in the study and practice of international life but perpetuates a "remarkably self-contained and self-referential view of the West that is] oblivious to the intimate dialogue between 'Western' and 'non-Western' economies, societies, and philosophies that underwrite the disenchantment with modernity that characterizes the present epoch." 'Absence of Materiality Despite its emancipatory intentions, dissident IR tends to gloss over "a vital and phvsicalistic sense" of life's injustices (as in war) when "so preoccupied with practices of representation and signification." 'Binding Dualisms While denouncing the dualisms that shackle sovereign international relations (e.g., order vs. chaos, domestic vs. international, objectivity vs. subjectivity), dissident IR itself reproduces dichotomies such as a totalizing critique vs. a capitulationist narrative, dissidence vs. sovereignty, good vs. bad. 'Disabling Politics in its deep suspicion of a stable subjectivity and unitary agency, dissident IR undermines an enabling politics for an emancipatory future. Left unresolved, these internal ironies may lead to a "new recipe of discipline and dominance."47 Dissident IR's fixation with the West offers little analytical room for an interactive, articulating, and self-generating Other in international relations. It relegates to the Other, instead, an identity assigned by sovereign IR: i.e., as a mute, passive reflection of the West or as an Utopian projection based solely on its Otherness from the West With this construction of Self-Other relations, dissident IR tends to romanticize the dangers of its self-isolation into a totalizing critique — especially for those who must bear the brunt of its repercussions. Indeed, dissident IR's distaste for a singular, "sovereign" subjectivity further accentuates its elitism. After all, who can afford to not negotiate with sovereignty while refusing a coherent identity? As bell hooks writes. "Should we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the 'subject' when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time?"48 In short, these internal ironies of dissident IR continue to marginalize, silence, and exile precisely those it seeks to embrace. Worse yet, adds ROger Spegele, dissidence as offshore observation "frees us from the recognition that we have a moral obligation to do anything about it."49

A2: Mack

Psychoanalysis wrong

Robinson '5 (Andrew, Early Career Fellow in the School of Politics – University of Nottingham, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique", Theory & Event, 8(1))

⬚ Lacanian analysis consists mainly of an exercise in projection. As a result, Lacanian "explanations" often look more propagandistic or pedagogical than explanatory. A particular case is dealt with only in order to, and to the extent that it can, confirm the already-formulated structural theory. Judith Butler criticizes Zizek's method on the grounds that 'theory is applied to its examples', as if 'already true, prior to its exemplification'. 'The theory is articulated on its self-sufficiency, and then shifts register only for the pedagogical purpose of illustrating an already accomplished truth'. It is therefore 'a theoretical fetish that disavows the conditions of its own emergence'52. She alleges that Lacanian psychoanalysis 'becomes a theological project' and also 'a way to avoid the rather messy psychic and social entanglement' involved in studying specific cases53. Similarly, Dominick LaCapra objects to the idea of constitutive lack because specific 'losses cannot be adequately addressed when they are enveloped in an overly generalised discourse of absence... Conversely, absence at a "foundational" level cannot simply be derived from particular historical losses'54. Attacking 'the long story of conflating absence with loss that becomes constitutive instead of historical'55, he accuses several theorists of eliding the difference between absence and loss, with 'confusing and dubious results', including a 'tendency to avoid addressing historical problems, including losses, in sufficiently specific terms', and a tendency to 'enshroud, perhaps even to etherealise, them in a generalised discourse of absence'56. Daniel Bensa'd draws out the political consequences of the projection of absolutes into politics. 'The fetishism of the absolute event involves... a suppression of historical intelligibility, necessary to its depoliticization'. The space from which politics is evacuated 'becomes... a suitable place for abstractions, delusions and hypostases'. Instead of actual social forces, there are 'shadows and spectres'57. ⬚   The operation of the logic of projection is predictable. According to Lacanians, there is a basic structure (sometimes called a 'ground' or 'matrix') from which all social phenomena arise, and this structure, which remains unchanged in all eventualities, is the reference-point from which particular cases are viewed. The "fit" between theory and evidence is constructed monologically by the reduction of the latter to the former, or by selectivity in inclusion and reading of examples. At its simplest, the Lacanian myth functions by a short-circuit between a particular instance and statements containing words such as "all", "always", "never", "necessity" and so on. A contingent example or a generic reference to "experience" is used, misleadingly, to found a claim with supposed universal validity. For instance, Stavrakakis uses the fact that existing belief-systems are based on exclusions as a basis to claim that all belief-systems are necessarily based on exclusions58, and claims that particular traumas express an 'ultimate impossibility'59. Similarly, Laclau and Mouffe use the fact that a particular antagonism can disrupt a particular fixed identity to claim that the social as such is penetrated and constituted by antagonism as such60. Phenomena are often analysed as outgrowths of something exterior to the situation in question. For instance, Zizek 's concept of the "social symptom" depends on a reduction of the acts of one particular series of people (the "socially excluded", "fundamentalists", Serbian paramilitaries, etc.) to a psychological function in the psyche of a different group (westerners). The "real" is a supposedly self-identical principle which is used to reduce any and all qualitative differences between situations to a relation of formal equivalence. This shows how mythical characteristics can be projected from the outside, although it also raises different problems: the under-conceptualization of the relationship between individual psyches and collective phenomena in Lacanian theory, and a related tendency for psychological concepts to acquire an ersatz agency similar to that of a Marxian fetish. "The Real" or "antagonism" occurs in phrases which have it doing or causing something. ⬚   As Barthes shows, myth offers the psychological benefits of empiricism without the epistemological costs. Tautology, for instance, is 'a minor ethical salvation, the satisfaction of having militated in favour of a truth... without having to assume the risks which any somewhat positive search for truth inevitably involves'61. It dispenses with the need to have ideas, while treating this release as a stern morality. Tautology is a rationality which simultaneously denies itself, in which 'the accidental failure of language is magically identified with what one decides is a natural resistance of the object'62.

⬚   This passage could almost have been written with the "Lacanian Real" in mind. The characteristic of the Real is precisely that one can invoke it without defining it (since it is "beyond symbolization"), and that the accidental failure of language, or indeed a contingent failure in social praxis, is identified with an ontological resistance to symbolization projected into Being itself. For instance, Zizek 's classification of the Nation as a Thing rests on the claim that 'the only way we can determine it is by... empty tautology', and that it is a 'semantic void'63. Similarly, he claims that 'the tautological gesture of the Master-Signifier', an empty performative which retroactively turns presuppositions into conclusions, is necessary, and also that tautology is the only way historical change can occur64. He even declares constitutive lack (in this case, termed the "death drive") to be a tautology65. Lacanian references to "the Real" or "antagonism" as the cause of a contingent failure are reminiscent of Robert Teflon's definition of God: 'an explanation which means "I have no explanation"'66. An "ethics of the Real" is a minor ethical salvation which says very little in positive terms, but which can pose in macho terms as a "hard" acceptance of terrifying realities. It authorizes truth-claims - in Laclau's language, a 'reality' which is 'before our eyes67', or in Newman's, a 'harsh reality' hidden beneath a protective veil68 - without the attendant risks. Some Lacanian theorists also show indications of a commitment based on the particular kind of "euphoric" enjoyment Barthes associates with myths. Laclau in particular emphasizes his belief in the 'exhilarating' significance of the present69, hinting that he is committed to euphoric investments generated through the repetition of the same.

Feminist IR Answers

2ac

1 – No link – we do not embrace masculinity in our affirmative – we are a break down of the way that masculinity has structured and ordered international relations discourse

2 – Permute – do the Plan – we remove the masculine regime of surveillance.

3 – Realism inevitable

4 – Perm DO both – if they say "reject the aff" we don't do that part

Deconstructing IR from within IR key to solve hegemonic masculinization.

Hooper, teacher of Gender politics and IR, lecturer at University of West England, **01**[Charlotte, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics Columbia University Press, New York. p227

> The power of such struggles over masculine identities, as I argue, depends to some extent on their taking part in a space that has been naturalized as a masculine space. If the environment is no longer so clearly a masculine one, then some of the imagery loses its genderspecific connotations, while the rest loses the power of naturalization. Cracks in the edifice of masculinism are appearing, not only with the arrival of feminist scholarship and a number of postpositivist fellow travelers who take gender seriously, but also in that gender issues are beginning to be addressed, however crudely, by more mainstream IR contributors.

5 - Feminist international relations recreate the oppressive structures they seek to dismantle by assigning and categorizing by gender.
Stern and Zalewski 09 MARIA STERN, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Peace and Development research at Gotberg university, AND MARYSIA ZALEWSKI, Director of Centre for Gender Studies at university of Aberdeen. "Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization" Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 611–630, Cambridge journals) DF

> In this section we clarify what we mean by the problem of sexgender and how it transpires in the context of feminist narratives within IR – which we will exemplify below with a recounting of a familiar feminist reading of militarisation. To re-iterate, the primary reason for investigating this is that we suspect part of the reason for the aura of disillusionment around feminism – especially as a critical theoretical resource – is connected to the sense that feminist stories repeat the very grammars that initially incited them as narratives in resistance. To explain; one might argue that there has been a normative feminist failure to adequately construct secure foundations for legitimate and authoritative knowledge claims upon which to garner effective and permanent gender change, particularly in regard to women. But for poststructural scholars this failure is not surprising as the emancipatory visions of feminism inevitably emerged as illusory given the attachments to foundationalist and positivistic understandings of subjects, power and agency. If, as poststructuralism has shown us, we cannot – through language – decide the meaning of woman, or of femininity, or of feminism, or produce foundational information about it or her;42 that subjects are 'effects' rather than 'origins of institutional practices and discourses';43 that power 'produces subjects in effects';44 or that authentic and authoritative agency are illusory – then the sure foundations for the knowledge that feminist scholars are conventionally required to produce – even hope to produce – are unattainable. Moreover, post-colonial

feminisms have vividly shown how representations of 'woman' or 'women' which masquerade as 'universal' are, instead, universalising and inevitably produced through hierarchical and intersecting power relations.45 In sum; the poststructural suggestion is that feminist representations of women do not correspond to some underlying truth of what woman is or can be; rather feminism produces the subject of woman which it then subsequently comes to represent.46 The implications of this familiar conundrum are far-reaching as the demands of feminism in the context of the knowledge/political project of the gender industry are exposed as implicated in the re-production of the very power from which escape is sought. In short, feminism emerges as complicit in violent reproductions of subjects and knowledges/ practices. How does this recognisable puzzle (recognisable within feminist theory) play out in relation to the issues we are investigating in this article? As noted above, the broad example we choose to focus on to explain our claims is militarisation; partly chosen as both authors have participated in pedagogic, policy and published work in this generic area, and partly because this is an area in which the demand for operationalisable gender knowledge is ever-increasing. Our suggestion is that the increasing requirement47 for knowledge for the gender industry about gender and militarisation re-animates the sexgender paradox which persistently haunts attempts to translate what we know into useful knowledge for redressing (and preventing) conflict, or simply into hopeful scenarios for our students.

6 - Alt doesn't solve – fracturing ideas of masculinity only results in more conflict
Marysia **Zalewski**, Reader in the Centre for Women's Studies, **and** Jane **Parpart**, professor of Gender Studies at University of Dalhousie, **98** [The 'Man' Question in International Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, p76]

Central though this binary conception of gender is to much of Western thought, it presents an illusory dichotomous opposition between genders that obscures important distinctions within masculinity and femininity. Interestingly enough, once the idea of fractures within Western conceptions of masculinity and femininity is accepted, the division between what is masculine and what is feminine tends to be less clear. Fractures within masculinity have played a crucial part in defining the relationships between the two orthodox paradigms in IR: namely realism and liberal internationalism. The division of orthodox IR into two different masculine camps has led to a competition between two aspiring hegemonic masculinities over which is more masculine (real and objective) and which should be regarded as inferior and feminine (subjective and normative)

7 - Post-Cold War conceptions of peace are false → the world is inevitably realist
Ikenberry 01

(G. John, reviewing John J. Mearsheimer, "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", November/December 2001, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57267/g-john-ikenberry/the-tragedy-of-great-power-politics) SLS

Mearsheimer boldly states that great-power rivalry is not over. The major powers still fear each other, and dangerous security competition lurks. This view is built on an "offensive realist" theory of world politics: the deep insecurity generated by the anarchic (hence "tragic") international system leads great powers to act aggressively toward each other, thwarting rivals from gaining power even if such moves risk war. Moreover, great powers are rarely satisfied with the status quo and instead seek hegemony. Mearsheimer tests his theory across the last two centuries, citing the territorial conquests of Japan and Germany before 1945 and Soviet policies after 1917 as evidence. The United States and the United Kingdom do not fit as well into Mearsheimer's framework, but he argues that the "offshore balancing" strategies of these maritime states are just more sophisticated versions of calculated aggression. As a

result, Mearsheimer predicts, the post-Cold War peace among great powers will soon end: without a peer competitor in Europe or Asia, the United States will retract its security commitments there and great-power security competition will return. But he does not make clear why the United States would act in this way -- even if it is a sophisticated power maximizer.

Perm Solvency (1)

The perm solves best: IR criticism is only effective when it is combined with practical policy making.

Keohane, 98 ("Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations and Feminist Theory" Robert O. Keohane, Duke University. International Studies Quarterly 42, 193-198. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/action/showPdf?submitPDF=Full+Text+PDF+%2889+KB%29&doi=10.1111%2F0020-8833.00076

The problem with Tickner's dichotomies, however, goes much deeper. The dichotomies should be replaced by continua, with the dichotomous characterizations at the poles. Each analyst of world politics has to locate herself or himself somewhere along the dimensions between critical and problem-solving theory, nomothetic and narrative epistemology, and a social or structural conception of international relations. In my view, none of the ends of these continua are the optimal places to rest one's perspective. Criticism of the world, by itself, becomes a jeremiad, often resting implicitly on a utopian view of human potential. Without analysis, furthermore, it constitutes merely the opinion of one or a number of people. On the other hand, implicit or complacent acceptance of the world as it is would rob the study of international relations of much of its meaning. How could one identify "problems" without criticism at some level? The issue is not problem-solving vs. critical theory- a convenient device for discarding work that one does not wish to accept- but how deeply the criticism should go. For example, most students of war study it because they hope to expose its evils or to control it in some way: few do so to glorify war as such. But the depth of their critique varies. Does the author reject certain acts of warfare, all warfare, all coercion, or the system of states itself? The deeper the criticism, the more wide-ranging the questions. Narrowly problem-solving work, as in much policy analysis, often ignores the most important causal factors in a situation because they are not manipulable in the short run. However, the more critical and wide-ranging an author's perspective, the more difficult it is to do comparative empirical analysis. An opponent of some types of war can compare the causes of different wars, as a way to help to eliminate those that are regarded as pernicious; but the opponent of the system of states has to imagine the counterfactual situation of a system without states.

Perm Solvency (2)

Perm – embrace realist ideologies ad question our epistemology. Maximizing the positives of politics and minimizing destruction is key to political and ethical responsibility.

Michael C. **Williams**, Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, 20**05**, Cambridge University Press, "The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations"

This book seeks to outline this understanding of the Realist tradition, a tradition that I call 'wilful Realism'. The vision of wilful Realism as I try to present it here has three defining features. The first lies in its relationship to *scepticisim*. <u>Wilful Realism is characterised by a rational questioning of the limits of reason.</u> **It is not a denial of knowledge**, or of rationality, <u>and it insists upon the importance of empirical and historical knowledge. It is,</u> however, deeply **<u>sceptical</u>** – and often harshly critical – **of modern empiricism and rationalism as adequate bases for political knowledge**, and of the broader tendency to model knowledge after the lead of Enlightenment science. <u>These concerns</u> are not abstract: they <u>are driven by the conviction that questions of knowledge and belief are crucial elements in the construction and evaluation of action and order.</u> The sense of limits arising from this scepticism does not yield resignation or nihilism; on the contrary, it is taken as a challenge requiring the active construction of political and social order, leading wilful Realism to a continual concern with the relationship between knowledge and politics, the politics of knowledge, and a strong advocacy of the need for a politics both informed and suitably chastened by an understanding of the limits of knowledge. A second key component is *relationality*<u>. Wilful Realism does not assume that the nature of either the self or political order is fixed or given. It focuses instead on the construction of subjectivity and political order through relational processes of self and other</u>, at the level of both individuals and communities. This concern with relationality is historical and sociological, examining processes of constitution, maintenance, and transformation within and between political orders. It is also conceptual and philosophical. <u>By focusing on the importance of knowledge in the construction of action wilful Realism seeks to ensure that the inescapability of relationality – of</u>, for example, <u>the self gaining identity in relation to other</u>s<u>,</u> or of concepts gaining meaning in relation to their antitheses – <u>does not devolve into</u> dualism: into <u>understandings of identity or knowledge as defined wholly by opposition</u>. This makes the concern with relationality more than just analytic: <u>it is also part of a</u> **political and ethical sensibility** in which **the relationship between self and other has significance as a political principle**, and <u>constitutes one of the most important differences between wilful Realism and forms of rigidly oppositional power politics</u>. The third dimension can, more familiarly, be termed *power politics*. Power is central to any understanding of Realism, and wilful Realism is no exception. At the centre of wilful Realism analysis is an engagement with the multiple forms of power at work in politics, including those involved in knowledge claims, forms of subjectivity, and structures of authority and action (including those that allow the effective mobilisation and exercise of material power). Beyond these analytical issues, however, there again lies a broader set of political and ethical imperatives. Politics is in this vision identifies by its specific duality: an indeterminacy that makes it at one and the same time a realm of power and inevitable struggle, *and* a realm of openness and self-determination. As a sphere of contest over the determination of values and wills, <u>politics is an undetermined realm in which the struggle for power and domination is potentially limitless. Yet politics is also the sphere of activity uniquely concerned with the consideration, generation, and transformation of common interests and understandings: the sphere where the fundamental meanings and values of social life are contested and determined.</u> The lack of fixed understandings of the good and the true is the condition of modern politics, and the basis of its distinctiveness as a realm of freedom, creativity, and change. Wilful Realism is deeply concerned that a recognition of the centrality of power in politics does no result in the reduction of politics to pure power, and particularly to the capacity to wield violence. <u>It seeks, on the contrary, a politics of limits that recognises the destructive and productive dimensions of politics, and that **maximizes its positive possibilities while minimising its destructive potential.**</u>

Perm Solvency (3)

Turn—Their kritik creates a false dichotomy between total rejection and oppression—their "all or nothing" alternative dooms coalitions and closes off space for political activism

Krishna '93 [Sankaran, Dept. of Polit. Sci., Alternatives, 1993]

The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to "nostalgic", essential unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear oppression, the Nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s, that according to him, was operating along obsolete lines emphasizing "facts" and "realities" while a "postmodern" President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4)Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms.This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freedom movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives.The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics

No Link

No link– there is no one form of 'manhood' in IR that we reinforce

Marysia **Zalewski**, Reader in the Centre for Women's Studies, and Jane Parpart, professor of Gender Studies at University of Dalhousie, **98** [The 'Man' Question in International Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, p203-4]

The assertion that international politics and relations is a "man's affair" of course presupposes a single, biologically based, and largely AngloAmerican vision of masculinity. 16 Whereas most of the chapters in the book are situated within this cultural context, no single agreed standard of masculinity comes to the fore. Indeed, one is struck by the variety and richness of definitions of manhood and masculinity that emerge. Steve Niva described a series of shifts in the dominant/hegemonic conceptions of masculinity in the United States. The defeat in Vietnam undermined the longheld myth of the American frontiersman-warrior only to fuel a remasculinization of America in the Ramboized rhetoric of Reagan and Bush. Panama and the Gulf War thus played a central role in the reassertion and redefinition of American masculinity. To Cynthia Weber, the hypermasculine posturing during the Panama invasion signaled not strength but male hysteria over the loss of American hegemonic power. Perhaps these cracks in U.S. hegemony explain the shift to a new definition of (superior) manhood described by Niva. This new "tough but tender" version of hegemonic masculinity ridicules the "insensitive" hypermasculinity of Saddam Hussein and Manuel Noriega, celebrating instead the "new" American man who is morally responsive, sensitive to the needs of women and children, and yet able to kick butt when needed. The possibility that there is one, biologically based, predictable set of characteristics that define a "real man" dissolves in this complexity. Male associations with power, especially over women, youth, and subordinate males, are widespread (both historically and in the present), but definitions of masculinity(ies) obviously vary over time and place. 17 The historical context, the economic, political, and cultural/social factors at play at any given time, clearly have profound implications for the way manhood and masculinities are understood and maintained. As Spike Peterson and Jacqui True reminded us, new times require new ways of thinking about gender relations and manhood/masculinity(ies). I would argue that "old times" require (re)analysis as well, for definitions of manhood and masculinity(ies) have surely varied in the past. Indeed, colonialism and imperialism profoundly shaped the emergence of a hegemonic version of Euramerican manhood, which benefited from being compared with colonial images of soft and effeminate or warriorlike but technically "backward" colonial males

No link//IR not gender based

Gender biases in international relations don't exist and the alternative feminist perspective is fictional as well.

Alastair J.H. **Murray**, Politics Department, University of Wales Swansea, Reconstructing Realism, **1997**, p. 192

Whilst <u>Tickner's feminism</u> presents an interesting revisioning of international relations, it ultimately suffers from the problem that, in order to sustain any of its claims, most of all the notion that a distinctively *feminist* epistemology is actually necessary, it <u>must establish the existence of a gender bias in international relations theory which simply does not exist</u>, <u>and the existence of an 'alternative' feminist position on international affairs which is simply a fiction.</u> Consequently, in order to salvage her very *raison d'etre*, Tickner is forced to engage in some imaginative rewriting of international relations theory. First, <u>in order to lay the basis for the claim that an alternative perspective is actually necessary, conventional theory is stripped of its positive elements</u>, and an easily discredited caricature, centred on realism, erected in its place. Second, in order to conjure up a reason <u>for this alternative perspective to be a feminist one, the positive elements which have been removed from conventional theory are then claimed as the exclusive preserve of such perspectives.</u> Yet, however imaginative this 'revisioning' of international relations theory, <u>its inevitable result is a critique which is so riddled with contradictions that it proves unsustainable</u>, and an alternative epistemology which, based upon this flawed critique, collapses in the face of the revelation of its inadequacy

Alt Fails (1)

IR Feminist narrow the space for worldviews, creating "others".

Caprioli 2004 (Mary, PhD Assistant Professor, University of Minnesota, Duluth. "Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis," International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 253-269) BN.

Contrary to the argument that conventional IR theory excludes feminist inquiry, <u>space exists within the field of international relations for feminist inquiry even allowing for a state-centric focus,</u> just as room exists for scholars interested in exploring the democratic peace and ethnonationalism. <u>International relations feminists make the same mistake that they accuse IR scholars of making: narrowing the space for various worldviews, thereby creating competition and a sense of exclusion among the so-called others.</u> <u>If the role of "feminist theory is to explain women's subordination, or the unjustified asymmetry between women's and men's social and economic positions, and to seek prescriptions for ending it"</u> (Tickner 2001:11), <u>then feminist IR scholarship ought to allow for an explanation of how women's subordination or inequality has an impact on state behavior, assuming a statecentric focus, while at the same time challenging the predetermination of a structural analysis.</u>

Feminism can't adequately explain international relations.

Stern and Zalewski 09 MARIA STERN, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Peace and Development research at Gotberg university, AND MARYSIA ZALEWSKI, Director of Centre for Gender Studies at university of Aberdeen. "Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization" Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 611–630, Cambridge journals) DF

We argue that <u>one of the dominant motifs or signatures of feminism within IR is one of decline and demise particularly in relation to feminism's theoretical and methodological potential.</u>[17] <u>These apparent tired limits of feminism within IR mirror a quandary facing feminist scholarship more generally.</u>[18] Manifestations of this quandary include a certain lassitude inflecting narratives about gender weaved through feminism parsimoniously represented,[19] accompanied by a sense that <u>feminism is becoming increasingly obsolete.</u>[20] As noted above, we investigate this quandary in order to think more deeply, if tangentially through feminism, about the limitations and accompanying <u>violence</u> that <u>marks the academic production of knowledge,</u>[21] <u>as well as</u> to ponder <u>feminism's own performative function</u> in this regard.

Feminism will never be able to resolve the question of gender identity in militarization because it cannot resolve the contradiction between sex and gender.

Stern and Zalewski 09 MARIA STERN, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Peace and Development research at Gotberg university, AND MARYSIA ZALEWSKI, Director of Centre for Gender Studies at university of Aberdeen. "Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization" Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 611–630, Cambridge journals) DF

<u>In familiar feminist fables of gender and militarization, gender conventionally materializes as if it were real (in a foundational sense) yet</u> our <u>critical feminist theorizing tells us it is a construction.</u> We 'know' that when we speak woman, we re-constitute her, we construct and delimit her through our stories about her; <u>a paradox indeed.</u> <u>If an apparent move is made toward gender</u> (usually there is an assumption that this is different from, more advanced than, or more inclusive than feminist

theorizations of woman) then gender metamorphoses into masculinity or femininity, or on the relations between the two in order to show how they act on, impact, influence or provide roles for the sexed body. 'Opening' the feminist agenda to include 'men' and 'masculinity' does not alter this dynamic. Masculinity tends also to become a (gender) 'thing' which we have learned, understood, imported, conveyed, tried to change; more inflections of paradox. 'Gender' becomes reduced to either 'women', 'men', or 'femininity', 'masculinity'; and crucially we lose sight of the productive power involved – productive of the paradox mentioned above, as well as other related paradoxes such as perpetrator victim, 54 security-insecurity,55 and even war-peace.56 We suggest that being attendant to how the 'move' from sex to gender and the 'move' from a focus on 'women' and 'men' to looking at constructions of masculinity and femininity and the hierarchical relations between the two may not be as large a step away from feminism parsimoniously defined as is usually imagined. Indeed it is perhaps not a step 'forward' at all, as we shall illustrate. This side-step invokes the specter of anxiety as it raises questions about the possibility of responsible feminist political interventions, given the paradox with which we grapple. Importantly however, we suggest the sexgender paradox or aporia can never be successfully resolved; 'an aporia is not a contradiction which can be brought into the dialectic, smoothed over and resolved into the unity of the concept, but an untotalisable problem at the heart of the concept, disrupting its trajectory, emptying out its fullness, opening out its closure.'57 As such we see the production of sexgender as irresolvable – as a perpetual conundrum. We return to this point in our conclusion. To reiterate: through the following critical reading of a familiar feminist fable of militarisation58 we illustrate the logic which produces the paradox of feminism that demands (but ultimately belies) resolution. We explore how feminist narratives are not able to fulfil their supposed transformative promise since attempts to transgress the discursive frameworks in which they are framed are haunted; thus ensuring the failure of feminist stories. Failure, in this sense, is judged in feminism's (in)ability to resolve its inherent contradiction.

Alt links back

Arguing that any IR theory overwhelms the specifics of the situation is an over simplification that re-creates the hierarchies they critique.

Caprioli, 04 "Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis" Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076).

There is little utility in constructing a divide if none exists. As Thomas Kuhn (1962) argues, common measures do exist across paradigms that provide a shared basis for theory. It seems overly pessimistic to accept Karl Popper's ''Myth of Framework,'' which postulates that ''we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories, our expectations, our past experiences, our language, and that as a consequence, we cannot communicate with or judge those working in terms of a different paradigm'' (Neufeld 1995:44). <u>Some feminists</u> (for example, Tickner 1996, 2001; Peterson 2002; Steans 2003) <u>appear to embrace this ''Myth of Framework'' by accentuating the differences between the perspectives of feminist and IR theorists based on their past experiences and languages and criticize IR theorists for their lack of communication with feminist IR scholars. Ironically, the ''Myth of Framework'' shares a number of assumptions with Hobbes's description of the state of nature that feminists routinely reject. The ''Myth of Framework'' assumes no middle ground scholars are presumably entrenched in their own worldviews without hope of compromise or the ability to understand others' worldviews.</u> If this is the case, scholars are doomed to discussions with likeminded individuals rather than having a productive dialogue with those outside their own worldview. <u>Scholars who accept the ''Myth of Framework'' have essentially created a Tower of Babel in which they choose not to understand each other's language. The acceptance of such a myth creates conflict and establishes a hierarchy within international relations scholarship even though conventional feminists theoretically seek to identify and eradicate conflict and hierarchy within society as a whole.</u>

Realism Inev

War is inevitable – the anarchic system of international politics ensures that States will always be vying for power, regardless of their visible intentions

Slater 09

(Hannah Louise, reviewing John J. Mearsheimer, "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", November 25 2009, http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/politics/1949577-tragedy-great-power-politics/) SLS

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics' by John Mearsheimer, outlines his theory of "Offensive Realism". It describes what motivates the international system and offers historical explanations as well as future predictions.

The book begins with the central tenet of Offensive Realist theory: <u>the international system is anarchic and this causes states to fear each other and compete for power. A state's ultimate aim is become a hegemon because this is most secure. Thus states are constantly trapped in security competition, seeking to increase their share of world power.</u> Mearsheimer argues that <u>power is based on military capabilities a state possesses and the strongest power is the state with the strongest army as only land power can win a major war alone.</u> Latent power –based upon population and wealth, which create large armies- is significant but not as important as actual power. <u>Hesitance about using nuclear weapons means land power remains the key measure of power, while this hesitance means nuclear arsenals increase stability between great powers.</u> Offensive Realism says <u>configurations of power emerge across regions, affecting fear levels between states. Fear levels determine the intensity of security competition and likelihood of war</u>. 'Bipolarity' causes least fear and is most stable, 'unbalanced multipolarity' causes most fear, thus is the least stable configuration; and 'multipolarity' sits in between. Mearsheimer posits that large bodies of water profoundly limit the power-projection capabilities of land forces, reducing fear and also explaining why there is no global hegemon. Offensive Realism says **war is inevitable** and the author argues that China and the US are "destined to be adversaries" as growing Chinese economic might translates into military might.

Mearsheimer adds Offensive Realism to a long tradition of Realist theory, bringing some of his own ideas and combining others. He agrees with Waltz's Defensive/Structural Realism that international anarchy causes states to engage in security competition. However he diverges from Waltz there saying, like Morgenthau's Human Nature/Classic Realism, <u>states will maximise their power constantly, striving ultimately for hegemony.</u> He adds ideas such as "the stopping power of water" and he has striven to ensure his is a workable theory for explaining the past and predicting the future, making his book a significant contribution to the canon of International Relations theory. 'The Tragedy of Great Power Politics' challenges the Liberal paradigm to a certain extent, but Mearsheimer does this by using abundant examples to prove his points, rather than through dissecting Liberal theory. Instead he focuses more on critiquing Defensive Realism and does this throughout the book. With regard to Liberalism, Mearsheimer says that <u>cooperation between states does exist, but only to promote a state's selfish interests, not for the sake of world peace. Security competition remains essential in today's world which, despite international institutions, remains anarchic.</u> Indeed, <u>such institutions are simply another arena for furthering national interests,</u> he argues. So while Mearsheimer's book does refute Liberal ideas, it is not a detailed critique instead concentrating on making the case for Offensive Realism. A fascinating and in-depth addition to Realist thought, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is a good attempt to reveal what really causes war and conflict in the international system.

Security K Answers

Security K 2AC

1. Perm – do the aff an all non-competitive parts of the alt

2. Perm – do the plan and reject securitized representations – rejecting political solutions is counterproductive – realism synthesizes critical theories in order to provide for the possibility of transition
Murray 97
(Alastair J.H. Politics Department, University of Wales Swansea, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 178-9) NS

In Wendt's constructivism, the argument appears in its most basic version, presenting an analysis of realist assumptions which associate it with a conservative account of human nature. In Linklater's critical theory it moves a stage further, presenting an analysis of realist theory which locates it within a conservative discourse of state-centrism. In Ashley's post-structuralism it reaches its highest form, presenting an analysis of realist strategy which locates it not merely within a conservative statist order, but, moreover, within an active conspiracy of silence to reproduce it. Finally, in Tickner's feminism, realism becomes all three simultaneously and more besides, a vital player in a greater, overarehing, masculine conspiracy against femininity. Realism thus appears, first, as a doctrine providing the grounds for a relentless pessimism, second, as a theory which provides an active justification for such pessimism, and, third, as a strategy which proactively seeks to enforce this pessimism, before it becomes the vital foundation underlying all such pessimism in international theory.

Yet, an examination of the arguments put forward from each of these perspectives suggests not only that the effort to locate realism within a conservative, rationalist camp is untenable, but, beyond this, that realism is able to provide reformist strategies which are superior to those that they can generate themselves. The progressive purpose which motivates the critique of realism in these perspectives ultimately generates a bias which undermines their own ability to generate effective strategies of transition. In constructivism, this bias appears in its most limited version, producing strategies so divorced from the obstacles presented by the current structure of international politics that they threaten to become counter-productive. In critical theory it moves a stage further, producing strategies so abstract that one is at a loss to determine what they actually imply in terms of the current structure of international politics. And, in post-modernism, it reaches its highest form, producing an absence of such strategies altogether, until we reach the point at which we are left with nothing but critique. Against this failure, realism contains the potential to act as the basis of a more constructive approach to international relations, incorporating many of the strengths of reflectivism and yet avoiding its weaknesses. It appears, in the final analysis, as an opening within which some synthesis of rationalism and reflectivism, of conservatism and progressivism, might be built.

3. Perm – do the plan and position yourself as a critical intellectual in order to re-think securitization – representations of security can be changed

4. Perm – do the alt – conditionality justifies
5. Our advantage is an impact turn to this criticism - ……

6. No link, impact inevitable and alt doesn't solve – treating security as a speech act means there are an infinite number of security threats, making it impossible to solve. Securitization is only when used by actors in positions to make security choices, it doesn't apply to us.

Williams 3 (Michael C., university of Whales, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4) CC

This stance allows the Copenhagen School to argue simultaneously for both an expansion and a limitation of the security agenda and its analysis. On the one hand, treating security as a speech-act provides, in principle, for an almost indefinite expansion of the security agenda. Not only is the realm of possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened (what are termed the "referent objects" of security) can be extended to include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the territorial state. Accordingly, the Copenhagen School has argued that security can usefully be viewed as comprising five "sectors," each with their particular referent object and threat agenda (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998).6 In the "military" sector, for example, the referent object is the territorial integrity of the state, and the threats are overwhelmingly defined in external, military terms. In the "political" sector, by contrast, what is at stake is the legitimacy of a governmental authority, and the relevant threats can be ideological and sub-state, leading to security situations in which state authorities are threatened by elements of their own societies, and where states can

become the primary threat to their own societies. Even further from an exclusively military-territorial focus is the concept of "societal" security, in which the identity of a group is presented as threatened by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements. Conversely, while treating security as a speech-act allows a remarkable broadening of analysis, securitization theory seeks also to limit the security agenda. Security, the Copenhagen School argues, is not synonymous with "harm" or with the avoidance of whatever else might be deemed malign or damaging (Buzan et al., 1998:2-5, 203-12). As a speech-act, securitization has a specific structure which in practice limits the theoretically unlimited nature of "security." These constraints operate along three lines. First, while the securitization process is in principle completely open (any "securitizing actor" can attempt to securitize any issue and referent object), in practice it is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audience, and by the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference. Not all claims are socially effective, and not all actors are in equally powerful positions to make them. This means, as Buzan and Waever put it, that the "Conditions for a successful speech-act fall into two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical-to follow the rules of the act (or, as Austin argues, accepted conventional procedures must exist, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures); and (2) the external, contextual and social-to hold a position from which the act can be made ('The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked')" (Buzan et al., 1998:32). The claims that are likely to be effective, the forms in which they can be made, the objects to which they refer, and the social positions from which they can effectively be spoken are usually deeply "sedimented" (rhetorically and discursively, culturally, and institutionally) and structured in ways that make securitizations somewhat predictable and thus subject to probabilistic analysis (Waever, 2000)-and not wholly open and expandable. Finally, while empirical contexts and claims cannot in this view ultimately determine what are taken as security issues or threats, they provide crucial resources and referents upon which actors can draw in attempting to securitize a given issue.

7. Threats are real – Use your 1ac as specific proof

8. We must confront threats – key to prevent ceding the political – does not preclude the transformative potential of securitization

Franke 9

(Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 92-93)JFS

Apocalypse prima facie refuses and makes an end of dialogue: it thunders down invincibly from above. But for this very reason the greatest test of our dialogical capacity is whether we can dialogue with the corresponding attitude or must resort to exclusionary maneuvers and force. What is called for here is a capacity on the part of dialogue not to defend itself but to let itself happen in interaction with an attitude that is apparently intolerant of dialogue. Letting this possibility be, coming into contact with it, with the threat of dialogue itself, may seem to be courting disaster for dialogue. It is indeed a letting down of defenses. Can dialogue survive such a surrendering of itself in utter vulnerability to the enemy of dialogue? Or perhaps we should ask, can it rise up again, after this self-surrender, in new power for bringing together a scattered, defeated humanity to share in an open but commonly sought and unanimously beckoned Logos of mutual comprehension and communication? May this, after all, be the true and authentic "end" of dialogue provoked by apocalypse? For what it is worth, my apocalyptic counsel is that we must attempt an openness to dialogue even in this absolute vulnerability and risk. The world is certainly not a safe place, and it will surely continue not to be such, short of something … apocalyptic. Needed, ever again, is something on the order of an apocalypse, not just a new attitude or a new anything that we can ourselves simply produce. Philosophy itself, thought through to its own end, can hardly resist concluding that "only a god can save us" (Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten). But can not our attitude make a difference- perhaps make possible the advent of apocalypse beyond all our powers, even those of our own imaginations? I will wager an answer to this question only in the operative mood. May we bring a voice speaking up for mutual understanding onto the horizon of discourse in our time, a time marked by the terrifying sign of apocalyptic discourse. May we do this not by judging apocalyptic discourse, but by accepting that our condition as humans is as much to be judged as to judge and that all our relatively justified judgments are such to the extend that they offer themselves to be judged rather than standing on their own ground as absolute. In other words, may our discussions remain open to apocalypse, open to what we cannot represent or prescribe but can nevertheless undergo in a process of transformation that can be shared with others – and that may be genuinely dialogue.

9. Case outweights – the only impact to securitization is inaccurate constructions that they say spills over into all of their other impacts – we're winning our threats are real and that we should confront them, which means our threat of extinction should come first

10. No impact – security discourse isn't inherently bad — presenting it in debate allows the negative attributes to be avoided

Williams 3 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4), AD: 7-10-9)

I have argued thus far that recognizing the roots of securitization theory within the legacy of a Schmittian-influenced view of politics explains a number of its key and most controversial features. Charges of an ethically and practically irresponsible form of objectivism in relation to either the act of securitization or the concept of societal security are largely misplaced. Locating the speech-act within a broader commitment to processes of discursive legitimation and practical ethics of dialogue allows the most radical and disturbing elements of securitization theory emerging from its Schmittian legacy to be offset. Seen in this light, the Copenhagen School is insulated from many of the most common criticisms leveled against it.

11. Alt doesn't solve the case – rejecting orientalist discourse doesn't prevent money laundering in Yemen, which triggers all of our impacts

12. No spillover and impact is inevitable – even if they win our threats are constructions, they're embedded in US policymaking now, which means policymakers will continue to act according to realist assumptions even if they're based on faulty representations
Williams 3

(Michael, Prof. of International Politics at the Univ. of Wales, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 511-531)

The first, and simplest point is that in some ways the Copenhagen School treats securitization not as a normative question, but as an objective process and possibility. Very much like Schmitt, they view securitization as a social possibility intrinsic to political life. In regard to his concept of the political, for example, Schmitt once argued,

It is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or whether it is perhaps strong pedagogic reasoning to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with abstractions nor normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of making such a distinction. One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend–enemy antithesis, that the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere (1996 [1932]: 28).30 In certain settings, the Copenhagen School seems very close to this position. Securitization must be understood as both an existing reality and a continual possibility. Yet equally clearly there is a basic ambivalence in this position, for it raises the dilemma that securitization theory must remain at best agnostic in the face of any securitization, even, for example, a fascist speech-act (such as that Schmitt has often been associated with) that securitizes a specific ethnic or racial minority. To say that we must study the conditions under which such processes and constructions emerge and become viable is important but incomplete, for without some basis for avoiding this process and transforming it the Copenhagen School appears to risk replicating some of the worst excesses made possible by a Schmittian understanding of politics.

13. Realism is inevitable and necessary – failure to incorporate realist understandings detaches us from politics, which makes true change impossible

Guzzini 1998, Stefano (Assis. Prof @ Central European U), Realism in Int'l Relations, p. 212

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism. Alt fails

1ar: Alt Fails

JUST REJECTING SECURITY POLITICS REPRODUCES SOVEREIGNTY AND EXPLOITATION. ONLY POLITICAL ACTION CAN END GLOBAL OPPRESSION

Agathangelou & Ling '97   Anna M. **Agathangelou,** Dir. Global Change Inst. And Women's Studies Prof at Oberlin, and L.H.M. Ling, Institute For Social Studies at The Hague, Fall 1997, "Postcolonial Dissidence within Dissident IR: Transforming Master Narratives of Sovereignty in Greco-Turkish Cyprus," Studies in Political Economy, v. 54, pp. 7-8

Yet, ironically if not tragically, dissident IR also paralyzes itself into non-action. While it challenges the status quo, dissident IR fails to transform it. Indeed, dissident IR claims that a "coherent" paradigm or research program — even an alternative one — reproduces the stifling parochialism and hidden powermongering of sovereign scholarship. "Any agenda of global politics informed by critical social theory perspectives," writes Jim George "must forgo the simple, albeit self-gratifying, options inherent in readymade alternative Realisms and confront the dangers, closures, paradoxes, and complicities associated with them. Even references to a "real world, dissidents argue, repudiate the very meaning of dissidence given their sovereign presumption of a universalizable, testable Reality. What dissident scholarship opts for, instead, is a sense of disciplinary crisis that "resonates with the effects of marginal and dissident movements in all sorts of other localities." Despite its emancipatory intentions, this approach effectively leaves the prevailing prison of sovereignty intact. It doubly incarcerates when dissident IR highlights the layers of power that oppress without offering a heuristic, not to mention a program, for emancipatory action. Merely politicizing the supposedly non-political neither guides emancipatory action nor guards it against demagoguery. At best, dissident IR sanctions a detached criticality rooted (ironically) in Western modernity. Michael Shapiro, for instance, advises the dissident theorist to take "a critical distance" or "position offshore' from which to "see the possibility of change." But what becomes of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like while the esoteric dissident observes "critically" from offshore? What hope do they have of overthrowing these shackles of sovereignty? In not answering these questions, dissident IR ends up reproducing despite avowals to the contrary, the sovereign outcome of discourse divorced from practice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving.

Permutation Solvency

Combining Realism and Reflectivist thinking produces the most effective form of politics

Murray 97

(Alastair, Professor in the Politics Department at the University of Wales Swansea, Reconstructing Realism)

For the realist, then, if rationalist theories prove so conservative as to make their adoption problematic, critical theories prove so progressive as to make their adoption unattractive. If the former can justifiably be criticised for seeking to make a far from ideal order work more efficiently, thus perpetuating its existence and legitimating its errors, reflectivist theory can equally be criticised for searching for a tomorrow which **may never exist**, thereby **endangering** the possibility of establishing any form of **stable order** in the **here and now**. Realism's distinctive contribution thus lies in its attempt to drive a path between the two, a path which, in the process, suggests the basis on which some form of **synthesis** between rationalism and reflectivism might be achieved. Oriented in its genesis towards addressing the shortcomings in an idealist transformatory project, it is centrally motivated by a concern to reconcile vision with practicality, to relate utopia and reality. Unifying a technical and a practical stance, it combines aspects of the positivist methodology employed by problem-solving theory with the interpretative stance adopted by critical theory, avoiding the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two. Ultimately, it can **simultaneously** acknowledge the **possibility of change** in the structure of the international system and the need to **probe the limits of the possible**, and yet also **question the proximity** of any international transformation, emphasise the **persistence of problems** after such a transformation, and serve as a **reminder** of the need to grasp whatever **semblance of order** can be obtained in the **mean time.** Indeed, it is possible to say that realism is uniquely suited to serve as such an orientation. Simultaneously to critique contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority as unsatisfactory and yet to support them as an attainable measure of order in an unstable world involves one in a contradiction which is difficult to accept. Yet, because it grasps the **essential ambiguity** of the political, and adopts imperfectionism as its dominant motif, realism can relate these two tasks in a way which allows **neither to predominate**, achieving, if not a reconciliation, then at least a **viable synthesis.** Perhaps the most famous realist refrain is that **all politics are power politics.** It is the all that is important here. Realism lays claim to a relevance across systems, and because it relies on a conception of human nature, rather than a historically specific structure of world politics, it can make good on this claim. If its observations about human nature are even remotely accurate, the problems that it addresses will transcend contingent formulations of the problem of political order. Even in a genuine cosmopolis, conflict might become technical, but it **would not be eliminated** altogether. The primary manifestations of power might become more economic or institutional rather than (para)military, but, where disagreements occur and power exists, the employment of the one to ensure the satisfactory resolution of the other is inevitable short of a wholesale transformation of human behaviour. Power is ultimately of the essence of politics; it is not something which can be banished, only **tamed and restrained.** As a result, realism achieves a universal relevance to the problem of political action which allows it to relate the **reformist zeal** of critical theory, without which advance would be impossible, with the problem-solver's **sensible caution** that, before reform is attempted, whatever measure of **security** is possible under contemporary conditions must first be ensured.

Survaillance K Answers

Particularity Good

Particularity is essential in surveillance debates. Reject sweeping Ks.

Haggerty 6 — Kevin D. Haggerty, Director of the Criminology Program and Professor of Criminology and Sociology at the University of Alberta, Editor of the *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Book Editor for *Surveillance & Society*, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of British Columbia, 2006 ("Tear Down The Walls: On Demolishing The Panopticon," *Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond*, Edited by David Lyon, Published by Willan Publishing, ISBN 1843921929, p. 41)

The emphasis on **particular governmental projects** also restrains any desire to conceptualize surveillance **tout court** in favour of examining how **particular** systems of visibility are deployed in the context of **specific governmental ambitions**. It allows for a focused consideration of the aims, dynamics and rationalizations of **particular surveillance projects**. Such a focus can also mitigate the tendency towards forms of dystopian technological determinism that are often apparent in the surveillance studies literature. Combining a normatively ambivalent stance with a focus on **particular governmental projects** allows for the development of **a more refined normative stance** towards surveillance. Surveillance is neither good nor bad. We can only develop a **meaningful normative position** towards surveillance projects that are coordinated and calibrated in light of **particular governmental ambitions**. Such an emphasis also allows for analysis of the complexities and dynamics of contemporary surveillance politics, as citizens typically do not oppose or resist surveillance in the **abstract**, but express concerns about **concrete manifestations or imaginings** of how surveillance is or will be deployed for **very specific purposes** by **particular institutions**.

Reject totalizing Ks. Debating nitty-gritty policy details is key.

Haggerty 6 — Kevin D. Haggerty, Director of the Criminology Program and Professor of Criminology and Sociology at the University of Alberta, Editor of the *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Book Editor for *Surveillance & Society*, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of British Columbia, 2006 ("Tear Down The Walls: On Demolishing The Panopticon," *Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond*, Edited by David Lyon, Published by Willan Publishing, ISBN 1843921929, p. 41-42)

The understanding of citizens as active agents, combined with the frequent suggestion in this literature that governance has political dimensions (O'Malley 2004), suggest a clear place for the analysis of the politics of governance and attendant practices of resistance. However, to date, this line of inquiry has not been embraced, as doing so would entail breaching some of the methodological dictates established by key governmental authors. Having emerged from a Foucauldian framework, governmental studies have concentrated **almost entirely** on discourse analysis and have been reluctant to explore **the nitty-gritty politics of governance** or the experience of subjects. Indeed, almost all of these studies have followed Nikolas Rose's admonition that there is no such thing as 'the governed', but instead only 'multiple objectifications of those over whom government is to be exercised' (1999: 40). Rose also proposes that studies of governance should eschew sociological realism in order to concentrate on how authorities have conceived of what it means to govern, and how governance is made possible. Specifically, he suggests that studies of governmentality are exclusively concerned [end page 41] with 'the conditions of possibility and intelligibility for certain ways of seeking to act upon the conduct of others, or oneself, to achieve certain ends' (Rose 1999: 19). In this, governmental studies self-

consciously **exclude** a series of **important issues**, including the **actual operation of systems** of rule and the relations among political actors (Rose 1999: 19). Unfortunately, in this quest for a form of **methodological and epistemological purity**, studies of governmentality inevitably **forgo important lines of inquiry** into the **actual experience** of being subjected to different governmental regimes. Studies of surveillance therefore can and should embrace many of the insights about governance advanced within this Foucauldian approach, while also reserving space for **modestly realist projects** that analyze **the politics of surveillance** or the experiences of the subjects of surveillance.

Finally, studies of governance also allow for greater reflection on the monitoring of non-human entities. This is apparent in the types of phenomena which are recognized as being subject to governmental ambitions which include a heterodox assortment of such things as pregnancy, universities, pain, and economic life. While governmental authors are only interested in non-human entities to the extent that the governance of things also entails efforts to shape the rationality of human conduct (Dean 1999: 11), there are opportunities to explore whether there is an inevitable relationship between the monitoring of non-human phenomena such as forests, animals and microbes, and efforts to regulate human actions.

Surveillance studies can therefore benefit from embracing a modified governmental approach. It offers a path forward for exploring many of the silences and omissions of the panoptic model, but without falling into the temptation of advancing **a totalizing model of surveillance**.

Surveillance Literacy Good

Surveillance literacy is essential to make informed <u>life-or-death decisions</u>.

Donohue 13 — Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Director of the Center on National Security and the Law, and Director of the Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown University, has held fellowships at Stanford Law School's Center for Constitutional Law, Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Cambridge and a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2013 ("National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations," *Journal of National Security Law & Policy*, Volume 6, Available Online at http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf, Accessed 07-23-2015, p. 527-528)

5. Leadership, Integrity and Good Judgment

National security law often takes place in **a high stakes environment**. There is tremendous pressure on attorneys operating in the field – not least because of [end page 527] the coercive nature of the authorities in question. The classified environment also plays a key role: many of the decisions made will never be known publicly, nor will they be examined outside of a small group of individuals – much less in a court of law. In this context, leadership, integrity, and good judgment stand paramount.

The types of powers at issue in national security law are among **the most coercive** authorities available to **the government**. Decisions may result in the **death** of one or many human beings, the abridgment of rights, and the bypassing of protections otherwise incorporated into the law. The amount of pressure under which this situation places attorneys is of a **higher magnitude** than many other areas of the law. Added to this pressure is the **highly political nature** of national security law and the necessity of understanding **the broader Washington context**, within which individual decision-making, power relations, and institutional authorities compete. **Policy concerns** similarly **dominate the landscape**. It is not enough for national security attorneys to claim that they simply deal in legal advice. Their analyses carry consequences for those exercising power, for those who are the targets of such power, and for the public at large. The function of leadership in this context may be more about process than substantive authority. It may be a willingness to act on critical thought and to accept the impact of legal analysis. It is closely bound to integrity and professional responsibility and the ability to retain good judgment in extraordinary circumstances.

<u>Studying the details</u> is essential to surveillance literacy.

Donohue 13 — Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Director of the Center on National Security and the Law, and Director of the Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown University, has held fellowships at Stanford Law School's Center for Constitutional Law, Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Cambridge and a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2013 ("National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations," *Journal of National Security Law & Policy*, Volume 6, Available Online at http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf, Accessed 07-23-2015, p. 521)

2. Factual Chaos and Uncertainty

One of the most important skills for students going into national security law is the ability to deal with factual chaos. The presentation of factual chaos significantly differs from the traditional model of legal education, in which students are provided a set of facts which they must analyze. Lawyers working in national security law must figure out what information they need, integrate **enormous amounts of data** from **numerous sources**, determine which information is **reliable and relevant**, and proceed with **analysis and recommendations**. Their recommendations, moreover, must be based on contingent conditions: facts may be classified and unavailable to the legal analyst, or facts may change as new information emerges. This is as true for government lawyers as it is for those outside of governmental structures. They must be aware of what is **known**, what is **unsure**, what is **unknown**, and the possibility of **changing circumstances**, and they must advise their clients, from the beginning, how the legal analysis might shift if the factual basis alters.

Informed decision-making about national security requires consideration of policy considerations. Surveillance literacy depends on policy relevance.

Donohue 13 — Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Director of the Center on National Security and the Law, and Director of the Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown University, has held fellowships at Stanford Law School's Center for Constitutional Law, Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Cambridge and a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2013 ("National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations," *Journal of National Security Law & Policy*, Volume 6, Available Online at http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf, Accessed 07-23-2015, p. 523-524)

c. Creative Problem Solving. Part of dealing with factual uncertainty in a rapidly changing environment is learning how to construct new ways to address emerging issues. Admittedly, much has been made in the academy about the importance of problem-based learning as a method in developing students' critical thinking skills.134 Problem-solving, however, is not merely a method of [end page 523] teaching. It is itself a goal for the type of activities in which lawyers will be engaged. The means-ends distinction is an important one to make here. Problem-solving in a classroom environment may be merely a conduit for learning a specific area of the law or a limited set of skills. But problem-solving as an end suggests the accumulation of a broader set of tools, such as familiarity with multidisciplinary approaches, creativity and originality, sequencing, collaboration, identification of contributors' expertise, and how to **leverage each skill set**.

This goal presents itself in the context of fact-finding, but it draws equally on strong understanding of legal **authorities and practices**, **the Washington context**, and **policy considerations**. Similarly, like the factors highlighted in the first pedagogical goal, adding to the tensions inherent in factual analysis is the abbreviated timeline in which national security attorneys must operate. Time may not be a commodity in surplus. This means that national security legal education must not only develop students' **complex fact-finding skills** and their ability to provide **contingent analysis**, but it must teach them how to **swiftly and efficiently engage in these activities**.

Surveillance Debates Good — Student Participation

If <u>students like us</u> don't debate surveillance policy, *<u>no one will</u>*.

Tempera 13 — Jackie Tempera, Summer *USA Today* Collegiate Correspondent, Journalism Student at Emerson College, 2013 ("Viewpoint: Where are the college students protesting NSA surveillance?," *USA Today*, June 19th, Available Online at http://college.usatoday.com/2013/06/19/opinion-where-are-the-college-students-protesting-nsa-surveillance/, Accessed 07-24-2015)

==The college-age generation has been known as== the protesters, the action takers, ralliers and picketers. The ==**outspoken policy influencers**== and the liberals — working the First Amendment nearly since its inception.

<u>Where is that attitude now?</u> Apparently in Hong Kong, where hundreds of demonstrators stood in support of Snowden last week.

Wake up, undergrads. Channel that 1960s student fighting for civil rights or the hippie anti-war protester. ==Form an opinion, and act on it. If== we ==students don't== support whistle-blowers and ==oppose government surveillance, **who will?**==

It should make you at least a little uneasy that all this information is being cataloged. Didn't anyone else read 1984 in high school?

<u>Snowden revealing this government secret is something college students should live for. That spunky, fight-the-power attitude should run deep in the veins of students everywhere. He should be supported</u>. Not turned on or given a simple, "Meh" while you try to figure out the name of Kanye West and Kim Kardashian's new baby. (Be careful where you look, too, because the government might be recording the search.)

<u>So read an article. Talk to a friend and think about what is happening.</u> ==Be inspired and stop perpetuating the== **self-involved Generation-Y stereotype**. <u>Call a senator, hold a protest or create a hashtag</u>. For all I care, <u>vehemently argue for it</u> — ==just **do something**==.

This topic is a <u>once in a generation</u> chance for ordinary citizens to shape the surveillance debate. Neglecting it leaves our perspectives <u>unexpressed</u>.

Froomkin 13 — Dan Froomkin, Senior Washington Correspondent for the *Huffington Post*, former Columnist for *The Washington Post*, 2013 ("Politicians, press dodge crucial debate on surveillance," *Al Jazeera America*, October 9th, Available Online at http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/9/nsa-surveillancesnowdenprivacydebate.html, Accessed 07-24-2015)

Throughout all the bombshell revelations this summer about U.S. government surveillance, President Barack <u>Obama and</u> top intelligence <u>officials have insisted they welcome a public debate</u> on the balance between security and privacy.

<u>But in reality, they could not be trying</u> much <u>harder to stifle it</u>.

Thanks to the bountiful leaks from Edward Snowden to The Guardian and other newspapers, the public is finally getting an accurate sense of the vast U.S. electronic surveillance regime that collects, connects

and retains massive amounts of information about all of us — although government officials are asking us to believe that almost none of it ever gets looked at by anyone.

Far from being forthcoming, however, when administration representatives have made themselves available for questions, their answers have been defensive — often vague or overly narrow, misleading or plainly untruthful. In oversight hearings, they have attacked the leaks and the leaker, made unsubstantiated complaints about press coverage, misrepresented the concerns of privacy advocates and employed scare tactics.

Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., has been one of the few members of Congress to complain about it, raising one subterfuge in particular: "After years of stonewalling on whether the government has ever tracked or planned to track the location of law-abiding Americans through their cellphones," he said in a statement last week, "once again, the intelligence leadership has decided to leave most of the real story secret — even when the truth would not compromise national security."

The president has charged two ostensibly independent commissions to report back to him on some possible reforms, but he has indicated he thinks the most that might be needed is some tweaks. "People may want to jigger slightly sort of the balance between the information that we can get versus the incremental encroachments on privacy that if haven't already taken place, might take place in a future administration, or as technologies develop further," Obama told reporters in August.

What the nation needs, however, is not reassurance from politicians about a few secret changes to covert programs. We need an accessible public discussion of what privacy means in this new era.

Americans have historically had a reasonable expectation that the government was not watching their every move. But the kind of ubiquitous surveillance that once required a massive application of manpower is now cheap, and will soon be effortless.

Thanks to the Snowden revelations, we now know that the government already sweeps up vast amounts of information about Americans, including "metadata" showing whom they talk to, and email, public and commercial information including bank codes, insurance information, Facebook profiles, transportation manifests and GPS-location data.

When you add all that up — even if the government stops short of actually listening in on your phone calls and reading your emails — there is basically no privacy left.

So the central questions posed by the Snowden revelations are these: Is there still a right to privacy in the modern age? And if so, how far does it extend?

And because congressional leaders appear disinclined to call attention to their own historical submissiveness to the executive branch in this area — even though they control the funding and oversight of the intelligence agencies — the following questions will need to be addressed in public by the media, through probing journalism, on-the-record interviews, public-records requests, and town halls and other public forums that encourage citizen involvement:

Do American citizens have a right to private electronic communication? Does anyone else, here or abroad? Does that right protect just the content of their communications, or the metadata about those communications as well? Or does the government's duty to protect Americans justify the collection, storage, analysis and monitoring of every electronic communication between persons?

Although most people travel openly in public and do not take precautions about being seen, they do not thereby consent to being tracked. Nor do they expect their phones to be used as tracking devices. So should there be limits to the government's use of location data gathered from cell phones, mobile apps and public video cameras?

What is permissible for other governments to do to Americans? Is the U.S. government protecting Americans from surveillance by foreign governments, or is it sharing our secrets with them? Does the U.S. intelligence community recognize any privacy rights at all for citizens of other countries?

What about attorney-client privilege? Doctor-patient confidentiality? Journalist-source secrecy? Should those be shielded from the scrutiny of U.S. intelligence, either at home or abroad? Should U.S. legislators and judges be subject to the same surveillance as everyone else?

Is the very act of collecting massive amounts of information about Americans and putting it into a giant database a violation of privacy? Or does it matter only when and if that information is accessed and used by officials?

Secure encryption protects Internet commerce, provides security and authenticates identity. Should Americans grant the government the power to undermine it? If so, under what circumstances?

And why should we trust what government officials say about surveillance programs? If nothing else, the Snowden leaks have made it painfully obvious that officials have misled the public for a very long time.

Despite such dishonesty, Americans are being asked to trust that the government will access its massive databases only for legitimate investigative purposes. We are being asked to trust the intelligence community to police itself.

How can the public be confident that any of the rules meant to protect its privacy are really being enforced? How can we be confident that the government can even keep track of what it is doing?

Finally, how much of the surveillance regime itself really needs to be secret? Al-Qaeda operatives are surely aware that the government is watching them in countless ways. What could more disclosure about the general nature of the programs tell them that they do not already surmise? How can Americans assert their rights against encroachment from such programs if they remain ignorant about them?

The Snowden revelations have been so numerous that they are still being processed, and more are to come. Predicting the public's reaction is difficult: More shocks could bring numbness and paralysis — or they could stimulate the public's desire for a coming-to-terms.

The public and the press have perhaps been cowed from demanding a more open and frank discussion of these issues in deference to national security concerns. But the Snowden revelations demand more of us.

The nature of privacy is **too important** to be determined by a small group of experts **behind closed doors**. This is the kind of debate that comes around only **once in a generation**, and is possibly even **unique to this moment in history** as our analog world transitions to a digital one.

The future of this debate depends on how the national press responds. It could allow the story to fade into just so much more background noise. Or the press could embrace its rightful role as the champion of the public interest, and make sure **regular** American citizens are a party to important decisions about what is private and what is not in the digital age.

Surveillance Debates Good — Internet Freedom

This topic presents a <u>once-in-a-lifetime</u> opportunity to educate policymakers about Internet technology. This is vital to <u>Internet freedom.</u>

Meinrath and Ammori 12 — Sascha Meinrath, Vice President and Founder and Director of the Open Technology Institute at the New America Foundation, holds a Ph.D. in Communications and Media from the Institute of Communications Research at the University of Illinois, and Marvin Ammori, Bernard L. Scwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation, Principal of the Ammori Group—a law firm, holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2012 ("Internet Freedom and the Role of an Informed Citizenry at the Dawn of the Information Age," *Emory International Law Review* (26 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 921), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

More than sixty years ago, civil rights activists realized that the most effective route to bettering our country was through mass social movements, civil disobedience, and judicial review. Those whom we hold up today as champions from this era - from Rosa Parks and Thurgood Marshall to Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr. - were part of **sophisticated, nationwide, legal interventions** to stand up for what they believed. To be **an informed citizen** and **an active member of civil society** during this epoch was to be **aware of these battles** and even **participate in them** — taking sides on the street, at the lunch counters, in the pages of the nation's newspapers, and through broadcast radio and television. In law school, reading Brown v. Board of Education n1 and Cooper v. Aaron, n2 you might get the mistaken impression that the judicial branch was the focus of the debate, or the most important agent of change. But this litigation was a purposeful and well-thought-out facet of a far broader social movement and organizing strategy. n3 This social movement focused on a key normative question for civil society: Who can participate in our democracy as a full citizen - with an equal vote, equal treatment under the law, equal access to education, and all the other social resources necessary to enjoy true liberty - and have a meaningful say in our government? n4

Today we are at a similar **critical juncture**, asking similar questions about participation in modern civil society. n5 We have made progress in making our [*922] democracy more racially inclusive, although controversies remain over de facto segregation and voter discrimination. n6 But while the foundation of our democracy includes the right to vote, it also requires the right to access information and disseminate information to others. n7 The Constitution terms it the right to freedom of speech and press, while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls it the right to opinion and expression. n8 Today the most powerful tools to amplify our thoughts and ideas are often not newspapers and broadcast stations, controlled by the few and the powerful.

The most powerful tool for a large and growing global constituency is an open Internet and the applications we use every day - from Facebook and Twitter to YouTube and Tumblr. The Internet has become the core infrastructure of modern free expression and speech. By connecting us, the free and open Internet is the foundation for twenty-first century civil society. The enemies of a robust, democratic civil society know this. It is why Internet freedom is under sustained attack.

The battle over Internet freedom will have a profound impact on the future of civil society and democracy. These attacks sometimes take the form of legislation in cybersecurity or copyright. For example, Senator Lieberman pushed to introduce legislation granting the President authority to shut down the Internet by creating a central "kill switch" - legislation that was only buried when Egypt's

President Mubarak used a similar system to take that country offline during its own democratic protests. n9 Congress also nearly passed the hugely controversial Stop Online Piracy Act n10 ("SOPA"), which is often derisively called the Stop Online Privacy Act, and Protect Intellectual Property Act n11 ("PIPA") - bills that resulted in a Wikipedia blackout on January 18, 2012. n12

 [*923] Decisions being made **right now in** Washington, D.C., will affect **the very trajectory of democracy**. Too often, proposed decisions are at odds not only with freedom, but also with technological reality. D.C. is, first and foremost, a city of lawyers. Unfortunately, these lawyers think themselves to be technologists and are running rampant, drafting remarkably bad laws - usually not through malfeasance, but through **ignorance**. Thus, there is **a crucial opportunity to change the course of history** simply by ensuring that key decision-makers **actually understand technology**, its limits, and what it makes possible. To analogize to an earlier era, the decision in Brown v. Board of Education turned on psychological evidence concerning children in segregated schools. n13 Imagine if lawyers based their case on their **"gut feeling"** rather than relying on **social psychological experts** and **research based upon empirical data**.

Sascha directs the Open Technology Institute at the New America Foundation ("OTI"). n14 The New America Foundation is a public interest think tank in Washington, D.C., whose programs span everything from foreign policy analysis to educational reform, and from asset building amongst the poor to how to remake our medical system to be both more affordable and more responsive. The Open Technology Institute is the technology and telecom arm of the New America Foundation's work - a group of technologists working to counter the misinformation campaigns currently running rampant in D.C.

Marvin is one of the few lawyers welcomed to hang out at the Open Technology Institute. He is a veteran of the open Internet battles and the SOPA battle, a First Amendment scholar, and once served as the head lawyer of Free Press. Most importantly, he tries to wield technical know-how to bolster his legal acumen.

Simply put, to defend Internet freedom at this critical juncture, we need not only legal expertise but also **technological expertise**. Interested parties - both corporations and entrenched bureaucracies - take advantage of the woeful technological naivete of most politicians, regulators, and key administration officials. Sowing "Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt" ("FUD") is often their modus operandi. And this FUD has, for far too long, driven a national debate over [*924] cybersecurity, copyright, surveillance, and open Internet policies. This FUD is **directly undermining our ability, as a democratic society**, to protect human rights online.

Much of the work that OTI does focuses on educating key decision makers - at the Federal Communications Commission, Federal Trade Commission, State Department, and White House; in the Senate and House of Representatives; and at leading advocacy organizations - about technological reality. But the forces of FUD are powerful, and OTI has a modest team of some fifty tech-savvy staff. What is needed today is **a far more widespread intervention** - with help from technologists across the country and from **average Americans**, who often **know far more about technology** than the average policymaker in D.C.

But why would you want to help? For the same reason you would want to take part in the great debates over civil rights and civil society in the 1950s and 1960s. What stories do we want to be able to tell our children and our grandchildren? We have **a once-in-a-lifetime, perhaps a once-in-a-century**,

opportunity. As we transition into the Information Age, we must ask ourselves: How do we support a twenty-first century civil society that is **inclusive**, **decentralized**, and **free** - the kind of society where participatory democracy thrives?

The future of the Internet depends on the outcome of surveillance debates. Teaching students to win these debates is important.

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The Internet has always been, from its genesis, a tool for swapping information amongst participants. And as the power of this tool has grown exponentially, far beyond what anyone could have possibly imagined, so too has **our responsibility** to act as defenders and champions of its openness and fundamentally participatory nature.

Even more importantly, we have **a responsibility to teach future generations** to improve upon what we have created and ensure that the Internet's next [*932] iterations are more inclusive, less discriminatory, and increasingly supportive of our fundamental, inalienable human rights.

The best way we can do this is to ensure that our **pedagogical practices** not only empower students with the digital literacy skills they need to navigate online resources, but also that they have the critical thinking and organizing skills necessary to **actively defend themselves against** online threats of censorship, **surveillance**, and discrimination.

Permutation vs. "Starting Point"/"Method" Alt

Both the aff _and_ the critique support the same policy conclusion. "Starting point" and "method" links overvalue <u>purity</u> at the expense of <u>effective politics</u>. <u>Perm</u> best.

Burris 13 — Greg Burris, Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Film and Media Studies at the University of California-Santa Barbara, holds degrees in Middle Eastern Studies and Central Eurasian Studies from the University of Texas-Austin and Indiana University-Bloomington, 2013 ("What the Chomsky-Žižek debate tells us about Snowden's NSA revelations," *The Guardian*, August 11th, Available Online at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/11/chomsky-zizek-debate-snowden-nsa, Accessed 07-06-2015)

In order to demonstrate how Chomsky and Žižek, despite their squabbling, can be made to **complement each other, I** now turn to a developing story with which we should all already be concerned: the ongoing saga of whistleblower Edward Snowden and his revelations about NSA surveillance practices. Snowden's leaks have already changed the entire framework of the discussion. Their impact has thus been seismic. Here, we are talking about facts, about the importance of **new empirical data** for our assessment of the contemporary moment. The introduction of these facts into the public arena has put the government on the defense. One need only recall how Snowden's disclosures immediately revealed that Director of National Intelligence James Clapper had outright lied to Congress. Glenn Greenwald and his editors at the Guardian have thus been wise in choosing to publish Snowden's revelations gradually, thereby preventing them from so easily becoming yesterday's news.

But look how quickly the discourse shifts. After an initial shock, power can rapidly appropriate new data for its own ends. As Herbert Marcuse put it in One-Dimensional Man, that which initially appears subversive can be "quickly digested by the status quo as part of its healthy diet". Thus, government representatives are, for the most part, no longer disputing the positive content of Snowden's claims. Rather, they are justifying them in the name of fighting terror. In this way, the site of struggle slips from one dimension to another, **from the realm of contested facts to the realm of contested interpretations**.

In light of the recent NSA surveillance scandal, Chomsky and Žižek offer us very different approaches, **both of which are helpful for leftist critique**. For Chomsky, the path ahead is clear. Faced with new revelations about the surveillance state, Chomsky might engage in data mining, juxtaposing our politicians' lofty statements about freedom against their secretive actions, thereby revealing their utter hypocrisy. Indeed, Chomsky is a master at this form of argumentation, and he does it beautifully in Hegemony or Survival when he contrasts the democratic statements of Bush regime officials against their anti-democratic actions. He might also demonstrate how NSA surveillance is not a strange historical aberration but a continuation of past policies, including, most infamously, the FBI's counter intelligence programme in the 1950s, 60s, and early 70s.

Žižek, on the other hand, might proceed in a number of ways. He might look at the ideology of cynicism, as he did so famously in the opening chapter of The Sublime Object of Ideology, in order to demonstrate how expressions of outrage regarding NSA surveillance practices can actually serve as a form of inaction, as a substitute for meaningful political struggle. We know very well what we are doing, but still we are doing it; we know very well that our government is spying on us, but still we continue to support it (through voting, etc). Žižek might also look at how surveillance practices ultimately fail as a method of subjectivisation, how the very existence of whistleblowers like Thomas Drake, Bradley Manning, Edward

Snowden, and the others who are sure to follow in their footsteps demonstrates that technologies of surveillance and their accompanying ideologies of security can never guarantee the full participation of the people they are meant to control. As Žižek emphasises again and again, subjectivisation fails.

Importantly, neither of these approaches is wrongheaded. Both provide **productive and fruitful avenues** for further reflection and consideration. Indeed, political struggles **never** take place solely within one isolated site or at one level of abstraction. Rather, they take place seemingly everywhere and in multiple dimensions simultaneously. Thus, to deny ourselves access to the important contributions of either Chomsky or Žižek would be to engage in an exercise of **self-mutilation**, an instance of **cutting off one's nose to spite one's face**. Existing structures of power do not limit their operations to only one level of abstraction and **neither should we**. To meet these structures head-on, then, we must **diversify our strategies**. As a result, Chomsky's astute political analyses and Žižek's creative inquiries into the functioning of ideology can **both be helpful**. The debate between these two figures is thus a **non-debate**, and the choice between them is a **false** one. **Why choose only one when we can just as easily have both?**

Reject demands for methodological purity. The plan and alt are _on the same side_. Perm best.

Weiland 13 — Jeremy Weiland, Activist who has worked with Occupy Richmond and Richmond Industrial Workers of the World, Contributing Writer at the Center for a Stateless Society and Attack The System, Software Developer who has worked for CustomInk, Jobaio, 6th Density LLC, INM United, and ALTERthought, former Systems Analyst for the Computer Sciences Corporation, holds a B.S. in German and Computer Science from the University of Mary Washington, 2013 ("An anarchist critique of the reporting on the Snowden leaks," _Social Memory Complex_—an anarchist blog, December 31st, Available Online at http://www.socialmemorycomplex.net/2013/12/31/an-anarchist-critique-of-the-reporting-on-the-snowden-leaks/, Accessed 07-07-2015)

As the year rolls to an end, I'd like to compile a few thoughts on the handling of the NSA secrets leaked by Edward Snowden to Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras, Ryan Gallagher, and others. This debate has occurred on ephemeral media like twitter, and these matters deserve a more extended treatment. There have been many developments since my last post on the subject; one of the most interesting has been the journalistic issues surrounding this episode.

Throughout this post, keep in mind that I approach this as a radical, anti-institutionalist anarchist. My values place very little weight on compromising secret government plots for any reason. I disagree fundamentally with Snowden's desire for selective leaking, though it shouldn't surprise anybody that an ex-NSA employee would maintain very different priorities than an anarchist. **Nothing could be more useless** or moronic than to expect relatively establishmentarian, statist folks like Snowden, Greenwald, or Poitras to act **exactly like I might** were I in their shoes.

However, I have a basic respect for Snowden's sacrifice and Greenwald's work that **transcends my political preferences** (I'm not familiar with Poitras's work prior to this episode, though she has my respect as well). I will not sully that respect by dragging any of these people through the mud, **even if** their chosen acts don't quite conform to my personal standards. Indeed, I wish to advance a critique of

their conduct that can **actually contribute to the debate** without **drowning everything in** the noise of acrimony **and belligerence**.

Unlike many on the radical left, I believe tone is important, both for **maintaining crucial solidarity within the larger resistance** and for disciplining our own thinking against irrational laziness. Snowden, Greenwald, Poitras, and others are **fundamentally on my side of this issue**, regardless of our differences in values and ideology. People on the same side can disagree and debate without devolving into **crude infighting**. I regard it as **shameful, juvenile, and counter-productive** to elevate **any kind of political or methodological purity** over those **broad interests that unite us**.

Permutation vs. "State Bad" Alt

Responding to NSA surveillance by demanding abolition of the state is counterproductive. Our call for <u>negative state action</u> is a more effective challenge. "Reformism bad" <u>oversimplifies</u>. <u>Perm</u> best.

Weiland 13 — Jeremy Weiland, Activist who has worked with Occupy Richmond and Richmond Industrial Workers of the World, Contributing Writer at the Center for a Stateless Society and Attack The System, Software Developer who has worked for CustomInk, Jobaio, 6th Density LLC, INM United, and ALTERthought, former Systems Analyst for the Computer Sciences Corporation, holds a B.S. in German and Computer Science from the University of Mary Washington, 2013 ("An anarchist critique of the reporting on the Snowden leaks," *Social Memory Complex*—an anarchist blog, December 31st, Available Online at http://www.socialmemorycomplex.net/2013/12/31/an-anarchist-critique-of-the-reporting-on-the-snowden-leaks/, Accessed 07-07-2015)

There is only a political solution

I mentioned earlier that it is the scale at which the NSA operates that makes it dangerous. Only with such concentrated resources and authority can the NSA compromise the entire communications network infrastructure at every layer. Any defense strategy or reform that doesn't squarely address the issues surrounding this unprecedented concentration of power is **worse than useless**. Clever hacking **will not save us from concentrated power**; crypto is a workaround and not a sufficient response to the fundamental challenge here. New oversight practices, such as a "privacy advocate" position in the FISA court, will fail as surely as old ones. Organizations like the NSA specialize in telling themselves and others precisely the narratives that justify their abusive, disingenuous conduct in the dark.

Knowing this, statists of all varieties must wrestle with how to check and balance the government in this era. The sheer level of secrecy and abuse here can't help but give the lie to their minarchist approach of legal reform and institutional counterbalancing. Clearly any government abiding an organization like the NSA is no mere accomplice but rotten to the core. Any reform that does not squarely face this reality is **insufficient and counterproductive** on its face.

While anarchists understand that even this latest outrage **will not bring about the revolution**, I do think we are uniquely positioned to advocate for **extreme measures** that others currently find unthinkable. There literally is no alternative, because who could ever trust anything the government does in secret again? The NSA's power and operation in the dark must be **scaled far, far back** if we are to have **a real solution** to this crisis. Indeed, the state must be made to understand that its very legitimacy is at stake, and this is a core anarchist goal in the first place.

Dissolution of the state and the NSA may not be **politically feasible**, but a sharp and crippling cut to the budget—especially the abolition of the secret black budget—may be **one concession we can extract from the establishment**. After abolition, containing the budget is **the next best insurance** against power becoming too concentrated in an organization. Granted, this is a long shot, but it both has the virtue of being **measureable** and also marking **a grave reappraisal of the government's legitimacy**.

I'm sure each and every person responsible for bringing the NSA cache of secrets to light has a different vision of what reforms are best. However, we are at a unique juncture in history—one we indeed owe to Snowden, Greenwald, Poitras, and others, but nevertheless one which belongs to all of us. Never before

have the people faced such **pervasive and subtle totalitarianism** so undermining to society as we know it. If folks finally consider radical solutions, **it will not be because anarchists berated them into it**. The **right arguments** could ensure the separation of the head from the snake this time, if anarchists can model **a new attitude towards power** that seeks **not to alienate opponents** but **build a qualitatively different consensus**.

Our defense of <u>negative state action</u> avoids the link. <u>Perm</u> best.

Izquieta 14 — Stephanie Izquieta, Board Member and Director of Congress at the Student Net Alliance—a student-run digital rights organization, Senior in the Philosophy, Politics & Law program at Binghamton University, 2014 ("Binghamton University Students and Faculty Against Mass Surveillance," Open Letter by Faculty and Students at Binghamton University, May, Available Online at http://studentsagainstsurveillance.com/Binghamton/, Accessed 07-23-2015)

A free flow of ideas is the cornerstone of a strong and vibrant society. An informed citizenry is one of the most important guarantors of the integrity and security of a nation. As a community of teachers and scholars at Binghamton University, we sign this letter in support of digital rights and free speech on campus, and in objection to government surveillance. An important idea in the definition of a university is the notion of academic freedom. Academic freedom is the belief that the freedom of inquiry by faculty members is essential to the mission of the academy as well as the principles of academia, and that scholars should have freedom to teach or communicate ideas or facts (including those that are inconvenient to external political groups or to authorities) **without being targeted for repression**, job loss, or imprisonment. Thanks to whistleblower Edward Snowden, we now know that there exists **a tangible threat to academic freedom** and that our rights as cybercitizens are being violated. In an environment of mass surveillance, speech and academic freedom are **chilled**. We, as students and faculty of the global academic community, **protest**. Together, we are taking a stand against mass surveillance on our campus.

While the bulk of the revelations on mass government surveillance are relatively new, studies show a marked shift in people's online behavior [1]. Government surveillance negatively affects free speech and digital rights by:

* Undermining our ability to communicate and collaborate with our peers abroad by directly targeting non-US citizens, immigrants, and those connected to others outside of the United States, with programs like CO-TRAVELR [2], MYSTIC [3], and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court's interpretation of Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act [4].

* Targeting our Muslim and Arab peers by spying on religious student organizations and university prayer rooms [5]. This represses free speech among students and creates an atmosphere of fear.

* Mapping and monitoring social networks [6], chilling our ability to organize and engage in political discourse.

Accordingly, we stand collectively for a university environment that decries digital surveillance and embodies principles of free speech and online privacy. As such, we are calling on the Binghamton University administration to develop policies that actively minimize on-campus surveillance and to foster a culture of digital freedom that is consonant with the commitments to academic freedom and freedom

of speech that are at the heart of any institution of higher education. As members of the global academic community, we sign this letter in protest. We **protest the U.S. surveillance state** and **the chilling effects it has** on our campus life. We **call on the** U.S. **government** to bring the NSA **back within the bounds of the constitution**.

Permutation vs. "Individual Action" Alt

No tradeoff between _individual_ and _collective_ approaches. <u>Perm</u> best.

Lee 14 — Ashlin Lee, Ph.D. Candidate and Associate Lecturer in Sociology at the School of Social Sciences at the University of Tasmania, Member of The Australian Sociological Association, The Surveillance Studies Network, and the Asia-Pacific Science Technology Studies Network, 2014 ("A Question of Momentum: Critical Reflections on Individual Options for Surveillance Resistance," _Revista Teknokultura_—Journal of Digital Culture and Social Movements, Volume 11, Issue 2, Available Online at http://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4820459.pdf, Accessed 07-12-2015, p. 434-436)

Concluding Remarks and Future Directions

Is resistance to global surveillance then **pointless** for an individual? Perhaps in some current iterations, but that **does not mean** abandoning resistance is helpful. Global surveillance presents **a pressing** moral, **legal, and social issue for all** members of contemporary society. Ignoring surveillance, and allowing global surveillance regimes to go unchallenged and unopposed perpetuates a growing asymmetry between those conducting surveillance and the subject(s) of surveillance. It is therefore important that surveillance and its subsequent asymmetries do not go unquestioned or unopposed, whether this be through resistance or alternative means. But any suggested opposition to surveillance, especially for individuals, needs to recognise the current context of surveillance, including issues of technological momentum and surveillance's role in everyday life, which **complicates opposition**.

Because of these points, future discussion on resistance, especially for individuals, may benefit from looking beyond confrontational resistance towards ideas more attuned to dealing with the context. One possible angle for this might be considering ideas around how surveillance can be **controlled or engaged with**, to facilitate a positive outcome for individuals. It is unlikely global surveillance systems will be reversed or halted given the momentum developed so far and the gains these systems have had for those in power. Additionally, this momentum is set to continue to build as a new generation of technologies such as drones (Wall & Monahan, 2011), wearable devices (Whitson, 2013), and algorithmic and intelligent surveillance (Introna & Wood, 2004), are developed and deployed. An individual can never hope to resist, avoid, or destroy **all** these measures of surveillance. **However** if Marx's (2013) assertion that surveillance holds no inherent moral character and is contextually determined holds true, then [end page 434] considering how individuals can engage with surveillance and **determine its course** could be **a good next step**. Such an approach would sidestep the idea of confrontation as the basis for resistance, avoiding problems of technological momentum, while acknowledging the role of surveillance in everyday life. Positive change would occur through **participation**, **engagement**, and **control**, instead of **fighting**, **destroying**, or **hiding** from surveillance. This is not an entirely new idea, with Mann (2013) suggesting that all individuals should adopt veillance (or watching) technologies to address the current asymmetries of a surveillance society (where watching occurs only from above). He suggests harnessing the technological momentum of surveillance to allow all individuals to watch each other and the authorities. Individual thus do not have to resist surveillance when they are able to conduct their own veillance, demonstrating how participating and engaging might be positive for individuals. Through this Mann believes that society "will tend to be more balanced, just, prosperous and 'livable'" (Mann, 2013, p. 11), in comparison to where there is surveillance only. However any such notion of engagement or control would still need to overcome significant hurdles. While new generations of devices, such as Google Glass, may offer a feasible platform for this, there is

no guarantee that uptake will be high enough to create a veillance society. All individuals need equal access and opportunity to engage for a veillance society to work. As a social measure, it would also require **a supportive legislative and political environment**, a difficult proposition given that governments and corporations benefit from the current asymmetries. It also begs the question of how individuals would be able to generate enough momentum, whether this be technological, social, political, or economic, to create and maintain such a radical social arrangement.

Consequently, this would mean **a shift in focus** from **individual** to **group** forms of participation and resistance. An obvious counterpoint to much of the above discussion is that it has not engaged with these kinds of group forms of resistance. As Martin, van Brakel, and Burnhard (2009) state resistance to surveillance is best understood as occurring in relation to multiple actors and groups. It has been well demonstrated that it is possible for individual's to **come together in collectives** or communities to resist or challenge surveillance in these contexts (see Monahan, 2006a). These facts and the necessity to consider groups in the analysis of resistance is not in question, and indeed may offer individuals a way of engaging in resistance. But this should not obscure the fact that surveillance occurs in a world that is increasingly individualised and fragmented (Bauman, 2000) especially for those living in the developed West, and individual options for resistance should still be explored. This article has sought to directly engage with this notion and critique it without at all devaluing or detracting from group options for resistance. Surveillance must be considered as a part of the political economic [end page 435] patterns of society (Lyon, 2007), with individualisation existing as an important factor in these patterns. With traditional forms of sociality and community evolving towards an individually directed project (Bauman, 2000), and surveillance being increasingly ubiquitous to these projects (Lyon, 2001), it is left in the individual's hands how this risk is negotiated. Therefore a consideration of the individual and their capacity to act is important and necessary, as it compliments existing understandings of group resistance.

The importance of having options for enacting positive change upon surveillance is **enormous**, whether these options come from **individuals** or **groups**. But any such notion must be **pragmatic** and **open for development**. It is hoped this article will encourage further discussion in this vein, for the good of all the subjects under surveillance.

"Global-local" and *"focus tradeoff"* arguments are wrong. <u>Perm</u> best.

Snowden Commons 14 — Snowden Commons, a project created at the Berliner Gazette Conference that seeks to publicly share the Snowden document archive in public libraries throughout the world, 2014 ("From the Snowden Files to the Snowden Commons: The Library as a Civic Hub," *Libreas*—an academic library journal, Number 26, Available Online at http://libreas.eu/ausgabe26/08anonym/#from-the-snowden-files-to-the-snowden-commons-the-library-as-a-civic, Accessed 06-28-2015)

From the right to privacy to participatory autonomy

So far, citizens have been **trapped between two strategies** for defending themselves from the forms of surveillance implied in the Snowden files, both of which tend to be **difficult for common citizens to participate in** because they require specialized technical or policy knowledge. On the one hand,

individuals have been encouraged to use new digital privacy tools and techniques to create a wall between themselves and the watchers (but is this a solution for everyone?).

On the other, some activists, organizations and human rights advocates have sought to compel governments to better protect citizens' rights through lobbying, legal action and constitutional challenges (but what to do when the government is the watcher?). But there is **a third option**, one that **complements and supports the other two** while creating **something new**. We must **re-create public spaces** where citizens can **learn about the threat they face** and **come up with common, workable solutions**: a place to deliberate **not only about how we are affected as individuals**, but also **as a society** and **as communities**, different communities being affected **in different ways**, and what **multiple perspectives** different people and different communities take on surveillance. In this way we can build **a solid and sustained public dialogue** about security, surveillance, privacy and autonomy.

We envision the public library as a space where social movements are structured through sharing interests, information, strategies, tactics and tools. We call upon librarians to facilitate the publics' reclaimation of the information that impacts all of us.

Why? Because the right to privacy is **not simply a personal matter** of the individual; it is **a societal challenge** which requires **society-level solutions**. Further, human rights are not only something granted under constitutional and international law; they must be continuously demanded, negotiated, and constantly rebuilt from society's grassroots. For instance, while article 5 of the German Constitution guarantees the right of each person to freely express and disseminate their opinions in speech, writing, and pictures and to inform themselves without hindrance from generally accessible sources, such a right must be activated by citizens to be meaningful, effective and transformative.

To confront the new powers of surveillance we need to think broadly about building **zones of autonomy**: autonomy of the individual, autonomy for communities, autonomy for society. The principle of autonomy translates the ideal of privacy into **concrete goals** grounded in human rights.

Privacy and autonomy are **essential components** of a functional and vibrant democracy; **without them critical citizenship is not possible**. A library could be an autonomous zone proper, librarians its caretakers. We need to **create and re-imagine public institutions** to serve this purpose in the digital age, to make information **widely accessible**, truly **common** and **operative**.

Permutation vs. "Critical Theory" Alt

Critical theory divorced from <u>policy proposals</u> fails *in the context of surveillance*. <u>Perm best.</u>

Cohen 15 — Julie E. Cohen, Mark Claster Mamolen Professor of Law and Technology at the Georgetown University Law Center, Member of the Advisory Board of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, holds a J.D. from Harvard University, 2015 ("Studying Law Studying Surveillance," *Surveillance & Society*, Volume 13, Issue 1, Available Online at http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/viewFile/law/lawsurv, Accessed 07-21-2015, p. 96-97)

Surveillance Studies and Law

<u>Relative to legal scholarship, work in</u> ==Surveillance Studies== <u>is more likely to build from a</u> solid <u>foundation in</u> contemporary social <u>theory.</u> Even so, <u>such</u> ==work often reflects== both an ==**insufficient grasp of the complexity**== of the legal system in action ==and lack of interest in== the ==ways== that ==legal== and regulatory ==actors understand, conduct, and contest surveillance==. By this I don't mean to suggest that Surveillance Studies scholars need law degrees, but only to point out what ought to be obvious but often isn't: legal processes are social processes, too, and <u>in overlooking these processes, Surveillance Studies</u> ==scholars== also ==engage in== a form of ==**black-boxing**== that treats law as monolithic and surveillance and government as== ==interchangeable==. Legal actors engage in a variety of discursive and normative strategies by which institutions and resources are mobilized around surveillance, and understanding those strategies is essential to the development of an archaeology of surveillance practices. Work in ==Surveillance Studies== also ==favors== a type of ==theoretical jargon that can seem **impenetrable and**==, more importantly, ==**unrewarding** to== those in ==law and policy communities==. As I've written elsewhere (Cohen 2012a: 29), "==[t]oo many== such ==works== find power everywhere and hope nowhere, and seem to ==offer== well-meaning policy makers little more than **a prescription for despair**==." Returning to the topics already discussed, let us consider some ways in which Surveillance Studies might benefit from dialogue with law.

Let us return first to the problem of digitally-enhanced surveillance by law enforcement—the problem of the high-resolution mosaic. As discussed in the section above, <u>works by Surveillance Studies scholars</u> exploring issues of mobility and control <u>offer profound insights into the ways in which continual observation shapes spaces and subjectivities</u>—the precise questions about which, as we have already seen, [end page 96] judges and legal scholars alike are skeptical. Such works reveal the extent to which pervasive surveillance of public spaces is emerging as a new and powerful mode of ordering the public and social life of civil society. ==They offer rich food for thought—**but not for action**==. Networked surveillance is increasingly a fact of contemporary public life, and totalizing theories about its power don't take us very far toward gaining regulatory traction on it. That enterprise is, moreover, essential even if it entails an inevitable quantum of self-delusion. Acknowledgment of pervasive social shaping by networked surveillance need not preclude legal protection for socially-shaped subjects, but that project requires attention to detail. To put the point a different way, <u>the networked democratic society and the totalitarian state may be points on a continuum rather than binary opposites, but the fact that the continuum exists is still worth something.</u> If so, ==one needs tools== for assessment and differentiation that ==Surveillance Studies does not== seem to ==provide==.

<u>As an example of this</u> sort of <u>approach within legal scholarship,</u> ==consider a recent article by== legal scholars Danielle ==Citron and== David ==Gray== (2013), ==which proposes== that courts and legislators undertake what they

term <mark>a technology-centered approach</mark> to regulating surveillance. They would have courts and legislators ask whether particular technologies facilitate total surveillance and, if so, act to put in place comprehensive procedures for approving and overseeing their use. <mark>From a Surveillance Studies perspective, this</mark> approach **lacks theoretical purity** <mark>because its</mark> technology-specific <mark>focus appears to ignore</mark> the fact <mark>that</mark> total <mark>surveillance</mark> also <mark>can emerge via</mark> the <mark>fusion of data streams</mark> originating from various sources. <mark>But the proposal is</mark> **pragmatic**; it does not so much **ignore** that risk as **bracket it while pursuing the narrower goal** of gaining a regulatory foothold within the data streams. And because it focuses on the data streams themselves, it is administrable in a way that schemes based on linear timelines and artificial distinctions between different types of surveillance are not. <mark>One can envision</mark> both <mark>courts and legislatures</mark> **implementing** the Citron and Gray <mark>proposal in a way that enables far better oversight</mark> of what law enforcement is doing.

Critical surveillance theory must be implemented via <u>policy levers</u>. Abstract Ks of "reform" don't apply in this context. <u>Perm</u> best.

Cohen 15 — Julie E. Cohen, Mark Claster Mamolen Professor of Law and Technology at the Georgetown University Law Center, Member of the Advisory Board of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, holds a J.D. from Harvard University, 2015 ("Studying Law Studying Surveillance," *Surveillance & Society*, Volume 13, Issue 1, Available Online at http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/viewFile/law/lawsurv, Accessed 07-21-2015, p. 99)

Conclusion: Doing Law-and-Surveillance-Studies Differently

The prospects for fruitful interchange and collaboration between legal scholars and Surveillance Studies scholars are likely to remain complicated by pronounced differences in underlying theoretical orientation. But since Surveillance Studies is itself an interdiscipline (Garber 2001), and since legal scholarship has thrived on interdisciplinary exploration, the prospects for effective communication also seem reasonably good. <mark>Bridging</mark> the <mark>gaps requires</mark>, first and foremost, efforts by emissaries from both traditions to foster a more tolerant and curious dialogue directed toward improved understanding and, ultimately, toward **methodological hybridization**. Within one's own academic community, it can become too easy to mistake consensus on methodological conventions for epistemological rigor, and to forget that <mark>methodological strength</mark> also <mark>derives from refusal to be</mark> **hemmed in** by disciplinary <mark>boundaries</mark>.

From the standpoint of theory, <mark>a more sustained</mark> <mark>dialogue between law and Surveillance Studies would count as</mark> a <mark>success if it</mark> produced a mode of inquiry about surveillance that <mark>melded</mark> the <mark>theoretical sophistication</mark> of Surveillance Studies <mark>with lawyerly attention to</mark> the **details**, **mechanisms**, and interests that constitute surveillance practices as legal practices, <mark>and to</mark> the <mark>kinds of framing that</mark> **mobilize legal and policy communities**. To do Surveillance Studies better, legal scholars need to challenge their own preference for putting problems in categories that fit neatly within the liberal model of human nature and behavior, and Surveillance Studies scholars can help by calling attention to the social and cultural processes within which surveillance practices are embedded. Surveillance Studies scholars need to do more to resist their own penchant for totalizing dystopian narratives, and should delve more deeply into the legal and regulatory realpolitik that surrounds the administration of surveillance systems; legal scholars can help by demystifying legal and regulatory processes.

From a legal scholar's perspective, however, theory achieves its highest value when it becomes a tool for forcing **productive confrontations** about how to respond to **real problems**. And so I think it would count as an even bigger success if dialogue between law and Surveillance Studies generated not only a hybridized theoretical discourse of law-and-Surveillance-Studies but also the beginnings of **a more accessible policy discourse about surveillance and privacy**, along with **reform proposals** designed to put the animating concepts behind such a discourse into practice. Here the goal would be a hybridization between law's ingrained pragmatism and Surveillance Studies' attentiveness to the social and cultural processes through which surveillance is experienced and assimilated. Working together, legal scholars and Surveillance Studies scholars might advance the project of formulating working definitions of privacy interests and harms, and might develop **more sophisticated projections** of the likely effects of **different policy levers** that could be brought to bear on systems of surveillance.

Permutation vs. "Why Try?" Alt

Even if they're right _generally_, students are <u>powerful agents</u> in the context of <u>surveillance policy</u>. <u>Perm</u> best.

Glaser 14 — April Glaser, Staff Activist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014 ("17 Student Groups Pen Open Letters on the Toxicity of Mass Surveillance to Academic Freedom," Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 9th, Available Online at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/students-against-surveillance-17-university-groups-pen-open-letters-toxicity-mass, Accessed 07-23-2015)

<u>Students are **rising up and fighting** to protect our Internet</u>. In response to our call to action, <u>seventeen university groups</u> from across the United States <u>have published open letters about the</u> real <u>chilling effects mass surveillance is having</u> right now <u>on academic freedom</u> and life on campus.

<u>Universities are places where</u> the free flow of <u>new ideas and</u> the <u>discussion of controversial topics should be **fostered, encouraged, and amplified**</u>. <u>But when</u> students and researchers know that the <u>government is recording</u> our communications, <u>our data</u>, and our online behavior, <u>students **can't speak freely**</u>. <u>Speech is **chilled**</u>. In response, we launched our call for students across the country to write letters about the effects of illegal, unconstitutional government spying in their campus communities last month.

<u>Students and researchers get it</u>. "<u>Mass warrantless surveillance by</u> the <u>NSA has restricted our ability to freely **think**, **act**, **research**, **innovate**, and **share ideas**</u> in a multitude of ways," reads the letter from Stanford University students penned by student Devon Kristine Zuegel.

<u>Students have been **central to the movement** to</u> put an <u>end</u> to illegal <u>mass spying</u> since Snowden's leaks hit the press</u>. As the letter from Temple University students notes, it was Temple student Ali Watkins, who broke the story last March about CIA surveillance of members of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The campus letters also call attention to the effects of mass government surveillance on international students and global collaboration in research. These international connections are a bragging point of many academic institutions. But as the letters from Purdue University students and Queens College students note, "NSA surveillance specifically targets foreign nationals, regardless of whether they have actually done anything wrong."

Both of these institutions are highly ranked, in part for their diverse, international student communities. And student activists on both campuses point out that mass government spying that targets non-US persons is not only discriminatory, but stifles student cross-cultural collaboration, especially on politically sensitive topics.

"Certain demographics of students, such as the LGBTQ community that remain closeted, could be made public," wrote Liz Hawkins in the letter she composed from the University of Nevada in Las Vegas. "This also includes students in [search] of mental health care," the UNLV student letter continues. And she's right.

<u>Students often come to universities excited to explore their identity and find community that might not have been available back home. But when we know that the government is collecting information and</u>

storing it in a way that could be potentially used against us, we don't say what we would say otherwise. Students are less likely to associate with campus groups and less likely to engage fully in campus life.

Our call to write letters was assisted by the organizing prowess of the Student Net Alliance (SNA), a group dedicated to bringing the fight for digital rights into campus communities all over the world. The SNA amplified the call to action into a campaign called Students Against Surveillance. And we're glad they did. Students are **powerful forces for change**, and intuitively understand the potential of an open, free Internet, not hampered by intrusive government spying that undermines our basic rights, like our freedom of speech and freedom from unwarranted search and seizure.

If you're a student or a researcher and want to write an open letter to take a stand against NSA surveillance on your campus, see our letter-writing guide and get in touch with either the Student Net Alliance or with us. Writing a letter is a great way to spark debate on campus and build the foundation for future organizing. The fight against NSA spying is going to be a long one. And students will be **a critical force** in building a movement to **raise awareness, push for change**, and **put an end to mass government surveillance**.

FW: Public Debate on Surveillance Good

Public Debate Works

Public Debate is influential in enacting real change with USFG surveillance policy

Michael **Mimoso** 20**14**, is the former Editorial Director of TechTarget's Security media group and former editor of Information Security magazine. He is an award-winning journalist and former Editor of Information Security magazine, a two-time finalist for national magazine of the year. He has been writing for business-to-business IT websites and magazines for over 10 years, with a primary focus on information security, "NSA Reforms present value of Public Debate", https://threatpost.com/nsa-reforms-demonstrate-value-of-public-debate/105052

Two nights ago, the *New York Times* reported that President Obama responded to those calls and would soon reveal a new legislative proposal that would end the agency's bulk collection of phone call records. While shy on many important details, the move demonstrates that **public debate still holds some sway with policy makers**. "The only [turning point] was disclosure of the program," said Brett Max Kaufman, National Security Fellow and attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union. "Since that day, this has almost been inevitable because the claims the government made in secret to FISC [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court] and to Congress were never given a fair hearing from the other side. Once these programs became public and the government had to defend them in a court of law and in the court of public opinion, it was clear that these claims made in secret could not withstand arguments from civil libertarians and the public at large." While the president's proposal carries the weight of the White House, it addresses only the NSA's collection of phone metadata, and none of the other alleged surveillance activities made public by the Snowden documents. Other bills, such as the USA FREEDOM Act, extend beyond phone records to digital information collected through what's known as the PRISM program under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and provide for enhanced oversight over intelligence gathering.

The time is now for surveillance debates, with disclosures on government procedures debate is key to maintain public security and freedom

Gigi **Alford and** Llana **Ulman** 20**13**, Senior Program Officer and Advisor at the Freedom House, Human Rights Organization, "Private Data, Secret Surveillance, and the Need for Public Debate", https://freedomhouse.org/blog/private-data-secret-surveillance-and-need-public-debate#.VbuO2PlVikp

It is time for a serious, open, and public debate on government surveillance that goes beyond pat assurances and partial revelations. The only way for this debate to lead to transparent and effective lawmaking is for the U.S. government to officially disclose to the public the existing laws and procedures surrounding its surveillance programs. A free country does not need to become a surveillance state to maintain public safety and carry out legitimate investigations of criminals online. President Obama and Congress must take a principled stand and heed public calls for a frank and unfettered conversation about what has happened and how to move forward.

Public Surveillance Debate answers SO many questions on government policy regarding liberty, transparency, and law

David **Shipler** June 17th, 20**13**, Graduate of Dartmouth college, Former fellow at the Brookings Institute, Author of latest books are two companion volumes on civil liberties, The Rights of the People: How Our Search for Safety Invades Our Liberties and Rights at Risk: The Limits of Liberty in Modern America, winner of the Pullitzer, "It's Time for a 21st Century Debate on Privacy and Surveillance", http://www.thenation.com/article/its-time-21st-century-debate-privacy-and-surveillance/

If this sounds absurd, we can hope that today's arguments on the forfeiture of privacy in a digital age will someday sound equally ridiculous. The telephone was still a relatively new technology in 1928, as cellphones and the Internet are today, and the law had not yet adjusted to its use. It took thirty-nine years for the Supreme Court to catch up with the times and reverse Olmstead. In Katz v. United States, the Court devised a new test to determine the Fourth Amendment's jurisdiction—"first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,'" as Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in a concurring opinion. Thereafter, wiretaps required warrants. So it may eventually be for the massive collection of cellphone locations, numbers called and received and e-mail addresses (including subject lines)—all of which the National Security Agency has been sweeping up in an effort to map interconnections among the suspicious and the innocent alike—just in case. This "metadata," as it's called, may actually provide a more complete picture of a person's private life than the transcripts of a few phone conversations. President Obama dismissed the collection as a minor intrusion, but it's worth recalling the words of the federal appeals court in the District of Columbia, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in ruling that police had to get a warrant before attaching a GPS device to a vehicle. "A person who knows all of another's travels," the appeals court observed, "can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts." Indeed, in 2011, Democratic Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon rose on the Senate floor to denounce the NSA's collection, which he could not describe because it was classified, by insisting that "when the American people find out how their government has secretly

interpreted the Patriot Act, they will be stunned and they will be angry." Judging by the polls and the debate, it seems that he overestimated the American people. The future judgment about the program—both its constitutionality and cultural acceptance—will turn on how the "expectation of privacy" is defined, for that remains the main test of where the Fourth Amendment's protection begins and ends. The boundaries of privacy have grown very blurry in an age when we practically disrobe at airports, share our inner torments on Facebook and Twitter, don't mind advertisers' following us from website to website and happily allow weather and traffic apps to know where we are at all times. So how do we draw the line between what we want known and what we don't, or whom we want to know it? Is there a difference between giving information to our bank and to the FBI? Between Verizon and the National Security Agency? And if so, what firewalls should be placed between them? What tests should government have to meet to obtain and use information that we find convenient to provide to third parties?

Surveillance Education Key

Surveillance directly affects "all of us", not just one person, debate is key to prove that curtailment is needed and to bring issues to light

Virginia **Eubanks** January 15th, 20**15**, author of Digital Dead End: Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age and co-editor with Alethia Jones and Barbara Smith of Ain't Gonna Let Nobody Turn Me Around: Forty Years of Movement Building with Barbara Smith. She teaches in the Department of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University at Albany, SUNY, and is a fellow at the Rockefeller Institute of Government, "Want to Predict the Future of Surveillance? Ask Poor Communities", http://prospect.org/article/want-predict-future-surveillance-ask-poor-communities

Counterintuitive as it may seem, we are targeted for digital surveillance as groups and communities, not as individuals. Big Brother is watching us, not you. The NSA looks for what they call a "pattern of life," homing in on networks of people associated with a target. But networks of association are not random, and who we know online is affected by offline forms of residential, educational, and occupational segregation. This year, for example, UC San Diego sociologist Kevin Lewis found that online dating leads to fewer interracial connections, compared to offline ways of meeting. Pepper Miller has reported that sometimes, African Americans will temporarily block white Facebook friends so that they can have "open, honest discussions" about race with black friends. Because of the persistence of segregation in our offline and online lives, algorithms and search strings that filter big data looking for patterns, that begin as neutral code, nevertheless end up producing race, class, and gender-specific results. Groups of "like" subjects are then targeted for different, and often unequal, forms of supervision, discipline and surveillance, with marginalized communities singled out for more aggressive scrutiny. Welfare recipients like Dorothy are more vulnerable to surveillance because they are members of a group that is seen as an appropriate target for intrusive programs. Persistent stereotypes of poor women, especially women of color, as inherently suspicious, fraudulent, and wasteful provide ideological support for invasive welfare programs that track their financial and social behavior. Immigrant communities are more likely to be the site of biometric data collection than native-born communities because they have less political power to resist it. As panicked as mainstream America is about the government collecting cellphone meta-data, imagine the hue and cry if police officers scanned the fingerprints of white, middle-class Americans on the street, as has happened to day laborers in Los Angeles, according to the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Marginalized people are in the dubious position of being both on the cutting edge of surveillance, and stuck in its backwaters. Some forms of surveillance, like filmed police interrogations, are undoubtedly positive for poor and working-class communities and racial minorities. But marginalized people are subject to some of the most technologically sophisticated and comprehensive forms of scrutiny and observation in law enforcement, the welfare system, and the low-wage workplace. They also endure higher levels of direct forms of surveillance, such as stop-and-frisk in New York City. The practice of surveillance is both separate and unequal. Acknowledging this reality allows us to challenge mass surveillance based on the 14th Amendment, which provides for equal protection under the law, not just on the 4th Amendment, which protects citizens against unwarranted search and seizure. Surveillance should be seen as a collective issue, a civil rights issue, not just an invasion of privacy.

Surveillance debates are key to discuss not only privacy but also human rights as a whole

Virginia **Eubanks** January 15th, 20**15**, author of Digital Dead End: Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age and co-editor with Alethia Jones and Barbara Smith of Ain't Gonna Let Nobody Turn Me Around: Forty Years of Movement Building with Barbara Smith. She teaches in the Department of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University at Albany, SUNY, and is a fellow at the Rockefeller Institute of Government, "Want to Predict the Future of Surveillance? Ask Poor Communities", http://prospect.org/article/want-predict-future-surveillance-ask-poor-communities

In his Christmas Day address on the U.K.'s Channel 4, Edward Snowden trotted out the hoary old clichés about George Orwell, Big Brother, and the end of privacy. But for most people, privacy is a pipedream. Living in dense urban neighborhoods, public housing, favellas, prisons, or subject to home visits by caseworkers, poor and working people might wish for more personal space, but they don't make Snowden's mistake of assuming that privacy is "what allows us to determine who we are and who we want to be." We need to move away our fixation on privacy and towards a future based on digital human rights. We can take some cues from Brazil, which is currently creating a collaborative, multi-stakeholder "Internet Constitution," the Marco Civil da Internet. The Marco connects digital communication to deeply held democratic values: internationalism, active citizenship, access to information, freedom of expression, democratic governance, civic participation, multilateralism, inclusivity and non-discrimination, plurality, cultural diversity, freedom of speech. The Marco also addresses network neutrality, personal data protection, and, yes, even privacy. But it is not the central issue. Seeing privacy as the cornerstone for democracy is a kind of naiveté we can no longer excuse nor afford. We should care when national governments engage in surveillance of any kind, not just when they spy on us. Shock and outrage are callow luxuries, and the Snowden leaks eliminated our last justification for ignorance. Software designed for authoritarian political aims spawns repressive political environments wherever it is used. Systems tested in low rights environments will, as Dorothy informed me a decade ago, eventually be used on everyone.

We must discuss curtailing surveillance, and "pay attention" to the increasing surveillance occurring now

Virginia **Eubanks** January 15th, 20**15**, author of Digital Dead End: Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age and co-editor with Alethia Jones and Barbara Smith of Ain't Gonna Let Nobody Turn Me Around: Forty Years of Movement Building with Barbara Smith. She teaches in the Department of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University at Albany, SUNY, and is a fellow at the Rockefeller Institute of Government, "Want to Predict the Future of Surveillance? Ask Poor Communities", http://prospect.org/article/want-predict-future-surveillance-ask-poor-communities

Since Edward Snowden started disclosing millions of classified NSA documents in June, terms like metadata, software backdoors, and cybervulnerability have appeared regularly in headlines and sound bites. Many Americans were astonished when these stories broke. In blogs, comment sections, and op-ed pages, they expressed disbelief and outrage. But I wasn't surprised. A decade ago, I sat talking to a young mother on welfare about her experiences with technology. When our conversation turned to Electronic Benefit Transfer cards (EBT), Dorothy* said, "They're great. Except [Social Services] uses them as a tracking device." I must have looked shocked, because she explained that her caseworker routinely looked at her EBT purchase records. Poor women are the test subjects for surveillance technology,

Dorothy told me ruefully, and you should pay attention to what happens to us. You're next. Poor and working-class Americans already live in the surveillance future. The revelations that are so scandalous to the middle-class data profiling, PRISM, tapped cellphones–are old news to millions of low-income Americans, immigrants, and communities of color. To be smart about surveillance in the New Year, we must learn from the experiences of marginalized people in the U.S. and in developing countries the world over. Here are four lessons we might learn if we do.

We have a unique opportunity to debate surveillance in a democratic setting which is necessary to discuss our civil liberties and privacy rights

David **Madine** March 31st, 20**15**, Writer at The Hill, The Hill, premier source for policy and political coverage, reporting on every aspect of the business of Washington and the campaign trail, "Window to debate surveillance policy is closing", http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/237407-window-to-debate-surveillance-policy-is-closing

Third, Congress could hastily pass a bill to reform or replace Section 215. Without a robust drafting process and public debate, this sort of legislation, would likely have legal and practical implications that neither Congress nor the public would fully understand until they were too late to fix. Experience with Section 215 tells us that when Congress legislates in the dark, bad policy follows. If Congress acts now, the American people and their representatives can undertake the public debate that is necessary to craft a new and sensible law that ends the telephony metadata bulk collection program but permits the government to collect the same information – but on a case-by-case basis from the telephone companies – with far less infringement of privacy and civil liberties. It would be a shame for Congress to squander the opportunity to apply a strong dose of democracy to our country's surveillance efforts.

Debate key to Deter Surveillance

This debate round is a form of resistance calling for a decrease in oppressive government surveillance

Virginia **Eubanks** January 15th, 20**15**, author of Digital Dead End: Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age and co-editor with Alethia Jones and Barbara Smith of Ain't Gonna Let Nobody Turn Me Around: Forty Years of Movement Building with Barbara Smith. She teaches in the Department of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University at Albany, SUNY, and is a fellow at the Rockefeller Institute of Government, "Want to Predict the Future of Surveillance? Ask Poor Communities", http://prospect.org/article/want-predict-future-surveillance-ask-poor-communities

Resistance to surveillance is as common as surveillance itself. "There is always a cross-section of the population working to trick the system," explains John Gilliom, co-author of *SuperVision: An Introduction to the Surveillance*. "Whether it's a college kid getting a fake ID, or the middle class family hiding a little bit of cash income to lower its tax bill, or the food-stamp recipient hiding an extra roommate. We often call this fraud or cheating, but something this widespread is more than misbehavior. It is resistance."

"Data is the new oil. Beyond collecting information, it also means gathering power," argues Joana Varon Ferraz, researcher from the Center of Technology and Society at Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, "Every government has become dataholic." Dataholic political and commercial systems foster defiance. We don't necessarily resist because we've done something wrong. We resist because surveillance is not just about privacy; it is about power, control, self-determination and autonomy.

If people remain concerned about the impact of surveillance on their lives they may voluntarily withdraw from the digital world. Gilliom suggests we might even see "a hipster social trend where disengagement becomes a form of cache." But digital disconnection can simply be an excuse for maintaining ignorance; many people don't have the option to disengage. For example, public assistance applicants must sign a personal information disclosure statement to permit social services to share their social security number, criminal history, personal, financial, medical and family information with other public agencies and private companies. Technically, you can refuse to sign and withhold your social security number. But if you do not sign, you cannot access food stamps, transportation vouchers, cash assistance, childcare, emergency housing assistance, and other basic necessities for survival, or even talk to a caseworker about available community resources.

There are alternatives to disengagement. Brazil and Germany introduced a joint resolution to the UN condemning the member countries of what is unofficially known as the Five Eyes Alliance—the U.S., U.K., New Zealand, Canada, and Australia—for massive electronic surveillance and infringement of human rights. The EU is developing a General Data Protection Regulation that would unify data protection under a single European law. The BRICS cable, a 21,000 mile, 12.8 Terabyte per second fiber system connecting Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and Miami—is creating an alternative data pipeline to lower the cost of communication among major economies of the global south and provide non-U.S. routes for world communications.

Answers to the dilemmas we face in the surveillance society are not likely to come from Silicon Valley or Washington. This year, the Obama administration was put in the position of defending the National Security Administration's snooping while stumping for a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights that boosts security for online shoppers. It is still unclear how President Obama will respond to his Review Group on

Intelligence and Communications Technologies' report calling to terminate the storage of bulk data collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

We need Debates about Government surveillance because they are necessary to address concerns about current and future uses of surveillance technology

Doug **Mataconis**, April 20**13**, B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University and J.D. from George Mason University School of Law, http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/a-camera-on-every-corner-the-surveillance-debate-after-boston/

Additionally, it's important to note that there are virtually no Constitutional issues raised by the use of surveillance cameras in public places, whether they are maintained by the government or by private entities (although private entities are not covered by the Bill of Rights). Courts have long held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public place, which makes sense when you think about it. If a police officer observes you committing a crime in public, they have a right to arrest you on the spot so it makes sense that video evidence of that crime captured by a surveillance camera would be accepted as evidence in court, so long as the cameras proper operation and related matters are sufficiently established in court. The concern about surveillance cameras, though, isn't so much about the fact that they exist, there's nothing we can do about that now, or the way they are used in cases such as the one now pending in Boston where they are used to crack cases, it's about how they are used or may be used in the future. For example, as the linked article notes there are about 150 cameras operated by government authorities in Boston, by contrast there are more than 3,000 such cameras in New York City, most of them in the downtown/midtown area of Manhattan where attacks are believed to be most likely. According to some reports, many of those cameras are part of a system that is so advanced that it can detect when someone in Times Square leaves a package unattended and walks away and independently notifies law enforcement of the potential threat. Admittedly, that's actually a very useful piece of technology if the reports are true. However, the question that remains unanswered is what else these cameras can do. Can they track individual people as they go about their day in public, for example? Have they ever been used for that purpose outside of the context of a specific criminal investigation? And, most importantly, how will this technology be used in the future when things like facial recognition technology become far more accurate? As I said above, there aren't any specific Constitutional issues that are raised by the presence of surveillance cameras, be they public or private. However, **the uses that** this **technology could be put to in the future should raise concern**s for all of us. There was a time when one could walk the streets of a major American city with some degree of anonymity. Those times are vanishing quickly, and I'm not sure that's a good thing.

Discussion is needed to decide whether or not the USFG's surveillance programs are intrusive or useful

Rebecca **Shabad** 20**13**, The Hill, premier source for policy and political coverage, reporting on every aspect of the business of Washington and the campaign trail, "Hillary Clinton urges a 'comprehensive discussion' about NSA surveillance", http://thehill.com/policy/technology/188130-hillary-clinton-urges-comprehensive-discussion-about-nsa

Hillary Clinton says the U.S. government needs to have a 'comprehensive discussion' about the scope of the National Security Agency's surveillance program. "Trying to go up to the line of what is appropriate surveillance and security measures, and not over the line is something we need to have a full comprehensive discussion about," the former secretary of state said at Colgate University in Upstate New York Friday evening. Her comments come at the end of a week consumed in reports claiming the NSA spied on American allies abroad. Stories largely based on documents NSA leaker Edward Snowden provided to journalists said the U.S. has monitored phone calls of French citizens and may have tapped German Chancellor Angela Merkel's cell phone. The White House, however, denied the report regarding France and said the U.S. isn't and will not monitor Merkel's communications. Officials did not say whether such activity previously happened. "I think people have a right to complain if they've gone over the line," Clinton said, while adding NSA's activities have proven useful in intelligence gathering. The public should have the right to know about those operations, she said, but she also warned the U.S. doesn't want to reveal enough that would alert its enemies. "I think everybody now says, 'We have to make sure we're not going too far,' and that's a discussion that has to happen in a calm atmosphere," she said. In addition to Clinton's Colgate lecture, she recently spoke at the University of Buffalo this week, and at Hamilton College—both of which are also based in Upstate New York.

Debates on surveillance are needed to grasp the concepts of whether or not the Federal government is correct, and to understand the meaning of privacy in our age
Washington University 20**13,** University in St. Louis, Privacy and Surveillance' roundtable discussion to address history, meaning of privacy, http://news.wustl.edu/news/Pages/26147.aspx

When former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden exposed classified information about widespread government surveillance programs, he launched a public debate about privacy in the digital age. Is privacy a "right"? What are we willing to sacrifice for privacy? How consistent are our beliefs about privacy and how consistently do we "practice" it. In response to these types of questions, Washington University in St. Louis **experts on privacy issues, ranging from the history of privacy to privacy law, will participate in a roundtable discussion**, titled "Privacy and Surveillance," from noon to 2 p.m. Wednesday, Nov. 20, in Anheuser-Busch Hall, Bryan Cave Moot Courtroom. The Interdisciplinary Project in the Humanities (IPH) in Arts & Sciences and Arts & Sciences are co-sponsoring the discussion, which is free and open to the public. Joe Loewenstein, PhD, director of IPH and professor of English, believes the humanities are especially suited to address the complex issues surrounding privacy and surveillance. "The humanities have a real grip on what's vivid and, well, dangerous in life around us; privacy is very much our topic," Loewenstein said. "This discussion is a good opportunity to remind the St. Louis community, our university colleagues, and, especially, our students that there's a long history of meditation on privacy, that the tradition of thinking on this topic is long, volatile and complicated." The discussion will begin with the political and theoretical beginnings of thinking about privacy and move to contemporary questions surrounding Internet surveillance. In addition to discussing the negative aspects of privacy violation, experts will offer perspectives on the potential benefits of surveillance. For example, faculty will describe literary studies suggesting that repressive situations often spur rather than inhibit creativity. Other topics to be discussed include feminist critiques of certain types of privacy and the ethics of scholarship. "I think it's important that serious intellectual communities like ours should not treat a complex concept like privacy as simple or stable. We can't assume that when I speak of privacy, what you hear is what I mean. Above all, we need to recognize that

privacy is not an unmitigated and simple good," Lowenstein said. "One of the pleasures of being at a university is that we don't have to deal in sound bites."

Surveillance Debates are needed to address the effects that government surveillance has on everyday life, public space and to be educated on that

Jason W. **Patton 2000**, Department of Science and Technology Studies, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, "Protecting privacy in public? Surveillance technologies and the value of public places", http://www.its.ohiou.edu/bernt/ITS351/protecting%20privacy%20in%20public%20spaces.pdf

While maintaining the importance of privacy for critical evaluations of surveillance technologies, I suggest that privacy also constrains the debate by framing analyses in terms of the individual. Public space provides a site for considering what is at stake with surveillance technologies besides privacy. After describing two accounts of privacy and one of public space, I argue that surveillance technologies simultaneously add an ambiguity and a specificity to public places that are detrimental to the social, cultural, and civic importance of these places. By making public places accessible to other places and/or times, surveillance technologies make these social contexts ambiguous by blurring their spatial and temporal bounds. At the same time, surveillance technologies valence public places in functionally specific ways that are detrimental to informal civic life. To complement defensive approaches to surveillance technologies based on individual privacy, I conclude by suggesting how sociality as a relational value or an ethics of place as a contextual value could provide a proactive line of reasoning for affirming the value of that which is between people and places.

With a changing world new debate is needed to determine how the government should honor citizens' constitutional rights, while still protecting the country

Gigi **Alford and** Llana **Ulman** 20**13**, Senior Program Officer and Advisor at the Freedom House, Human Rights Organization, "Private Data, Secret Surveillance, and the Need for Public Debate", https://freedomhouse.org/blog/private-data-secret-surveillance-and-need-public-debate#.VbuO2PlVikp

Almost as troubling as the recent revelations about the U.S. government's sweeping collection and analysis of the personal information of law-abiding internet and phone users are the inadequate "just trust us" response to the outrage and the administration's lack of decisive action to regain the faith of a tense American public and wary netizens abroad. Under the U.S. constitution, citizens are guaranteed protection from unreasonable searches and seizures by their government. Violent events, such as the Boston Marathon bombings, leave no question about the serious need for strong security measures. However, maintaining an appropriate balance between security and privacy requires constant public vigilance. Any state surveillance of personal communications is an intrusion into the private domain. While exceptional circumstances may render this intrusion necessary and justified, it is only permissible when associated with a targeted investigation, conducted according to a court-supervised and transparent process, and guided by fundamental human rights principles. Freedom House outlined its views on this subject last week in its oral statement at the UN Human Rights Council session on freedom

of expression. Unfortunately, it appears that the requirements for permissible surveillance were not met in the instances of secret U.S. court orders that have recently come to light—both the large-scale seizure of Verizon customers' metadata and the secret internet data collection operation code-named PRISM—which appear to involve incredibly broad data gathering and storage by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These examples raise concerns that current legal and judicial protections are no longer sufficient to prevent government spying from creeping into the private lives of law-abiding individuals. Technology has evolved significantly, with new applications and means of communication being developed on an almost daily basis, including new modalities for surveillance. These changes demand public debate and consensus on new limits and laws to prevent the abuse of novel technologies.

Strong debate is key to find the best solution in surveillance policy, and to determine the truth of government surveillance (spill the beans on the USFG policies)

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The Electronic Frontier Foundation, one of the most vocal advocacy groups opposing government surveillance of Americans, applauded the White House proposal yesterday, but endorsed the FREEDOM Act. The EFF called it "a giant step forward" and said it was a more favorable proposal than the president's or another introduced by the House Intelligence Committee yesterday. "Or better still, we urge the Administration to simply decide that it will stop misusing section 215 of the Patriot Act and section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act and Executive Order 12333 and whatever else it is secretly relying on to stop mass spying," said EFF legal director Cindy Cohn and EFF legislative analyst Mark M. Jaycox. "The executive branch does not need congressional approval to stop the spying; nothing Congress has done compels it to engage in bulk collection. It could simply issue a new Executive Order requiring the NSA to stop." The president's proposal would end the NSA's collection and storage of phone data; those records would remain with the providers and the NSA would require judicial permission under a new court order to access those records. The House bill, however, requires no prior judicial approval; a judge would rule on the request after the FBI submits it to the telecommunications company. "It's absolutely crucial to understand the details of how these things will work," the ACLU's Kaufman said in reference to the "new court order" mentioned in the New York Times report. "There is no substitute for robust Democratic debate in the court of public opinion and in the courts. The system of oversight is broke and issues like these need to be debated in public." Phone metadata and dragnet collection of digital data from Internet providers and other technology companies is supposed to be used to map connections between foreigners suspected of terrorism and threatening the national security of the U.S. The NSA's dragnet, however, also swept up communication involving Americans that is supposed to be collected and accessed only with a court order. The NSA stood by claims that the program was effective in stopping hundreds of terror plots against U.S. interests domestic and foreign. Those numbers, however, quickly were lowered as they were challenged by Congressional committees and public scrutiny. "The president said the effectiveness of this program was one of the reasons it was in place," Kaufman said. "But as soon as these claims were made public, journalists, advocates and the courts pushed back and it could not withstand the scrutiny. It's remarkable how quickly [the number of] plots turned into small numbers. The NSA was telling FISC the program was absolutely necessary to

national security, but the government would not go nearly that far in defending the program. That shows the value of public debate and an adversarial process in courts."

Debate is needed to reduce the large amount of abusive surveillance occurring in this country

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We can intuit the shape of surveillance-to-come by keeping an eye on developing countries, as well as exploring its impacts on marginalized communities here in the United States. The most sweeping digital surveillance technologies are designed and tested in what could be called "low rights environments"— poor communities, repressive social programs, dictatorial regimes, and military and intelligence operations—where there are low expectations of political accountability and transparency. Drones that deliver Hellfire missiles, Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs) that send pain-inducing tones over long distances, and stun cuffs that deliver 80,000 volts to detainees via remote control allow users to avoid direct responsibility for the human suffering they cause. Many of these technologies are first developed for the U.S. military to deploy in the global south, and later tested for civilian purposes on marginal communities in the United States. LRADs, for example, were developed by San Diego-based military contractor American Technology Corporation in response to the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, and then famously used to disburse G20 protestors in Pittsburgh in 2009. Technologies designed for the military carry expectations about the dangerousness of the public, and can be used over-aggressively in community policing and crowd control. To a technology designed for counter-terrorism, everyone looks like a bad guy. Then there is the digital side of things. "Law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, and militaries invest in Trojans, bad software, malicious network attacks and other things that we normally associate with heavy criminality," says Amelia Andersdotter, member of the European Parliament and the Swedish Pirate Party, which is dedicated to reforming copyright and patent laws. "No one is obliged to inform users of security flaws or to fix vulnerabilities." In fact, as the Guardian and The New York Times reported in September, the NSA spends $250 million a year to work with technology companies to make commercial software—including encryption software—more "exploitable." Insecure by design, this software is passed on to business and the public sector. A standard of design liability—already common for architects—might work to hold software producers accountable. Presently, we mandate penalties for vendors that fail to security test their software in the airline and shipping industries, but not in other crucial areas: healthcare, nuclear plants, electricity grids. Andersdotter suggests that design liability regulations could hold software companies liable for not disclosing security flaws, responsible for damages they cause, and obliged to help users fix problems. But this solution may pose more questions than it settles: Who will administer the standards if software vendors and national governments are already subverting data-security requirements? How much transparency is possible when data holdings are centralized by commercial entities like Google, or by state entities, as in Brazil's proposed national data centers?

The USFG is tracking your every movement, debate is needed to become aware of this and to deter surveillance of the future

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By the time you read this, President Obama will probably have finished his speech outlining some changes to the NSA's global information vacuum. According to early reports, he'll propose creating an independent body to hold the phone metadata that the NSA gathers, and forcing the agency to get some kind of approval (presumably from the FISA court) before accessing it. Which is all fine and good. But the real question is whether we set up procedures and systems that constrain the NSA from doing not just what we already know about, but the things we haven't yet heard of, and even more importantly, the kinds of surveillance that will become possible in the future. Just today, we learned from the Guardian that "The National Security Agency has collected almost 200 million text messages a day from across the globe, using them to extract data including location, contact networks, and credit-card details, according to top-secret documents." I can't imagine that will be the last revelation from the documents obtained by Edward Snowden. Do you find that disturbing? If not, imagine what it's going to look like ten or twenty years from now.

Predicting the development of technology is often difficult to do accurately, but we can be almost positive that in the very near future there will dramatically more information about you being collected than there is today. Your phone metadata is nothing compared to what will be gathered. There will be reasonable justifications for every step along the way, of course, ways in which each new advancement in the technology enhances your life. For instance, eventually the idea of using a piece of metal with grooves cut into it in order to get into your house will seem like a quaint anachronism, and that will be more convenient, since you won't have to carry your keys anymore. Once you have some kind of biometric entry system, it will be linked to other systems in your home that will constantly be producing data about where you go and what you do. You think Google bought Nest because it's interested in temperature adjustment and smoke detection? Of course not. Google is interested in data, and data about what happens in your home—when you come and go, when you're awake and asleep, what kinds of energy you use—that's a growth area.

Your phone tracks your movements, and future phones will monitor much more. There's a network of surveillance technologies, including but not limited to security cameras, that grows more dense and sophisticated with each passing year. Law enforcement agencies across the country use license plate scanners that can monitor everyone who drives on certain roads. These kinds of technologies will be integrated with improved face-recognition software, all powered by increasingly capable computers with the capacity to store, sort, and analyze the huge quantities of data produced. If you want to live as a participant in the modern world—having a smartphone, using the Internet, going out in public—you are already being tracked, and tomorrow you'll be tracked more closely than you are today, your every step leaving bits of data that can be gathered together and reconstructed to learn more about you than you could possibly want corporations or the government to know. And make no mistake: the NSA wants every bit of it. There is no piece of surveillance data that couldn't at least potentially be used to catch a terrorist or stop a plot, so they'll always be able to say (with complete sincerity, by the way), that they

only want to protect national security, and the more information they have about all of us, the easier it will be. So making sure that some semblance of privacy is protected in the future will take a hell of a lot more than sectioning off cell phone metadata. That's a start. But it's only a start.